THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT CONCEPT CRITICIZED
One of the main ideas attacked in the memorandum was the concept of
protracted conflict.[83] This concept, with other materials, was
presented in the handbook entitled _American Strategy for the Nuclear
Age_. The memorandum stated that this handbook contained basic material
for implementing the 1958 directive of the National Security Council.
“Although scholarly, and worth attention as elements of strategy,
its total effect can be said to be contrary to the President’s
program.”[84] What is the concept of protracted conflict?
_Protracted Conflict_
“The West can hope to defeat the Communists only by giving battle on
its own chosen terrain. It must carry the battle to the vital sectors
of Communist defense. To do that it must learn to counter the strategy
of protracted conflict—to manage conflict in space and in time.
“The development of proper Western attitudes toward protracted conflict
will be immensely difficult. The Communists possess a mentality that
is much better suited to protracted and controlled conflict than that
of the Western peoples. The West has neither a doctrine of protracted
conflict nor an international conspiratorial apparatus for executing
it. What is more, we do not want such a doctrine or such a political
apparatus, for it would be a tragic piece of irony if the men of
the Free World, in trying to combat the Communists, should become
like them. Some of our ‘weaknesses’ vis-a-vis the Communists are
irremediable: we cannot turn ourselves into a conflict society, nor can
we assign to the government and, in the last resort, to the police the
discipline of our conscience. It is within these limitations—which are
the ramparts of civilized self-restraint—that we are forced to cope
with Communist perversity.
“Pericles long ago was confronted with a similar problem. As the
leader of the open society of Athens, locked in an irreconcilable
conflict with the garrison state of Sparta, he recognized a relatively
simple fact which many of the theorists of war in the nuclear age have
overlooked, namely, that there are subtle alternatives to the risky and
blunt strategy of engaging the enemy in direct and decisive military
action. In the protracted conflict known as the Peloponnesian War,
Pericles chose to pursue an extended strategy which was designed to
avoid a showdown battle while wearing down, by a campaign of economic,
political, and psychological attrition, the enemy’s will to resist.
Lidell Hart pointed out that the Periclean plan was simply a war policy
aimed at ‘draining the enemy’s endurance in order to convince him that
he could not gain a decision’. In today’s protracted conflict the
United States must maintain and use its power for the same ultimate
purposes: to turn the tide of battle against the Communists, to induce
them to overextend themselves, to exploit the weakness of their system,
to paralyze their will, and to bring about their final collapse. Within
the framework of mutual deterrence, both sides can employ the strategy
of protracted conflict, and we can do so quite effectively without
the dispensation of a jealous and demanding dogma of conflict for
conflict’s sake.
“A psychopolitical offensive, directed against the Communist citadel
itself, offers the West its best chance for winning the battle for its
own survival and for spoiling the Communist strategy for the subversion
of the uncommitted world. Although the currents within the uncommitted
world are running against the West, the West need not despair of
holding its remaining positions once it has forced the Communists on
the psychopolitical defensive by engaging them on the most favorable
terrain, namely, the Communists’ own ‘peace zone’.
“It is rather in the psychological arena than in its technological
workshop that the West has displayed its most alarming shortcomings.
Objectively, Western strategy has been far more effective than the
sensational charges of its critics will have it. It is improbable that
either side from now on will be able to achieve decisive technological
superiority for more than a temporary, even brief, period. No doubt,
our military posture is susceptible to a great deal of improvement. But
an exaggerated zeal for improvement, especially when it is triggered
by pained surprise at the latest ploy of communist psychological
warfare or considerations of domestic advantage, might prove to be
‘counterproductive’ in developing our real range of power. Do not
let us pour the baby out with the bath water. What we need now more
than anything else is an understanding of the comprehensive, complex,
subtle, and consistent strategy of our opponent—and the calm resolution
to draw the practical consequences.”[85]
Now let the reader raise this question. If one is opposed to this
concept of protracted conflict is he not in reality opposed to firm,
unyielding opposition to communism?
_Secretary McNamara Seems to Accept Protracted Conflict_
Secretary of Defense McNamara realizes that if we lose the war with
communism it will be total defeat. He also recognized that the
Communists are out to conquer the world and that there is no indication
that they will change.
This necessitates educating our troops in the nature of Communism as
well as the nature of the freedom which we enjoy. As the Secretary
himself put it: “There is no true historical parallel to the drive
of Soviet Communist imperialism to colonize the world. This is not
the first time that ambitious dictators have sought to dominate the
globe. But none has ever been so well organized, has possessed so many
instruments of destruction, or has been so adept at disguising ignoble
motives and objectives with noble phrases and noble words.
“Furthermore, there is a totality in Soviet aggression which can be
matched only by turning to ancient history when warring tribes sought
not merely conquest but the total obliteration of the enemy.
