+1.+ My reason for prefixing a table of contents to each book, rather
than a preface, is not because I do not recognise the usefulness of a
preface in arresting attention and rousing interest, and also giving
facilities for finding any passage that is wanted, but because I find
prefaces viewed, though from many inadequate reasons, with contempt and
neglect. I therefore had recourse to a table of contents throughout my
history, except the first six books, arranged according to Olympiads,
as being as effective, or even more so, than a preface, and at the same
time as less subject to the objection of being out of place, for it
is closely connected with the subject-matter. In the first six books
I wrote prefaces, because I thought a mere table of contents less
suitable....
_After the battle at Baecula, Hasdrubal made good his passage over
the Western Pyrenees, and thence through the Cevennes, B.C. 208. In
the spring of B.C. 207 he crossed the Alps and descended into Italy,
crossed the Po, and besieged Placentia. Thence he sent a letter to his
brother Hannibal announcing that he would march southward by Ariminum
and meet him in Umbria. The letter fell into the hands of the Consul
Nero, who was at Venusia, and who immediately made a forced march
northward, joined his colleague at Sena, and the next day attacked
Hasdrubal. See above, 10, 39; Livy, 27, 39-49._
Much easier and shorter was Hasdrubal’s journey into Italy....[17]
Never at any other time had Rome been in a greater state of excitement
and terrified expectation of the result....[18]
[Sidenote: Battle of the Metaurus, B.C. 207. Coss. C. Claudius Nero, M.
Livius Salinator II.]
None of these arrangements satisfied Hasdrubal. But circumstances no
longer admitted of delay. He saw the enemy drawn out in battle array
and advancing; and he was obliged to get the Iberians and the Gauls
who were serving with him into line. He therefore stationed his ten
elephants on the front, increased the depth of his lines, and so
had his whole army covering a somewhat small ground. He took up a
position himself in the centre of the line, immediately behind the
elephants, and commenced an advance upon the Roman left, with a full
resolution that in this battle he must either conquer or die. Livius
advanced to meet the enemy with proud confidence, and having come to
close quarters with him was fighting with great gallantry. Meanwhile
Claudius, who was stationed on the right wing, found himself unable
to advance and outflank the enemy, owing to the rough ground in front
of him, relying on which Hasdrubal had directed his advance upon the
Roman left: and being embarrassed by his inability to strike a blow,
he promptly decided what the circumstances pointed out as the tactics
to pursue. He withdrew his men from the right wing, and marched them
on the rear of the field of battle; and, after passing the left of
the Roman line, fell upon the flank of the Carthaginians who were
fighting near the elephants. Up to this point the victory had been
doubtful; for both sides fought with desperation, the Romans believing
that all would be over with them if they failed, and the Iberians and
Carthaginians holding exactly the same conviction for themselves.
Moreover the elephants were being of disservice to both sides alike;
for finding themselves between two forces, and exposed to a crossfire
of javelins, they kept throwing both the Carthaginian and Roman lines
into confusion. But as soon as Claudius fell upon the rear of the
enemy the battle ceased to be equal: for the Iberians found themselves
attacked on front and rear at once, which resulted in the greater part
of them being cut down on the ground. Six of the elephants were killed
with the men on them, four forced their way through the lines and were
afterwards captured, having been abandoned by their Indian drivers.
[Sidenote: Hasdrubal falls in the battle.]
+2.+ Hasdrubal had behaved on this occasion, as throughout his whole
life, like a brave man, and died fighting: and he deserves not to be
passed over without remark. I have already stated that Hannibal was
his brother, and on his departure to Italy entrusted the command in
Iberia to him. I have also described his many contests with the Romans,
and the many embarrassing difficulties with which he had to struggle,
caused by the generals sent from Carthage to Iberia; and how in all
these matters he had supported these vicissitudes and reverses in a
noble spirit worthy of a son of Barcas. But I will now speak of his
last contest, and explain why he seems to me pre-eminently to deserve
respectful attention and imitation. Most generals and kings, when
entering upon decisive battles, place before their eyes the glory and
advantages to be obtained from victory, and frequently consider and
contrive what use they will make of every success; but they do not
go on to review the chances of failure, nor contemplate the plan to
be adopted, or the action to be taken, in the case of reverse. Yet
the former is obvious, the latter requires foresight. Therefore it is
that most of them, though in many instances their soldiers have fought
nobly, by their own folly and imprudence in this respect have added
dishonour to defeat: have disgraced their previous achievements, and
rendered themselves, during the remainder of their lives, objects of
reproach and contempt. It is easy to see that many leaders make this
fatal mistake, and that the difference between one man and another in
these points is most signal; for history is full of such instances.
Hasdrubal, on the contrary, as long as there was reasonable hope of
being able to accomplish anything worthy of his former achievements,
regarded his personal safety in battle as of the highest consequence;
but when Fortune deprived him of all hopes for the future, and reduced
him to the last extremities, though neglecting nothing either in
his preparations or on the field that might secure him the victory,
nevertheless considered how, in case of total overthrow, he might face
his fate and suffer nothing unworthy of his past career.
These remarks are meant for those engaged in active operations, that
they may neither dash the hopes of those who rely upon them by a
heedless seeking of danger, nor by an unworthy clinging to life add
disgrace and shame to the catastrophies which befall them.
+3.+ Having won the victory, the Romans began pillaging the enemy’s
camp; and killed a number of the Celts, as they lay stupefied with
drunkenness in their beds, like unresisting victims. Then they
collected the rest of the booty, from which more than three hundred
talents were paid into the treasury. Taking Carthaginians and Celts
together, not less than ten thousand were killed, and about two
thousand Romans. Some of the principal Carthaginians were taken
prisoners, but the rest were put to the sword. When the report reached
Rome, people at first could not believe it, from the intensity of their
wish that it might be true; but when still more men arrived, not only
stating the fact, but giving full details, then indeed the city was
filled with overpowering joy; every temple-court was decked, and every
shrine full of sacrificial cakes and victims: and, in a word, they were
raised to such a pitch of hopefulness and confidence, that every one
felt sure that Hannibal, formerly the object of their chief terror,
could not after that stay even in Italy....
_A speech of the legate from Rhodes[19] before an assembly of Aetolians
at Heraclea in the autumn of B.C. 207 (see Livy, 28, 7), at the end of
the summer campaign_.
+4.+ “Facts I imagine, Aetolians, have made it clear to you that
neither King Ptolemy nor the community of Rhodes, Byzantium, Chios, or
Mitylene, regard a composition with you as unimportant. For this is not
the first or the second time that we have introduced the subject of
peace to your assembly; but ever since you entered upon the war we have
beset you with entreaties, and have never desisted from warning you on
this subject; because we saw that its immediate result would be the
destruction of yourselves and of Macedonia, and because we foresaw in
the future danger to our own countries and to that of all other Greeks.
