Chapter VI

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE PRINCIPLE PROBLEM?

Senator Fulbright takes a dim view of the American people. He indicates

that the curbing of the people, or the manipulation of the masses, may

be the primary problem of the President. The masses are all potential

McCarthyites who are easily infected with the virus of extremely

radical rightwingism. “In the long run, it is quite possible that the

principal problem of leadership will be, if it is not already, to

restrain the desire of the people to hit the Communists with everything

we’ve got, particularly if there are more Cubas and Laos. Pride in

victory, and frustration in restraint, during the Korean war, led to

MacArthur’s revolt and McCarthyism.”[119] This is the most charitable

interpretation of McCarthyism which the Senator has ever made. For

in effect he is saying that McCarthyism is the result of the desire

for victory over Communism, and the frustration which comes when the

leaders try to restrain people from winning this victory.

We think that the principal problem is Communism and not the American

people.

The memorandum went on to say that the people cannot be trusted on

foreign policy. They tend to “obey the impulse of passion” and “to

abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary caprice.”

Thus the Senator thought that if foreign aid was “laid before the

people in a referendum, it would be defeated.” The Senator obviously

does not want what _he thinks_ is the people’s will to be carried out.

The people want simple solutions, they want to scourge devils or lash

out at the enemy.[120]

The Senator, it is plain to see, does not have a very high opinion of

the American people and their ability to govern themselves. Is not

this a lack of confidence in our republican form of government?

_How Much Is the Senator For Civilian Control?_

Senator Fulbright says that he has a “strong belief in the principle

of military subordination to civilian control.”[121] So does this

reviewer. Furthermore, civilian control ultimately means the

_sovereignty of the people_. Thus it ultimately means the civilian

control of the President and of all other politicians and statesmen.

Does the Senator believe as strongly in the civilian control of

politicians as well as of the military? It does not seem that the

Senator is too well pleased with this bedrock principle of our

constitutional system. In a TV interview July 30, 1961, he said,

concerning the question of Red China and the U. N. and the recognition

of Communist Outer Mongolia, that: “The sentiments of this country have

been developed to such a pitch our President has no freedom of action

in this field.”[122] Again: “... we will not recognize Red China,

because of the price of dissension within our own ranks at home; it is

too great to pay ... I think we have no freedom of action in this field

because of domestic politics.”[123]

If he thought that he could get by with it would the Senator thwart the

will of the people concerning Red China and Outer Mongolia? Would he

like to have the freedom to act in these matters contrary to what he

knows to be the will of the people?

As a matter of fact, the Senator wants us to recognize Outer Mongolia.

He thinks that it might help us learn more about the relationship

between the U.S.S.R. and Red China. Obviously he would urge the

President to recognize Outer Mongolia if he thought that the people

would stand for it.

The American people, in my judgment, have good reason to be against the

recognition of Outer Mongolia. _First_, around five thousand of her

troops fought Americans and the U.N. forces in Korea.[124] _Second_,

it is one of the oldest of the satellites of the U.S.S.R. _Third_,

it is recognized as a loyal Communist country by Red China. For

example, a Communist paper recently carried an article entitled: “China

Salutes Fraternal Mongolia.”[125] In trade talks around the first of

March, 1961, it was emphasized by Peking that the cooperation between

Mongolia and China was “on the basis of the principles of proletarian

Internationalism.” Marshall Malinevsky, who is chief of the Russian

Army, “described the bond between Mongolian, Chinese and Russian Armies

as ‘cemented in blood’.” _Fourth_, the Premier of Outer Mongolia in

a broadcast on April 24, 1961, emphasized their loyalty to Lenin.

Furthermore, he said: “In their struggle for building a new life,

our people always leaned and continue to lean upon the disinterested

all-around aid of the Soviet Union, the first country of triumphant

Socialism.” _Fifth_, if we recognize Outer Mongolia, Japan will likely

do likewise. This will help increase the sentiment of neutralism in

Japan.[126] _Sixth_, it would have a bad psychological effect in Asia.

The Foreign Secretary of the Philippines, Felix Berto Serrano, said

that it would be “an example of the softening of the U.S. attitude

toward Communism in this part of the world.” The Foreign Minister of

Thailand, Phanat Khoman, said that it would have an adverse affect on

free world morale.[127]

The Senator thinks that if the people were given a choice in the

matter, they would defeat foreign aid. He may or may not be right. But

is he not saying that what he thinks is the will of the people should

not rule in this matter?

_Attitude Towards America_

The Senator attacks those individuals who, he says, run down America.

“Implicit in much of the propaganda of the radical right is the

assumption that our free society is permeated with corruption and

decay.”[128]

There is much that is right in America. We believe that it is the

greatest country in the world. The principles on which it is founded

are the principles which when followed produce progress and prosperity.

