months later he avowed that he would not have been sorry to have ended
his life then. Austria was vanquished, it is true; she had lost two
great battles and one of the richest provinces; but Prussia had not
drawn any material, palpable advantage from this disaster of the
Hapsburg, and the cavalier of the Mark was not the man to cherish, like
his friend Alexander Mikhailovitch, a purely Platonic hatred. He
consoled himself, however, by the thought that the peace of Villafranca
was only a truce: "to wish in the present state of affairs to seriously
reconcile Austria with France, is to labor at the squaring of the
circle." "I shall endeavor," he wrote at the approach of autumn, 1859,
"to cower in my bear-skin, and to bury myself in the snow; in the thaw
of next May, I will see what remains of me and our affairs; if too
little I shall definitely settle with politics." The following month of
May brought grave events; the annexation of Savoy became the signal for
the greatest distrust in Europe, of which we have spoken above: but the
cabinet of Berlin persisted in its ancient course, and the prince regent
had, in July, an interview with the Emperor Francis Joseph at Toeplitz.
"I learn," wrote the representative of Prussia at the court of St.
Petersburg with undisguised spite, "that we have been shaved at
Toeplitz, splendidly shaved; we have let ourselves be taken in by the
Viennese good nature. And all that for nothing, not even the smallest
plate of lentils." At last, in the month of October, after Castelfidardo
and the conquest of the kingdom of Naples, the cabinet of Berlin
addressed an energetic note to M. de Cavour, on the bearing of the House
of Savoy on the Italian peninsula. The note established that "it is
solely in the legal manner of reforms, and in respecting the existing
rights, that a regular government is allowed to realize the legitimate
wishes of nations," and closes by the following passage: "Called to
express ourselves on the acts and principles of the Sardinian
government, we can only deplore them profoundly, and we believe that we
are fulfilling a rigorous duty by expressing in the most explicit and
formal manner our disapprobation, both of those principles and of the
application which has been thought could be made of them." One can
imagine what bad humor such _naivetes_ would cause to the future
destroyer of the _Bund_, to the future spoliator of Denmark, of Hanover,
and so many other states. He again thought of leaving the career; he
resolved in any case to "cling to the situation of an observer," as
regards the monstrous policy which was pursued at Berlin. He is
perfectly astonished at the scandal which is caused on the banks of the
Spree by the publication of the posthumous journal of M. de Varnhagen, a
journal full of piquant revelations concerning the court of Prussia.
"Why be so indignant. Is it not taken from life? Varnhagen is vain and
_mechant_, but who is not? Does it not all depend on the manner in which
nature has ripened our lives? According to what we have suffered from
the bites of worms, from dampness, or from the sun, behold us sweet,
sour, or rotten."
That did not hinder him, however, from carefully cultivating, during
these years 1859-1860, his relations with the political world of St.
Petersburg from taking root there, and from attaching by a thousand ties
the fortune of his country to this friendship of Russia, of which he
understood all the value. The position of the representatives of Prussia
has always been exceptional at St. Petersburg; thanks to the near
relationship of the two courts, they enjoyed in the winter palace a
confidence and intimacy which the envoys of other states scarcely ever
obtained there. M. de Bismarck was able to add to these favorable
conditions the influence of his personal merit, and the good reputation
which he had acquired, in a Russian point of view, during his long
sojourn at Frankfort. His former journeys in Courland had made him
known and liked by the German nobility of the Baltic Provinces, by the
Keyserlingk, the Uxkuell, the Nolde, the Bruvern, etc., always so
influential at court, in the chancellor's office, and in Russian
diplomacy. "The first prophets of the future greatness of M. de
Bismarck," says an author very _au fait_ in the society of St.
Petersburg, "the first who predicted the providential mission which was
reserved for him in Germany, were perhaps those barons of Courland and
Livonia with whom the present chancellor of Germany had so often passed
the hunting season, shared their amusements, their banquets, and their
political conversations."[32] The representative of Prussia at the court
of St. Petersburg took care, however, not to give himself up too much to
this liking for the Courlanders and Livonians; he was careful to place
in his affections, or at least in his demonstrations, the greatest part
in Russian Russia, autochthonal Muscovy (_nastaiastchaia_). This
enthusiasm for the customs and genius of the "Scythians," this love for
the "bear-skin and caviare," was it very sincere? We may perhaps doubt
it; it is allowable to suppose that the man who, in the name of his
Germanic superiority, has so often and boldly expressed his disdain for
the _Welches_ and Latins, feels at bottom a still greater contempt for
that Sclavic race which every good German makes rhyme with slave
(_slave-esclave_).[33] However that may be, never did foreign
ambassador on the banks of the Neva have so much devotion as the
cavalier of the Mark for the polar stars, or pushed as far as he did the
passion of local color. He pushed it so far as to introduce into his
house several little bears which (as formerly the foxes at Kniephof)
came, at the dinner hour, bounding into the dining hall, agreeably
deranging the _convives_, licking the hand of their master, and "biting
the calves of the servants' legs."[34] A worthy Nimrod, he never missed
an expedition against the black king of the boreal forests; he did not
fail to don on these occasions the Muscovite hunting costume, and the
team of horses _a la Russe_ has remained dear to him up to the present,
and even in the streets of Berlin. He also affected to interest himself
greatly in the literary movement of the country; he had a Russian
professor in his house, and he learned enough of it to be able to give
his orders to those people in their native idiom, even to delightfully
surprise one day the Emperor Alexander with some phrases pronounced in
the language of Pouchkine.