For as, when a man has once set a fire alight, the result is no longer
dependent upon his choice, but it spreads in whatever direction chance
may direct, guided for the most part by the wind and the combustible
nature of the material, and frequently attacks the first author of the
conflagration himself: so too, war, when once it has been kindled by
a nation, sometimes devours the first those who kindled it; and soon
rushes along destroying everything that falls in its way, continually
gathering fresh strength, and blown into greater heat by the folly of
the people in its neighbourhood, as though by the wind. Wherefore,
men of Aetolia, considering that we, as representatives of the whole
body of the islanders and of the Greek inhabitants of Asia, are here
to beseech you to put an end to war and to choose peace, because the
matter affects us as well as you, show your wisdom by listening to
us and yielding to our entreaties. For if you were carrying on a war
which, though profitless (and most wars are that), was yet glorious
from the motive which prompted it, and the reputation likely to accrue
from it, you might be pardoned perhaps for a fixed determination to
continue it; but if it is a war of the most signal infamy, which
can bring you nothing but discredit and obloquy,—does not such an
undertaking claim considerable hesitation on your part? We will speak
our opinion frankly; and you, if you are wise, will give us a quiet
hearing. For it is much better to hear a disagreeable truth now and
thereby be preserved, than to listen to smooth things now, and soon
afterwards to be ruined yourselves, and to ruin the rest of the Greeks
with you.
[Sidenote: Cp. 9. 39.]
+5.+ “Put then before your eyes your own folly. You profess to be
at war against Philip on behalf of the Greeks, that they may escape
from servitude to him; but your war is really for the enslavement
and ruin of Greece. That is the tale told by your treaty with Rome,
which formerly existed only in written words, but is now seen in full
operation. Heretofore, though mere written words, it was a disgrace
to you: but now your execution of it has made that disgrace palpable
to the eyes of all the world. Moreover, Philip merely lends his name
and serves as a pretext for the war: he is not exposed to any attack:
it is against his allies,—the majority of the Peloponnesian states,
Boeotia, Euboea, Phocis, Locris, Thessaly, Epirus,—that you have made
this treaty, bargaining that their bodies and their goods shall belong
to the Romans, their cities and their territory to the Aetolians. And
though personally, if you took a city, you would not stoop to violate
the freeborn, or to burn the buildings, because you look upon such
conduct as cruel and barbarous; yet you have made a treaty by which you
have handed over all other Greeks to the barbarians, to be exposed to
the most shameful violence and lawlessness. And all this was hitherto
kept a secret. But now the fate of the people of Oreus, and of the
miserable Aeginetans, has betrayed you to every one,—Fortune having,
as though of set purpose, suddenly brought your infatuation before the
scenes.
“So much for the origin of the war and its events up to now. But as to
its result,—supposing everything to go to your wish,—what do you expect
that to be? Will it not be the beginning of great miseries to all
Greece?
+6.+ “For I presume no one can fail to see that, if once the Romans get
rid of the war in Italy,—and this is all but done, now that Hannibal
has been confined to a narrow district in Bruttii,—they will direct
their whole power upon Greece: professedly, indeed, in aid of the
Boeotians against Philip, but really with the view of reducing it
entirely under their own power. And if they design to treat it well
when they have conquered it, theirs will be the honour and glory; and
if badly, theirs too will be the plunder from the states they destroy,
and the power over those which they allow to survive: while you will
be calling upon the gods to witness your wrongs, when no god will be
any longer willing, nor any man be able to help you. Now, perhaps,
you ought to have foreseen all this from the first, for that would
have been your best course. But since the future often escapes human
foresight, now, at any rate, that you have seen by actual experience
what has happened, it must be your duty to take better measures for the
future. In any case we have omitted nothing which it becomes sincere
friends to say or do. We have spoken our opinion about the future with
absolute frankness; and you we urge and entreat not to stand in the way
of the freedom and safety of yourselves or of the rest of Greece.”
This speaker having, as it seemed, made a considerable impression,
he was followed by the ambassadors of Philip, who, without making a
long speech, merely said that they were commissioned to do one of
two things,—if the Aetolians chose peace, to accept it readily: if
not, to call the gods and the ambassadors from Greece to witness that
the Aetolians, and not Philip, ought to be held responsible for what
happened thereafter, and so to depart....
[Sidenote: Attalus eludes Philip. Livy, 28, 7, 8, B.C. 207.]
+7.+ Philip loudly lamented his ill-fortune in having so narrowly
missed getting Attalus into his hands....
[Sidenote: Philip at Thermus. See 5, 6-18.]
On his way to the lake Trichonis Philip arrived at Thermus, where there
was a temple of Apollo; and there he once more defaced all the sacred
buildings which he had spared on his former occupation of the town. In
both instances it was an ill-advised indulgence of temper: for it is
a mark of utter unreasonableness to commit an act of impiety against
heaven in order to gratify one’s wrath against man....
PHILOPOEMEN IN THE PELOPONNESE, B.C. 207
[Sidenote: Defects of the Achaean officers.]
+8.+ There are three methods followed by those who wish to arrive at an
intelligent knowledge of tactics. The first is by the study of history,
the second by the use of scientific treatises composed by specialists,
the third by actual experience on the field. But of all three of these
methods the Achaean commanders were equally ignorant....
A very general fault in the men was an unfortunate rivalry, engendered
by the ostentation and bad taste of the others. They were very
particular about their attendants and their dress; and there was a show
of splendour in this, kept up by the majority beyond their means. But
to their arms they paid no attention whatever....
Most people, indeed, do not so much as attempt to imitate the real
achievements of those who obtain success, but, while trying to
reproduce their unimportant peculiarities, succeed only in displaying
their own frivolity....
[Sidenote: Speech of Philopoemen urging reform.]
+9.+ “Brightness in the armour,” he said, “contributes much to
inspire dismay in the enemy; and care bestowed on having it made to
fit properly is of great service in actual use. This will best be
secured if you give to your arms the attention which you now bestow
on your dress, and transfer to your dress the neglect which you now
show of your arms. By thus acting, you will at once save your money,
and be undoubtedly able to maintain the interests of your country.
Therefore the man who is going to take part in manoeuvres or a campaign
ought, when putting on his greaves, to see that they are bright and
well-fitting, much more than that his shoes and boots are; and when he
takes up his shield and helmet, to take care that they are cleaner and
more costly than his cloak and shirt: for when men take greater care
of what is for show, than of what is for use, there can be no doubt
of what will happen to them on the field. I beg you to consider that
elaboration in dress is a woman’s weakness, and a woman of no very
high character either; but costliness and splendour in armour are the
characteristics of brave men who are resolved on saving themselves and
their country with glory.”
