Bradley. The former, with splendid bearing and courage, rallied his
columns, and though they were taken at every disadvantage, under the
inspiration which he imparted they faced the resistless advance with
desperate valor. Lytle fell where death was thickest for his comrades.
His brigade, and that of Bradley, with Wilder, who had also fought to
the extremity to assist, were all borne to the rear and forced to join
the fugitive columns falling off from the Union right toward Rossville.
General Rosecrans had just ridden the lines from the left, and had
passed in the rear of McCook's position, when the line was severed.
Finding the roads in rear of the right filled with retreating columns
representing all corps of the army, for Negley was there from Thomas, he
deemed it prudent to ride to Chattanooga and decide upon a new position
in front of the place. General Crittenden's whole command, that is,
three divisions, having been ordered in succession to Thomas before the
break, Crittenden himself, being without command, rode into Chattanooga
after Rosecrans, as did also McCook. Sheridan's division was in good
order by the time it reached Rossville, and most of the troops which
left the field were about that place and McFarland's Gap in fighting
condition throughout the afternoon. Their numbers at 2 o'clock were from
seven to ten thousand. They could easily have been led to Baird's left
or Brannan's right, as the way to either flank was open. This was proved
by the fact that General Garfield, Colonel Gates Thurston, and Surgeons
Gross and Perkins, the medical directors of the Fourteenth and Twentieth
Corps, rode back and joined General Thomas. It is one of the myths of
current Chickamauga history that Sheridan marched with his division back
to the fighting line, but this is an error. He received a request at
McFarland's Gap from Gen. Thomas to return to the field, but decided
instead to retire to Rossville. Upon reaching the latter point he moved
out on the Lafayette road toward Gen. Thomas, but did not form a
junction with him. He reached the Cloud House at 7 p. m. and soon after
withdrew to Rossville.
Six Confederate divisions under Longstreet had taken part in breaking
the Union center and sweeping its right off the field. These were
Stewart, Bushrod Johnson, and Preston, of Buckner's corps: Hood and
McLaws, of Longstreet's Virginia troops, and Hindman's division of
Polk's corps. Eight brigades of this force had first entered the gap
left by Wood, and from that time till Rosecrans, McCook, Crittenden,
and Sheridan had gone, and Brannan had established himself on
Horseshoe Ridge, each of these six divisions had advanced and fought
with vigor. Finally Hindman, finding no resistance on his left, wheeled
to the right to assist Longstreet's center and right, which had been
checked by Brannan and Wood. This brought Longstreet's six divisions
together in the vicinity of Horseshoe ridge.
[Illustration: THE CONCENTRATION.]
[Illustration: KELLEY'S FARM--HORSESHOE RIDGE.]
Shortly after 2 o'clock Longstreet ordered a general assault by his
wing. It was delivered with confidence and tremendous power. To meet
these six divisions Brannan on the right had Croxton's brigade and part
of Connell's; Wood, on the left, had Harker's brigade. With these
organized commands were a part of John Beatty's, a good part of
Stanley's and the Twenty-first Ohio, of Sirwell's, all of Negley; parts
of the Ninth and the Seventeenth Kentucky; Forty-fourth Indiana and
Thirteenth Ohio, of Van Cleve's division, with the Fifty-eighth Indiana,
of Buell's brigade--in all about 4,000 men.
Against this line, hastily formed and without reserves, Longstreet
launched his solid columns. They came on magnificently, wave behind
wave. They met sheeted fire from the summits, and yet pressed on to hand
encounters, but from these they soon recoiled. The whole line retired
from the foot of the slopes, and covered by the forests organized for a
second attack. It was delivered soon after 3 o'clock. Like the first, it
fell on the fronts of Wood and Brannan. But while Hindman assaulted the
latter in front he also sent a brigade through the gap to Brannan's
right to scale the ridge and gain his rear. Negley, who had held this
point with abundant artillery and infantry supports, and who had
promised to stay there, had promptly fled before any attack had reached
him and was even then in Rossville. There was absolutely nothing to send
against Hindman's left, towering there with its fringe of bayonets on
the commanding ridge, and forming to sweep down on Brannan's right and
rear. Longstreet and all his general officers were exultant, and though
their second attack had failed everywhere, except as this lodgment was
obtained on the ridge beyond Brannan, they rapidly arranged their lines
for what they believed would be a final assault leading to sure victory.
