BOOK XXXV

Spain, the eastern and southern parts of which were, since the 2d

Punic war, governed by the Romans under a kind of military

occupation without being reduced to the form of regular

provinces, was always in a disturbed state, partly from sudden

uprisings of various tribes against the Roman authority, and

partly from numerous bodies of banditti, who seized strongholds

or fortified towns and carried on their depredations from these

centres. Hence it had been the policy of the Roman praetors and

consuls to insist on the demolition of fortresses and city walls,

as we learn from the accounts of Cato in B.C. 195 and others. In

B.C. 177 Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus had inflicted a severe

defeat upon the Celtiberians, and had made a settlement of the

country, which for a few years produced comparative quiet and

content. But in B.C. 154 an outbreak of the Lusitani led to a

considerable disaster to the Roman army under Lucius Mummius; and

when the consul Q. Fulvius Nobilior arrived in B.C. 153, he found

that the war had accordingly spread to the Celtiberian tribes,

the Belli and Titthi, who attempted to build the walls of Segeda.

On Nobilior ordering them to desist, in accordance with Gracchan

settlement, most of them obeyed after some resistance, but some

of them fled to the Arevacae (near the sources of the Douro and

Tagus); and this powerful tribe, after defeating the Roman army,

entrenched themselves in Numantia, under the walls of which

Nobilior sustained further losses. He was superseded in B.C. 152

by Marcus Claudius Marcellus, who, partly by strategy, and partly

by administrative skill and conciliation, restored the Roman

fortunes to a better position. The Belli and Titthi became allies

of Rome, and the Arevacae at least thought it worth while to ask

for a truce to enable them to send envoys to Rome to arrange

peace.—Appian, _Hispan._ 44-50.

[Sidenote: B.C. 153-151. The war with the Celtiberian Arevacae

conducted by Q. Fulvius Nobilior and M. Claudius Marcellus.]

+1.+ The war between the Romans and Celtiberians was called the “fiery

war;” for it was of a peculiarly fierce kind and remarkable for the

frequency of its battles. The wars in Greece and Asia were as a rule

settled by one battle, or in rare cases by two; and the battles

themselves were decided by the result of the first charge and shock of

the two armies. But in this war things were quite different. As a rule

the battles were only stopped by the fall of night; the men neither

lost heart nor would yield to bodily fatigue; but returned again and

again with fresh resolution to renew the combat. The whole war, and its

series of pitched battles, was at length interrupted for a time by the

winter. One therefore could hardly conceive a war more nearly answering

to our notion of a “fiery war” than this....

[Sidenote: M. Claudius Marcellus winters at Cordova. B.C. 152-151.]

[Sidenote: The envoys from Spain.]

[Sidenote: demand the settlement of Tiberius Gracchus, B.C. 177.]

[Sidenote: The Arevacae]

[Sidenote: Speech of the Belli and Titthi.]

+2.+ The Celtiberians, after making a truce with the consul M. Claudius

Marcellus, had sent ambassadors to Rome who remained there quietly

waiting for the answer of the Senate. Meanwhile M. Claudius went on

an expedition against the Lusitani, took Nercobrica by assault, and

then went into winter quarters at Corduba. Of the ambassadors who

came to Rome the Senate admitted those from the Belli and Titthi, who

were on the side of Rome, to enter the city; but ordered those from

the Arevacae to lodge on the other side of the Tiber, as being at war

with Rome, until such time as the Senate should have decided the whole

question. When the time for the interview was come,[232] the praetor

introduced the envoys from their allies first. Barbarians as they were,

they made a set speech, and endeavoured to explain clearly the causes

of all the dissension prevailing in their country: pointing out that

“Unless those who had broken out into war were reduced to tranquillity

and punished as they deserved, the very moment the Roman legions left

Iberia, they would inflict punishment upon the Belli and Titthi as

traitors; and that if they escaped unpunished for their first act

of hostility, they would make all the tribes in Iberia ripe for an

outbreak from the belief that they were capable of coping with Rome.”

They begged, therefore, that the legions should remain in Iberia, and

that each year a consul should come thither[233] to protect the allies

of Rome and punish the depredations of the Arevacae; or, if they wished

to withdraw the legions, they should first take signal vengeance for

the outbreak of this tribe, that no one might venture to do the like

again.” Such, or to this effect, was the speech of the envoys of the

Belli and Titthi who were in alliance with Rome. The envoys of the

hostile tribe were then introduced. On coming forward the Arevacae

assumed a feigned tone of submission and humility in the language of

their answer, without being, as was evident, at all yielding in their

hearts or acknowledging themselves beaten. On the contrary, they

continually hinted at the uncertainty of fortune; and speaking of the

battles that had taken place as undecided, they conveyed the impression

that they had had the best of the contest in them all. The upshot of

their speech was this: “If they must submit to some definite mulct for

their error, they were ready to do so: but, when that was completed,

they demanded that things should revert to the position fixed by their

treaty made with the Senate in the time of Tiberius Gracchus.”

[Sidenote: The Senate refer both the deputations to Marcellus,]

[Sidenote: but secretly determine to go on with the war and to

supersede Marcellus.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 151. Coss. Lucius Licinius Lucullus, Aulus Postumius

Albinus.]

