_The events of the years B.C. 174, 173, 172, which gradually led up to
the war with Perseus, to be described in the twenty-seventh book, were
briefly these_:—
In B.C. 174 Perseus forced the Dolopes, who had appealed against him
to Rome, to submit to his authority. After this successful expedition
he marched through Central and Northern Greece, visiting Delphi, where
he stayed three days, Phthiotid Achaia, and Thessaly. He carefully
abstained from inflicting any damage in the districts through which he
passed, and tried to gain the confidence of the various states. In the
same year he made friendly advances to the Achaeans, who had forbidden
any Lacedaemonian to enter their territory, by offering to restore
their fugitive slaves. But in spite of the exertions of Xenarchus the
Strategus, the Achaeans refuse to make any change (Livy, 41, 22-24).
The same year saw also commotions in Aetolia, which were settled by
five Roman commissioners: and in Crete, on the old score of the status
of the Lycians. Q. Minucius was sent to settle this also (Livy, 41, 25).
In B.C. 173 Perseus entered on still more active intrigues in
Greece, and in spite of the wildest scandals that were afloat as to
his tyranny, he gained a powerful hold in Aetolia, Thessaly, and
Perrhaebia. The Senate accordingly sent Marcellus to Aetolia and
Achaia, and App. Claudius to Thessaly, to inquire into the facts;
and a commission of five into Macedonia, with directions to proceed
afterwards to Alexandria (Livy, 42, 5, 6).
In B.C. 172 king Eumenes visited Rome and urged the Senate to take
measures in time to counteract the attempts of Perseus; warning them
that he had already obtained strong hold upon the Boeotians and
Aetolians, and had an inexhaustible recruiting ground in Thrace. That
everywhere he had secured the death or exile of the partisans of Rome,
and was overrunning in arms Thessaly and Perrhaebia (Livy, 42, 11-13).
The Senate, already inclined to listen to these representations,
was still more inclined to do so by the defiant tone of Harpalus,
the representative of king Perseus; by the attempted assassination
of Eumenes by emissaries of Perseus at Delphi on his home journey;
by receiving a report from Greece from C. Valerius confirming the
speech of Eumenes; and lastly by the confession of one L. Rammius of
Brundisium, that he had been requested to poison certain Roman envoys
who were accustomed to stay at his house on their journeys to and from
Macedonia and Greece (Livy, 42, 15-17).
War was now determined on for the next year, and the praetor ordered to
enroll troops. And Eumenes also, now recovered from the wounds of the
assassins, made preparations to join in the struggle (Livy, 42, 18-27).
In B.C. 171, fresh legions having been enrolled, and an army of sixteen
thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry ordered to Macedonia,
envoys appeared from Perseus demanding the reason. The Senate would
not allow them to enter the Pomoerium, but received them in the temple
of Bellona: and after listening to a report from Sp. Cavilius that
Perseus had, among other acts of hostility, taken cities in Thessaly
and entered Perrhaebia in arms, the Senate answered the Macedonian
envoys that any complaint they had to make must be made to the consul,
P. Licinius, who would presently be in Macedonia, but that they must
not come into Italy again (Livy, 42, 36).
A few days afterwards five commissioners were sent into Greece, who
distributed the districts to be visited among themselves: Servius
and Publius Lentulus and Lucius Decimius were to go to Cephallenia,
the Peloponnese, and the west coast generally; Q. Marcius and Aulus
Atilius to Epirus, Aetolia, Thessaly, and thence to Boeotia and Euboea,
where they were to meet the Lentuli. Meanwhile a letter from Perseus,
demanding the cause of their coming and of the presence of troops
in Macedonia, was received and left unanswered. After visiting the
districts assigned to them, in the course of doing which Marcius and
Atilius had met Perseus on the river Peneus, and granted him a truce to
enable him to send envoys to Rome (Marcius knowing well that the Romans
were not yet fully prepared for war[144]), the commissioners reached
their destination at Chalcis, where the earlier events narrated in the
following extracts occurred (Livy, 42, 36-43).
THE WAR WITH PERSEUS
[Sidenote: Thebes.]
[Sidenote: The Roman commissioners at Chalcis: ambassadors from
Thespiae and Neon of Boeotia.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 171. Coss. P. Licinius Crassus, C. Cassius Longinus.]
