The Procuration Of The Good Of The People
The OFFICE of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,)
consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign
Power, namely the procuration of the Safety Of The People; to which he
is obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to
God, the Author of that Law, and to none but him. But by Safety here, is
not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life,
which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the
Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe.
By Instruction & Lawes
And this is intended should be done, not by care applyed to
Individualls, further than their protection from injuries, when they
shall complain; but by a generall Providence, contained in publique
Instruction, both of Doctrine, and Example; and in the making, and
executing of good Lawes, to which individuall persons may apply their
own cases.
Against The Duty Of A Soveraign To Relinquish Any Essentiall Right of
Soveraignty Or Not To See The People Taught The Grounds Of Them
And because, if the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty (specified before
in the eighteenth Chapter) be taken away, the Common-wealth is thereby
dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a
warre with every other man, (which is the greatest evill that can happen
in this life;) it is the Office of the Soveraign, to maintain those
Rights entire; and consequently against his duty, First, to transferre
to another, or to lay from himselfe any of them. For he that deserteth
the Means, deserteth the Ends; and he deserteth the Means, that being
the Soveraign, acknowledgeth himselfe subject to the Civill Lawes; and
renounceth the Power of Supreme Judicature; or of making Warre, or
Peace by his own Authority; or of Judging of the Necessities of the
Common-wealth; or of levying Mony, and Souldiers, when, and as much as
in his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making Officers,
and Ministers both of Warre, and Peace; or of appointing Teachers, and
examining what Doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the Defence,
Peace, and Good of the people. Secondly, it is against his duty, to let
the people be ignorant, or mis-in-formed of the grounds, and reasons
of those his essentiall Rights; because thereby men are easie to be
seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the Common-wealth shall require
their use and exercise.
And the grounds of these Rights, have the rather need to be diligently,
and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any Civill Law,
or terrour of legal punishment. For a Civill Law, that shall forbid
Rebellion, (and such is all resistance to the essentiall Rights of
Soveraignty,) is not (as a Civill Law) any obligation, but by vertue
onely of the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth the violation of Faith;
which naturall obligation if men know not, they cannot know the Right of
any Law the Soveraign maketh. And for the Punishment, they take it
but for an act of Hostility; which when they think they have strength
enough, they will endeavour by acts of Hostility, to avoyd.
Objection Of Those That Say There Are No Principles Of Reason For
Absolute Soveraignty
As I have heard some say, that Justice is but a word, without substance;
and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himselfe,
(not onely in the condition of warre, but also in a Common-wealth,) is
his own, which I have already shewed to be false: So there be also
that maintain, that there are no grounds, nor Principles of Reason, to
sustain those essentiall Rights, which make Soveraignty absolute. For
if there were, they would have been found out in some place, or other;
whereas we see, there has not hitherto been any Common-wealth, where
those Rights have been acknowledged, or challenged. Wherein they argue
as ill, as if the Savage people of America, should deny there were any
grounds, or Principles of Reason, so to build a house, as to last as
long as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built.
Time, and Industry, produce every day new knowledge. And as the art
of well building, is derived from Principles of Reason, observed by
industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and
the divers effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind
began (though poorly) to build: So, long time after men have begun to
constitute Common-wealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder,
there may, Principles of Reason be found out, by industrious meditation,
to make use of them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my
particular interest, at this day, very little. But supposing that
these of mine are not such Principles of Reason; yet I am sure they are
Principles from Authority of Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when
I shall come to speak of the Kingdome of God, (administred by Moses,)
over the Jewes, his peculiar people by Covenant.