On the other hand, there is enough crime, corruption and decay to cause

all thoughtful Americans real concern. For example, J. Edgar Hoover has

called our attention to these matters countless times.

We shall not enter into a discussion of this except to point out that

the Senator himself has some hard things to say about America.

In the speech at Stanford University he said: “In the last few years

American statesmen and scholars have been turning their thoughts

toward an effort to re-define the national ‘purpose,’ to interpret our

national life and politics in terms of goals. The genesis of this quest

for a clear national objective was a feeling that somehow the American

people had strayed from their historic course into a blind alley of

aimlessness and frustration. In an era of unexampled affluence, the

American people, by and large, are not happy. In the years since World

War II, we have attained our private purposes almost too well at home,

but beyond our personal material needs we have not yet recognized an

objective or purpose which inspires our real interest. At home we

have become immersed in the crass delight of extravagant consumption,

puerile faddism, and callow amusements.”

“The quest for a definition of the national purpose has been generated

by this sense of malaise. If our people were engaged in vigorous

and meaningful activity, it is quite possible that we would not now

be troubling ourselves with a quest for abstract definition and

articulation.”[129]

Rightwing extremism, he says, has great appeal to the American public,

and in times of crisis it has “great mass appeal”. The people are the

ones who need to be restrained in our conflict with communism. The

people do not have enough understanding to back an adequate foreign

policy.[130] The people are misled by simple solutions and need some

devils to scourge. “The radicalism of the right can be expected to

have great mass appeal during such periods. It offers the simple

solution, easily understood: Scourging of the devils within the body

politic, or, in the extreme, lashing out at the enemy.”[131]

On September 1, 1960, Senator Fulbright said: “I believe that such

a study would conclude that America’s trouble is basically one of

aimlessness at home and frustration abroad.”[132]

In the light of these contentions of the Senator, he is hardly the one

to defend America against the charge, which he says is made by the

“radical right,” that our “free society is permeated with corruption

and decay.” Has the “radical right” said anything harder about America

than has the Senator? If not, why should they be classified as radical,

and the Senator not also be grouped with them in this matter.

_The Manipulated Masses?_

Not only does the Senator think that the problem is to restrain

the people, but that the people should be “directed” into backing

whatever the President’s program happens to be. He does not trust

the people; his statements make this clear. They must be “directed”.

“Fundamentally, it is believed that the American people have little,

if any, need to be alerted to the menace of the cold war. Rather,

the need is for understanding of the true nature of that menace, and

the direction of the public’s present and foreseeable awareness of

the fact of the menace toward support of the President’s own total

program for survival in a nuclear age. There are no reasons to believe

that military personnel generally can contribute to this need, beyond

their specific, technical competence to explain their own role. On the

contrary, there are many reasons, and some evidence, for believing

that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation, involves

considerable danger.”[133]

Frankly at times we are not sure what is the President’s own total

program. It has vacillated, for example, concerning Laos and Cuba. Are

we to be “directed” into it, as the President unfolds it, or shapes it,

from time to time?

Senator Fulbright has attacked the competency of the people. He laid

down in his secret memorandum, in our judgement, the ideological basis

for a program of Pavlovian conditioning of the American people to

accept whatever is decided on in the White House, the State Department

and by a small group of advisors.[134]

The Senator thinks that the people are susceptible to radicalism. He

says that extremely radical rightwingism “already has great appeal to

the public. In the future it may well have much greater appeal.”[135]

So the problem is to “direct” them into the President’s own total

program. This program, the Senator implies, _is quite different_ from

the general program for victory and survival which is discussed in the

memorandum and repudiated as being rightwing. For he thinks that the

rightwingers are raising an obstacle to the “public acceptance of the

President’s program.”[136]

Carried out to its logical conclusion, we believe that the memorandum,

and the way in which it was formed and implemented, introduces a

new concept into our government, a concept which would replace the

Constitution and the sovereignty of the people. The President, the

State Department and a few advisors are the ones who through their own

will and wisdom formulate the policies which shall be followed. This

they are to do independently of the people, for the people are too

deficient in understanding; they are so immature that they follow the

momentary caprice; they tend to obey the impulse of passion and thus

the “Radicalism of the right can be expected to have great mass appeal

during such periods” as the “long twilight struggle”. Furthermore,

our age is complex, therefore, the public must either be ignored or

conditioned so that they will follow the leader. In directing the

people into the President’s program, the military should engage in the

cold war only to the extent that it can help do this in explaining

their own strictly military role. After speaking of the need for the

direction of the people’s awareness, that there is a danger, into

support for the President’s program, he said: “There are no reasons

to believe that military personnel generally can contribute to this

need, beyond their specific technical competence to explain their own

role. On the contrary, there are many reasons and some evidence, for

believing that an effort by the military, beyond this limitation,

involves considerable danger.”[137] Does this mean that when the

military cannot be used as a rubber stamp it must not be used in waging

the cold war?

