[Sidenote: B.C. 167. Coss. Q. Aelius Paetus, M. Junius Pennus.]
[Sidenote: Attalus at Rome, is persuaded to try by the Roman help to
supplant his brother.]
+1.+ Attalus, brother of king Eumenes, came to Rome this year,
pretending that, even if the disaster of the Gallic rising had not
happened to the kingdom, he should have come to Rome, to congratulate
the Senate, and to receive some mark of its approval for having been
actively engaged on their side and loyally shared in all their dangers;
but, as it happened, he had been forced to come at that time to Rome
owing to the danger from the Gauls. Upon finding a general welcome from
everybody, owing to the acquaintance formed with him on the campaign,
and the belief that he was well disposed to them, and meeting with a
reception that surpassed his expectation, the young man’s hopes were
extraordinarily raised, because he did not know the true reason of
this friendly warmth. The result was that he narrowly escaped ruining
his own and his brother’s fortunes, and indeed the entire kingdom.
The majority at Rome were thoroughly angry with king Eumenes, and
believed that he had been playing a double game during the war, keeping
up communications with Perseus, and watching his opportunity against
them: and accordingly some men of high rank got Attalus under their
influence, and urged him to lay aside the character of ambassador for
his brother, and to speak in his own behalf; as the Senate was minded
to secure a separate kingdom and royal government for him, because
of their displeasure with his brother. This excited the ambition of
Attalus still more, and in private conversation he signified his assent
to those who advised this course. Finally, he arranged with some men of
position that he would actually appear before the Senate and deliver a
speech on the subject.
[Sidenote: Stratius is sent to dissuade Attalus from his meditated
treason.]
+2.+ While Attalus was engaged on this intrigue, Eumenes, fearing
what would happen, sent his physician Stratius to Rome, putting him
in possession of the facts and charging him to employ every means to
prevent Attalus from following the advice of those who wished to ruin
their kingdom. On arriving at Rome and getting Attalus by himself, he
used a great variety of arguments to him (and he was a man of great
sense and powers of persuasion), and at length, with much trouble,
succeeded in his object, and in recalling him from his mad project.
He represented to him that “he was already practically joint-king
with his brother, and only differed from him in the fact that he wore
no diadem, and was not called king, though in everything else he
possessed an equal and identical authority: that in the future he was
the acknowledged heir to the crown, and with no very distant prospect
of possession; as the king, from the weak state of his health, was in
constant expectation of his departure, and being childless could not,
even if he wished it, leave the crown to any one else.” (For in fact
that natural son of his, who afterwards succeeded to the crown, had
not as yet been acknowledged.) “Above all, he was surprised at the
hindrance Attalus was thus interposing to the measures necessary at
that particular crisis. For they ought to thank heaven exceedingly if
they proved able, even with hearty co-operation and unanimity, to repel
the threatened attack of the Gauls; but if he should at such a time
quarrel with and oppose his brother, it was quite clear that he would
ruin the kingdom, and deprive himself both of his present power and his
future expectations, and his other brothers also of the kingdom and the
power they possessed in it.” By these and similar arguments Stratius
dissuaded Attalus from taking any revolutionary steps.
[Sidenote: Embassy to Galatia.]
+3.+ Accordingly, when Attalus appeared before the Senate, he
congratulated it on what had happened; expatiated on the loyalty and
zeal shown by himself in the war with Perseus; and urged at some
length that the Senate should send envoys to restrain the audacity
of the Gauls, and compel them to confine themselves once more to
their original boundaries. He also said something about the cities
of Aeneus and Maronea, desiring that they might be given as a free
gift to himself. But he said not a single word against the king, or
about the partition of the kingdom. The senators, supposing that
he would interview them privately on a future occasion upon these
points, promised to send the envoys, and loaded him lavishly with the
customary presents, and, moreover, promised him these cities. But when,
after receiving these marks of favour, he at once left Rome without
fulfilling any of its expectations, the Senate, though foiled in its
hopes, had nothing else which it could do; but before he had got out
of Italy it declared Aeneus and Maronea free cities,—thus rescinding
its promise,—and sent Publius Licinius at the head of a mission to
the Gauls. And what instructions these ambassadors had given to them
it is not easy to say, but it may be guessed without difficulty from
what subsequently happened. And this will be rendered clear from the
transactions themselves.