But not a Union soldier moved from his place. The men clutched their
guns tighter. Officers everywhere moved closer to the lines to encourage
and steady them. The color-bearers set their flags firmer. And then, as
if to repay such courage, help came as unexpectedly as if the hand of
the Lord had been visibly extended to save. Suddenly a Union column
appeared, moving with speed across the fields from the direction of the
McDaniel house. It was Granger, of the reserve, with two brigades of
Steedman's division. Being stationed four miles away toward Ringgold,
Granger, agreeing with Steedman that they must be sorely needed on the
field, had started without orders, and though shelled by Forrest on his
flank for two miles of the way, had not allowed his columns to be
greatly delayed. And now Steedman was sweeping up to the foot of the
hill below the Snodgrass House. As he reported to Thomas, coming in from
toward the Kelly farm was another well-ordered column. It proved to be
Van Derveer returning from the charge upon Breckinridge in the Kelly
field. The map shows how he had left Brannan's line just before the
break and hastened with deployed lines toward the left; how thus
deployed he had marched from the woods to be enfiladed from
Breckinridge's front as the latter emerged from the woods and burst upon
the Union rear. Here, under this fire, he whirled his brigade to the
left, delivered a full volley at pistol range into the enemy's faces,
charged into their lines on a run, drove them back on their batteries,
and pursued both infantry and artillery to a point beyond the Union
left, where Grose, coming from the rear of Palmer, completed the work.
The dotted line shows Van Derveer's return. He, too, had moved without
orders to the sound of tremendous firing about the Snodgrass house. Just
as Steedman had hastily formed and assaulted Hindman's forces beyond the
right of Brannan, Van Derveer joined his brigade to Steedman's left and
moved also to the assault. Steedman seized a regimental flag and rode
with it in his hands to the top. His command was the brigades of those
splendid soldiers, John G. Mitchell and Walter C. Whittaker.
One (Whittaker's) plunged into the gorge through which Hindman's left
was pouring, the rest of the line, with Van Derveer on its left, charged
for the ridge. In twenty minutes it was carried and all of Hindman's
forces were driven from it and out of the ravine. Whittaker had been
wounded and four of his five staff officers either killed or mortally
wounded. One-fifth of Steedman's force had been disabled in the charge.
Van Derveer's loss was considerable, but less in proportion, as he was
not fairly in front of Hindman, as Steedman was. Twice Hindman turned
his recoiling troops to recapture the position, but finally abandoned
the effort and relinquished the ridge to Steedman. The center and right
of Longstreet's third assault was in like manner repelled. In this
movement the Fourth Kentucky, Col. R. M. Kelley, joined Van Derveer and
fought with him till night.
The coming of Steedman was more than an inspiration. It was more than
the holding of the right. He brought 100,000 rounds of cartridges and
artillery ammunition--far more welcome than diamonds. Regiments in the
line had been fighting, even at that early hour, with the bayonet and
clubbed muskets. Now, when Longstreet's right came on in aid of the
attempt of Hindman to hold his position on the west they were received
with terrific and continuing fire, and as the lines of gray, with
desperate valor, neared the summit Wood's men and Brannan's rushed at
them with the bayonet and broke their ranks, rolled them down the
slopes, and on Wood's front, with help of a direct fire from Aleshire's
battery on the left and a terrible enfilading fire from Battery I,
Fourth Regular Artillery, on Brannan's left, under those splendid young
soldiers, Lieutenants Frank G. Smith and George B. Rodney, drove them in
disorder beyond their artillery.
At this time both Confederate wings were calling for re-enforcements.
Bragg's reply to Longstreet was that the right was so badly shattered
that it could not help him.
When Steedman's coming with four thousand men had so changed the whole
current of the battle, what if the seven thousand men under Sheridan and
Negley about McFarland's and Rossville, much nearer than Steedman was,
had been brought up? How the officers who were there could stay
themselves, or manage to keep the men, is a mystery sickening to think
about.