The whole audience were so convinced by this speech and so much struck
with the wisdom of the advice, that, immediately after leaving the
council-chamber, they began pointing with scorn at the over-dressed
dandies, and forced some of them to quit the market-place; and what is
more, in future manoeuvres and campaigns they kept a stricter watch on
each other in these points.
[Sidenote: Philipoemen’s own example.]
+10.+ So true it is that a single word spoken by a man of credit is
often sufficient not only to turn men from the worst courses, but even
to incite them to the noblest. But when such a speaker can appeal to
his own life as in harmony with his words, then indeed his exhortation
carries a weight which nothing can exceed. And this was above all
others the case with Philopoemen. For in his dress and eating, as well
as in all that concerned his bodily wants, he was plain and simple; in
his manners to others without ceremony or pretence; and throughout his
life he made it his chief aim to be absolutely sincere. Consequently a
few unstudied words from him were sufficient to raise a firm conviction
in the minds of his hearers; for as he could point to his own life
as an example, they wanted little more to convince them. Thus it
happened on several occasions, that the confidence he inspired, and
the consciousness of his achievements, enabled him in a few words to
overthrow long and, as his opponents thought, skilfully argued speeches.
[Sidenote: War against Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta. B.C. 208-207.]
So on this occasion, as soon as the council of the league separated,
all returned to their cities deeply impressed both by the words and
the man himself, and convinced that no harm could happen to them with
him at their head. Immediately afterwards Philopoemen set out on a
visitation of the cities, which he performed with great energy and
speed. He then summoned a levy of citizens and began forming them into
companies and drilling them; and at last, after eight months of this
preparation and training, he mustered his forces at Mantinea, prepared
to fight the tyrant Machanidas in behalf of the freedom of all the
Peloponnesians.
[Sidenote: Battle of Mantinea, B.C. 207.]
[Sidenote: The road to Tegea. See Paus. 8, 10 _sq._]
+11.+ Machanidas had now acquired great confidence, and looked upon
the determination of the Achaeans as extremely favourable to his
plans. As soon as he heard of their being in force at Mantinea, he
duly harangued his Lacedaemonians at Tegea, and the very next morning
at daybreak advanced upon Mantinea. He led the right wing of the
phalanx himself; his mercenaries marched in two parallel columns on
each side of his front; and behind them were carts carrying quantities
of field artillery and bolts for the catapults. Meanwhile Philopoemen
too had arranged his army in three divisions, and was leading them
out of Mantinea, the Illyrians and the men with body armour by the
gate leading to the temple of Poseidon, and with them all the rest
of the foreign contingent and light-armed troops; by the next gate,
toward the west, the phalanx; and by the next the Achaean cavalry. He
sent his light-armed men forward to occupy the hill, which rises to a
considerable height above the road called Xenis and the above-mentioned
temple: he stationed the men with body armour next, resting on this
hill to the south; next them the Illyrians; next them, in the same
straight line, the phalanx, drawn up in companies, with an interval
between each, along the ditch which runs towards the temple of
Poseidon, right through the middle of the plain of Mantinea, until it
touches the range of mountains that forms the boundary of the territory
of the Elisphasii. Next to them, on the right wing, he stationed the
Achaean cavalry, under the command of Aristaenetus of Dyme; while on
the left wing he led the whole of the foreign contingent, drawn up in
lines one behind the other.
+12.+ As soon as the enemy were well in sight, Philopoemen went down
the ranks of the phalanx, and addressed to them an exhortation which,
though short, clearly pointed out to them the nature of the battle
in which they were engaged. But most of what he said was rendered
inaudible by the answering shouts of the troops. The affection and
confidence of the men rose to such a pitch of enthusiasm and zeal
that they seemed to be almost acting under a divine inspiration, as
they cried out to him to lead them on and fear nothing. However he
tried, when he could get the opportunity, to make this much clear to
them, that the battle on the one side was to establish a shameful and
ignominious servitude, on the other to vindicate an ever-memorable and
glorious liberty.
[Sidenote: The attack of Machanidas.]
[Sidenote: The battle begun by light-cavalry charges.]
Machanidas at first looked as though he meant to attack the enemy’s
right wing in column; but when he got within moderate distance he
deployed into line by the right, and by this extension movement made
his right wing cover the same amount of ground as the left wing of
the Achaeans, and fixed his catapults in front of the whole force at
intervals. Philopoemen understood that the enemy’s plan was, by pouring
volleys from the catapults into his phalanx, to throw the ranks into
confusion: he therefore gave him no time or interval of repose, but
opened the engagement by a vigorous charge of his Tarentines[20] close
to the temple of Poseidon, where the ground was flat and suitable for
cavalry. Whereupon Machanidas was constrained to follow suit by sending
his Tarentines forward also.
[Sidenote: Defeat of the Achaean right wing.]
+13.+ At first the struggle was confined to these two forces, and was
maintained with spirit. But the light-armed troops coming gradually
to the support of such of them as were wavering, in a very short time
the whole of the mercenaries on either side were engaged. They fought
sometimes in close order, sometimes in pairs: and for a long time so
entirely without decisive result, that the rest of the two armies, who
were watching in which direction the cloud of dust inclined, could
come to no conclusion, because both sides maintained for a long while
exactly their original ground. But after a time the mercenaries of the
tyrant began to get the better of the struggle, from their numbers,
and the superiority in skill obtained by long practice. And this is
the natural and usual result. The citizens of a democracy no doubt
bring more enthusiasm to their battles than the subjects of a tyrant;
but in the same proportion the mercenaries of sovereigns are naturally
superior and more efficient than those of a democracy. For in the
former case one side is fighting for liberty, the other for a condition
of servitude; but in the case of mercenaries, those of the tyrant are
encouraged by the certain prospect of reward, those of a democracy
know that they must lose by victory: for as soon as a democracy has
crushed its assailants, it no longer employs mercenaries to protect
its liberties; while a tyranny requires more mercenaries in proportion
as its field of ambition is extended: for as the persons injured by it
are more numerous, those who plot against it are more numerous also;
and the security of despots rests entirely on the loyalty and power of
mercenaries.
+14.+ Thus it came about that the mercenaries in the army of Machanidas
fought with such fury and violence, that even the Illyrians and men
with body armour, who formed the reserve supporting the mercenaries of
the Achaean army, were unable to withstand their assault; but were all
driven from their position, and fled in confusion towards the city of
Mantinea, which was about seven stades distant.
