THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF MAY, 1794, AND BATTLE OF THE FIRST OF JUNE.
The pressure of the allied armies upon all her frontiers, combined
with the British mastery of the sea, had thrown France largely upon
her own resources during the year 1793; while the distracted condition
of the country and a bad harvest had united to cause a scarcity of
bread-stuffs, which threatened a famine, with all its consequences
of sufferings to the army and the people, and inevitable increase of
disturbance and sedition.
The eyes of the government had therefore turned beyond the sea to the
United States, and its representatives there had been directed to
accumulate a quantity of provisions to be shipped to France. It was
intended to despatch these in a great convoy, to be protected on the
voyage by a force of ships-of-war; while its approach to the shores of
Europe would be covered by a sortie of the great fleet from Brest and
Rochefort, to occupy the attention of, and, if necessary, forcibly to
contest the control of the sea with, the British navy. Experience had
not yet corrected the sanguine confidence of the republican government,
based upon the wordy enthusiasm of the crews, nor taught it that, with
the departure of the trained officers and the spread of license among
the men, the navy had ceased to be the strong power which had faced
Great Britain with success in the war of the American Revolution. The
very measures which had most contributed to destroy its efficiency
became, in the excitement and ignorance of the times, the sure gage of
victory.
The convoying squadron of two ships-of-the-line and three smaller
vessels sailed from Brest for the United States in December, 1793,
under the command of Rear-Admiral Van Stabel, an active and judicious
officer. On the 12th of February it anchored in Chesapeake Bay, and
sailed again for France on the 11th of April. The merchant ships under
its charge numbered one hundred and thirty,[76] among them being many
laden with produce from the French West India islands, which, not
venturing to make the passage home direct and unattended, for fear of
British cruisers, had collected at Hampton Roads to await the time of
sailing. It seems somewhat remarkable that the British government,
which was fairly well informed as to the designs of the French, should
not have attempted to intercept the convoy at its port of departure.
That is the point at which a great maritime expedition, whether purely
military or otherwise, can usually be most effectually watched; and in
this case the more so, because, if the convoy had eluded the blockading
squadron, the latter, few in number and homogeneous, could easily have
outstripped the unwieldy multitude and again awaited it off its port
of arrival. The success of this mass of merchantmen in escaping the
numerous enemies that attended it off the coast of France is a striking
illustration of the uncertainties of commerce-destroying, and of the
chances that favor the safe arrival of a body of ships when the enemy
is in doubt as to their exact destination.
The French minister to the United States, M. Genêt, had written home
that he would forward a part of the convoy, under the care of two
small ships of war, as soon as possible. With the idea that these
might have sailed before Van Stabel reached America, a force of five
ships-of-the-line with some lighter vessels was directed to protect
their arrival. This squadron accordingly sailed from Brest under the
command of Rear-Admiral Nielly, on the 10th of April.[77] It had been
preceded by a light division, whose mission was to meet the convoy and
inform the officer in charge that Nielly would await him a hundred
leagues west of Belle-Isle.
Later news corrected the expectations based upon Genêt's first
despatches, and as the close approach of summer made it more easy for
the British fleet to maintain its position in the Bay of Biscay, and
consequently increased the dangers through which the convoy must pass,
the French government determined to send out all the available ships
in Brest. On the 16th of May the great fleet, comprising twenty-five
ships-of-the-line, one of which carried one hundred and twenty guns
and three others one hundred and ten, sailed under the command of
Rear-Admiral Villaret Joyeuse. A representative of the National
Convention, charged with duties resembling those of the representatives
present with the armies in the field, embarked on board the flag-ship,
"La Montagne." This magnificent vessel, called under the monarchy the
"États de Bourgogne," now bore the name of the terrible party dominant
in the National Convention. These were still the days of the Terror,
and Robespierre had yet two months to live when the fleet sailed from
Brest. The admiral's orders were to cruise in the same station that had
already been assigned to Nielly, with whom he was expected to form a
junction, and to protect the approach of the convoy at all hazards, but
not to fight unless essential to secure that end, to which all other
objects were subordinated. The time of waiting was to be utilized for
fleet manœuvres, in which the representative and admiral had too much
reason to fear that the captains were unskilled.
The anxiety of the French government about the convoy, and the
embarrassment which would be caused by its loss, were obvious
incentives to the British authorities to do all in their power to
intercept it. The Channel fleet, so called from the ports upon which
its operations were based, had returned from its cruises of the
previous year in December, and had since then remained at anchor,
repairing and refitting for the next year's work. Its commander, Lord
Howe, as has before been said,[78] was averse from keeping the sea in
winter with the heavy ships. According to his system of warfare, the
fleet should be anchored at some convenient point on the Channel coast,
and depend upon frigates stationed before the French ports to bring it
word of the enemy's movements. Had, however, the expected convoy in
1794 sailed from America as soon as it was expected to do, it would
have reached its own ports before the British had left their anchors.
On the 2d of May the Channel fleet, numbering thirty-four
ships-of-the-line and attended by fifteen frigates and smaller
ships-of-war, sailed from Spithead. It had under its charge one
hundred and forty-eight sail of merchantmen, bound to Newfoundland
and to the East and West Indies. Upon arriving two days later off
the Lizard, a promontory near the south-west extremity of England
and a hundred miles due north of the Island of Ushant, Howe detached
eight ships-of-the-line to accompany the convoy to the latitude of
Cape Finisterre, on the north-west coast of Spain. After performing
this service, six, under Admiral Montagu, were to cruise between Cape
Ortegal and the latitude of Belle-Isle, to intercept the convoy from
America. The width, over two hundred miles, of the belt of ocean to
be covered by these six ships with their accompanying frigates, taken
in connection with the chances which night and fog might give the
French convoy for passing unobserved, illustrates the comparative
disadvantages of lying in wait at the supposed point of arrival,
instead of at the known port of departure, for a body of vessels whose
precise destination is in doubt.
Howe, with the twenty-six ships remaining to him, steered directly
for Ushant, reconnoitred Brest, and, having ascertained that the bulk
of the French fleet was still in port, proceeded to cruise in the Bay
of Biscay, moving backward and forward across the probable track of
the expected convoy. On the 19th of May he again looked into Brest,
and found that the French had sailed. The same evening a frigate from
Montagu joined him, requesting a re-enforcement, as the rear-admiral
had learned from a captured vessel that Nielly's squadron was at sea,
and that Van Stabel's force numbered four of the line. He consequently
anticipated the possibility of falling in with nine ships-of-the-line,
which would be too large a number for his own six to meet. As the
frigate, of course, brought word where Montagu was to be found, Howe,
knowing that the main French fleet was out, steered at once to join
his subordinate; but ascertaining later, from passing vessels, that
Villaret had been seen in a position and heading a course which would
take him well clear of Montagu, he abandoned this purpose and went
directly in pursuit of the enemy. The latter, by the information he
received, numbered twenty-six ships-of-the-line, precisely equalling
his own fleet.
A week, however, was to elapse before he found the French. On the
morning of the 28th of May, the wind being then south by west, the
lookout frigates signalled a strange fleet to windward. It proved to
be that of Villaret, then steering north-north-east, nearly before the
wind, in three columns. At the time of this meeting, Howe was running
back to the eastward with a fair wind, having actually gone a hundred
miles west of the enemy's rendezvous without finding him. The French
admiral stood on until he could recognize the British, and then hauled
to the wind, intending to form his line-of-battle on the port tack,
heading west or a little south of it. The inexperience of the captains,
of whom a large proportion had no naval training and had never
commanded ships in a fleet, led to a long delay and a poor formation.