Hindman thus tells of the attack by which he carried the ridge to the
right of Brannan, before Steedman arrived:
"In a few minutes a terrific contest ensued, which continued, at close
quarters, without any intermission, over four hours. Our troops attacked
again and again with a courage worthy of their past achievements. The
enemy fought with determined obstinacy and repeatedly repulsed us, but
only to be again assailed. As showing the fierceness of the fight, the
fact is mentioned that on our extreme left the bayonet was used and men
were also killed and wounded with clubbed muskets."
Of the attack of Steedman's men in the ravine, where they rushed on the
Confederate line with the bayonet, pushed in among the guns and killed
gunners at their posts, Hindman further says: "I have never known
Federal troops to fight so well. It is just to say, also, that I never
saw Confederate soldiers fight better." Of the second attack upon
Brannan's position, which was repulsed, Kershaw, commanding in
Longstreet's troops from Virginia, said: "This was one of the heaviest
attacks of the war on a single point."
Up to the time of Steedman's arrival there had been a break between
Reynolds and Wood, but the flank of the former in advance of the latter
somewhat covered it. Upon this point Longstreet now organized a heavy
attack. But the lull on the left, arising from the rebels there having
been, as Bragg expressed it, "so badly beaten back" that they could be
of no service on his left, made it practicable to strengthen the Union
center. Hazen was found to have ammunition, and was moved with celerity
into the gap, and Grose, Johnson's reserve, replaced him. Hazen arrived
none too soon. His lines were hardly established before Longstreet's
right was upon him, lapping over upon Reynold's front, and then, from
Reynolds to Steedman, there was one continuing hell of battle. Garfield,
who had come up with an escort, having ridden from Rossville, after
reporting to Thomas, moved along the ranks of his old brigade (Harker,
of Wood), encouraging the men, and giving evidence against all loiterers
at the gaps in the rear that every officer and man of them could easily
have reached the field.
Longstreet's columns assault at every point, as rapidly as his lines
rolled back from the crest could be reformed. He had ten brigades in
front of Brannan and Steedman, while these officers had only four
unbroken in organization, and fragments of two others. One brigade of
Preston, which assaulted Wood and Hazen's line, had over 2,000 men in
the movement. The successive movements, rather the tremendous dashes of
these lines against the hill, was like the advance of breakers with
which ocean storms attack the shore. But, as surely, each wave with its
crest of steel, its spray of smoke, and its glitter of fire broke and
swept back with dead and wounded in its terrible undertow. It was
treason, but magnificent. Such was the scene which these soldiers of
Thomas saw on the Snodgrass Hill throughout the afternoon till dusk.
To relieve the left Polk was ordered at 3 o'clock, to attack in force
with the whole right wing. But it required much time to organize those
battered lines for assault, but when done, it was, indeed, formidable.
The second map will make it plain. Cleburne, with four brigades, was
deployed before Palmer and Johnson. Jackson and Polk's brigades lapped
over Baird. Cheatham was in a second line. The map gives his position
wrongly, though it is taken from the original official map in the War
Department. Ranged further to the right, and crossing the State and
Lafayette road at McDaniel's, and thus massed against the Union left,
were the divisions of Breckinridge and Liddell, Armstrong's dismounted
cavalry division of Forrest, and Forrest's artillery. While Grose, of
Preston, was assaulting Hazen and Wood this attack on the Union left
began. But, as before, the brigades that moved up to the log breastworks
were speedily shattered, though this time they took their artillery
through the thickets with them, pushing it by hand.
Once more, as the assault was made on Baird's left, there came a Union
charge across the Kelly field, the fourth for the day. This time it was
Willich, the reserve of Johnson. Withdrawing from line and facing north,
he swept along on the run and with cheers. His lines dashed into the
woods at the point where Stanley and Grose had charged before, and
without a halt sprang into the faces of the advancing Confederates.
King's regulars and Barnes gave brave help, and once more the immediate
left was cleared. The force on the road by the McDaniel house, though
unbroken, was not advanced. Later, an assault on Reynolds and Palmer was
ordered, but, naturally, it was feeble after so many repulses at the
breastworks. At half-past 5 there was quiet again along the Union left.
Longstreet, however, in front of the right, was active for another hour,
though at every point unsuccessful.
