CHAPTER XXVI.

MINOR EVENTS IN MARCH.

Having briefly narrated in the last chapter the progress of Sir Colin

Campbell’s army in Oude, from the beginning towards the close of March;

it now becomes expedient to watch the operations of those military

officers who, during the same month, were engaged in services in other

parts of India. The achievements were not so great in magnitude or

notoriety, but they do not the less require to be noticed: seeing that

they illustrate the state of feeling among the native population, the

fluctuations of fortune among the rebels, and the struggles of British

officers amid great difficulties.

As in former chapters, there will be a convenience in beginning with the

Calcutta regions, and transferring attention successively to the west,

northwest, and southwest.

The Anglo-Indian capital was shorn of somewhat of its splendour during

the spring months, by the absence of the governor-general at Allahabad;

but in truth this was a secondary matter; for it was not a time for

levees, gaieties, or vice-regal presentations and splendour. Calcutta

experienced a panic so late in the history of the mutiny as the 3d of

March—one of many to which a somewhat excitable population had been

exposed. A telegraphic message was received from Barrackpore, to the

effect that the sepoys of two native regiments at that station—the 2d

and the 23d B. N. I.—were deserting in bodies of ten or twelve; and that

the deserters were supposed to be making their way to Calcutta. The

officers of the volunteer guards were at once requested to send pickets

to certain unprotected buildings in Calcutta. Very speedily these

pickets were told off; cavalry patrolled the streets all night; the

artillerymen remained watchful within the fort; and the English troops

present were kept under arms. The rumour proved to have been greatly

exaggerated, and the suspected danger passed away—but not without

causing much trepidation among the unwarlike portion of the Calcutta

community.

So numerous were the European troops that arrived at Calcutta during the

winter, and so obvious the necessity for increasing the strength of that

branch of the army in India, that preparations were made for

accommodating them within easy reach of the capital. Barrackpore,

although well supplied with sepoy lines, had never held European troops

in large number. It was now resolved, instead of building new European

barracks at that place, to increase those at Chinsura. This town, about

twenty miles from Calcutta, on the banks of the Hoogly, had already a

fine European barrack and military hospital, in a very healthy spot.

About the month of March, many hundred men were set to work, to increase

the barrack accommodation to a level with the wants of five thousand

European troops, and to raze all the buildings within five hundred yards

on all sides, to form parade-grounds, &c.

In the regions north and east of Calcutta, the materials for rebellion

were pretty nearly exhausted. There had from the first been only a small

amount of disturbance in those districts; and it became gradually

evident that the town and village population were desirous of continuing

their peaceful avocations, uninterrupted by mutinous sepoys or fanatical

Mohammedans.

It was in many ways fortunate that the recently acquired province of

Pegu had remained peaceful during the dangerous periods of the mutiny.

Had revolt or treason been at work in that quarter, the embarrassment of

the government would have been seriously aggravated. Disturbances, it is

true, did take place; but they were not of such magnitude as to give

occasion for alarm. This was mainly owing to the policy of the King of

Burmah. We had taken from him a rich province, a slice out of his

empire, by a mingled course of war and politics; and he was no more

likely to be content with that result than any other defeated monarch.

But he was a shrewd observant man; he measured the power of England, and

saw reason to believe that he would weaken rather than strengthen

himself by any hostility at this time. There were not wanting those near

him who urged him to a different policy. Burmah, like other countries,

had its war-party, who kept up a spirit of bitterness towards the

British. This party was headed by the king’s brother, and by many of the

old dispossessed Burman officials of Pegu. There is reason to believe

that, had the strength of the rebels in Oude remained much longer

unbroken, the King of Burmah might have been drawn or driven into

hostility in spite of himself. Whenever news came over from the opposite

side of the Bay of Bengal, the Mohammedans resident in Burmah made the

most of such parts of it as indicated a decline of the English ‘raj,’

and gave strength to a feeling among the Burmese which the king might

not much longer have been able to resist. In the early part of 1857

there were four European regiments in Pegu; but the urgent demands from

India had led to the withdrawal of all these, except a wing of the 2d

Madras Europeans at Toungoo, and a few of H.M. 29th at Thayetmyo; and

even of native Madras troops in Pegu, the number was but small. There

was a time, in the autumn of that year, when the war-party might have

wrought serious mischief to British interests; but when steam-frigates,

corvettes, gun-boats, and regiments from various quarters began to shew

themselves at Rangoon or in the Irrawaddy, or were known to be passing

up the Bay towards Calcutta, the chances were altered. Instead of

fighting, the king did a much wiser thing, whether from humane or from

politic motives—he subscribed ten thousand rupees towards the Mutiny

Relief Fund.

West and southwest of Calcutta, in a part of India very imperfectly

known to Europeans, tranquillity was occasionally disturbed, not so much

by mutinous sepoys, as by ambitious chieftains desirous of strengthening

themselves in a time of anarchy and uncertain allegiance. In the region

around Chyabassa, many petty occurrences from time to time kept the few

Europeans in anxiety. There were not many rebel sepoys in that quarter,

it is true; but, on the other hand, there were few troops of any kind to

aid Captain Moncrieff, the senior assistant-commissioner. A semi-savage

tribe, called Coles or Koles, infested the neighbourhood. On the 25th of

March, three thousand of these Coles, with a medley of guns, muskets,

and native weapons of all kinds, assembled at Chuckerderpore, where

Moncrieff had a small camp of marines and two guns; they were, however,

dispersed by a mere handful of men, and three of their guns taken. This

district was kept in an agitated state mainly by the machinations of a

turbulent chieftain, the Rajah of Porahat.

Let us advance, however, to those regions where the audacity of the

insurgents was more seriously felt—the regions of the Middle Ganges and

the Lower Jumna. The Lower Ganges, between Calcutta and Dinapoor,

remained peacefully in the hands of cultivators and traders, who were

glad enough to be free from the visitations of fighting-men; but from

Dinapoor upwards the sources of discordance were numerous. A few

mutineers lurked about, aided by a much larger proportion of desperate

characters, who took service under chieftains (mostly Mohammedan) bent

upon increasing their own power at the expense of the British.

The Azimghur district, nearly north of Benares, became in March the

scene of a conflict which certainly gave a triumph for a time to the

enemy, although it was favourable to the British in the first instance.

This conflict took place on the 21st at Atrowlia, between a body of

insurgents on the one side, and a small force under Colonel Millman of

H.M. 37th, commandant of the Azimghur field-force. Being in camp at

Koelsa, he received information from Mr Davies, magistrate of Azimghur,

that a considerable body of mutineers was in the neighbourhood of

Atrowlia, a place about twenty-five miles from that city. The colonel

immediately set out, with about 260 infantry, cavalry, and gunners, and

two pieces of ordnance—his troops being British and Madrasses. At

daybreak on the 22d, he espied the enemy—chiefly sepoys of the Dinapoor

brigade, who had followed the fortunes of Koer Singh—posted in several

topes of mango-trees. His infantry of the 37th, his Madras cavalry under

Colonel Cumberlege, and his two guns, speedily discomfited the enemy and

put them to flight; but his day’s work was not ended. While his men were

halting in the neighbourhood of Atrowlia, and breakfast was being

prepared among the topes of trees, news was suddenly brought that the

rebels were advancing in great force. Millman, immediately proceeding

with some skirmishers to ascertain their strength, found them strongly

posted behind a mud-wall, in the midst of topes of trees and

sugar-canes. He sent back orders for his troops to advance; but the

enemy increased in number so rapidly, that he could not contend against

them; he retired slowly from Atrowlia to his camp at Koelsa, followed by

the enemy, who fired at a distance, and endeavoured to turn his flanks.

He made one dash with his cavalry; but news, or at least a rumour,

reaching the camp, that no fewer than 5000 rebels were approaching, such

a panic was created among his camp-followers, that many of the

hackery-drivers left their carts, and all the cooks ran away. The

colonel, perplexed both by his foes and his camp-followers, and

conscious that his camp was untenable in case of a night-attack, and

that adequate supplies would be wanting for his men—deemed it expedient

to retreat to Azimghur, which he did the same day. He was compelled to

abandon a portion of his tents and baggage, which fell into the hands of

the enemy.

This was a vexatious and serious discomfiture. It told unfavourably in

two directions; for while it paralysed the exertions of the few British

officers and troops in that region, it afforded to the rebels an excuse

for vaunting abroad their prowess and success. The natives, inexplicable

in character to Europeans, were often incredulous to rumours of defeat

among their own countrymen; but rumours on the other side spread among

them with astounding rapidity, encouraging them to schemes of resistance

which they might possibly otherwise have avoided.

It was a natural consequence of the withdrawal from Atrowlia, and the

retreat to Azimghur, that the last-named station should itself become

imperiled; for a wide range of country was thus left wholly at the mercy

of Koer Singh and his associates. The British in Azimghur proceeded to

intrench themselves within the jail, which was surrounded by a deep

ditch; and every man was set to work to strengthen the fortifications.

The rebels gradually approached, to the number of four or five thousand;

and then the small garrison was fairly besieged—all the rest of the city

being in the hands of the insurgents. A messenger was despatched to

Benares on the 26th, to announce the state of affairs; but all that the

authorities at that place could do, on the spur of the moment, was to

send fifty dragoons in carts, drawn by bullocks and pushed on by

coolies. A telegraphic message was at the same time sent to Allahabad;

consequent upon which a wing of H.M. 13th foot, and the depôt of the 2d,

started off to Benares, for service at that place or at Azimghur. There

was a rumour that Koer Singh intended to attack Ghazeepore or Benares,

or both, on his way from Azimghur to Arrah; and this rumour led to much

entreaty for aid to the threatened stations.

