Transcriber’s note:
This book was published in two volumes, of which this is the second.
The first volume was released as Project Gutenberg ebook #44125,
available at https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44125.
Following entries in the Index are erroneous,
as there is no Chapter 15 in Book XXXIV and no
Chapter 59 in Book VI.:
Sallentini, a tribe in Calabria. 34, 15, Rhyncus,
in Aetolia, 6, 59, Morini, a Gallic tribe, 34, 15,
Mauretania, 34, 15, Lugdunum, a town in Gaul, 34,
15. and there are no references in the text
related to these entries.
Bold characters are enclosed within plus signs.(+)
THE
HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS
TRANSLATED FROM THE TEXT OF F. HULTSCH
BY
EVELYN S. SHUCKBURGH, M.A.
LATE FELLOW OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II
London
MACMILLAN AND CO.
AND NEW YORK
1889
_All rights reserved_
CONTENTS
PAGES
BOOKS X TO XXXIX 1-541
SMALLER FRAGMENTS 542-559
APPENDICES 560-568
INDEX 569-615
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS
BOOK X
THE HANNIBALIAN WAR—THE RECOVERY OF TARENTUM
[Sidenote: B.C. 209, Coss. Q. Fabius Maximus V. Q. Fulvius Flaccus IV.]
+1.+ The distance from the strait and town of Rhegium to Tarentum is
more than two thousand stades; and that portion of the shore of Italy
is entirely destitute of harbours, except those of Tarentum: I mean
the coast facing the Sicilian sea, and verging towards Greece, which
contains the most populous barbarian tribes as well as the most famous
of the Greek cities. For the Bruttii, Lucani, some portions of the
Daunii, the Cabalii, and several others, occupy this quarter of Italy.
So again this coast is lined by the Greek cities of Rhegium, Caulon,
Locri, Croton, Metapontum, and Thurii: so that voyagers from Sicily or
from Greece to any one of these cities are compelled to drop anchor in
the harbours of Tarentum; and the exchange and commerce with all who
occupy this coast of Italy take place in this city. One may judge of
the excellence of its situation from the prosperity attained by the
people of Croton; who, though only possessing roadsteads suitable for
the summer, and enjoying therefore but a short season of mercantile
activity, still have acquired great wealth, entirely owing, it seems,
to the favourable situation of their town and harbour, which yet cannot
be compared with those of Tarentum. For, even at this day, Tarentum
is in a most convenient position in respect to the harbours of the
Adriatic, and was formerly still more so. Since, from the Iapygian
promontory as far as Sipontum, every one coming from the other side
and dropping anchor at Italy always crossed to Tarentum, and used that
city for his mercantile transactions as an emporium; for the town of
Brundisium had not yet been founded in these times.[1] Therefore Fabius
regarded the recovery of it as of great importance, and, omitting
everything else, turned his whole thoughts to this....
PUBLIUS CORNELIUS SCIPIO AFRICANUS IN SPAIN, B.C. 210-206
[Sidenote: A common mistake as to Scipio’s character.]
+2.+ Being about to narrate the exploits of Publius Scipio in Iberia,
and in fact all the achievements in his life, I think it necessary to
direct my readers’ attention, to begin with, to his moral and mental
qualities. For as he is perhaps the most illustrious man of any born
before the present generation, everybody seeks to know what kind of
man he was, and what advantages from natural ability or experience he
enjoyed, to account for a career so crowded with brilliant achievement;
and yet is compelled to remain in the dark, or to entertain false
opinions, because those who write about him have not kept to the truth.
The soundness of this assertion will be rendered evident in the course
of my narrative to all who are capable of estimating the noblest and
most gallant of his exploits. Now all other writers represent him as
a man favoured by fortune, who succeeded in his undertakings contrary
to rational expectation, and by the mere force of circumstances. They
consider apparently such men to be, so to speak, more god-like and
worthy of admiration, than those who act in every case by calculation.
They do not seem to be aware of the distinction between credit for
good fortune and credit for good conduct in the case of such men; and
that the former may be assigned to any one however commonplace, while
the latter belongs to those alone who act from prudent calculation and
clear intelligence: and it is these last whom we should look upon as
the most god-like and god-beloved.
[Sidenote: Scipio’s use of religion compared with that of Lycurgus.]
Now it seems to me that in his character and views Publius was very
like Lycurgus the legislator of the Lacedaemonians. For we must not
suppose that it was from superstition that Lycurgus continually
consulted the Pythian priestess in the establishment of the
Lacedaemonian constitution; nor that Publius depended on dreams and
ominous words for his success in securing empire for his country.
But as both saw that the majority of mankind cannot be got to accept
contentedly what is new and strange, nor to face dangers with courage,
without some hope of divine favour,—Lycurgus, by always supporting his
own schemes by an oracular response from the Pythia, secured better
acceptation and credit for his ideas; and Publius, by always in like
manner instilling into the minds of the vulgar an opinion of his acting
on some divine suggestion in the formation of his designs, caused those
under his command to confront dangerous services with greater courage
and cheerfulness. But that he invariably acted on calculation and with
foresight, and that the successful issue of his plans was always in
harmony with rational expectation, will be evident by what I am about
to relate.
[Sidenote: Scipio’s first exploit, B.C. 218.]
+3.+ For that he was beneficent and high-minded is acknowledged; but
that he was acute, sober-minded, and earnest in pursuit of his aims, no
one will admit, except those who have lived with him, and contemplated
his character, so to speak, in broad daylight. Of such Gaius Laelius
was one. He took part in everything he did or said from boyhood to the
day of his death; and he it was who convinced me of this truth: because
what he said appeared to me to be likely in itself, and in harmony with
the achievements of that great man. He told me that the first brilliant
exploit of Publius was when his father fought the cavalry engagement
with Hannibal near the Padus. He was then, as it seems, eighteen years
old and on his first campaign. His father had given him a squadron of
picked cavalry for his protection; but when in the course of the battle
he saw his father surrounded by the enemy, with only two or three
horsemen near him, and dangerously wounded, he first tried to cheer on
his own squadron to go to his father’s assistance, but when he found
them considerably cowed by the numbers of the enemy surrounding them,
he appears to have plunged by himself with reckless courage into the
midst of the enemy: whereupon, his comrades being forced to charge
also, the enemy were overawed and divided their ranks to let them pass;
and Publius the elder, being thus unexpectedly saved, was the first to
address his son as his preserver in the hearing of the whole army.[2]
Having gained an acknowledged reputation for bravery by this exploit,
he ever afterwards freely exposed himself to every sort of personal
danger, whenever his country rested its hope of safety on him. And this
is not the conduct of a general who trusts to luck, but of one who has
a clear head.
[Sidenote: Elected aedile, end of B.C. 217.]
+4.+ Subsequently, when his elder brother Lucius was a candidate for
the Aedileship, which is about the most honourable office open to a
“young” man at Rome: it being the custom for two patricians to be
appointed, and there being many candidates, for some time he did not
venture to stand for the same office as his brother. But as the day
of election drew near, judging from the demeanour of the people that
his brother would easily obtain the office, and observing that his own
popularity with the multitude was very great, he made up his mind that
the only hope of his brother’s success was that they should combine
their candidatures. He therefore resolved to act as follows: His mother
was going round to the temples and sacrificing to the gods in behalf
of his brother, and was altogether in a state of eager expectation as
to the result. She was the only parent whose wishes he had to consult;
for his father was then on his voyage to Iberia, having been appointed
to command in the war there. He therefore said to her that he had seen
the same dream twice: for he thought that he was coming home from the
Forum after being elected Aedile with his brother, and that she met
them at the door and threw her arms round them and kissed them. His
mother with true womanly feeling exclaimed, “Oh, that I might see that
day!” He replied, “Do you wish us to try”? Upon her assenting, under
the idea that he would not venture, but was only jesting on the spur
of the moment (for of course he was quite a young man), he begged her
to prepare him at once a white toga, such as it is the custom for
candidates for office to wear.
+5.+ His mother thought no more about it: but Publius, having obtained
a white toga, went to the Forum before his mother was awake. His
boldness, as well as his previous popularity, secured him a brilliant
reception from the people; and when he advanced to the spot assigned
for candidates, and took his place by the side of his brother, the
people not only invested him with the office, but his brother also
for his sake; and both brothers returned home Aediles designate. The
news having been suddenly brought to their mother, she rushed in the
utmost delight to meet them at the door, and kissed the young men in an
ecstasy of joy. Accordingly Publius was believed by all who had heard
previously about his dream to have held commune with the gods, not
merely in his sleep, but rather in a waking vision, and by day. But in
point of fact there was no dream at all: Scipio was kind, open-handed,
and courteous, and by these means had conciliated the favour of the
multitude. But by a dexterous use of the occasion, both with the
people and his mother, he obtained his purpose, and moreover got the
reputation of acting under divine inspiration. For those persons, who,
from dulness or want of experience, or idleness, can never take a clear
view of the occasions or causes or connexion of events, are apt to give
the gods and chance the credit for what is really effected by sagacity
and far-seeing calculation. I have thought it worth while to say thus
much, that my readers may not be misled by unfounded gossip to pass
over this great man’s finest and most splendid qualities, I mean his
wealth of resource and untiring diligence; which will become still more
apparent when we come to recount his actual achievements.
[Sidenote: Speech of Publius Scipio to the soldiers in Spain, B.C. 210.]
[Sidenote: Scipio crosses the Ebro, and swoops down upon New Carthage.]
+6.+ Such was the man who now assembled the soldiers and exhorted them
not to be dismayed by the disaster which had befallen them. “For,”
said he, “Romans have never been beaten by Carthaginians in a trial of
valour. It was the result of treachery on the part of the Celtiberians,
and of rashness, the two commanders getting cut off from each other
owing to their trust in the alliance of these men. But now these two
disadvantages are on the side of the enemy: for they are encamped at a
wide distance from each other; and by their tyrannical conduct to their
allies have alienated them all, and made them hostile to themselves.
The consequence is that some of them are already sending messages to
us; while the rest, as soon as they dare, and see that we have crossed
the river, will gladly join us; not so much because they have any
affection for us, as because they are eager to punish the outrages of
the Carthaginians. Most important of all is the fact that the enemy are
at variance with each other, and will refuse to fight against us in a
body, and by thus engaging in detail will be more easily dealt with by
us.” Looking to these facts, therefore, he bade them cross the river
with confidence, and undertook that he and the other officers would see
to the next step to be taken. With these words he left his colleague,
Marcus Silanus, with five hundred horse to guard the ford, and to
protect the allies on the north of the river, while he himself began
taking his army across, without revealing his design to any one. As
a matter of fact he had resolved to do nothing of what he gave out
publicly, and had made up his mind to make a rapid attack upon the
town called Iberian Carthage. This may be looked upon as the first and
strongest proof of the judgment which I lately passed upon him. He was
now only in his twenty-seventh year: and yet he, in the first place,
undertook to accomplish what the magnitude of the previous disasters
had made the world look upon as completely hopeless; and, in the second
place, having undertaken it, he left on one side the plain and obvious
course, and conceived and carried out a plan which was a surprise
to the enemy himself. This could only be the result of the closest
calculation.
