undaunted pluck and endurance. Baldwin fell on his line. Baird, with
Scribner, King, and Starkweather, held their ground, though vigorously
attacked. Preston Smith, on the Confederate side, was killed here.
Darkness put an end to the movement and the fighting, and each army
sought rest.
For the commanders of all grades it was a busy night. While the Union
line was continuous and measurably compact between the enemy and
practicable roads to Chattanooga, there was much realignment to be done
to better the position for the morrow. The Union troops obtained only
snatches of rest on ground white with frost. No fires were lighted, lest
the direction of the lines might be revealed. This made supper a dry
meal. But the fact that for most there had been no time for breakfast
and none at all for dinner, gave excellent relish even to a dry supper.
Rosecrans's purpose of establishing his lines between the enemy and
Chattanooga had been accomplished. Bragg's plan of thrusting his army
between the Union advance and the city had been defeated. At the close
of this first day victory rested with Rosecrans. He had found himself
largely outnumbered, and had thrown every available man into the fight.
Bragg had many brigades which were not engaged, and Longstreet, with the
greater part of his force, was yet to arrive. The spirit of the Union
army had risen to a high pitch under the splendid and most effective
fighting which it had done, and it looked forward to the morrow with a
confidence born of the consciousness of fighting and staying powers.
But hard as the work of the day had been, and stubborn and bitter as was
the fighting in each army, the coming Sunday was to witness a battle
eclipsing this and surpassing all the war for its pluck and deadliness.
While the weary commanders were preparing for this day, and tired
sentinels kept faithful watch, the wounded suffered and the armies
slept.
H. V. B.
WASHINGTON, _August_ 17.--[Special.]--The second and final fight for the
possession of Chattanooga opened on Sunday, September 20. We have seen
how through the preceding day, in the white heat of battle, the Union
lines had established themselves on the field of Chickamauga, and that
at nightfall they were still between Bragg and the city for which they
were fighting.
It was a cool and beautiful morning, though heavy fog hung over the
lower parts of the field, greatly impeding the preparations of each
commander. For an hour or two after daylight there were few indications
of the terrific scenes which were to be crowded into that Sabbath day.
Both sides had improved the night to rectify and strengthen the
alignment. Bragg had received important re-enforcements. General
Longstreet arrived in the night and was placed in command of the left
wing. Polk was assigned to the right wing. With Longstreet came the bulk
of his two divisions from Virginia, Hood and McLaws. Three brigades only
of the former had taken part with Hood in the first day's fight. Gist's
brigade of Walker's corps also arrived from Meridian. The Army of the
Tennessee, with all the warnings and requests of Rosecrans to the
authorities at Washington, had done nothing to prevent a general exodus
of rebel forces from Mississippi. Even a portion of Pemberton's paroled
men came, and two brigades, relieved by paroled prisoners, were in time
for the first day's battle. Bragg readjusted his lines during the night.
The most important change was to bring Breckinridge from his extreme
left, east of the Chickamauga, to the extreme right. Cleburne and
Cheatham were both moved close to Breckinridge. Forrest, with two
divisions, one to fight on foot, was placed still to the right of
Breckinridge, to observe the Lafayette road. With this heavy force,
strengthened on its extreme left with Stewart, he intended to attack the
Union left at daylight.
Rosecrans, on the other hand, had no re-enforcements with which to
relieve or help his lines, and most of his army had marched a night and
fought a day without rest and with little food, and every available man
had been engaged. Burnside had been for weeks where he could easily have
formed a junction. In fact, slowly as he had moved, his infantry had
reached Kingston about the time Rosecrans had finished concentrating his
army. It was the duty and the business of Halleck and others at
Washington to have had it on the field for the first day's battle.
It was grim business for this contracted line of Union heroes to face
the eleven divisions of infantry and two of cavalry, one of the
latter fighting as infantry, which Bragg had before them. Their only
advantage was in their shorter lines and the fact that it was necessary
for Bragg to attack, while for the most part they could remain on the
defensive. They were besides in excellent spirits and confident of their
powers.