It will hereafter be seen that Azimghur needed the care of Sir Colin

Campbell. Meanwhile we may notice the state of affairs in a district

somewhat further north.

The neighbourhood of Goruckpore was the scene of a contest early in

March. At that time there were assembled about 200 men of the naval

brigade, under Captain Sotheby, 200 Bengal yeomanry cavalry, 900

Goorkhas, a few Sikhs and four guns—under Colonel Rowcroft. This motley

but stanch garrison was attacked on the 5th in great force by several

influential rebels, who had with them an army of 12,000 men, including

3500 sepoys of mutinied Bengal regiments. Between eight o’clock and

noon, Rowcroft not only defeated this greatly superior force, but chased

the enemy seven miles, nearly to their encampment at Bilwa or Belwar.

The enemy lost 400 or 500 in killed and wounded, eight guns, and much

ammunition. Among the leaders of the rebels were the Nazim Mahomed

Hussein, Rajah Dabie Buksh of Gonda, the Rajah of Churdah, and Mehndee

Ali Hussein, who were all mounted on elephants. This victory was a very

fortunate one; for not only was Goruckpore saved from being a second

time overrun by insurgents, but Colonel Rowcroft received news that many

thousand villagers on the banks of the Gogra were ready to rise in

rebellion if he had been defeated. This kind of peril was constantly

impressed on the minds of the British officers; the consequences of a

disaster were always more than they could safely calculate.

A defeat was experienced by a small force in the Allahabad district

towards the close of March, owing to the want of due information

concerning the position and strength of the enemy. Two companies of H.M.

54th, a hundred Sikhs, a few Madras cavalry, and two guns, went out to

attack some rebels at a place called Suraon, between Allahabad and

Gopeegunje. Insufficiently informed of the locality, the force came

suddenly to a spot surrounded by a jungle, in which a large body of

rebels were concealed. Much to the astonishment of the magistrate of the

district, those rebels possessed six pieces of artillery; a fire was

opened, which wrought much mischief to the British force, and eventually

compelled it to retreat. This was a small affair, but it rendered the

authorities uneasy; for it shewed that within a few hours of Allahabad,

where the governor-general had temporarily taken up his quarters, there

were not only insurgents ready for mischief, but that those insurgents,

in some way and from some source not easily accounted for, had possessed

themselves of artillery.

Jung Bahadoor’s participation in the later stages of the siege of

Lucknow was noticed in the last chapter. He had entered Oude from the

east; and shortly before his junction with Sir Colin, his advanced

division had a sharp engagement with a force of the enemy, which may

briefly be noticed here. Captain Plowden was in charge of this division;

and under him were a few English and many Nepaulese officers, commanding

the Goorkha regiments of which the division consisted. Having received

information that the Nazim Mahomed Hussein, with a force of 4000 men,

intended to dispute the passage of Jung Bahadoor’s army at the road to

Lucknow over the Kandoo Nuddee, Captain Plowden prepared to contest the

matter with him. His division consisted of seven Goorkha regiments,

about 4000 strong, with thirteen guns. On the morning of the 5th of

March, he found the enemy drawn up in detached parties near the bridge;

he opened fire with his guns, and then charged with infantry in line.

His progress was much disturbed by an intervening space of bush-jungle

and deep ravines; nevertheless his Goorkhas charged resolutely, drove

back the enemy at all points, pursued them for two or three miles,

killed 600 of their number, and captured a gun—without losing more than

17 in killed and wounded. Captain Plowden, in his dispatch, told how he

had been aided by the Nepaulese General Khurruk Bahadoor, the two

brigadiers Junga Doje and Run Sing Bahadoor, Colonel Teela Bickrum Singh

Tappah, and other officers whose names present a formidable appearance.

The Nepaulese army pursued its way to Lucknow, and rendered a small

amount of assistance. When their services had terminated at that city,

Jung Bahadoor took a few of the best regiments with him to Allahabad, on

his expedition to an interview with the governor-general; but the main

body of his army marched off _viâ_ Nawabgunge, on the Fyzabad route,

towards the Nepaul and Goruckpore frontier. Whether Jung Bahadoor was

negotiating with Lord Canning concerning the price at which the services

of the Goorkhas were to be purchased; or whether any project was afoot

for transferring some of the Goorkha regiments formally to the British

service—was not made publicly known; but it was understood that the main

Nepaulese force would remain near Nawabgunge until after the interview

between the two great personages.

Of the wildly excited province of Oude, it is scarcely necessary to say

much here. The great event of the month, the siege of Lucknow, has

already been recorded; the other parts of the province were still almost

wholly in the hands of the insurgents. It will, however, contribute

towards an understanding of the state of the province in March, if we

advert to a few facts concerning the temporary occupants of the city of

Lucknow, and the arrangements made by Sir Colin affecting his army.

First, a word or two concerning the soldiery. It would be quite

impossible to say which regiments of the Queen’s army rendered most

service or behaved most valiantly; but the defence of Lucknow had been

so extraordinary in its character, that the government deemed it right

to notice specially the courage and fortitude of the 32d

infantry—Inglis’s main prop during his defence of the Residency from the

1st of July till the arrival of Havelock and Outram near the end of

September. There was put forth an announcement to the effect that ‘her

Majesty, in consideration of the enduring fortitude and persevering

gallantry displayed in defence of the Residency at Lucknow, has been

graciously pleased to command that the 32d be clothed, equipped, and

trained as a light infantry regiment, from the 26th of February 1858.

Her Majesty has also been pleased to command that the word “Lucknow”

shall be borne on the regimental colour of the 32d light infantry, in

commemoration of the enduring fortitude and persevering gallantry

displayed in the defence of the Residency of Lucknow for eighty-seven

days.’ Many of the other royal regiments had borne more fighting in the

open field; but none equalled the 32d in long enduring privation and

heroism, owing to the extraordinary circumstances in which the regiment

had been placed.

Next, concerning the city itself, the place which had undergone so

strange a series of sieges and defences. In Lucknow, after the

recapture, the shopkeepers gradually returned, opened their places of

business, and resumed commercial dealings. Many parts of the city had

been so battered by shot and shell that the buildings were scarcely

habitable; but as this only occurred to a small extent in the trading

streets, there was little interruption on that ground to the return of

the inhabitants. The chief obstacles were—the complicity of many of the

towns-people in the proceedings of the mutineers, and the impoverishment

of others by several days of fighting, anarchy, and plunder. The troops

destined for the defence of the city were quartered in some among the

many palaces, not so much battered by cannonading as the others. A clear

space was formed around the Kaiser Bagh, by the demolition of small

buildings; and operations were made for opening a wide street or avenue

entirely through the city, from the iron bridge to the canal—strategic

precautions, intended to give the garrison control over the city in case

of a turbulent rising. Precautions were in truth still necessary.

Lucknow had contained more ruffians, more desperate characters ready for

any lawless enterprises, than most other cities in India; and the

British authorities felt by no means certain that the lurking-places in

the narrow streets were yet cleared of them. The officers bore in mind,

with regret and resentment, that two of their companions had been

murdered in the city when the siege might have been deemed fairly over.

These two were Lieutenants Cape and Thackwell. They rode from the camp

into the city, but for what purpose was not clearly known to their

companions. They got off their horses, tied them to a doorpost, and went

into a house. It is supposed that budmashes, prowling about, shot them;

but the only certainty is that, when some of the Madras fusiliers went

out to search for them, the headless trunks of the two unfortunate

officers were all that remained to reveal the secret of their fate.

The details given in the last chapter will have rendered evident the

fact that the escape of the rebels from Lucknow after the siege was far

more complete than the English public had expected or wished. How far it

disappointed those immediately responsible, no one but themselves knew.

A secrecy enveloped the plans of the commander-in-chief; he told just so

much as he wished to be known, and kept the rest to himself, or shared

it with the governor-general. Whether foreseen or not, however, the

escape of the rebels was very marked and significant. Sir Hope Grant and

other cavalry leaders endeavoured to check them, but the check was of

small account; in truth, the cavalry were too few for a belt of country

so wide. When the fact became indisputably clear that the main body of

insurgents had got away, the question arose—whither? The camping-grounds

of the fugitive rebels were very imperfectly known to the British

authorities. It was supposed, but on uncertain information, that, at the

end of the month of March, Nena Sahib was at Bareilly, with 2000 men,

and many members of his family; that the Begum of Oude was at Khyrabad,

with nearly 10,000 men; that 2000 more were near Shahjehanpoor; and that

Khan Bahadoor Khan was concocting some scheme of operations with the

Nena, having Rohilcund for its theatre. These were the suppositions,

founded on vague data.

