CHAPTER VI.

THE YEAR 1794 IN THE ATLANTIC AND ON THE CONTINENT.

While the British ships engaged on the 1st of June were refitting,

Admiral Cornwallis, on the 22d of the month, sailed in command of

Montagu's division for a cruise to the westward, from which he

returned to port on the 8th of July. With this short exception, both

the Channel and the Bay of Biscay were left unguarded until the 3d of

September, when Howe again sailed with thirty-four ships-of-the-line,

five of which were Portuguese, returning on the 21st to Torbay after a

tempestuous cruise. The fleet remained in port until November 8, when

the "Canada" seventy-four arrived with the news that her consort, the

"Alexander," of similar force, had been captured two hundred miles

west of Ushant by a French division of five ships-of-the-line, from

which she herself had escaped by better sailing. The British at once

put to sea, but, it is needless to say, failed to find the French

ships, which had cruised with impunity during their absence; and on

the 29th the fleet anchored again at Spithead, a station so far to the

eastward as to indicate little expectation of interfering with any of

the operations of the enemy from Brest. There accordingly it remained

until the 14th of the following February. The protection of commerce

was entrusted to squadrons of frigates, whose young and enterprising

commanders did much service by capturing or dispersing the French

forces of a similar character.

The Committee of Public Safety determined to use the opportunity which

was permitted them by the diligent care of the British admiral to

economize his fleet. There were, at this time, in Brest and the other

Biscay ports as many as forty-six ships-of-the-line, either afloat or

building; whereas in the Mediterranean, in consequence of the disaster

at Toulon, there were only fifteen. The Committee therefore decided

to send six ships round, and Villaret Joyeuse was directed to sail

with the entire Brest fleet, thirty-five in all, for the purpose of

escorting this division clear of the Bay of Biscay; after which he was

to cruise for a fortnight against British commerce. The destitution

of the Brest arsenal, however, still continued; for, with the enemy's

command of the Channel, the naval stores of the Baltic could reach

Brest only by going north of the British islands, and then running

the risk of capture in the Atlantic by hostile cruisers. There had

therefore been great difficulty in repairing the injuries received in

the actions with Lord Howe, as well as in equipping the ships not then

engaged. When the orders were received, vivid remonstrances were made,

and the condition of the vessels fully represented to the Committee as

being entirely unfit for a winter's cruise. Many masts wounded in the

battle could not be replaced, the rigging was in bad condition, the

crews were untrained. Several of the ships it was proposed to send were

old and worn out; and so great was the dearth of provisions that only

those for Toulon received enough for some months, the others for no

more than four weeks.

Robespierre had fallen five months before, and the Reign of Terror

was now over; but the Committee were still unaccustomed to admit

objections, and did not find in their limited knowledge of sea matters

any reason for recalling orders once given. On the 24th of December,

1794, the fleet began to leave Brest, and, in so doing, one of the

largest, of one hundred and ten guns, was wrecked on a rock in the

entrance. On the 29th the remaining thirty-four had cleared the harbor

and anchored in the road outside, whence they sailed on the 30th. On

the night of January 1, 1795, a furious gale sprang up, followed by

a spell of violent weather. Two eighty-gun ships and a seventy-four

foundered, the crews being with difficulty saved. Two yet larger, of

one hundred and ten guns, had seven feet of water in the hold and would

have been lost had the storm lasted for twenty-four hours longer.

Another seventy-four had to be run on the coast to save the lives

of her people. In the midst of these difficulties, which caused the

separation of the fleet, it was necessary to transfer provisions from

the Toulon division to the other ships, an herculean undertaking, but

imperative to keep the latter from starving. On the 2d of February

the greater part of the survivors again reached Brest; but some had

to scatter to other ports as the weather permitted. The Toulon ships

returned with the rest. This mid-winter cruise had cost the republic

five ships-of-the-line; it brought in one British corvette and seventy

merchantmen as prizes.

