with the management of their foreign affairs must labor under in the
execution of his duty, without a more perfect knowledge of their
sentiments, than can be obtained from their public acts, have been
pleased to admit him to attend Congress, that (as the ordinance
expresses it,) he may be better informed of the affairs of the United
States, and have an opportunity of explaining his reports respecting
his Department; but here it stops short, and does not say in what
manner he is to gain the sentiments of Congress, when he does himself
the honor to attend upon them. It is true they may in part be
collected from an attention to the debates, but it often so happens,
that the debate does not take the turn that he would wish, in order to
satisfy a doubt, and he goes away, after hearing a subject largely
discussed, ignorant of the only point upon which he wishes to be
informed, when perhaps by a single question, his doubt might be
removed, or by a word of information, which he has the best means of
acquiring, a debate might be shortened.
It is true the power of explaining his reports given by the ordinance,
seems to imply a permission to offer his sentiments when they are
under consideration, but as I do not wish to assume a liberty which is
not expressly given, I must beg the sentiments of Congress on this
subject. The ordinance is also deficient, in not affording a power to
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to take order upon the application
either of foreigners, or subjects, relative to matters not of
sufficient moment to engage the attention of Congress; as for
instance, applications for aid in procuring the release of an
American, taken under particular circumstances in English ships, and
confined in the French West Indies or elsewhere; claims upon prizes
carried into the French Islands, &c., which cases occur every day, and
are attended with long memorials, which would take up much of the time
and attention of Congress.
As I have hitherto taken the liberty to transact business of this kind
with the Minister of his Most Christian Majesty, and the Governors or
Generals of the French Islands, I wish to be justified in so doing by
the orders of Congress. As a check upon myself, I keep a book, though
it is attended with much labor, in which all such applications, and
the steps taken in consequence thereof, are inserted at length.
The organization of this office will, too, I presume, render some
alteration necessary in matters of form and ceremony as heretofore
settled by Congress in conformity to the practice of other nations,
and to enable us to avail ourselves of the advantages they sometimes
afford in creating useful delays, and concealing for political reasons
the views of the sovereign.
Congress having vested me with the power of appointing clerks, I have
appointed two gentlemen, in whose integrity and abilities I can
confide. These are barely sufficient to do the running business of the
office, which is much greater than I imagined it would be, five
copies, besides the draft being necessary for every foreign letter or
paper transmitted. To copy all the letters, which have hitherto been
received, with the Secret Journals and other extracts from the books
and files of Congress, though absolutely necessary, both for order and
security, will be impossible, without further aid for at least one
year. Congress have not, indeed, limited the number I may employ, nor
have they fixed their salaries, upon both of which I could wish for
their direction. An interpreter is so necessary, both for this
Department and the Admiralty, that I cannot but recommend to Congress
the appointment of one, from whom, if a man in whom I could confide, I
might receive assistance as a Secretary when hurried with business.
It may possibly be expected, Sir, that I should close this long letter
by a report on the matters it contains, but as it is a delicate
subject to point out a mode for extending my own powers, I only beg
leave to recommend the enclosed resolve.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
* * * * *
TO MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.
Office of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, }
January 31st, 1782. }
Dear Sir,
I was this day favored with yours of the 13th ultimo. I need not tell
you, that the intelligence it conveyed, and the spirit in which it was
written, afforded me the most sensible pleasure. The idea it holds
forth of an attempt upon Charleston, and the prospect of success in
it, is one that we dare not indulge here, more especially as troops
have sailed from New York, and as we presume to Charleston, but you
have taught us rather to measure your success by your genius than by
your means.
I wish it were in my power to tell you, that our accounts from Europe
were proportionate to our expectations. The combined fleets, as you
know, have returned and separated, without having effected anything.
The British are again masters of the ocean. Gibraltar is a rock, on
which all the exertions of Spain seem to split, and the siege of fort
St Philip seems to be carried on in the most energetic manner. We have
no prospect of forming an alliance, either with Spain or Holland, who
both appear to sigh for peace. Our loan on the guarantee of France
with the last, is nearly completed. But what is not a little
unsatisfactory, it is also nearly expended by advances, which France
has made us on the credit of it. From Spain we are likely to get
nothing.
The negotiations for a peace are entirely, at a stand; the mediating
powers have no interest in wishing it, and the belligerent nations are
neither of them sufficiently weakened to request their interposition.
