In spite of wars, removals, and diminished food supply since the advent
of the white man, they still number nearly 26,000. In addition to
these there are about 600 more residing in Canada. They formerly held
the headwaters of the Mississippi, extending eastward almost to Lake
Superior, but were driven into the prairie about two centuries ago by
their enemies, the Ojibwa, after the latter had obtained firearms from
the French. On coming out on the buffalo plains they became possessed
of the horse, by means of which reinforcement to their own overpowering
numbers the Sioux were soon enabled to assume the offensive, and
in a short time had made themselves the undisputed masters of an
immense territory extending, in a general way, from Minnesota to the
Rocky mountains and from the Yellowstone to the Platte. A few small
tribes were able to maintain their position within these limits, but
only by keeping close to their strongly built permanent villages on
the Missouri. Millions of buffalo to furnish unlimited food supply,
thousands of horses, and hundreds of miles of free range made the
Sioux, up to the year 1868, the richest and most prosperous, the
proudest, and withal, perhaps, the wildest of all the tribes of the
plains.
In that year, in pursuance of a policy inaugurated for bringing all the
plains tribes under the direct control of the government, a treaty was
negotiated with the Sioux living west of the Missouri by which they
renounced their claims to a great part of their territory and had “set
apart for their absolute and undisturbed use and occupation”—so the
treaty states—a reservation which embraced all of the present state
of South Dakota west of Missouri river. At the same time agents were
appointed and agencies established for them; annuities and rations,
cows, physicians, farmers, teachers, and other good things were
promised them, and they agreed to allow railroad routes to be surveyed
and built and military posts to be established in their territory and
neighborhood. At one stroke they were reduced from a free nation to
dependent wards of the government. It was stipulated also that they
should be allowed to hunt within their old range, outside the limits of
the reservation, so long as the buffalo abounded—a proviso which, to
the Indians, must have meant forever.
The reservation thus established was an immense one, and would have
been ample for all the Sioux while being gradually educated toward
civilization, could the buffalo have remained and the white man kept
away. But the times were changing. The building of the railroads
brought into the plains swarms of hunters and emigrants, who began
to exterminate the buffalo at such a rate that in a few years the
Sioux, with all the other hunting tribes of the plains, realized that
their food supply was rapidly going. Then gold was discovered in the
Black hills, within the reservation, and at once thousands of miners
and other thousands of lawless desperadoes rushed into the country
in defiance of the protests of the Indians and the pledges of the
government, and the Sioux saw their last remaining hunting ground
taken from them. The result was the Custer war and massacre, and a new
agreement in 1876 by which the Sioux were shorn of one-third of their
guaranteed reservation, including the Black hills, and this led to deep
and widespread dissatisfaction throughout the tribe. The conservatives
brooded over the past and planned opposition to further changes which
they felt themselves unable to meet. The progressives felt that the
white man’s promises meant nothing.
On this point Commissioner Morgan says, in his statement of the causes
of the outbreak:
Prior to the agreement of 1876 buffalo and deer were the main
support of the Sioux. Food, tents, bedding were the direct outcome
of hunting, and with furs and pelts as articles of barter or
exchange it was easy for the Sioux to procure whatever constituted
for them the necessaries, the comforts, or even the luxuries
of life. Within eight years from the agreement of 1876 the
buffalo had gone and the Sioux had left to them alkali land and
government rations. It is hard to overestimate the magnitude of
the calamity, as they viewed it, which happened to these people by
the sudden disappearance of the buffalo and the large diminution
in the numbers of deer and other wild animals. Suddenly, almost
without warning, they were expected at once and without previous
training to settle down to the pursuits of agriculture in a land
largely unfitted for such use. The freedom of the chase was to be
exchanged for the idleness of the camp. The boundless range was
to be abandoned for the circumscribed reservation, and abundance
of plenty to be supplanted by limited and decreasing government
subsistence and supplies. Under these circumstances it is not in
human nature not to be discontented and restless, even turbulent
and violent. (_Comr., 28._)
It took our own Aryan ancestors untold centuries to develop from
savagery into civilization. Was it reasonable to expect that the Sioux
could do the same in fourteen years?