The stars, or rather the winds, in their courses had fought for Great

Britain; but in no wise did she owe anything to her own efforts. Not

till the 14th of February did the Channel fleet put to sea, nearly a

fortnight after the French had returned to Brest. Whatever may be said

of the inexpediency of exposing the heavy ships to winter weather,

it seems clear that the opposite system left the enemy at perfect

liberty to combine his movements; and that there was little likelihood

of these being made known to the commander-in-chief in Torbay soon

enough for him to follow efficaciously. Howe himself felt this, and,

from instructions issued by him to Sir James Saumarez on the 15th of

January, it would appear that this escape of the French roused him for

a moment to contemplate the close watch off Brest, afterwards practised

by Jervis and Cornwallis.[97] This was the last occasion on which the

veteran admiral actually went to sea in command of a fleet; although,

from an apparent reluctance to try new men, the government insisted

upon his exercising a nominal charge from quarters on shore. He was

now in his seventieth year and suffering from many infirmities. The

command afloat devolved upon a man not much younger, Lord Bridport,

one of the naval family of Hood, but whose career does not bear the

impress of great ability which distinguished so many of its members.

Immediately before this, general dissatisfaction had caused a change

in the Admiralty, over which, since 1788, had presided Pitt's elder

brother, the Earl of Chatham. He was succeeded, in December, 1794, by

Earl Spencer, a more vigorous and efficient man, who remained First

Lord until the fall of Pitt's administration in 1801.

The new head, however, did not make any substantial variation of

system, calculated to frustrate the enemy's naval combinations by

the strategic dispositions of the British fleet. More activity was

displayed by keeping a small squadron of half a dozen ships-of-the-line

constantly cruising in the soundings and to the westward, and the

great Channel fleet was more continuously at sea during the summer

months; but the close blockade of Brest was not attempted, nor was

Bridport the man to persuade the government to the measures afterwards

so vigorously, and in the main successfully, carried out by Lord

St. Vincent, both as successor to Bridport in the Channel fleet and

subsequently as First Lord of the Admiralty. To this faulty policy

contributed not a little the system of telegraphs, adopted in 1795, by

which communications were quickly transmitted from height to height

between London and Portsmouth. This great improvement unfortunately

confirmed the tendency of the Admiralty to keep the Channel fleet

at the latter point, regardless of the obvious, but unappreciated,

strategic disadvantage of a position so far east of Brest, with winds

prevailing from the western quarters. To have the commander-in-chief

just there, under their own hand, to receive orders from them, seemed

much safer than to put him and his fleet in a central position whence

he could most certainly intercept or most rapidly follow the enemy, and

then to trust to the judgment of a trained and competent sea-officer

to act as the emergency required. The plan came near resulting very

disastrously when the French attempted to invade Ireland; and would

have done so, had not the elements again interfered to remedy the

absence of the British fleet. "If," says Osler in his life of Lord

Exmouth,[98] from whom he probably received the idea, "if Lord Bridport

(in 1796) had been waiting at Falmouth, with discretional powers, Sir

Edward Pellew having been instructed to communicate directly with him,

he might have sailed early on December 21st" (Pellew reached Falmouth

from before Brest on the 20th) "and found the enemy in Bantry Bay,

when perhaps not a ship would have escaped him. It is, however, to be

remembered that, as the destination of the French armament was unknown

to the last, the Admiralty might very properly determine that he should

receive his final instructions from themselves, and therefore would

keep the fleet at Spithead (Portsmouth) for the convenience of ready

communication." But why! How could they in London judge better than a

good admiral on the coast?