“Soviet communism does not seek the physical obliteration of a
conquered people, although it would not hesitate to do so, in my
opinion, if this would serve its ends. But it does seek the total
obliteration of their customs, their social structure, their political
structure, their religion and their freedoms. Everything and everybody
must be remolded according to a blueprint laid down by Lenin and
altered only for the purposes of ruthless efficiency by Stalin and the
present-day leaders.
“There is nothing too sacred—friendship, integrity, church or
family—that it escapes the attention of the Soviet Commissar or the
Communist bureaucrat.
“Soviet communism seeks to wipe out the cherished traditions and
institutions of the free world with the same fanaticism that once
impelled winning armies to burn villages and sow the fields with salt
so they would not again become productive.
“To this primitive concept of total obliteration, the Communists have
brought the resources of modern technology and science. The combination
is formidable. Twentieth century knowledge, when robbed of any moral
restraints, is the most dangerous force ever let loose in the world.
And the entire literature of Soviet communism can be searched without
turning up the faintest trace of moral restraint.
“If the free world should lose to communism, the loss would be total,
final, and irrevocable. The citadel of freedom must be preserved
because there is no road back, no road back to freedom for anyone if
the citadel is lost.
“These are not new convictions with me. I have held them for many
years. I was deeply impressed and horrified by the human misery and
destruction that Hitler was able to create. Hitler’s philosophy was
based on the concept of total obliteration and Hitler lost. But the
years since the end of World War II have demonstrated that Soviet
communism is operating from a far stronger position than Hitler ever
held.
“In 1949, 12 years ago, I read an article in Foreign Affairs magazine
which analyzed the writings of Stalin and quoted him at length. It
was clear from these quotes that the Communist world had no intention
of living forever in peace with the world of freedom. One of Stalin’s
favorite quotations from Lenin states this point and, as translated and
published in Foreign Affairs, this is what he said:
‘We live * * * not only in a state but in a system of states, and the
existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist
states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end either one or the
other will conquer. And until that end comes, a series of the most
terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois
states is inevitable.’
“It is obvious that the aggressive goals of Soviet communism have not
changed, for Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, has said that our
grandchildren will live under communism.
“I cite this material because I want you to know the spirit in which
I believe the education program of our Defense Establishment should
be conducted. The threat is clear and it is immediate. Our fighting
men should know the positive values of the freedoms which the Nation
is calling them to defend, and they should know the nature of Soviet
communism which seeks to take them away.
“One of my most vivid recollections is that of a colleague in the Ford
Motor Co. calling me out of my office a few years ago. He asked that
I drop the work in which I was engaged to hear an analysis of the
behavior of U. S. soldiers of war in North Korea, and I heard with
amazement the story of prisoners who had cracked and become informers;
men who had written articles for Communist newspapers; men who had
cooperated with their captors.
“These American soldiers did not understand the Communist threat. They
had not been taught to value the freedom of individual choice, which
is at the basis of our form of society. They had not been taught what
happens when the spirit of individual freedom and free inquiry is lost.”
“I believe we suffered during the Korean war because we did not stress
with sufficient force and vigor the realities of freedom and the threat
of communism.
“As Secretary of Defense, it is my policy that the members of the
Military Establishment be educated in the role that they are playing
in the battle against communism, through knowledge of the strength of
our democracy, as well as the nature of the threat we face. We are
prosecuting a vigorous program and we intend to step it up.”[86]
Is not this analysis, in brief, but a presentation of the concept
of protracted conflict which is advanced by Dr. Barnett, and the
Institute for American Strategy, and which is condemned in the
memorandum?
Since there is a total threat certainly we should meet it on every
level on which it faces us. And yet, according to the article from the
_Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists_, which was the longest reprint
in the memorandum, if we act in the light of the realization of the
nature, tactics and threat of Communism which is outlined by the
Secretary, we shall split the world and be in more serious trouble!
In other words, we must be careful lest we do something to make the
Communists mad! As a matter of fact, their philosophy and ambitions
have made them mad. They are angry unto death with us because we exist
as a free people.
_Senator Fulbright Repudiates Protracted Conflict_
How does the _Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists_ view the possibility
of our waging protracted conflict? The _Bulletin_ and the memorandum
are resolutely opposed to our so doing. The memorandum said that
the handbook—which advances the concept—undermines the President’s
program.[87] The _Bulletin_ said: “The significance of ‘American
Strategy for the Nuclear Age’ lies in its analysis of the international
situation and its appeal for direct action. To a very large extent,
the theme depends on the particular estimate of Soviet intentions that
is presented and the particular prophecy of the Communist future that
is forecast. Several contributions stress the persistency, strength,
and versatility of ideology in the evolution of Soviet communism but
nowhere is there adequate treatment of the forces that limit Soviet
policy, and thus limit the projection of its ideological motivation.
There is ample evidence, for example, of instability in the Soviet
leadership and of ideological differences between the Russians and
their Chinese colleagues. The diverse effect of these forces is
highly problematical, but they do suggest that Communist policy is
far less monolithic than the concept of protracted conflict presumes.