Objection From The Incapacity Of The Vulgar
But they say again, that though the Principles be right, yet Common
people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. I
should be glad, that the Rich, and Potent Subjects of a Kingdome, or
those that are accounted the most Learned, were no lesse incapable than
they. But all men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine,
proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the
interest of them that are to learn. Potent men, digest hardly any thing
that setteth up a Power to bridle their affections; and Learned men,
any thing that discovereth their errours, and thereby lesseneth their
Authority: whereas the Common-peoples minds, unlesse they be tainted
with dependance on the Potent, or scribbled over with the opinions
of their Doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by
Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them. Shall whole Nations be
brought to Acquiesce in the great Mysteries of Christian Religion, which
are above Reason; and millions of men be made believe, that the same
Body may be in innumerable places, at one and the same time, which
is against Reason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching, and
preaching, protected by the Law, to make that received, which is so
consonant to Reason, that any unprejudicated man, needs no more to learn
it, than to hear it? I conclude therefore, that in the instruction
of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and
Fundamentall Lawes) of Soveraignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a
Soveraign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault,
or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the
Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be
instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security,
against the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person,
from Rebellion.
Subjects Are To Be Taught, Not To Affect Change Of Government
And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First, that
they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government they see
in their neighbour Nations, more than with their own, nor (whatsoever
present prosperity they behold in Nations that are otherwise governed
than they,) to desire change. For the prosperity of a People ruled by
an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly, commeth not from
Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience, and Concord of
the Subjects; nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy, because one man
has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in
any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the Concord of the
People,) and they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time be
dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than
reforme the Common-wealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like
the foolish daughters of Peleus (in the fable;) which desiring to renew
the youth of their decrepit Father, did by the Counsell of Medea, cut
him in pieces, and boyle him, together with strange herbs, but made not
of him a new man. This desire of change, is like the breach of the first
of Gods Commandements: For there God says, Non Habebis Deos Alienos;
Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations; and in another place
concerning Kings, that they are Gods.
Nor Adhere (Against The Soveraign) To Popular Men
Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with
admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow Subjects, how
high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the
Common-wealth; nor of any Assembly, (except the Soveraign Assembly,)
so as to deferre to them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the
Soveraign onely, whom (in their particular stations) they represent; nor
to receive any influence from them, but such as is conveighed by them
from the Soveraign Authority. For that Soveraign, cannot be imagined to
love his People as he ought, that is not Jealous of them, but suffers
them by the flattery of Popular men, to be seduced from their loyalty,
as they have often been, not onely secretly, but openly, so as to
proclaime Marriage with them In Facie Ecclesiae by Preachers; and by
publishing the same in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to
the violation of the second of the ten Commandements.
Nor To Dispute The Soveraign Power
Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how great
fault it is, to speak evill of the Soveraign Representative, (whether
One man, or an Assembly of men;) or to argue and dispute his Power, or
any way to use his Name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into
Contempt with his People, and their Obedience (in which the safety
of the Common-wealth consisteth) slackened. Which doctrine the third
Commandement by resemblance pointeth to.
And To Have Dayes Set Apart To Learn Their Duty
Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when ’tis taught,
remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the
Soveraign Power is placed, without setting a part from their ordinary
labour, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are
appointed to instruct them; It is necessary that some such times be
determined, wherein they may assemble together, and (after prayers and
praises given to God, the Soveraign of Soveraigns) hear those their
Duties told them, and the Positive Lawes, such as generally concern them
all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the Authority that maketh
them Lawes. To this end had the Jewes every seventh day, a Sabbath, in
which the Law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they
were put in mind, that their King was God; that having created the world
in six days, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from
their labour, that that God was their King, which redeemed them from
their servile, and painfull labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after
they had rejoyced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawfull
recreation. So that the first Table of the Commandements, is spent all,
in setting down the summe of Gods absolute Power; not onely as God,
but as King by pact, (in peculiar) of the Jewes; and may therefore give
light, to those that have the Soveraign Power conferred on them by the
consent of men, to see what doctrine they Ought to teach their Subjects.
And To Honour Their Parents
And because the first instruction of Children, dependeth on the care
of their Parents; it is necessary that they should be obedient to them,
whilest they are under their tuition; and not onely so, but that also
afterwards (as gratitude requireth,) they acknowledge the benefit of
their education, by externall signes of honour. To which end they are
to be taught, that originally the Father of every man was also his
Soveraign Lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the
Fathers of families, when by instituting a Common-wealth, they resigned
that absolute Power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the
honour due unto them for their education. For to relinquish such right,
was not necessary to the Institution of Soveraign Power; nor would there
be any reason, why any man should desire to have children, or take the
care to nourish, and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no
other benefit from them, than from other men. And this accordeth with
the fifth Commandement.