At half-after 5 General Thomas, having full discretion, decided to
withdraw to occupy the passes in his rear at McFarland and Rossville,
which controlled the roads to Chattanooga. His line was solid at every
point. Both wings of the Confederates were at bay. Their right was too
much broken to successfully assault the Union left. The Union right,
though its ammunition ran low, and its officers were constantly
searching the boxes of the killed and wounded for cartridges, was
becoming practiced in the use of the bayonet against assaulting lines,
and in spite of the persistence of Longstreet's men, had begun to feel
comfortable in its position. The whole line could have been held until
night. But daylight was wanted to set the army in orderly motion toward
the gaps which controlled the city. After that was accomplished the
darkness afforded the needed cover to complete the movement. It was
because Chattanooga, and not the Chickamauga woods, was the objective of
the campaign that the army withdrew to Rossville. It was in no sense a
military retreat.
If Thomas had not occupied these passes in the night, Bragg could have
done so, and the object he had in view would then have been
accomplished. Had Thomas allowed it, Bragg would have been only too glad
to have withdrawn from the field and "retreated" on Rossville. Thomas
did not permit it, but went there first, and Chattanooga was won.
The withdrawal involved some fighting. The movement began on the right
of Reynolds. Palmer, Johnson, and Baird were to follow in succession,
all leaving their skirmishers in their works.
Reynolds formed his brigades by the flank on each side of the Lafayette
road, King on the right and Turchin on the left. Thus he advanced
northward along the Kelly field toward Rossville. General Thomas
followed at the head of the column. As they passed a short distance
beyond the south line of the field they encountered the advancing troops
which had taken part in the last rebel attack. Instantly Thomas ordered
Reynolds to cause Turchin to file to the left, and after thus changing
front to "charge and clear them out." The line of Turchin's charge is
shown on the map. Filing into the wood to the left at double-quick, he
faced to the front while thus moving, and his lines darted at a run into
the faces of the enemy. It was one of the bravest and most brilliant,
most important and effective charges of the day--the fifth over those
Kelly fields. At the same moment King, forcing his way along the road,
fell on the flank of Liddell's division and broke it. Dan McCook, who
had been active during the day on the flank of Forrest, advanced and
opened with his artillery on the rebel rear, and after short but sharp
fighting the formidable array was driven back and the way to Rossville
was open.
Turchin and King moved by the roads to McFarland's Gap. Baird, Johnson,
and Palmer followed over the same roads. They were attacked as they left
their works and crossed the Kelly field, but order in their columns was
restored as soon as they gained the shelter of the woods on the west of
the road. Hazen and Wood then followed without molestation. Steedman
withdrew at six o'clock from the extreme right, and Brannan was left
alone on Horseshoe Ridge. The sun was down. The shadows were thickening
in the woods before him, and yet Longstreet's men remained on the
slopes, and several times appeared in detachments close along his lines.
Suddenly a line of Hindman's men were found on the slope where Steedman
had been. By some strange oversight Brannan had not been notified that
his right was unprotected. A hasty examination in the gathering dusk
showed another rebel line on the slope directly in the rear, and which
had come round through the gap where Steedman's right had been, and was
evidently forming for an assault. The Thirty-fifth Ohio, of Van
Derveer's brigade, was thrown back to face both these lines. Fragments
of five regiments more, which had opportunely arrived, were given to the
commander of the Thirty-fifth. His own regiment had one round and one in
the guns. This was placed in front. The others, with fixed bayonets,
were formed in the rear. Just before dark a rebel officer rode in on
the line and asked what troops were here. He was shot by the near
outposts.
Then came a scattering fire from the flank of the rebel line along the
ridge, next a volley from the Thirty-fifth, and a silent awaiting
results behind its line of bayonets. The volley had scattered the enemy
on the ridge, and the force in the rear had withdrawn. These were the
last shots on the right. Following them there was absolute quiet
everywhere on the field. The stillness was painful and awful. Brannan's
officers and men, peering down into the dim and smoking ravine, saw long
lines of fire creeping over the leaves, and in and out among the wounded
and the dead. It was a sight far more horrible than any of the pictured
presentations of Dante's Inferno. From this scene, with the low wailings
of the sufferers in their ears, they turned in triumph and exultant to
form the rear guard of Thomas's advance to Rossville. Turchin and
Willich fought last on the left and formed the rear guard there; Van
Derveer covered the right. And thus the Army of the Cumberland at
midnight occupied the passes which made the possession of Chattanooga
secure.