+1.+ At this time Lases and Callias arrived at the head of an embassy
from the Thespians, and Ismenias[145] from Neon. Lases and his
colleagues offered to put their city wholly into the hands of the
Romans; Ismenias proposed to submit all the cities of Boeotia as one
nation to the discretion of the commissioners. But this latter proposal
was diametrically opposed to the policy of Marcius and his colleagues.
What suited that policy best was to split up Boeotia into separate
cities: and they therefore received Lases and his party, as well as
the envoys from Chaeronea and Lebadea, and all who came from single
cities, with great favour and lavish courtesy; but treated Ismenias
with ostentatious neglect and coldness. Some of the exiles[146] also
attacked Ismenias and were very near stoning him to death, and would
have done so if he had not saved himself by taking refuge through the
door[147] of the chamber where the commissioners were sitting. At the
same period there were disturbances and party contests at Thebes. One
party were for committing the town unconditionally to Rome; but the
Coroneans and Haliartians flocked to Thebes and vehemently maintained
that they ought to maintain the alliance with Perseus. For a time
neither of the two parties showed any disposition to give in to each
other; but when Olympichus of Coronea set the example of changing
sides and asserting that they ought to cleave to the Romans, a great
change and revolution came over the feelings of the populace. First,
they compelled Dicetas to go on an embassy to Marcius and the other
commissioners to excuse them for their alliance with Perseus. Next,
they expelled Neon and Hippias, crowding to their houses, and bidding
them go and make their own defence for the terms that they had made;
for they were the men who had negotiated the alliance. When these men
had left the town, the people immediately collected into the assembly
and first voted honours and gifts to the Romans, and then ordered
the magistrates to push on the alliance. Last of all they appointed
ambassadors to hand over the city to the Romans and to restore their
exiles.
[Sidenote: The cause of the exiles’ triumph at Chalcis.]
+2.+ Whilst these things were being accomplished at Thebes, the
exiles in Chalcis appointed Pompides to state their grievances
against Ismenias, Neon, and Dicetas. The bad policy of these men
being manifest, and the Romans lending their support to the exiles,
Hippias and his party were rendered so odious that they were in danger
of falling victims to the fury of the populace, until the Romans, by
checking the assaults of the mob, secured them a certain degree of
safety.
[Sidenote: Dissolution of the Boeotian league, B.C. 171.]
When the Theban envoys arrived, bringing with them to the commissioners
the decrees and honours I have mentioned, a rapid change passed over
the face of things in each of the towns, for they were separated by a
very narrow interval from each other. The commissioners with Marcius
received the Theban envoys, complimented their town and counselled
them to restore the exiles, and bade the several towns send embassies
to Rome submitting themselves individually and unreservedly to the
protection of the Romans. Their policy, therefore, of splitting up
the league of the Boeotian towns, and of destroying the popularity
of the Macedonian royal house with the Boeotian populace having thus
completely succeeded, the commissioners sent for Servius Lentulus from
Argos, and leaving him in charge at Chalcis went themselves to the
Peloponnese; while Neon a few days afterwards retired to Macedonia;
and Ismenias and Dicetas, being thrown at once into prison, shortly
afterwards put an end to their lives. Thus it came about that the
Boeotians, who had for a long period of years, and through many
strange vicissitudes, maintained a national league, by now rashly and
inconsiderately adopting the cause of Perseus, and giving way to an
outburst of unreasoning excitement, were entirely disintegrated and
split up into separate cities.
[Sidenote: The Commissioners in the Peloponnese.]
When Aulus and Marcius arrived at Argos, after communication with the
council of the Achaean league, they called upon Archon the Strategus
to despatch a thousand men to Chalcis, to garrison the town until the
arrival of the Romans; an order which Archon readily obeyed. Having
thus settled affairs in Greece during the winter, and met Publius
Lentulus and his two colleagues, the commissioners sailed back to
Rome....
[Sidenote: The Rhodians prepare to co-operate with Rome.]
+3.+ Meanwhile Tiberius Claudius and Aulus Postumius had been engaged
on a visitation of the islands and Greek cities in Asia, and had spent
the longest time in Rhodes; though the Rhodians at that time did not
require any supervision, for the prytanis that year was Agesilochus,
a man of high rank, who had once been on an embassy to Rome. Even
before the legates came, as soon as it became clear that the Romans
intended to go to war with Perseus he had urged his people to throw
in their fortunes with those of Rome; and, among other things, had
counselled them to repair forty ships, in order that, if any occasion
for using them should arise, it should not find them still in the midst
of preparations, but ready to answer to the call and to carry out
their resolve at once. By stating these facts to the Roman envoys, and
showing them the preparations visibly progressing, he let them return
to Rome in a high state of satisfaction with Rhodes....