During the year 1794, now closing, the Revolution in France had been

rapidly devouring its children. After the overthrow of the Girondists

in June, 1793, the Terror pursued its pitiless march, sweeping before

it for the time every effort made in behalf of moderation or mercy. The

queen was put to death on the 16th of October, and her execution was

followed on the 31st by that of those Girondists who had not deigned

to escape from their accusers. Dissension next arose and spread among

the now triumphant party of the Jacobins; resulting in March and April,

1794, in the trial and death of the Hébertists on the one side, and

of Danton and his friends on the other. More and more power fell into

the hands of the Committee of Public Safety, whose tokens to the world

were Robespierre and his chief supporters, St. Just and Couthon, ruling

the Convention which passively decreed their wishes, and, through the

Convention, France. For three short months Robespierre now appeared

as the master of the country, but was himself carried on and away by

the torrent which he had done so much to swell. The exigencies and

dangers of his position multiplied the precautions he deemed necessary

to secure his authority and his safety; and the cold relentlessness

of his character recognized no means so sure as death. On the 10th of

June, by his sole authority, without the intervention of the Committee

of Public Safety, he procured a decree modifying the procedure of the

Revolutionary Tribunal, and suppressing the few checks that restrained

its uncontrolled power. In the fourteen months preceding this decree

1256 persons had been by the tribunal condemned to death; in the six

weeks that followed, until Robespierre himself fell, the executions

were 1361.[99] So extreme an access of fury betokened approaching

exhaustion; no society could endure the strain; the most violent and

blood-thirsty, as well as the most timid, felt their own lives in

danger. Bitter opposition to the dictator arose both in the Committee

of Public Safety and in the Legislature. The doubtful struggle, between

the prestige of his power and long continued success and the various

passions of fear and vengeance animating his opponents, culminated in a

violent scene in the Convention on the 27th of July. For some hours the

issue was balanced, but in the end the arrest and trial of Robespierre

and his chief supporters were decreed. The following day he, St. Just

and Couthon, with some others of lesser note, died on the guillotine.

No immediate change in the form of government ensued. The Committee

of Public Safety, reconstituted, continued to exercise the executive

functions which nominally depended upon the Convention; and the impulse

which it had imparted to the soldiers and armies of France continued

for a time to carry them resistlessly forward. But the delirious

intensity of the popular movement had reached its climax in the three

months' unrestrained power of Robespierre, with whose name it has

been ever associated. Though the external manifestations of strength

continued for a time unabated, the inner tension was relaxing. Weakness

was about to succeed the strength of fever, to spread from the heart

throughout the whole organism, and, by threatening social dissolution,

to prepare the way for concentrated absolute power.

The onward swing of the French armies on the north-east still

continued. The year 1794 had opened with the investment of Landrecy by

the allies, and its surrender to them on the 30th of April. The French

began their campaign with the plan, especially affected by Carnot in

all his military combinations, of attacking at the same time both

flanks of the allied Austrians, Dutch and English, concentrating at

each extremity of the line a force greatly superior to the enemy before

it. As Jourdan, commanding the French right, threatened the allied

stronghold of Charleroi, he drew thither the greater effort of the

allies, and Pichegru, on the left, found his task easier. Five times

did Jourdan cross the Sambre to attack Charleroi, and four times was

he compelled to re-cross; but on the fifth, before the allies could

come up in sufficient force, the place capitulated,—the guns of the

relieving force being heard just as the garrison was marching out.

The following day, June 26, 1794, Jourdan fought and won the battle

of Fleurus; the Austrians retreating upon Nivelles towards the future

field of Waterloo. The allies on both flanks continued to fall back;

Ostend and Nieuport, ports on the North Sea facilitating communication

with England, were successively surrendered, and Brussels uncovered.

On the 10th of July Pichegru entered Brussels and formed his junction

with Jourdan. On the 15th the allies lost Landrecy, the first and only

prize of the campaign. On the same day the French attacked in force

the centre of the allied line, where the Anglo-Dutch left touched the

Austrian right. The former being gradually turned fell back, and the

Austrians, finding their flank uncovered, did the same. From this time

the allies retired in divergent directions, the Anglo-Dutch north-east

toward Holland, the Austrians eastward toward Coblentz; thus repeating

in retreat the unmilitary and ruinous mistake which had rendered

abortive the offensive campaign of 1793.

The French advance was now stayed by the Committee of Public Safety, in

deference to an emotion of patriotism, until the towns surrendered the

year before should be retaken. On the 11th of August Le Quesnoy opened

its gates, on the 27th Valenciennes, and on the 30th Condé. The siege

corps now rejoined the armies in the field and the advance was resumed;

Pichegru following the British and Dutch toward Holland, Jourdan, by

a series of flank attacks which threatened the communications of the

Austrians, forcing the latter from one position to another, until on

the 5th October they recrossed to the east side of the Rhine, the

French occupying Coblentz and Bonn on the west bank. The advance of

Pichegru was marked by less of battle and more of siege than that of

Jourdan, but was alike successful. By the middle of October his army

had reached the Rhine; which in Holland divides into two branches,

the Waal and the Leek, between which the enemy lay. A month later

they had retreated beyond the latter, the French being for a moment

stopped by the floating ice in the rivers; but the winter was one of

unusual severity, and early in January the waters were frozen hard.

On the 17th of January, 1795, the Prince of Orange left Holland for

England, and on the 20th Pichegru entered Amsterdam. The provinces and

cities everywhere declared for the French, and a provisional republican

government was established; while the pursuit of the British troops was

continued with unremitting diligence until they had escaped into German

territory, whence they returned, in April, to England.

