in my opinion to no one cause can be attributed the recent so-called
outbreak on the part of the Sioux, but rather to a combination of
causes gradually cumulative in their effect and dating back through
many years—in fact to the inauguration of our practically demonstrated
faulty Indian policy.
There can be no question but that many of the treaties, agreements, or
solemn promises made by our government with these Indians have been
broken. Many of them have been kept by us technically, but as far as
the Indian is concerned have been misunderstood by him through a lack
of proper explanation at time of signing, and hence considered by him
as broken.
It must also be remembered that in all of the treaties made by the
government with the Indians, a large portion of them have not agreed to
or signed the same. Noticeably was this so in the agreement secured by
us with them the summer before last, by which we secured one-half of
the remainder of the Sioux reserve, amounting to about 16,000 square
miles. This agreement barely carried with the Sioux nation as a whole,
but did not carry at Pine Ridge or Rosebud, where the strong majority
were against it; and it must be noted that wherever there was the
strongest opposition manifested to the recent treaty, there, during the
present trouble, have been found the elements opposed to the government.
The Sioux nation, which at one time, with the confederated bands of
Cheyennes and Arapahos, controlled a region of country bounded on the
north by the Yellowstone, on the south by the Arkansas, and reaching
from the Missouri river to the Rocky mountains, has seen this large
domain, under the various treaties, dwindle down to their now limited
reserve of less than 16,000 square miles, and with the land has
disappeared the buffalo and other game. The memory of this, chargeable
by them to the white man, necessarily irritates them.
There is back of all this the natural race antagonism which our
dealings with the aborigine in connection with the inevitable onward
march of civilization has in no degree lessened. It has been our
experience, and the experience of other nations, that defeat in war is
soon, not sooner or later, forgotten by the coming generation, and as
a result we have a tendency to a constant recurrence of outbreak on
the part of the weaker race. It is now sixteen years since our last
war with the Sioux in 1876—a time when our present Sioux warriors were
mostly children, and therefore have no memory of having felt the power
of the government. It is but natural that these young warriors, lacking
in experience, should require but little incentive to induce them to
test the bravery of the white man on the war path, where the traditions
of his people teach him is the only path to glory and a chosen seat
in the “happy hunting grounds.” For these reasons every precaution
should be adopted by the government to guard against trouble with its
disastrous results. Have such precautions been adopted? Investigation
of the present trouble does not so indicate.
Sitting Bull and other irreconcilable relics of the campaign of 1876
were allowed to remain among their people and foment discord. The
staple article of food at Pine Ridge and some of the other agencies
had been cut down below the subsisting point, noticeably the beef at
Pine Ridge, which from an annual treaty allowance of 6,250,000 pounds
gross was cut down to 4,000,000 pounds. The contract on that beef was
violated, insomuch as that contract called for northern ranch beef, for
which was substituted through beef from Texas, with an unparalleled
resulting shrinkage in winter, so that the Indians did not actually
receive half ration of this food in winter—the very time the largest
allowance of food is required. By the fortunes of political war, weak
agents were placed in charge of some of the agencies at the very time
that trouble was known to be brewing. Noticeably was this so at Pine
Ridge, where a notoriously weak and unfit man was placed in charge. His
flight, abandonment of his agency, and his call for troops have, with
the horrible results of the same, become facts in history.
Now, as for facts in connection with Pine Ridge, which agency has
unfortunately become the theater of the present “war,” was there
necessity for troops? My past experience with those Indians does not so
indicate. For seven long years, from 1879 to 1886, I, as agent, managed
this agency without the presence of a soldier on the reservation,
and none nearer than 60 miles, and in those times the Indians were
naturally much wilder than they are to-day. To be sure, during the
seven years we occasionally had exciting times, when the only thing
lacking to cause an outbreak was the calling for troops by the agent
and the presence of the same. As a matter of fact, however, no matter
how much disturbed affairs were, no matter how imminent an outbreak,
the progressive chiefs, with their following, came to the front enough
in the majority, with the fifty Indian policemen, to at once crush out
all attempts at rebellion against the authority of the agent and the
government.
Why was this? Because in those times we believed in placing confidence
in the Indians; in establishing, as far as possible, a home-rule
government on the reservation. We established local courts, presided
over by the Indians, with Indian juries; in fact, we believed in
having the Indians assist in working out their own salvation. We
courted and secured the friendship and support of the progressive and
orderly element, as against the mob element. Whether the system thus
inaugurated was practicable, was successful, comparison with recent
events will decide.
When my Democratic successor took charge in 1886, he deemed it
necessary to make general changes in the system at Pine Ridge, i. e.,
a Republican system. All white men, half-breeds, or Indians who had
sustained the agent under the former administration were classed as
Republicans and had to go. The progressive chiefs, such as Young Man
Afraid, Little Wound, and White Bird, were ignored, and the backing
of the element of order and progress was alienated from the agent
and the government, and in the place of this strong backing that had
maintained order for seven years was substituted Red Cloud and other
nonprogressive chiefs, sustainers of the ancient tribal system.