One thing Sir Colin speedily decided on. It was useless to keep a fine

army at Lucknow, while so much serious work had to be done elsewhere. As

already mentioned, he broke up his ‘army of Oude’ into separate

portions. Jung Bahadoor having taken his departure with his nine

thousand Nepaulese, the commander-in-chief proceeded to organise columns

or divisions for special service in various directions. On the 29th of

March Sir Colin issued a general order, pointing to the forthcoming

duties of these portions of the army. The 5th and 78th regiments were to

march from the Alum Bagh to Cawnpore. The artillery at the Alum Bagh was

to be divided, some to return to the camp at Lucknow, the rest to join

the 5th regiment. The troops to be left at Lucknow were to be formed

into a division under Sir Hope Grant. This was to comprise H.M. 20th,

28th, 33d, 53d, 90th, and 93d infantry, the 2d Dragoon Guards, three

Punjaub regiments of horse, and various detachments of artillery and

engineers, with Brigadiers W. Campbell and Barker as subordinate

commanders. Sir Edward Lugard was to form and command a division to be

called the ‘Azimghur Field-force,’ to consist of H.M. 10th regiment,

various detachments of cavalry, artillery, and engineers, and whatever

troops might at that time be in the Azimghur district. The infantry of

this force was to form a brigade under Brigadier Douglas; and the

destination was the district from which the force was named—a district,

as we have lately seen, greatly endangered by the presence of a large

rebel force. Indeed, so urgent was the need for aid in that quarter,

that Lugard started off at once. Another division, for service in

Rohilcund, was placed under the command of General Walpole. It comprised

H.M. 42d, 79th, and 93d infantry, two battalions of the Rifle Brigade,

the 1st Bengal Europeans, two regiments of native infantry, H.M. 7th

Hussars and 9th Lancers, three regiments of Punjaub cavalry, the Naval

Brigade from H.M. steamer _Shannon_, and various detachments of

artillery and engineers. Everything portended that this division would

have hot work before it—hot both in the common and the figurative sense;

for the powerful sun of the month of April would soon pour down on the

heads of the troops; while it was quite certain that Rohilcund contained

a large number of mutinied sepoys, rebel leaders, and desperate men

ready for any deeds of violence and anarchy.

It may here suitably be mentioned, that Sir Colin Campbell’s experience

of Oudian warfare taught him the necessity of caution in all attacks on

the forts with which that province was so fully provided. His officers

would have dashed at them, as at other obstacles; but he forbade

enterprises likely to be followed by losses which good guns might

obviate. On the 24th of March, just when the army of Oude was about to

be broken up, he issued a general order concerning the arrangements to

be made for attacking such strongholds.[152]

Quitting Oude for a time, and transferring attention to the important

and fertile Doab between the Ganges and the Jumna, we shall see that the

month of March found that part of India still much distracted by

fighting and lawless violence. True, Allahabad was in British hands at

one end of it, Delhi at the other, Cawnpore and Agra at intermediate

points; but nevertheless there were numerous bands of rebels roaming

about the open country. Whether two or three of these towns were on

river-banks just beyond the Doab, does not affect the question, which is

not one of mere geographical nomenclature.

The Lower Doab was brought more fully than before within the influence

of military control, by the opening of a further portion of the great

trunk-railway to Futtehpoor, placing that town within a few hours’

distance of Allahabad. This opening took place on the 25th of March;

when Viscount Canning, with nearly all the civil officers of the

last-named city, made the inaugurating journey to Futtehpoor, amid the

holiday accompaniments of flags, triumphal arches, bands of music,

feasting, and speech-making. Further to the northwest, Cawnpore remained

a kind of central point, whence troops could be sent to quarters where

they were most needed. A few regiments only were kept there, sufficient

to guard against sudden surprises. All the British who entered the place

beheld with melancholy interest the cross erected near the terrible well

by the men of the 32d, in memory of the women and children of that

regiment, included among the victims of Nena Sahib.

There was an important town, southwest of Cawnpore, which seemed likely

to be a scene of warfare. During the month of March, it became very

apparent that Calpee was a spot which would speedily require attention

on the part of the military authorities. When Sir Colin Campbell

defeated the Gwalior mutineers at Cawnpore, many weeks earlier, they

fled from that neighbourhood. Rumours spread around that a considerable

portion of the defeated force had fled southwest to Calpee, fortified

themselves there, and called upon the neighbouring zemindars for

supplies of men and money—both of which were forthcoming. The truth of

this rumour, doubtful for a time, became confirmed as the spring

advanced. It was now certain that rebels in great force occupied Calpee,

well supplied with artillery and other munitions of war, and eagerly

watching for a chance of making an attack on Cawnpore—should that

oft-besieged place be left at any time insufficiently guarded. To what

extent Nena Sahib or his brothers were connected with this Calpee force,

was not known. The struggles in and near that town belong to a month

beyond that to which this chapter relates.

The great city of Agra remained peacefully in the hands of the British.

Occasionally, small columns were sent out to attack and disperse bodies

of mutineers who were working mischief in the country districts; but the

formidable brigades of mutinied regiments were not in that quarter. As

one instance; on the 11th of March, Brigadier Showers found it necessary

to chastise some rebels at Bah, in the Agra district. He set forth with

two companies of the 8th foot, 400 of the Sikh police, two guns, a

howitzer, and a mortar; and encountered a motley force of 4000

rebels—comprising three troops of insurgent cavalry, three companies of

infantry, and a body of escaped convicts. These ruffians had assaulted

and captured the town of Bah, plundered all the houses, carried off the

cattle, and murdered some of the wealthier inhabitants. This body of

rebels appeared to have come from the direction of the Gwalior

territories across the Chumbul. Many of their leaders had been in the

civil service of the Company, but turned rebels when they thought

rebellion would be more profitable. Against these men Brigadier Showers

marched from Agra. A strange wild contest ensued. The enemy did not

stand to fight a battle, but made use of ravines, rocks, temples, topes,

and villages as places whence masked attacks might be effected. There

were no roads thereabouts, and Showers experienced much difficulty in

struggling through jungles and ravines.

It was often difficult for the officers in command to muster troops

enough to put down these bands of insurgents. At one period during the

month, Colonel Riddell marched out from Minpooree to aid in intercepting

fugitives from Lucknow. While he was gone, information arrived that

Etawah was threatened by a large body of rebels. No aid being available

from Minpooree, a telegraphic message was sent on to Futteghur

(Furruckabad); and Colonel Seaton immediately ordered a regiment of

Bengal Europeans to march to the threatened spot. These minor operations

were often very harassing to the troops, who had to march great

distances, and wage contests which did not bring them so much glory as a

regular siege or a great battle. Officers naturally preferred those

battle-fields which would bring their names in honourable form into the

official gazettes; and private soldiers those which might earn for some

of them the Victoria Cross; but many weary months passed over some of

the corps, during which the troops were engaged in harassing pursuit of

marauders and ruffians whom they heartily despised, and to conquer whom

brought them very little increase of military reputation.

Speaking generally, it may be said that, at the end of March, the

efforts made by the British officers in the Doab were directed chiefly

to prevent the escape of rebels across the Ganges from Oude. One small

force was watching to this intent at and near Cawnpore; another was in

the Minpooree district; a third was marching down the road from Meerut

to Futteghur; while two others, under Chamberlain and Coke, were

endeavouring to control the Gangetic valley between Futteghur and

Roorkee.

Further to the northwest, the region around Delhi was nearly all in

British hands, and the city itself wholly so—all the mutinous regiments

being far away. The authorities, after Delhi had remained several months

peacefully in their hands, resolved on the formation of a camel corps,

under a peculiar system of organisation. It was completed by the end of

March, by a native named Lalla Jotee Pershaud, under the superintendence

of Captain Chalmers, assistant commissary-general. The camels, 400 in

number, were selected with great care, in the Bikaneer district. The

drivers were armed each with a sword and fusil; and each camel was

fitted to carry a European soldier if necessary. The drivers, equivalent

to troopers or cavalry-men, were carefully selected from the natives of

Rajpootana. The purpose in view was to form a corps of armed men capable

of moving with great rapidity to any spot where their services might be

urgently needed. Lalla Jotee Pershaud was a wealthy and influential man;

and it was intended to make the officering of the corps such as would

render it an acceptable compliment to friendly natives of good position.

As to the city itself, no semblance of fighting was presented. The

conquest by Sir Archdale Wilson, half a year before, had been so

complete, that no enemy remained to fight with. The British kept just

sufficient reliable troops in the place to defend it from surprise; but

the authority was mainly transferred to civil commissioners, who

gradually re-established order and reorganised the revenue department.

The old king still resided there, waiting for his time of punishment. A

special tribunal tried and executed a large number of rebels.

A curious struggle of opinions arose on the question—What should be done

with Delhi? Not only within that city itself, but all over India, the

controversy was maintained with much earnestness. The opinions resolved

themselves into three varieties—advocating destruction, decay, and

conservation, respectively. When the city was captured, a very general

desire was expressed, under the influence of fierce indignation, to

destroy the place altogether, leaving not one stone upon another to tell

where Delhi had been—or rather, leaving the stones to tell where Delhi

had ceased to be. The destructives, if these persons may thus be called,

argued that Delhi should be extinguished from the list of cities,

because it was the centre of disaffection, the scene of the first and

worst stroke levelled at British power; that the Mohammedans of India

would ever think they had a national rallying-point, so long as Delhi

remained; and that the destruction of this rallying-point would impress

them with an idea of British power. The place has a charm for native

ears; it is a sign, a symbol, a standard, a flag of nationality, the

memory of which should be effaced, as something dangerous to the future

security of the British ‘raj.’ Delhi, they urged, should be regarded

rather as a dynastic than a commercial capital; everything in it recalls

the past greatness of a race which had just been foremost in mutiny. For

all these reasons—destroy Delhi. Gradually there arose a second party,

who suggested decay rather than destruction. They said: ‘Destroy Delhi,

and it would be perpetually an object of regret to the followers of

Islam; but Delhi decayed would excite only a feeling of contempt. No

tradition of sovereignty could attach to a dirty little village in which

a population of pauper Mussulmans, around the ruins of old palaces,

scrambled for the charity of a contemptuous traveller.’ They recommended

that the European troops at Delhi should be removed to Hansi, where they

might be easily accommodated; that the arsenal should be removed to

Ferozpore; or that an entirely new European city should be built, lower

down the Jumna; and that Delhi should then be left to be supported by

natives alone, burdened by a special taxation as a punishment for

treason—this, it was believed, would gradually rob the city of all its

dignity and importance. But there arose a third party, to which, it was

reputed, no less a personage than Sir John Lawrence belonged, urging the

preservation of Delhi. The grounds for this advice were many and

important. It was pointed out, among other things—that Delhi is

admirably placed, geographically and politically; that its site was

selected by men who looked primarily to the maintenance of power in the

northwestern regions of India; that, as a commercial entrepôt, it is the

point at which the two great streams of Central Asian trade diverge to

Calcutta and Bombay; that, as a military cantonment, the city commands

the Jumna at the best point for crossing the river; that it is the most

central point from which the marauding Goojurs and Meewatties could be

controlled; that the imperial palace would form an admirable fortress,

to be garrisoned by British troops; and that the walls, brought at one

point within a narrower sweep, would keep out plunderers and protect the

magazine.