And To Avoyd Doing Of Injury:
Again, every Soveraign Ought to cause Justice to be taught, which
(consisting in taking from no man what is his) is as much as to say, to
cause men to be taught not to deprive their Neighbour, by violence,
or fraud, of any thing which by the Soveraign Authority is theirs. Of
things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own
life, & limbs; and in the next degree, (in most men,) those that
concern conjugall affection; and after them riches and means of living.
Therefore the People are to be taught, to abstain from violence to
one anothers person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugall
honour; and from forcibly rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one
anothers goods. For which purpose also it is necessary they be shewed
the evill consequences of false Judgement, by corruption either of
Judges or Witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away,
and Justice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the
sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth Commandements.
And To Do All This Sincerely From The Heart
Lastly, they are to be taught, that not onely the unjust facts, but the
designes and intentions to do them, (though by accident hindred,) are
Injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in
the irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth
Commandement, and the summe of the Second Table; which is reduced all to
this one Commandement of mutuall Charity, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour
as thy selfe:" as the summe of the first Table is reduced to "the love
of God;" whom they had then newly received as their King.
The Use Of Universities
As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive this
Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so may Opinions,
contrary to the peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles, have
neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them. I mean those, which I have
in the precedent Chapter specified: as That men shall Judge of what is
lawfull and unlawfull, not by the Law it selfe, but by their own
private Judgements; That Subjects sinne in obeying the Commands of the
Common-wealth, unlesse they themselves have first judged them to be
lawfull: That their Propriety in their riches is such, as to exclude the
Dominion, which the Common-wealth hath over the same: That it is lawfull
for Subjects to kill such, as they call Tyrants: That the Soveraign
Power may be divided, and the like; which come to be instilled into
the People by this means. They whom necessity, or covetousnesse keepeth
attent on their trades, and labour; and they, on the other side, whom
superfluity, or sloth carrieth after their sensuall pleasures, (which
two sorts of men take up the greatest part of Man-kind,) being diverted
from the deep meditation, which the learning of truth, not onely in the
matter of Naturall Justice, but also of all other Sciences necessarily
requireth, receive the Notions of their duty, chiefly from Divines
in the Pulpit, and partly from such of their Neighbours, or familiar
acquaintance, as having the Faculty of discoursing readily, and
plausibly, seem wiser and better learned in cases of Law, and
Conscience, than themselves. And the Divines, and such others as make
shew of Learning, derive their knowledge from the Universities, and from
the Schooles of Law, or from the Books, which by men eminent in
those Schooles, and Universities have been published. It is therefore
manifest, that the Instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the
right teaching of Youth in the Universities. But are not (may some men
say) the Universities of England learned enough already to do that? or
is it you will undertake to teach the Universities? Hard questions. Yet
to the first, I doubt not to answer; that till towards the later end of
Henry the Eighth, the Power of the Pope, was alwayes upheld against the
Power of the Common-wealth, principally by the Universities; and that
the doctrines maintained by so many Preachers, against the Soveraign
Power of the King, and by so many Lawyers, and others, that had their
education there, is a sufficient argument, that though the Universities
were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how to
plant the true. For in such a contradiction of Opinions, it is most
certain, that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and ’tis no
wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that subtile liquor, wherewith
they were first seasoned, against the Civill Authority. But to the later
question, it is not fit, nor needfull for me to say either I, or No: for
any man that sees what I am doing, may easily perceive what I think.
The safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that have
the Soveraign Power, that Justice be equally administred to all degrees
of People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as poor and
obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the
great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they doe violence,
dishonour, or any Injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these,
does the like to one of them: For in this consisteth Equity; to which,
as being a Precept of the Law of Nature, a Soveraign is as much subject,
as any of the meanest of his People. All breaches of the Law, are
offences against the Common-wealth: but there be some, that are also
against private Persons. Those that concern the Common-wealth onely, may
without breach of Equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is
done against himselfe, according to his own discretion. But an offence
against a private man, cannot in Equity be pardoned, without the consent
of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.