+3.+ The Senators having thus heard both sides called in the legates

from Marcellus; and when they saw that they also were inclined to a

pacification, and that Marcellus was more inclined to favour the enemy

than the allied tribes, they answered the Arevacae that Marcellus

would declare in Iberia to both parties the decision of the Senate.

However, they were convinced in their own minds that their true

interests were such as the envoys of the allied tribes suggested, and

that the Arevacae were still inclined to haughty independence, and that

their own commander was afraid of them: they therefore gave secret

instructions to the legates of Marcellus to carry on the war with

spirit, and as the honour of the country demanded. But when they had

thus determined on a continuance of the war, feeling no confidence in

Marcellus, they determined first of all to send a commander to relieve

him in Iberia, as the new consuls Aulus Postumius and Lucius Licinius

Lucullus had just taken up their office. They then entered with spirit

and vigour on their preparations, because they believed that the

Iberian question would be decided by the result of this campaign: if

these enemies were beaten, they assumed that all others would accept

the orders of Rome; but that, if the Arevacae proved able to ward off

the punishment that threatened them, not only would their spirits be

again raised, but those of all the other Iberian tribes besides.

[Sidenote: The terror of the Celtiberians at Rome made men use every

pretext for avoiding service in the army.]

[Sidenote: Scipio volunteers to act as legatus or tribune.]

[Sidenote: This offer shames others into doing the same.]

+4.+ The more determined however the Senate was to carry on the war,

the greater became their embarrassment. For the report brought to

Rome by Q. Fulvius Nobilior, the commander in Iberia in the previous

year (B.C. 153), and those who had served under him, of the perpetual

recurrence of the pitched battles, the number of the fallen, and the

valour of the Celtiberians, combined with the notorious fact that

Marcellus shrank in terror from the war, caused such a panic in the

minds of the new levies as the old men declared had never happened

before. To such an extent did the panic go, that sufficient men were

not found to come forward for the office of military tribune, and these

posts were consequently not entirely filled up; whereas heretofore a

larger number than were wanted had been wont to volunteer for the duty:

nor would the men nominated by the Consuls as _legati_ to accompany the

commanders consent to serve; and, worst of all, the young men tried

to avoid the levies, and put forward such excuses as were disgraceful

for them to allege, and beneath the investigation of the Consuls, and

yet impossible to refute. But at length, in this embarrassment of the

Senate and magistrates, when they were wondering what was to be the

end of this shameless conduct of the young men, for they could call it

nothing else, Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, who, though still a

young man, had been one of those to advise the war, and who, though he

had already acquired a reputation for high principle and pure morality,

had not been known for his personal courage, seeing the Senate was

in a difficulty, stood up and bade them send him to Iberia, either

as military tribune or legatus, for he was ready to serve in either

capacity. “Though, as far as I am concerned,” he said, “my mission to

Macedonia would be safer and more appropriate”—for it happened that at

that time Scipio was personally and by name invited by the Macedonians

to come and settle the disputes which were raging among them—“yet

the needs of my own country are the more pressing of the two, and

imperatively summon to Iberia all who have a genuine love of honour.”

This offer was unexpected by all, both from the youth of Scipio and his

general character for caution, and consequently he became exceedingly

popular on the spot, and still more so on subsequent days. For those

who had before shrunk from the danger of the service, now, from

dislike of the sorry figure they made in comparison with him, began

volunteering to serve. Some offered to go as _legati_ to the generals,

and others in groups and clubs entered their names on the muster

rolls....

_Lucius Lucinius Lucullus, consul for B.C. 151, is sent to Spain,

Scipio Aemilianus acting as his legatus. They found that the Arevacae

had already submitted to Marcellus; but being in want of money Lucullus

was determined not to be deprived of a campaign. He therefore attacked

the next tribe, the Vaccaei, who lived on the other side of the Tagus,

nominally on the pretext of their having injured the Carpetani. The war

which followed was marked by signal acts of cruelty and treachery on

the part of Lucullus, as on that of the praetor Servius Sulpicius Galba

among the Lusitani. Appian,_ Hisp. 49-55.

[Sidenote: Incidents in Scipio’s Spanish campaign.]

+5.+ In Scipio’s mind there rose a contest of feelings, and a

hesitation as to whether he ought to meet the barbarian and fight him

in single combat.[234]...

Scipio’s horse was much distressed by the blow, but did not come down

entirely, and accordingly Scipio managed to light on his feet....

[Sidenote: Restoration of the Achaean detenus, B.C. 151.]

+6.+ Cato was consulted by Scipio, at the request of Polybius, on

behalf of the Achaeans; and when the debate in the Senate, between

the party who wished to grant it and the party that opposed it, was

protracted to a considerable length, Cato stood up and said: “As

though we had nothing else to do, we sit here the whole day debating

whether some old Greek dotards should be buried by Italian or Achaean

undertakers!” Their restoration being voted, Polybius and his friends,

after a few days’ interval, were for appearing before the Senate again,

with a petition that the exiles should enjoy the same honours in Achaia

as they had before. Cato, however, remarked with a smile that Polybius,

like another Odysseus, wanted to go a second time into the cave of the

Cyclops, because he had forgotten his cap and belt....

The Histories of Polybius, Vol. 2 (of 2) · 第 25 / 31 章