[Illustration: CHICKAMAUGA--SECOND DAY'S BATTLE.]
A glance at the map will show the rearrangement of the Union line.
Beginning on the left, which covered Bragg's objective--namely, the
control of the Lafayette road to Chattanooga--Baird, Johnson, Palmer,
and Reynolds were withdrawn slightly from the ground on which they had
fought the day before, and placed in strong position in the edge of the
woods which skirted the Kelly farm. Brannan remained near the position
to which he had been called to support Reynolds the night before. The
divisions of Negley, Wood, Davis, and Sheridan and the brigade of Wilder
had all been drawn back of the Lafayette road, their lines being
slightly advanced from the road, leading from Crawfish Springs to the
Lafayette road at Kelly's farm.
The order of the Confederate line, from its right to a point in front of
Brannan's has already been stated. Here Stewart, of Buckner's corps,
formed the right of Longstreet, who commanded the left wing, and,
counting toward the enemy's left, the succeeding divisions were Bushrod
Johnson, with Law and Kershaw in reserve, Hindman and Preston Buckner's
corps was present with this wing by the courtesy of Burnside and the
Washington authorities, while the latter alone were responsible for the
inaction at the East which allowed Longstreet's corps to be present. By
the same courtesy Walker's division from Mississippi was present with
Hill's corps, and was to fight again, splendidly but unsuccessfully, on
Bragg's right, as it had all the day before.
Under cover the fog in the shelter of the woods, and in the painful
quiet of that Sabbath morning, the two armies had brought their lines
face to face. At 9 o'clock there was scarcely any point the length of a
tiger's spring between them.
Bragg had 212 regiments, organized into 42 brigades, and these in 7
divisions. There were in all 173 infantry regiments and 11 of cavalry,
which were dismounted and fought as infantry, 28 cavalry regiments and
50 batteries. Rosecrans had 158 regiments, 33 brigades, 14 divisions,
and 5 corps. There were 141 regiments of infantry and 18 of cavalry and
36 batteries.
Of Bragg's corps two were cavalry--Wheeler and Forrest. One division of
Forrest's fought as infantry. Rosecrans had one cavalry corps of two
divisions. This tremendous array was pushed close against a Union front
of only two miles and a half.
At 9 o'clock that Sabbath service of all the gods of war began. It broke
full-toned with its infernal music over the Union left, and that morning
service continued there till noon.
Let us look a moment at the Union line. John Beatty's brigade had been
stretched as a thin line from Baird's left to the Lafayette road and
across it. King's regulars formed the left of Baird, Scribner his
center, and Starkweather his right. He had no reserve. Johnston's
division was on the right of Baird; Dodge and Baldwin, of his brigades,
on the front, and Willich in reserve. Next was Palmer, with Cruft and
Hazen on the line, and Grose in reserve. Reynolds, on Palmer's right,
reached the Lafayette road again. He had Turchin in line and King in
reserve. The Union line was protected by log barricades. It thus ran
around the Kelley farm and was established from fifty to a hundred yards
within the woods which skirted the great open space in their rear. This
field, which lay along the State road for half a mile and was a quarter
of a mile wide, became the scene of almost continuous and ever brilliant
fighting. Beside the great battle along the main lines surrounding it,
there were during the day five distinct brigade charges over it, one of
Stanley, one of Van Derveer, one of Grose, a fourth by Willich, and a
fifth by Turchin.
Bragg's orders were to attack successively by divisions, from right to
left. Breckinridge struck first. He came on in single line, swinging
around towards the State road to gain Baird's rear. Adams was on his
right, Stovall in the center, and Helm on the left. This latter brigade
struck Scribner's breastworks, and was instantly shattered there. Helm
rode bravely among his troops, enthusiastically urging them forward, and
fell dead while thus engaged. Two of his colonels were killed, and two
were wounded.