[Sidenote: Perseus sends a circular despatch to the Greek States.]
[Sidenote: The reply of the Rhodians.]
+4.+ After the conferences had been held between the Roman envoys
and the Greeks, Perseus drew up a despatch containing a statement of
his case, and the arguments employed on either side; partly from an
idea that he would thus be shown to have the superiority of right on
his side, and partly because he wished to test the feelings of the
several states. Copies of this despatch he sent to the other states
by his ordinary letter-carriers; but to Rhodes he sent also Antenor
and Philip as ambassadors, who, on their arrival in the island, handed
over the document to the magistrates, and a few days afterwards entered
the Council chamber and urged the Rhodians “To remain neutral for the
present and watch what happened; and, if the Romans attacked Perseus
in violation of the treaty, to endeavour to mediate. For this was the
interest of all, and pre-eminently of the Rhodians, who more than most
peoples desired equality and freedom of speech, and were ever the
protectors, not only of their own liberty, but of that of the rest
of Greece also; and therefore ought to be proportionally careful to
provide and guard against a policy of an opposite tendency.” These
and similar arguments of the envoys found favour with the Rhodian
people. But, as they were already pledged to an attitude of friendship
to Rome, the influence of the upper classes so far prevailed that,
though a friendly reception was given to the Macedonian envoys, they
demanded in their formal answer that Perseus should not ask them to
take any measure which would involve the appearance of hostility to
Rome. Antenor and his colleagues would not accept this reply, but with
thanks for the kindness of their general reception, sailed back to
Macedonia....
[Sidenote: Mission of Perseus to Boeotia.]
[Sidenote: Truce made with Q. Marcius. See Livy, 42, 43, B.C. 171.]
+5.+ Being informed that some of the cities of Boeotia remained
faithful to him, Perseus sent Alexander on a mission to them. On his
arrival in Boeotia, Alexander was obliged to abstain from visiting any
of the cities except Coronea, Thisbae,[148] and Haliartus, finding
that they offered him no facilities for securing close relations. But
he entered those three towns and exhorted their inhabitants to cling
to their loyalty to the Macedonians. They received his words with
enthusiasm, and voted to send ambassadors to Macedonia. Alexander
accordingly returned to the king and reported the state of things in
Boeotia. A short time afterwards the ambassadors arrived, desiring the
king to send aid to the cities which favoured the Macedonian cause; for
the Thebans were oppressing them severely, because they would not agree
with them and side with Rome. But Perseus replied that he was precluded
by the truce from sending any aid to any one; but he begged them to
resist the Thebans to the best of their power, and yet not to go to war
with the Romans, but to remain neutral....
[Sidenote: War is decided upon at the expiration of the truce.]
[Sidenote: Attempted assassination of Eumenes at Delphi. Livy, 42, 16,
B.C. 172.]
+6.+ When the report of the commissioners from Asia concerning Rhodes
and the other states had been made at Rome, the Senate called in the
ambassadors of Perseus, Solon and Hippias: who endeavoured to argue the
whole case and to deprecate the anger of the Senate; and particularly
to defend their master on the subject of the attempt upon the life of
Eumenes. When they had finished all they had to urge, the Senate, which
had all the while been resolved on war, bade them depart forthwith
from Rome; and ordered all other Macedonians also that happened to be
staying in the country to quit Italy within thirty days. The Senate
then called upon the Consuls to act at once and see that they moved in
good time....
[Sidenote: Jealousy of Eumenes.]
[Sidenote: The Macedonian party.]
[Sidenote: The Romanising party.]
[Sidenote: Politics at Rhodes.]