Lord Howe, on the contrary, soon had his fleet in manageable condition,
pressing to windward in two columns on the port tack, and with a
flying squadron of four fast and handy seventy-four-gun ships well to
the windward of the main body. The British fleet was now steering the
same course as the French, to leeward, or north, of it, and at noon
the distance between the main bodies was from nine to ten miles. The
place of this first meeting was about four hundred miles west (and a
little south) of the island of Ushant. There was a strong breeze and a
moderately heavy sea.
Villaret soon found that the slowness of the formation, to facilitate
which many of his ships had to heave-to,[79] was causing the line to
set gradually to leeward, toward the British. Four also of his fleet
were separated from the main body, being some distance astern and to
windward, two of them slightly disabled. To approach these, and at the
same time keep the advantage of the wind, he determined to put the
fleet on the other tack. At ten minutes before two in the afternoon the
French began tacking in succession, and by quarter past three were all
on the starboard tack, heading now east-south-east toward the separated
ships. Meantime, the British flying squadron, acting independently
of the main body, but under orders to attack the enemy's rear, kept
forcing to windward, and at a little after three o'clock one of them
was able to open fire, just before the rear French ships went about.
The main body tacked between three and four o'clock, and being now on
the same course as the French, east-south-east, but entirely out of
cannon-shot, carried a press of sail to overtake them.
The ships of the flying squadron, being handled for the most part with
vigor and judgment, fulfilled Howe's purpose of making an impression
upon the _rear_ of the enemy's column. As soon as the attack became
pronounced, one of the French one-hundred-and-ten-gun ships, the
"Révolutionnaire," took the extreme rear, and upon her fell the brunt
of the action, which lasted this day until after ten P. M.; daylight,
at that time of the year and in that latitude, continuing till nearly
then. The British advanced ships were joined after some time by
two more from the main body, so that the "Révolutionnaire" had to
encounter, first and last, some half-dozen hostile seventy-fours. No
diagram of this day's fighting need be given. The reader has only to
picture a long column of ships steering to the southward and eastward,
its rear harassed by the repeated but irregular attacks of a superior
hostile detachment.
The "Révolutionnaire" was nobly fought; and the concentration upon her,
while eminently judicious, served to bring out vividly the advantage,
which should never be forgotten, of one heavy ship over several
smaller, even though the force of the latter may, in the aggregate, be
much superior. The attacks this day made upon her were, from the nature
of the case, not simultaneous. They resembled one of those elaborately
combined movements in land warfare, whereby several separate columns
are intended to be brought at the same time to the same point, but
actually arrive one by one and are beaten off in detail. The result
in the present instance was somewhat more fortunate. As darkness
fell, Howe called off all but two of the assailants,—one having
already been driven off,—in order to form his line for the night. The
"Révolutionnaire" remained in hot action with a small seventy-four,
the "Audacious," alone; for the comrade of the latter took no share.
At ten P. M., having lost her captain and sixty-two men killed and
eighty-six wounded, and with her mizzen-mast shot away, she wore out
of action under charge of her fourth lieutenant, the three seniors
having been killed or seriously hurt. Covered by the dark she passed to
the northward, astern of the British fleet, her remaining masts falling
soon after. The "Audacious" was so badly crippled that it took her long
to get clear of the French line, and she was unable to rejoin her own
that night. The next morning, finding herself isolated and in presence
of some enemy's ships, she was forced to run before the wind and was
permanently separated from the fleet. The two opponents passed within
sight of each other the following day, but they were in no condition to
resume the encounter, and both reached port without further injury.
[Illustration: Fig. 1 and Fig. 2: Manœuvres of British and French
Fleets, May 29, 1794.]
During the short summer night the two fleets continued to run on
parallel lines (May 29, Fig. 1. BB, FF,) south-east by east, being
about three miles apart, the French bearing south from the British.
The latter appear to have gained somewhat upon their less practised
adversaries, so that at six o'clock Howe, ever intent upon getting to
windward and thereby obtaining the opportunity to attack, directed
his fleet to tack in succession (a), expecting that the van would
on the new course pass near enough to the enemy's rear to exchange
shots. After the evolution, the British were in column steering west
(B'B'), the French still south-east by east. Villaret, seeing his rear
threatened, wore his fleet in succession at quarter before eight (b),
the van ships running down north-west by west (F'F') parallel to their
previous course, toward the rear of their own column; upon reaching
which the leading ship hauled to the wind again (c), followed by each
of the others in order. These two manœuvres brought both fleets once
more heading in the same direction, following parallel courses and
abreast each other; the French still to windward, but having lost much
of the distance which separated them from their enemies. A few shots
had been exchanged, as Howe expected, between the British van and the
French rear as they passed on opposite tacks (Fig. 1, d).
Toward ten o'clock the French head ships ran down toward the British
van and opened fire at long range, their centre and rear keeping out
of action (May 29, Fig. 2). The leading British ship, "Cæsar," failed
to carry sail enough, though repeatedly signalled to make more; and
in consequence those astern of her had also to shorten sail, the
flag-ship "Queen Charlotte" in particular being forced to leeward by
the necessity of backing a topsail to keep in her station. At noon
there was a brisk cannonade between the two vans. Dissatisfied with
this partial engagement, which, by crippling some of his ships, might
put out of his power to reach the enemy, Howe at noon signalled to
tack again in succession, and to pass through the French line. The
"Cæsar," which should have begun the manœuvre, made no reply, and it
was necessary to repeat the order. Shortly before one o'clock she
wore instead of tacking. The ships between her and the admiral also
went about; but none, save the "Queen," of ninety-eight guns, second
in the order, appears to have reached the hostile line, except at
its extreme rear. She passed alone, and for a long time unsupported,
along a considerable portion of the enemy's order, which had now been
re-established by the centre and rear bearing down to support the van
(Fig. 2, a); but she was unable to break through, owing at first to
the closeness of the French ships to each other, and afterwards to
the injuries received from their successive broadsides. The "Cæsar"
kept so far from the wind as to neutralize the admiral's purpose; and
of the other van ships all went to leeward of the French line, none
breaking through. So far, therefore, the general result was only to
bring confusion into the British order without attaining the end which
Howe desired. He therefore determined to set the example, directed
the flag-ship to be tacked (Fig. 2, b), and stood under a press of
sail toward the French line, closely followed by two others, the next
ahead and next astern of him. The "Queen Charlotte," which had been
tenth in the British column, reached the enemy at a point not far in
rear of Villaret's flag-ship, and ran along the line (Fig. 3) till
she came abreast of the sixth ship from the rear, astern of which she
luffed through and gained to windward of the French (Fig. 3, a). One
of her two followers passed through the second interval (b) behind
that pierced by herself, and the other through the next (c),—that is,
between the third and second vessel from the enemy's rear. The two
remaining French ships, the "Indomptable" (I), of eighty guns, and
the "Tyrannicide" (T), of seventy-four, were not only far astern but
to leeward of their line. They were therefore easily to be reached by
several of the British, who gradually encircled them.
[Illustration: Fig. 3: Manœuvres of British and French Fleets, May 29,
1794.]
With his rear thus for the third time threatened, and much more
seriously than before, Villaret again made signal to wear in
succession. The French van had by now become much separated from the
rest of the fleet, and the leading ship was too disabled to go about.