If my successor had been other than an amateur, or had had any
knowledge or experience in the inside Indian politics of an Indian
tribe, he would have known that if the element he was endeavoring to
relegate to the rear had not been the balance of power, I could not for
seven years have held out against the mob element which he now sought
to put in power. In other words, he unwittingly threw the balance of
power at Pine Ridge against the government, as he later on discovered
to his cost. When still later he endeavored to maintain order and
suppress the ghost dance, the attempt resulted in a most dismal failure.
The Democratic agent was succeeded in October last by the recently
removed Republican agent, a gentleman totally ignorant of Indians
and their peculiarities; a gentleman with not a qualification in his
make-up calculated to fit him for the position of agent at one of
the largest and most difficult agencies in the service to manage;
a man selected solely as a reward for political services. He might
possibly have been an average success as an Indian agent at a small,
well-regulated agency. He endeavored to strengthen up matters, but the
chiefs and leaders who could have assisted him in so doing had been
alienated by the former agent. They virtually said among themselves,
“We, after incurring the enmity of the bad element among our people
by sustaining the government, have been ignored and ill-treated by
that government, hence this is not our affair.” Being ignorant of the
situation, he had no one to depend on. In his first clash with the mob
element he discovered that the Pine Ridge police, formerly the finest
in the service, were lacking in discipline and courage, and, not being
well supplied with those necessary qualities himself, he took the bluff
of a mob for a declaration of war, abandoned his agency, returned with
troops—and you see the result.
As for the ghost dance, too much attention has been paid to it. It was
only the symptom or surface indication of deep-rooted, long-existing
difficulty; as well treat the eruption of smallpox as the disease and
ignore the constitutional disease.
As regards disarming the Sioux, however desirable it may appear, I
consider it neither advisable nor practicable. I fear that it will
result as the theoretical enforcement of prohibition in Kansas, Iowa,
and Dakota; you will succeed in disarming the friendly Indians, because
you can, and you will not so succeed with the mob element, because you
can not. If I were again to be an Indian agent and had my choice, I
would take charge of 10,000 armed Sioux in preference to a like number
of disarmed ones; and, furthermore, agree to handle that number, or the
whole Sioux nation, without a white soldier.
Respectfully, etc., +V. T. McGillycuddy+.
P.S.—I neglected to state that up to date there has been neither a
Sioux outbreak nor war. No citizen in Nebraska or Dakota has been
killed, molested, or can show the scratch of a pin, and no property has
been destroyed off the reservation.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MILES
[_From the Report of the Secretary of War for 1891, Vol. I, pp.
133, 134, and 149. He enumerates specific causes of complaint at
each of the principal Sioux agencies, all of which causes may be
summarized as hunger and unfulfilled promises._]
_Cause of Indian dissatisfaction._—The causes that led to the serious
disturbance of the peace in the northwest last autumn and winter were
so remarkable that an explanation of them is necessary in order to
comprehend the seriousness of the situation. The Indians assuming the
most threatening attitude of hostility were the Cheyennes and Sioux.
Their condition may be stated as follows: For several years following
their subjugation in 1877, 1878, and 1879 the most dangerous element
of the Cheyennes and the Sioux were under military control. Many of
them were disarmed and dismounted; their war ponies were sold and the
proceeds returned to them in domestic stock, farming utensils, wagons,
etc. Many of the Cheyennes, under the charge of military officers, were
located on land in accordance with the laws of Congress, but after they
were turned over to civil agents and the vast herds of buffalo and
large game had been destroyed their supplies were insufficient, and
they were forced to kill cattle belonging to white people to sustain
life.
The fact that they had not received sufficient food is admitted by the
agents and the officers of the government who have had opportunities
of knowing. The majority of the Sioux were under the charge of civil
agents, frequently changed and often inexperienced. Many of the
tribes became rearmed and remounted. They claimed that the government
had not fulfilled its treaties and had failed to make large enough
appropriations for their support; that they had suffered for want of
food, and the evidence of this is beyond question and sufficient to
satisfy any unprejudiced intelligent mind. The statements of officers,
inspectors, both of the military and the Interior departments, of
agents, of missionaries, and civilians familiar with their condition,
leave no room for reasonable doubt that this was one of the principal
causes. While statements may be made as to the amount of money that
has been expended by the government to feed the different tribes, the
manner of distributing those appropriations will furnish one reason for
the deficit.