Whatever was to be the course pursued, Delhi remained, at the period to

which this chapter relates, undestroyed. The city-wall was still

standing, with the breaches hastily earthed up; all the gates had been

closed, except the Cashmere, Lahore, and Calcutta Gates, but none

destroyed; the fractured Cashmere Gate had been replaced by a temporary

wooden barrier; the English church had been painted and repaired; the

college, riddled by cannon and musket balls, had been converted into a

barrack; the magazine remained as poor Willoughby had left it, half

blown up; and the palace had not suffered very materially from the

siege. Concerning the principal street of the city, an eye-witness wrote

as follows: ‘The Chandnee Chowk is the only street we have seen in India

to which the terms of descriptive admiration bestowed on European cities

justly apply. If the traveller does not examine details too minutely,

the cheerful picturesque aspect of the Chandnee Chowk may remind him for

a moment of the Parisian boulevards. In the centre of a spacious street

is a double row of well-grown trees, on either side a broad roadway

flanked by irregular picturesque buildings. But if we speak of this

street as being in 1858 cheerful, we can allude only to its

architectural structure. Neither its associations nor its own present

accompaniments and accessories are other than gloomy. Every house has

been plundered; and the little show of property, as it begins again

under the protection of British bayonets slowly to accumulate, cannot

disguise the ruin which 1857 has created. To a stranger, the population

that flows up and down the shining street would seem large; but to one

who saw Delhi and the Chandnee Chowk before the rebellion, it is but as

the ghost of the former life of the place that moves to and fro. There

is the mosque where Nadir Shah sat and witnessed his great massacre.

There is the Kotwallee or police-station, whereat were exposed the

bodies of murdered Europeans, and afterwards of their murderers the

princes, whom Hodson slew. In front of this building stand now three

large gibbets, whereon have been already justly executed between two and

three hundred of those who joined in the murder and rapine of the 11th

of May, and on which more culprits are destined yet to pay for their

crimes. Everywhere the demeanour of the native population is more than

respectful to the Europeans—it is cringing. Fear possesses every soul.

Never was a conquest more thorough than is for the present that of Delhi

and its neighbourhood by the British. The present disposition of the

native mind in Delhi towards us, of terror and trembling obedience, is

one which no wise man can wish permanently to continue. It is a

disposition, however, which no wise man will deny that it was necessary

temporarily to create, if the mild uniformity of British rule was ever

again to be asserted in Delhi.’ In connection with these observations,

it may be stated that the cringing servility of the natives, so manifest

at Delhi, was by no means so evident in Oude and the Doab. A sullen

haughtiness, or perhaps a fierce vindictiveness, was visible on the

countenances of a very large percentage of those natives with whom the

British came into contact, telling of discontent, or of hostile passion.

[Illustration:

Kootub Minar, near Delhi.

]

Of Rohilcund it is not necessary to say much in this chapter. The

greater part of it still continued, as it had been for nine months, in

the hands of the rebels; and in addition to this, many of the escaped

mutineer regiments from Lucknow had unquestionably directed their steps

to this province, to swell the numbers of those who were in arms against

the British. General Walpole was sent out against them with a powerful

column; what he achieved, we shall see in the proper place.

That part of Rohilcund which constitutes the ‘Hills,’ the group of

healthy hill-stations at the base of the Himalaya, though nearly cut off

from communication with the Jumna regions, maintained itself bravely,

never once falling into the hands of the armed insurgents. Colonel

M’Causland, military commandant in Kumaon, so steadily and watchfully

maintained British interests in that remote hilly province, that he

generally detected hostile machinations in time to frustrate them. He

had chiefly Goorkhas for troops, Rohilcund rebels for opponents; and he

seldom failed to baffle and defeat those rebels, whether his force were

great or small. Early in March he heard that the insurgents had sent a

detachment to collect revenue—that is, to plunder—at Sitargunje, a place

twenty-five miles from his camp at Huldwanee. He determined to surprise

them; and although the success was not so great as he could have wished,

through the unexpected absence of the larger part of the enemy’s force,

still those who were met with were speedily vanquished. He intrusted the

enterprise to Captain Baugh, who commanded the Nepaul Contingent in the

Kumaon brigade. Baugh started off on the evening of the 3d, taking with

him about 220 horse and foot, and two mountain howitzers. To expedite

matters, he mounted his infantry and artillery on elephants; but during

the night his progress was retarded ‘by an elephant carrying one of the

mountain howitzers falling sick.’ Arriving at Sitargunje early in the

morning of the 4th, he found that the main body of rebels had departed

on the preceding day to a village about six miles distant. Most of those

remaining were within the government tehseel, a high building forty or

fifty yards square; and these did not fight; they fell or escaped as

their individual luck determined. Captain Baugh brought away from the

place whatever he thought might be most useful. Finding that the main

body of the insurgents, under Fuzul Huq, numbered not less than 5000

men, with six guns, he did not deem it prudent to march after them with

his little force to Butteree, the village where they were on that day

encamped, about midway between Huldwanee and Bareilly.

The Punjaub and Sirhind continued to be nearly free from anarchy. Yet

there were symptoms which, if left unattended to, might have led to

evil. The 4th regiment Bengal native cavalry, one of the last remaining

links in that fine army, was disarmed and unhorsed at Umballa during the

month of March. After ten months of faithfulness, amid the treachery of

so many of their compatriots, these troopers at length exhibited a

tendency to insubordination, not safely to be overlooked. In the Punjaub

generally the movements of troops were very frequent and rapid, shewing

that the authorities were well on the alert. Wishing to obtain a healthy

military station west of the Indus, the brigadier in command laid the

foundation of Campbellpore—a station named in honour of the

commander-in-chief. This custom was often adopted in India: witness

Jacobabad and Sleemanabad.

One of the most instructive facts brought to light during the wars of

the mutiny, was the ardour with which some of the natives of India

joined in waging battle with others. During the first and second Sikh

wars, the sepoys of the Bengal native army unquestionably fought

heroically against the Sikhs, winning battles in a way that excited the

admiration of their British officers. And now the Sikhs shewed

themselves equally willing to aid the British against the sepoys, and

equally able to vanquish them in the field. Two inferences may

legitimately be drawn from this—that success depended rather on the

British officers than on the kind of troops whom they commanded; and

that the maintenance of an army formed of any one nation in India is not

so safe as the admixture of nationalities, each to act as a check upon

the other. The subject is adverted to in this place, because the month

of March witnessed the return of the Guides to Peshawur, and the honours

that marked that event. It will be remembered[153] that this celebrated

corps, chosen among the Punjaubees for their activity and intelligence,

consisted of two small regiments, one of infantry and one of cavalry;

that they made an extraordinary march of 750 miles, from Peshawur to

Delhi, in the hot weather of June 1857; and that they served most

gallantly in the operations against that city during the autumnal

months. They remained until February in and near Delhi, and then

returned to their native country. Major-general Cotton, commanding in

the Peshawur division, made a point of giving the gallant fellows an

honorary reception. He caused all the troops in the Peshawur cantonment

to be paraded on the 16th of March. On the approach of the Guides to the

parade-ground, the assembled troops saluted and the guns fired; the

major-general delivered an address; a _feu de joie_ and an ordnance

salute of twenty guns followed; and the Guides marched past him in full

military array. Captain Battye, who had commanded the cavalry portion of

the force, was killed almost immediately on the arrival of the Guides at

Delhi; but Captain Daly lived to return. Cotton addressed Daly and his

companions first, welcoming them back to Peshawur; and then he addressed

the Peshawur force generally, telling them of the wonderful march which

the Guides had made nine months before, and of their deeds at Delhi.

‘Within three hours after reaching Delhi, the Guides engaged the enemy,

and every one of their officers was wounded. For nearly four months,

officers and men were almost constantly in action, sometimes twice a

day. They took 600 men to Delhi, and received 200 recruits during the

siege. Not one man deserted to the enemy or from the corps; but no less

than 350 were killed and wounded, and 120 fell to rise no more. I need

not dwell on their separate deeds of valour, their general actions,

their skirmishes, or their single combats; but as a specimen of the

spirit that animated the corps, I will mention that a mere boy, Singh by

name, bore a wounded European soldier out of the battle.’

In connection with this subject, it may be remarked that the personal

character of the British officers has always exercised a very notable

influence over the native troops of India. In Brigadier Hodgson’s

_Opinions on the Indian Army_, an anecdote is related, illustrative of

the power possessed over the sepoys by any commander whose prowess and

genius they had learned to value. A native officer, speaking to him of

events which he had himself witnessed, said: ‘During the campaign

against the Mahrattas, in the year 1804, we made a tremendous forced

march of 54 miles in 30 hours, and surprised Holkar and his cavalry at

Furruckabad, and routed them with great slaughter. We had marched 250

miles in 13 days. The troops had been upon very short commons for some

time; and you, sir, know what a tyrant a hungry belly is. The sepahees

(sepoys) began to be very loud in their grumblings, and expressed their

discontent pretty freely. This was reported. A short time afterwards,

Lick Sahib Bahadoor (Lord Lake) was observed riding past the column

_eating dry pulse_. This fact spread rapidly through the ranks; and from

that moment, not the whisper of a murmur was heard. I believe, sir, had

a man grumbled after that, he would have run the risk of being put to

death by his companions—such was the love and veneration the sepahees

had for Lick Sahib Bahadoor.’