The white population in the Black hills had rapidly increased, and it
had become desirable to open communication between eastern and western
Dakota. To accomplish this, it was proposed to cut out the heart of
the Sioux reservation, and in 1882, only six years after the Black
hills had been seized, the Sioux were called on to surrender more
territory. A commission was sent out to treat with them, but the price
offered—only about 8 cents per acre—was so absurdly small, and the
methods used so palpably unjust, that friends of the Indians interposed
and succeeded in defeating the measure in Congress. Another agreement
was prepared, but experience had made the Indians suspicious, and it
was not until a third commission went out, under the chairmanship of
General Crook, known to the Indians as a brave soldier and an honorable
man, that the Sioux consented to treat. (_Welsh, 1._) The result, after
much effort on the part of the commission and determined opposition
by the conservatives, was another agreement, in 1889, by which the
Sioux surrendered one-half (about 11,000,000 acres) of their remaining
territory, and the great reservation was cut up into five smaller ones,
the northern and southern reservations being separated by a strip 60
miles wide.
Then came a swift accumulation of miseries. Dakota is an arid country
with thin soil and short seasons. Although well adapted to grazing it
is not suited to agriculture, as is sufficiently proven by the fact
that the white settlers in that and the adjoining state of Nebraska
have several times been obliged to call for state or federal assistance
on account of failure of crops. To wild Indians hardly in from the
warpath the problem was much more serious. As General Miles points out
in his official report, thousands of white settlers after years of
successive failures had given up the struggle and left the country, but
the Indians, confined to reservations, were unable to emigrate, and
were also as a rule unable to find employment, as the whites might, by
which they could earn a subsistence. The buffalo was gone. They must
depend on their cattle, their crops, and the government rations issued
in return for the lands they had surrendered. If these failed, they
must starve. The highest official authorities concur in the statement
that all of these did fail, and that the Indians were driven to
outbreak by starvation. (See appendix to this chapter.)
In 1888 their cattle had been diminished by disease. In 1889 their
crops were a failure, owing largely to the fact that the Indians had
been called into the agency in the middle of the farming season and
kept there to treat with the commission, going back afterward to find
their fields trampled and torn up by stock during their absence. Then
followed epidemics of measles, grippe, and whooping cough, in rapid
succession and with terribly fatal results. Anyone who understands
the Indian character needs not the testimony of witnesses to know the
mental effect thus produced. Sullenness and gloom, amounting almost
to despair, settled down on the Sioux, especially among the wilder
portion. “The people said their children were all dying from the face
of the earth, and they might as well be killed at once.” Then came
another entire failure of crops in 1890, and an unexpected reduction
of rations, and the Indians were brought face to face with starvation.
They had been expressly and repeatedly told by the commission that
their rations would not be affected by their signing the treaty, but
immediately on the consummation of the agreement Congress cut down
their beef rations by 2,000,000 pounds at Rosebud, 1,000,000 at Pine
Ridge, and in less proportion at other agencies. Earnest protest
against this reduction was made by the commission which had negotiated
the treaty, by Commissioner Morgan, and by General Miles, but still
Congress failed to remedy the matter until the Sioux had actually
been driven to rebellion. As Commissioner Morgan states, “It was not
until January, 1891, _after the troubles_, that an appropriation of
$100,000 was made by Congress for additional beef for the Sioux.” The
protest of the commission, a full year before the outbreak, as quoted
by Commissioner Morgan (see page 829), is strong and positive on this
point.