[Sidenote: Scipio’s careful inquiries as to the state of things in
Spain.]
+7.+ The fact is that he had made minute inquiries, before leaving
Rome, both about the treason of the Celtiberians, and the separation
of the two Roman armies; and had inferred that his father’s disaster
was entirely attributable to these. He had not therefore shared the
popular terror of the Carthaginians, nor allowed himself to be overcome
by the general panic. And when he subsequently heard that the allies
of Rome north of the Ebro were remaining loyal, while the Carthaginian
commanders were quarrelling with each other, and maltreating the
natives subject to them, he began to feel very cheerful about his
expedition, not from a blind confidence in Fortune, but from deliberate
calculation. Accordingly, when he arrived in Iberia, he learnt, by
questioning everybody and making inquiries about the enemy from every
one, that the forces of the Carthaginians were divided into three.
Mago, he was informed, was lingering west of the pillars of Hercules
among the Conii; Hasdrubal, the son of Gesco, in Lusitania, near the
mouth of the Tagus; while the other Hasdrubal was besieging a certain
city of the Caspetani; and none of the three were less than ten days’
march from the New Town. Now he calculated that, if he decided to give
the enemy battle, it would be risking too much to do so against all
three at once, because his predecessors had been beaten, and because
the enemy would vastly out-number him; if, on the other hand, he were
to march rapidly to engage one of the three, and should then find
himself surrounded—which might happen by the one attacked retreating,
and the others coming up to his relief,—he dreaded a disaster like that
of his uncle Gnaeus and his father Publius.
[Sidenote: He determines to attempt New Carthage.]
+8.+ He therefore rejected that idea altogether: but being informed
that New Carthage was the most important source of supplies to the
enemy and of damage to the Romans in the present war, he had taken the
trouble to make minute inquiries about it during the winter from those
who were well informed. He learnt that it was nearly the only town in
Iberia which possessed a harbour suitable for a fleet and naval force;
that it lay very conveniently for the Carthaginians to make the sea
passage from Libya; that they in fact had the bulk of their money and
war material in it, as well as their hostages from the whole of Iberia;
that, most important of all, the number of fighting men garrisoning the
citadel only amounted to a thousand,—because no one would ever suppose
that, while the Carthaginians commanded nearly the whole of Iberia, any
one would conceive the idea of assaulting this town; that the other
inhabitants were exceedingly numerous, but all consisted of craftsmen,
mechanics, and fisher-folk, as far as possible removed from any
knowledge of warfare. All this he regarded as being fatal to the town,
in case of the sudden appearance of an enemy. Nor did he moreover fail
to acquaint himself with the topography of New Carthage, or the nature
of its defences, or the lie of the lagoon: but by means of certain
fishermen who had worked there he had ascertained that the lagoon
was quite shallow and fordable at most points; and that, generally
speaking, the water ebbed every day towards evening sufficiently to
secure this. These considerations convinced him that, if he could
accomplish his purpose, he would not only damage his opponents, but
gain a considerable advantage for himself; and that, if on the other
hand he failed in effecting it, he would yet be able to secure the
safety of his men owing to his command of the sea, provided he had once
made his camp secure,—and this was easy, because of the wide dispersion
of the enemy’s forces. He had therefore, during his residence in winter
quarters, devoted himself to preparing for this operation to the
exclusion of every other: and in spite of the magnitude of the idea
which he had conceived, and in spite of his youth, he concealed it from
all except Gaius Laelius, until he had himself decided to reveal it.
+9.+ But although historians agree in attributing these calculations
to him; yet, when they come to narrate their issue, they somehow
or another attribute the success obtained not to the man and his
foresight, but to the gods and to Fortune, and that, in spite of all
probability, and the evidence of those who lived with him; and in spite
of the fact that Publius himself in a letter addressed to Philip has
distinctly set forth that it was upon the deliberate calculations,
which I have just set forth, that he undertook the Iberian campaign
generally, and the assault upon New Carthage in particular.
[Sidenote: Gaius Laelius proceeds to New Carthage with the fleet.]
[Sidenote: Scipio by land. B.C. 209.]
However that may be, at the time specified he gave secret instructions
to Gaius Laelius, who was in command of the fleet, and who, as I have
said, was the only man in the secret, to sail to this town; while he
himself marched his army at a rapid pace in the same direction. His
force consisted of twenty-five thousand infantry and two thousand five
hundred cavalry; and arriving at New Carthage on the seventh day he
pitched his camp on the north of the town;[3] defended its rear by a
double trench and rampart stretching from sea to sea,[4] while on the
side facing the town he made absolutely no defences, for the nature of
the ground made him sufficiently secure.
But as I am now about to describe the assault and capture of the
town, I think I must explain to my readers the lie of the surrounding
country, and the position of the town itself.
[Sidenote: Description of New Carthage.]
+10.+ It stands about half-way down the coast of Iberia in a gulf which
faces south-west, running about twenty stades inland, and about ten
stades broad at its entrance. The whole gulf is made a harbour by the
fact that an island[5] lies at its mouth and thus makes the entrance
channels on each side of it exceedingly narrow. It breaks the force of
the waves also, and the whole gulf has thus smooth water, except when
south-west winds setting down the two channels raise a surf: with all
other winds it is perfectly calm, from being so nearly landlocked. In
the recess of the gulf a mountain juts out in the form of a chersonese,
and it is on this mountain that the city stands, surrounded by the sea
on the east and south, and on the west by a lagoon extending so far
northward that the remaining space to the sea on the other side, to
connect it with the continent, is not more than two stades. The city
itself has a deep depression in its centre, presenting on its south
side a level approach from the sea; while the rest of it is hemmed in
by hills, two of them mountainous and rough, three others much lower,
but rocky and difficult of ascent; the largest of which lies on the
east of the town running out into the sea, on which stands a temple
of Asclepius. Exactly opposite this lies the western mountain in a
closely-corresponding position, on which a palace had been erected at
great cost, which it is said was built by Hasdrubal when he was aiming
at establishing royal power. The remaining three lesser elevations
bound it on the north, of which the westernmost is called the hill of
Hephaestus, the next to it that of Aletes,—who is believed to have
attained divine honours from having been the discoverer of the silver
mines,—and the third is called the hill of Cronus. The lagoon has been
connected with the adjoining sea artificially for the sake of the
maritime folk; and over the channel thus cut between it and the sea
a bridge has been built, for beasts of burden and carts to bring in
provisions from the country.
+11.+ Such is the nature of this city’s situation. The side of the
Roman camp which faced the city therefore was secured, without any
artificial means, by the lagoon and the sea. The neck of land lying
between these two, and connecting the city with the continent, Scipio
did not fence off with a stockade, although it abutted on the middle of
his camp,—either for the sake of making an impression upon the enemy,
or by way of suiting the arrangement to his own design,—that he might
have nothing to hamper the free egress and return of his troops to and
from the camp. The circuit of the city wall was not more than twenty
stades formerly,—though I am aware that it has been stated at forty
stades; but this is false, as I know from personal inspection and not
from mere report,—and in our day it has been still farther contracted.
[Sidenote: Scipio discloses his intention of assaulting New Carthage.]
The fleet arrived to the hour, and Publius then thought it time to
summon a meeting of his men and to encourage them to the undertaking by
the use of the same arguments by which he had convinced himself, and
which I have just now detailed. He pointed out to them that the plan
was practicable; and briefly summing up the blow which their success
would be to their enemies, and the advantage it would be to themselves,
he ended by promising crowns of gold to those who first mounted the
walls, and the usual rewards to those who displayed conspicuous
gallantry. And finally he declared that “Poseidon had appeared to
him in his sleep, and originally suggested his plan to him; and had
promised to give him such signal aid in the actual hour of battle that
his assistance should be made manifest to all.” The skilful mixture
in this speech of accurate calculation with promises of gold crowns,
and a reference to Divine Providence, created a great impression and
enthusiasm in the minds of the young soldiers.
[Sidenote: The assault.]
[Sidenote: A sally of the defenders.]
[Sidenote: repulsed.]
+12.+ Next morning he stationed ships supplied with missiles of every
sort, all along the seaboard, under the command of Gaius Laelius;
and having told off two thousand of his strongest men to accompany
the ladder-carriers, he begun the assault about the third hour. The
commandant of the town, Mago, divided his garrison of a thousand men
into two companies; half he left upon the citadel, and the rest he
stationed upon the eastern hill. Of the other inhabitants he accoutred
about two thousand of the strongest men with such arms as there were
in the city, and stationed them at the gate leading to the isthmus and
the enemy’s camp: the rest he ordered to assist to the best of their
power at all points in the wall. As soon as the bugles of Publius
sounded the moment of the assault, Mago caused those whom he had armed
to sally from the gate, feeling confident that he should create a
panic among the assailants and entirely baffle their design. These men
vigorously attacked those of the Roman army who were drawn up opposite
the isthmus, and a sharp engagement took place accompanied by loud
cries of encouragement on both sides: the Romans in the camp cheering
on their men, and the people in the city theirs. But the contest was
an unequal one in the respect of the facility of bringing up reserves.
The Carthaginians had all to come out by one gate, and had nearly two
stades to march before they got on the ground; whereas the Romans had
their supports close at hand and able to come out over a wide area;
for Publius had purposely stationed his men close to the camp in order
to induce the enemy to come out as far as possible: being quite aware
that if he succeeded in destroying these, who were so to speak the
sharp edge of the urban population, universal consternation would be
the result, and no more of those in the town would have the courage
to come out of the gate. The contest however for a certain time was
undecided, for it was between picked men on both sides; but finally
the Carthaginians were overpowered by the superior weight of their
opponents, owing to the constant reinforcements from the camp, and
turned to flight. A large number of them fell in the actual engagement,
and during the retreat; but the greater number were trampled to death
by each other as they crowded through the gate. The city people were
thrown into such a panic by these events, that even those who were
guarding the walls fled. The Romans very nearly succeeded in forcing
their way in through the gates with the fugitives; and of course fixed
their scaling-ladders against the wall in perfect security.