Stovall pushed in with dauntless pluck against the regulars on the left
of Scribner, but King's men fought splendidly. The rebels assaulted
bravely but uselessly. Adams had swept in on John Beatty's thin line,
and broken it. Still it fought with undaunted courage, yielding
doggedly, and by the inch, and finally Adams, retarded by the disaster
on his left, was at bay. At this juncture came Stanley's brigade, from
Negley, near the center, with deployed lines, and the sun on its
banners. It swept over the Kelly field, from near the house, and plunged
into the woods in the rear of Beatty. Well might those who were
witnessing that threatening move toward the Union rear hold their
breaths as Stanley disappeared, and thus wait for his volleys and their
effect. In a moment they came, then his rattling line fire, then the
cheer of a charge. The first attack of Breckinridge had ended in a sore
defeat.
But Cleburne had in turn advanced. He, like Breckinridge, came in single
line. Polk, of Cleburne, assaulted Starkweather's front, while Wood of
the same command extended the attack as far as the right of Baldwin. The
remnants of Helm, under Colonel Lewis, still assisted against Scribner,
but soon Cleburne's division was repelled at every point with terrible
loss. The Confederate officers engaged describe the effect of the Union
artillery throughout this attack as the most destructive in their
experience. Thus Bragg's first attack had wholly failed. The Union
forces were exultant, and so strong were their skirmish demonstrations
that Hill, who was under orders to organize a second and much stronger
attack, paused, to first prepare his own lines against assault.
Walker's reserve corps of two divisions was brought up, and its five
brigades distributed along the shattered points of Breckinridge's and
Cleburne's lines. The organizations of rebel divisions being thus
destroyed, the attack became largely one of brigades acting
independently, each rushing at the Union works. There were ten rebel
brigades engaged in the movement from the Union left to Palmer's
position, and beyond this point Stewart's division co-operated by
assaulting Reynold's narrow front and Brannan's lines. Wood, of
Cleburne, who had previously stormed the angle of the Union works on
Johnson's right and been repulsed, assisted by Deshler, of the same
division, thinking this angle the flank of the barricades, again struck
obliquely and with fury with the idea of turning them. Instead, these
dashing Confederates went to pieces on Baldwin's brigade, of Johnson,
and on Palmer's front. Walthall assaulted the corresponding angle at
Scribner's position, and though he carried his men within pistol range
of the crests, he was beaten back with heavy loss. Gist, acting with
Helm's (now Lewis') broken line, attacked with power, but in turn was
driven back. Colquitt, still further to the right, came upon the regular
brigade of King. But his line had missed direction, and was at once
exposed to a withering flank fire, and overwhelmed. Colquitt fell.
Several of his most prominent officers were killed. Ector and Wilson, of
Walker's second division (Liddell's), advanced to help, but without
effect. Govan, however, of this same division, was successful, and by
hot fighting and the weight of numbers, he bore back John Beatty's
weakened line, and the situation on the Union left became at once most
serious. Everything but this along the line of the second attack by
Bragg's right had failed. It began to look as if rebel victory was
dawning here, and that the triumph of Bragg's plan of turning the Union
left had come.