[Sidenote: Fresh embassies from Rhodes, B.C. 167. See 29, 27.]
[Sidenote: Terror of the Rhodian envoys at the threat of war.]
[Sidenote: A criticism on the speech of the Rhodian Astymedes.]
+4.+ There also came embassies from Rhodes, the first headed by
Philocrates, the second by Philophron and Astymedes. For when the
Rhodians received the answer given to the embassy of Agesipolis
immediately after the battle of Pydna, they understood the anger
and threatening attitude of the Senate towards them, and promptly
despatched these embassies. Astymedes and Philophron, observing in the
course of public and private conversations the suspicions and anger
entertained towards them at Rome, were reduced to a state of great
discouragement and distress. But when one of the praetors mounted the
Rostra and urged the people to declare war against Rhodes, then indeed
they were beside themselves with terror at the danger that threatened
their country. They assumed mourning garments, and in their various
interviews with their friends dropped the tone of persuasion or demand,
and pleaded instead, with tears and prayers, that they would not adopt
any measure of supreme severity towards them. A few days afterwards
Antony, one of the tribunes, introduced them to the Senate, and dragged
the praetor who advised the war down from the Rostra. Philophron spoke
first, and was followed by Astymedes; and, having thus uttered the
proverbial “swan’s song,” they received an answer which, while freeing
them from actual fear of war, conveyed a bitter and stern rebuke from
the Senate for their conduct. Now Astymedes considered himself to have
made a good speech on behalf of his country, but did not at all satisfy
the Greeks visiting or residing at Rome. For he afterwards published
the speech containing his argument in defence, which, to all those
into whose hands it fell, appeared absurd and quite unconvincing. For
he rested his plea not alone on the merits of his country, but still
more on an accusation of others. Comparing the good services done and
the co-operation undertaken by the others, he endeavoured to deny or
minimise them; while he exaggerated those of Rhodes as far above their
actual amount as he could. The errors of others, on the contrary, he
inveighed against in bitter and hostile terms, while those of the
Rhodians he attempted to cloak and conceal, in order that, by this
comparison, those of his own country might appear insignificant and
pardonable, those of others grave and beyond excuse, “all of whom,” he
added, “had already been pardoned before.” But this sort of pleading
can in no circumstances be considered becoming to a statesman. Take the
case of the betrayal of secrets. It is not those who, for fear or gain,
turn informers that we commend; but those who endure any torture and
punishment rather than involve an accomplice in the same misfortune.
These are the men whom we approve and consider noble. But a man who,
from some undefined alarm, exposes to the view of the party in power
all the errors of others, and who recalls what time had obliterated
from the minds of the ruling people, cannot fail to be an object of
dislike to all who hear of it.
[Sidenote: Dismayed by this answer the Rhodians endeavour to propitiate
the Senate. Livy, 45, 25.]
[Sidenote: The Senate declare Caria and Lycia free. See 22, 5.]
[Sidenote: Caunus, in Peraea, and Mylassa, in Caria, revolt.]
[Sidenote: The astuteness of the Rhodian policy.]
+5.+ After receiving the above answer Philocrates and his colleagues
immediately started home; but Astymedes and his fellows stayed where
they were and kept on the watch, that no report or observation against
their country might be made unknown to them. But when this answer of
the Senate was reported at Rhodes, the people, considering themselves
relieved of the worst fear—that, namely, of war—made light of the
rest, though extremely unfavourable. So true it ever is that a dread
of worse makes men forget lighter misfortunes. They immediately voted
a complimentary crown worth ten thousand gold pieces[174] to Rome,
and appointed Theaetetus at once envoy and navarch to convey it at
the beginning of summer, accompanied by an embassy under Rhodophon,
to attempt in every possible way to make an alliance with the Romans.