+13.+ Meanwhile Publius, though throwing himself heartily into the
struggle, yet took all possible precautions to protect his life. He had
three men with him carrying large shields, which they held in such a
position as to completely protect him from the side of the wall; and
accordingly he went along the lines, or mounted on elevated ground,
and contributed greatly to the success of the day. For he was enabled
to see all that was going on, and at the same time, by being himself
in view of all, inspired great zeal in the hearts of the combatants.
The result was that nothing was omitted which could contribute to the
success of the battle; but any help he saw to be at any moment required
was rapidly and thoroughly supplied.
[Sidenote: Difficulties of the escalade.]
But though the leaders of the escalade had begun mounting the walls
with great spirit, they found the operation accompanied by some danger:
not so much from the number of the defenders, as from the height of
the walls. The defenders accordingly plucked up courage considerably
when they saw the distress of the assailants: for some of the ladders
were breaking under the weight of the numbers which, owing to their
length, were on them at the same time; while on others the first to
mount turned giddy owing to their great height, and without requiring
much resistance from the defenders threw themselves from the ladders:
and when beams, or anything of that sort, were hurled upon them from
the battlements, they were swept off _en masse_ and fell to the ground.
In spite however of these difficulties nothing could check the zeal
and fury of the Roman attack; but as the first fell their place was
always taken at once by the next in order. And now, as the day was far
advanced, and the soldiers were worn out with fatigue, Scipio sounded a
recall for the assaulting party.
[Sidenote: Towards evening Scipio renews the assault on the gate, to
distract attention from his attack by way of the lagoon.]
+14.+ The men in the town were accordingly in high spirits at having,
as they thought, repulsed the assault. But Scipio, who was conscious
that the time was now approaching for the ebb of the lagoon, had five
hundred men stationed ready by its edge with ladders; and meanwhile
massed some fresh soldiers upon the gate and isthmus, and, after
urging them to undertake the work, furnished them with a larger number
of ladders than before: so that the wall was almost covered with men
scaling it. When the signal for attack was sounded, and the men placed
their ladders against the wall, and began ascending at every point, the
excitement and consternation inside the walls was extreme; for when
they thought themselves released from the threatened danger, they saw
it beginning all over again by another assault. Besides, their missiles
were beginning to fall short; and the number of men they had lost
greatly disheartened them. Still, though they were in great distress,
they continued the defence as well as they could.
[Sidenote: Scipio crosses the lagoon and gets his men upon the wall.]
Just when the struggle at the ladders was at its hottest the ebb of the
tide began. The water began gradually to leave the edges of the lagoon,
and the current ran with such violence, and in such a mass through its
channel into the adjoining sea, that to those who were unprepared for
the sight it appeared incredible. Being provided with guides, Scipio at
once ordered his men, who had been stationed ready for this service,
to step in and to fear nothing. His was a nature especially fitted to
inspire courage and sympathy with his own feelings. So now the men at
once obeyed him, and when the army saw them racing each other across
the marsh, it could not but suppose that the movement was a kind of
heaven-sent inspiration. This reminded them of the reference Scipio had
made to Poseidon, and the promises contained in his harangue: and their
enthusiasm rose to such a height that they locked their shields above
their heads, and, charging up to the gate, they began trying to hew
their way through the panels of the doors with their axes and hatchets.
Meanwhile the party which had crossed the marsh had approached the
wall. They found the battlements unguarded: and therefore, not only
fixed their ladders against the wall, but actually mounted and took
it without striking a blow; for the attention of the garrison was
distracted to other points, especially to the isthmus and the gate
leading to it, and they never expected that the enemy were likely to
attack on the side of the lagoon: besides, and above all, there was
such disorderly shouting, and such a scene of confusion within the
wall, that they could neither hear nor see to any purpose.
[Sidenote: The city entered and given up to the sword.]
+15.+ As soon as they found themselves in possession of the wall, the
Romans began making their way along the top of it, hurling off such of
the enemy as they met, the nature of their arms being especially suited
for an operation of that sort. But when they arrived at the gate they
descended and began cutting through the bolts, while those without
began forcing their way in, and those who were mounting the walls in
the direction of the isthmus, beginning by this time to get the better
of their opponents, were getting a footing on the battlements. Thus
the walls were finally in possession of the enemy: and the troops,
which entered by the gate, carried the eastern hill and drove off the
garrison occupying it.
When Scipio thought that a sufficient number of troops had entered the
town, he gave leave to the larger number of them to attack those in it,
according to the Roman custom, with directions to kill everything they
met, and to spare nothing; and not to begin looting until they got the
order to do so. The object of this is, I suppose, to strike terror.
Accordingly, one may often see in towns captured by the Romans, not
only human beings who have been put to the sword, but even dogs cloven
down the middle, and the limbs of other animals hewn off. On this
occasion the amount of such slaughter was exceedingly great, because of
the numbers included in the city.
[Sidenote: Mago surrenders the citadel.]
[Sidenote: Sack of the city.]
Scipio himself with about a thousand men now pressed on towards the
citadel. When he arrived there, Mago at first thought of resistance;
but afterwards, when he was satisfied that the city was completely
in the power of the enemy, he sent to demand a promise of his life,
and then surrendered. This being concluded, the signal was given to
stop the slaughter: whereupon the soldiers left off slaying, and
turned to plunder. When night fell those of the soldiers to whom this
duty had been assigned remained in the camp, while Scipio with his
thousand men bivouacked in the citadel; and summoning the rest from the
dwelling-houses by means of the Tribunes, he ordered them to collect
all their booty into the market-place by maniples, and to take up their
quarters for the night by these several heaps. He then summoned the
light-armed from the camp, and stationed them upon the eastern hill.
Thus did the Romans become masters of Carthage in Iberia.
[Sidenote: The Roman customs in the distribution of booty.]
[Sidenote: See 6, 33.]
+16.+ Next morning the baggage of those who had served in the
Carthaginian ranks, as well as the property of the city-folk and the
craftsmen, having been collected together in the market-place, the
Tribunes divided it according to the Roman custom among their several
legions. Now the Roman method of procedure in the capture of cities
is the following: Sometimes certain soldiers taken from each maniple
are told off for this duty, their numbers depending on the size of the
city; sometimes maniples are told off in turn for it: but there are
never more than half the whole number assigned to the work. The rest
remain in their own ranks in reserve, sometimes outside, at others
inside the city, for taking such precautions as may be from time to
time necessary. Sometimes, though rarely, four legions are massed
together; but generally speaking the whole force is divided into two
legions of Romans and two of allies. This being settled, all who are
told off for plundering carry all they get, each to his own legion; and
when this booty has been sold, the Tribunes distribute the proceeds
among all equally, including not only those who were thus held in
reserve, but even those who were guarding the tents, or were invalided,
or had been sent away anywhere on any service. But I have spoken fully
before, when discussing the Roman constitution, on the subject of the
distribution of booty, showing how no one is excluded from a share in
it, in accordance with the oath which all take upon first joining the
camp. I may now add that the arrangement whereby the Roman army is thus
divided, half being engaged in gathering booty and half remaining drawn
up in reserve, precludes all danger of a general catastrophe arising
from personal rivalry in greed. For as both parties feel absolute
confidence in the fair dealing of each in respect to the booty,—the
reserves no less than the plunderers,—no one leaves the ranks, which
has been the most frequent cause of disaster in the case of other
armies.
+17.+ For, as the majority of mankind encounter miseries and embrace
dangers for the sake of gain, it is plain that when such opportunity
is presented to them as this, the men in the reserve or in the camp
would be with difficulty induced to abstain from taking advantage of
it; because the usual idea is that everything belongs to the man who
actually takes it: and though a general or king may be careful to order
all booty to be brought into the common stock, yet everybody considers
that what he can conceal is his own. The result is that, while the ruck
of the army cannot be prevented from eagerly devoting themselves to
plunder, they often run the risk of a complete overthrow: and it has
often in fact happened that after a successful movement, such as the
carrying of an entrenched camp or the capture of a city, the victorious
army has, from no other cause but this, been not only ejected but even
utterly defeated. Therefore there is nothing about which leaders ought
to exercise more care or foresight, than that, on such an occasion, all
may have an absolutely equal prospect of sharing in the booty.
[Sidenote: Scipio’s treatment of the prisoners. The citizens are
dismissed to their homes.]
[Sidenote: The skilled slaves are promised their freedom at the end of
the war.]
[Sidenote: Some are drafted into the navy.]
Thus on the present occasion, while the Tribunes were busied in the
distribution of the spoil; the Roman commander caused the prisoners,
who numbered little short of ten thousand, to be assembled; and having
first ordered them to be divided into two groups, one containing the
citizens and their wives and children, the other the craftsmen, he
exhorted the first of these to be loyal to the Romans, and to remember
the favour which they were now receiving, and allowed them all to
depart to their own houses. With tears of joy at this unexpected
preservation, they bowed in reverence to Scipio and dispersed. He then
told the craftsmen that they were for the present public slaves of
Rome, but that, if they showed themselves loyal and zealous in their
several crafts, he promised than their freedom, as soon as the war with
the Carthaginians had been brought to a successful issue. He then bade
them go get their names enrolled in the office of the Quaestor, and
appointed a Roman overseer for every thirty of them, their whole number
being about two thousand. From the remaining captives he selected the
strongest, those who were in the prime of youth and physical vigour,
and assigned them to serve on board ship: and having thus increased
the number of his naval allies by one half, he manned the ships taken
from the enemy as well as his own; so that the number of men on board
each vessel were now little short of double what it was before. For the
captured ships numbered eighteen, his original fleet thirty-five. These
men he also promised their freedom, if they showed themselves loyal
and zealous, as soon as they had conquered the Carthaginians. By this
treatment of the captives he inspired the citizens with warm feelings
of loyalty and fidelity, and the handicraftsmen with great readiness to
serve, from the hope held out to them of recovering their freedom.
[Sidenote: Mago is entrusted to Lachus.]
[Sidenote: The women.]
[Sidenote: The hostages.]