No other taking the initiative, the admiral, like Howe, was forced
to set the example. The "Montagne" (M) wore out of line (d), and led
down toward the two surrounded ships, with a signal flying to follow
and form in her wake (F' F') without regard to usual station. This
movement of Villaret not only tended to release the "Indomptable" and
"Tyrannicide," but also threatened the "Queen" (Q), which had fallen
to leeward disabled. Howe, after getting to windward and tacking (e),
had endeavored to reach the "Terrible," of one hundred and ten guns,
carrying the flag of the admiral commanding the French rear, which
had been astern of the point at which the "Queen Charlotte" broke the
line; but, while the "Charlotte" was putting about, the "Terrible"
(Te) passed ahead and reached the centre of Villaret's column before
Howe's ship could come up with her. For every reason, therefore, but
especially for the safety of the "Queen," it became imperative for the
British admiral to reverse his course. He therefore wore (f), gathering
round him by signal all vessels within reach, and again stood east,
toward the threatened ships of the two parties,—running in a column
parallel to, but to windward of, that of the French admiral.
The "Queen," though much crippled, had, with her head to the eastward,
passed astern of the two threatened French ships. These had suffered
from the engagement, in passing, with the British van a few hours
before, as well as with the flying squadron on the previous day;
and the injuries then received had doubtless contributed to place
them in the exposed and dangerous position they now occupied. The
"Leviathan," seventy-four, attacked them to windward, the "Orion," of
the same class, to leeward, and the latter was soon after re-enforced
and replaced by the "Barfleur," of ninety-eight guns. No particular
statement is given in the British narratives of other ships attacking
these two, but several of those astern of the "Queen Charlotte," which
could have reached no other of the French, lost killed and wounded,
and it is probable that these shared in this encounter. The French
accounts speak of their two vessels as "surrounded;" and Villaret wrote
that their resistance "should immortalize their captains, Dordelin
and Lamesle." They came out of the engagement of the 29th of May with
only their lower masts standing; and the heavier of the two, the
"Indomptable," was in such condition that Villaret thought necessary to
send her to Brest that night, escorted by another of his fleet, which
was thus dwindling piece-meal.
For the moment, however, the French admiral's manœuvre, well conceived
and gallantly executed, rescued the endangered ships. The "Queen
Charlotte" and her immediate supporters, after first tacking, had
barely reached the rear of the French. As the latter continued to
stand on, it was of course impossible for all the fifteen ships behind
the British admiral to come up with them at once. In fact, the failure
of the van to do its whole duty, combined with the remote position of
the rear,—increased probably by the straggling usually to be observed
at the tail of long columns,—had resulted in throwing the British
order into confusion. "As the ships arrived," wrote Lord Howe in his
journal, "they came up so crowded together as afforded an opportunity
for the enemy to have fired upon them with great advantage." (Fig. 3,
C, R.) "The British line was completely deformed," states one French
authority. But, though disordered, they formed a large and dangerous
body, all within supporting distance,—they had on their side the
prestige of an indisputable, though partial, success,—they were flushed
with victory, and it would appear that the French van had not yet come
up. Villaret therefore contented himself with carrying off his rescued
ships, with which and with the rest of his fleet he stood away to the
north-west.
It is desirable to sum up the result of these two days of partial
encounters, as an important factor in the discussion of the campaign
as a whole, which must shortly follow. On the morning of May 28, the
French numbered twenty-six ships-of-the-line[80] and were, when they
first formed line, from ten to twelve miles to windward of the British,
also numbering twenty-six. On the evening of May 29, in consequence of
Howe's various movements and the course to which Villaret was by them
constrained,—for he acted purely on the defensive and had to conform
to the initiative of the enemy,—the French fleet was to leeward of the
British. As Howe had succeeded within so short a time in forcing action
from to leeward, there was every reason to apprehend that from the
windward position—decidedly the more favorable upon the whole, though
not without its drawbacks—he would be able to compel a decisive battle,
which the French naval policy proscribed generally, and in the present
case particularly. Besides this adverse change of circumstance, the
balance of loss was still more against the French. On the first day
the "Révolutionnaire" on one side and the "Audacious" on the other
had been compelled to quit their fleets; but the force of the latter
was not over two thirds that of the former. By the action of the 29th
the "Indomptable," of eighty guns, was driven from the French fleet,
and the admiral thought necessary to send with her a seventy-four and
a frigate. The "Tyrannicide," seventy-four, had lost all her upper
masts; she had consequently to be towed by one of her consorts through
the next two days and in the battle of the First of June. If Villaret
had had any expectation of escaping Howe's pursuit, the presence of
this disabled ship would have destroyed it, unless he was willing to
abandon her. Besides the mishaps already stated, the leading ship,
"Montagnard," had been so much injured in the early part of the
engagement that she could not go about. Continuing to stand west, while
the body of the fleet was running east to the aid of the "Indomptable"
and "Tyrannicide," this ship separated from her consorts and was not
able to regain them. To this loss of four ships actually gone, and one
permanently crippled, may be added that of the "Audacieux," one of
Nielly's squadron, which joined on the morning of the 29th, but was
immediately detached to seek and protect the "Révolutionnaire." On
the other hand, the British had by no means escaped unscathed; but on
the morning of the 30th, in reply to an interrogatory signal from the
admiral, they all reported readiness to renew the action, except one,
the "Cæsar," which was not among the most injured. This ship, however,
did not leave the fleet, and was in her station in the battle of the
First.
The merit of Howe's conduct upon these two days does not, however,
depend merely upon the issue, though fortunate. By persistent attacks,
frequently renewed upon the same and most vulnerable part of the
French order, he had in effect brought to bear a large part of his own
fleet upon a relatively small number of the enemy, the result being a
concentration of injury which compelled the damaged ships to leave the
field. At the same time the direction of the attack forced the French
admiral either to abandon the endangered vessels, or step by step to
yield the advantage of the wind until it was finally wrested from him
altogether. By sheer tactical skill, combined with a fine display of
personal conduct, Howe had won a marked numerical preponderance for
the decisive action, which he now had good reason to expect from the
advantageous position likewise secured. Unfortunately, the tactical
gain was soon neutralized by the strategic mistake which left Montagu's
squadron unavailable on the day of battle.
Towards the close of the day the weather grew thick, and so continued,
with short intervals of clearing, for the next thirty-six hours. At
half-past seven the body of the French bore from the British flag-ship
north-west, distant nine or ten miles; both fleets standing very slowly
to the westward and a little northerly, with wind from the southward
and westward. During most of the 30th, none of the British fleet could
be seen from the flag-ship, but they all, as well as the French,
kept together. On that day also, by a piece of great good fortune
considering the state of the weather, Admiral Nielly joined Villaret
with the three ships still under his command, as did also another
seventy-four belonging to the Cancale squadron. These four fresh ships
exactly replaced the four disabled ones that had parted company, and
again made the French twenty-six to Howe's twenty-five.
About ten o'clock in the morning of May 31st, the fog lifted for a
moment, allowing Howe to count twenty-seven sail of his ships and
frigates; and, after again shutting down for a couple of hours, it
finally dispersed shortly after noon. The French were then seen
bearing from west to north-west. The British made sail in chase and by
six P.M. had approached to within about three miles. They were not,
however, able to reach the position Howe wished—abreast the enemy—early
enough to permit the intended general engagement, unless by a night
action; which for more than one reason the admiral was not willing
to undertake. He therefore hauled again to the wind, heading to the
westward in order of battle. The French had formed on a parallel line
and were running in the same direction. During the night both fleets
carried all the sail their masts would stand. In the morning the
French, thanks to the better sailing of their vessels, were found to
have gained somewhat on their enemies, but not sufficiently to avoid or
postpone the battle, which they had been directed if possible to shun.