For Breckinridge, in the second advance, had swung his lines much
farther to his right, and by a wide left wheel had brought his right
across the State road, and so between the Union left and Rossville. His
left reached and slightly overlapped Beatty's left. Thus formed with
lines perpendicular to the State road, he began a march directly toward
the Kelly house and the rear of Reynolds, just beyond it. While the
remnants of the left, so badly broken, first under Helm and then under
his successor, were entangled with Beatty and Stanley, his two other
brigades, Adams on the right and Stovall to the left, burst out of the
woods on the north side of the Kelly field, quickly rectified their
lines, threw out a heavy skirmish force, and bore rapidly down toward
Reynolds. It was half a mile to his position over smooth and open
ground. From the start the skirmishers could throw their bullets into
Reynolds rear. It was a movement threatening dire disaster. The moment
it developed in the rear of Baird, Walker's corps and Cleburne's
brigades reopened their fire on the front of the barricades, while
Stewart advanced on Reynolds and Brannan. Thus, taken on flank, front,
and full in the rear, and outnumbered at every point, it seemed as if
there was no salvation for the Union left. But it came, and at that
point where Confederate victory seemed sure, full defeat fell suddenly
upon them. Thomas watching the progress of Breckinridge's flank attack,
had sent to Rosecrans for Brannan. At that moment the battle had not
extended to the latter. But just as Rosecrans' order to go to Thomas
reached Brannan signs of heavy and immediate attack on his front became
apparent. He well used his discretion, and remained on the line until he
could report the situation to Rosecrans. But in the mean time, in
partial compliance with the order, he sent Fred Van Derveer's brigade,
which constituted his reserve, to the help of the left. This brigade
deployed, marched rapidly in to line toward the Kelly house, and came
into the field less than two hundred yards in advance of Breckinridge's
line. Though presenting its flank to the enemy when he was first
discovered, it changed front in the open ground under fire, charged the
rebel line, broke it, following it back into the woods, and after an
hours' fighting drove these two brigades with their artillery entirely
clear of the Union left. It then returned to a point near the Kelly
house.
Govan, of Walker, next on the left of Breckinridge, had, however, gained
a lodgment on the line which Beatty had so stubbornly held. Then came
another Union charge over the Kelly field. Palmer, under Thomas's
orders, sent Grose with his reserve brigade to clear Baird's immediate
left. Moving from the edge of the woods back into the open field, Grose
formed in double lines, moved at double-quick across the rear of Johnson
and Baird, and rushed with cheers into the woods on the north side of
the field. In a few moments his volleys were pouring into the face of
Govan. The latter's troops fought desperately, but their supports on
each flank had been previously broken, and soon, after bitter loss, gave
way. The Union left was then further strengthened by placing Barnes, of
Van Cleve, on the left of Beatty. It was then noon. So badly shattered
was Bragg's right that it was nearly 5 o'clock before another attack
could be organized on this ground. Thenceforth the Union left was safe.
Simultaneously with the appearance of Breckinridge in the Kelly field
events were hastening to an appalling consummation on the Union center.
Stewart, the right of Longstreet's wing, moved to the assault in
Reynold's front. With three brigades he rushed upon Turchin, who formed
Reynold's advance, and Hazen, of Palmer, next on the left, while his
left also involved Brannan's left. On his right he also had the
co-operation of Wood's and Deshler's brigades, of Cleburne. Deshler was
killed as the movement began, and Roger Q. Mills, of Texas, succeeded
him.
As this was the opening of the memorable attack which led to the break
in the Union center it is worthy of close attention. General Stewart, in
his report, thus describes it:
"For several hundred yards both lines pressed on under the most terrific
fire it has ever been my fortune to witness. The enemy retired, and our
men, though mowed down at every step, rushed on at double-quick, until
at length the brigade on the right of Brown broke in confusion, exposing
him to an enfilading fire. He continued on, however, some fifty to
seventy-five yards further, when his two right regiments gave way in
disorder and retired to their original position. His center and left,
however, followed by the gallant Clayton and indomitable Bate, pressed
on, passing the cornfield in front of the burnt house, and to a distance
of two hundred to three hundred yards beyond the Chattanooga road,
driving the enemy within his line of intrenchments and passing a battery
of four guns, which were afterward taken possession of by a regiment
from another division. Here new batteries being opened by the enemy on
our front and flank, heavily supported by infantry, it became necessary
to retire, the command reforming on the ground occupied before the
advance."
All this was going on in the front of Reynolds and Palmer, while
Breckinridge, as already described, was entering the open field from the
north in plain sight from their rear. Yet not a single Union soldier
left the line. Standing steadfast, they first resisted, as Stewart
describes, and then were incited to still greater action by the
brilliant fighting of Van Derveer in their rear, which so unexpectedly
brought them the much-needed relief.