+18.+ He next took Mago and the Carthaginians with him separately,
consisting of one member of the Council of ancients and fifteen of the
Senate.[6] These he put under the charge of Gaius Laelius, with orders
that he should take due care of them. He next summoned the hostages,
who numbered more than three hundred. Such of them as were children he
called to him one by one, and stroking their heads told them not to be
afraid, for in a few days they would see their parents. The others also
he exhorted to be of good cheer, and to write word to their relations
in their several cities, first, that they were safe and well; and,
secondly, that the Romans were minded to restore them all unharmed to
their homes, if only their relations adopted the Roman alliance. With
these words, having already selected from the spoils such articles as
were fitting for his purpose, he presented each with what was suitable
to their sex and age: the girls with ear-rings and bracelets, the young
men with daggers and swords. Among the captive women was the wife of
Mandonius, brother of Andobalus king of the Ilergētes. This woman fell
at his feet and besought him with tears to protect their honour better
than the Carthaginians had done. Touched by her distress Scipio asked
her in what respect she and the other women were left unprovided. She
was a lady of advanced years and of a certain majestic dignity of
appearance: and upon her meeting his question by perfect silence, he
summoned the men who had been appointed to take charge of the women;
and when they reported that they had supplied them with all necessaries
in abundance, and when the woman again clasped his knees and repeated
the same request, Scipio felt still more embarrassed; and, conceiving
the idea that their guardians had neglected them, and were now making
a false report, he bade the women fear nothing, for that he would
appoint different men to see to their interests, and secure that they
were not left in want of anything. Then after a brief hesitation the
woman said, “You mistake my meaning, General, if you think that we are
asking you for food.” Scipio then at length began to understand what
she wished to convey; and seeing under his eyes the youthful beauty of
the daughters of Andobalus, and of many of the other nobles, he could
not refrain from tears, while the aged lady indicated in a few words
the danger in which they were. He showed at once that he understood her
words: and taking her by the hand, he bade her and the others also be
of good cheer, for that he would watch over them as he would over his
own sisters and daughters, and would accordingly put men in charge of
them on whom he could rely.
[Sidenote: The money.]
+19.+ His next business was to pay over to the Quaestors such public
money of the Carthaginians as had been captured. It amounted to more
than six hundred talents, so that when this was added to the four
hundred which he had brought with him from Rome, he found himself in
possession of more than one thousand talents.
[Sidenote: Scipio’s continence.]
It was on this occasion that some young Romans fell in with a girl
surpassing all the other women in bloom and beauty; and seeing that
Scipio was fond of the society of women, they brought her to him, and,
placing her before him, said that they desired to present the damsel
to him. He was struck with admiration for her beauty, and replied
that, if he had been in a private position, he could have received no
present that would have given him greater pleasure; but as general it
was the last in the world which he could receive. He meant to convey, I
presume, by this ambiguous answer that, in hours of rest and idleness,
such things are the most delightful enjoyments and pastimes for young
men; whereas in times of activity they are hindrances physically and
mentally. However that may be, he thanked the young men; but called the
girl’s father, and handing her over at once to him, told him to bestow
her in marriage on whichever of the citizens he chose. By this display
of continence and self-control he gained the warm respect of his men.
[Sidenote: Laelius sent to Rome with the news. B.C. 209.]
Having made these arrangements, and handed over the rest of the
captives to the Tribunes, he despatched Gaius Laelius on board a
quinquereme to Rome, with the Carthaginian prisoners and the noblest
of the others, to announce at home what had taken place. For as the
prevailing feeling at Rome was one of despair of success in Iberia, he
felt certain that on this news their spirits would revive, and that
they would make much more strenuous efforts to support him.
[Sidenote: Preparations for an advance.]
[Sidenote: Xen. _Hellen._ 3, 4, 17: _Agesil._ 1, 26.]
+20.+ Scipio himself stayed a certain time in New Carthage and
assiduously practised his fleet; and drew up the following scheme
for his military Tribunes for training their men. The first day he
ordered the men to go at the double for thirty stades in their full
arms; and on the second all of them to rub down, clean, and thoroughly
examine their whole equipments; on the third to rest and do nothing;
on the fourth to have a sham fight, some with wooden swords covered
with leather and with a button at the end, others with javelins also
buttoned at the end; on the fifth the same march at the double as on
the first. That there might be no lack of weapons for the practises,
or for the real fighting, he took the greatest pains with the
handicraftsmen. He had, as I have already stated, appointed overseers
over them in regular divisions to secure that this was done; but he
also personally inspected them every day, and saw that they were
severally supplied with what was necessary. Thus while the legions were
practising and training in the vicinity of the town, and the fleet
manoeuvring and rowing in the sea, and the city people sharpening
weapons or forging arms or working in wood, every one in short busily
employed in making armour, the whole place must have presented the
appearance of what Xenophon called “a workshop of war.” When he thought
all these works were sufficiently advanced for the requirements of
the service, he secured the town by posting garrisons and repairing
the walls, and got both his army and navy on the move, directing his
advance upon Tarraco, and taking the hostages with him....
PHILOPOEMEN OF MEGALOPOLIS
[Sidenote: Euryleon Achaean Strategus, B.C. 210-209.]
+21.+ Euryleon, the Strategus of the Achaeans, was a man of timid
character, and quite unsuited for service in the field.
But as my history has now arrived at a point at which the achievements
of Philopoemen begin, I think it only proper that, as I have attempted
to describe the habits and characters of the other men of eminence
with whom we have had to deal, I should do the same for him. It is
strangely inconsistent in historians to record in elaborate detail
the founding of cities, stating when and how and by whom they were
established, and even the circumstances and difficulties which
accompanied the transaction, and yet to pass over in complete silence
the characteristics and aims of the men by whom the whole thing was
done, though these in fact are the points of the greatest value. For as
one feels more roused to emulation and imitation by men that have life,
than by buildings that have none, it is natural that the history of the
former should have a greater educational value. If I had not therefore
already composed a separate account of him, clearly setting forth who
he was, his origin, and his policy as a young man, it would have been
necessary to have given an account now of each of these particulars.
But since I have done this in a work in three books, unconnected with
my present history, detailing the circumstances of his childhood and
his most famous achievements, it is clear that in my present narrative
my proper course will be to remove anything like details from my
account of his youthful characteristics and aims; while I am careful to
_add_ details to the story of the achievements of his manhood, which
in that treatise were only stated summarily. I shall thus preserve
the proper features of both works. The former being in the nature of
a panegyric demanded an account of his actions, put briefly and in a
style deliberately intended to enhance their merits; my present work,
which is history, and therefore absolutely uncommitted to praise or
blame, requires only a true statement, which puts the facts clearly,
and traces the policy which dictated the several actions.
[Sidenote: Birth, parentage, and education of Philopoemen, b. B.C. 252.]
+22.+ Philopoemen, then, to begin with, was of good birth, descended
from one of the noblest families in Arcadia. He was also educated under
that most distinguished Mantinean, Cleander, who had been his father’s
friend before, and happened at that time to be in exile. When he came
to man’s estate he attached himself to Ecdemus and Demophanes, who were
by birth natives of Megalopolis, but who having been exiled by the
tyrant, and having associated with the philosopher Arcesilaus during
their exile, not only set their own country free by entering into an
intrigue against Aristodemus the tyrant, but also helped in conjunction
with Aratus to put down Nicocles, the tyrant of Sicyon. On another
occasion also, on the invitation of the people of Cyrene, they stood
forward as their champions and preserved their freedom for them. Such
were the men with whom he passed his early life; and he at once began
to show a superiority to his contemporaries, by his power of enduring
hardships in hunting, and by his acts of daring in war. He was moreover
careful in his manner of life, and moderate in the outward show which
he maintained; for he had imbibed from these men the conviction, that
it was impossible for a man to take the lead in public business with
honour who neglected his own private affairs; nor again to abstain from
embezzling public money if he lived beyond his private income.
[Sidenote: Elected Hipparch, B.C. 210. Cp. Plut. _Phil._ 7, συχνὸς
χρόνος after the battle of Sallasia, B.C. 222.]
Being then appointed Hipparch by the Achaean league at this time, and
finding the squadrons in a state of utter demoralisation, and the men
thoroughly dispirited, he not only restored them to a better state
than they were, but in a short time made them even superior to the
enemy’s cavalry, by bringing them all to adopt habits of real training
and genuine emulation. The fact is that most of those who hold this
office of Hipparch, either, from being without any genius themselves
for cavalry tactics, do not venture to enforce necessary orders upon
others; or, because they are aiming at being elected Strategus, try all
through their year of office to attach the young men to themselves and
to secure their favour in the coming election: and accordingly never
administer necessary reprimands, which are the salvation of the public
interests, but hush up all transgressions, and, for the sake of gaining
an insignificant popularity, do great damage to those who trust them.
Sometimes again, commanders, though neither feeble nor corrupt, do more
damage to the soldiers by intemperate zeal than the negligent ones, and
this is still oftener the case with regard to the cavalry....
[Sidenote: The cavalry tactics of Philopoemen, B.C. 210-209.[7]
+23.+ Now the movements which he undertook to teach the horsemen as
being universally applicable to cavalry warfare were these. ] In the
first place each separate horse was to be practised in wheeling first
to the left and then to the right, and also to face right-about;
and in the next place they were to be taught to wheel in squadrons,
face-about, and by a treble movement to face-about right-turn. Next
they were to learn to throw out flying columns of single or double
companies at full speed from both wings or from the centre; and then
to pull up and fall in again into troops, or squadrons, or regiments:
next to deploy into line on both wings, either by filling up the
intervals in the line or by a lateral movement on the rear. Simply to
form an oblique line, he said, required no practice, for it was exactly
the same order as that taken up on a march. After this they were to
practice charging the enemy and retreating by every kind of movement,
until they were able to advance at an alarming pace; provided only that
they kept together, both line and column, and preserved the proper
intervals between the squadrons: for nothing is more dangerous and
unserviceable than cavalry that have broken up their squadrons, and
attempt to engage in this state.
After giving these instructions both to the people and their
magistrates, he went on a round of inspection through the towns, and
inquired, first, whether the men obeyed the words of command; and,
secondly, whether the officers in the several towns knew how to give
them clearly and properly: for he held that the first thing requisite
was technical knowledge on the part of the commanders of each company.
+24.+ When he had thus made the proper preliminary preparations, he
mustered the cavalry from the various cities into one place, and set
about perfecting their evolutions under his own command, and personally
directed the whole drill. He did not ride in front of the army, as
generals nowadays do, from the notion that this is the proper position
for a commander. For what can be less scientific or more dangerous
than for a commander to be seen by all his men, and yet not to see one
of them? In such manoeuvres a Hipparch should not make a display not
of mere military dignity, but of the skill and ability of an officer,
appearing at one time in the front, at another on the rear, and at
another in the centre. This is what he did, riding along the lines, and
personally seeing to all the men, giving them directions when they were
at a loss what to do, and correcting at once every mistake that was
being made. Such mistakes, however, were trifling and rare, owing to
the previous care bestowed on every individual and company. Demetrius
of Phalerum has, as far as words go, given expression to the same idea:
“As in the case of building, if you lay each single brick rightly, and
if proper care is taken in placing each successive course, all will be
well; so in an army, accuracy in the arrangement of each soldier and
each company makes the whole strong....”
_A fragment of a speech of some Macedonian orator as to the Aetolians
making an alliance with Rome._
[Sidenote: Alliance between Aetolians and Rome against Philip,
negotiated by Scopas and Dorimachus, B.C. 211. See Livy, 26, 24.]