Villaret therefore formed his fleet in close order, and stood on slowly
under short canvas, which at once allowed irregularities in the order
to be more easily corrected and also left the crews free to devote
themselves exclusively to fighting the ships. Howe, by carrying sail,
was thus able to choose his position prior to bearing down. Having
reached it and formed his line, the French being now hove-to to await
the attack, the British fleet was also hove-to, and the crews went to
breakfast. At twelve minutes past eight it again filled-away by signal,
and stood slowly down for the enemy (June 1, Fig. 1). The intention
being to attack along the whole line, ship to ship, advantage was taken
of this measured approach to change the place of the three-decked
ships in the order, so that they should be opposed to the heaviest of
the French. Lord Howe, who in the matter of drill was something of a
precisian, is said to have rectified the alignment of his fleet more
than once as it stood down; and, unless some such delay took place,
it is difficult to reconcile the rate of sailing of the ships with
the time it took them to cover the ground. The combatants had a long
summer's day before them, and such scrupulous care was not wholly out
of place in an attack of the kind; for not only was it desirable that
the shock should be felt everywhere at once, but ships in advance of
the line would invite concentration of fire from the enemy, while those
much in the rear would be embarrassed by smoke concealing the position
it behooved them to take.
[Illustration: Battle of the First of June, 1794.]
This difficulty from smoke was the more to be feared because Howe's
plan, as communicated to the fleet by signal, was not merely to attack
on the side from which he approached, but to pass through the intervals
between the enemy's ships, and to engage them on the further, or lee,
side. This method conferred the advantage of a raking fire[81] while
passing through the line, and cut off the retreat of disabled enemies;
for a crippled ship could only retire to leeward.[82] To carry out the
design, however, required not only that the enemy should leave wide
enough intervals, but also that the assailants should be able to see
where the intervals were.
The British ships were steering each for its opposite in the enemy's
order, heading about north-west; so that, as the French line was
east and west, the approach was not perpendicular but in a slanting
direction. At twenty minutes before nine, the formation was so accurate
that Lord Howe shut the signal book with an air of satisfaction, as
though his work as admiral was done and all that remained was to show
the gallant bearing and example which had ever been associated with
his name. The gesture was, however, premature, and eccentricities of
conduct on the part of some captains compelled him again to open the
book and order them into their stations. Shortly after nine o'clock the
French van began firing. The British ship "Cæsar," on the left flank
of her line, and therefore corresponding to the leader of the French,
instead of pressing on to her station for battle, hauled to the wind
and began firing while still five hundred yards distant,—a position
inconsistent with decisive results under the gunnery conditions of that
day. Lord Howe, who had not thought well of the captain of this ship,
but had permitted him to retain his distinguished position in the order
at the request of the captain of the "Queen Charlotte," now tapped
the latter on the shoulder, and said, "Look, Curtis, there goes your
friend; who is mistaken now?"
The rest of the fleet stood on. The "Queen Charlotte," in order to
reach her position, had to steer somewhat more to the westward. Either
the French line had drawn a little ahead, or some other incident had
thrown this ship astern of her intended point of arrival. Her course,
therefore, becoming more nearly parallel to the enemy's, she passed
within range of the third vessel behind Villaret's flag-ship, the
"Montagne," her destined opponent. This ship, the "Vengeur," opened
fire upon her at half-past nine. The "Queen Charlotte," not to be
crippled before reaching her place, made more sail and passed on. The
next ahead of the "Vengeur," the "Achille," also engaged her, and
to this the "Charlotte" replied at eight minutes before ten. The
assailant suffered severely, and her attention was quickly engrossed
by the "Brunswick," the supporter of Howe's flag-ship on her starboard
side, which tried to break through the line ahead of the "Achille."
The "Queen Charlotte" (June 1, Fig. 2, C) continued on for the
"Montagne" (M). Seeing her evident purpose to pass under the stern,
the captain of this ship threw his sails aback, so as to fall to the
rear and close the interval. At the same moment the French ship next
astern, the "Jacobin," increased her sail, most properly, for the
same object. The two thus moving towards each other, a collision was
threatened. As the only alternative, the "Jacobin" put her helm up and
steered for the starboard, or lee, side of the "Montagne." At this
moment the "Queen Charlotte" drew up. Putting her helm hard over, she
kept away perpendicularly to the "Montagne," and passed under her
stern, so close that the French flag brushed the side of the British
ship. One after another the fifty guns of the latter's broadside swept
from stern to stem of the enemy,—three hundred of her crew falling at
once, her captain among the number. The "Jacobin" having moved to the
starboard side of the "Montagne," in the place the "Queen Charlotte"
had intended to take, it was thought that the latter would have to go
to leeward of both; but, amid all the confusion of the scene, the quick
eye of the gallant man who was directing her movements caught a glimpse
of the "Jacobin's" rudder and saw it moving to change the ship's
direction to leeward. Quickly seizing his opportunity, the helm of the
British flag-ship was again shifted, and she came slowly and heavily
to the wind in her appointed place, her jib-boom in the movement just
clearing the "Jacobin," as her side a few minutes before had grazed
the flag of the "Montagne." The latter, it is said, made no reply to
this deadly assault. The "Jacobin" fired a few shots, one of which cut
away the foretopmast of the "Queen Charlotte;" and then, instead of
imitating the latter's movement and coming to the wind again, by which
the British ship would have been placed between his fire and that of
the "Montagne," the captain weakly kept off and ran to leeward out of
action.
By this time the engagement was general all along the line (Fig. 2).
Smoke, excitement and the difficulties of the situation broke somewhat
the simultaneousness of the shock of the British assault; but, with
some exceptions, their fire from van to rear opened at nearly the same
time. Six ships only passed at once through the enemy's line, but very
many of the others brought their opponents to close action to windward.
In this, the first pitched battle after many years of peace, there were
found the inevitable failures in skill, the more sorrowful shortcomings
of many a fair-seeming man. To describe minutely the movements of
every ship would not tend to clearness, but to obscurity. For general
impression of the scene at certain distinctive moments the reader is
referred to the diagrams; in which, also, an attempt has been made to
represent the relative motions of the ships in both squadrons, so far
as can be probably deduced from the narratives. (See Figs. 2 and 3.)
There was, however, one episode of so singular, so deadly, and yet so
dramatic an interest, occurring in the midst of this extensive _mêlée_,
that it cannot be passed by. As long as naval history shall be written,
it must commemorate the strife between the French ship "Vengeur du
Peuple" and the British ship "Brunswick." The latter went into action
on the right hand of the "Queen Charlotte;" its duty therefore was
to pierce the French line astern of the "Jacobin." This was favored
by the movement of the latter to support the "Montagne;" but, as the
"Brunswick" pressed for the widened gap, the "Achille" made sail ahead
and threw herself in the way. Foiled here, the "Brunswick" again tried
to traverse the line astern of the "Achille," but the "Vengeur" now
came up, and, as the "Brunswick" persisted, the two collided and swung
side to side, the anchors of the British ship hooking in the rigging
and channels of the French. Thus fastened in deadly embrace, they fell
off before the wind and went away together to leeward (Fig. 2, B).