It should be remembered that this basically anti-constitutional

concept—against the Constitution in that it distrusts and wants

to “direct” the people, rather than accept the sovereignty of the

people—was set forth in a secret memorandum. The other members of the

Foreign Relations Committee did not see it. It was sent directly to the

President and the Secretary of Defense, and has had an influence on a

very important policy.

Walter Lippmann, who is highly regarded by Senator Fulbright, said that

there was a tendency of Government “insiders” to view the criticism

of the “outsiders” as that of ignoramuses who were not enlightened

by secret files and conferences. He said: “I tell the critic, you be

careful. You will be denouncing the principle of democracy itself,

which asserts that the outsiders shall be sovereign over the insiders.

For you will be showing that the people themselves, since they are

ignoramuses because they are outsiders, are therefore incapable of

governing themselves.

“Furthermore, Lippmann declared that as far as the affairs of the world

are concerned, those who regard themselves as insiders are actually

outsiders since none of them read all of the U.S. papers and they

have no access to the records of foreign governments that are equally

important and if one is to have the total wisdom the insiders indicate

they have.”[138]

_An Out-Moded Constitutional System?_

Senator Fulbright seems to want to change our system of government

so that it will be run by one man, the President. He has unlimited

confidence in the President as a man who is above partisan politics

and who is of high moral calibre _by virtue of the fact_ that he is

President. He views our constitutional system as out of date. Thus in

his Stanford speech, July 28, 1961, he said:

“The President is hobbled in his task of leading the American people

to consensus and concerted action by the restrictions of power imposed

on him by a constitutional system designed for an eighteenth century

agrarian society far removed from the centers of world power. It is

imperative that we break out of the intelligent confines of cherished

and traditional beliefs and open our minds to the possibility that

basic changes in our system may be essential to meet the requirements

of the twentieth century.

“The ability of this nation to preserve the value system which

constitutes the core of our national interest has come to depend

principally on our ability to cope with world wide revolutionary

forces. If we are to deal with these forces successfully, we must be

able to act quickly and decisively on the one hand and persistently and

patiently on the other. ‘Our American task,’ wrote Walter Lippmann in

a recent article, ‘is to generate superior national strength. For this

we must have a powerful and purposeful National Government.... There is

no getting away from the fact that, as Lord Acton said, power corrupts.

But also, there is no getting away from the fact that powerlessness

invites confusion, demoralization, and defeat.’

“The fact that is needed is Presidential power. He alone, among elected

officials, can rise above parochialism and private pressures. He

alone, in his role as teacher and moral leader, can hope to overcome

the excesses and inadequacies of a public opinion that is all too

often ignorant of the needs, the dangers, and the opportunities in our

foreign relations.

“Public Opinion, wrote Lippmann in _The Public Philosophy_,

consistently lags a generation behind in its attitudes and assessments

of international relations. The tyranny of public opinion, he says,

imposes upon our policy-makers a ‘compulsion to make mistakes.’

The poet Yeats was not wholly wrong when he laid down this harsh

pronouncement on public opinion: ‘The best lack all conviction—the

worst are filled with passionate intensity.’

“These views may be extreme but they are not wholly without merit,

and I point to them in order to stress the point that public opinion

must be educated and led if it is to bolster wise and effective

national policies. Only the President can provide the guidance that is

necessary, while legislators display a distressing tendency to adhere

slavishly to the dictates of public opinion, or at least to its vocal

and highly organized minority segments.”[139]

Lippmann’s statement concerning the “insiders” and “outsiders” ought to

be recalled in this connection. We should also remember his criticism

that President Eisenhower was a defeatist who lacked faith in our

people and in our system.[140] Why, then, should he contend that what

is needed is more Presidential power? Why should Senator Fulbright

maintain the same thing?

In a news conference in Washington, President Eisenhower said on May

10, 1962, that: “I believe that the problem of the Presidency is

rarely an inadequacy of power. Ordinarily, the problem is to use the

already enormous power of the Presidency judiciously, temperately and

wisely.”[141]

With all due respect to the President of the United States, whoever he

may be at any given time in our history, we do not believe that any

President is wise enough, knows enough or is good enough to occupy the

position to which Senator Fulbright would elevate him. Of course, with

the attitude which Fulbright has toward the masses, it is logical that

he should accept the Fuhrer (Fuhrer means “leader”) principle. The

masses must look to _the leader_. He must be their teacher and their

moral leader.

“We got rid of kings back there in 1776, Senator.”[142] The Senator

talks like a reactionary who wants to go back to kings and their

“divine right” to rule.

