forced to acknowledge that, in his negotiation concerning the
secret treaty on Belgium, he exchanged a correspondence which
did not pass through the department for foreign affairs, and
which the directing minister of this department did not know
of. "I thought it fitting," we read there, "to address to the
minister of state, M. Rouher, the letter in which I announced
my interview with M. de Bismarck, and which accompanied the
plan of the treaty relating to Belgium. M. Rouher did not lay
before the ministry, not having then undertaken the direction
of it, the correspondence which during several days I
exchanged with him." It is true that, in order to palliate
this very grave irregularity, M. Benedetti pretends that M.
Drouyn de Lhuys had offered his resignation toward the middle
of August: "At this moment there was no minister of foreign
affairs;" but we have proved to him that M. Drouyn de Lhuys
did not lose his portfolio until the 1st September, 1866. Up
to that date, M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not ceased to direct the
department, with the desire of remaining there, and of
preventing the complete abandonment of the traditional French
policy. The ambassador himself quotes in his book several
dispatches exchanged with him on grave questions, up to the
date of the 21st and 25th August (pages 204 and 223); but M.
Benedetti thought _proper_ to be silent to his immediate
chief concerning the negotiation on the subject of the treaty
on Belgium, and only to inform the minister of state. This
negotiation not only had its beginning, but also its end (it
was broken off by M. de Bismarck the 29th August), _during
the ministry of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and without his
knowledge_. This was then _one occasion_ when M. Benedetti
did not exclusively correspond with the minister of foreign
affairs! There was then _one epoch in the career_ of M.
Benedetti when he received orders which did not pass through
the Quai d'Orsay! And how suppose of the honorable M. Daru
that what had happened in the month of August, 1866, could
have also taken place in the months of March and April of the
same year?
M. Benedetti completely ignores in his protest this incident
of the treaty concerning Belgium; it is, however, the
culminating point, in fact the only grave point of the
debate, and the only one concerning which we allowed
ourselves to reproach him with having acted _without the
knowledge_, not of his government, but _of his minister_.
Would M. Benedetti perhaps find that this is an anecdotal
incident, incompatible with the dignity of history? He had in
fact first tried, in his letter published in the "Moniteur,"
the 29th July, 1870, to give to this deplorable event an
entirely anecdotal turn, to assign to the compromising
document a, so to say, spontaneous generation; he would have
wished to give only an exact account of the ideas of M. de
Bismarck, and "consented to transcribe them in a manner under
his dictation." He could not long persist in such trifling;
he had to avow in his book that he had entered on a veritable
negotiation, and M. de Bismarck has since then taken
malicious pleasure in casting light on the different phases
of this negotiation, by different extracts taken from the
papers of Cercay and published in the "Moniteur prussien," in
reply to the book of M. Benedetti. "During my long career,"
says M. Benedetti, in the preface of his book (p. 4), "I have
been charged only on three different occasions with opening
negotiations having a fixed object, and leaving me with an
initiative part proportionate to the responsibility." He
enumerates these three negotiations and proves that he
conducted them all to a good end, but he takes good care not
to include in the number his negotiations on Belgium, in
which he was given an initiative part, and in which we will
also give him his proportional part of the responsibility.
We will also leave him the tone of his polemics; it is like
his diplomacy, _sui generis_, and we can say with M. de
Bismarck: "M. Benedetti is too clever for us."
JULIAN KLACZKO.
* * * * *
THE MISSION EXTRAORDINARY OF MR. FOX.
On Monday, the 16th April (according to the Russian calendar, the 4th),
1866, an attempt was made on the life of Alexander II., Emperor of
Russia. The would-be assassin was a Russian named Dmitry Karakozoff, a
member of the order of the Nihilists. The rescuer of the Czar was a
newly-emancipated serf, Ossip Ivanovitch Komissaroff by name. The facts
of the attempted assassination are as follows: In the morning of that
day Komissaroff started for the chapel built by Peter the Great on an
island in the Neva. The bridge between the main bank and the island had,
however, been removed, and he therefore turned toward the palace quay.
On approaching the Summer Garden he joined the crowd of people waiting
to see the Emperor pass. While trying to secure a favorable position,
Komissaroff was attracted by a stranger who was attempting to force his
way to the front, and who kept his right hand constantly in his coat
pocket.