Indeed, like other major powers, the Soviet Union is also limited by
external forces. Within the framework set by the editors of ‘American
Strategy,’ however, any attempt to take advantage of these forces in
order to insulate an area from big power confrontation, or to seek a
resolution of differences on an ad hoc basis of mutual interest, would
be tantamount to appeasement.
“The nonmilitary techniques advocated by Barnett and several other
contributors (such as Strausz-Hupe and William Kintner) clearly
recognize a grave deficiency in American Strategy, but they hardly
cover the full spectrum of alternatives open to the United States.
None of these suggestions includes the full use of either traditional
diplomacy or innovating methods of settling disputes. At the same time,
they contain an element of militancy that raises serious problems,
geared as they are to setting up a savage dichotomy between the
Communist and the Western World, and of making almost every issue a
matter of irreconcilable competition.
“It is difficult to see how these tactics can do anything but intensify
international tensions and, short of a complete collapse of the Soviet
bloc (which the editors would surely discount), increase the likelihood
that force will be used. Indeed, the more intense the conditions of
rivalry become, the greater the inclination will be to reassess the
major premises of our strategic doctrine, including our renunciation of
preventative war, and to begin to incorporate provisions for offensive
military action in the calculus of our planning. The editors fail to
consider whether the provocative nature of the policies they openly
advocate can be restricted to the nonmilitary spheres for very long.
Indeed, they seem to assume that the Communists will back down under
pressure—a highly dangerous assumption.
“Perhaps the most fundamental criticism that can be made of the book is
that it fails to analyze the impact of a policy of protracted conflict
on our domestic institutions. Barnett’s program of action, for example,
would require large sums of public funds used with little public
accountability, a wide network of secrecy and security in government
operations, a cold war orientation in our schools and universities—in
short, a stunting of pluralism, a curtailment of individual liberties,
and a weakening of politically responsible government. The editors
of ‘American Strategy’ seem to see no alternative to confronting the
Soviets with strong opposition at every turn. Indeed, they appear more
concerned with virility than freedom, as if strength and courage were
goals in themselves. This, together with the somewhat static nature of
their view of history and the militant nature of their recommendations,
justifies further inquiry about the men and the organizations who
advocate a strategy based on these premises.”[88]
What shall we say to these things? _First_, it must be recognized that
we are at war, and that the concept of protracted conflict is based on
this obvious fact of present-day life. In other words, this concept
takes seriously the words and deeds of the Communists which say that
they are fighting to conquer and to rule the world, and that we must
act accordingly. The memorandum shrinks from accepting this fact and
its implications. Ivo Duchacek, a member of the Czech Parliament until
the Communists took over, said: “Nobody likes to accept the idea that
we cannot get along with our fellow men if we try hard enough....
When I look back at my own practical experience in Czechoslovakia
where cooperation with the Communists was tried on both national and
international levels, I realize that the basic mistake was our wishful
thinking that communism had fundamentally changed under the influence
of its 25-year experience and under the impact of World War II.”[89]
According to James Reston, who has been close to the President,
President Kennedy came to office with the idea that he could work out
reasonable arrangements with the Communists and put an end to the angry
dialogue which has been going on.[90]
It is not of our choosing, it is not to our taste, but the fact is that
the Communists are at war with us. It does not take two to start a
war, and the Communists have started a war whether we like it or not.
As Edgar Ansel Mowrer, one of the nation’s outstanding students of
world affairs, put it: “Communists play to win.... The West, including
the United States, want only to call the game off. It fails to admit
that this is a real war which it can win only if it gives it No. 1
priority and stops considering it just another problem like smog or
juvenile delinquency,”[91] Roscoe Drummond said: “It is my conviction
that we will continue to lose this war called peace as long as we try
to conduct it on a basis of business as usual, politics as usual and
defence as usual.”[92]
Congressman Hosmer observed that “we can freeze to death in cold war as
easily as we can burn to death in hot war.”[93]
Roscoe Drummond has underscored the fact that although we are at war,
we are not acting in the light of that unpleasant reality. “It is my
conviction that the time for words has passed, that the moment is at
hand when it is not enough to say what needs to be done—but to do what
needs to be done before it is too late.
“It is my conviction that the time has come when the American
Government and the American people must act on the reality that we are
not at peace, but at war, though a different and more difficult kind of
war than we have ever faced; that, as the Overstreets have put it, we
are in a war called peace and that there is nothing peaceful about it.
“At this stage we are losing, not winning—and we are not yet strong
enough to win.”
“In New York last week, President Kennedy declared that ‘every new
piece of information, every fresh event, have deepened my conviction
that the survival of our civilization is at stake—and the hour is
late’.”[94]
_Second_, the intensification of international tensions is going on
today because the Communists are pushing even harder for the conquest
of the world. Any so-called easing of international tension would
be equivalent to a boxer relaxing in the middle of the fight. For
tension to be relaxed in reality would necessitate the cessation of the
communist drive for world conquest. In other words, it would mean that
the Communists had ceased to be Communists.