The occupation of Belgium and Holland by the French was in every

way a matter of concern to the other European powers. It threatened

Great Britain in the North Sea, where her flank had previously been

strengthened by the Dutch alliance, and compelled her at once to

weaken the Channel fleet by a detachment of five ships-of-the-line to

confront the Dutch squadrons. The merchants of Holland being among

the great money-lenders of Europe, large revenues were opened to the

needy French; and the resources thus gained by them were by the same

blow lost to the allies. Great Britain thenceforth had to bear alone

the money burden of the war. But on the other hand the republican

commissaries sucked like leeches the substance of the Dutch; and

the sources of their wealth, commerce and the colonies, were at the

same time threatened with extinction by the British sea power, whose

immediate hostility was incurred by the change in their political

relations. Within a month, on the 9th of February, orders were issued

to arrest all Dutch ships at sea; temporary provision being made to

restore neutral property found on board them, because shipped while

Holland was an ally. Vigorous measures were at once taken for the

seizure of the rich Dutch colonies in all parts of the world; and

before the year 1795 closed, there passed into the hands of Great

Britain the Cape of Good Hope, Malacca, all the Dutch possessions

on the continent of India, and the most important places in Ceylon;

the whole island submitting in 1796. Besides these, other colonies

were taken in the farther East and in the West Indies. The Dutch

navy remained inoffensively in its ports until the year 1797, with

the exception of a small expedition that escaped from the Texel in

February, 1796, prepared to retake the Cape of Good Hope. Unable to go

through the English Channel, which was completely under the enemy's

control, it passed north of the British Islands and eluded capture

until Saldanha Bay, near the Cape, was reached. Upon hearing of its

arrival the British admiral on that station sailed in pursuit, and,

having a greatly superior force, received its instant surrender.

The success that followed the French standards in Belgium and Holland

during 1794 accompanied the less striking operations on the Rhine and

in the South. At the end of the year the Austrians and Prussians had

abandoned the west bank of the river, except Luxembourg and the very

important fortress of Mayence. Luxembourg also was closely invested,

and capitulated in June, 1795. In the Pyrenees, the Spaniards were

driven across the frontiers, and had, in the early autumn, established

themselves in a strong entrenched camp at Figueras. On the 17th and

20th of November the French assaulted this position, and on the latter

day drove the enemy from all their works round the place, forcing

them to retreat upon Gerona. The garrison of Figueras, ten thousand

strong, capitulated a week later, and the French then invested Rosas,

which held out for two months longer; but the resistance of Spain was

completely broken, and the further events of the war in that quarter

are unimportant.

On the Italian frontier the year opened with substantial successes

on the part of the French, who got possession of important mountain

passes of the Alps; but progress here was stopped, in May, by reverses

attending the operations on the Rhine, causing troops to be withdrawn

from the Army of the Alps. The belligerents rested in the same relative

positions during the remainder of 1794.

The important political results of the French military successes in

the campaign of 1794 were demonstrated and sealed by treaties of peace

contracted in 1795 with Prussia, Spain, and Holland. That with the

latter power was one not only of peace, but also of alliance, offensive

and defensive. The principal naval conditions were that the United

Provinces should furnish twelve ships-of-the-line, with frigates, to

cruise in the North Sea and Baltic, and should admit a French garrison

into the important seaport of Flushing. This treaty was signed May

15, 1795. The Prussian treaty was concluded on the 5th of April. It

stipulated, generally, the surrender of Prussian possessions on the

left bank of the Rhine, and by a later agreement established a neutral

zone in North Germany under Prussian guarantee. The treaty with Spain

was signed at Basle on the 22d of July. It maintained the integrity

of the Spanish possessions in Europe, but provided for the cession to

France of Spain's part of Haïti.

On the other hand, Great Britain during the same year drew closer the

ties binding her to her still remaining allies. An agreement was made

in May with the emperor of Germany that he should provide not less than

two hundred thousand men for the approaching campaign, while Great

Britain was to pay a large subsidy for their support. This was followed

by a treaty of defensive alliance, each government engaging not to make

a separate peace. With Russia also was made a defensive alliance, and

the czarina sent twelve ships-of-the-line to cruise with the British

fleet in the North Sea.

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