Commissioner Morgan, while claiming that the Sioux had before been
receiving more rations than they were justly entitled to according
to their census number, and denying that the reduction was such as
to cause even extreme suffering, yet states that the reduction was
especially unwise at this juncture, as it was in direct violation of
the promises made to the Indians, and would be used as an argument
by those opposed to the treaty to show that the government cared
nothing for the Indians after it had obtained their lands. It is
quite possible that the former number of rations was greater than the
actual number of persons, as it is always a difficult matter to count
roving Indians, and the difficulties were greater when the old census
was made. The census is taken at long intervals and the tendency is
nearly always toward a decrease. Furthermore, it has usually been the
policy with agents to hold their Indians quiet by keeping them as
well fed as possible. On the other hand, it must be remembered that
the issue is based on the weight of the cattle as delivered at the
agency in the fall, and that months of exposure to a Dakota winter
will reduce this weight by several hundred pounds to the animal. The
official investigation by Captain Hurst at Cheyenne River agency shows
conclusively that the essential food items of meat, flour, and coffee
were far below the amount stipulated by the treaty. (See page 837.)
In regard to the effect of this food deficiency Bishop Hare says: “The
people were often hungry and, the physicians in many cases said, died,
when taken sick, not so much from disease as for want of food.” General
Miles says: “The fact that they had not received sufficient food is
admitted by the agents and the officers of the government who have
had opportunities of knowing,” and in another place he states that in
spite of crop failures and other difficulties, after the sale of the
reservation “instead of an increase, or even a reasonable supply for
their support, they have been compelled to live on half and two-thirds
rations and received nothing for the surrender of their lands.” The
testimony from every agency is all to the same effect.
There were other causes of dissatisfaction, some local and others
general and chronic, which need not be detailed here. Some of these
are treated in the documents appended to this chapter. Prominent among
them were the failure of Congress to make payment of the money due the
Sioux for the lands recently ceded, or to have the new lines surveyed
promptly so that the Indians might know what was still theirs and
select their allotments accordingly; failure to reimburse the friendly
Indians for horses confiscated fourteen years before; the tardy arrival
of annuities, consisting largely of winter clothing, which according
to the treaty were due by the 1st of August, but which seldom arrived
until the middle of winter; the sweeping and frequent changes of agency
employees from the agent down, preventing anything like a systematic
working out of any consistent policy, and almost always operating
against the good of the service, especially at Pine Ridge, where so
brave and efficient a man as McGillycuddy was followed by such a one as
Royer—and, finally, the Ghost dance.
The Ghost dance itself, in the form which it assumed among the
Sioux, was only a symptom and expression of the real causes of
dissatisfaction, and with such a man as McGillycuddy or McLaughlin
in charge at Pine Ridge there would have been no outbreak, in spite
of broken promises and starvation, and the Indians could have been
controlled until Congress had afforded relief. That it was not the
cause of the outbreak is sufficiently proved by the fact that there
was no serious trouble, excepting on the occasion of the attempt to
arrest Sitting Bull, on any other of the Sioux reservations, and none
at all among any of the other Ghost-dancing tribes from the Missouri to
the Sierras, although the doctrine and the dance were held by nearly
every tribe within that area and are still held by the more important.
Among the Paiute, where the doctrine originated and the messiah has his
home, there was never the slightest trouble. It is significant that
Commissioner Morgan in his official statement of the causes of the
outbreak places the “messiah craze” eleventh in a list of twelve, the
twelfth being the alarm created by the appearance of troops. The Sioux
outbreak of 1890 was due entirely to local grievances, recent or long
standing. The remedy and preventive for similar trouble in the future
is sufficiently indicated in the appended statements of competent
authorities.
APPENDIX—CAUSES OF THE OUTBREAK
COMMISSIONER MORGAN’S STATEMENT
[_From the Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
for 1891, Vol. I, 132–135._]
In stating the events which led to this outbreak among the Sioux,
the endeavor too often has been merely to find some opportunity for
locating blame. The causes are complex, and many are obscure and
remote. Among them may be named the following:
First. A feeling of unrest and apprehension in the mind of the Indians
has naturally grown out of the rapid advance in civilization and the
great changes which this advance has necessitated in their habits and
mode of life.