They acted thus because they wished that, if the embassy failed by
an adverse answer at Rome, the failure might take place without the
people having passed a formal decree, the attempt being made solely
on the initiative of the navarch, and the navarch having by the law
power to act in such a case. For the fact was that the republic of
Rhodes had been administered with such consummate statesmanship,
that, though it had for nearly a hundred and forty years been engaged
in conjunction with Rome in actions of the greatest importance and
glory, it had never yet made an alliance with her. Nor ought I to omit
stating the reason of this policy of the Rhodians. They wished that
no ruler or prince should be entirely without hope of gaining their
support or alliance; and they therefore did not choose to bind or
hamper themselves beforehand with oaths and treaties; but, by remaining
uncommitted, to be able to avail themselves of all advantages as they
arose. But on this occasion they were much bent upon securing this mark
of honour from Rome, not because they were anxious for the alliance,
or because they were afraid of any one else at the time except the
Romans, but because they wished, by giving an air of special importance
to their design, to remove the suspicions of such as were inclined to
entertain unfavourable thoughts of their state. For immediately after
the return of the ambassadors under Theaetetus, the Caunians revolted
and the Mylassians seized on the cities in Eurōmus. And about the same
time the Roman Senate published a decree declaring all Carians and
Lycians free who had been assigned to the Rhodians after the war with
Antiochus. The Caunian and Mylassian revolts were speedily put down by
the Rhodians; for they compelled the Caunians, by sending Lycus with a
body of soldiers, to return to their allegiance, though the people of
Cibyra had come to their assistance; and in an expedition into Eurōmus
they conquered the Mylassians and Alabandians in the field, these two
peoples having combined their forces to attack Orthosia. But when the
decree concerning the Lycians and Carians was announced they were once
more in a state of dismay, fearing that their gift of the crown had
proved in vain, as well as their hopes of an alliance....
[Sidenote: The three classes of men who in the various states got into
trouble for their conduct during the Macedonian war.]
+6.+ I have already directed my readers’ attention to the policy
of Deinon and Polyaratus. For Rhodes was not the only place which
experienced grave danger and important changes. Nearly all the states
suffered in the same way. It will therefore be instructive to take a
review of the policy adopted by the statesmen in the several countries,
and to ascertain which of them will be proved to have acted with
wisdom, and which to have done otherwise: in order that posterity in
similar circumstances of danger may, with these examples as models,
so to speak, before their eyes, be able to choose the good and avoid
the bad with a genuine insight; and may not in the last hour of their
lives dishonour their previous character and achievements, from failing
to perceive where the path of honour lies. There were, then, three
different classes of persons who incurred blame for their conduct in
the war with Perseus. One consisted of those who, while displeased at
seeing the controversy brought to a decisive end, and the control of
the world fall into the power of one government, nevertheless took
absolutely no active steps for or against the Romans, but left the
decision entirely to Fortune. A second consisted of those who were glad
to see the question settled, and wished Perseus to win, but were unable
to convert the citizens of their own states or the members of their
race to their sentiments. And a third class consisted of those who
actually succeeded in inducing their several states to change round and
join the alliance of Perseus. Our present task is to examine how each
of these conducted their respective policies.
[Sidenote: Antinous, Theodotus, and Cephalus of the Molossi are
instances of the third class.]
+7.+ In the last class were Antinous, Theodotus, and Cephalus, who
induced the Molossians to join Perseus. These men, when the results of
the campaign went completely against them, and they found themselves
in imminent danger of the worst consequences, put a bold face upon
it and met an honourable death in the field. These men deserve our
commendation for their self-respect, in refusing to allow themselves to
lapse into a position unworthy of their previous life.
[Sidenote: Several instances of the first class in Achaia Phthiotis,
Thessaly, and Perrhaebia.]