Some of the half-savage mountain tribes of Peshawur and the Afghan

frontier gave occasional trouble; but neither there nor in Sinde were

the authorities prevented from sending reinforcements to the more

troubled provinces. In connection with Sinde, it may be mentioned that

Mr Frere, commissioner of that province, communicated a singular

document to Lord Elphinstone, governor of the Bombay presidency. It was

not directly connected with the mutiny or its instigators; but was

nevertheless deemed important by Mr Frere, as illustrating phases of

Hindoo character concerning which Europeans know so little. The

information was given by Mr Macdonald, deputy-collector of Larkhana, in

his weekly digest under date 20th of March. We transcribe it in a

foot-note.[154]

We may now conveniently turn our attention to Central India—that region,

south of the Jumna, in which Mahrattas and Bundelas were so strong. We

have stated in former chapters that Sir Hugh Rose, a distinguished

Bombay officer, was placed in command of various regiments and

detachments known collectively as the ‘Central India Field-force.’ He

was gradually working his way northward to the notorious city of Jhansi,

defeating rebels everywhere on his road. On the 4th of March, Sir Hugh

Rose was enabled to telegraph the following news, from his camp at

Peeplia: ‘Yesterday, the troops under my command forced the pass of

Mudenpore, after a short but very vigorous resistance. The troops,

British and native, behaved gallantly. The pass is extremely strong, and

the enemy suffered severely. They numbered about 4000 or 5000 Pathans

and Bundelas, and 600 or 700 sepoys of the 52d and other regiments. I

sent Major Orr in pursuit; and he cut up 50 or 60 rebels, of whom a

large proportion were sepoys. The enemy are scattered in every

direction. They have abandoned the little fortress of Seraj, a fort or

arsenal which is the property of the Rajah of Shagurh, in which I shall

have a small force to keep up my communication with Saugor. I am now in

communication with my first brigade (under Brigadier Stuart) at

Chendaree, and this gives me command of the whole of the country up to

Jhansi, with the exception of two or three forts, which I can take.’

About a week later, he sent news to Bombay that the capture of the pass

of Mudenpore—on the line of hills which separated the British district

of Saugor from the little state of Shagurh—and the defeat of the rebels

on the 3d, had produced advantages far exceeding those at first

anticipated by him. The rebels had successively abandoned several

strongholds which they had possessed—first the fort of Seraj, with four

guns, a rude manufactory for powder, shot and shell, carriages and

tents; then the town and fort of Murrowra, with a triple line of

defences; then the town and fort of Multhone; next the pass of Goonah;

then the pass and town of Hurat; and lastly, the fort of Cornel Gurh. As

all the passes had been fortified and barricaded, their precipitate

abandonment by the rebels was fortunate for Sir Hugh. Another result was

the occupation by him of the hitherto independent district of Shagurh;

the rajah having joined the rebels, Sir Robert Hamilton and Sir Hugh

Rose resolved to punish him by ‘annexing’ his small territory, or at

least occupying it until instructions could be received from Calcutta.

Accordingly, on the 10th of March, the British flag was hoisted at

Murrowra, in Shagurh, in presence of Rose’s second brigade, under a

salute of twenty-one guns. The encampment of the brigade at this time

was about twenty-five miles from Jhansi. Rose and Hamilton were well on

the alert; for Balla Sahib, brother of the Nena, was at that time

heading an army of rabble, and levying contributions in various parts of

Bundelcund. What troops this rebel had with him, was not clearly known;

but it was found that the Rajah of Chuanpore had been mulcted by him of

seven lacs of rupees; and the Rajah of Churkaree, resisting a similar

demand, had had his town destroyed by fire, and was compelled to take

refuge in his fort. Mr Carne, British resident in Churkaree, narrowly

escaped capture at the hands of the rebels.

While Rose was thus engaged, Brigadier Stuart, with the first brigade of

the Central India Field-force, was clearing out various rebel haunts in

districts lying southward of Jhansi. On the morning of the 6th of March,

Stuart’s column or brigade set out from his camp near the Chendaree

fort, and marched six or eight miles to Khookwasas, a fort near which a

large body of rebels were assembled. The route being through a thick

jungle nearly the whole distance, the 25th and 86th regiments advanced

cautiously, in skirmishing order. Arriving at a small pass near the

fort, Stuart found that the enemy had barricaded the road, and lined the

hills on either side with matchlockmen. The engineers soon cleared away

the barricades; while a small party of the 86th rushed up the hills and

dislodged the matchlockmen. Shortly afterwards, however, it was

ascertained that the chief body of the enemy had taken up a position

behind the wall of an enclosure about a mile from the fort. The 86th

dashed forwards to gain this enclosure; two of the officers, Lieutenant

Lewis and Captain Keating, climbed to its top before any of their men,

and jumped down into the interior of the enclosure. The troops soon

cleared out the enclosure, and then pursued their operations against the

fort itself. Working his way steadily onwards, defeating and expelling

bodies of insurgents from neighbouring villages, Stuart was at length

enabled, on the 17th, to capture the fort of Chendaree itself. This

place, situated in Malwah, about a hundred miles from Gwalior, is in a

district which was assigned by Scindia in 1844, according to agreement

with the British government, to assist in the maintenance of the Gwalior

Contingent. The fort—consisting of a strong rampart of sandstone,

flanked by circular towers, and crowning a high hill—was in the hands of

insurgents at the date now under notice; and it was Brigadier Stuart’s

duty to capture it. After cannonading on the evening of the 16th, he

formed a practicable breach in the walls, and resolved to take the place

by assault on the following morning. This he did very effectually. The

25th and 86th regiments, by an impetuous rush, carried everything before

them. Captain Keating was severely wounded whilst foremost with the

storming-party. The enemy mostly escaped, on account of the simple

failure of a letter. On the preceding evening, the brigadier received a

message informing him that Captain Abbott was within available distance

with a considerable body of irregular cavalry; and in return a letter

was despatched to Abbott, requesting him to gallop forward and invest

the north side of the fort. This letter did not reach Abbott in time;

and as a consequence, there was no obstacle to the escape of the rebels

northward. All the guns, eight of iron and two of brass, were taken. The

fort was given up to the keeping of one of Scindia’s lieutenants or

soubahs, in friendly relation with the British; and the inhabitants of

the town resumed their peaceful avocations, apparently glad to get rid

of the presence of the rebels.

Stuart’s operations at Chendaree greatly facilitated the advance of Sir

Hugh Rose towards Jhansi. He marched on, with the second brigade of his

Central India Field-force, and reached that blood-stained city on the

21st of March. He gave a sketch of his operations from the 20th to the

25th in the following brief telegraphic form: ‘On the 20th my cavalry

invested as much as possible the fort and town of Jhansi. The next day

the rest of my force arrived. The rebels have fortified the walls of the

town, and, shutting themselves up in the town and fort, have not

defended the advanced position of Jhansi. The ranee has left her palace

in the town, and has gone into the fort. The rebel garrison numbers

about 1500 sepoys, of whom 500 are cavalry, and 10,000 Bundelas, with 30

or 40 cannon. Their position is strong; but I have occupied two good

positions, one a breaching, the other a flanking one. I have been

delayed by the want of a plan of Jhansi, and consequently have been

obliged to make long and repeated reconnaissances. I opened a flanking

fire, vertical and horizontal, yesterday (the 25th), and hope to open a

breaching fire to-morrow, or at latest the next day.’ We shall see in a

later page that Sir Hugh completely succeeded in his assault, early in

April.