+7.+ Caius Lucretius[149] being at anchor off Cephallenia, wrote
a letter to the Rhodians, requesting them to despatch some ships,
and entrusted the letter to a certain trainer named Socrates. This
letter arrived at Rhodes in the second six months of the Prytany of
Stratocles. When the question came on for discussion, Agathagetus,
Rhodophon, Astymedes, and many others were for sending the ships and
taking part in the war from the first, without any further pretence;
but Deinon and Polyaratus, though really displeased at the favour
already shown to Rome, now for the present used the case of Eumenes as
their pretext, and began by that means to alienate the feelings of the
populace. There had in fact been a long standing feeling of suspicion
and dislike in the minds of the Rhodians against Eumenes, dating from
the time of his war with Pharnaces; when, upon king Eumenes blockading
the entrance of the Hellespont to prevent ships sailing into the
Pontus, the Rhodians had interfered with his design and thwarted him.
This ill-feeling had again been recently exasperated during the Lycian
war on the question of certain forts, and a strip of territory on the
frontier of the Rhodian Peraea, which was being damaged by some of
Eumenes’s subjects. These incidents taken together made the Rhodians
ready to listen to anything against the king. Seizing on this pretext,
the party of Deinon tried to discredit the despatch, asserting that it
did not come from the Romans but from Eumenes, who wished to involve
them on any possible pretext in a war, and bring expense and perfectly
unnecessary suffering upon the people. In support of their contention
they put forward the fact that the man who brought the letter was some
obscure trainer or another; and asserted that the Romans were not
accustomed to employ such messengers, but were rather inclined to act
with unnecessary care and dignity in the despatch of such missives.
When they said this they were perfectly aware that the letter had
really been written by Lucretius: their object was to persuade the
Rhodian people to do nothing for the Romans readily, but rather to
perpetually make difficulties, and thus give occasions for offence and
displeasure to crop up between the two nations. For their deliberate
purpose was to alienate Rhodes from the Roman friendship, and to join
it to that of Perseus, by every means in their power. Their motives for
thus clinging to Perseus were that Polyaratus, who was ostentatious and
vain, had become heavily in debt; and that Deinon, who was avaricious
and unscrupulous, had from the first relied on increasing his wealth
by getting presents from princes and kings. These speeches having been
delivered, the Prytanis Stratocles rose, and, after inveighing at some
length against Perseus, and speaking with equal warmth in praise of the
Romans, induced the people to confirm the decree for the despatch of
the ships. Forthwith six quadriremes were prepared, five of which were
sent to Chalcis under the command of Timagoras, and the other under
the command of another Timagoras to Tenedos. This latter commander
fell in at Tenedos with Diophanes, who had been despatched by Perseus
to Antiochus, and captured both him and his crew. All such allies
as arrived with offers of help by sea Lucretius thanked warmly, but
excused from taking part in this service, observing that the Romans had
no need of naval support....
_Perseus now collected a large army at Citium, thirty-nine thousand
foot and four thousand horse, and advanced through the north of
Thessaly taking many towns, and finally taking up his quarters at
Sicyrium, at the foot of Mount Ossa. The Roman consul, P. Licinius,
marched from the south-west through Gomphi, and thence to Larisa, where
he crossed the river Peneus. After some cavalry skirmishes, which were
generally favourable to the king, Perseus advanced nearer to the Roman
camp, and a more important battle was fought, in which the king again
scored a considerable success with his cavalry and light-armed troops.
The Romans lost two hundred cavalry killed and as many prisoners and
two thousand infantry, while Perseus only had twenty cavalry and
forty infantry killed. He did not, however, follow up the victory
sufficiently to inflict a crushing blow upon the Roman army; and though
the Consul withdrew to the south of the Peneus, after some days’
reflection the king made proposals of peace. See Livy, 42, 51-62. B.C.
171 (summer.)_
[Sidenote: After beating the Roman cavalry on the Peneus, and obliging
Licinius to retire south of the river, Perseus endeavours to make
terms.]
[Sidenote: The Romans are inexorable.]
[Sidenote: Perseus returns to Sicyrium.]
+8.+ After the Macedonian victory Perseus summoned his Council, when
some of his friends expressed an opinion that he ought to send an
embassy to the Roman general, to signify his readiness even now to
pay the Romans the same amount of tribute as his father had formerly
undertaken to pay when beaten in war, and to evacuate the same places.