Again, in Achaia and Thessaly and Perrhaebia several persons incurred
blame by remaining neutral, on the ground that they were watching their
opportunity, and were in heart on the side of Perseus; and yet they
never let a word to that effect get abroad, nor were ever detected
in sending letter or message to Perseus on any subject whatever, but
conducted themselves with unexceptionable discretion. Such men as these
therefore very properly determined to face judicial inquiry and stand
their judgment, and to make every effort to save themselves. For it is
quite as great a sign of cowardice to abandon life voluntarily when a
man is conscious of no crime, from fear of the threats of political
opponents or of the power of the conquerors, as it is to cling to life
to the loss of honour.
[Sidenote: Instances of the second class in Rhodes, Cos, and other
places.]
Again, in Rhodes and Cos, and several other cities, there were men
who favoured the cause of Perseus, and who were bold enough to speak
in behalf of the Macedonians in their own cities, and to inveigh
against the Romans, and to actually advise active steps in alliance
with Perseus, but who were not able to induce their states to transfer
themselves to alliance with the king. The most conspicuous of such men
were in Cos the two brothers Hippias and Diomedon, and in Rhodes Deinon
and Polyaratus.
+8.+ And it is impossible not to view the policy of these men with
disapproval. To begin with, all their fellow-citizens were aware of
everything they had done or said; in the next place, the letters were
intercepted and made public which were coming from Perseus to them, and
from themselves to Perseus, as well as the messengers from both sides:
yet they could not make up their minds to yield and put themselves
out of the way, but still disputed the point. The result of this
persistence and clinging to life, in the face of a desperate position,
was that they quite ruined their character for courage and resolution,
and left not the least ground for pity or sympathy in the minds of
posterity. For being confronted with their own letters and agents,
they were regarded as not merely unfortunate, but rather as shameless.
One of those who went on these voyages was a man named Thoas. He had
frequently sailed to Macedonia on a mission from these men, and when
the decisive change in the state of affairs took place, conscious of
what he had done, and fearing the consequences, he retired to Cnidos.
But the Cnidians having thrown him into prison, he was demanded by
the Rhodians, and on coming to Rhodes and being put to the torture,
confessed his crime; and his story was found to agree with everything
in the cipher of the intercepted letters, and with the despatches from
Perseus to Deinon, and from Deinon and Polyaratus to him. Therefore it
was a matter of surprise that Deinon persuaded himself to cling to life
and submit to so signal an exposure.
[Sidenote: The vain attempts of Polyaratus to escape,]
[Sidenote: at Phaselis,]
[Sidenote: at Caunus,]
[Sidenote: and at Cibyra.]
+9.+ But in respect to folly and baseness of spirit, Polyaratus
surpassed Deinon. For when Popilius Laenas charged king Ptolemy to send
Polyaratus to Rome, the king, from a regard both to Polyaratus himself
and his country, determined not to send him to Rome but to Rhodes, this
being also what Polyaratus himself asked him to do. Having therefore
caused a galley to be prepared, the king handed him over to Demetrius,
one of his own friends, and despatched him, and wrote a despatch to the
Rhodians notifying the fact. But touching at Phaselis in the course
of the voyage, Polyaratus, from some notion or another which he had
conceived, took suppliant branches in his hand, and fled for safety to
the city altar. If any one had asked him his intention in thus acting,
I am persuaded that he could not have told it. For if he wanted to go
to his own country, where was the need of suppliant branches? For his
conductors were charged to take him there. But if he wished to go to
Rome, that was sure to take place whether he wished it or no. What
other alternative was there? Other place that could receive him with
safety to himself there was none. However, on the people of Phaselis
sending to Rhodes to beg that they would receive Polyaratus, and take
him away, the Rhodians came to the prudent resolution of sending an
open vessel to convoy him; but forbade the captain of it to actually
take him on board, on the ground that the officers from Alexandria had
it in charge to deliver the man in Rhodes. When the vessel arrived
at Phaselis, and its captain, Epichares, refused to take the man
on board, and Demetrius, who had been deputed by the king for that
business, urged him to leave the altar and resume his voyage; and when
the people of Phaselis supported his command, because they were afraid
they would incur some blame from Rome on that account, Polyaratus
could no longer resist the pressure of circumstances, but once more
went on board Demetrius’s galley. But in the course of the voyage he
seized an opportunity of doing the same again at Caunus, flying for
safety there in the same way, and begging the Caunians to save him.