The present may be a proper place in which to advert to a matter which

greatly agitated the public mind from time to time, both in England and

India—namely, the conduct of the insurgents towards those of the British

who unfortunately fell into their power. Jhansi was one of the stations

in respect to which horror was most distressingly expressed. The morbid

taste for horrors engendered by the incidents of the Revolt gave rise to

many exaggerations. The terrible news from Delhi, Cawnpore, Jhansi, and

other places, during the early months of the struggle, produced mischief

in two ways; it created a demand for indiscriminate sanguinary

vengeance; and it produced a tendency, not only to believe, but to

exaggerate, all rumours of atrocities as committed by the natives. In

England as well as at Calcutta, controversies almost of a fierce

character arose on these points; the advocates on one side treating it

as a point of honour to believe the tragedies in their worst form; while

those on the other, in bitter terms demanded proof that the rumours were

true. It was extremely difficult to disprove any statements concerning

atrocities committed; for in most cases there were no Europeans left

behind to give trustworthy testimony. Circumstances became known, during

the progress of the military operations, which led to an inference that,

though inhuman slaughter of innocent persons unquestionably took place

soon after Delhi fell into the hands of the insurgents, it was not

preceded by so much of hideous barbarity towards the women and children

as had at first been reported and believed. It also became more and more

evident, as time advanced, that many of the inscriptions on the wall of

the slaughter-room at Cawnpore must have been written _after_ the

departure or death of the hapless persons whose writing they professed

to be, by some one who failed to see the cruelty of the hoax he was

perpetrating. This subject is adverted to in the present place, because

the month of March lightened a little the terrible severity of the story

of Jhansi, one of those which made a distressing impression on the

public mind. It will be remembered[155] that, early in June of the

preceding year, the British at Jhansi, upwards of fifty in number, were

all put to death by the insurgents, acting at the instigation of a

woman, the ranee or chieftainess of Jhansi; the destruction was so

complete, that no European was left to tell the true incidents. Nine

months afterwards, in the month of March, some of the English newspapers

in India gave a detail of revolting indignities said to have been

inflicted on the females of the party at Jhansi—greatly adding to the

distress already felt by the relatives of the murdered persons. Jhansi

had by that time been restored to British rule; and Captain Pinkney,

superintendent of Jhansi, Jaloun, and Chendaree, determined to ascertain

how far the real facts could be got at. After a diligent inquiry in

various quarters, he arrived at a belief that the massacre, however

barbarous, had not been deepened in atrocity by the frightful

circumstances put forth in the newspapers. The truth appeared to him to

be as follows: When the British in the fort were unable longer to hold

out through want of food, they surrendered to the rebels, who swore that

they would spare all their lives. No sooner, however, were the

fort-gates opened, than the rebels entered, bound the men, and took them

as well as the women and children to a place outside the city-walls

called the Jokun Bagh. Here the men were placed in one group, and the

women and children in another. The rebels and the ranee’s armed servants

then murdered all the men, Major Skene being the first cut down by the

jail darogah, one Bukshish Ali. After this the women and children were

put to death with swords and spears. The dead bodies were stripped, and

left two days in the Jokun Bagh, when they were all thrown into a

neighbouring stream. Shortly after the writing of Captain Pinkney’s

report, a letter was sent to the supreme government by Sir Robert

Hamilton, political agent in Central India, in which a few of the facts

were somewhat differently stated. According to his account, when the

unhappy Europeans reached the Jokun Bagh, ‘they were stopped on the

roadside under some trees. They were accompanied by a crowd of mutinous

sepoys, irregular sowars, disaffected police, fanatic Mussulmans, men in

the service of the ranee, inhabitants of the town, and rabble. Here

Bukshish Ali, jail darogah, called out: “It is the ressaldar’s order

that all should be killed;” and immediately cut down Captain (Major)

Skene, to whom he was indebted for his situation under government. An

indiscriminate slaughter of the men, women, and children then commenced;

all were mercilessly destroyed, and their bodies left strewn about the

road, where they remained until the third day, when, by permission of

the same ressaldar, they were all buried in two gravel-pits close by.’

Execrable as this was, it was far less harrowing than the newspaper

narratives which had given rise to the investigation. Captain Pinkney

ascertained that the total number of Europeans thus barbarously murdered

was sixty-seven, of whom just about one half were women and children.

Sir Robert Hamilton caused the ground around the two gravel-pits to be

cleared, and an enclosing wall to be built; he and all the other

officials, on a selected day, attended a funeral-service at the spot,

delivered by the Rev. Mr Schwabe, chaplain to the station; and he also

planned the erection of an obelisk. Strange that India should become the

ground for so many obelisks and crosses erected in memory of Europeans

ruthlessly murdered by natives. One hundred and two years before, in

1756, Suraj-u-Dowlah, after conquering Calcutta from the Company’s

servants, drove a hundred and forty-six adult Europeans, on a sultry

June evening, into a dungeon only twenty feet square; and of those

miserable creatures, a hundred and twenty-three died during the night,

of heat, thirst, pressure, suffocation, and madness. An obelisk was

afterwards set up, to mark this terrible ‘Black Hole of Calcutta.’ And

now, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the English again found

themselves engaged in erecting these damning memorials of native

brutality, at Cawnpore and at Jhansi.

[Illustration:

Obelisk built on the Site of the Black Hole, Calcutta, to commemorate

the Murder of the One Hundred and Twenty-three Englishmen.—From a

Drawing in the India House.

]

Leaving Jhansi and its mournful recollections for a while, we pass over

from the Mahratta territories into Rajpootana; where numerous petty

chieftains kept the territory in a state of much agitation. There were

scarcely any of the mutinied Bengal regiments in that part of India; but

the Kotah Contingent, and other auxiliary corps which had revolted,

sided with some of the chieftains in hostilities against the British. So

far as concerns the operations of the month of March, those of the Kotah

insurgents were the chief that call for attention. We have in former

pages alluded to a ‘Rajpootana Field-force,’ formed of several regiments

sent up from Bombay. The first division of this force set forth from

Nuseerabad on the 10th of March, for service against Kotah. It consisted

of H.M. 95th foot, a wing of the 83d, the 10th Bombay infantry, the

Sinde horse, and some horse and foot artillery. Siege-material of

formidable character accompanied the column; comprising eighteen

field-pieces, of which ten were 8-inch mortars and howitzers, and an

immense supply of ammunition. The second division, that started on the

following day, consisted of H.M. 72d foot, a wing of the 83d, the 1st

Bombay Lancers, a mountain train, Brown’s battery, and an engineering

corps. The 8th Hussars, with detachments of horse and foot artillery,

were afterwards to join the columns. Several of the guns in the

siege-train were drawn by elephants. Brigadier-general Lawrence

accompanied this field-force, but only in a political capacity; the

military command was held by General Roberts. The conquest of Kotah was

looked forward to as a difficult enterprise, not only from the force of

the enemy in men and guns, but from the peculiar position of the town

itself. Kotah is bounded by the deep river Chumbul on one side, and by a

lake on the other; and there was a probability that batteries would have

to be erected on the opposite side of the river. The approach to it by

land from Nuseerabad was also beset by many obstacles. It would be

necessary to traverse the Mokundurra Pass, a long and narrow valley

between two parallel ranges of hills, easily rendered formidable by a

small number of men. It was altogether a larger and more important

operation than the conquest of the numerous petty forts with which

Rajpootana abounded. Many persons in India thought that those forts

might safely be left to themselves; since the hill-chieftains were more

frequently incited by hostility towards each other than towards the

British, and since it was very little better than a waste of power to

pursue them into the wilds and jungles which intersect that part of

India. One favourable circumstance in connection with Kotah was, that

the rajah was faithful, and as much opposed as the British to the

insurgents.

The middle of the month was occupied by the march of Roberts’s force

from Nuseerabad, over a difficult country. Surmounting all obstacles,

the general arrived at Kotah on the 22d of March, and encamped a mile or

two distant, on the north bank of the Chumbul. The rebels were in

possession of the south bank, having with them a powerful array of guns,

many of large calibre. The fort, the palace, and half the city, were

held by the rajah, with Rajpoots and troops from Kerowlie. On the 25th,

a portion of the British, about 300 in number, under Major Heatley,

crossed the river, to aid the rajah at a critical moment. The rebels had

that morning made a desperate attempt to escalade the walls, and drive

the rajah’s troops into their only remaining stronghold, the castle; but

this attempt was frustrated; had it succeeded, the rebels would have

commanded the ferry over the river. Portions of H.M. 83d, and of the

Bombay troops, formed the small force which crossed the river on the

25th. Two days afterwards, 600 men of H.M. 95th, with two 9-pounders,

crossed over. On the 30th General Roberts was able to announce by

telegraph, ‘I this day assaulted the town of Kotah with complete

success, and comparatively trifling loss. No officer killed. The whole

town is in my possession.’ Upwards of fifty guns were captured. The

victory was gained by a clever flank-movement, which turned the enemy’s

position, and rendered their defences useless. This was a point in

tactics which the rebels seldom attended to sufficiently; they

repeatedly lost battles by allowing their flanks to be turned.

Eastward of the Mahratta and Rajpoot territories, there were isolated

bodies of insurgents in the Saugor regions, between the Jumna on the

north and Nagpoor on the south. But General Whitlock, with a field-force

gathered from the Madras presidency, kept these rebels under some

control. His movements, however, scarcely need record here.

The South Mahratta country kept up just so much disturbance as to demand

the vigilant attention of the authorities, without exciting any serious

apprehension. In the month of March there was much of this disturbance,

near the frontier between the two presidencies of Bombay and Madras, at

Belgaum. On the one side, the Bombay government offered a large reward

for the apprehension of three brothers, rebel leaders, Baba Desaee, Nena

Desaee, and Hunmunt Desaee; while the governor of the Madras presidency

put in force a disarming statute on his side of the frontier. One of the

leaders, Hunmunt Desaee, after many contests, was driven, with the wives

and families of others among the insurgents, into a tower on the summit

of a peak in the Coonung range; it was a one-storied structure, with a

ladder leading to an entrance trap-door. Such towers had been used by

the military police in that range, and Hunmunt defended himself here as

long as he could. There were other traitors in this part of the country.

Towards the close of March, Mr Manson, one of the Company’s civil

servants, obtained a clue to a conspiracy in which several natives—Naga

Ramchunder, Balla Bhoplay, Bhow Shrof Chowdry, and others—were

concerned; having for its object the collecting of guns unknown to the

British authorities, and the inciting of other natives to acts of

rebellion. One of these men was the chief of Jamkhundie, one a

money-lender, and two others were Brahmins. The money-lender was

supposed to have assisted the mutineers of Kolapore with pecuniary means

for carrying on their operations. By lodging these mischief-makers in

safe keeping at Belgaum and Satara, preparatory to a trial, the

authorities checked an incipient disturbance.