And now there occurred an undoubted instance of what some doubt,
namely, that the issues in war are for the most part decided by the
skill or want of skill of the commanders. For though perhaps it is a
great thing to be able to follow up a first success properly, it is a
greater thing still that, when the first step has proved a failure, a
man should retain his presence of mind, keep a good look-out for any
error of judgment on the part of the victors, and avail himself of
their mistakes. At any rate one often sees the side, which imagines
itself to have obtained a clear victory, ultimately lose the day; while
those who seemed at first to have failed recover themselves by presence
of mind, and ultimately win an unexpected victory. Both happened on
this occasion to the respective leaders.
[Sidenote: Machanidas pursues the fugitives, and thus allows the
Achaean hoplites to get between him and his quarters.]
The whole of the Achaean mercenaries having been driven from
their ground, and their left wing having been thoroughly broken
up, Machanidas abandoned his original plan of winning the day by
outflanking the enemy with some of his forces and charging their
front with others, and did neither; but, quite losing his head,
rushed forward heedlessly with all his mercenaries in pursuit of the
fugitives, as though the panic was not in itself sufficient to drive
those who had once given way up to the town gates.
[Sidenote: The fight at the dyke.]
+15.+ Meanwhile the Achaean general was doing all he could to rally the
mercenaries, addressing the officers by name, and urging them to stand;
but when he saw that they were hopelessly beaten, he did not run away
in a panic nor give up the battle in despair, but, withdrawing under
cover of his phalanx, waited until the enemy had passed him in their
pursuit, and left the ground on which the fighting had taken place
empty, and then immediately gave the word to the front companies of
the phalanx to wheel to the left, and advance at the double, without
breaking their ranks. He thus swiftly occupied the ground abandoned by
his mercenaries, and at once cut off the pursuers from returning, and
got on higher ground than the enemy’s right wing. He exhorted the men
to keep up their courage, and remain where they were, until he gave the
word for a general advance; and he ordered Polybius of Megalopolis[21]
to collect such of the Illyrians and body armour men and mercenaries
as remained behind and had not taken part in the flight, and form a
reserve on the flank of the phalanx, to keep a look-out against the
return of the pursuers. Thereupon the Lacedaemonians, excited by the
victory gained by the light-armed contingent, without waiting for the
word of command, brought their sarissae to the charge and rushed upon
the enemy. But when in the course of their advance they reached the
edge of the dyke, being unable at that point to change their purpose
and retreat when at such close quarters with the enemy, and partly
because they did not consider the dyke a serious obstacle, as the
slope down to it was very gradual, and it was entirely without water
or underwood growing in it, they continued their advance through it
without stopping to think.
+16.+ The opportunity for attack which Philopoemen had long foreseen
had now arrived. He at once ordered the phalanx to bring their
sarissae to the charge and advance. The men obeyed with enthusiasm,
and accompanied their charge with a ringing cheer. The ranks of the
Lacedaemonians had been disorganised by the passage of the dyke, and
as they ascended the opposite bank they found the enemy above them.
They lost courage and tried to fly; but the greater number of them
were killed in the ditch itself, partly by the Achaeans, and partly
by trampling on each other. Now this result was not unpremeditated
or accidental, but strictly owing to the acuteness of the general.
For Philopoemen originally took ground behind the dyke, not to avoid
fighting, as some supposed, but from a very accurate and scientific
calculation of strategical advantages. He reckoned either that
Machanidas when he arrived would advance without thinking of the dyke,
and that then his phalanx would get entangled, just as I have described
their actually doing; or that if he advanced with a full apprehension
of the difficulty presented by the dyke, and then changing his mind
and deciding to shrink from the attempt, were to retire in loose order
and a long straggling column,[22] the victory would be his, without
a general engagement, and the defeat his adversary’s. For this has
happened to many commanders, who having drawn up their men for battle,
and then concluded that they were not strong enough to meet their
opponents, either from the nature of the ground, the disparity of their
numbers, or for other reasons, have drawn off in too long a line of
march, and hoped in the course of the retreat to win a victory, or at
least get safe away from the enemy, by means of their rear guard alone.
[Sidenote: Machanidas, returning from the pursuit, is killed while
trying to recross the dyke.]
+17.+ However, Philopoemen was not deceived in his prognostication
of what would happen; for the Lacedaemonians were thoroughly routed.
Seeing therefore that his phalanx was victorious and that he had gained
a complete and brilliant success, he set himself vigorously to secure
the only thing wanting to complete it, that is, to prevent the escape
of Machanidas. Seeing therefore that, in the course of the pursuit,
he was caught between the dyke and the town with his mercenaries,
he waited for him to attempt a return. But when Machanidas saw that
his army was in full retreat, with the enemy at their heels, he knew
that he had advanced too far, and had lost his chance of victory: he
therefore rallied the mercenaries that he had with him, and tried
to form close order, and cut his way through the enemy, while they
were still scattered and engaged in the pursuit. Some of his men,
understanding his plan and seeing no other hope of safety, kept by him
at first; but when they came upon the ground, and saw the Achaeans
guarding the bridge over the dyke, they lost heart; and the whole
company began falling away from him, each doing the best he could to
preserve his own life. Thereupon the tyrant gave up all hope of making
his way over the bridge; and rode along the edge of the dyke, trying
with all his might to find a place which he could cross.
[Sidenote: Death of Machanidas and capture of Tegea.]
[Sidenote: Achaeans in Laconia.]
+18.+ Philopoemen recognised Machanidas by his purple cloak and the
trappings of his horse. He at once left Anaxidamus, with orders to
guard the bridge with vigilance, and give no quarter to any of the
mercenaries; because they were the men on whom the despots of Sparta
always depended for supporting their power. Then taking Polyaenus of
Cyprus and Simias, who were attending on him at the time, he rode
along the edge of the ditch opposite to that in which the tyrant
and his attendants were; for Machanidas had still two men with him,
Arexidamus and one of the mercenaries. As soon as Machanidas had found
a spot in the dyke which could be crossed, he put spurs to his horse,
and tried to force it to go on and get over. Then Philopoemen turned
suddenly round upon him and dealt him a mortal wound with his spear,
and a second with a stab from the spike at the butt end of it, and
thus killed the tyrant in a hand-to-hand encounter. Those who were
riding with him did the same to Arexidamus; but the third man seeing
their fall gave up the idea of crossing the dyke and escaped. Simias
immediately stripped the bodies of the two who had fallen, and with
their armour carried off also the tyrant’s head, and then hurried off
to overtake the pursuing party; being eager to give the soldiers ocular
evidence of the fall of the enemy’s commander, that they might continue
the pursuit of their opponents with all the more confidence and spirit
right up to Tegea. And this in fact added so greatly to the spirit of
the men that it contributed more than anything else to their carrying
Tegea by assault, and pitching their camp next day on the Eurotas,
undisputed masters of all the open country. For many years past they
had been vainly trying to drive the enemy from their own borders,
but now they were themselves devastating Laconia without resistance,
without having lost any great number of their own men in the battle;
while they had killed not less than four thousand Lacedaemonians, taken
even more prisoners, and possessed themselves of all their baggage and
arms....