The Count de Vergennes assures us, that Britain will still make the
most vigorous exertions. I mention these circumstances not only for
your information, but that you may make the proper use of them in
animating the exertions of the Southern States. It is the misfortune
of America to presume too much upon each dawning of success, and to
believe that peace must tread upon the heels of every little
advantage, instead of being taught by her own struggles and
difficulties, that every nation has resources, that surpass the
expectations of its enemies.
Would to God that you could be enabled, by the animated efforts of the
Southern States, to expel the enemy from them without the aid of our
allies. This would re-establish our character for activity in Europe,
where I am sorry to say, it has for some time past been upon the
decline, and I do sincerely believe, that co-operating with the
brilliant successes of the last fall, it would incline the enemy to
peace, without which I have no expectations of it. But I fear this is
rather to be wished for than expected.
Domestic news we have none, but what Colonel Ternant will give, or you
may collect from the enclosed papers.
If anything turns up worth your notice, you shall hear from me. I
flatter myself that you will think with me, that our distance is too
great to wait for the ceremony of answer and reply, and favor me with
a line as occasion offers.
I have the honor to be, Sir, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
* * * * *
CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATES.
Philadelphia, February 18th, 1782.
Sir,
I do myself the honor to transmit to your Excellency several
resolutions of Congress, which having a reference to the Department of
Foreign Affairs, are in course to go through this office. The
necessity of carrying them into effect is too obvious to need
observations.
While we hold an intercourse with civilised nations, we must conform
to laws, which humanity has established, and which custom has
consecrated among them. On this the rights, which the United States or
their citizens may claim in foreign countries must be founded.
One of the resolutions passed Congress in consequence of a convention
about to be concluded between his Most Christian Majesty and the
United States of America, which affords an additional reason for
paying it the earliest attention. Your Excellency and the Legislature
will see the propriety of rendering the laws on these subjects as
simple, and the execution of them as expeditious, as possible, since
foreigners, who are the great object of them, are easily disgusted at
complex systems, which they find a difficulty in understanding, and
the honor and peace of a nation are frequently as much wounded by a
delay as by a denial of justice.
Another resolution relates to your boundaries, and is designed as one
means of ascertaining the territorial rights of the United States
collectively, which can only be accurately known by each State's
exhibiting its claims, and the evidence on which they found them. Your
Excellency will therefore be pleased to direct, authentic copies from
your records of all grants, charters, maps, treaties with the natives,
and other evidences, to be transmitted to this office, as soon as you
can conveniently collect them. I could wish, that the copies might be
proved, by having the great seal of your State annexed.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
* * * * *
TO GOVERNOR RUTLEGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.
Office of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, }
February 19th, 1782. }
Dear Sir,
I wish to avail myself of the opportunity Colonel Ternant affords me,
to convey the agreeable intelligence contained in the enclosed letter
from Mr Harrison, our agent at Cadiz. Many other objects present
themselves, on which I would write could I do it without detaining
Colonel Ternant, who only waits for this.
I propose to have the honor of writing more at large by the next safe
conveyance. In the meanwhile, I should consider it as a favor, which
might be rendered useful to the public, as well as agreeable to me, if
your Excellency would open a correspondence with this office, in which
an exact state of affairs in the government, over which you preside
ought to be detailed, which could not fail to have some influence in
the direction of our foreign affairs.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
* * * * *
CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATES.
Philadelphia, February 19th, 1782.
Sir,
Where a Government is composed of independent States, united not by
the power of a sovereign but by their common interest, the Executive
Departments form a centre of communication between each State and
their Chief Council, and are so far links of the chain, which should
bind them together, as they render to each similar views of great
national objects, and introduce uniformity in their measures for the
establishment of general interests. A mistaken idea of our own
importance to other nations, of their attachment to us, and of the
weakness of our common enemy, having lulled us into a very imprudent
security, I beg leave to state to your Excellency the information last
received from Europe. Our success in this important war, under the
favor of Heaven, must be built upon the weakness of our enemy, the
strength and perseverance of her foes in Europe, and our own
exertions.
It is an undeniable fact, that Britain has not, in the course of the
last campaign, gained any advantage of her enemies, but, on the
contrary, has seen their fleets ride triumphant in the seas, she
proudly called her own, and an army, in which she placed her fondest
hopes, made captive. But, on the other hand, we are compelled to
admit, that she has met with no such reverse of fortune as materially
to debilitate her, or weaken her resources for another campaign. Her
trade has, for the most part, returned in safety. Her fleets have
blocked up those of the Dutch, and, upon the separation of the
combined fleets, recovered the superiority in the European seas. The
army taken in America is only so far decidedly ruinous to her affairs
here, as we know how to avail ourselves of the advantage it affords.