+25.+ “The case is just like that of the disposition of the various
kinds of troops on the field of battle. The light-armed and most active
men bear the brunt of the danger, are the first to be engaged and
the first to perish, while the phalanx and the heavy-armed generally
carry off the glory. So in this case, the Aetolians, and such of the
Peloponnesians as are in alliance with them, are put in the post of
danger; while the Romans, like the phalanx, remain in reserve. And
if the former meet with disaster and perish, the Romans will retire
unharmed from the struggle; while if they are victorious, which Heaven
forbid! the Romans will get not only them but the rest of the Greeks
also into their power....”[8]
PHILIP V.
[Sidenote: King Philip’s conduct at Argos after presiding at the Nemean
games, B.C. 208. See Livy, 27, 30, 31.]
+26.+ After finishing the celebration of the Nemean games, King Philip
of Macedon returned to Argos and laid aside his crown and purple robe,
with the view of making a display of democratic equality and good
nature. But the more democratic the dress which he wore, the more
absolute and royal were the privileges which he claimed. He was not
now content with seducing unmarried women, or even with intriguing
with married women, but assumed the right of sending authoritatively
for any woman whose appearance struck him; and offered violence to
those who did not at once obey, by leading a band of revellers to their
houses; and, summoning their sons or their husbands, he trumped up
false pretexts for menacing them. In fact his conduct was exceedingly
outrageous and lawless. But though this abuse of his privileges as a
guest was exceedingly annoying to many of the Achaeans, and especially
to the orderly part of them, the wars that threatened them on every
side compelled them to show a patience under it uncongenial to their
character....
None of his predecessors had better qualifications for sovereignty, or
more important defects, than this same Philip. And it appears to me
that the good qualities were innate, while the defects grew upon him as
he advanced in years, as happens to some horses as they grow old. Such
remarks I do not, following some other historians, confine to prefaces;
but when the course of my narrative suggests it, I state my opinion of
kings and eminent men, thinking that most convenient for writer and
reader alike....
_War between Antiochus the Great (III.) and Arsaces III., King of the
Parthians._ B.C. 212-205. _See above_ 8, 25.
[Sidenote: Description of Media, and of the palace at Ecbatana.]
+27.+ In regard to extent of territory Media is the most considerable
of the kingdoms in Asia, as also in respect of the number and excellent
qualities of its men, and not less so of its horses. For, in fact,
it supplies nearly all Asia with these animals, the royal studs
being entrusted to the Medes because of the rich pastures in their
country.[9] To protect it from the neighbouring barbarians a ring
of Greek cities was built round it by the orders of Alexander. The
chief exception to this is Ecbatana, which stands on the north of
Media, in the district of Asia bordering on the Maeotis and Euxine.
It was originally the royal city of the Medes, and vastly superior to
the other cities in wealth and the splendour of its buildings. It is
situated on the skirts of Mount Orontes, and is without walls, though
containing an artificially formed citadel fortified to an astonishing
strength. Beneath this stands the palace, which it is in some degree
difficult to describe in detail, or to pass over in complete silence.
To those authors whose aim is to produce astonishment, and who are
accustomed to deal in exaggeration and picturesque writing, this city
offers the best possible subject; but to those who, like myself,
are cautious when approaching descriptions which go beyond ordinary
notions, it presents much difficulty and embarrassment. However, as
regards size, the palace covers ground the circuit of which is nearly
seven stades; and by the costliness of the structure in its several
parts it testifies to the wealth of its original builders: for all its
woodwork being cedar or cypress not a single plank was left uncovered;
beams and fretwork in the ceilings, and columns in the arcades and
peristyle, were overlaid with plates of silver or gold, while all
the tiles were of silver. Most of these had been stripped off during
the invasion of Alexander and the Macedonians, and the rest in the
reigns of Antigonus and Seleucus Nicanor. However, even at the time
of Antiochus’s arrival, the temple of Aena[10] still had its columns
covered with gold, and a considerable number of silver tiles had been
piled up in it, and some few gold bricks and a good many silver ones
were still remaining. It was from these that the coinage bearing the
king’s impress was collected and struck, amounting to little less than
four thousand talents....
[Sidenote: The nature of the desert between Media and Parthia.]
+28.+ Arsaces expected that Antiochus would come as far as this
district (of Media), but that he would not venture to proceed across
the adjoining desert with so large a force, if for no other reason,
yet from the scarcity of water. For in this tract of country there is
no water appearing on the surface, though there are many subterranean
channels which have well-shafts sunk to them, at spots in the desert
unknown to persons unacquainted with the district. A true account of
these channels has been preserved among the natives to the effect
that, during the Persian ascendency, they granted the enjoyment of
the profits of the land to the inhabitants of some of the waterless
districts for five generations, on condition of their bringing fresh
water in; and that, there being many large streams flowing down Mount
Taurus, these people at infinite toil and expense constructed these
underground channels through a long tract of country, in such a way,
that the very people who now use the water are ignorant of the sources
from which the channels are originally supplied.
[Sidenote: Antiochus prepares to cross it: Arsaces orders the wells to
be choked.]
[Sidenote: Antiochus arrives at Hecatompylos.]
When, however, Arsaces saw that Antiochus was determined to attempt
to cross the desert, he endeavoured at once to choke up and spoil the
wells. But King Antiochus, upon this being reported to him, despatched
Nicomedes with a thousand horse; who found that Arsaces had retired
with his main army, but came upon some of his cavalry in the act of
choking up the shafts which went down into the underground channels.
They promptly attacked these men, and, having routed and forced them
to fly, returned back again to Antiochus. The king, having thus
accomplished the journey across the desert, arrived before the city
Hecatompylos, which is situated in the centre of Parthia, and derives
its name from the fact that the roads which lead to all the surrounding
districts converge there.
[Sidenote: Antiochus determines to follow Arsaces into Hyrcania.]
+29.+ Having rested his army at this place, and having convinced
himself that, had Arsaces been able to give him battle, he would
not have abandoned his own country, nor have sought a ground more
favourable to his own army for fighting him than the district round
Hecatompylos; he concluded that, since he had done so, it stood to
reason that he had had entirely changed his mind. He therefore decided
to advance into Hyrcania. But having arrived at Tagae, he learnt from
the natives that the country he had to cross, until he reached the
ridges of Mount Labus sloping down into Hyrcania, was exceedingly rough
and difficult, and that large numbers of barbarians were stationed at
the narrowest points. He therefore resolved to divide his light-armed
troops into companies, and distribute their officers among them, giving
them directions as to the route they were severally to take. He did the
same with the pioneers, whose business it was to make the positions
occupied by the light-armed possible of approach for the phalanx and
beasts of burden. Having made these arrangements, he entrusted the
first division to Diogenes, strengthening him with bowmen and slingers
and some mountaineers skilled in throwing javelines and stones, and
who, without keeping any regular order, were always ready to skirmish
at a moment’s notice, and in any direction, and rendered the most
effective assistance at the narrow passes. Next to these he ordered a
company of about two thousand Cretans armed with shields to advance,
under the command of Polyxenidas of Rhodes. The rear was to be brought
up by companies armed with breastplate and shield, and commanded by
Nicomedes of Cos, and Nicolaus the Aetolian.
[Sidenote: The ascent of Mount Labus.]
+30.+ But as they advanced, the ruggedness of the ground and the
narrowness of the passes were found to far exceed the king’s
expectations. The length of the ascent was altogether about three
hundred stades; and a great part had to be made up the bed of a winter
torrent of great depth, into which numerous rocks and trees had been
hurled by natural causes from the overhanging precipices, and made a
passage up it difficult, to say nothing of the obstacles which the
barbarians had helped to construct expressly to impede them. These
latter had felled a large number of trees and piled up heaps of huge
rocks; and had besides occupied all along the gully the high points,
which were at once convenient for attack and capable of covering
themselves; so that, if it had not been for one glaring error on their
part, Antiochus would have found the attempt beyond his powers, and
would have desisted from it. The error was this. They assumed that
the whole army would be obliged to march the entire way up the gully,
and they accordingly occupied the points of vantage. But they did not
perceive this fact, that, though the phalanx and the baggage could
not possibly go by any other route than the one they supposed, there
was yet nothing to make it impossible for the light-armed and active
troops to accomplish the ascent of the bare rocks. Consequently, as
soon as Diogenes had come upon the first outpost of the enemy, he and
his men began climbing out of the gully, and the affair at once took a
different aspect. For no sooner had they come to close quarters, than,
acting on the suggestion of the moment, Diogenes avoided the engagement
by ascending the mountains that flanked the enemy’s position, and so
got above him; and by pouring down volleys of darts and stones he
seriously harassed the barbarians. Their most deadly weapons however
proved to be the slings, which could carry a great distance; and when
by these means they had dislodged the first outpost and occupied their
position, an opportunity was secured for the pioneers to clear the way
and level it, without being exposed to danger. Owing to the number of
hands the work went on rapidly; and meanwhile the slingers, bowmen,
and javelin-men advanced in skirmishing order along the higher ground,
every now and then reforming and seizing on strong points of vantage;
while the men with shields formed a reserve, marching in order and
at a regular pace along the side of the gully itself. The barbarians
thereupon abandoned their positions, and, ascending the mountain,
mustered in full force on the summit.
[Sidenote: The battle on the summit of Mount Labus.]
[Sidenote: He reaches Tambrax.]
[Sidenote: Capture of Sirynx.]
+31.+ Thus Antiochus effected this ascent without loss, but slowly and
painfully, for it was not until the eighth day that his army made the
summit of Labus. The barbarians being mustered there, and resolved
to dispute his passage, a severe engagement took place, in which the
barbarians were eventually dislodged, and by the following manoeuvre.
As long as they were engaged face to face with the phalanx, they
kept well together and fought desperately; but before daybreak the
light-armed troops had made a wide circuit, and seized some high ground
on the rear of the enemy, and as soon as the barbarians perceived
this they fled in a panic. King Antiochus exerted himself actively
to prevent a pursuit, and caused a recall to be sounded, because he
wished his men to make the descent into Hyrcania, without scattering,
and in close order. He accomplished his object: reached Tambrax, an
unwalled city of great size and containing a royal palace, and there
encamped. Most of the natives fled from the battle-field, and its
immediate neighbourhood, into a city called Sirynx, which was not
far from Tambrax, and from its secure and convenient situation was
considered as the capital of Hyrcania. Antiochus therefore determined
to carry this town by assault; and having accordingly advanced thither,
and pitched his camp under its walls, he commenced the assault. The
operation consisted chiefly of mining under pent-houses. For the city
was defended by three trenches, thirty cubits broad and fifteen deep,
with a double vallum on the edge of each; and behind these there was
a strong wall. Frequent struggles took place at the works, in which
neither side were strong enough to carry off their killed and wounded:
for these hand-to-hand battles took place, not above ground only, but
underground also in the mines. However, owing to the numbers employed
and the activity of the king, it was not long before the trenches
were choked up and the walls were undermined and fell. Upon this the
barbarians, giving up all as lost, put to death such Greeks as were in
the town; and having plundered all that was most worth taking, made off
under cover of night. When the king saw this, he despatched Hyperbasus
with the mercenaries; upon whose approach the barbarians threw down
their booty and fled back again into the city; and when they found the
peltasts pouring in energetically through the breach in the walls they
gave up in despair and surrendered.