+19.+ What profit is it to our readers to describe wars and battles,
the storming of cities and the enslavement of their inhabitants, if
they are to know nothing of the causes which conduce to success and
failure? The results of such operations merely touch the fancy: it is
the tracing of the designs of the actors in such scenes that is really
instructive; and above all it is the following in detail of each step
that can educate the ideas of the student....
ABILITY OF HANNIBAL. See Livy, 28, 12
[Sidenote: B.C. 218-202.]
Who could refrain from speaking in terms of admiration of this great
man’s strategic skill, courage, and ability, when one looks to the
length of time during which he displayed those qualities; and realises
to one’s self the pitched battles, the skirmishes and sieges, the
revolutions and counter-revolutions of states, the vicissitudes of
fortune, and in fact the course of his design and its execution in its
entirety? For sixteen continuous years Hannibal maintained the war
with Rome in Italy, without once releasing his army from service in
the field, but keeping those vast numbers under control, like a good
pilot, without any sign of disaffection towards himself or towards
each other, though he had troops in his service who, so far from being
of the same tribe, were not even of the same race. He had Libyans,
Iberians, Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, Greeks, who had
naturally nothing in common with each other, neither laws, nor customs,
nor language. Yet the skill of the commander was such, that these
differences, so manifold and so wide, did not disturb the obedience to
one word of command and to a single will. And yet circumstances were
not by any means unvarying: for though the breeze of fortune often set
strongly in his favour, it as often also blew in exactly the opposite
direction. There is therefore good ground for admiring Hannibal’s
display of ability in campaign; and there can be no fear in saying
that, if he had reserved his attack upon the Romans until he had first
subdued other parts of the world, there is not one of his projects
which would have eluded his grasp. As it was, he began with those whom
he should have attacked last, and accordingly began and ended his
career with them....
SCIPIO IN SPAIN, AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE METAURUS
[Sidenote: Hasdrubal son of Gesco encamps near Ilipa (or Silpia) in
Baetica, B.C. 206. Livy 28, 13-6.]
[Sidenote: Scipio advances into Baetica,]
[Sidenote: and encamps close to the Carthaginian forces.]
+20.+ Hasdrubal having collected his forces from the various towns
in which they had wintered, advanced to within a short distance of
Ilipa and there encamped; forming his entrenchment at the foot of the
mountains, with a plain in front of him well suited for a contest and
battle. His infantry amounted to seventy thousand, his cavalry to four
thousand, and his elephants to thirty-two. On his part, Scipio sent M.
Junius Silanus to visit Colichas and take over from him the forces that
had been prepared by him. These amounted to three thousand infantry
and five hundred horse. The other allies he received personally in
the course of his march up the country to his destination. When he
approached Castalo and Baecula, and had there been joined by Marcus
Junius and the troops from Colichas, he found himself in a position
of great perplexity. For without their allies the Roman forces were
not strong enough to risk a battle; yet to do so, in dependence upon
the allies for his hopes of ultimate success, appeared to him to be
dangerous and too venturesome. In spite however of his perplexity, he
was obliged to yield to the force of circumstances so far as to employ
the Iberians; but he resolved to do so only to make a show of numbers
to the enemy, while he really fought the action with his own legions.
With this purpose in his mind he got his whole army on the march,
forty-five thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; and when he
had come within the view of the Carthaginians, he pitched his camp on
some low hills exactly opposite the enemy.
[Sidenote: Futile attack by Mago.]
+21.+ Mago thought that it would be an excellent moment to attack the
Romans while actually engaged in making their camp; he therefore rode
up to the entrenchment with the greater part of his own cavalry and
Massanissa with the Numidians, persuaded that he should catch Scipio
off his guard. Scipio had however all along foreseen this, and had
placed some cavalry equal in number to those of the Carthaginians
under cover of some hills. Upon these making an unexpected charge,
many of the enemy’s horsemen at once took to flight at the startling
appearance, and began to make off; while the rest closed with their
opponents and fought with great gallantry. But the Carthaginians
were disconcerted by the agility of some of the Roman horsemen
in dismounting, and after a short resistance they retreated with
considerable loss. The retreat was at first conducted in good order:
but as the Romans pressed them hard, they broke up their squadrons, and
fled for safety to their own camp. This affair gave the Romans better
spirits for engaging in a pitched battle, and had the contrary effect
on the Carthaginians. However, during the next few days they both
drew out on the intervening plain; skirmished with their cavalry and
light-armed troops; and, after thus trying each other’s mettle, were
resolved to bring the matter to the test of a general engagement.
[Sidenote: Scipio resolves on a general engagement, and alters his
disposition so as to make the battle depend upon the Italians rather
than the Spaniards.]
+22.+ On this occasion Scipio appears to have employed a twofold
stratagem. Hasdrubal had been accustomed to make his demonstrations in
force somewhat late in the day, with the Libyans in his centre, and the
elephants on either wing; while his own practice had been to make his
counter-movements somewhat later still, with the Roman soldiers on his
centre opposite the Libyans, and the Iberians on his two wings; but the
day on which he resolved upon a general engagement, by reversing this
arrangement, he greatly contributed to secure the victory for his own
men, and succeeded in putting the enemy at a considerable disadvantage.
For directly it was light he sent his aides with orders to the tribunes
and men to arm, as soon as they had got their breakfasts, and parade
outside the camp. The order was obeyed with alacrity because the men
suspected what was going to take place. He then sent the cavalry and
light-armed forward, with orders to advance close to the enemy’s camp,
and skirmish boldly up to it; while he himself marched out with the
infantry, just as the sun was appearing above the horizon; and on
reaching the middle of the plain, made his dispositions in the reverse
order to his usual arrangement, placing the Iberians in the centre and
the Roman legionaries on the two wings.
The sudden approach of the cavalry to their camp, and the simultaneous
appearance of the rest of the army getting into order, left the
Carthaginians barely time to get under arms. Hasdrubal was therefore
obliged, without waiting for the men to get breakfast, or making any
preparations, to despatch his cavalry and light-armed troops at once
against the enemy’s cavalry on the plain, and to get his infantry into
order on some level ground not far from the skirts of the mountains,
as was their custom. For a time the Romans remained quiet; but when
the morning was getting on, and the engagement between the light-armed
troops still continued undecided, because such of them as were forced
from their ground retired on their own heavy infantry and then formed
again for attack, Scipio at length thought that the time was come. He
withdrew his skirmishers through the intervals of the maniples, and
then distributed them equally between the two wings on rear of his
line, first the velites and behind them the cavalry. He then advanced,
at first in line direct; but when he was about a stade[23] from the
enemy, he ordered the Iberians to continue the advance in the same
order, while he commanded the maniples and squadrons on the right wing
to turn outwards to the right, and those on the left wing to the left.