That communism, and not the waging of protracted conflict by the
non-communist world, is the cause of the existing tension is recognized
by President Kennedy. Thus he told editor Adzhubei, of _Izvestia_, that
the root of the conflict is the Soviet’s efforts “to communize, in a
sense, the entire world.”[95]
As the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of the British
Government, said to the United Nations General Assembly on September
27, 1961, “the world is divided by an ideological chasm.... And when
one side advertises its intention to destroy the way of life of the
other, then you cannot have true collective security.”[96]
George E. Kennan, now Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and at one time
Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., has summarized in his book _Russia and the
West_ what the communists are saying to us through their words and
their deeds. Roscoe Drummond presented it in his column as follows:
“We despise you. We consider that you should be swept from the earth
as governments and physically destroyed as individuals. We reserve
the right in our private if not in our official capacities to do what
we can to bring this about: to revile you publicly, to do everything
within our power to detach your own people from their loyalty to you
and their confidence in you, to subvert your armed forces, and to work
for your downfall in favor of a Communist dictatorship. But since we
are not strong enough to destroy you today ... we want you during this
interval to trade with us; we want you to finance us; we want you to
give us the advantages of full-fledged diplomatic recognition, just as
you accord these advantages to one another.
“An outrageous demand? Perhaps. But you will accept it nevertheless.
Driven by this competition, which you cannot escape, you will do what
we want you to do until such time as we are ready to make an end of
you.* * *”[97]
Mr. Kennan also quoted a resolution of the Communist International
which said: “The Comintern will not let its freedom be hampered by any
obligation whatever. We are deadly enemies of bourgeois society to the
last breath, in word and in deed and if necessary with arms in hand.
It is the historical mission of the Communist International to be the
gravedigger of the bourgeois society.”[98]
Roscoe Drummond commented as follows on this resolution. “Mr. Kennan is
here describing Communist policy and purpose toward all non-Communist
governments formulated in the 1930’s, which hasn’t changed in the least.
“It is the same today—in Korea, in Laos, in Viet-Nam, in the Congo, at
the conference table in Geneva. To the Communists, U. S. aid to the
legitimate government of South Vietnam is ‘aggressive’ because the
Communists recognize no non-Communist government as ever legitimate.
“We are not at peace with the Communists. We are engaged in a war
called peace by the Communists. We can’t afford to think or act
otherwise for 1 second.”[99]
The _Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists_ does not realize that our
resistance to Communism does not set up a “savage dichotomy between the
Communist and the Western World”. This dichotomy or division exists
but it has been set up by the ideology and actions of the Communists.
We _wish_ that it were not so, we _wish_ that they would change, but
wishing does not make it so. It is a fact of life which we should
realize, and which we fail to realize only at our peril. The Communists
in the _Communist Manifesto_, which they consider to be an up-to-date
document, and many times since have stated that they are irreconcilably
at war with us.
Lenin, who is stressed today, said: “We are living not merely in a
state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet
Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is
unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that
end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet
Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable. That means that
if the ruling class, the proletariat, wants to hold sway, it must prove
its capacity to do so by its military organizations.”
“As long as capitalism and socialism exists, we cannot live in peace;
in the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung
over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism.”[100]
Mao Tse-tung speaks in no uncertain terms about their revolutionary
triumph. “In human history, antagonism between the classes exists as a
particular manifestation of the struggle within the contradiction. The
contradiction between the exploiting class and the exploited class:
the two mutually contradictory classes coexist for a long time in one
society, be it a slave society, or a feudal or a capitalist society,
and struggle with each other; but it is not until the contradiction
between the two classes has developed to a certain stage that the
two sides adopt the form of open antagonism which develops into a
revolution. In a class society, the transformation of peace into war is
also like that.
“The time when a bomb has not yet exploded is the time when
contradictory things, because of certain conditions, coexist in an
entity. It is not until a new condition (ignition) is present that the
explosion takes place. An analogous situation exists in all natural
phenomena when they finally assume the form of open antagonism to solve
old contradictions and to produce new things.
“It is very important to know this situation. It enables us to
understand that in a class society revolutions and revolutionary wars
are inevitable, that apart from them the leap in social development
cannot be made, and the reactionary ruling classes cannot be overthrown
so that the people will win political power. Communists must expose
the deceitful propaganda of the reactionaries that social revolution
is unnecessary and impossible, and so on, and firmly uphold the
Marxist-Leninist theory of social revolution so as to help the people
to understand that social revolution is not only entirely necessary but
also entirely possible and that the whole history of mankind and the
triumph of the Soviet Union all confirm this scientific truth.”[101]
The cold war and the danger of hot war come, according to the
Communists, only because we resist their so-called inevitable conquest
of the world. As Hugo Pauk, a Communist in the Ruhr, told Dr. John
R. Van de Water, “You must also understand that unless you accept our
Communist way of life, war is inevitable.”[102]
If we did not resist communism there would be no cold war—only
enslavement and death. For the cold war is their term for our
resistance to communism. In one of the leading communist journals,
_International Affairs_, we read that: “The aggressive imperialist
forces have let loose upon the world their horrible offspring—the
cold war. Its purpose was to keep the people in a state of constant
fear, to persuade them that war is inevitable, and to compel them to
spill more and more money into the bottomless pit of the arms race.