Second. Prior to the agreement of 1876 buffalo and deer were the main
support of the Sioux. Food, tents, bedding were the direct outcome of
hunting, and, with furs and pelts as articles of barter or exchange,
it was easy for the Sioux to procure whatever constituted for them the
necessaries, the comforts, or even the luxuries of life. Within eight
years from the agreement of 1876 the buffalo had gone, and the Sioux
had left to them alkali land and government rations. It is hard to
overestimate the magnitude of the calamity, as they viewed it, which
happened to these people by the sudden disappearance of the buffalo and
the large diminution in the numbers of deer and other wild animals.
Suddenly, almost without warning, they were expected at once and
without previous training to settle down to the pursuits of agriculture
in a land largely unfitted for such use. The freedom of the chase was
to be exchanged for the idleness of the camp. The boundless range
was to be abandoned for the circumscribed reservation, and abundance
of plenty to be supplanted by limited and decreasing government
subsistence and supplies. Under these circumstances it is not in human
nature not to be discontented and restless, even turbulent and violent.
Third. During a long series of years, treaties, agreements, cessions
of land and privileges, and removals of bands and agencies have kept
many of the Sioux, particularly those at Pine Ridge and Rosebud, in
an unsettled condition, especially as some of the promises made them
were fulfilled tardily or not at all. (A brief history of negotiations
with the Sioux was given in my letter of December 24, 1890, to the
Department, which will be found in the appendix, page 182.)
Fourth. The very large reduction of the great Sioux reservation,
brought about by the Sioux commission through the consent of the
large majority of the adult males, was bitterly opposed by a large,
influential minority. For various reasons, they regarded the cession
as unwise, and did all in their power to prevent its consummation, and
afterwards were constant in their expressions of dissatisfaction and
in their endeavors to awaken a like feeling in the minds of those who
signed the agreement.
Fifth. There was diminution and partial failure of the crops for 1889,
by reason of their neglect by the Indians, who were congregated in
large numbers at the council with the Sioux commission, and a further
diminution of ordinary crops by the drought of 1890. Also, in 1888, the
disease of black leg appeared among the cattle of the Indians.
Sixth. At this time, by delayed and reduced appropriations, the Sioux
rations were temporarily cut down. Rations were not diminished to
such an extent as to bring the Indians to starvation or even extreme
suffering, as has been often reported; but short rations came just
after the Sioux commission had negotiated the agreement for the cession
of lands, and, as a condition of securing the signatures of the
majority, had assured the Indians that their rations would be continued
unchanged. To this matter the Sioux commission called special attention
in their report dated December 24, 1889, as follows:
“During our conference at the different agencies we were repeatedly
asked whether the acceptance or rejection of the act of Congress
would influence the action of the government with reference to
their rations, and in every instance the Indians were assured that
subsistence was furnished in accordance with former treaties, and that
signing would not affect their rations, and that they would continue
to receive them as provided in former treaties. Without our assurances
to this effect it would have been impossible to have secured their
consent to the cession of their lands. Since our visit to the agencies
it appears that large reductions have been made in the amounts of
beef furnished for issues, amounting at Rosebud to 2,000,000 pounds
and at Pine Ridge to 1,000,000 pounds, and lesser amounts at the
other agencies. This action of the Department, following immediately
after the successful issue of our negotiations, can not fail to have
an injurious effect. It will be impossible to convince the Indians
that the reduction is not due to the fact that the government,
having obtained their land, has less concern in looking after their
material interests than before. It will be looked upon as a breach of
faith and especially as a violation of the express statements of the
commissioners. Already this action is being used by the Indians opposed
to the bill, notably at Pine Ridge, as an argument in support of the
wisdom of their opposition.”