Upon the Caunians rejecting him, on the grounds of their being leagued
with Rhodes, he sent messages to Cibyra, begging them to receive him
in their city, and to send him an escort. He had some claim upon this
city, because the sons of its tyrant, Pancrates, had been educated at
his house; accordingly, they listened to his request, and did what he
asked. But when he got to Cibyra, he placed himself and the Cibyratae
into a still greater difficulty than that which he caused before when
at Phaselis. For they neither dared to retain him in their town for
fear of Rome, nor had the power of sending him to Rome, because of
their ignorance of the sea, being an entirely inland folk. Eventually
they were reduced to send envoys to Rhodes and the Roman proconsul in
Macedonia, begging them to take over the man. Lucius Aemilius wrote to
the Cibyratae, ordering them to keep Polyaratus in safe custody; and to
the Rhodians to make provision for his conveyance by sea and his safe
delivery upon Roman territory. Both peoples obeyed the despatch: and
thus Polyaratus eventually came to Rome, after making a spectacle of
his folly and cowardice to the best of his ability; and after having
been, thanks to his own folly, four times surrendered—by king Ptolemy,
the people of Phaselis, the Cibyratae, and the Rhodians.
The reason of my having dwelt at some length on the story of Polyaratus
and Deinon is not that I have any desire to trample upon their
misfortunes, for that would be ungenerous in the last degree; but in
order that, by clearly showing their folly, I might instruct those who
fall into similar difficulties and dangers how to take a better and
wiser course....
[Sidenote: The columns constructed at Delphi for statues of Perseus
used by Aemilius. Autumn of B.C. 167. Livy, 45, 27.]
+10.+ The most striking illustration of the mutability and
capriciousness of Fortune is when a man, within a brief period, turns
out to have been preparing for the use of his enemies the very things
which he imagined that he was elaborating in his own honour. Thus
Perseus was having some columns made, which Lucius Aemilius, finding
unfinished, caused to be completed, and placed statues of himself on
them....
[Sidenote: Aemilius at Corinth.]
He admired the situation of the city, and the excellent position of the
acropolis for commanding the districts on both sides of the Isthmus....
[Sidenote: At Olympia.]
Having been long anxious to see Olympia, he set out thither....
Aemilius entered the sacred enclosure at Olympia, and was struck with
admiration at the statue of the god, remarking that, to his mind,
Pheidias was the only artist who had represented the Zeus of Homer; and
that, though he had had great expectations of Olympia, he found the
reality far surpassed them....
[Sidenote: The disturbed state of Aetolia,]
+11.+ The Aetolians had been accustomed to get their livelihood from
plundering and such like lawless occupations; and as long as they
were permitted to plunder and loot the Greeks, they got all they
required from them, regarding every country as that of an enemy.
But subsequently, when the Romans obtained the supremacy, they were
prevented from this means of support, and accordingly turned upon
each other. Even before this, in their civil war, there was no horror
which they did not commit; and a little earlier still they had had a
taste of mutual slaughter in the massacres at Arsinoe;[175] they were,
therefore, ready for anything, and their minds were so infuriated that
they would not allow their magistrates to have even a voice in their
business. Aetolia, accordingly, was a scene of turbulence, lawlessness,
and blood: nothing they undertook was done on any calculation or fixed
plan; everything was conducted at haphazard and in confusion, as though
a hurricane had burst upon them....
[Sidenote: and of Epirus. See 27, 15.]
+12.+ The state of Epirus was much the same. For in proportion as the
majority of its people are more law-abiding than those of Aetolia,
so their chief magistrate surpassed every one else in wickedness and
contempt for law. For, I think, there never was and never will be a
character more ferocious and brutal than that of Charops....