“For if,” they argued, “the Romans accept the terms the war will be
ended in a manner honourable to the king after his victory in the
field; and the Romans, after this taste of Macedonian valour, will
be much more careful in the future not to impose an unjust or harsh
burden upon the Macedonians. And if, on the other hand, in spite of
the past, they prove obstinate and refuse to accept them, the anger
of heaven will with justice fall on them; while the king by his
moderation will gain the support of Gods and men alike.” The majority
of his friends held this view, and Perseus expressing his assent to
it, Pantauchus, son of Balacrus, and Midon of Beroea, were forthwith
sent as ambassadors to Licinius. On their arrival, Licinius summoned
his Council, and the ambassadors having stated their proposals in
accordance with their instructions, Pantauchus and his colleague were
requested to withdraw, and they deliberated on the proposition thus
made to them. They decided unanimously to return as stern an answer
as possible. For this is a peculiarity of the Romans, which they have
inherited from their ancestors, and are continually displaying,—to
show themselves most peremptory and imperious in the presence of
defeat, and most moderate when successful: a very noble peculiarity, as
every one will acknowledge; but whether it be feasible under certain
circumstances may be doubted. However that may be, on the present
occasion they made answer that Perseus must submit without reserve
himself, and give the Senate full power to take whatever measures it
might think good concerning Macedonia and all in it. On this being
communicated to Pantauchus and Midon, they returned and informed
Perseus and his friends; some of whom were roused to anger at this
astonishing display of haughtiness, and advised Perseus to send no more
embassies or messages about anything whatever. Perseus, however, was
not the man to take such a line. He sent again and again to Licinius,
with continually enhanced offers, and promising a larger and larger
sum of money. But as nothing that he could do had any effect, and as
his friends found fault with him, and told him that, though he had
won a victory, he was acting like one who had been defeated and lost
all, he was at length compelled to renounce the sending of embassies,
and remove his camp back to Sicyrium. Such was the position of the
campaign....
[Sidenote: The effect of the success of Perseus upon the Greeks.]
[Sidenote: A scene at Olympia.]
+9.+ When the report of the favourable result for Perseus of the
cavalry engagement, and of the victory of the Macedonians, spread
through Greece, the inclination of the populace to the cause of
Perseus blazed out like a fire, most of them having up to that time
concealed their real feelings. Their conduct, to my mind, was like what
one sees at gymnastic contests. When some obscure and far inferior
combatant descends into the arena with a famous champion reputed to be
invincible, the spectators immediately bestow their favour upon the
weaker of the two, and try to keep up his spirits by applause, and
eagerly second his efforts by their enthusiasm. And if he succeeds
so far as even to touch the face of his opponent, and make a mark to
prove the blow, the whole of the spectators again show themselves on
his side. Sometimes they even jeer at his antagonist: not because they
dislike or undervalue him, but because their sympathies are roused by
the unexpected, and they are naturally inclined to take the weaker
side. But if any one checks them at the right moment, they are quick to
change and see their mistake. And this is what Cleitomachus is said to
have done. He had the character of being an invincible athlete, and,
as his reputation was spread all over the world, King Ptolemy is said
to have been inspired with the ambition of putting an end to it. He
therefore had Aristonicus the boxer, who was thought to have unusual
physical capabilities for that kind of thing trained with extraordinary
care, and sent to Greece. When he appeared on the arena at Olympia a
great number of the spectators, it seems, immediately showed their
favour for him, and cheered him on, being rejoiced that some one should
have had the courage to make some sort of stand against Cleitomachus.
But when, as the fight went on, he showed that he was a match for
his antagonist, and even gave him a well-placed wound, there was a
general clapping of hands, and the popular enthusiasm showed itself
loudly on his side, the spectators calling out to Aristonicus to keep
up his spirits. Thereupon they say that Cleitomachus stepped aside,
and after waiting a short time to recover his breath, turned to the
crowd and asked them “Why, they cheered Aristonicus, and supported him
all they could? Had they detected him in playing foul in the combat?
Or were they not aware that Cleitomachus was at that moment fighting
for the honour of Greece, Aristonicus for that of king Ptolemy? Would
they prefer an Egyptian to carry off the crown by beating Greeks, or
that a Theban and Boeotian should be proclaimed victor in boxing over
all comers?” Upon this speech of Cleitomachus, they say that such a
revulsion of feeling came over the spectators, that Aristonicus in
his turn was conquered more by the display of popular feeling than by
Cleitomachus.