Senator Fulbright thinks that legislators are slaves of public opinion,

but the President is exempt from such. We ask: In our Republic

shouldn’t the legislators and the President be subject to public

opinion under law? If they are not to be responsive to the will of the

people within the framework of our constitutional government, to whom

and to what are they to be responsive?

Has the Senator from Arkansas forgotten that less than two years

ago President Kennedy was a Senator, and thus a legislator; and

legislators, according to Fulbright, display a “distressing tendency

to adhere slavishly to the dictates of public opinion, or at least to

its vocal and highly organized minority segments.” Just because this

particular Senator was elected President did he therefore become so

transformed that he rose above “parochialism and private pressures”?

Did he become overnight the “teacher and moral leader”, the “only” one

who can “provide the guidance that is necessary”? Does the Senator

think, if Nixon had been elected President, that automatically on

his shoulders would have descended the wisdom, the knowledge and the

unlimited goodness which would be necessary in one who is to be our

Leader in morality, our Teacher and our Guide? As a matter of fact,

we know that the Senator does not believe that Mr. Nixon, if he had

been elected, would have metamorphized into the Leader which Senator

Fulbright claims that the President by the very nature of the case

becomes. On February 1, 1960, Senator Fulbright reprinted in the

_Congressional Record_ an article by James Reston which was critical

of Mr. Nixon. Senator Fulbright said of the article that “it is seldom

in this stolid and humorless era that an observer of our political

scene sees through the absurd double talk of so much of the political

speeches with which we are entertained.” Reston, however, had done so

concerning Mr. Nixon.[143] And yet, Senator Fulbright’s concept of the

Presidency is such that he must believe, if he follows his position to

its logical conclusion, that Mr. Nixon would have ceased all double

talk, and have become the teacher and the moral leader of the nation if

he had been elected!

Did Senator Fulbright think that President Truman was the moral and

educational leader of the people just because he was President? Of

Truman he said in 1951: “For a long time we have been walking on

opposite sides of the street, neither of us nodding to the other. He

has often thought me wrong and unspeakable, while I have sometimes

thought him wrong and incomprehensible.”

“I have spoken with him on official business only once in several

years.”[144]

Senator Fulbright did not think that because President Eisenhower

was in the office of President that he was therefore qualified as

the leader and teacher of the people. He thought that Eisenhower was

confused and engaged in the lucrative business of making and selling

tranquilizer pills.[145] He spoke of the absence of leadership on the

part of the President.[146] A veto message was described as “unworthy

of his great office and beneath the dignity of the Congress to which

it was sent. It is not factual. It is intemperate. It was obviously

designed to catch newspaper headlines and radio and television news

blurbs.”[147] The President himself; the Senator said, was unaware of

the vastness of the Soviet challenge. “In defense, in our domestic

economy, and in our foreign relations, the administration seems to

be unaware of the depth and scope of the Soviet challenge. There is

no evidence that the administration is now or ever will be willing

to urge the American people to take in one notch on our belt to deal

with a Soviet challenge which confronts us in missiles, arms, and just

downright capacity to produce.”[148] “I believe that the people of

America will rise to the needs of our situation if they are clearly

told what is at stake. They certainly would be willing to be taxed

if it is necessary to survival. But I am not sure the administration

agrees with even that simple proposition.”[149]

With high commendation, Senator Fulbright inserted an article by Joseph

Alsop into the _Congressional Record_ which indicated that he thought

that President Eisenhower did not have, to say the least, the balanced

judgment necessary for guiding aright the ship of state. Of a reason

advanced by the President concerning test bans, Alsop said: “Surely

this singular choice of reasons for a high policy decision of truly

immeasurable import, reveals a mind gripped by one idea to the point

of total obsession. Surely it shows a man driven by a single purpose

almost to the point of mania.”[150]

Senator Fulbright further charged that President Eisenhower did not

have the proper attitude toward Congress and that he did not take

them into his confidence. Perhaps the Senator thought that there were

too many secret memorandums floating around! At any rate he said: “I

believe that a great deal of this stems from the President’s attitude

toward Congress, particularly toward the Democratic Members of

Congress. He has shown very little disposition to take them into his

confidence, now or at any other time.

“I believe that legitimately leaves many people with the feeling that

we do not know all that we ought to know. I asked Mr. Kohler about the

letter which Khrushchev had written, and Mr. Kohler said flatly that

he could not discuss it. I said that it had appeared at least in part

in the Herald Tribune, and that it was strange indeed that it could

be revealed to Miss Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune, but not

to a committee of the Senate. He said that he could not discuss it.

Apparently he was under orders not to discuss it in any respect with

the committee. That did not leave a very good taste in my mouth. It is

a mystery to me why a letter, unless it was specifically agreed that

Mr. Khrushchev considered it a personal and confidential letter, should

not be released. Having been released, or leaked, as the new term is,

to the Herald Tribune, I do not know of any reason why it should not be

made available to the committee, and to the public, for that matter, in

a more official manner than the way in which it was.