This little patch of country, inhabited to a considerable extent by the

southern Mahrattas, was the only part of the Bombay presidency south of

the city itself which was in any anxiety concerning the proceedings of

the insurgents. And indeed, northward of the city, there were no

manifestations of rebellion short of the regions around Gujerat and

Rajpootana; where even those who were disposed to be peaceful found

themselves embarrassed and imperiled by the turbulence of their

neighbours. In Gujerat, Sir Richmond Shakespear commenced and steadily

carried on a general disarming of the population; the Guicowar or native

sovereign cordially assisted him, and the two together collected many

guns and thousands of stands of arms. As to the Madras presidency, it

was quite at peace. From Cuttack in the north to Travancore in the

south, there were no rebellious regiments, and few chieftains who

ventured to endanger their safety by disputing the British ‘raj.’ In the

Nagpoor and Saugor territories, belonging rather to the Bengal than to

the Madras presidency, the elements of convulsion surged occasionally,

but not to a very alarming extent. The Nizam’s country was troubled in a

way which shews how desirable it is that orientals should not be tempted

by anarchy or weakness in the governing power. The regular troops were

moderately steady; but the news of mutiny elsewhere excited all the

turbulent elements of the Deccan. Robber chieftains and city ruffians

rose, not so much against the British, as against any who had property

to lose. The town of Mulgate, held by a chieftain who commanded a motley

band of Rohillas and Arabs, resisted the Nizam’s authority for some

time; but it fell, and the leaders were taken prisoner.

This chapter will have shewn that, when the last day of March arrived,

the attention of the military authorities in India was chiefly directed

to those districts which had Azimghur, Bareilly, Calpee, and Jhansi for

their chief cities, and which swarmed with large bodies of rebels ready

to make a desperate resistance. It was left for the months of April and

May to develop the strategic operations against those places.

Notes.

So frequent is the mention, in all matters relating to the local

government of India, of ‘covenanted’ and ‘uncovenanted’ service, and

so peculiar the duties of those covenanted servants who bear or bore

the title of ‘collectors’—that it may be well to sketch briefly the

Company’s remarkable system, so far as it refers to those two

subjects. The collectors and magistrates suffered much and braved

much during the mutiny, owing to their peculiarly intimate relations

with the natives; and their duties deserve on that account a little

attention in the present work. For many reasons it will be

desirable, as in the volume generally, to adopt the past tense in

speaking of this system—bearing in mind, however, that the system

was fully in operation during the mutiny, except when the officials

were actually driven away from their districts.

_’Covenanted’ and ‘Uncovenanted’ Service._—The ‘services’ supported

by the East India Company were of four kinds—civil, military, naval,

and ecclesiastical. The military has already been frequently

noticed; the Company supported a military force of something near

three hundred thousand men, involving various engagements on the one

hand with the British crown, and on the other with native princes.

The naval service was limited to a force of about sixty vessels and

five thousand men, employed chiefly in surveying, coast-guarding,

mail-conveyance, and the prevention of piracy. The ecclesiastical

service, maintained by the Company for their own servants only,

consisted of three Church of England bishops, about a hundred and

forty Protestant clergymen, three Roman Catholic bishops, and about

eighty Roman Catholic priests. The Protestants were liberally

supported; the Roman Catholics simply received a grant, in aid of

larger funds to be derived by them from other quarters. But it was

the civil service that constituted the most remarkable feature in

the Company’s organisation, embracing all the persons engaged in the

collection of revenue or the administration of justice.

The civil service was of two kinds, covenanted and uncovenanted. The

uncovenanted civil servants were very much like _employés_ in other

countries, paid reasonably for their services, but having no

peculiar privileges—no declared provision for life, no claim to

promotion by seniority, no stipulated furlough or leave of absence,

no claimable pension. They comprised Europeans, Eurasians or

half-castes, and natives. Subordinate duties, fiscal and judicial,

were intrusted to them, according to their range of ability and

supposed honesty, as judged by the local governments. The Europeans

in this class were chiefly persons who had gone out to India in some

other capacity, or were sons of officers already in service in

India. The European and Eurasian uncovenanted servants barely

reached three thousand in number. The class was mainly composed of

natives—Mohammedans more generally than Hindoos. The employment of

natives as uncovenanted servants of the Company was commenced by

Lord William Bentinck (1828 to 1835), and steadily increased under

other governors-general: insomuch that the judicial administration

of the lower courts fell almost wholly into the hands of natives.

The humbler offices in the revenue department were also filled by

them. A few of the uncovenanted servants received salaries ranging

from £500 to £800 per annum; but in the greater number of instances

the amount was far lower.

The covenanted servants comprised nominated or favoured persons who,

after receiving a special education in the Company’s seminary at

Haileybury, were subjected to examination in England, and then sent

out to India at the Company’s expense. They entered into a covenant,

prescribed by ancient custom, ‘That they shall obey all orders; that

they shall discharge all debts; and that they shall treat the

natives of India well.’ Until 1853 (when a system of public

competition was established by the charter granted to the Company in

that year), the appointment of persons to this favoured service was

wholly in the patronage of the directors. After a certain amount of

tuition and examination, the young men (’writers,’ as they were

sometimes called) were conveyed to India, where they pursued further

studies, chiefly in oriental languages, at Calcutta, Madras, or

Bombay. While so studying, they received an ‘out-of-employ

allowance.’ At length they commenced employment as ‘assistants’ to

magistrates and collectors in country districts, as soon as they

possessed a certain amount of knowledge of vernacular languages,

criminal law, and revenue law. Their daily duties were partly

magisterial, partly fiscal. After some years’ practice, the

assistant was competent for promotion. He became collector or

magistrate of a district, under regulations differing in the

different presidencies. In Bengal, the offices of judge, magistrate,

and collector were held by three different persons, all

‘covenanted;’ in the other presidencies the offices of magistrate

and collector were held by the same person; in the ‘non-regulation

provinces’ (Punjaub, Nagpoor, Sinde, &c.), all three offices were

held by one person. The local government had a voice in the

selection of persons to fill these offices; but the principle of

promotion by seniority was extensively acted on, and was almost

claimed as a right by the ‘covenanted.’ The salaries paid were very

munificent. The lowest assistant received £500 per annum, and the

amount rose gradually to £10,000 per annum, the salary of a member

of the Supreme Council at Calcutta.

Such were the chief points of difference between the covenanted and

uncovenanted services of the East India Company. It was not so much

a distinction of race, colour, or creed, as a means of favouring

selected persons in England, and of giving those persons a special

education to fit them for civil duties in India.

* * * * *

_Collectors and Collectorates._—We shall next notice in a succinct

way the remarkable duties of such of the covenanted civil servants

as filled the office of collector—especially in those districts

where the collector was also the magistrate. In the Northwest

Provinces, to which the mutiny was mainly confined, the

collector-magistrate of each district was in many matters controlled

by the commissioner of the province in which the district was

situated; but he had in a larger degree than the commissioner an

intimate knowledge of the villages and villagers of India, their

incomes, hopes, fears, wants, and peculiarities; and he became more

deeply involved in anxieties and dangers consequent on the mutiny.

The term ‘collector’ very inadequately expresses the status and

duties of the official so named. So far from being a mere

tax-gatherer, he was a revenue judge, an executive district

authority, with large powers and heavy responsibilities. As

collector and magistrate, he was responsible to two different

departments—to the higher judicial courts for his conduct as a

magistrate, and to the revenue department in all that concerned his

collectorship. He had two sets of assistants, with duties clearly

defined and separated. The magisterial duties being dismissed

without further description, as susceptible of easy comprehension,

we shall dwell only on the collectorship.

The duties of the collector were fivefold. He was collector of

government revenue; registrar of landed property in his district;

revenue judge between landlord and tenant; ministerial officer of

courts of justice; and treasurer and accountant of the district.

None but a man of varied and extensive attainments, united to zeal

and industry, could adequately fulfil so many duties; many of the

great names in the recent years of Indian history are those of men

who laid the foundations for their greatness as collectors. The

districts over which the collectors presided varied greatly in size

and wealth; but in all cases they comprised several thousand

villages each, and yielded revenue varying from one to two hundred

thousand pounds per annum—for the whole of which the collector was

responsible. In the whole of India, the collectorates were somewhat

under a hundred and seventy in number, for the most part identical

with districts, but in a few cases comprising whole provinces newly

annexed; and these collectorates yielded, in 1856, revenue to the

amount of about thirty millions sterling.

The collector-magistrate had generally two assistants, like himself

‘covenanted’ servants of the Company. Besides these there were

‘uncovenanted’ servants, European and native, sufficient in number

for the duties to be rendered. The district was marked out into

sub-districts containing from one to two hundred villages each. The

collector resided at the head-station of the district, with a staff

of clerks, writers, and record-keepers. Each sub-district was under

the revenue management of a responsible native officer, who had

subordinates under him to keep his accounts and conduct the details

of his office. Carrying down the classification still more minutely,

every village in every sub-district had its headman and its native

accountant, who were in intimate correspondence concerning the

revenue of the village.

The chief official of the district, as collector of government

revenue, obtained this revenue mainly from three sources—land-tax,

spirit and drug duty, and stamps. The second and third items were so

small in amount, that many well-wishers of the Company urged the

abandonment of those imposts; and at anyrate only a small share of

the collector’s attention was devoted to them. The land-tax was the

great source of revenue; and until the government of India undergoes

an entire revolution both in spirit and in practice, such must

continue to be the case. So decided was the importance of this tax

compared with all others, that of the thirty millions sterling

raised in 1856, no less than seventeen millions resulted from

land-tax. The land-tax formed the great fund out of which the vast

expenses for the executive government, military and civil, were

mainly paid. Hence the importance of the revenue-collector and his

land-tax duties. The assessment of the land, for the realisation of

the tax, differed in different presidencies, according to the

relations existing between the state, the landowners, the farmers,

and the labourers. In Bengal the revenue was collected in gross from

great and powerful zemindars, the state having little or nothing to

do with the actual cultivators. In Madras no zemindars or great men

were recognised; the state drew the tax from the ryots or

cultivators, each on his own bit of land. In Bombay the Madras

system existed in a modified form. In Oude nothing could be done

till the annexation in 1856, when the peculiar _thalookdaree_

system[156] laid a foundation for many troubles in the following

year. In the Northwest Provinces the assessment depended on the

peculiar village tenures, which had existed from time immemorial,

and according to which the ownership of the soil could not be

interfered with by the state so long as the village paid the

revenue. Great as may have been, and great as were, the differences

between the Hindoo, Mohammedan, and English governments, this

village system maintained its ground century after century. The

tenure of land in these provinces, recognised by the Company as

among those institutions which they wished to respect, were mainly

three in number:

_Zemindaree_—denoting those estates where the property was held

collectively without any territorial division, whether the

owners were one, few, or many.