+23.+ Scipio with the three leading squadrons of cavalry from the
right wing, preceded by the usual number of velites and three maniples
(a combination of troops which the Romans call a cohort), and Lucius
Marcius and Marcus Junius with a similar force from the left wing,
turned the one to the left the other to the right, and advanced at a
great speed in column upon the enemy, the troops in succession forming
up and following in column as they wheeled. When these troops were
within a short distance of the enemy,—the Iberians in the line direct
being still a considerable distance behind, because they were advancing
at a deliberate pace,—they came into contact with the two wings of
the enemy simultaneously, the Roman forces being in column, according
to Scipio’s original plan. The movements subsequent to this, which
resulted in the troops on the rear finding themselves in the same line
as the troops in front, and engaged like them with the enemy, were
exactly the converse of each other—taking the right and left wings in
general, and the cavalry and infantry in particular. For the cavalry
and velites on the right wing came into line on the right and tried
to outflank the enemy, while the heavy infantry came into line on the
left; but on the left wing the heavy infantry came into line by the
right, the cavalry and velites by the left. The result of this movement
was that, as far as the cavalry and light infantry were concerned,
their right became their left. Scipio cared little for this, but was
intent on something more important, namely, the outflanking of the
enemy. For while a general ought to be quite alive to what is taking
place, and rightly so, he ought to use whatever movements suit the
circumstances.
[Sidenote: The elephants.]
+24.+ When these troops were at close quarters the elephants were
severely handled, being wounded and harassed on every side by the
velites and cavalry, and did as much harm to their friends as to
their foes; for they rushed about promiscuously and killed every one
that fell in their way on either side alike. As to the infantry,—the
Carthaginian wings began to be broken, but the centre occupied by the
Libyans, and which was the best part of the army, was never engaged at
all. It could not quit its ground to go to the support of the wings for
fear of the attack of the Iberians, nor could it by maintaining its
position do any actual fighting, because the enemy in front of it did
not come to close quarters. However, for a certain time the two wings
fought gallantly, because it was for them, as for the enemy, a struggle
for life and death. But now the midday heat was become intense, and
the Carthaginians began to feel faint, because the unusual time at
which they had been forced to come on the field had prevented them
from fortifying themselves with the proper food; while the Romans had
the advantage in physical vigour as well as in cheerfulness, which was
especially promoted by the fact that the prudence of their general had
secured his best men being pitted against the weakest troops of the
enemy. Thus hard pressed Hasdrubal’s centre began to retreat: at first
step by step; but soon the ranks were broken, and the men rushed in
confusion to the skirts of the mountain; and on the Romans pressing
in pursuit with still greater violence, they began a headlong flight
into their entrenchments. Had not Providence interfered to save them,
they would promptly have been driven from their camp too; but a sudden
storm gathered in the air, and a violent and prolonged torrent of rain
descended, under which the Romans with difficulty effected a return to
their own camp....
[Sidenote: The Romans in the mining district of Spain.]
Many Romans lost their lives by the fire in trying to get the silver
and gold which had been melted and fused....
SCIPIO ON THE EXPULSION OF THE CARTHAGINIANS FROM SPAIN IN CONSEQUENCE
OF THE ABOVE VICTORY
[Sidenote: Scipio’s idea of transferring the war to Africa.]
When every one complimented Scipio after he had driven the
Carthaginians from Iberia, and advised him straightway to take some
rest and ease, as having put a period to the war, he answered that
he “congratulated them on their sanguine hopes; for himself he was
now more than ever revolving in his mind how to begin the war with
Carthage. Up to that time the Carthaginians had waged war upon the
Romans; but that now fortune put it in the power of the Romans to make
war upon them....”
SCIPIO’S VISIT TO SYPHAX, KING OF MASAESYLIANS.
See Livy, 28, 17, 18
[Sidenote: Scipio’s influence over Syphax.]
In his conversation with Syphax, Scipio, who was eminently endowed
by nature in this respect, conducted himself with so much kindness
and tact, that Hasdrubal afterwards remarked to Syphax that “Scipio
appeared more formidable to him in such an interview than in the
field....”
A MUTINY IN SPAIN
[Sidenote: Scipio appeases a mutiny in the Roman camp, at Sucro. Livy,
28, 24. In the autumn of B.C. 206.]
+25.+ When a mutiny broke out among part of the troops in the Roman
camp, Scipio, though he had now had a very adequate experience of the
difficulties of administration, never felt himself more at a loss how
to act or in greater embarrassment. And naturally so. For as in the
case of the body, causes of mischief, such as cold, heat, fatigue, or
wounds, may be avoided by precautions, or easily relieved when they
occur; while those which arise from within the body itself, such as
tumours or diseases, are difficult to foresee and difficult to relieve
when they do exist, so it is, we must believe, with political and
military administration. Against plots from without, and the attacks
of enemies, the precautions to be taken and the measures for relief
may readily be learned by those who pay the requisite attention;
but to decide on the right method of resisting intestine factions,
revolutions, and disturbances is difficult, and requires great tact and
extreme acuteness; and, moreover, the observation of one maxim suitable
in my opinion to all armies, states, and bodies alike, which is this:
never in such cases to allow any lengthened idleness or repose, and
least of all at a time of success and when provisions are abundant.
Being, then, as I have all along said, a man eminently careful, acute,
and prompt, Scipio summoned a meeting of the military tribunes and
proposed a solution of the existing troubles as follows. He said
that “he must promise the soldiers the settlement of their pay;
and, in order to create a belief in his promise, he must now take
public steps to exact with all speed the contributions which had been
already imposed upon the cities for the support of the whole army,
with the distinct understanding that the object of that measure was
the settlement of the pay: and these same tribunes should return to
the army and urge and entreat the men to abandon their rebellious
spirit, and come to him to receive their pay, either singly or, if they
preferred it, in a body. And when this was done he would consider, as
circumstances arose, what measures it was necessary to take.”