The cold war was to help the doomed forces of the old world to retain
their positions and hold back the surging advance of social and
national-liberation movements, to prepare war against the Socialist
camp, that untiring champion of world peace.”[103]
“The Socialist countries have set themselves the task of eliminating
war from the lives of nations for all time—a goal for which the best
minds in the world have striven for centuries. Proceeding from the
analysis of the real balance of power on Earth, the 21st Congress of
the C.P.S.U. stressed that this problem could be solved even before the
complete victory of Socialism, with capitalism still extant in a part
of the world.”[104]
“To establish durable peace on Earth is no easy task, of course. There
are influential forces outside the bounds of the Socialist world whose
riches and privileges depend on the arms race, on the preparation
and unleashing of wars. These forces will not give in without
desperate resistance and will do everything to prevent a relaxation
of international tension. It will take the utmost effort of all the
peace-loving forces in the world to turn into reality the existing
possibility of achieving an international _detente_ and putting an end
to the cold war.
“N. S. Khrushchev’s visit to the United States is another brilliant
proof of the fact that the Soviet Government and Communist Party are
doing everything to terminate the cold war.”[105]
These quotations show that, as a matter of fact, with the Communists
every issue is a matter of irreconcilable competition in the sense that
they are not out to make reasonable agreements which they will keep
with integrity, but that every discussion is another front on which
they are fighting us. Any agreement is made only because they have to
make it or because in some way it contributes to their total program of
victory.
The quotations which we took from the memorandum are saying that if we
firmly resist Communism we are apt to have trouble! The Senator should
raise the question: What trouble will there be if we do not firmly
resist Communism and win this war for freedom?
International tension exists because of Communist aggression. Of
course, if we ceased resisting they would enslave us, and kill
millions, but this hardly seems like a desirable way to lessen tensions.
The fact that the Communists are waging protracted conflict on us is
the provocative factor in the world situation. Why is it that the
memorandum speaks of “the provocative nature of the policies” of those
who call on us to awaken to the fact that the Communists have declared
protracted war on us, and that we should wage protracted conflict for
victory and freedom—yes, and for survival.
Concerning those who advocate that we wage this protracted conflict
the _Bulletin_ says: “Indeed, they seem to assume that the Communists
will back down under pressure—a highly dangerous assumption.” Does
the _Bulletin_ and the Senator think that the Communists will back
down if we retreat? Or if we are not firm? Does he think that the
Communists have not been encouraged by the success which they have had
hithertofore on their road to world conquest? Does he suggest that
we relieve pressure by backing down? Does he think that the road of
retreat is the road to survival? If we are not to put on increased
pressure, what are we to do? Does he think that the Communists respect
anything other than firm pressure?
Does the Senator believe, or does he not, that the Communists are
intent on world conquest? If the Senator believes that the Communists
are waging protracted conflict to conquer the world, why did he include
the article from the _Bulletin_? If he does not believe that they are
waging protracted conflict to conquer the world, we ask: Can America
afford public servants, men who help shape national policy, who think
that the Communists are not trying to conquer the world? On the other
hand, can America afford public servants who, if they believe that the
Communists are out to conquer the world, criticize those who agree
with them, and who also say that we ought to act accordingly and wage
protracted conflict to defeat Communism?
Does the Senator believe that we should refuse to act in the light
of the realization that the Communists are out to conquer the world?
In other words, since the Communists are waging war on us on various
fronts and in various ways, should we not engage them in combat on
these various levels? Or should we leave the victory to them by
default? The Communists have declared war on us, they are at war with
us. They are engaging in protracted conflict against us. What should we
do? Fail to respond? Respond weakly? Fearfully?
Since the _Bulletin_ does not expect the Soviet bloc to collapse, since
it does not think we should meet its aggression in protracted conflict;
just what does it and what does Senator Fulbright propose? Do they
suggest that Communism will back down from world conquest if we refuse
to engage them in protracted conflict? If Communists will not back down
under pressure, will they back down if we yield or refuse to apply
pressure? As a matter of fact, every retreat on our part and every
advance on their part, is viewed by them as proof that their theory of
history is right.[106] Even if we surrendered, they would consider this
as further proof that they have a mandate from history to overthrow all
existing social conditions and to remake man.