THE HANNIBALIAN WAR
[Sidenote: B.C. 208. Coss. M. Claudius Marcellus, T. Quinctius
Crispinus. The two Consuls were encamped within three miles of each
other, between Venusia and Bantia, Hannibal had been at Lacinium in
Bruttii, but had advanced into Apulia. Livy, 27, 25-27.]
[Sidenote: Death of the Consul M. Claudius Marcellus.]
+32.+ The Consuls, wishing to reconnoitre the slope of the hill towards
the enemy’s camp, ordered their main force to remain in position; while
they themselves with two troops of cavalry, their lictors, and about
thirty velites advanced to make the reconnaisance. Now some Numidians,
who were accustomed to lie in ambush for those who came on skirmishes,
or any other services from the Roman camp, happened, as it chanced, to
have ensconced themselves at the foot of the hill. Being informed by
their look-out man that a body of men was coming over the brow of the
hill above them, they rose from their place of concealment, ascended
the hill by a side road, and got between the Consuls and their camp. At
the very first charge they killed Claudius and some others, and having
wounded the rest, forced them to fly in different directions down
the sides of the hill. Though the men in camp saw what was happening
they were unable to come to the relief of their endangered comrades;
for while they were still shouting out to get ready, and before they
had recovered from the first shock of their surprise, while some were
putting the bridles on their horses and others donning their armour,
the affair was all over. The son of Claudius, though wounded, narrowly
escaped with his life.
[Sidenote: Fiat experimentum in corpore vili.]
Thus fell Marcus Marcellus from an act of incautiousness unworthy of a
general. I am continually compelled in the course of my history to draw
the attention of my readers to occurrences of this sort; for I perceive
that it is this, more than anything else connected with the science
of tactics, that ruins commanders. And yet the blunder is a very
obvious one. For what is the use of a commander or general, who has
not learnt that the leader ought to keep as far as possible aloof from
those minor operations, in which the whole fortune of the campaign is
not involved? Or of one who does not know that, even if circumstances
should at times force them to engage in such subordinate movements,
the commanders-in-chief should not expose themselves to danger until
a large number of their company have fallen? For, as the proverb has
it, the experiment should be made “on the worthless Carian”[11] not
on the general. For to say “I shouldn’t have thought it,”—“Who would
have expected it?” seems to me the clearest proof of strategical
incompetence and dulness.
+33.+ And so, though Hannibal’s claims to be reckoned a great general
are manifold, there is none more conspicuous than this, that though
engaged for a great length of time in an enemy’s country, and though he
experienced a great variety of fortune, he again and again inflicted a
disaster on his opponents in minor encounters, but never suffered one
himself, in spite of the number and severity of the contests which he
conducted: and the reason, we may suppose was, that he took great care
of his personal safety. And very properly so: for if the leader escapes
uninjured and safe, though a decisive defeat may have been sustained,
fortune offers many opportunities for retrieving disasters; but if he
has fallen, the pilot as it were of the ship, even should fortune give
the victory to the army, no real advantage is gained; because all the
hopes of the soldiers depend upon their leaders. So much for those who
fall into such errors from foolish vanity, childish parade, ignorance,
or contempt. For it is ever one or the other of these that is at the
bottom of such disasters....
[Sidenote: An incident in the attempt of Hannibal to enter Salapia,
under cover of a letter sealed by the ring of the dead Consul Marcus.
Livy, 27, 28.]
They suddenly let down the portcullis, which they had raised somewhat
by pulleys, and thus closed up the gateway. Then they took the men and
crucified them before the walls....
SCIPIO IN SPAIN
[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 209-208. See _supra_. ch. 20. The adhesion of
Edeco, prince of the Edetani.]
+34.+ In Iberia Publius Scipio took up his winter quarters at Tarraco,
as I have already stated; and secured the fidelity and affection of the
Iberians, to begin with, by the restoration of the hostages to their
respective families. He found a voluntary supporter of his measures in
the person of Edeco, the prince of the Edetani; who no sooner heard
that New Carthage had been taken, and that Scipio had got his wife
and children into his hands, than, concluding that the Iberians would
change sides, he resolved to take the lead in the movement: conceiving
that, by acting thus, he would best be able to get back his wife and
children, and at the same time have the credit of joining the Romans
by deliberate choice, and not under compulsion. And so it turned out.
For as soon as the armies were dismissed to their winter quarters, he
came to Tarraco, accompanied by his kinsfolk and friends; and there
being admitted to an interview with Scipio, he said that “he thanked
the gods heartily that he was the first of the native princes to come
to him; for whereas the others were still sending ambassadors to the
Carthaginians and looking to them for support,—even while stretching
out their hands to the Romans,—he was come there to offer not only
himself, but his friends and kinsfolk also, to the protection of
Rome. If therefore he should have the honour to be regarded by him as
a friend and ally, he would be able to render him important service
both in the present and the future. For as soon as the Iberians saw
that he had been admitted to Scipio’s friendship, and had obtained
what he asked, they would all come in with a similar object, hoping
to have their relatives restored, and to enjoy the alliance of Rome.
Their affection being secured for the future by receiving such a mark
of honour and benevolence, he would have in them sincere and ready
coadjutors in all his future undertakings. He therefore asked to have
his wife and children restored to him, and to be allowed to return
home an acknowledged friend of Rome; in order that he might have a
reasonable pretext for showing, to the best of his power, his own and
his friends’ affection for Scipio himself and for the Roman cause.”
[Sidenote: Edeco is followed by other tribes. B.C. 209-8.]
+35.+ When Edeco had finished his speech, Scipio, who had been ready to
gratify him from the first, and took the same view as to the policy of
the proceeding, delivered him his wife and children, and granted the
friendship which he asked. More than this, his subtle intellect made an
extraordinary impression on the Iberian in the course of the interview;
and having held out splendid hopes to all his companions for the
future, he allowed him to return to his own country. This affair having
rapidly got wind, all the tribes living north of the Ebro, such as had
not done so before, joined the Romans with one consent.
Thus so far everything was going well with Scipio. After the departure
of these people, he broke up his naval force, seeing that there was
nothing to resist him at sea; and selecting the best of the crews, he
distributed them among the maniples, and thus augmented his land forces.
[Sidenote: Andobales and Mandonius abandon Hasdrubal.]
But Andobales and Mandonius, the most powerful princes of the day
in Iberia, and believed to be the most sincerely devoted to the
Carthaginians, had long been secretly discontented and on the look-out
for an opportunity: ever since Hasdrubal, under a pretence of having a
doubt of their loyalty, had demanded a large sum of money, and their
wives and daughters as hostages, as I have already narrated.[12] And
thinking that a convenient opportunity had now come, they got together
their own forces, and, quitting the Carthaginian camp under cover of
night, occupied a position sufficiently strong to secure their safety.
Upon this, most of the other Iberians also abandoned Hasdrubal: having
long been annoyed at the overbearing conduct of the Carthaginians, and
now seizing the first opportunity to manifest their feelings.
+36.+ This has often happened to people before. For though, as I have
many times remarked, success in a campaign and victory over one’s
enemies are great things, it requires much greater skill and caution
to use such successes well. Accordingly, you will find that those who
have gained victories are many times more numerous than those who have
made good use of them. The Carthaginians at this crisis are an instance
in point. After conquering the Roman armies, and slaying both the
generals, Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, imagining that Iberia was their
own without dispute, they began treating the natives tyrannically;
and accordingly found enemies in their subjects instead of allies and
friends. And they were quite rightly served, for imagining that the
conduct necessary for keeping power was something different from that
necessary for obtaining it; and for failing to understand that they
keep empire best, who best maintain the same principles in virtue of
which they gained it. And yet it is obvious enough, and has been again
and again demonstrated, that men gain power by beneficent actions, and
by holding out hopes of advantage to those with whom they are dealing;
but that, as soon as they have got what they wanted, and begin to act
wickedly and rule despotically, it is but natural that, as their rulers
have changed, the feelings of the subjects should change too. So it was
with the Carthaginians.
+37.+ Surrounded by such difficulties Hasdrubal was agitated by many
conflicting emotions and anxieties. He was vexed by the desertion of
Andobales; vexed by the opposition and feud between himself and the
other commanders; and greatly alarmed as to the arrival of Scipio,
expecting that he would immediately bring his forces to attack him.
Perceiving therefore that he was being abandoned by the Iberians, and
that they were joining the Romans with one accord, he decided upon
the following plan of action. He resolved that he must collect the
best force he could, and give the enemy battle: if fortune declared in
his favour he could then consider his next step in safety, but if the
battle turned out unfavourably for him, he would retreat with those
that survived into Gaul; and collecting from that country as many of
the natives as he could, would go to Italy, and take his share in the
same fortune as his brother Hannibal.
[Sidenote: Early in B.C. 208, Scipio moves southward to attack
Hasdrubal in the valley of the Baetis. Livy, 27, 18-19.]
While Hasdrubal was arriving at this resolution, Publius Scipio was
rejoined by Gaius Laelius; and, being informed by him of the orders
of the Senate, he collected his forces from their winter quarters
and began his advance: the Iberians joining him on the march with
great promptness and hearty enthusiasm. Andobales had long been in
communication with Scipio: and, on the latter approaching the district
in which he was entrenched, he left his camp with his friends and came
to Scipio. In this interview he entered upon a defence of himself in
regard to his former friendship with the Carthaginians, and spoke of
the services he had done them, and the fidelity which he had shown to
them. He then went on to narrate the injustice and tyranny which he had
experienced at their hands; and demanded that Scipio himself should
be the judge of his pleas. If he were shown to be making ungrounded
complaints against the Carthaginians, he might justly conclude him
incapable of keeping faith with the Romans either: but if, on a review
of these numerous acts of injustice he were proved to have had no other
course than to desert the Carthaginians, Scipio might confidently
expect that, if he now elected to join the Romans, he would be firm in
his loyalty to them.
[Sidenote: Andobales joins Scipio.]