The Inequality of Subjects, proceedeth from the Acts of Soveraign Power;
and therefore has no more place in the presence of the Soveraign; that
is to say, in a Court of Justice, then the Inequality between Kings,
and their Subjects, in the presence of the King of Kings. The honour of
great Persons, is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aydes
they give to men of inferiour rank, or not at all. And the violences,
oppressions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by
the greatnesse of their persons; because they have least need to commit
them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in
this manner. Impunity maketh Insolence; Insolence Hatred; and Hatred,
an Endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatnesse,
though with the ruine of the Common-wealth.
Equall Taxes
To Equall Justice, appertaineth also the Equall imposition of Taxes;
the equality whereof dependeth not on the Equality of riches, but on the
Equality of the debt, that every man oweth to the Common-wealth for his
defence. It is not enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance
of his life; but also to fight, (if need be,) for the securing of his
labour. They must either do as the Jewes did after their return from
captivity, in re-edifying the Temple, build with one hand, and hold the
Sword in the other; or else they must hire others to fight for them. For
the Impositions that are layd on the People by the Soveraign Power, are
nothing else but the Wages, due to them that hold the publique Sword,
to defend private men in the exercise of severall Trades, and Callings.
Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is the
enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor, and rich; the debt
which a poor man oweth them that defend his life, is the same which a
rich man oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who have
the service of the poor, may be debtors not onely for their own persons,
but for many more. Which considered, the Equality of Imposition,
consisteth rather in the Equality of that which is consumed, than of the
riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there,
that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour,
consumeth little, should be more charged, then he that living idlely,
getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no
more protection from the Common-wealth, then the other? But when the
Impositions, are layd upon those things which men consume, every man
payeth Equally for what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth defrauded, by
the luxurious waste of private men.
Publique Charity
And whereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable to maintain
themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the Charity
of private persons; but to be provided for, (as far-forth as the
necessities of Nature require,) by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. For
as it is Uncharitablenesse in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it
is in the Soveraign of a Common-wealth, to expose them to the hazard of
such uncertain Charity.
Prevention Of Idlenesse
But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: they are to
be forced to work; and to avoyd the excuse of not finding employment,
there ought to be such Lawes, as may encourage all manner of Arts; as
Navigation, Agriculture, Fishing, and all manner of Manifacture that
requires labour. The multitude of poor, and yet strong people still
encreasing, they are to be transplanted into Countries not sufficiently
inhabited: where neverthelesse, they are not to exterminate those they
find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not range
a great deal of ground, to snatch what they find; but to court each
little Plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in due
season. And when all the world is overchargd with Inhabitants, then the
last remedy of all is Warre; which provideth for every man, by Victory,
or Death.
Good Lawes What
To the care of the Soveraign, belongeth the making of Good Lawes. But
what is a good Law? By a Good Law, I mean not a Just Law: for no Law can
be Unjust. The Law is made by the Soveraign Power, and all that is done
by such Power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people; and
that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in
the Lawes of a Common-wealth, as in the Lawes of Gaming: whatsoever
the Gamesters all agree on, is Injustice to none of them. A good Law
is that, which is Needfull, for the Good Of The People, and withall
Perspicuous.
Such As Are Necessary
For the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not to bind
the People from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in
such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires,
rashnesse, or indiscretion, as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers,
but to keep them in the way. And therefore a Law that is not Needfull,
having not the true End of a Law, is not Good. A Law may be conceived to
be Good, when it is for the benefit of the Soveraign; though it be
not Necessary for the People; but it is not so. For the good of the
Soveraign and People, cannot be separated. It is a weak Soveraign, that
has weak Subjects; and a weak People, whose Soveraign wanteth Power to
rule them at his will. Unnecessary Lawes are not good Lawes; but trapps
for Mony: which where the right of Soveraign Power is acknowledged, are
superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, unsufficient to defend
the People.