In reply to the _Bulletin’s_ repudiation of protracted conflict, we
would say, in the _third_ place, that it should be clearly understood
that there is no evidence that the Communists will change their goal of
world conquest. G. F. Hudson, Director of the Center for Far Eastern
Studies at St. Anthony’s College, Oxford University, has said: “Ever
since the early days of the Bolshevik regime, there has been the
expectation abroad that it was just about to settle down, discard
its fantastic ideas of world revolution, and revert to the normal
habits and usages of a national sovereign state in its international
relations.”
“Yet, every time the world has become convinced that the original
creed of Lenin no longer governed Soviet actions and that the policies
of the Soviet Union could be interpreted simply in terms of national
interest and security, like the policies of non-Communist states,
events have provided fresh evidence that the ultimate aim of the
rulers of Russia continued to be the destruction of all ‘bourgeois’
governments.”[107]
In the _fourth_ place, the concept of protracted conflict does not rule
out the use of traditional diplomacy or innovating methods of settling
disputes. But it does ask that we recognize that all of these must be
used as weapons in our war with communism. For it is obvious to every
student that the Communists use traditional diplomacy and innovating
methods as but phases of their warfare against civilization.
It is clear that traditional diplomacy has been tried again and again.
We have even had innovating methods, such as helping enemy countries
with financial aid. We have tried to work through the U.N. Traditional
methods are still being tried. We should continue to use them to the
best of our ability.
Furthermore, the concept of protracted conflict does not rule out the
resolution of some particular differences “on an ad hoc basis of mutual
interest....”
Our _fifth_ observation on the _Bulletin’s_ charges, is that the cold
war is bound to have some effect on our democratic institutions.
However, it will not involve near the dangers that would be created
by putting greater power in the hands of the President—whoever the
President may be at a given time—as Senator Fulbright wants to do. The
_Bulletin_ spoke of funds being spent secretly but it made no comments
on the danger of secret executive agreements.
But there is no reason for protracted conflict to destroy democratic
institutions. We can erect the proper safeguards. Furthermore, the
failure to wage protracted conflict and to win the war we are in
will lead to the destruction of our democratic institutions by the
Communists.
Whether we wage protracted conflict or not, we are engaged in a war.
Even Senator Fulbright speaks of the long twilight struggle and the
influence it may have on the people. But certainly it is better to risk
the possibility of some dangers to our democratic institutions than to
accept the certainty of their destruction if the Communists win.
The Communists leave us no range of pleasant choices. We either win in
the struggle with them or we lose all.
Our _sixth_ observation is that to win this war we must wage it on
every necessary level. We must put the Communists on the defensive
instead of simply reacting to their aggressive moves. As Charles
Malik said: “It is most important that the Communists be put on the
defensive. It is most important that the total arsenal of political,
moral, and spiritual values be bought to bear upon this struggle.”[108]
Even Senator Fulbright has said that we ought to take the initiative
and that a truly tough “approach to Communism is one that meets it with
‘every instrumentality of foreign and domestic policy’....”[109] This
is exactly what the concept of protracted conflict calls for, including
the use of the military in the cold war!
This does not mean that a nuclear war will take place if we wage
protracted conflict; although we might keep in mind that a failure
to wage protracted conflict will result in our defeat, for they will
nibble us to death, or slice us to pieces with the salami tactic. Edgar
Ansel Mowrer has well said: “And whatever one thinks of the cold war,
one fact stands out: The Soviets have made of it a third way, neither
peace nor hot war. And the conclusions seem obvious: If such a third
way exists for communism, does it not also exist for the West?
“It certainly does. Its name is waging freedom. Waging freedom means
that, instead of continuing the military and diplomatic defensive, the
West publicly sets as its goal an extension or recovery of the area of
national determination—the rollback of communism. It means the cool,
calculated, and determined acceptance of the Soviet challenge in the
intermediate field. Above all, it means a complete repudiation of
the thesis that the West has no choice save humbly seeking peace or
accepting nuclear annihilation.
“Most of all, waging peace would mean an end to the present
make-believe in regard to Soviet intentions that dominates too much
thinking. Many, too many, believe, or are trying to believe, that
by some means—a mixture of defensive firmness, magical formula, and
turning the other cheek—the Kremlin can be induced to call the cold war
off.
“For this, with apologies to Prime Minister Macmillan, there is no
shred of concrete evidence. All known facts point the other way—to the
conclusion that the U.S.S.R. is gradually forcing the West back without
fighting by playing upon its nuclear fears, its reluctance to believe
the unpleasant, and its even greater reluctance to overtrump Soviet
military expenditures.
“_West Has Best Hand_”
“Yet curiously enough, even in such an intermediate struggle, the
stronger cards are on the side of the West. The Kremlin can play upon
the reluctance of a free people to accept a long and costly diplomatic
and arms-building struggle. But the West can count upon much more—the
fact that so far as is known, communism is popular in no country where
it has firmly fixed its claws—not even in the U.S.S.R. as hundreds
of thousands of defections from the Soviet Army during World War II
demonstrated.