“With reference to the statement of the Senator regarding what Mr.

Tsarapkin said, I have only seen a summary of it which Mr. Farley

brought to me and said:

“‘This is all that can be released now.’

“I do not quite understand why that should be true. Maybe the Senator’s

explanation would be a violation of an understanding. That is possible.

However, I must agree with the Senator that a little more frank

discussion, and taking the public into their confidence, certainly the

Senate of the United States, particularly the Committee on Foreign

Relations, would be a very healthy step.”[151]

Senator Fulbright also thought that President Eisenhower was forcing

uniformity of viewpoint in his administration. Men under him were

either muzzled or suffered the consequences. Or at least the Senator

indicated this in an insertion, with high praise, of an article by

Joseph Alsop which said: “In this administration, uniformity of

viewpoint is virtually enforced. Independent-minded persons who do

not take their viewpoint, readymade, from the White House have always

been condemned as non-team players. Soon or late, they have always

met the fate of General Gavin, General Ridgway, and Gen. Maxwell D.

Taylor.”[152]

As late as March 22, 1960, Senator Fulbright, in a speech before the

Annual Dinner of the Harvard Club of Washington, D. C., commended

a high military official for disagreeing with the President. And,

furthermore, Senator Fulbright seems to cast scorn on the idea that

it was not for Generals to reason why! As the Senator put it: “Gen.

Bernard Schriever has also said that there is ‘very much evidence’

that Russia has greatly strengthened its bomber defenses. But the

aircraft that might not be able to get through may not even be able to

demonstrate their impotence. ‘For,’ states Gen. Thomas Power, Chief of

the Strategic Air Command, ‘our bomber bases are vulnerable to surprise

attack.’

“Generals are not to reason why. Their Commander in Chief complains

that, ‘too many generals have all sorts of ideas.’

“Yet mankind moves on ideas. Men with ideas are the makers and shakers

of the world. The larger their number serving the country the more

fruitful and vigorous the country. But few men of ideas come to

Washington. They are not likely to seek service in a government which

is scornful of their kind.”[153]

The Senator seemed to agree with the idea that “President Eisenhower

leads a dangerously sheltered life as Chief Executive of the

Nation.”[154]

Lyndon B. Johnson also commended, on February 16, 1960, the idea that

public debate by military officials was good. He reprinted a letter

from a Harvard professor, Henry A. Kissinger, that: “The President

says he deplores public argument by military experts regarding our

defense policy. Prior to this, he had called his critics parochial and

had invoked his superior expertise in the subject. It is impossible,

of course, for laymen to pass judgment on a debate of such technical

complexity. They have a right to insist, however, that the categories

of the debate be properly put.”[155]

In the light of these considerations, it is a serious question as to

what has happened to Senator Fulbright within the last year or so that

has led him to think now that President Kennedy is in office, that

the office of the Presidency has automatically raised the President

above the temptations and mistakes that not only beset legislators—and

Kennedy was a Senator less than two years ago—but also above those

which beset Eisenhower. What makes the Senator, in the light of his

previous criticisms of Eisenhower, think what is needed in this country

is more power for the President? After all, the Senator might reflect,

President Kennedy will not be President forever, and what if after we

have conferred far greater powers on the President, while Kennedy was

in office, someone like Eisenhower or Truman, of whom the Senator was

so critical, became President!!

In denouncing those whom he labeled as “fanatics” and “extremists” of

the right, in a speech in Los Angeles on November 18, President Kennedy

said: “They call for a ‘man on horseback’ because they do not trust

the people.”[156] And yet, Senator Fulbright calls for more power for

the President, because the people are so ignorant that they need the

Leader. Wouldn’t this position make the Senator, in this matter, akin

to the rightwing “fanatics”? As Joseph Alsop said, in regards to a

position President Eisenhower had taken, “perhaps it would have been

better to assert, at the outset, that it is always wrong for any nation

to trust any leader, instead of trusting the hard facts.”[157]

Former President Herbert Hoover has indicated that more than one loss

to communism has taken place because the man in the position of the

Presidency, along with his selected advisors, entered into agreements

without an opportunity being given to the Congress or to the people to

know of, to discuss or to pass on these matters. “Executive agreements,

Mr. Hoover said, had spread communism over the earth, turned over the

Baltic States to Soviet Russia, partitioned Poland at the Teheran

Conference, surrendered 10 nations to slavery at Yalta and set in

motion the communization of Mongolia, North Korea, and all China. One

result of these ‘unrestrained Presidential actions’ is a worldwide

shrinking of human freedoms. Another has been a steady encroachment on

powers of the legislative branch by the executive.”[158]

Senator Fulbright would lead us away from our constitutional system

to a system wherein the power would be concentrated in the hands of

the President. “The power that is needed is Presidential power.” “Only

the President can provide the guidance that is necessary....” But

this is not to lead us to a newer and higher form of government, than

that of our so-called out-moded “eighteenth century agrarian society”

constitutional system. It is to lead us back to the concept of

dictatorship, of the Fuhrer.