[Sidenote: The selection of suspected Greeks, especially Achaeans, to
be sent to Italy, B.C. 167.]
+13.+ After the destruction of Perseus, immediately after the decisive
battle, embassies were sent on all sides to congratulate the Roman
commanders on the event. And as now all power tended towards Rome, in
every city those who were regarded as of the Romanising party were in
the ascendant, and were appointed to embassies and other services.
Accordingly they flocked into Macedonia—from Achaia, Callicrates,
Aristodamus, Agesias, and Philippus; from Boeotia, Mnasippos; from
Acarnania, Chremas; from Epirus, Charops and Nicias; from Aetolia,
Lyciscus and Tisippus. These all having met, and eagerly viewing with
each other in attaining a common object; and there being no one to
oppose them, since their political opponents had all yielded to the
times and completely retired, they accomplished their purpose without
trouble. So the ten commissioners issued orders to the other cities
and leagues through the mouths of the strategi themselves as to what
citizens were to go to Rome. And these turned out to be, for the most
part, those whom the men I have named had made a list of on party
grounds, except a very few of such as had done something conspicuous.
But to the Achaean league they sent two men of the highest rank of
their own number, Gaius Claudius and Gnaeus Domitius. They had two
reasons for doing so: the first was that they were uneasy lest the
Achaeans should refuse to obey the written order, and lest Callicrates
and his colleagues should be in absolute danger from being reputed
to be the authors of the accusations against all the Greeks,—which
was about true; and in the second place, because in the intercepted
despatches nothing distinct had been discovered against any Achaean.
Accordingly, after a while, the proconsul sent the letter and envoys
with reference to these men, although in his private opinion he did
not agree with the charges brought by Lyciscus and Callicrates, as was
afterwards made clear by what took place....
[Sidenote: Triumph of L. Anicius Gallus over the Illyrians at the
Quirinalia, February 17, B.C. 167.]
[Sidenote: A scene in a Roman theatre.]
+14.+ Lucius Anicius, who had been praetor, after his victory over the
Illyrians, and on bringing Genthius prisoner to Rome with his children,
while celebrating his triumph, did a very ridiculous thing. He sent for
the most famous artists from Greece, and having constructed an immense
theatre in the circus, he brought all the flute-players on the stage
together first. Their names were Theodorus the Boeotian, Theopompus and
Hermippus of Lysimacheia, the most celebrated of the day. He placed
them on the proscenium with the chorus, and bid them all play at once.
But on their beginning to play the tune, accompanied by appropriate
movements, he sent to them to say that they were not playing well,
and must put more excitement into it. At first they did not know what
to make of this, until one of the lictors showed them that they must
form themselves into two companies, and facing round, advance against
each other as though in a battle. The flute-players caught the idea
at once, and, adopting a motion suitable to their own wild strains,
produced a scene of great confusion. They made the middle group of the
chorus face round upon the two extreme groups, and the flute-players,
blowing with inconceivable violence and discordance, led these groups
against each other. The members of the chorus meanwhile rushed, with a
violent stamping which shook the stage, against those opposite them,
and then faced round and retired. But when one of the chorus, whose
dress was closely girt up, turned round on the spur of the moment
and raised his hands, like a boxer, in the face of the flute-player
who was approaching him, then the spectators clapped their hands and
cheered loudly. Whilst this sort of sham fight was going on, two
dancers were brought into the orchestra to the sound of music; and four
boxers mounted upon the stage, accompanied by trumpeters and clarion
players. The effect of these various contests all going on together
was indescribable. But if I were to speak about their tragic actors, I
should be thought by some to be jesting.[176]...
+15.+ It requires the same sort of spirit to arrange public games
well, and to set out great banquets and wine with fitting splendour,
as it does to draw up an army in presence of the enemy with strategic
skill....
[Sidenote: Aemilius in Epirus.]