+38.+ Andobales added many more arguments before finishing his
speech; and when he had done, Scipio answered by saying that “he
quite believed what he had said; and that he had the strongest reason
for knowing about the insolent conduct of the Carthaginians, both
from their treatment of the other Iberians, and conspicuously from
their licentious behaviour to their wives and daughters, whom he had
found occupying the position, not of hostages, but of captives and
slaves; and to whom he had preserved such inviolable honour as could
scarcely have been equalled by their very fathers themselves.” And upon
Andobales and his companions acknowledging that they were quite aware
of this, and falling at his feet and calling him king, all present
expressed approval. Whereupon Scipio with emotion bade them “fear
nothing, for they would experience nothing but kindness at the hands
of the Romans.” He at once handed over his daughters to Andobales; and
next day made the treaty with him, the chief provision of which was
that he should follow the Roman commanders and obey their commands.
This being settled, he returned to his camp; brought over his army to
Scipio; and, having joined camps with the Romans, advanced with them
against Hasdrubal.
[Sidenote: Hasdrubal changes his position to one of superior strength.]
[Sidenote: Scipio arrives.]
Now the Carthaginian general was encamped at Baecula, in the district
of Castulo, not far from the silver mines. But when he learnt the
approach of the Romans, he shifted his quarters; and his rear being
secured by a river, and having a stretch of table-land in front of
his entrenchment of sufficient extent for his troops to manœuvre, and
bounded by a steep descent sufficiently deep for security, he stayed
quietly in position: always taking care to post pickets on the brow
of the descent. As soon as he came within distance, Scipio was eager
to give him battle, but was baffled by the strength of the enemy’s
position. After waiting two days, however, he became anxious, lest by
the arrival of Mago and Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, he should find himself
surrounded by hostile forces: he therefore determined to venture on an
attack and make trial of the enemy.
[Sidenote: Scipio successfully assaults Hasdrubal’s position.]
[Sidenote: Hasdrubal retreats, and makes the Pyrenees.]
+39.+ His whole army having been got ready for battle, he confined the
main body within his camp, but sent out the velites and some picked
men of the infantry with orders to assault the brow of the hill and
attack the enemy’s pickets. His orders were carried out with great
spirit. At first the Carthaginian commander watched what was happening
without stirring: but when he saw that, owing to the fury of the Roman
attack, his men were being hard pressed, he led out his army and drew
them up along the brow of the hill, trusting to the strength of the
position. Meanwhile Scipio despatched all his light-armed troops with
orders to support the advanced guard: and the rest of his army being
ready for action, he took half of them under his own command, and
going round the brow of the hill to the enemy’s left, began assaulting
the Carthaginians; while he entrusted the other half to Laelius, with
orders to make a similar attack on the right of the enemy. While this
was going on, Hasdrubal was still engaged in getting his troops out
of camp: for hitherto he had been waiting, because he trusted in the
strength of the position, and felt confident that the enemy would never
venture to attempt it. The attack, therefore, took him by surprise,
before he was able to get his men on to the ground. As the Romans were
now assaulting the two wings of the position which the enemy had not
yet occupied, they not only mounted the brow of the hill in safety, but
actually advanced to the attack while their opponents were still in all
the confusion and bustle of falling in. Accordingly they killed some
of them on their exposed flank; while others, who were actually in the
act of falling in, they forced to turn and flee. Seeing his army giving
way and retreating, Hasdrubal reverted to his preconceived plan; and
determining not to stake his all upon this one desperate hazard, he
secured his money and his elephants, collected as many of his flying
soldiers as he could, and commenced a retreat towards the Tagus, with
a view of reaching the passes of the Pyrenees and the Gauls in that
neighbourhood.
Scipio did not think it advisable to pursue Hasdrubal at once, for fear
of being attacked by the other Carthaginian generals; but he gave up
the enemy’s camp to his men to pillage.
[Sidenote: Scipio’s self-restraint.]
+40.+ Next morning he collected the prisoners, amounting to ten
thousand foot and more than two thousand horse, and busied himself in
making arrangements about them. All the Iberians of that district,
who were in alliance at that time with the Carthaginians, came in and
submitted to the Roman obedience, and in addressing Scipio called him
“king.” The first to do this and to bow the knee before him had been
Edeco, and the next Andobales. On these occasions Scipio had passed
the word over without remark; but after the battle, when all alike
addressed him by that title, his attention was drawn to it; and he
therefore summoned the Iberians to a meeting, and told them that “he
quite wished to be called a man of royal liberality by them all, and to
be so in the truest sense, but that he had no wish to be a ‘king,’ nor
to be called one by any one; they should address him as general.”
Even at this early period of his career, an observer might have
remarked the loftiness of Scipio’s character. He was still quite young.
His good fortune had been so persistent, that all who came under his
rule were led naturally to think and speak of him as a king. Yet he
did not lose his self-control; but deprecated this popular impulse and
this show of dignity. But this same loftiness of character was still
more admirable in the closing scenes of his life, when, in addition to
his achievements in Iberia, he crushed the Carthaginians; reduced the
largest and fairest districts of Libya, from the Altars of Philaenus
to the Pillars of Hercules, under the power of his country; conquered
Asia and the kings of Syria; made the best and largest part of the
world subject to Rome; and in doing so had numerous opportunities of
acquiring regal sway, in whatever parts of the world suited his purpose
or wish. For such achievements were enough to have kindled pride,
not merely in any human breast, but even, if I may say so without
irreverence, in that of a god. But Scipio’s greatness of soul was so
superior to the common standard of mankind, that he again and again
rejected what Fortune had put within his grasp, that prize beyond which
men’s boldest prayers do not go—the power of a king: and he steadily
preferred his country and his duty to that royalty, which men gaze at
with such admiration and envy.
[Sidenote: Scipio occupies the position evacuated by the Carthaginians.]
[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 208-207.]
Scipio next proceeded to select from the captives the native Iberians,
and all these he dismissed to their homes without ransom; and bidding
Andobales select three hundred of the horses, he distributed the
remainder among those who had none. For the rest, he at once occupied
the entrenchment of the Carthaginians, owing to its excellent
situation; and there he remained himself, waiting to see the movements
of the other Carthaginian generals; while he detached a body of men
to the passes of the Pyrenees to keep a look-out for Hasdrubal. After
this, as it was getting late in season, he retired with his army to
Tarraco being bent on wintering there....
AFFAIRS IN GREECE
[Sidenote: King Philip undertakes to aid the Achaean league, and other
Greek states, against a threatened attack of the Aetolians in alliance
with Rome, B.C. 208. Cp. Livy, 27, 30. See above Bk. 9, ch. 28-42.]
+41.+ The Aetolians had recently become greatly encouraged by the
arrival of the Romans and King Attalus: and accordingly began menacing
every one, and threatening all with an attack by land, while Attalus
and Publius Sulpicius did the same by sea. Wherefore Achaean legates
arrived at the court of King Philip entreating his help: for it was not
the Aetolians alone of whom they were standing in dread, but Machanidas
also, as he was encamped with his army on the frontier of Argos. The
Boeotians also, in fear of the enemy’s fleet, were demanding a leader
and help from the king. Most urgent of all, however, were the Euboeans
in their entreaties to him to take some precaution against the enemy.
A similar appeal was being made by the Acarnanians; and there was an
embassy even from the Epirotes. News had arrived that both Scerdilaidas
and Pleuratus were leading out their armies: and, over and above this,
that the Thracian tribes on the frontier of Macedonia, especially the
Maedi, were planning to invade Macedonia, if the king were induced to
stir from his realm however short a distance. Moreover the Aetolians
were already securing the pass of Thermopylae with trenches and
stockades and a formidable garrison, satisfied that they would thus
shut out Philip, and entirely prevent him from coming to the assistance
of his allies south of the pass. It appears to me that a crisis of this
sort is well worth the observation and attention of my readers; for it
affords a trial and test of the vigour of the leader affected. As in
the hunting-field the wild animals never show their full courage and
strength until surrounded and brought to bay,—so it is with leaders.
And no more conspicuous instance could be found than this of Philip. He
dismissed the various embassies, promising each that he would do his
best: and then devoted his attention to the war which surrounded him on
all sides, watching to see in what direction, and against which enemy,
he had best direct his first attack.
+42.+ Just then intelligence reached him that Attalus had crossed the
sea and, dropping anchor at Peparethos, had occupied the island. He
therefore despatched a body of men to the islanders to garrison their
city; and at the same time despatched Polyphontes with an adequate
force into Phocis and Boeotia; and Menippus, with a thousand peltasts
and five hundred Agrianes to Chalcis and the rest of Euboea; while
he himself advanced to Scotusa, and sent word at the same time to
the Macedonians to meet him at that town. But when he learnt that
Attalus had sailed into the port of Nicaea, and that the leaders
of the Aetolians were collecting at Heraclea, with the purpose of
holding a conference together on the immediate steps to be taken, he
started with his army from Scotusa, eager to hurry thither and break
up their meeting. He arrived too late to interrupt the conference: but
he destroyed or carried off the corn belonging to the people along
the Aenianian gulf, and then returned. After this he left his army
in Scotusa once more; and, with the light-armed troops and the royal
guard, went to Demetrias, and there remained, waiting to see what
the enemy would attempt. To secure that he should be kept perfectly
acquainted with all their movements, he sent messengers to the
Peparethii, and to his troops in Phocis and Euboea, and ordered them to
telegraph to him everything which happened, by means of fire signals
directed to Mount Tisaeum, which is a mountain of Thessaly conveniently
situated for commanding a view of those places.
[Sidenote: Fire signals.]
+43.+ The method of signalling by fire, which is of the highest utility
in the operations of war, has never before been clearly expounded; and
I think I shall be doing a service if I do not pass it over, but give
an account of it adequate to its importance. Now that opportuneness
is of the utmost moment in all undertakings, and pre-eminently so in
those of war, no one doubts; and of all the things which contribute
to enable us to hit the proper time nothing is more efficacious than
fire signals. For they convey intelligence sometimes of what has
just happened, sometimes of what is actually going on; and by paying
proper attention to them one can get this information at three or
four days’ journey off, and even more: so that it continually happens
that the help required may be unexpectedly given, thanks to a message
conveyed by fire signals. Now, formerly, as the art of signalling by
fire was confined to a single method, it proved in very many cases
unserviceable to those employing it. For as it was necessary to employ
certain definite signals which had been agreed upon, and as possible
occurrences are unlimited, the greater number of them were beyond
the competence of the fire signals to convey. To take the present
instance: it was possible by means of the signals agreed upon to send
the information that a fleet had arrived at Oreus or Peparethos or
Chalcis; but it was impossible to express that “certain citizens had
gone over to the enemy,” or “were betraying the town,” or that “a
massacre had taken place,” or any of those things which often occur,
but which cannot be all anticipated. Yet it is precisely the unexpected
occurrences which demand instant consideration and succour. All such
things then were naturally beyond the competence of fire signalling,
inasmuch as it was impossible to adopt an arbitrary sign for things
which it was impossible to anticipate.