The unfortunate failure of the crops in the plains country during
the years of 1889 and 1890 added to the distress and suffering of
the Indians, and it was possible for them to raise but very little
from the ground for self-support; in fact, white settlers have been
most unfortunate, and their losses have been serious and universal
throughout a large section of that country. They have struggled on from
year to year; occasionally they would raise good crops, which they were
compelled to sell at low prices, while in the season of drought their
labor was almost entirely lost. So serious have been their misfortunes
that thousands have left that country within the last few years,
passing over the mountains to the Pacific slope or returning to the
east of the Missouri or the Mississippi.
The Indians, however, could not migrate from one part of the United
States to another; neither could they obtain employment as readily as
white people, either upon or beyond the Indian reservations. They must
remain in comparative idleness and accept the results of the drought—an
insufficient supply of food. This created a feeling of discontent even
among the loyal and well disposed and added to the feeling of hostility
of the element opposed to every process of civilization.
Reports forwarded by Brigadier-General Ruger, commanding Department of
Dakota, contained the following:
The commanding officer at Fort Yates, North Dakota, under date of
December 7, 1890, at the time the Messiah delusion was approaching a
climax, says, in reference to the disaffection of the Sioux Indians at
Standing Rock agency, that it is due to the following causes:
(1) Failure of the government to establish an equitable southern
boundary of the Standing Rock agency reservation.
(2) Failure of the government to expend a just proportion of the money
received from the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul railroad company,
for right of way privileges, for the benefit of the Indians of said
agency. Official notice was received October 18, 1881, by the Indian
agent at the Standing Rock agency, that the said railroad company had
paid the government under its agreement with the Sioux Indians, for
right of way privileges, the sum of $13,911. What additional payments,
if any, have been made by the said railroad company, and what payments
have been made by the Dakota Central railroad company, the records of
the agency do not show. In 1883, and again in 1885, the agent, upon
complaints made by the Indians, wrote to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, making certain recommendations as regards the expenditure of
the money received from the said railroad company, but was in each
instance informed that until Congress took action with respect to the
funds referred to nothing could be done. No portion of the money had
been expended up to that time (December, 1890) for the benefit of the
Indians of the agency, and frequent complaints had been made to the
agent by the Indians because they had received no benefits from their
concessions to the said railroad companies.
(3) Failure of the government to issue the certificates of title to
allotments, as required by article 6 of the treaty of 1868.
(4) Failure of the government to provide the full allowance of seeds
and agricultural implements to Indians engaged in farming, as required
in article 8, treaty of 1868.
(5) Failure of the government to issue to such Indians the full number
of cows and oxen provided in article 10, treaty of 1876.
(7) Failure of the government to issue to the Indians the full ration
stipulated in article 5, treaty of 1876. (For the fiscal year beginning
July 1, 1890, the following shortages in the rations were found to
exist: 485,275 pounds of beef [gross], 761,212 pounds of corn, 11,937
pounds of coffee, 281,712 pounds of flour, 26,234 pounds of sugar, and
39,852 pounds of beans. Although the obligations of the government
extend no further than furnishing so much of the ration prescribed in
article 5 as may be necessary for the support of the Indians, it would
seem that, owing to the almost total failure of crops upon the Standing
Rock reservation for the past four years, and the absence of game, the
necessity for the issue of the full ration to the Indians here was
never greater than at the present time—December, 1890.)
(8) Failure of the government to issue to the Indians the full amount
of annuity supplies to which they were entitled under the provisions of
article 10, treaty of 1868.
(9) Failure of the government to have the clothing and other annuity
supplies ready for issue on the first day of August of each year. Such
supplies have not been ready for issue to the Indians, as a rule,
until the winter season is well advanced. (After careful examination
at this agency, the commanding officer is convinced that not more than
two-thirds of the supplies provided in article 10 have been issued
there, and the government has never complied with that provision of
article 10 which requires the supplies enumerated in paragraphs 2,
3, and 4 of said article to be delivered on or before the first day
of August of each year. Such supplies for the present fiscal year,
beginning July 1, 1890, had not yet reached (December, 1890) the
nearest railway station, about 60 miles distant, from which point
they must, at this season of the year, be freighted to this agency in
wagons. It is now certain that the winter will be well advanced before
the Indians at this agency receive their annual allowance of clothing
and other annuity supplies.)
(10) Failure of the government to appropriate money for the payment of
the Indians for the ponies taken from them, by the authority of the
government, in 1876.
In conclusion, the commanding officer says: “It, however, appears
from the foregoing, that the government has failed to fulfill its
obligations, and in order to render the Indians law-abiding, peaceful,
contented, and prosperous it is strongly recommended that the treaties
be promptly and fully carried out, and that the promises made by the
commission in 1889 be faithfully kept.”
[_The reports from Pine Ridge, Rosebud, Cheyenne River, and Yankton
agencies are of similar tenor. Following are two telegrams sent
from the field by General Miles at the beginning of the trouble._]
+Rapid City, South Dakota+, _December 19, 1890_.