_Puttidaree_—those estates where the property was partially or

entirely divided, and held separately by the coparceners.

_Bhyacharuh_—estates held by coparcenary communities, where

actual possession had overborne law; it was a kind of

Puttidaree founded on actuality rather than right.

Whichever of these systems prevailed, the Company respected it in

assessing the land-tax; and thus each piece of land was represented

in the tax-books by the name of a particular tax-payer or community

of tax-payers. The actual assessment, the percentage on produce,

depended on circumstances specially ascertained in each district;

but the two guiding principles laid down by the Company, when they

established a revenue-system for the Northwest Provinces were—that

the rate should be light enough to leave a wide margin of profit to

the cultivators; and that it should be fixed without alteration for

a considerable period of years. The collector, knowing how much was

assessed upon every village or every piece of land, was armed with

powers sufficient to enforce payment. Whether the assessment was

‘light’ or not, was a standing controversy between those who

respectively supported the zemindaree, the ryotwaree, and the

village systems. The Company’s advocates generally urged that,

though the ratio of tax to produce seemed heavy, any comparison with

English land-tax would be fallacious; seeing that the villagers and

cultivators in India were not called upon to pay, in addition to

land-tax, any such imposts as excise, tithes, church-rates,

county-rates, poor-rates, or income-tax. The excellences and defects

of the system, however, are not discussed here; we simply describe

the system itself.

The collector, having a definite amount to receive, from a definite

number of villages, represented by a definite number of persons,

could neither increase nor lessen, anticipate nor postpone, the tax,

without special reasons. If a district suffered from drought, the

government often deferred or wholly remitted the tax; but this only

under well-defined circumstances. The collector’s register recorded

all changes in ownership or occupancy by death or private transfer;

and as he knew each year who _ought_ to pay, he was intrusted with

certain powers to enforce payment by imprisonment, distraint of

personal property, annulment of lease, sequestration of profits,

transfer of defaulting share to a solvent shareholder of the same

community, farming of the estate to a stranger, or sale by public

auction.

In most districts, until the time of the Revolt, the collection of

revenue was an easy task, occupying only a portion of the

collector’s thoughts in May and June, November and December. ‘So

complete the machinery,’ said a writer in the _Calcutta Review_, ‘so

prosperous the provinces, so well adjusted the assessment, that the

golden shower fell uninterruptedly; and the collector, who had

without an effort of his own transmitted a royal ransom half-yearly

to the public treasury, was scarcely aware of the financial feat

which he and his subordinates had performed.’ But when a drought, an

inundation, or any great calamity interfered with the growth or

harvesting of the crop, the collector’s duties were most trying and

laborious; seeing that he had to listen to petitions for relief or

delay from hundreds or thousands of villages in his district.

His ordinary duties as a collector of revenue occupied only a

small portion of his time and thoughts. As registrar of landed

property, he kept maps and registers of land, drawn out with a

degree of minuteness scarcely paralleled in any other country in

the world; and these maps and registers were renewed or corrected

annually, to shew the size, position, ownership, and crop of every

cultivated field in the whole district. As revenue judge between

landlord and tenant, he was often called upon to assist the

responsible landowner to collect his rent from the cultivators, or

to assist the cultivator in resisting oppression by the landlord;

it was a duty requiring a knowledge both of law and of revenue

matters. As a ministerial officer of the courts of justice, he had

to put in force, somewhat in the manner of a sheriff, all

decisions of the judge relating to land, transfers of property, or

arrears of land-tax; and his local knowledge often enabled him to

assist the judge in arriving at an equitable decision. As

treasurer and accountant, he took care of the bags of silver coin

in which the land-tax and the other taxes were chiefly paid,

tested and weighed the coin before making up his accounts, paid

monthly stipends to some of the military and civil officers of the

district, kept a minute debtor and creditor account, and

transmitted his accounts and his surplus silver to Calcutta. In

addition to all these duties, the collector, considered as the

European who possessed most knowledge on various subjects in his

district, performed miscellaneous duties scarcely susceptible of

enumeration. ‘Everything that is to be done by the executive, must

be done by him, in one of his capacities; and we find him, within

his jurisdiction, publican [tax-gatherer], auctioneer, sheriff,

road-maker, timber-dealer, enlisting sergeant, sutler, slayer of

wild beasts, wool-seller, cattle-breeder, postmaster, vaccinator,

discounter of bills, and registrar-general—in which last capacity

he has also to tie the marriage-knot for those who object to the

Thirty-nine Articles. Latterly, he has been made schoolmaster of

his district also. Every new measure of government places an extra

straw on the collector’s back. Whatever happens to be the

prevailing hobby, the collector suffers. One day specimens are

called for, for the Exhibitions of London or Paris; the next day,

the cry is for iron and timber for the railway, or poles for the

telegraph.’

[Illustration:

GROUP OF INDIAN ARMS.

1. Matchlock. 2. Head of a Hunting-spear. 3. Potta. 4. Creece. 5.

Knife. 6. Hunting Tulwar. 7. Common Tulwar. 8. Kundeer. 9. Kundeer.

10. Ballagondeeka. 11. Powder-horn. 12. Pouch for balls. 13. Bow.

14. Arrow. 15. Borsee Spear—carried before chiefs, &c. 16. Bottom

end of a Spear. 17. Head of common Spear.

]

-----

Footnote 152:

‘The commander-in-chief prohibits columns from moving to the attack of

forts, whether large or small, without at least two heavy guns, or a

heavy gun and a heavy howitzer. If possible, such columns should

always have mortars also; namely, two 8-inch and two 5½-inch.

Arrangements are to be made by the inspector-general of ordnance to

insure the presence of a proportion of heavy guns, howitzers, mortars,

and cohorns, at all stations where British regiments are quartered.

Wherever there is a possibility of movable columns being organised,

the necessary elephant and bullock draught should be maintained. When

an expedition against a fort is deemed absolutely necessary, and heavy

ordnance cannot be obtained, a special reference is to be made to the

chief of the staff by telegraph. If, however, the station be removed

from the wire, the general officer commanding the division or station

must, of course, exercise a discretionary power; but the

commander-in-chief begs that it may be recollected, as a principle,

that, except in cases of the most absolute necessity, forts are not to

be attacked with light guns only.’

Footnote 153:

Chap. xiv., p. 234.

Footnote 154:

‘A circumstance well worthy of note has taken place during the last

week; it calls for remark, inasmuch as it exposes the peculiar

superstitions of the Hindoo shopkeepers of this country. In the

talooka of Nuseerabad, below the hills which form the western boundary

of Sinde, and not far south of the jaghire of Ghybee Khan, the Sirdar

of the Chandia tribe, there stands the ancient and still important

town of Hamal. It is situated on a mound close to the great Western

Trunk-road, which runs from the town of Dost Allee, in Kumbur, to that

of Gool Mahomed Luggaree; this part of the country is annually flooded

by the hill-torrents, and for this reason all the towns are built on

eminences, and surrounded by strong bunds. About twelve months ago, a

certain shopkeeper of the town went out to his field with his donkey

to work. On returning in the evening he loaded the ass, and was

proceeding homewards, when the animal fell down and died. The Hindoos

of that town consider that if, through any man’s carelessness, the

death of a beast of burden is caused, that man must make a pilgrimage

to the town of Narrainsir, a few miles south of Lucput, in the Runn of

Kutch, and there, shaving his head and performing other numerous

ceremonies, expiate his fault. Consequently, when this unfortunate man

returned home and reported the death of the donkey, he was at once

told that, unless he immediately made the requisite pilgrimage to

Narrainsir, and there expiated his fault, they would neither eat nor

drink with him, nor hold any intercourse whatever with him. As the

poor man thought the ass’s death was in no way brought about by any

fault of his, he appealed to the punchayets (Hindoo juries of five

persons each) of Larkhana, Guerrilla, and Kumbar, other large towns in

the Larkhana district. They returned answer that the punchayet of

Hamal was wrong in its decision, and that they acquitted the man of

all blame as to the cause of the ass’s death. A controversy was at

once raised throughout this part of the country, and it ended in all

the punchayets of the towns of the Katcha country siding with the

punchayet of Hamal, and the punchayets of the towns on the plain near

the river taking part with Larkhana. The dispute came to a climax

during the past week, when the Larkhana punchayet, in the name and

acting for the minor towns near the river, issued a notice that the

Hindoos of these towns would no longer associate with, nor have any

intercourse with those of Hamal, Ghybee Dherah, and other towns of the

Katcha country. This challenge was at once accepted, and the

punchayets of the Katcha country issued a counter-notice, forbidding

all Hindoos of their towns to hold intercourse with those of the

district towns above mentioned; marriages before agreed upon have been

broken off, agencies broken up, partnerships dissolved, and even the

ties of relationship are no longer binding. To such an extent do the

superstitious feelings of these men act upon their social conduct.’

Footnote 155:

Chap. xi., p. 179.

Footnote 156:

Chap. xxi., p. 360.

[Illustration:

Zemindar, Hindoo landowner.

]