“To be brief: The West has it in its hands to adopt a third policy, a
policy of waging freedom short of major war—and outlasting the Kremlin
at its own chosen game. For the West has several times the economic
resources and in addition the overwhelming moral resource of the appeal
against Communist tyranny. It can, if it chooses, chivvy and harry
Moscow to the point of exhaustion and despair. It can win without
fighting provided it has the courage and the stamina.”[110]
As James Reston put it: “The choice before the President and the other
leaders of the Western world today is not between the certainty of
destruction and the certainty of Communist expansion, but between
the possibility of destruction if we risk war, and the certainty of
Communist expansion if we don’t.”[111]
Both from Communist theory and from their past actions we know that
they will start some local conflicts, when and if they think they can
get away with it. They will do this regardless of whether or not we use
protracted conflict. As Dr. Ralph K. White, of the U.S.I.A. said: “But
for a well indoctrinated Communist the rational, prudent aggressive
use of force in the cause of Communism is not only legitimate; it is
obligatory. It is an accepted, integral part of his self-image. He
believes with Karl Marx that ‘force is the midwife of every old society
that is pregnant with the new.’”[112]
_Is Victory the Goal?_
The memorandum includes an article which is critical of the call for
total victory. “At a 2-day strategy seminar held in Chicago last
September, Adm. Arthur W. Radford, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, called for ‘total victory over the Communist system—not
stalemate,’ and warned that ‘the minute we become satisfied with the
status quo, we have started down the road to defeat.’ This theme has,
in fact, dominated a series of strategy seminars that have been held
throughout the country during the past 2 years—in New York, Cleveland,
New Orleans, and Wilmington; in California, Massachusetts, Texas, and
Washington, D. C. The chief force behind these meetings of businessmen,
teachers, servicemen, and church leaders has been an organization
called the Institute for American Strategy.”[113]
The Communist is working toward total victory over the non-Communist
world. In dealing with an enemy who seeks total victory over us, and
in the conflict with whom final defeat would be total defeat, can one
win if he does not seek total victory? Well did Jay Lovestone say: “The
war is total. If we don’t fight them down the line, we lose down the
line.”[114]
Total victory does not mean that there will be no more evil in the
world once Communism has been defeated. It simply means, in my view
of it, that we should take the initiative and endeavor to meet and to
defeat them on every necessary level. We all wish that by so doing
on some levels that they will be halted in their onward march and
ultimately cease to be Communists. However, in our battle plans we
should not relax and expect the Communists to cease being Communists.
It would have been a real blessing if Hitler had ceased to be Hitler
and if World War II had not been started. But he wasn’t converted from
the errors of his way, and World War II did take place.
Khrushchev closed the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union in the Fall of 1961 by saying: “Our aims are clear, the
tasks have been set. To work, comrades! For new victories of communism.”
What is wrong with seeking total victory over Communism? This would
include victory over its ideology, its subversive activities and its
other forms of aggression.
Is the call for victory contrary to the President’s program for
survival in this nuclear age? Doesn’t his program for survival
include a program for victory? If such a total victory is not in the
President’s program then the people need to know it. If it is in the
President’s program, what is wrong with backing it and struggling
for it? Senator Fulbright said that the military and the civilian
population should back the President’s program.
Elsewhere Senator Fulbright himself recognized that the challenge is
total, and that the Communists are waging protracted conflict. “We
endure in an era of total crisis.”[115] After speaking of the armies
and navy of the U.S.S.R., Fulbright said: “In addition the Soviet
Union is mounting a world wide trade offensive aimed primarily at us.
Hence the challenge to us is total. It involves the military, the
political, the intellectual, and the industrial. The measures of our
antagonist cannot be countered by half measures or by half-hearted
competition.”[116]
“Since we are now in deadly conflict with a prodigious antagonist, we
can neglect nothing that might assure our security.”[117]
Why, then, take the military out of the cold war? Why, then, did
the Senator criticize in the memorandum the concept of protracted
conflict?[118]
FOOTNOTES:
[83] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, pp. 13439, col. 2,m.-p.
13441, col. 1.
[84] _Ibid._, p. 13436, col. 3,b. point 2.
[85] Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, _American Strategy for the
Nuclear Age_, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960, pp.
30-31. I agree with Gerhart Niemeyer that the ideological dimension of
the cold war must be emphasized. _Problems of Communism_, Nov.-Dec.
1961, p. 59.
[86] Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, _Defense
Secretary McNamara on S. Res. 191_, Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1961, pp. 3-4.
[87] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b. A
government official in a position to know the viewpoint of current
policy-makers, told Edith Kermit Roosevelt that: “The purpose of
American policy is to work for a merger of East and West. It is
believed accommodation can be reached as the two systems become more
alike politically and economically: As the United States adopts a
more collectivist pattern of federal control, while at the same time
a consolidation of Soviet rule makes genocide purges, and other
less-pleasant attributes of the police state unnecessary.” (“Policy of
‘No Win’ Now Official”, _Dallas Morning News_, May 27, 1962.)