As the contact of the two ships prevented opening the lower ports as
usual, the British crew blew off the lids. The "Vengeur" having already
been firing from the side engaged, hers were probably open; but, owing
to the hulls touching, it was not possible to use the ordinary sponges
and rammers, with rigid wooden staves, and the French had no other. The
British, however, were specially provided for such a case with sponges
and rammers having flexible rope handles, and with these they were
able to carry on the action. In this way the contest continued much
to the advantage of the British on the lower decks, where the French,
for the reason given, could use only a few of the forward and after
guns, the form of a ship at the extremities causing the distance there
between the combatants to be greater. But while such an inequality
existed below, above the balance was reversed; the heavy carronades
of the "Vengeur," loaded with langrage, and the superiority of her
musketry,—re-enforced very probably by the men from the useless cannon
below,—beating down the resistance of the British crew on the upper
deck and nearly silencing their guns. The captain of the "Brunswick"
received three wounds, from one of which he afterwards died; and a
number of others, both officers and men, were killed and wounded. This
circumstance encouraged the "Vengeur's" commander to try to carry his
opponent by boarding; but, when about to execute the attempt, the
approach of two other British ships necessitated calling off the men,
to serve the guns on the hitherto disengaged side.
Meanwhile the "Brunswick's" crew maintained an unremitting fire, giving
to their guns alternately extreme elevation and depression, so that at
one discharge the shot went up through the "Vengeur's" decks, ripping
them open, while at the other they tended to injure the bottom. The
fight had thus continued for an hour when the "Achille," with only
her foremast standing, was seen approaching the "Brunswick" on her
port, or disengaged, side. The threatened danger was promptly met
and successfully averted. Before the new enemy could take a suitable
position, half-a-dozen guns' crews on each of the lower decks shifted
to the side on which she was, and in a few moments their fire brought
down her only remaining and already damaged mast. The "Achille" had no
farther part in the battle and was taken possession of by the British a
few hours later.
At quarter before one the uneasy motions of the two ships wrenched the
anchors one after another from the "Brunswick's" side, and after a
grapple of three hours they separated. The character of the contest,
as described, had caused the injury to fall mainly upon the hulls
and crews, while the spars and rigging, contrary to the usual result
in so fierce an action, had largely escaped. As they were parting,
the "Brunswick" poured a few final shots into the "Vengeur's" stern,
injuring the rudder, and increasing the leaks from which the doomed
ship was already suffering. Immediately afterwards the mizzen-mast of
the British vessel went overboard; and, being already well to leeward
of her own fleet and threatened by the approach of the French admiral,
she stood to the northward under such sail as her spars would bear,
intending to make a home port, if possible. In this long and desperate
conflict, besides the injuries to be expected to hull and spars, the
"Brunswick" had twenty-three of her seventy-four guns dismounted, and
had lost forty-four killed and one hundred and fourteen wounded out of
a crew of six hundred men.[83]
Soon after the dismasting of the "Achille," the British ship
"Ramillies," commanded by the brother of the "Brunswick's" captain, had
been seen coming slowly down toward the two combatants. She arrived
but a few moments before their separation, and, when they were far
enough apart for her fire not to endanger the "Brunswick," she also
attacked the "Vengeur," but not long after left her again in order to
secure the "Achille." This fresh onslaught, however, brought down all
the "Vengeur's" masts except the mizzen, which stood for half an hour
longer. The French ship was helpless. With numerous shot-holes at or
near the water line, with many of her port lids gone, she was rolling
heavily in the waves, unsteadied by masts, and taking in water on
all sides. Guns were thrown overboard, pumps worked and assisted by
bailing, but all in vain,—the "Vengeur" was slowly but surely sinking.
At half-past one the danger was so evident that signals of distress
were made; but among the disabled or preoccupied combatants they for
a long time received no attention. About six P.M., fortunately, two
British ships and a cutter drew near, and upon learning the state of
the case sent all their boats that remained unhurt. It was too late to
save every survivor of this gallant fight, but nearly four hundred were
taken off; the remainder, among whom were most of the badly wounded,
went down with their ship before the British boats had regained their
own. "Scarcely had the boats pulled clear of the sides, when the most
frightful spectacle was offered to our gaze. Those of our comrades
who remained on board the 'Vengeur du Peuple,' with hands raised to
Heaven, implored with lamentable cries the help for which they could no
longer hope. Soon disappeared the ship and the unhappy victims which
it contained. In the midst of the horror with which this scene inspired
us all, we could not avoid a feeling of admiration mingled with our
grief. As we drew away, we heard some of our comrades still making
prayers for the welfare of their country; the last cries of these
unfortunates were: 'Vive la République!' They died uttering them."[84]
A touching picture of brave men meeting an inevitable fate, after doing
all that energy and courage could to avoid it; very different from
the melodramatic mixture of tinsel verbiage and suicide which found
favor with the National Convention, and upon which the "Legend of the
Vengeur" was based.[85] Of the seven hundred and twenty-three who
composed her crew, three hundred and fifty-six were lost; two hundred
and fifty of whom were, by the survivors, believed to have been killed
or wounded in the three actions.
Long before the "Vengeur" and the "Brunswick" separated, the fate
of the battle had been decided, and the final action of the two
commanders-in-chief taken. It was just ten o'clock when the British
flag-ship passed under the stern of the "Montagne." At ten minutes past
ten the latter, whose extensive injuries were mainly to the hull, made
sail in advance,—a movement which the "Queen Charlotte," having lost
both fore and main topmasts, was unable to follow. Many of the French
ships ahead of the "Montagne" had already given ground and left their
posts; others both before and behind her had been dismasted. Between
half-past ten and eleven the smoke cleared sufficiently for Villaret to
see the situation on the field of battle.
Ships dismasted not only lose their power of motion, but also do
not drift to leeward as rapidly as those whose spars are up, but
which are moving very slowly. In consequence, the lines having some
movement ahead, the dismasted ships of both parties had tended astern
and to windward of the battle. There they lay, British and French,
pell-mell together. Of the twelve ahead of the French admiral when
the battle began, seven had soon run out of action to leeward. Two of
these, having hauled to the wind on the other tack, were now found
to be astern and to windward of both fleets; to windward even of the
dismasted ships. Of the rest of the twelve, one, having lost main and
mizzen masts, was unavoidably carried to leeward, and the remaining
four were totally dismasted. Of these four, three finally fell into the
hands of the British. Of the thirteen ships astern of the "Montagne,"
six had lost all their masts, and one had only the foremast standing;
the remaining six had their spars left in fairly serviceable condition,
and had, some sooner and some later, retreated to leeward. Four of the
dismasted ships in the rear, including among them the "Vengeur," were
captured by the British.
When Admiral Villaret Joyeuse had recognized the situation, as thus
briefly described, he directed the "Montagne" also to be headed to
leeward, and made signals to gather the serviceable ships round the
commander-in-chief. A column of twelve was thus formed (June 1, Fig.
3, F' F') on the starboard tack, standing, that is, to the eastward
again,—the "Montagne" leading and the rear being brought up by the
"Terrible," the flag-ship of the second in command, which had only
her foremast left and was therefore taken in tow by an uninjured
seventy-four. Villaret considered it imprudent, if not impossible,
to get far enough to windward to interpose in favor of the dismasted
vessels. He determined, therefore, to place himself to leeward of them,
in such position as to receive and cover those that could run down to
him, or which his frigates could reach and tow away. In this manner
the "Scipion," the "Jemappes," and the "Mucius," totally disabled,
were restored to the French fleet between two and four o'clock. The
last named had actually struck to a British ship, but had not been
taken into possession. Villaret remained for some time, hove-to in this
position, until satisfied that no more of the separated vessels could
join him, and then made sail to the north-west (F" F").[86]
Lord Howe was unable to follow with his own ship the comparatively
rapid movements of the French commander-in-chief. At eleven o'clock,
however, a signal was made for those that could to close around the
admiral, and the "Queen Charlotte" was with difficulty put on the other
tack. Howe then led the column thus formed (B' B') to the eastward, a
step that was necessary not only in order to cover dismantled British
ships and secure the prizes, but also to relieve the "Queen," which was
threatened by Villaret and in a critical situation. This ship, which
had behaved with so much forwardness and gallantry in the British van
on the 29th of May, had on the First of June been stationed in the
rear. The antagonist which she attacked went away rapidly to leeward;
and the "Queen," following with unrelenting ardor, found herself at
the end of the engagement again between the lines, with a dismantled
enemy, indeed, near by, but with her own mainmast gone and other spars
tottering. Eight of Villaret's column cannonaded her as they passed,
but without doing much harm, and Howe's approach extricated her.