+26.+ With this suggestion in their minds these officers deliberated on
the means of raising money; and having communicated their decisions to
Scipio, he said that he would now consult them on the next necessary
step. They accordingly resolved that they would name a day on which
all were to appear; and that then they would pardon the general body
of the men, but severely punish the instigators of the mutiny, who
were as many as thirty-five. The day having arrived, and the mutineers
having appeared to make terms and receive their pay, Scipio gave secret
instructions to the tribunes, who had been sent on the mission to them,
to meet them; and, each of them selecting five of the ringleaders,
to greet them with politeness and invite them, if possible, to their
own tent, or, if they could not do that, to dinner or some such
entertainment. But to the troops with him he sent round orders to have
provisions for a considerable period ready in three days’ time, because
they were to march against the deserter Andobales under Marcus Silanus.
When they heard this the mutineers were much emboldened, because they
imagined that they would have everything in their own hands, as the
other troops would be gone by the time they joined the general.
[Sidenote: The mutiny suppressed and the ringleaders executed at New
Carthage.]
+27.+ Upon the approach of the mutineers, Scipio gave orders to his
army to march out the next morning at daybreak with their baggage. But
he instructed the tribunes and praefects that, as soon as they met the
mutineers, they should order their men to put down their baggage, and
keep them under arms at the city gate; and then, placing a detachment
at each of the gates, take good care that none of the mutineers should
leave the city. The officers who had been sent to meet the men fell
in with them on their arrival, and took the ringleaders with every
appearance of civility to their own tents, in accordance with the
arrangement that had been made. At the same time orders had been given
to them to arrest the thirty-five immediately after dinner, and to keep
them in fetters: without allowing any one in the tent to go out, except
the messenger who was to inform the general from each of them that this
had been accomplished.
[Sidenote: Scipio’s speech to the mutineers.]
The tribunes having done as they were ordered, at daybreak next
morning, seeing that the new arrivals were collected in the
market-place, the general gave the signal for the assembly of the army.
The signal was as usual promptly obeyed by all, for they were curious
to see how the general would demean himself in their presence, and what
he would say to them about the business in hand. As soon as they were
come together, Scipio sent word to the tribunes to bring their soldiers
under arms, and station them round the assembled men. He then came
forward himself. His first appearance caused an immediate change of
feeling. The soldiers supposed that he was still unwell, and when they
suddenly saw him, contrary to all expectations, with all the appearance
of full health and strength, they were struck with terror.
+28.+ He began his speech by saying that he wondered what their
grievances were, or what they looked for forward that induced them to
mutiny. For that there were three motives only on which men usually
venture to rebel against their country and their commanders,—discontent
and anger with their officers; dissatisfaction with their present
position; or, lastly, hopes of something better and more glorious.
“Now, I ask you,” he continued, “which of these can you allege? It is
with me, I presume, that you are dissatisfied, because I did not pay
you your wages. But this cannot be laid to my charge; for while I was
in office your pay was never short. The fault then may lie with Rome
that the accumulated arrears have not been settled. Which was your
proper course then in that case? To have brought forward your complaint
thus, as rebels and enemies to the country that nurtured you, or to
have come personally to me and stated your case, and to have begged
your friends to support and help you? The latter would have been the
better plan in my opinion. In those who serve others for pay it is
sometimes pardonable to revolt against their paymasters; but in the
case of those who are fighting for themselves, for their own wives and
children, it can in no circumstances be conceded. It is just as though,
on the plea of being wronged in money matters by his own father, a man
were to come in arms to slay him from whom he received his own life.
Or perhaps you may allege that I imposed greater hardships and dangers
on you than on the others, and gave the rest more than their share of
profits and booty. But you can neither venture to say this, nor, if you
did venture, could you prove it. What then is your grievance against me
at this moment, I should like to ask, that you have mutinied? I believe
that not one of you will be able to express or even conceive it.
+29.+ “Nor again can it have been any dissatisfaction with the position
of affairs. For when was any prosperity greater? When has Rome won
more victories, when have her arms had brighter prospects than now?
But perhaps some faint-heart will say that our enemies have more
numerous advantages, fairer and more certain prospects than ourselves.
Which, pray, of these enemies? Is it Andobales and Mandonius? But
which of you is ignorant of the fact that these men first betrayed the
Carthaginians and joined us, and now once more, in defiance of their
oaths and pledges, have come forward as our opponents? It is a fine
thing surely to become the enemies of your country in reliance on such
men as these! Nor again had you any prospect of becoming masters of
Iberia by your own prowess: for you would not have been strong enough,
even in conjunction with Andobales, to meet us in the field, to say
nothing of doing so without such aid. I should like then to ask,—what
was it in which you trusted? Surely not in the skill and valour of the
leaders whom you have now elected, or in the fasces and axes which
were borne in front of them,—men of whom I will not deign to say even
another word. All this, my men, is absolutely futile; nor will you be
able to allege even the smallest just complaint against me or your
country. Wherefore I will undertake your defence to Rome and myself,
by putting forward a plea which all the world will acknowledge to hold
good. And it is that, _a crowd is ever easily misled and easily induced
to any error_. Therefore it is that crowds are like the sea, which in
its own nature is safe and quiet; but, when winds fall violently upon
it, assumes the character of the blasts which lash it into fury: thus
a multitude also is ever found to be what its leaders and counsellors
are. Acting on this consideration, I and all my fellow-officers hereby
offer you pardon and amnesty for the past: but to the guilty authors
of the mutiny we are resolved to show no mercy, but to punish them as
their misconduct to their country and to ourselves deserves.”
[Sidenote: Execution of the ringleaders.]
+30.+ Just as he said these words, the soldiers, who were posted under
arms round the assembly, clashed their swords against their shields:
and at the same instant the ringleaders of the mutiny were brought in,
stripped and in chains. But such terror was inspired in the men by
the threatening aspect of the surrounding troops, and by the dreadful
spectacle before them, that, while the ringleaders were being scourged
and beheaded, they neither changed countenance nor uttered a sound,
but remained all staring open-mouthed and terrified at what was going
on. So the ringleaders of the mischief were scourged and dragged off
through the crowd dead; but the rest of the men accepted with one
consent the offer of an amnesty from the general and officers; and then
voluntarily came forward, one by one, to take an oath to the tribunes
that they would obey the orders of their commanders and remain loyal to
Rome.
Having thus crushed what might have been the beginning of serious
danger, Scipio restored his troops to their former good disposition....
_Scipio at New Carthage has heard of hostile movements on the part of
Andobales north of the Ebro, B.C. 206. See Livy, 28, 31-34._
[Sidenote: Scipio’s address to his soldiers.]
+31.+ Scipio at once summoned a meeting of the soldiers in New
Carthage, and addressed them on the subject of the audacious
proceedings of Andobales, and his treachery to them; and by dwelling
at great length on these topics he inspired the men with a very great
eagerness to attack these princes. He then proceeded to enumerate the
battles they had already fought against the Iberians and Carthaginians
combined, the Carthaginians acting as leaders in the campaigns.