[88] _Ibid._, p. 13440, col. 1,t.
[89] _Ibid._, August 2, 1949, pp. A4995-A4996.
[90] Quoted in the _Congressional Record_, October 3, 1961, p. A7922,
col. 3,t.
[91] “Ten Reasons Why Communism is Winning”, _Congressional Record_,
April 25, 1961, p. A2788, col. 2,m.
[92] “War Called Peace: Time for Words Has Passed.” _Congressional
Record_, May 3, 1961, p. A3045, col. 3,m.
[93] _Congressional Record_, August 7, 1961, p. 13759, col. 3,m.
[94] _Congressional Record_, May 3, 1961, p. A3045, col. 3.
[95] _Arkansas Democrat_, November 28, 1961, p. 1, _Arkansas Gazette_,
November 29, 1961, p. 1.
[96] “Speech Delivered by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to
the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday, September 27, 1961,”
mimeographed copy of the speech, p. 2.
[97] _Congressional Record_, June 19, 1961, p. A4545, col. 3,m.
[98] _Ibid._, p. A4546, col. 1,t.
[99] _Ibid._, p. A4546, col. 1,t.
[100] Quoted in Department of State, _Soviet World Outlook_, July 1959,
p. 96.
[101] Mao Tse-tung, _On Contradiction_, Foreign Language Press, Peking,
1952, pp. 66-67.
[102] John R. Van de Water, _Ideologies in Conflict_. Address on June
8, 1951, p. 7.
[103] _International Affairs_, Moscow, November 1959, pp. 3-4.
[104] _Ibid._, p. 5.
[105] _Ibid._, p. 6.
[106] Mao Tse-tung _On Contradiction_, p. 61.
[107] G. F. Hudson, _Problems of Communism_, July-Aug. 1961, p. 31.
[108] _Congressional Record_, Oct. 3, 1961, p. A7894, col. 3,m. See
Frank J. Johnson, _No Substitute For Victory_, Chicago: Regnery, 1962.
[109] _Arkansas Democrat_, November 8, 1961, p. 1.
[110] _Congressional Record_, March 26, 1959, p. A2762, col. 2,m-3,t.
[111] _Ibid._, September 26, 1961, p. A7750, col. 3,t.
[112] Ralph K. White’s speech before the American Psychological
Association, Duplicated copy, p. 4.
[113] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13439, col. 2,b.
[114] Taken from my notes of Mr. Lovestone’s speech, Washington, D.
C., November 4, 1961. Congressman Judd said: “Mr. Chairman, nobody
has ever yet won a struggle military or otherwise, by being only on
the defensive and announcing ahead of time that he is not trying to
win.” _Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy._ Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1959, p. 123.
[115] Senator Fulbright, _Congressional Record_, March 28, 1960, p.
A2707, col. 2,b.
[116] _Ibid._, p. A2708, col. 2,t.
[117] _Ibid._, p. A2709, col. 1,m. Congressman McCormack of
Massachusetts said: “As long as the Communists adhere to dialectic
communism and their ultimate intent for world revolution and world
domination, as long as the dominating influence of communism is its
dialectic aspect, the dominating and controlling power or influence of
international communism, they have got to keep on going, and going,
and going until their (sic) either conquer the world or blow up.
International communism as presently constituted cannot permanently
survive in any part of the world there are free men and women.”
(_Congressional Record_, January 22, 1959, p. 951, col. 2,t.)
[118] In the author’s judgment, there are some who want the military
out of the cold war, because they fear that the military is for the
hard line against communism, i.e. for victory over communism. This,
they fear, will start a war. Several years ago Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr. wrote an article on the future of democratic socialism in the
United States. In it he advocated some ideas which, he said, the State
Department had been somewhat following for some time. Among these ideas
were: (a) The U.S.S.R. will get over its “messianic intoxication.”
(b) We must contain her so that she will not run the risk of the
aggression that might prove a general war. (c) We must not engage in
an anti-Soviet crusade. (d) We must not “permit reactionaries in the
buffer states to precipitate conflicts in defense of their own obsolete
prerogatives.” (e) We must demonstrate to the U.S.S.R. that we have
no aggressive intentions toward the U.S.S.R. (f) We must back the
non-Communist left, since—the implication is—such governments will not
be apt to engage in an anti-Soviet crusade. In this way, perhaps we can
stave off general war and give the U.S.S.R. time to undergo a change of
heart. See the _Congressional Record_, Feb. 6, 1962, pp. A881-A884. A
reprint.
This approach would not only mean that we should encourage neutralism
in at least some nations, but it would also mean that an anti-communist
crusade in America should be defeated.
It would mean that we should not seek victory over communism.
It would encourage the salami tactics of the Communists who will try to
see to it that each slice they cut off from the non-Communist world is
not large enough to precipitate a general war.