[Sidenote: The improvement introduced by Aeneas Tactitus.]
+44.+ Aeneas, therefore, the writer of the treatise on tactics, wished
to correct this defect, and did in fact make some improvement; but
his invention still fell very far short of what was wanted, as the
following passage from his treatise will show.[13] “Let those who
wish,” he says, “to communicate any matter of pressing importance to
each other by fire-signals prepare two earthenware vessels of exactly
equal size both as to diameter and depth. Let the depth be three
cubits, the diameter one. Then prepare corks of a little shorter
diameter than that of the vessels: and in the middle of these corks
fix rods divided into equal portions of three fingers’ breadth, and
let each of these portions be marked with a clearly distinguishable
line: and in each let there be written one of the most obvious and
universal of those events which occur in war; for instance in the first
‘cavalry have entered the country,’ in the second ‘hoplites,’ in the
third ‘light-armed,’ in the next ‘infantry and cavalry,’ in another
‘ships,’ in another ‘corn,’ and so on, until all the portions have
written on them the events which may reasonably be expected to occur
in the particular war. Then carefully pierce both the vessels in such
a way that the taps shall be exactly equal and carry off the same
amount of water. Fill the vessels with water and lay the corks with
their rods upon its surface, and set both taps running together. This
being done, it is evident that if there is perfect equality in every
respect between them, both corks will sink exactly in proportion as the
water runs away, and both rods will disappear to the same extent into
the vessels. When they have been tested, and the rate of the discharge
of water has been found to be exactly equal in both, then the vessels
should be taken respectively to the two places from which the two
parties intend to watch for fire signals. As soon as any one of those
eventualities which are inscribed upon the rods takes place, raise a
lighted torch, and wait until the signal is answered by a torch from
the others: this being raised, both parties are to set the taps running
together. When the cork and rod on the signalling side has sunk low
enough to bring the ring containing the words which give the desired
information on a level with the rim of the vessel, a torch is to be
raised again. Those on the receiving side are then at once to stop the
tap, and to look at the words in the ring of the rod which is on a
level with the rim of their vessel. This will be the same as that on
the signalling side, assuming everything to be done at the same speed
on both sides.”
[Sidenote: The drawbacks to this method.]
+45.+ Now this method, though introducing a certain improvement in the
system of fire signalling, is still wanting in definiteness: for it is
evident that it is neither possible to anticipate, or, if you could
anticipate, to write upon the rod every possible thing that may happen:
and therefore, when anything unexpected in the chapter of accidents
does occur, it is plainly impossible to communicate it by this method.
Besides, even such statements as are written on the rods are quite
indefinite; for the number of cavalry or infantry that have come, or
the particular point in the territory which they have entered, the
number of ships, or the amount of corn, cannot be expressed. For what
cannot be known before it happens cannot have an arrangement made for
expressing it. And this is the important point. For how is one to take
proper measures for relief without knowing the number or direction of
the enemy? Or how can the party to be relieved feel confidence or the
reverse, or indeed have any conception at all of the situation, if it
does not know how many ships or how much corn have been despatched by
the allies?
[Sidenote: The improved method of Cleoxenus and Democlitus.]
But the last method which was hit upon by Cleoxenus and Democlitus, and
further elaborated by myself, is above all things definite, and made
capable of indicating clearly whatever is needed at the moment; but
in its working it requires attention and more than ordinarily close
observation. It is as follows: Divide the alphabet into five groups
of five letters each (of course the last group will be one letter
short, but this will not interfere with the working of the system). The
parties about to signal to each other must then prepare five tablets
each, on which the several groups of letters must be written. They must
then agree that the party signalling shall first raise two torches, and
wait until the other raises two also. The object of this is to let each
other know that they are attending. These torches having been lowered,
the signalling party raises first torches on the left to indicate which
of the tablets he means: for instance, one if he means the first, two
if he means the second, and so on. He next raises torches on the right
showing in a similar manner by their number which of the letters in the
tablet he wishes to indicate to the recipient.
+46.+ This matter being agreed upon, the two parties must go to their
respective points of observation; and each must have, to begin with,
a stenoscope with two funnels, to enable him to distinguish through
one the right, through the other the left position of the signaller
opposite him. Near this stenoscope the tablets must be fixed, and both
points, to the right and to the left, must be defended by a fence ten
feet long and about the height of a man, in order to make it clear
on which side the torches are raised, and to hide them entirely when
they are lowered. These preparations completed on both sides, when a
man wishes, for instance, to send the message “Some of our soldiers
to the number of a hundred have deserted to the enemy,”—the first
thing to do is to select words that may give the same information with
the fewest letters, for instance, “A hundred Cretans have deserted,”
for thus the number of letters is diminished by more than a half and
the same information is given. This sentence having been written on
a tablet will be transmitted by five signals thus: The first letter
is κ, this comes in the second group of letters and therefore on the
second tablet; the signaller therefore must raise two torches on the
left to show the recipient that he must look at the second tablet; then
he will raise five on the right, because κ is the fifth letter in the
group,[14] which the recipient must thereupon write on his tablet. Then
the signaller must raise four torches on the left, for ρ is in that
group, and two on the right, because it is the second in the fourth
group, and the recipient will write ρ on his tablet: and so on for the
other letters.
+47.+ Now everything that happens can be definitely imparted by means
of this invention; but the number of torches employed is large,
because each letter has to be indicated by two series of them: still,
if proper preparations are made, the thing can be adequately carried
out. But whichever method is employed, those who use it must practise
beforehand, in order that when the actual occasion for putting it
in use arises they may be able to give each other the information
without any hitch. For there are plenty of instances to show what a
wide difference there is between the way an operation is carried out
by men who hear of it for the first time, and by men who have become
habituated to it. Many things which were considered not only difficult,
but impossible at first, are, after an interval of time and practice,
performed with the greatest ease. I could give many illustrations of
the truth of this remark, but the clearest may be found in the art
of reading. Put side by side a man who has never learnt his letters,
though otherwise acute, and a child who has acquired the habit, and
give the latter a book, and bid him read it: the former will clearly
not be induced to believe that the reader has first to attend to the
look of each of the letters, secondly to their sound-value, and thirdly
to their combinations with others, each of which operation requires
a certain time. Therefore when he sees the boy, without a pause for
thought, reading off seven or five lines at a breath, he will not
easily be induced to believe that he has not read the book before;
and certainly not, if he is able also to observe the appropriate
enunciation, the proper separations of the words, and the correct use
of the rough and smooth breathings. The moral is, not to give up any
useful accomplishment on account of its apparent difficulties, but to
persevere till it becomes a matter of habit, which is the way mankind
have obtained all good things. And especially is this right when the
matters in question are such as are often of decisive importance to our
safety.
I was led to say this much in connexion with my former assertion that
“all the arts had made such progress in our age that most of them were
reduced in a manner to exact sciences.” And therefore this too is a
point in which history properly written is of the highest utility....
ANTIOCHUS IN PARTHIA, B.C. 209-5. See ch. 31.
[Sidenote: The entrance of the Nomad Scythians into Hyrcania.]
+48.+ The Apasiacae live between the rivers Oxus and Tanais, the
former of which falls into the Hyrcanian Sea, the latter into the
Palus Maeotis.[15] Both are large enough to be navigable; and it seems
surprising how the Nomads managed to come by land into Hyrcania along
with their horses. Two accounts are given of this affair, one of them
probable, the other very surprising yet not impossible. The Oxus rises
in the Caucasus, and being much augmented by tributaries in Bactria, it
rushes through the level plain with a violent and turbid stream. When
it reaches the desert it dashes its stream against some precipitous
rocks with a force raised to such tremendous proportions by the mass
of its waters, and the declivity down which it has descended, that
it leaps from the rocks to the plain below leaving an interval of
more than a stade between the rock and its falls. It is through this
space that they say the Apasiacae went on foot with their horses into
Hyrcania, under the fall, and keeping close to the rock. The other
account is more probable on the face of it. It is said that, as the
basin of the river has extensive flats into which it descends with
violence, the force of the stream makes hollows in them, and opens
chasms into which the water descends deep below the surface, and
so is carried on for a short way, and then reappears: and that the
barbarians, being well acquainted with the facts, make their way on
horseback, over the space thus left dry, into Hyrcania....
[Sidenote: Battle on the river Arius between Antiochus and the
Bactrians.]
+49.+ News being brought that Euthydemus[16] with his force was at
Tapuria, and that a body of ten thousand horsemen were keeping guard
at the passage of the river Arius, he decided to abandon the siege
and attack these last. The river was three days’ march away. For two
days therefore he marched at a moderate speed; but on the third, after
dinner, he gave orders for the rest of his army to start next day at
daybreak; while he himself, with the cavalry and light-armed troops and
ten thousand peltasts, started in the night and pushed on at a great
rate. For he was informed that the cavalry of the enemy kept guard
by day on the bank of the river, but at night retired to a city more
than twenty stades off. Having completed therefore the rest of the way
under cover of night, the plains being excellent for riding, he got
the greater part of his army across the river by daybreak, before the
enemy came back. When their scouts told them what had happened, the
horsemen of the Bactrians hastened to the rescue, and fell in with
their opponents while on the march. Seeing that he must stand the first
charge of the enemy, the king summoned the two thousand horsemen who
were accustomed to fight round his own person; and issuing orders that
the rest were to form their companies and squadrons, and take up their
usual order on the ground on which they already were, he advanced with
the two thousand cavalry, and met the charge of the advanced guard of
the Bactrians. In this engagement Antiochus is reputed to have shown
the greatest gallantry of any of his men. There was heavy loss on
both sides: the king’s men conquered the first squadron, but when a
second and a third charged, they began to be hard pressed and to suffer
seriously. At that juncture, most of the cavalry being by this time on
the ground, Panaetolus ordered a general advance; relieved the king
and his squadrons; and, upon the Bactrians charging in loose order,
forced them to turn and fly in confusion. They never drew rein before
the charge of Panaetolus, until they rejoined Euthydemus, with a loss
of more than half their number. The king’s cavalry on the contrary
retired, after killing large numbers and taking a great many prisoners,
and bivouacked by the side of the river. In this action the king had
a horse killed under him, and lost some of his teeth by a blow on the
mouth; and his whole bearing obtained him a reputation for bravery of
the highest description. After this battle Euthydemus retreated in
dismay with his army to the city of Zariaspa in Bactria....