The leader, of course, would have his small, select group of advisors.

In such a set-up, government by secret memorandums would likely be the

order of the day.

We trust that Senator Fulbright, who is influential in the present

administration, will not influence President Kennedy to accept this

concept of our constitutional system, nor this idea of the role of the

President.

The Senator knows that power tends to corrupt and that absolute power

corrupts absolutely, for he himself once said: “Wherever there is power

there is the possibility that it will be used and the danger that it

will be misused. This assumption, expressed in Lord Acton’s maxim that

‘power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,’ is common

to all effective democracies. This principle is one of instinctive

distrust of power itself wherever it exists. It has nothing to do with

the motives of any group or individual who may wield it. It has been

directed against big business, big labor, and big government, and now,

inevitably, it is directed against our big Military Establishment.”[159]

Why, then, does the Senator want to give to the President far more

power than the Constitution now allows and the President now has? For

what does the President need more power?

_Backing the President_

The Senator said that the need is for the public to be directed into

the support of the President’s own total program.[160] Does this apply

to the Senator?

As a candidate, President Kennedy said he would do something about

Cuba. He was going to do something, i.e. back an invasion. But Senator

Fulbright’s opposition to our backing an invasion had an influence,

according to some, on the President which helped induce him to modify

his plans. Thus the invasion was doomed to failure.

President Kennedy emphasized that we would stand firm in Berlin.[161]

On a TV program on July 30, 1961, the following exchange took place:

“Mr. Scali. In any negotiations over Berlin, Senator, would you be

willing to accept any concessions on the part of the West which closed

West Berlin as an escape hatch for refugees in any way?

“Senator Fulbright. Well, I think that that might certainly be a

negotiable point. The truth of the matter is I think the Russians have

the power to close it in any case. I mean we are not giving up very

much because I believe next week if they chose to close their borders,

they could, without violating any treaty right I know of. We have no

right to insist that they be allowed to come out. As I said I don’t

understand why the East Germans don’t close the border because I think

they have a right to close it. So why is this a great concession? You

don’t have that right now.”[162]

The question dealt specifically with the West making some concessions

which would close the escape hatch. The Senator thought “that might

certainly be a negotiable point.” He made it clear that we could not

negotiate with them as to whether they had the power to close it, so he

was not implying we should negotiate concerning their power; nor, as

he also put it, their right to close the escape hatch. The only thing

left to negotiate was, as the question specifically said, whether the

West should make any concessions “which closed West Berlin as an escape

hatch for refugees in any way.” In other words, the Senator indicates

that we should negotiate as to whether or not the West should help—by

making concessions on our part, since obviously we could not make

concessions for the Russians—close the escape hatch and thus in effect

whether the West should help the Communists guard the prison house in

which the Communists have their slaves.

The East German Communists made use of the Senator’s statements, and

commended him. On August 3, 1961, in East Berlin _Neues Deutschland_

had the following heading for an article: “U. S. Senator Against Trade

in Human Beings.” He was quoted as saying that: “the East Germans have

the right to close their borders.” The paper stressed that the Bonn

government was very much upset with Senator Fulbright’s proposal, as

they put it, to hold “serious negotiations on Berlin with the USSR.”

On August 4 the same paper said: “But the man seems to be a realistic

politician.” “Apparently Fulbright is aware of the fact that the

man-trap of West Berlin is an untenable situation, that it must and

will be closed.”

We wonder whether the President felt that the Senator’s speech upheld

the President’s position on Berlin.

The Senator later explained that this was not what he meant. It was,

however, what he said. We quote the entire explanation which was made

in the Senate on August 4, 1961.

“Last Sunday, I appeared on the ABC network television and radio

program, ‘Issues and Answers.’ In the course of that program one of

the exchanges led to an unfortunate and erroneous impression of my

views. When asked if I thought the West should make any concessions

on the question of the flight of East German refugees to West Berlin,

I responded that this, too, is something that could be discussed,

because—and this is the point—the East Germans have the ability to

control travel _within_ East Germany.

“The imposition of tighter travel restrictions by the East Germans

on travel of East German citizens within East Germany could restrict

access of East German citizens to all of Berlin, thus depriving a large

number of potential refugees from East Germany (as distinguished from

East Berlin) of this convenient means of escape.