+16.+ Aemilius Paulus took seventy cities in Epirus after the conquest
of the Macedonians and Perseus, most of which were in the country of
the Molossi; and enslaved one hundred and fifty thousand men....
[Sidenote: Release of Menalcidas.]
+17.+ In Egypt the first thing the kings did after being relieved from
the war with Antiochus was to send Numenius, one of their friends, as
an envoy to Rome to return thanks for the favours received; and they
next released the Lacedaemonian Menalcidas, who had made active use of
the occasion against the kingdom for his own advantage; Gaius Popilius
Laenas asked the king for his release as a favour to himself.[177]...
[Sidenote: Cotys, king of the Odrysae, cp. bk. 27, ch. 12.]
+18.+ At this period Cotys, king of the Odrysae, sent ambassadors to
Rome, asking for the restoration of his son, and pleading his defence
for having acted on the side of Perseus. The Romans, considering that
they had effected their purpose by the successful issue of the war
against Perseus, and that they had no need to press their quarrel with
Cotys any further, allowed him to take his son back—who, having been
sent as a hostage to Macedonia, had been captured with the children of
Perseus,—wishing to display their clemency and magnanimity, and with
the idea at the same time of binding Cotys to themselves by so great a
favour....
[Sidenote: The abject conduct of king Prusias.]
+19.+ About the same time king Prusias also came to Rome to
congratulate the Senate and the generals on their success. This Prusias
was in no sense worthy of the royal title, as we may judge from the
following facts: When the Roman envoys first appeared at his court, he
met them with shorn head and wearing a cap, toga, and shoes, and in
fact exactly in the garb worn by those recently manumitted at Rome,
whom they call _liberti_: and greeting the envoys respectfully, he
exclaimed, “Behold your freedman, who is willing to obey you in all
things and to imitate your fashions!” than which a more contemptible
speech it would be difficult to imagine. And now, again, when he
reached the entrance of the Senate-house he stopped at the door facing
the senators, and, dropping both his hands he paid reverence to the
threshold and the seated Fathers, exclaiming, “Hail, ye gods my
preservers!” seeming bent on surpassing all who might come after him
in meanness of spirit, unmanliness, and servility. And his behaviour
in the conference which he held when he had entered the Senate-house
was on a par with this; and was such as might make one blush even to
write. However this contemptible display served in itself to secure him
a favourable answer.
[Sidenote: To prevent a visit from Eumenes the Senate pass a decree
forbidding all kings to visit Rome.]
[Sidenote: Eumenes stopped at Brundisium.]
+20.+ Just as he had got his answer, news came that Eumenes was on his
way. This caused the Senators much embarrassment. They were thoroughly
incensed with him, and were entirely fixed in their sentiments towards
him; and yet they did not wish to betray themselves. For having
proclaimed to all the world that this king was their foremost and
most esteemed friend, if they now admitted him to an interview and
allowed him to plead his cause, they must either, by answering as they
really thought and in harmony with their sentiments, signalise their
own folly in having marked out such a man in past times for special
honour; or if, in deference to appearances, they gave him a friendly
answer, they must disregard truth and the interests of their country.
Therefore, as both these methods of proceeding could have consequences
of a disagreeable nature, they hit upon the following solution of the
difficulty. On the ground of a general dislike of the visits of kings,
they published a decree that “no king was to visit Rome.” Having been
informed subsequently that Eumenes had landed at Brundisium in Italy,
they sent the quaestor to convey the decree to him, and to bid him to
communicate with himself if he wanted anything from the Senate; or, if
he did not want anything, to bid him depart at the earliest possible
opportunity from Italy. When the quaestor met the king and informed him
of the decree, the latter, thoroughly understanding the intention of
the Senate, said not a single word, except that “he wanted nothing.”
[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 167-166.]
This is the way in which Eumenes was prevented from coming to Rome.
And it was not the only important result of this decree. For the Gauls
were at that time threatening the kingdom of Eumenes; and it was soon
made apparent that by this repulse the king’s allies were all greatly
depressed, while the Gauls were doubly encouraged to press on the war.