When the Emperor appeared, the man beside Komissaroff drew a pistol and
aimed it at his Majesty. He stood so near that the shot would
undoubtedly have proved fatal, had not Komissaroff struck up his arm
and caused the weapon to be discharged in the air. Karakozoff was
seized, and after trial, was executed on the 15th September. Komissaroff
was made a nobleman, and had gifts and orders showered on him by the
score. Mr. Clay, our minister to Russia, delivered a congratulatory
address to the Emperor at a special audience, and the Emperor returned
his thanks to the President and the people of the United States.
In the mean time, Congress, remembering that Russia had given our nation
its warmest sympathies and aid in our hour of peril, introduced a joint
resolution, relative to the attempted assassination of the Emperor of
Russia. The resolution was approved by President Johnson, and it was
then resolved to send a special envoy in a national vessel to carry to
the Emperor of Russia the congratulations at his providential escape.
For this delicate mission the Hon. Gustavus Vasa Fox, the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, was chosen. At his own request it was determined
to send him in a monitor, a class of vessel which had never crossed the
Atlantic, but in whose seaworthiness Mr. Fox trusted implicitly. For
this purpose the _Miantonomoh_, a two-turret monitor, to be accompanied
by two wooden men-of-war, was selected. On June 5, 1866, Mr. Fox left
St. John, N. B., for Queenstown, arriving there on June 16th. Mr. Fox
then left the _Miantonomoh_, and made short trips through England,
Ireland, and France. He rejoined the squadron at Copenhagen on Saturday,
July 21st, and after having been hospitably entertained by the king,
left on August 1st for Cronstadt. He arrived there on August 5th, and on
the following day he went to St. Petersburg and paid his respects to Mr.
Clay, the United States Minister there. On the 8th the mission was
received at Peterhof by the Emperor, assisted by Prince Gortchakof. Mr.
Fox addressed the Emperor, who replied to him through Prince
Gortchakof. On August 9th his Majesty visited the ships at Cronstadt.
For more than a month a series of dinners and balls were given in honor
of the mission, and Mr. Fox's progress throughout the country was a
perfect ovation. He was made honorary citizen of all the large cities;
he received delegations of peasants, and was honored with rich presents
from the Emperor. The tact and eminent social qualities which he
displayed, made this altogether unique mission successful, and greatly
strengthened the warm ties which exist between the two countries. It
will be seen that M. Klaczko erroneously calls Mr. Fox "assistant
secretary of state."
FOOTNOTES:
[146] We have said: "How could he undertake to present to M. de Bismarck
the _demands of the cabinet of the Tuileries_?" and M. Benedetti sees in
the word undertake the insinuation of an initiative. We have, however,
very explicitly said, _The demands of the cabinet of the Tuileries_, and
we immediately added M. Benedetti's own expressions: "_I have provoked
nothing_, still less have I guaranteed the success; I have only allowed
myself to _hope_ for it." None of our readers could mistake the meaning
of our words, nor, above all, see therein the insinuation which M.
Benedetti gratuitously credits us with.
[147] "_Del Conte Bismarck dice (M. de Benedetti) che e un diplomatico
per cosi dire_ MANIACO; _che da quindici anni che to conosce e lo_
SEGUE."--Report of General Govone, 6th April, 1866. La Marmora, p. 139.
[148] La Marmora, p. 110.
[149] See the _Revue_ of the 15th September, and the 1st October, 1868.
* * * * *
Transcriber's note:
Obvious spelling and punctuation errors have been corrected.
Both clear-sighted and clearsighted, re-formed and reformed, Lauenberg
and Lauenburg, and Leipsic and Leipzig, were used equally in this text
and were retained. Herzegovania and Herzegovina were also retained.
Changes were made to the original as follows:
"Wurtemberg" to "Wuertemberg."
"Hotel" to more frequent "Hotel."
"Moskova" to more frequent "Moscova."
"Over-excited" to more frequent unhyphenated uses, "overexcited."
P. 122, Chapter III, Section heading "I." which is implied but not
present in the original was added.
P. 181, "hotbed" to more frequent "hot-bed."
P. 243, single occurrence of "Slavic" changed to much more frequent
"Sclavic"(22).
P. 258, "Obrenovitch" standardized to "Obrenovitch."