+10.+ What happened in the case of Perseus in regard to the feeling of
the multitude was very similar to this. For if any one had pulled them
up and asked them plainly, in so many words, whether they wished such
great power to fall to one man, and were desirous of trying the effect
of an utterly irresponsible despotism, I presume that they would have
promptly bethought themselves, recanted all they had said, and gone
to the other extreme of feeling. Or if some one had briefly recalled
to their recollection all the tyrannical acts of the royal house of
Macedonia from which the Greeks had suffered, and all the benefits they
had received from the Romans, I imagine they would have at once and
decisively changed their minds. However, for the present, at the first
burst of thoughtless enthusiasm, the people showed unmistakable signs
of joy at the news, being delighted at the unlooked-for appearance of a
champion able to cope with Rome. I say this much to prevent anyone, in
ignorance of human nature, from bringing a rash charge of ingratitude
against the Greeks for the feelings which they displayed at that
time....
[Sidenote: A new kind of missile used in the army of Perseus.]
+11.+ The _cestros_ was a novel invention, made during the war with
Perseus. This weapon consisted of an iron bolt two palms long, half
of which was spike, and half a tube for the reception of the wooden
shaft which was fixed into the tube, and measured a span in length and
a finger-breadth in diameter. At the middle point of the shaft three
wooden “plumes” were morticed in. The sling had thongs of unequal
length, and on the leather between them the missile was loosely set.
When the sling was being swung round, with the two thongs taut, the
missile kept its place; but when the slinger let go one of the thongs,
it flew from the leather like a leaden bullet, and was projected from
the sling with such force as to inflict a very grievous wound upon any
one whom it hit.[150]
[Sidenote: Character of Cotys, king of the Odrysae, an ally of Perseus.]
+12.+ Cotys was a man of distinguished appearance and of great ability
in military affairs, and besides, quite unlike a Thracian in character.
For he was of sober habits, and gave evidence of a gentleness of temper
and a steadiness of disposition worthy of a man of gentle birth....
[Sidenote: A prudent governor of Cyprus. See above, bk. 18, ch. 55.]
+13.+ Ptolemy, the general serving in Cyprus, was by no means like
an Egyptian, but was a man of sense and administrative ability. He
received the governorship of the island when the king of Egypt was
quite a child, and devoted himself with great zeal to the collection of
money, refusing payments of any kind to any one, though he was often
asked for them by the king’s agents, and subjected to bitter abuse for
refusing to part with any. But when the king came of age he made up a
large sum and sent it to Alexandria, so that both king Ptolemy himself
and his courtiers expressed their approval of his previous parsimony
and determination not to part with any money....
_The battle on the Peneus was followed by other engagements of no
great importance; and finally Perseus returned to Macedonia, and the
Romans went into winter quarters in various towns in Thessaly, without
a decisive blow having been struck on either side. Winter of B.C.
171-170. Livy, 42, 64-67._
[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 171-170. Dispute at Rhodes as to the release
of Diophanes, the envoy of Perseus, captured at Tenedos. See ch. 7.]
+14.+ Just about the time when Perseus retired for the winter from the
Roman war, Antenor arrived at Rhodes from him, to negotiate for the
ransom of Diophanes and those who were on board with him. Thereupon
there arose a great dispute among the statesmen as to what course they
ought to take. Philophron, Theaetetus, and their party were against
entering into such arrangement on any terms; Deinon and Polyaratus
and their party were for doing so. Finally they did enter upon an
arrangement with Perseus for their redemption....
[Sidenote: Aetolian leaders arrested.]
[Sidenote: Charops.]
[Sidenote: What induced the leading men in Epirus to join Perseus.]