“As I pointed out in the TV and radio interview, I know of no

agreements to which the Western Powers are party which prohibit the

East Germans from restricting the travel of East German citizens within

East Germany (outside of Berlin). It is to that point of reference that

my response was intended in the interview.

“I certainly did not intend to imply that the West should execute any

agreement whereby the West would assist in enforcing any restriction

imposed by East Germany on travel within East Germany nor that the West

should consider changing existing agreements and consent to closing

West Berlin to refugees wishing to enter.

“The right of persons to move freely within all sectors of Berlin is

entirely another matter and is guaranteed by post-war agreements signed

by the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. I do not

consider such right to be negotiable.”[163]

According to Constantine Brown, Germans and other Europeans have raised

the question: “How can we reconcile what your President tells us with

what his own important party leaders and especially the chairman of

the most important Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Fulbright, says

in public, on the floor of the Senate and in radio and television

interviews?”

“The suspicions of what may be termed a schizophrenic foreign policy

started some time ago when Senator Mansfield, the majority leader, and

later Senator Fulbright urged negotiations on Berlin after Mr. Kennedy

had taken a formally strong stand on that very matter.”[164]

We wonder if the Senator has set the public a good example of clearly

and wholeheartedly backing the President’s program in such matters as

we have mentioned?

In a review of some of our history Senator Fulbright took the position

that it was important for the people themselves to bring to bear

pressure on the President, instead of always following the leader.

“Moreover, throughout the whole of this process, while much was done

by the action of individual Presidents, a great deal was done as a

direct result of congressional action or by the direct play of public

pressures, rising from a people whose life was being progressively

democratized.

“The key point is that the conduct of foreign affairs did not appear

to be an elite function, limited to specialists in and around the

Executive. Neither the electorate nor the Congress was ever overawed

by the Executive claim to exclusive knowledge, or its claim that it

would be against the national interest to disclose the facts relevant

to a foreign policy decision. Foreign policy was debated in remote

frontier outposts as well as in seaboard cities, with a shrewdness and

a knowledge of great power rivalries that astonishes any modern reader

who browses through the records of these debates preserved in our

National Archives.”[165]

Now that the Senator’s secret memorandum has been made public,

the people can study it, debate it and continue to exercise their

sovereignty. It is through knowledge and action based thereon that

the civilian control can be maintained over the government and thus

over the military. Those who do not believe that our constitutional

system is out of date will surely want to examine closely the Senator’s

position.[166] In fact, the Senator himself once emphasized the

necessity of debating issues. “Too many people are given a practical

veto over policy. There is an inhibition of the kind of free debate out

of which a fundamental national agreement emerges.” “Nonpartisanship

does not mean the absence of debate on foreign policy.” “I do not think

it is possible for a democratic country to have a viable, effective

policy unless it is founded on the widest possible public discussion.

Debate is a necessary ingredient of policymaking.”[167]

FOOTNOTES:

[119] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,t.

[120] _Ibid._, p. 13437.

[121] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,b.

[122] _Ibid._, August 1, 1961, p. 13219, col. 2,t.

[123] _Ibid._, p. 13219, col. 2,m.

[124] _Commercial Appeal_, August 1, 1961. Report of speech of

Congressman Frank J. Becker. This same news item said that Senator

Fulbright was for the recognition of Outer Mongolia.

[125] _Peking Review_, July 14, 1961, p. 7.

[126] See the American-Asian Educational Exchange’s recent report on

Communist China and Asia, July, 1961. See also _The Worker_, October 1,

1961, p. 6. _World Marxist Review_, July 1961, p. 3.

[127] _Chinese News Service_, August 1, 1961, pp. 3-4. For some

additional comments see Thomas J. Dodd’s speech in the _Congressional

Record_, August 2, 1961.

[128] _Congressional Record_, August 21, 1961, p. 15357, col. 3,m.

[129] Speech of Senator Fulbright before the 1961 Summer Cubberly

Conference of Stanford University, Stanford, California, July 28, 1961.

Mimeographed copy, pp. 1-2.

[130] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,m.

[131] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 2,m.

[132] _Ibid._, September 2, 1960, p. A6708, col. 2,b.

[133] _Ibid._, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 2,b. Dr. Robert T.

Oliver, of Pennsylvania State University, expressed his opinion on

October 24, 1961, that: “Democratic and totalitarian governments are

becoming more and more alike in their methods of governing—through the

manipulation of public opinion by control of secrecy and publicity.”

(_Congressional Record_, Jan. 15, 1962, p. A141, col. 2,t.)

[134] See Edward Hunter, speech on the Manion Forum. 1961. Reprinted in

the _Congressional Record_, Feb. 6, 1962, pp. A906-907.

[135] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 1,b.-2,t.

[136] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 1,b. See also p. 13436, col. 3,b.

[137] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 3,t.