Senator +Dawes+,
_Washington, District of Columbia_:
You may be assured of the following facts that can not be gainsaid:
First. The forcing process of attempting to make large bodies of
Indians self-sustaining when the government was cutting down their
rations and their crops almost a failure, is one cause of the
difficulty.
Second. While the Indians were urged and almost forced to sign a treaty
presented to them by the commission authorized by Congress, in which
they gave up a valuable portion of their reservation which is now
occupied by white people, the government has failed to fulfill its
part of the compact, and instead of an increase or even a reasonable
supply for their support, they have been compelled to live on half and
two-thirds rations, and received nothing for the surrender of their
lands, neither has the government given any positive assurance that
they intend to do any differently with them in the future.
Congress has been in session several weeks and could, if it were
disposed, in a few hours confirm the treaties that its commissioners
have made with these Indians and appropriate the necessary funds
for its fulfillment, and thereby give an earnest of their good faith
or intention to fulfill their part of the compact. Such action, in
my judgment, is essential to restore confidence with the Indians and
give peace and protection to the settlements. If this be done, and the
President authorized to place the turbulent and dangerous tribes of
Indians under the control of the military, Congress need not enter into
details, but can safely trust the military authorities to subjugate and
govern, and in the near future make self-sustaining, any or all of the
Indian tribes of this country.
+Rapid City, South Dakota+, _December 19, 1890_.
General +John M. Schofield+,
_Commanding the Army, Washington, District of Columbia_:
Replying to your long telegram, one point is of vital importance—the
difficult Indian problem can not be solved permanently at this end
of the line. It requires the fulfillment by Congress of the treaty
obligations which the Indians were entreated and coerced into signing.
They signed away a valuable portion of their reservation, and it is
now occupied by white people, for which they have received nothing.
They understood that ample provision would be made for their support;
instead, their supplies have been reduced, and much of the time they
have been living on half and two-thirds rations. Their crops, as well
as the crops of the white people, for two years have been almost
a total failure. The disaffection is widespread, especially among
the Sioux, while the Cheyennes have been on the verge of starvation
and were forced to commit depredations to sustain life. These facts
are beyond question, and the evidence is positive and sustained by
thousands of witnesses. Serious difficulty has been gathering for
years. Congress has been in session several weeks and could in a single
hour confirm the treaties and appropriate the necessary funds for their
fulfillment, which their commissioners and the highest officials of the
government have guaranteed to these people, and unless the officers
of the army can give some positive assurance that the government
intends to act in good faith with these people, the loyal element will
be diminished and the hostile element increased. If the government
will give some positive assurance that it will fulfill its part of
the understanding with these 20,000 Sioux Indians, they can safely
trust the military authorities to subjugate, control, and govern these
turbulent people, and I hope that you will ask the Secretary of War and
the Chief Executive to bring this matter directly to the attention of
Congress.
REPORT OF CAPTAIN HURST
(_A. G. O. Doc. 6266—1891._)
+Fort Bennett, South Dakota+, _January 9, 1891_.
+Assistant Adjutant-General+,
_Department of Dakota, Saint Paul, Minnesota_.
+Sir+: In compliance with instructions of the department commander—copy
attached marked A—I have the honor to submit the following report as
the result of my investigations into the matters referred to therein.
I have been at this post continuously since August 6, 1887, and
inspector of Indian supplies at the Cheyenne River Indian agency,
located here, during that period, and am at the present time.
The Indians of this agency have a standing list of grievances which
they present at every opportunity, and talk about in council when they
assemble at every monthly ration issue. The Indians most persistent in
recounting and proclaiming their grievances are those least willing to
help in bettering their condition, and who are opposed to any change or
improvement of their old habits and customs, and oppose all progress.
Of this class I cite Big Foot’s band of irreconcilables—who have now
ceased to complain—and those in accord with them. Except in the matter
of short rations, the story of their wrongs needs no attention. It
commences with a recital of the wrong done them by the white race
sharing the earth with them.
The other class, comprising a large majority of Indians of the
reservation, have accepted the situation forced upon them, and have
been for years bravely struggling in the effort to reconcile themselves
to the ways of civilization and moral progress, with a gratifying
degree of success. It is this class whose complaints and grievances
demand considerate attention. They complain in true Indian style that
they only have kept faith in all treaties made with them, and that
somehow the treaties when they appeared in print were not in many
respects the treaties which they signed.
They complain principally—
(1) That the boundaries of the reservation in the treaty of 1877 are
not what they agreed to and thought they were signing on the paper,
and they especially emphasize the point that the line of the western
boundary should be a _straight line_ at the Black Hills, instead of as
it appears on the maps.
(2) That they have never received full recompense for the ponies taken
from them in 1876.