The escape of some of the French dismasted ships was severely
criticised at the time, and there was also an opinion that Howe should
have renewed the attack after gathering about him his less injured
vessels. There can be little question that more promptitude and energy
would have secured some of the French that got away; many competent
eye-witnesses thought so, and much discontent was openly expressed
in the fleet. It is more doubtful whether the admiral would have
done well to order the attack renewed. Several captains had behaved
indifferently, either through lack of judgment or lack of nerve, and
the best were naturally among those whose ships, being well-placed
and hard-fought, were now out of condition for fighting. A decisive
practical reason for ceasing the action is to be found in Howe's
physical condition. He was then sixty-eight years old; and, although
possessed of the calm, unworrying temper which bears responsibility
lightly, he had undergone great fatigue during the five days of
battle and chase,—his only resting-place from the time the enemy was
encountered being an arm-chair. "When the report was brought to him,"
says the signal lieutenant, "that the French fleet showed every symptom
of determination to sustain a battle, I watched his face when he came
to the quarter-deck to look at them; it expressed an animation of
which, at his age, and after such fatigue of mind and body, I had not
thought it capable;" but the reaction came possibly a little too soon
for reaping the full fruits of the victory. "He went to bed," wrote the
same officer, "completely done up after the action of the First. We all
got round him; indeed, I saved him from a tumble; he was so weak that
from a roll of the ship he was nearly falling into the waist. 'Why,
you hold me up as if I were a child,' he said good-humoredly."[87] It
is not surprising that, under such circumstances, he could not do all
that a younger man might, nor that he yielded to the influence of his
chief-of-staff, Sir Roger Curtis, a distinguished and gallant officer,
but who appears to have been more impressed than was his superior by
the disadvantages under which the British fleet labored.
Many years later, Admiral Stopford, who commanded a frigate in the
action, made the following statement, which he allowed to be published:
"Having observed the 'Marlborough' dismasted and surrounded by enemy's
ships, I bore down and took her in tow,—which bringing me very near
the 'Queen Charlotte,' I went on board for orders. The cool, collected
manner in which I was received by Lord Howe, and the desire he
expressed to get the ships set to rights to continue the action, showed
that such was his intention; and for the purpose of exonerating Lord
Howe's memory from the charges I have heard alleged against him for not
following up his victory, I think it right to state that, when standing
on the 'Queen Charlotte's' poop, close to Lord Howe, Sir Roger Curtis
came up in haste and apparent perturbation, exclaiming, 'I declare
to God, my Lord, if you don't assemble the fleet, they will turn the
tables upon us.' I must confess that I did not see anything to warrant
such an exclamation, except a French ship passing under the 'Queen
Charlotte's' stern and firing a few guns into her. The admiral and Sir
R. Curtis then retired to another part of the poop, and nothing more
was done."[88]
The responsibility of a commander-in-chief is not affected by the
advice given him by any subordinate, however high his reputation or
confidential the relations between them; but in the state of bodily
weakness from which Howe suffered, he must, for subsequent action,
have depended largely upon Curtis, and it was probably well not to
undertake an undeniable risk against the judgment of the officer who
might be called upon to superintend the operation. The battle therefore
terminated with the movement of the two commanders-in-chief, with their
serviceable ships, to the eastward, through which three French vessels
escaped, the "Queen" was extricated, and seven dismasted enemies were
cut off by the British. At quarter past one the general firing ceased,
though a few random shots continued to be exchanged by scattered
vessels.
Such were the principal features of the battle of the First of June,
1794, which, being fought so far from any land,[89] has received no
other distinctive name. It has not been thought desirable to attempt
narrating, in words, the innumerable incidents of the fight. While
avoiding a superfluity of details, however, a tactical analysis of
the course of the action may be not uninteresting to the professional
reader. The method of attack undertaken by Lord Howe, single ship
against single ship, was identical with that employed on many previous
occasions by British admirals, and is to be justified only by the
evidence he had received, on the 28th and 29th of May, of the enemy's
professional incompetency and indifferent gunnery. He was probably
right in concluding, from the events of those days, as was decisively
proved by the issue on June 1st, that the French line was at every
point weaker than the ships he could thus bring against it. Under
such conditions it may be permissible to the assailant to throw away
the opportunity, which the offensive gives him, of combining an
attack in superior force upon a part of the enemy's order. It is very
possible that Howe might have reaped better results by making such
a combination, for the tactical inefficiency of the French fleet,
which he had observed, assured him that it could not, in the moment of
action, remedy any disadvantage under which he might place it; but,
on the other hand, the drill of his own captains was not yet very
good, nor were they all tried men upon whom he could depend. It was,
therefore, not improbable that an attempt to execute a combination
would result in a muddle, whereas he could count upon superior
seamanship and superior gunnery, ship to ship, and the movement of
approach which he made, though somewhat difficult in execution, is
perfectly simple in idea. Upon the whole, weighing the pros and cons,
it is the opinion of the author that Howe judged soundly in directing
the simple attack that he did.[90]
It is instructive to observe that the results of the movement,
though far more decisive in this than in previous battles, are, upon
dissection, found to be closely analogous. The British fleet, in
running down together, was ranged on a line parallel to the French,
but steering a course (north-west) that was oblique to its own front
as well as to that of the enemy. The issue in every other instance had
been indecisive,—scarcely ever was a ship taken or sunk. But while in
this respect different, the experience of previous engagements was
otherwise repeated. That flank of the assailant which in column had
been the van came, as a whole, promptly and orderly into action, while
delay and disorder, attended with imperfect execution, ensued in the
rear. This feature of simultaneous fleet attacks was emphasized by
the strenuous and brilliant efforts of three of the rear division,
which prevented indeed a general failure there, but brought out all
the more clearly how great the shortcoming would have been but for
their exertions, unparalleled in former battles. The proportion of
loss undergone in the different parts of the British column gives a
fair measure of the vigor displayed by each. This test is indeed most
misleading as a means of comparison between any two single ships.
Instances can readily be chosen, from this very case, in which vessels
skilfully placed and vigorously fought received less injury than
others, which were badly handled and did little harm to the enemy; but
when an average is taken of many ships, the specific causes of error
in different directions tend to balance each other, and if the general
conclusion is confirmed by the experience of other battles, it may
be accepted with much confidence. Now, on the First of June, taking
the total number of casualties in the British fleet, it will be found
that in every hundred men killed the eight van ships lost forty-three,
and in every hundred wounded forty-one; whereas the eight rear lost
seventeen killed and twenty-two wounded, or rather less than half the
proportion of the van. Nor does this tell the whole story, for four
fifths of the entire loss of the rear fell upon the three vessels,[91]
leaving but eight killed and thirty-three wounded to be divided among
the remaining five; whereas, in the eight van ships, though there are
marked individual differences, the loss is much more equally divided.