[138] _Ibid._, January 18, 1960, p. 578, col. 3,m. Dr. Robert T.

Oliver, who served over twelve years in the inner councils of the

government of Korea, dealing with matters of foreign policy, said: “On

the whole, however, the significant facts concerning all the major

international issues are completely available to anyone who takes the

trouble to keep up with the news.” (_Ibid._, Jan. 5, 1962, p. A140,

col. 3,b.)

[139] Speech of Senator Fulbright before the 1961 Summer Cubberly

Conference at Stanford University, Stanford, California, July 28,

1961, pp. 7-8. When he was a Senator, Kennedy made it clear that

the Presidency conferred no wisdom in his criticism of Eisenhower.

(_Congressional Record_, June 14, 1960, p. 11630, col. 3,t.) The

question is raised in my mind as to whether or not Senator Kennedy,

who spoke of the “missile gap” and other “gaps” in our defenses during

the campaign for President, was really that ignorant of our defense

posture? Yet, within a few months after he became president—and

certainly before anything that his administration did could have

changed the picture basically—we “learned” that there was no “missile

gap” and that our defense posture was strong. (See the article by David

Lawrence in the _Congressional Record_, Jan. 16, 1962, p. A241, cols. 2

and 3.)

Senator Fulbright himself said “In a democratic system, such as ours,

the people do have much to say about policy, and they decide who shall

govern them. How, may I ask, can our people be expected to discharge

their duty as citizens of a self-governing republic, if they are not

told the truth about their affairs? It would be easier, more pleasant,

and I am sure more popular, to join those who pretend that all is

well, that the summit meeting was a triumph for the West and that the

Japanese fiasco only demonstrates once again the viciousness of the

Communists.” (_Ibid._, June 28, 1960, p. 13672, col. 2,m.)

[140] Column of February 11, 1960. _Congressional Record_, February 19,

1960, p. 2761, col. 3,t.

[141] _U.S. News and World Report_, May 21, 1962, p. 15.

[142] _Evening Tribune_, San Diego, California, Editorial, August 14,

1961.

[143] _Congressional Record_, February 1, 1960, p. 1519, col. 2,m,

Senator Fulbright once accused Nixon of “deceiving the American

people”. Quoted in _The Arkansas Historical Quarterly_, Winter, 1961,

p. 328.

[144] _Congressional Record_, April 26, 1951, p. 4409, col. 3,m.

[145] _Ibid_, September 9, 1959, p. 17250, col. 3,m.

[146] _Ibid._, April 24, 1959, p. 5932, col. 3,b.

[147] _Ibid._, August 12, 1959, p. 14272, col. 1,m.

[148] _Ibid._, March 18, 1959, p. 3948, col. 1,m.

[149] _Ibid._, p. 3948, col 1,b.

[150] _Ibid._, February 8, 1960, p. 1978, col 3,m.

[151] _Ibid._, March 28, 1960, p. 6207, col. 2,m.

[152] _Ibid._, February 8, 1960, p. 1978, col. 3,b.-p. 1979, col. 1,t.

[153] _Ibid._, March 28, 1960, p. A2708, col. 2,m.

[154] _Ibid._, March 28, 1960, p. A2708, col. 2,b.

[155] _Ibid._, February 16, 1960, pp. A1250, col. 3,b. A1251, col. 1,t.

[156] As quoted in the _U.S. News and World Report_, December 4, 1961,

p. 4, col. 1,b.

[157] _Congressional Record_, February 19, 1961, p. 2769.

[158] _Congressional Record_, August 16, 1954, p. A6075, col. 3,m.

See the entire speech in Herbert Hoover, _Addresses Upon the American

Road_, August 10, 1954, pp. 74-84.

[159] _Ibid._, August 21, 1961, p. 15357, col. 1,t. Speech before the

National War College, August 21, 1961.

[160] _Ibid._, August 2, 1961, p. 13437, col. 3,t.

[161] Compare Constantine Brown, _Congressional Record_, September 5,

1961, p. A6963.

[162] _Ibid._, August 1, 1961, p. 13218, col. 2,t.

[163] Statement by Senator Fulbright before the United States Senate,

August 4, 1961. It is regrettable that the right to move freely within

all sectors of Berlin has been abrogated by the Communists without any

negotiations. J.D.B.

[164] _Congressional Record_, September 5, 1961, p. A6963, col. 2,m.

[165] Speech by Senator Fulbright at the 10th anniversary banquet of

the _Reporter_ magazine. April 16, 1959. _Congressional Record_, April

17, 1959, p. 5543, col. 2,m.

[166] Compare Constantine Brown, “Remaking the Constitution?” _Ibid._,

September 12, 1961, p. A7150, col. 2.

[167] Senator Fulbright, _Congressional Record_, April 17, 1959, p.

5542, col. 3.

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