That her pride is not humbled, that she did not wish for peace prior
to this advantage, is obvious, 1st. From her refusing to make a
separate treaty with the Dutch, who, under the mediation of the
Empress of Russia, seemed anxiously to wish it; 2dly. From her neglect
to notice the last proposals of the mediating powers, which yet remain
unanswered; so that if any alteration is made in their sentiments oh
this subject, they must originate in their ill success in America, for
in every other quarter their defensive war seems to have been
supported with advantage. How far this will operate admits of a doubt,
which prudence directs us not to rely upon. Money, the great support
of modern wars, has been raised with more facility in England, than in
any country in the world; and we find the minority last year censuring
Lord North for giving the advantage of lending to his friends. Their
losses may indeed render subscriptions more expensive to the public;
but there is no well grounded room to suppose they will not fill up;
and still less reason to believe, if the means for carrying on the war
are attainable, that the vindictive spirit of the King and his
ministry, and the overweening pride of the nation, will soon yield to
make a peace, which involves their disgrace and humiliation. But as
strength or weakness are mere comparative terms, we can form no
judgment of the measures of Britain but by attending to the force and
disposition of her enemies.
The United Provinces were evidently dragged into the war, and have
prosecuted it as if they momentarily expected a peace. The Colonies in
the West Indies have been taken, without being in a state to make the
smallest resistance, and the active interposition of France alone
saved those in the East from sharing the same fate. Our last letters
from Holland place the distress of their commerce in a strong point of
view. They are unhappily rent by parties, which clog the wheels of
government; though it is said the party opposed to England are the
most numerous and growing in strength, so that at some future day we
may reasonably hope they will assume the entire ascendency; yet we can
build very little on this, till the close of another year. This much
is certain, they are not yet allied to us, nor have they given us
reason to believe, that they intend to be so. They wish for peace, and
will take no measures that can obstruct it. They have lent us no
money, nor are they likely to do it; from whence we may presume,
either that they doubt our success, or do not much interest themselves
in it.
Our expectations from Spain are scarcely more flattering. Some little
aids of money have been received after long solicitation, hardly so
much as paid the expense of soliciting. We have reason to suppose that
no more will be granted. They are still cold with regard to our
alliance; nothing but brilliant success can bring it to a conclusion.
Nor have we the smallest reason to expect any pecuniary aid from her,
even if she should confederate with us in time to be of use for the
next campaign. She has at this moment very many and very expensive
operations on hand; and, till she has allied herself to us, we have no
certainty that she will choose to continue the war for the attainment
of our independence, if Britain should be sufficiently humbled to
sacrifice to her the objects which led her into the war.
To France, then, we turn, as the only enemy of Great Britain, who is
at the same time our ally, who will persevere in the war for the
attainment of our independence. She has already done so much for us,
in order to afford us the means of doing something for ourselves, that
she may reasonably hope to find the effects of her benevolence. Her
fleets have protected our coasts, her armies have fought our battles;
she has made various efforts to restore our finances, by paying the
interest of our loans, by obtaining credit in Europe on our account
for clothing, arms, and necessaries; by advancing money, and by
opening and guaranteeing a loan for us, to a considerable amount in
Holland, when, by the abolition of paper, our finances were totally
deranged. These sums are nearly expended, and another campaign is
about to be opened. France assures, that it is not in her power to
make us any further grants of money, her ministers repeat this to us
in every letter, in a tone that persuades us of their determination on
that point.
What then is to be done? Are we to relinquish the hopes, which the
present debility of the enemy affords us of expelling them by one
decided effort, and compensating all our losses by the enjoyment of an
active commerce? Are we to return to the wretched, oppressive system
we have quitted? Are we to carry on a weak defensive war with an
unpaid army, whose precarious subsistence must depend upon what can be
torn by violence from the industrious husbandman? Shall we vainly, and
I think disgracefully, supplicate all the powers of Europe for those
means, which we have in our own hands, if we dare call them forth, and
which, after all, must be called forth if we continue the war, (and
upon that subject there can be no doubt, till the end for which we
took up arms is attained.) The only question is, whether each State
shall fairly and regularly contribute its quota, or whether that which
happens to be the seat of war shall (as has too often been the case)
bear the whole burden, and suffer more from the necessities of our own
troops, than the ravages of the enemy. Whether we shall drive the
enemy from their posts with a strong body of regular troops, or
whether we shall permit them to extend their devastations, while, with
our battalions and fluctuating corps of militia, we protract a weak
defensive war, till our allies are discouraged, and some unfavorable
change takes place in the system of Europe.