In forwarding this report to Congress the Department called special
attention to the above-quoted statements of the commission and said:
“The commission further remarks that as to the quality of the rations
furnished there seems to be no just cause for complaint, but that it
was particularly to be avoided that there should be any diminution of
the rations promised under the former treaties at this time, as the
Indians would attribute it to their assent to the bill. Such diminution
certainly should not be allowed, as the government is bound in good
faith to carry into effect the former treaties where not directly and
positively affected by the act, and if under the provisions of the
treaty itself the ration is at any time reduced, the commissioners
recommend that the Indians should be notified before spring opens, so
that crops may be cultivated. It is desirable that the recent reduction
made should be restored, as it is now impossible to convince the
Indians that it was not due to the fact that the government, having
obtained their lands, had less concern in looking after their material
interests.”
Notwithstanding this plea of the commission and of the Department, the
appropriation made for the subsistence and civilization of the Sioux
for 1890 was only $950,000, or $50,000 less than the amount estimated
and appropriated for 1888 and 1889, and the appropriation not having
been made until August 19, rations had to be temporarily purchased and
issued in limited quantities pending arrival of new supplies to be
secured from that appropriation. It was not until January, 1891, after
the troubles, that an appropriation of $100,000 was made by Congress
for additional beef for the Sioux.
Seventh. Other promises made by the Sioux commission and the agreement
were not promptly fulfilled; among them were increase of appropriations
for education, for which this office had asked an appropriation of
$150,000; the payment of $200,000 in compensation for ponies taken from
the Sioux in 1876 and 1877; and the reimbursement of the Crow Creek
Indians for a reduction made in their per capita allowance of land,
as compared with the amount allowed other Sioux, which called for an
appropriation of $187,039. The fulfillment of all these promises except
the last named was contained in the act of January 19, 1891.
Eighth. In 1889 and 1890 epidemics of la grippe, measles, and whooping
cough, followed by many deaths, added to the gloom and misfortune which
seemed to surround the Indians.
Ninth. The wording of the agreement changed the boundary line between
the Rosebud and Pine Ridge diminished reservations and necessitated a
removal of a portion of the Rosebud Indians from the lands which, by
the agreement, were included in the Pine Ridge reservation to lands
offered them in lieu thereof upon the diminished Rosebud reserve. This,
although involving no great hardship to any considerable number, added
to the discontent.
Tenth. Some of the Indians were greatly opposed to the census which
Congress ordered should be taken. The census at Rosebud, as reported
by Special Agent Lea and confirmed by a special census taken by
Agent Wright, revealed the somewhat startling fact that rations had
been issued to Indians very largely in excess of the number actually
present, and this diminution of numbers as shown by the census
necessitated a diminution of the rations, which was based, of course,
upon the census.
Eleventh. The Messiah craze, which fostered the belief that “ghost
shirts” would be invulnerable to bullets, and that the supremacy of the
Indian race was assured, added to discontent the fervor of fanaticism
and brought those who accepted the new faith into the attitude of
sullen defiance, but defensive rather than aggressive.
Twelfth. The sudden appearance of military upon their reservation
gave rise to the wildest rumors among the Indians of danger and
disaster, which were eagerly circulated by disaffected Indians and
corroborated by exaggerated accounts in the newspapers, and these and
other influences connected with and inseparable from military movements
frightened many Indians away from their agencies into the bad lands and
largely intensified whatever spirit of opposition to the government
existed.
EX-AGENT McGILLYCUDDY’S STATEMENT
[_Letter of Dr V. T. McGillycuddy, formerly agent at Pine Ridge,
written in reply to inquiry from General L. W. Colby, commanding
Nebraska state troops during the outbreak, and dated January
15, 1891. From article on “The Sioux Indian War of 1890–91,” by
General L. W. Colby, in Transactions and Reports of the Nebraska
State Historical Society, III, 1892, pages 176–180._]