The inference, were the truth not otherwise known, would amount
almost to proof that the van ships went down in good order, attacked
vigorously, and so afforded mutual support, whereas the rear, whatever
the cause, did not impress themselves strongly on the enemy's line;
while the exceptional casualties of the three which did their duty well
indicate a lack of support from the others, which also appears to be
confirmed by the ascertained facts.
When a result is thus reproduced in various battles, it cannot be
attributed wholly to the fault of the captains. The exceptions to the
rule on the First of June were not the rear ships which failed in
gaining for themselves a fair share in the action, but those which
succeeded in so doing. The cause of this usual result seems to be that
the van ship is the pivot upon which the operation hinges, and in
proportion as the distance from the pivot grows greater, irregularities
become more frequent, while each one that occurs is propagated and
increased, until at last, in a long line, an approach to disorder
ensues. When this happens, the efficiency of each ship depends less
upon her normal relations to the line than upon the initiative of her
captain; and the differences between men, which had been controlled by
the exigencies of the order, where it still existed, begin to tell.
Short lines will suffer less than long ones from this cause; whence it
follows that in a long line new pivots, or points of departure for the
order beyond them, should be provided. On the 1st of June the "Queen
Charlotte," by her steady action and the authority conveyed by the
example of the commander-in-chief, served as such a pivot, and the
conduct of the ships on her right was better than that of those on her
immediate left, which were regulating their position by the van.[92]
As it seems probable, from the character of modern ships and weapons,
that attacks will be made in a line of front, it is a matter of
interest to naval officers to provide against this tendency to disorder
and imperfect execution, which seems to inhere in the part of an order
distant from the guide, or pivot.
The French line, by awaiting Howe's attack, laid itself open to any
combination he might see fit to make, but the plan actually adopted
threw the burden of resistance upon the individual captains, rather
than upon the admiral. Whenever a ship was vigorously attacked by an
enemy, her captain's task was simple, however arduous; nor does there
seem to have been an instance of a French officer in this position
failing to do his duty manfully. The superior gunnery of the British
at this time, however, generally beat down the resistance of the
opponent, and the latter then bore up and ran to leeward, unless his
masts had been shot away, or unless the assailant by piercing the
line had barred retreat. Thus the "Mucius," seventh in the line, was
engaged to leeward by the "Defence." She tried, therefore, to escape
by passing to windward of the British "Marlborough," next ahead, but
fell on board of her and there lost all her masts. This circumstance
of inferior gunnery, together with the fixed idea of keeping the line
closed, appear to have governed the movements of the French ships after
the battle joined. Now the duty of keeping the line closed is most
important and essential to mutual support, but it is not paramount
to every other consideration, particularly when an action, as this
inevitably must, had passed into a _mêlée_; but the French captains,
having few other ideas on fleet-fighting, clung to this one in its
simplest form,—that of following close upon the heels of the next
ahead. Thus the leading ship, "Convention," though not hotly attacked,
wore out of the line and was closely followed by the "Gasparin,"
though the latter was vigorously engaged. The next five ships were hard
pressed and fought manfully. The eighth, after a short engagement, ran
to leeward and was followed by the three astern of her. This brings
us to the twelfth, or nearly to the centre of the French line, and of
the six that followed, down to and including the seventeenth, four
were taken after a desperate resistance. The two that escaped were
the flag-ship "Montagne," whose career has already been told, and
the "Jacobin," next astern of her. The eighteenth, nineteenth, and
twentieth seem to have received little injury, but yet ran to leeward;
whether independently, or one following another, does not certainly
appear. The remaining six suffered the fierce assault of the three
of the enemy's rear, and four were reduced to such a condition that
they must have been taken—and not two only of them—had the rest of the
British division done their full duty.
Although the French officers, lacking both experience and instruction
in fleet warfare, failed to do all they might in the battle, distinct
misconduct by doing what should not have been done appears only in two
cases. The first was the captain of the leading ship, for whose act in
forsaking his post in the van no good reason appears. The second and
much more serious fault was committed by the captain of the "Jacobin."
The course of this officer in making sail to close upon the flag-ship,
when the intention of the "Queen Charlotte" to pass between the two
became evident, was perfectly proper. His keeping away, when collision
with the "Montagne" threatened, was probably the only way of avoiding a
disaster. Being thus forced to leeward of the line, he still retained
the power of attacking the British ship to starboard, while she was, or
should have been, engaged on the other side by the "Montagne." Instead
of using this opportunity, Captain Gassin kept off and ran to leeward.
This fault, grave in any case, was especially blameworthy in the next
astern or next ahead of the commander-in-chief. Those were posts of
peculiar honor, held by heavy vessels, chosen with the special object
of supporting their leader and strengthening the part of the order in
which he was. For Captain Gassin, personally, there may have been many
excuses; but for the course of the ship, considered from a military and
tactical point of view, no excuse whatever appears, for she suffered
little in the fight. The void caused by the "Jacobin" was filled by
the ships astern of her pressing up, and this forward movement, being
transmitted to the end of the line, was partly the cause why the rear
British ships did not reach their numerical opposite in the French
order.
Some attention is due to the naval strategy, to the general conduct
and results of this short maritime campaign, which covered only four
weeks,—from the 16th of May, when Villaret sailed from Brest, to the
11th of June, when he again anchored just outside the port. In order to
form a just opinion there must be considered the objects of each party,
the forces at their control, and the measures pursued by them.
The object of the French was to insure the arrival of the convoy
from America. For this purpose they had at sea, at the first, two
detachments,—one of five ships-of-the-line under Nielly, the other of
twenty-five under Villaret. The rendezvous for the two was the same,
and the important point where their intended junction should take place
was known to their admirals and unknown to the British. It may be again
said that the instructions of the French government to its officers
compelled the latter to avoid, if possible, any decisive engagement.
The object of the British was twofold: to intercept the expected
convoy, and to bring the French fleet to battle. The two might, and
did, interfere with each other,—might, by divergence of interest,
prompt a separation of the force. Of the two, fighting the French fleet
was indisputably the more important, and was doubtless so considered
by Howe, in accordance with the usual British naval policy, which aimed
at the destruction of the enemy's organized force afloat. The ships at
his disposal, including Montagu's squadron, amounted to thirty-two of
the line. He was ignorant of the rendezvous of the French fleets and of
the exact course that would be followed by the convoy; but of both he
could form approximate estimates.
From the 4th of May, when Montagu's squadron first separated, until
the 19th, Howe supposed the French to be in Brest. On the latter day
his lookouts reconnoitred the port for the second time, and he then
learned that they had sailed. The same evening he was joined by a
frigate from Montagu, bearing a request for a re-enforcement. Fearing
that his subordinate might fall in with Villaret's greatly superior
force, Howe next morning made all sail to join him; making a course of
west by south, while the French had been steering west one-half south.
On the 21st he fell in with and recaptured a number of Dutch ships,
which had been taken by Villaret on the 19th. From the logs of these
ships, the position and course of the French fleet two days before was
ascertained; and Howe, concluding that they would not go near Montagu,
who was well to the southward, dismissed the latter from his mind
and devoted himself thenceforth to finding the enemy. This decision
challenges criticism, because Montagu's orders were, if unsuccessful in
finding the convoy, to abandon his cruise on the 20th and rejoin the
admiral off Ushant. If he complied strictly with these instructions, he
should not now have been very far from the main fleet.