“Seeing,” he added, “that you always beat them, it does not now become
you to fear defeat in a war against Iberians by themselves, and led by
Andobales. I will not therefore even accept any Iberian of them all as
a partner in the struggle, but I will undertake the campaign by the
unassisted services of my Roman soldiers: in order to make it plain
to all that it was not, as some assert, by the aid of Iberians that
we defeated the Carthaginians and drove them from Iberia; but that
it was by Roman valour and your own gallantry that we have conquered
Carthaginian and Celtiberian combined. Let nothing therefore disturb
your confidence in each other: but, if you have ever done it before,
approach this undertaking with courage undismayed. For securing the
victory I will with God’s help make every necessary provision.” This
speech filled the troops with such zeal and confidence, that they
presented all the appearance of men whose enemies are in full view, and
who are on the very point of closing with them.
[Sidenote: Scipio marches to the Ebro, crosses it, and in fourteen days
is in the presence of the enemy.]
[Sidenote: A skirmish.]
+32.+ Scipio then dismissed the assembly, but on the next day got
his troops on the march, and having reached the Ebro in ten days and
crossed it, on the fourth day after that pitched his camp near that
of the enemy, with a valley between his own and the enemy’s lines.
Next day he turned some cattle that had accompanied his army into this
valley, after giving Caius Laelius instructions to have the cavalry
ready, and some of the tribunes to prepare the velites. The Iberians
having at once made an onslaught upon the cattle, he despatched some
of the velites against them. These two forces became engaged, and
reinforcements being sent to either party from time to time, a severe
infantry skirmishing place in the valley. The proper moment for attack
being now come, Caius Laelius, having the cavalry prepared as directed,
charged the skirmishers of the enemy, getting between them and the high
ground, so that the greater number of them were scattered about the
valley and killed by the cavalry. This event roused the barbarians to
a furious desire to engage, that they might not appear to be entirely
reduced to despair by their previous defeat; and accordingly by
daybreak next day they drew out their whole army for battle. Scipio was
quite ready to give them battle; but when he saw that the Iberians had
come down into the valley in an imprudent manner, and were stationing,
not only their cavalry, but their infantry also on the level ground,
he waited for a time, because he wished as many of the enemy as
possible to take up a position like that. He felt confidence in his
cavalry, and still more in his infantry; because, in such deliberate
and hand-to-hand battles as this, his men were vastly superior to the
Iberians both in themselves and in their arms.
[Sidenote: Decisive victory of Scipio.]
+33.+ When he thought the right time had come he drew out [the
velites][24] to oppose those of the enemy who occupied the foot of the
hills; while against those who had descended into the valley he led his
main force from the camp in four cohorts, and attacked the infantry.
Caius Laelius at the same time made a detour with the cavalry by the
hills, which stretched from the camp to the valley, and charged the
enemy’s horse on the rear; and so kept them occupied with fighting him.
The enemy’s infantry therefore, being thus deprived of the support of
the cavalry, on which they had relied in descending into the valley,
were distressed and overmatched in the battle; while their cavalry was
in much the same plight: for, being surprised on ground of insufficient
extent, they fell into confusion, and lost more men by hurting each
other than by the hands of the enemy; for their own infantry was
pressing upon their flank, and the enemy’s infantry on their front,
while his cavalry were attacking on their rear. The battle having taken
this course, the result was that nearly all those who had descended
into the valley lost their lives; while those who had been stationed
on the foot of the hills managed to escape. These last were the
light-armed troops, and formed about a third of the whole army: with
whom Andobales himself contrived to make good his escape to a certain
stronghold of great security....
_By further operations in this year, B.C. 206, Scipio had compelled
Mago to abandon Spain: and towards the winter the Roman army went into
winter-quarters at Tarraco._
[Sidenote: Scipio returns to Rome in the autumn of B.C. 206.]
Having thus put a finishing stroke to his campaigns in Iberia, Scipio
arrived at Tarraco in high spirits, bringing with him the materials
of a brilliant triumph for himself, and a glorious victory for his
country. But being anxious to arrive in Rome before the consular
elections, he arranged for the government of Iberia,[25] and, having
put the army into the hands of Junius Silanus and L. Marcius, embarked
with Caius Laelius and his other friends for Rome....
ANTIOCHUS IN BACTRIA. See 10, 48, 49
[Sidenote: The answer of Euthydemus (a Magnesian), king of Bactria, to
Teleas, the envoy of Antiochus.]
[Sidenote: Antiochus continues his march into the interior of Asia.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 212-205.]
+34.+ Euthydemus was himself a Magnesian, and he answered the envoy
by saying that “Antiochus was acting unjustly in trying to expel
him from his kingdom. He was not himself a revolted subject, but
had destroyed the descendant of some who had been such, and so had
obtained the kingdom of Bactria.” After adding more arguments to the
same effect, he urged Teleas to act as a sincere mediator of peace,
by urging Antiochus not to grudge him the royal title and dignity,
“for if he did not yield to this demand, neither of them would be
safe: seeing that great hords of Nomads were close at hand, who were
a danger to both; and that if they admitted them into the country,
it would certainly be utterly barbarised.” With these words he sent
Teleas back to Antiochus. The king had long been looking about for some
means of ending the controversy; and when he was informed by Teleas
of what Euthydemus had said, he readily admitted these pleas for a
pacification. And after several journeys of Teleas to and fro between
the two, Euthydemus at last sent his son Demetrius to confirm the terms
of the treaty. Antiochus received the young prince; and judging from
his appearance, conversation, and the dignity of his manners that he
was worthy of royal power, he first promised to give him one of his
own daughters, and secondly conceded the royal title to his father.
And having on the other points caused a written treaty to be drawn up,
and the terms of the treaty to be confirmed on oath, he marched away;
after liberally provisioning his troops, and accepting the elephants
belonging to Euthydemus. He crossed the Caucasus[26] and descended
into India; renewed his friendship with Sophagasenus the king of the
Indians; received more elephants, until he had a hundred and fifty
altogether; and having once more provisioned his troops, set out again
personally with his army: leaving Androsthenes of Cyzicus the duty
of taking home the treasure which this king had agreed to hand over
to him. Having traversed Arachosia and crossed the river Enymanthus,
he came through Drangene to Carmania; and, as it was now winter, he
put his men into winter quarters there. This was the extreme limit
of the march of Antiochus into the interior: in which he not only
reduced the up-country Satraps to obedience to his authority, but
also the coast cities, and the princes on this side Taurus; and, in a
word, consolidated his kingdom by overawing all his subjects with the
exhibition of his boldness and energy. For this campaign convinced the
Europeans as well as the Asiatics that he was worthy of royal power....