Your Excellency, I am persuaded, will pardon the freedom with which I
write. You see the necessity which dictates my letter, and were it in
my power to communicate all that our friends in Europe think of our
inactivity, I am persuaded you would urge your State to exertion in
much stronger terms than I dare venture to use.
When Congress call upon a State for supplies, they are usually
answered by pleas of disability, urged, too, by the State with good
faith, and a firm persuasion that they speak their real situation, a
recurrence to facts, that have passed under their own observation,
will convince them that they are deceived.
From the time that the depreciation of the Continental bills of credit
began, till they were no longer current, the States that received them
paid a tax equal to all the expenditures of the army, and a very
considerable one beyond it; for if we suppose ten millions of dollars,
in specie, a year, to be necessary for their support, then the
expense, till the close of the campaign of 1779, must have amounted to
upwards of fifty millions, exclusive of the supplies from Europe; and
yet, in March, 1780, the whole national debt contracted in America did
not, in fact, amount to five millions; so that forty five millions
were paid by the United States in those five years of the war, when
they had the least commerce and agriculture, and when they were most
distressed by the enemy; and this tax, too, was the most unjust and
partial that can be conceived, unless we except that, by which we have
since raised much more from the people, without giving so much to the
public; I mean the laws for impressing, &c., which placed the greatest
burden of the war upon the shoulders of a particular order of men in
particular States only.
Now surely, if by partial and unjust measures, for which necessity
alone can plead, we have been able to draw from every State, a tax
more than equal to the present demand, no State can say, that it
cannot afford its proportion of a more equitable tax. Those who have
hitherto borne the weight of the war, must warmly espouse a measure,
which is so greatly calculated for their relief. Those who have
hitherto been eased from the burden, must be more able to take it up
at this time, when they have the most promising expectation of
relinquishing it soon.
It is certain, that if we put ourselves in a state to take advantage
of circumstances early in the ensuing spring, we have the best
grounded reason to hope, that a few months will remove the war from
our doors. Whereas if we delay to enable Congress to say to their
allies, "we are ready for an effectual co-operation with any force you
may send," they will turn their attention to other objects, and leave
us to lament in vain the opportunities we have lost. Every motive
then, national honor, national interest, public economy, private ease,
and that love of freedom, which pervades every Legislature on the
Continent, call loudly not only for a compliance with the
requisitions of Congress, but for so early a compliance as to render
it effectual.
It is true we are at present in such a situation as to have no
apprehensions for the final establishment of our independence; but
surely it is a matter of some moment to us, whether we shall obtain
it, or at least be freed from the ravages of the enemy and the burden
of the war in the course of six months at the expense of eight
millions of dollars, or whether we shall wait for it till a general
and perhaps a distant peace, and be subject in the meanwhile to
infinitely more expense, and all the distress that attends a country
which is the seat of war.
But, Sir, it is time to dismiss a subject, which wants no arguments to
illustrate it. I am confident that you will use every means to
convince the State over which you preside, of the danger which will
result from relying more upon the weakness of the enemy than their own
strength, more upon the aid of their allies than their own exertions,
more upon unjust, partial, hazardous, and expensive expedients, than
upon an equal and regular support of the measures, which Congress,
upon the most mature deliberation have recommended to their attention.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Office of Foreign Affairs, February 21st, 1782.
Sir,
I do myself the honor to lay before Congress the enclosed note from
the Minister of France, a letter from the Marquis de Bouillé with
translations of both, and the proceedings of the Council of Assembly
of Dominique; all of which relate to the case of the ship Resolution's
cargo, part of which was adjudged lawful prize by the sentence of the
Court of Appeals; and the case of the brigantine Eeirsten and her
cargo, which was also adjudged lawful prize by the said Court.[21]
The case of the ship Resolution, as far as I have been able to learn,
was simply this, she was a Dutch vessel, freighted on account of
capitulants at Dominique, and bound for Holland, agreeably to the
seventh Article of the capitulation. She was taken by a British ship,
retaken by one of our privateers, and condemned by the Court of
Admiralty of this State, whose decree was reversed and the ship and
cargo acquitted, except a small part of the latter, on the principle
of its not being the property of capitulants, and because, as was
alleged, it was not protected by the ordinances of Congress, approving
the principles of the armed neutrality, Great Britain and Holland
being at open war; from whence it was inferred by the Court, that the
Dutch vessel could not be considered as sufficiently neutral to
protect the property of an enemy. The papers referred to in the
memorial of the Minister of France serve to show, that the whole cargo
belonged to capitulants.