Here the story reaches the event of the break in the Union lines, which
is widely misunderstood, and has been most unjustly used to throw
discredit on General Rosecrans. Just as Longstreet's attack was
developing upon Wood's front, the latter received an order from General
Rosecrans to "close upon Reynolds as fast as possible and support him."
As Brannan was between himself and Reynolds, Wood saw no other way of
executing the order, which he deemed imperative, except to withdraw from
line, and pass to the rear of Brannan. This he did, although the attack
was just bursting on his front.
It has been persistently claimed, to General Rosecrans's detriment, that
in the excitement of the height of battle he had issued a blundering
order. Nothing could be more unjust. The explanation is perfectly
simple. General Thomas had sent for Brannan to meet Breckinridge's flank
attack. Stewart's attack had struck Reynolds with force and was rapidly
developing on Brannan's front. The latter hastily consulted with
Reynolds as to the propriety of withdrawing, and both being clear that
to obey the order would open the line to the enemy, Brannan dispatched
Van Derveer, his reserve, to the left, in partial compliance with its
terms, and then reported to Rosecrans that he had deemed it vitally
important to maintain his line till the commanding officer could be
advised of the situation. He instantly approved Brannan's action. But
just before his message arrived, upon the supposition that he had obeyed
the order and gone to Thomas, the noted order to Wood to close to the
left on Reynolds had been dispatched. When it reached Wood, the attack,
rolling along Brannan's front, had reached his own. Had he exercised the
same discretion which Brannan had so wisely displayed, all would have
been well, and that nearly fatal break in the Union lines would not have
occurred. But instantly on reading it, Wood rapidly withdrew his
division and started in the rear of Brannan toward Reynolds. Longstreet,
who had waited most impatiently till 11 o'clock before he could move a
man to the attack, had solidified his lines before the Union center and
left, and the moment Wood left this wide gap for him, Longstreet thrust
into it the eight brigades of his central column of attack. They were
formed in three lines, and advancing rapidly they opened on Brannan's
right and rear and Davis' left, and greatly widened the gap. Brannan
threw back his right, losing something from Connell's brigade on that
flank, but, stubbornly resisting Longstreet's advance as he retired that
wing of his division, he soon re-established it on Horseshoe Ridge, near
the Snodgrass House, on a line nearly perpendicular to the one he had
occupied when Longstreet pushed through the gap left by wood. The latter
had passed rapidly to the rear of Brannan, and though subjected to heavy
attack after passing Brannan's left, he was able to establish his line
on a lower ridge in the prolongation of Brannan's new position, and
reaching in the direction of Reynolds. The latter officer soon retired
his right slightly, and the line was again continuous, except a break
between Wood and Reynolds, from Brannan's right to Barnes on Baird's
left. Into this vacant space Hazen moved later under orders from Thomas,
and then the line on that part of the field was firmly established.
All to the right of Brannan had gone. Negley, with one brigade of his
division, which was caught in the gap, had drifted toward Brannan. Here,
gathering up much artillery, which he was ordered by Thomas to post on
the crest overlooking the field in front of Baird's left, he took it
instead to Brannan's right, and soon, without waiting to be attacked in
his strong position, and although he had promised Brannan to hold it,
abandoned it, and retired in haste toward Rossville, ordering all the
artillery to follow him.
Davis had moved rapidly into the breastworks which Negley had occupied,
and there placed his weak force of two brigades across Longstreet's
advance. But after his terrific fighting of the day before he had only
twelve hundred men for action, and though Carlin, and Heg's men under
Martin, fought with desperation, they could do nothing but yield. They
were driven in disorder to the right and rear.
At the same time Van Cleve, with his two remaining brigades in motion
towards Thomas, was thrown into great disorder, though a considerable
portion of them rallied with Wood.
As Davis was borne back, McCook, of the Twentieth Corps, in person led
Laiboldt's brigade, of Sheridan's division, against Longstreet's
advancing columns. The attack was delivered with spirit and power, but
it failed in the face of overwhelming numbers, and the brigade was
utterly routed. McCook was carried to the rear with it.