+15.+ Cephalus came [to Pella] from Epirus. He had long been connected
by friendship with the royal house of Macedonia, but was now compelled
by the force of circumstances to embrace the side of Perseus, the
cause of which was as follows: There was a certain Epirote named
Charops, a man of high character, and well disposed to Rome, who, when
Philip was holding the passes into Epirus, was the cause of his being
driven from the country, and of Titus Flamininus conquering Epirus
and Macedonia. Charops had a son named Machatus, who had a son also
named Charops. Machatus having died when this son was quite a youth,
the elder Charops sent his grandson with a suitable retinue to Rome
to learn to speak and read Latin. In the course of time the young man
returned home, having made many intimate friendships at Rome. The elder
Charops then died, and the young man, being of a restless and designing
character, began giving himself airs and attacking the distinguished
men in the country. At first he was not much noticed, Antinous and
Cephalus, his superiors in age and reputation, managing public affairs
as they thought right. But when the war with Perseus broke out, the
young man at once began laying information against these statesmen
at Rome, grounding his accusations on their former intimacy with the
Macedonian royal family; and by watching everything they said or did,
and putting the worst construction on it, suppressing some facts and
adding others, he succeeded in getting his accusations against them
believed. Now Cephalus had always shown good sense and consistency,
and at the present crisis had adhered to a course of the highest
wisdom. He had begun by praying heaven that the war might not take
place, or the question come to the arbitrament of arms; but when the
war was actually begun, he was for performing all treaty obligations
towards Rome, but for not going a step beyond this, or showing any
unbecoming subservience or officiousness. When Charops then vehemently
accused Cephalus at Rome, and represented everything that happened
contrary to the wishes of the Romans as malice prepense on his part, at
first he and others like him thought little of the matter, being not
conscious of entertaining any designs hostile to Rome. But when they
saw Hippolochus, Nicander, and Lochagus arrested without cause, and
conveyed to Rome after the cavalry battle, and that the accusations
made against them by Lyciscus were believed,—Lyciscus being a leader
of the same party in Aetolia as Charops was in Epirus,—they at length
began to be anxious about what would happen, and to consider their
position. They resolved therefore to try every possible means to
prevent themselves from being similarly arrested without trial and
carried to Rome, owing to the slanders of Charops. It was thus that
Cephalus and his friends were compelled, contrary to their original
policy, to embrace the cause of Perseus....
[Sidenote: Coss. A. Hostilius Mancinus, A. Atilius Serranus, B.C. 170.]
[Sidenote: Attempt of two Molossian leaders to seize the consul.]
+16.+ Theodotus and Philostratus committed an act of flagrant impiety
and treachery. They learnt that the Roman consul Aulus Hostilius was
on his way to Thessaly to join the army; and thinking that, if they
could deliver Aulus to Perseus, they would have given the latter the
strongest possible proof of their devotion, and have done the greatest
possible damage to the Romans at this crisis, they wrote urgently to
Perseus to make haste. The king was desirous of advancing at once and
joining them; but he was hindered by the fact that the Molossians had
seized the bridge over the Aous, and was obliged to give them battle
first. Now it chanced that Aulus had arrived at Phanota,[151] and put
up at the house of Nestor the Cropian,[152] and thus gave his enemies
an excellent opportunity; and had not fortune interfered on his behalf,
I do not think that he would have escaped. But, in fact, Nestor
providentially suspected what was brewing, and compelled him to change
his quarters for the night to the house of a neighbour. Accordingly he
gave up the idea of going by land through Epirus, and, having sailed to
Anticyra,[153] thence made his way into Thessaly....
[Sidenote: Pharnaces, king of Pontus.] +17.+ Pharnaces was the worst of
all his predecessors on the throne....
[Sidenote: Attalus desires that his brother Eumenes should be restored
to honour in the Peloponnese.]
+18.+ While Attalus was spending the winter in Elateia (in Phocis),
knowing that his brother Eumenes was annoyed in the highest possible
degree at the splendid honours which had been awarded to him having
been annulled by a public decree of the Peloponnesians, though he
concealed his annoyance from every one,—he took upon himself to send
messages to certain of the Achaeans, urging that not only the statues
of honour, but the complimentary inscriptions also, which had been
placed in his brother’s honour, should be restored. His motive in
acting thus was the belief that he could give his brother no greater
gratification, and at the same time would display to the Greeks by this
act his own brotherly affection and generosity.[154]...
[Sidenote: Preparations for the attack upon Coele-Syria by the
ministers of Ptolemy Philometor.]
+19.+ When Antiochus saw that the government of Alexandria was openly
making preparations for a war of annexation in Coele-Syria, he sent
Meleager at the head of an embassy to Rome, with instructions to inform
the Senate of the fact, and to protest that Ptolemy was attacking him
without the least justification....
[Sidenote: The need of promptness,]
+20.+ In all human affairs perhaps one ought to regulate every
undertaking by considerations of time; but this is especially true in
war, in which a moment makes all the difference between success and
failure, and to miss this is the most fatal of errors....
[Sidenote: and of persistency.]
Many men desire honour, but it is only the few who venture to attempt
it; and of those who do so, it is rare to find any that have the
resolution to persevere to the end....