Such As Are Perspicuous
The Perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the Law it
selfe, as in a Declaration of the Causes, and Motives, for which it was
made. That is it, that shewes us the meaning of the Legislator, and the
meaning of the Legislator known, the Law is more easily understood
by few, than many words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity;
and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the Law, is
multiplication of ambiguity: Besides it seems to imply, (by too much
diligence,) that whosoever can evade the words, is without the compasse
of the Law. And this is a cause of many unnecessary Processes. For when
I consider how short were the Lawes of antient times; and how they
grew by degrees still longer; me thinks I see a contention between the
Penners, and Pleaders of the Law; the former seeking to circumscribe
the later; and the later to evade their circumscriptions; and that the
Pleaders have got the Victory. It belongeth therefore to the Office of
a Legislator, (such as is in all Common-wealths the Supreme
Representative, be it one Man, or an Assembly,) to make the reason
Perspicuous, why the Law was made; and the Body of the Law it selfe, as
short, but in as proper, and significant termes, as may be.
Punishments
It belongeth also to the Office of the Soveraign, to make a right
application of Punishments, and Rewards. And seeing the end of punishing
is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the
offender, or of others by his example; the severest Punishments are to
be inflicted for those Crimes, that are of most Danger to the
Publique; such as are those which proceed from malice to the Government
established; those that spring from contempt of Justice; those that
provoke Indignation in the Multitude; and those, which unpunished, seem
Authorised, as when they are committed by Sonnes, Servants, or Favorites
of men in Authority: For Indignation carrieth men, not onely against the
Actors, and Authors of Injustice; but against all Power that is likely
to protect them; as in the case of Tarquin; when for the Insolent act of
one of his Sonnes, he was driven out of Rome, and the Monarchy it selfe
dissolved. But Crimes of Infirmity; such as are those which proceed
from great provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance
whether the Fact be a great Crime, or not, there is place many times for
Lenity, without prejudice to the Common-wealth; and Lenity when there is
such place for it, is required by the Law of Nature. The Punishment of
the Leaders, and teachers in a Commotion; not the poore seduced People,
when they are punished, can profit the Common-wealth by their example.
To be severe to the People, is to punish that ignorance, which may in
great part be imputed to the Soveraign, whose fault it was, they were no
better instructed.
Rewards
In like manner it belongeth to the Office, and Duty of the Soveraign,
to apply his Rewards alwayes so, as there may arise from them benefit
to the Common-wealth: wherein consisteth their Use, and End; and is then
done, when they that have well served the Common-wealth, are with
as little expence of the Common Treasure, as is possible, so well
recompenced, as others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same
as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts by which they may be
enabled to do it better. To buy with Mony, or Preferment, from a Popular
ambitious Subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions
in the mindes of the People, has nothing of the nature of Reward; (which
is ordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a signe of
Gratitude, but of Fear: nor does it tend to the Benefit, but to the
Dammage of the Publique. It is a contention with Ambition, like that of
Hercules with the Monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one
that was vanquished, there grew up three. For in like manner, when the
stubbornnesse of one Popular man, is overcome with Reward, there arise
many more (by the Example) that do the same Mischiefe, in hope of like
Benefit: and as all sorts of Manifacture, so also Malice encreaseth by
being vendible. And though sometimes a Civill warre, may be differred,
by such wayes as that, yet the danger growes still the greater, and the
Publique ruine more assured. It is therefore against the Duty of the
Soveraign, to whom the Publique Safety is committed, to Reward those
that aspire to greatnesse by disturbing the Peace of their Country, and
not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger,
than after a longer time with greater.
Counsellours
Another Businesse of the Soveraign, is to choose good Counsellours;
I mean such, whose advice he is to take in the Government of the
Common-wealth. For this word Counsell, Consilium, corrupted from
Considium, is a large signification, and comprehendeth all Assemblies
of men that sit together, not onely to deliberate what is to be done
hereafter, but also to judge of Facts past, and of Law for the present.