There had been no such disordered rush of the broken portions of the
army on Chattanooga as the panic-stricken correspondent of an Eastern
paper depicted, who gave visions of his own early flight to the country
as news. Only a small part of the broken wing drifted to Chattanooga.
From 7,000 to 10,000 stopped at Rossville, and were fairly organized
there. When Thomas's forces arrived the whole army was placed in
position on Missionary Ridge, and in front of it, and remained in line
of battle throughout the whole of the 21st.
At nightfall the army advanced to Chattanooga--advanced is the word; the
term "retreated," so persistently used in regard to this movement has no
place in the truthful history of this campaign. The Army of the
Cumberland was on its way to Chattanooga, the city it set out to
capture. It had halted at Chickamauga, on its line of advance, to fight
for its objective. On the night of the 21st it began its last march for
the city. Every foot of it was a march in advance, and not retreat. At
sunrise of the 22d Brannan's division, which was the rear guard, reached
the city, and the campaign for Chattanooga was at an end. Until that
morning broke the great bulk of the Army of the Cumberland had never
seen the place.
Thus, crowned with success, though won at terrible cost, closed the last
campaign of General Rosecrans. It was matchless in its strategy,
unequaled in the skill and energy with which his outnumbered army was
concentrated for battle. Its stubborn, desperate, and heroic fighting
throughout the two days' battle was not surpassed, and, judged by its
returns of dead and wounded, not equaled in any one of the great battles
of the war. It secured the city which it marched to capture. The loss
was no greater than the country would have expected at any time in
attaining that result. If Rosecrans had crossed the river in front of
the city and captured it with even greater loss, the country would have
gone wild with enthusiasm. Had he been properly supported from
Washington he would have entered it without a battle, since, if there
had been even a show of activity elsewhere, Bragg's army would not have
been nearly doubled with re-enforcements and thus enabled to march back
on Chattanooga after its retreat from the city. The reverse on the field
on Sunday was not the disaster which at the time it was declared to be,
and which it has ever since suited several writers of military fiction
to persistently represent. The account herewith presented shows that
after General Thomas consolidated his lines at 1 o'clock on Sunday not a
single position was carried and held by the enemy. The withdrawal, which
began soon after 5 o'clock, was not in any sense forced. There is not an
officer or soldier who fought on those lines but knows that they could
have been held throughout till dark.
The accepted version of Sunday's break on Rosecrans's right is that the
two corps of Crittenden and McCook were swept off the field; but only
five brigades of McCook's entire corps left the field, and the fragments
which went from Crittenden would not exceed two brigades. Palmer's and
Johnson's divisions, which fought splendidly to the end under Thomas on
the left, were respectively from Crittenden's and McCook's corps. Wood
belonged to Crittenden. Barnes's brigade, which fought on the extreme
left, and part of Dick's and Samuel Beatty's were all of Van Cleve's
division of Crittenden's corps. In other words, the large part of
Crittenden's force fought to the last. Four regiments of Wilder's
brigade of Reynolds's division were detached and cut off with the right,
and a considerable part of Negley's division of Thomas went to the rear,
chiefly through the bad conduct of its commander. We have seen, however,
how persistently and effectively Stanley's and John Beatty's brigades of
that division fought, and Beatty and General Charles Grosvenor and
Sirwell and Stoughton, of these brigades, were all found fighting like
private soldiers on the hill with Wood and Brannan to the last. The
battle of Sunday was, then, not the fight of any one corps, but of the
Army of the Cumberland. There was no disorderly retreat of the army on
Chattanooga, and nothing approaching it. The greater portion of the
right wing, which was cut off and certainly thrown into much confusion,
was reorganized at Rossville, and occupied its place in line at that
point throughout the next day and until the army moved on in the night
to occupy Chattanooga. The battle was desperate from the moment it
opened till its close. For the most part the lines fought at close range
and, in the countless assaults, often hand to hand. On the first day
there were no field works of any kind. On the second Thomas was
protected by such rude log works as could be hastily thrown together.
Brannan and Steedman were without a semblance of works. The battle in
the main, on both sides, was dogged, stand-up fighting far within the
limit of point blank range. For the second day, on the Confederate side,
the contest was one continued series of brave and magnificent assaults.