And it was in fact their desire to humiliate him in every possible way
that induced the Senate to adopt this resolution. These things were
going on at the beginning of the winter: but to all other ambassadors
who arrived—and there was no city or prince or king who had not at that
time sent an embassy of congratulation—the Senate returned a gracious
and friendly answer, except to the Rhodians; and these they dismissed
with displeasure, and with ambiguous declarations as to the future. As
to the Athenians again the Senate hesitated....
[Sidenote: The Athenians ask for the restoration of Haliartus; failing
that, to have its territory, with Delos and Lemnos themselves.]
+21.+ The first object of the Athenian embassy was the restoration of
Haliartus;[178] but when they met with a refusal on that point, they
changed the subject of their appeal and put forward their own claim
to the possession of Delos, Lemnos, and the territory of Haliartus.
No one could properly find fault with them for this, as far as Delos
and Lemnos were concerned, for they had of old laid claim to them; but
there is good reason for reproaching them in respect to the territory
of Haliartus. Haliartus was nearly the most ancient city in Boeotia;
had met with a heavy misfortune: instead of endeavouring in every
possible way to restore it,—to contribute to its utter annihilation,
and to deprive its dispossessed inhabitants of even their hopes for the
future, was an act which would be thought worthy of no Greek nation,
and least of all of the Athenians. They open their own territory to all
comers; and to take away that of others can never appear consonant with
the spirit of their State. However, the Senate granted them Delos and
Lemnos. Such was the decision in the Athenian business....
[Sidenote: The possession of these places a misfortune to Athens. See
32, 17.] As to Lemnos and Delos they had, according to the proverb,
“got the wolf by the ears:” for they suffered much ill fortune from
their quarrels with the Delians; and from the territory of Haliartus
they reaped shame rather than profit....
[Sidenote: Death of Theaetetus of Rhodes.]
[Sidenote: Caunus and Stratoniceia in Caria.]
+22.+ At this time Theaetetus being admitted into the Senate spoke
on the subject of the alliance. The Senate, however, postponed the
consideration of the proposal, and in the meantime Theaetetus died in
the course of nature, for he was more than eighty years old. But on
the arrival in Rome of exiles from Caunus and Stratoniceia, and their
admission to the Senate, a decree was passed ordering the Rhodians to
withdraw their garrisons from Caunus and Stratoniceia. And the embassy
of Philophron and Astymedes having received this answer sailed with all
speed home, alarmed lest the Rhodians should disregard the order for
withdrawing the garrisons, and so give a fresh ground for complaints....
[Sidenote: The effect of the message from the Romans in the Achaean
league. _Supra_ ch. 13.]
+23.+ In the Peloponnese, when the ambassadors arrived and announced
the answers from Rome, there was no longer mere clamour, but downright
rage and hatred against Callicrates and his party....
[Sidenote: Unpopularity of Callicrates, Adronidas, and their party.]
An instance of the hatred entertained for Callicrates and Adronidas,
and the others who agreed with them, was this. The festival of the
Antigoneia was being held at Sicyon,—the baths being all supplied with
large public bathing tubs, and smaller ones placed by them used by
bathers of the better sort,—if Adronidas or Callicrates entered one of
these, not a single one of the bystanders would get into it any more,
until the bathman had let every drop of water run out and filled it
with fresh. They did this from the idea that they would be polluted
by entering the same water as these men. Nor would it be easy to
describe the hissing and hooting that took place at the public games in
Greece when any one attempted to proclaim one of them victor. The very
children in the streets as they returned from school ventured to call
them traitors to their faces. To such height did the anger and hatred
of these men go....
[Sidenote: Joy of the people of Peraea at the Roman decree emancipating
them from Rhodes.]
+24.+ The inhabitants of Peraea were like slaves unexpectedly released
from chains, who are scarcely able to believe their present good
fortune, thinking it a change almost too great to be natural; and
cannot believe that those they meet can understand or fully see that
they are really released, unless they do something strange and out of
the ordinary course....