Montagu, however, had seen reason for delaying some days on his
cruising ground, and while thus waiting retook some of the Dutch
prizes taken by Villaret and which had escaped recapture by Howe on
the 21st. He then first learned of the French sailing, and at the
same time that Howe was in pursuit. Instead of making any attempt to
rejoin his superior, or to take a position where he might further the
general objects of the cruise, he on the 24th or 25th of May bore up
for England and anchored at Plymouth on the 30th. The British naval
historian, James, says this was done in compliance with the spirit
of his orders. It would be more convincing to be told what was the
letter of orders that could admit such a construction, and what the
condition of his ships that could justify forsaking the field of action
with so strong a detachment at such a critical moment. His decision,
on whatever grounds made, seems not to have met the approval of the
government, and orders were at once sent for him to sail immediately,
accompanied by all the ships-of-the-line ready for sea at Plymouth. He
accordingly did sail on the 4th of June with nine ships, and on the 8th
reached the rendezvous appointed by Howe off Ushant, which was also the
station indicated by the last instructions of the admiralty to him.
On the 3d of June, the day before he left, the "Audacious" arrived,
bringing the first tidings of the meeting of the fleets on the 28th of
May, in which she had been disabled.
It appears from this account that neither Howe nor Montagu attached
sufficient importance to the concentration of the British fleet.
Howe's immediate pursuit might indeed be defended on the ground of the
necessity to overtake Villaret, before he had effected his junction
with Nielly; but, as both these admirals knew their rendezvous, while
he did not, and as Villaret had three days' start, the chances all
were that he would not come up before they met. Actually, one of
Nielly's ships joined before Howe found him, another on the 29th, and
the remainder on the 30th; thus neutralizing the advantages gained by
the fine tactical efforts of the British admiral on the 28th and 29th.
Had Montagu's six ships, however, come up, the full profit of the two
previous days' fighting would have been preserved; and it is hard to
over-estimate the effect which they would have had upon the results,
even if maintained simply as a reserve. To these considerations may be
added the risk of missing both fleet and convoy, by going in search of
them, instead of simply taking a position near which they must pass,
and there uniting the British fleet. That this was very possible is
shown by the facts of the chase. "On the 27th, at 9 A.M., having got a
few leagues to the northward of the latitude in which he had reason to
think Villaret was cruising, Lord Howe bore up and ran to the eastward,
with the wind on the starboard quarter."[93] The fleet had been running
on this course, with a fair and apparently fresh wind for twenty-one
hours, when the French were first seen in the south-south-east.
Although no precise data are at hand, it is reasonable to conclude from
the above that Howe had gone over a hundred miles to the westward of
the French rendezvous, which Villaret had reached a week before.[94] If
in the meantime the convoy had appeared, as it perfectly well might,
Villaret would at once have sailed for Brest, and the British admiral
would not improbably have lost both fleet and convoy.
The question presented is purely strategic. It was certain that the
French fleet, if undisturbed, would meet the convoy; therefore after
it had sailed from Brest the two objects of the British were merged
into one. There was no occasion thenceforth to remain divided into two
detachments. For what point precisely the convoy would aim was not
known, but Brest and Rochefort marked the two extreme points of the
coast line, between which it would probably arrive. The approach of so
large a body of ships, tied down to a common movement, is necessarily
slow. It would be as ignorant of the point where the British would
concentrate, as the latter were of the rendezvous where the different
French detachments were to meet. Fast single ships, well scattered to
the westward, might reasonably be expected to meet it and to return to
their main body in time to warn this where to look for the prey. That
there were no difficulties in this line of action will not, certainly,
be contended; but it was more sure and militarily sounder thus to
concentrate the British force of thirty-two ships-of-the-line in a well
chosen position, and with adequate lookouts, than to lead it hither
and thither in search of the enemy's whereabouts. It is a singular and
instructive fact that from first to last not a single British ship
appears to have laid eyes on the convoy from America. Ships both of
commerce and war, belonging to other bodies, were taken and retaken
in the Bay of Biscay; but those coming from America wore invisible
garments.
The strategic aim of the French admiral, after he had been so
unfortunate as to be found by the British fleet, was to draw it away
from the rendezvous appointed for the convoy. Both his orders and the
tactical condition of his fleet forbade the attempt to secure this
by bringing the enemy to battle. When first met, the French were to
windward, south of the British. If they had been north, with the same
advantage of the wind, the situation would have been most satisfactory
to them; for the convoy was approaching from the west-south-west, and
by retreating to the northward and westward Villaret would have led the
enemy directly from the position endangering it. As things were, it was
impossible to steer to the northward without bringing on the battle
he had to avoid; and if defeated where he then was, the victorious
fleet would be left too near the convoy. Villaret, therefore, kept the
advantage of the wind and steered a west course, which diverged slowly
from the convoy's path, and, if long enough continued, would allow
it to pass out of sight. The slowness of this divergence, however,
doubtless contributed to reconcile him to the loss of the weather
gage on the 29th, and immediately upon finding himself north of the
enemy he went to the northward and westward during the two following
days.[95] The result was eminently successful. It is stated by the
latest French authorities[96] that on the 30th the convoy passed over
the ground where the partial engagement of the 29th was fought. If so,
it must have been under cover of the dense fog which then prevailed, as
the fleets had not moved very far.
It is impossible not to admire heartily the judicious and energetic
measures by which Howe, on the 28th and 29th of May, succeeded in
gaining the weather gage, while inflicting, at the same time, a heavy
loss upon the enemy. Whatever judgment may be passed upon his tactics
on the 1st of June,—and in the opinion of the writer they were the best
adapted to the situation and to the condition of his fleet,—it cannot
be denied that those of the preceding days were well conceived, and,
on the part of the admiral, vigorously and gallantly executed. But the
strategic mistake, or misfortune, wherever the fault lay, by which
Montagu's detachment was absent, neutralized the tactical advantage
gained; while the correct strategy of the French, which brought the two
parts of their fleet within supporting distance of each other, restored
the balance of strength. Thus was again confirmed the maxim of military
writers, that a strategic mistake is more serious and far-reaching in
its effects than an error in tactics.
After the two fleets separated each made the best of its way to a
home port. Lord Howe waited until the morning of the 3d, securing and
refitting his prizes and disabled ships, and reached Portsmouth on
the 13th of June. Villaret Joyeuse went to Brest. On the morning of
the 9th he fell in with Montagu's squadron, a little south of Ushant.
The condition of the French, encumbered with injured ships, would
have afforded an opportunity to a quick-moving fleet; but two of the
British were excessively slow and the admiral did not dare approach
a much superior force. Villaret pursued for a short distance, but,
fearing to be drawn to leeward of his port in his crippled state, he
soon gave over the chase. On the 11th of June, all his fleet anchored
in Bertheaume roads, outside of Brest. Montagu, on the 10th, departed
for England, a movement which finally closed the campaign on the part
of the British. On the night of the 12th the French crews saw a number
of lights in the Raz de Sein, the southern passage by which Brest is
approached. They were those of the long-expected convoy. Admiral Van
Stabel, fearing to find a hostile fleet before the usual and safer
entrance, had steered for the Penmarcks, a rocky promontory thirty
miles south of the port, and thence for the Raz de Sein. On the same
day that Van Stabel made the land Montagu anchored in Plymouth. Two
days later, June 14, the convoy and the remnant of Villaret's squadron
entered Brest together. Thus ended the cruise, which was marked,
indeed, by a great naval disaster, but had insured the principal object
for which it was undertaken.