I take it here in the first sense onely: And in this sense, there is no
choyce of Counsell, neither in a Democracy, nor Aristocracy; because the
persons Counselling are members of the person Counselled. The choyce
of Counsellours therefore is to Monarchy; In which, the Soveraign that
endeavoureth not to make choyce of those, that in every kind are the
most able, dischargeth not his Office as he ought to do. The most able
Counsellours, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evill
Counsell, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the Peace,
and Defence of the Common-wealth. It is a hard matter to know who
expecteth benefit from publique troubles; but the signes that guide to a
just suspicion, is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable,
or irremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to
discharge their accustomed expences, and may easily be observed by any
one whom it concerns to know it. But to know, who has most knowledge of
the Publique affaires, is yet harder; and they that know them, need them
a great deale the lesse. For to know, who knowes the Rules almost of any
Art, is a great degree of the knowledge of the same Art; because no
man can be assured of the truth of anothers Rules, but he that is first
taught to understand them. But the best signes of Knowledge of any
Art, are, much conversing in it, and constant good effects of it. Good
Counsell comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore there is no
more reason to expect good Advice from the rich, or noble, in matter
of State, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortresse; unlesse we
shall think there needs no method in the study of the Politiques, (as
there does in the study of Geometry,) but onely to be lookers on; which
is not so. For the Politiques is the harder study of the two. Whereas
in these parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a Right of certain
persons, to have place in the highest Councell of State by Inheritance;
it is derived from the Conquests of the antient Germans; wherein many
absolute Lords joyning together to conquer other Nations, would not
enter in to the Confederacy, without such Priviledges, as might be
marks of difference in time following, between their Posterity, and the
posterity of their Subjects; which Priviledges being inconsistent with
the Soveraign Power, by the favour of the Soveraign, they may seem to
keep; but contending for them as their Right, they must needs by
degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour, than adhaereth
naturally to their abilities.
And how able soever be the Counsellours in any affaire, the benefit
of their Counsell is greater, when they give every one his Advice, and
reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an Assembly, by way of
Orations; and when they have praemeditated, than when they speak on the
sudden; both because they have more time, to survey the consequences
of action; and are lesse subject to be carried away to contradiction,
through Envy, Emulation, or other Passions arising from the difference
of opinion.
The best Counsell, in those things that concern not other Nations, but
onely the ease, and benefit the Subjects may enjoy, by Lawes that
look onely inward, is to be taken from the generall informations, and
complaints of the people of each Province, who are best acquainted
with their own wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in
derogation of the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty, to be diligently
taken notice of. For without those Essentiall Rights, (as I have often
before said,) the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist.
Commanders
A Commander of an Army in chiefe, if he be not Popular, shall not be
beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his Army; and consequently
cannot performe that office with good successe. He must therefore be
Industrious, Valiant, Affable, Liberall and Fortunate, that he may gain
an opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his Souldiers. This is
Popularity, and breeds in the Souldiers both desire, and courage, to
recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of
the Generall, in punishing (when need is) the Mutinous, or negligent
Souldiers. But this love of Souldiers, (if caution be not given of
the Commanders fidelity,) is a dangerous thing to Soveraign Power;
especially when it is in the hands of an Assembly not popular. It
belongeth therefore to the safety of the People, both that they be good
Conductors, and faithfull subjects, to whom the Soveraign Commits his
Armies.
But when the Soveraign himselfe is Popular, that is, reverenced and
beloved of his People, there is no danger at all from the Popularity of
a Subject. For Souldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with
their Captain; though they love him, against their Soveraign, when they
love not onely his Person, but also his Cause. And therefore those,
who by violence have at any time suppressed the Power of their Lawfull
Soveraign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been
alwayes put to the trouble of contriving their Titles, to save the
People from the shame of receiving them. To have a known Right to
Soveraign Power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no
more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of his Subjects to him, but
that they see him able absolutely to govern his own Family: Nor, on the
part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their Armies. For the greatest
and most active part of Mankind, has never hetherto been well contented
with the present.
Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are
comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations,
I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and
the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Soveraign hath the same
Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man
can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body. And the same Law,
that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to
do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to
Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, and
Soveraign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice, but
in the Conscience onely; where not Man, but God raigneth; whose Lawes,
(such of them as oblige all Mankind,) in respect of God, as he is the
Author of Nature, are Naturall; and in respect of the same God, as he is
King of Kings, are Lawes. But of the Kingdome of God, as King of Kings,
and as King also of a peculiar People, I shall speak in the rest of this
discourse.