The Russians could not help giving a most cordial reception to a
diplomat who showed himself so taken with their usages and customs, with
their pleasures and their "peculiarities," and who, moreover, had the
advantage of succeeding to that good M. de Werther, whose reputation,
neither there nor anywhere else, was exactly that of a too hilarious
character. On the contrary, they had never known on the banks of the
Neva a Prussian as gay as this excellent M. de Bismarck, as good a
fellow, as good a liver, having a loud laugh, coarse jests, and a witty
speech. He indulged in all sorts of pleasantries at the expense of the
"Philistines of the Spree," the "old fogies of Potsdam," which gave him
no small success: a minister plenipotentiary slandering his own
government, a grumbling, fault-finding diplomat in the very political
sphere which he had the mission to represent and to second, that was an
originality which could be appreciated by a world always on the watch
for the _piquant_ and pleasing. He knew how to please the empress-mother
Helen, whose influence at court was considerable, and whose warm support
never failed him in consequence, in the most grave moments of his career
as minister. The emperor had conceived a great affection for him,
invited him regularly to his bear hunts, and did him the honor of
admitting him in his _cortege_ during his journeys to Warsaw and Breslau
to meet the Prince Regent of Prussia. As for Prince Gortchakof, he
enjoyed more than ever the society of his former colleague of Frankfort,
and the _salons_ often repeated a malicious _mot, a mechant_ insinuation
of which Austria generally had to bear the brunt, and the paternity of
which they indifferently attributed first to one then to the other of
these two friends, grown inseparable, and whom spiteful intrigues
nevertheless wished to separate! At the end of 1859, M. de Bismarck
wrote in a confidential letter: "Austria and its dear confederates are
intriguing at Berlin to have me recalled from here: I am, however, very
amiable. God's will be done!"
At Berlin, in the mean time, they began little by little to glide down a
declivity, which would have caused Prussian politics to descend rapidly
from the cloudy regions of the _new era_ upon that ground of realities
and of action to which the tried friend of Alexander Mikhailovitch had
so long invited them, and, curiously enough, it was precisely the
mobilization of the Prussian army in 1859, the mobilization so condemned
by M. de Bismarck, which was the immediate cause of this sudden revival
fraught with incalculable consequences. It is fashionable now in France
to represent the Prussian government as having meditated for half a
century a war of revenge and conquest, slowly brightening their arms,
and training a succession of generations for the decisive hour of
combat. There is nothing more false, however. Neither the government of
Frederick William III., nor that of Frederick William IV. ever cherished
warlike projects, and even the humiliation of Olmuetz was not an
incentive to the minister of war at Berlin. The two predecessors of
William I. only sacrificed to the military spirit just that which was
necessary to insure them a stand among the great Powers, to hold
reviews, and to be able to speak of their faithful troops, and of their
always valiant swords; at bottom, they were not far from thinking like
the Grand Duke Constantine, the brother of the Emperor Nicholas, who one
day said naively: "I detest war, it spoils the armies!" The swords of
Bluecher and Scharnhorst were sheathed since 1815; even the adoption of
the needle gun in 1847 was only an accident, rather a scientific
experiment; in 1848 and 1849, the Prussian troops did not shine with
marvelous _eclat_ in the war of the Duchies, and were even miserably
held in check by the undisciplined bands of the insurrection of Posen
and Baden. The brother of the king, who had commanded the troops in
Baden, was grievously moved at the sight which his soldiers then
presented, and, having become regent of the kingdom (October, 1858), he
immediately turned his attention to military reform. Nevertheless it was
only the mobilization attempted during the Italian complications (in the
summer of 1859) which opened their eyes to all the grave inconveniences
and incoherencies of the organization till then in force. Two superior
men, MM. de Moltke and de Roon, joined with the prince regent in
remodeling the system from the very bottom. They displayed in it an
intelligence, an energy, and a rapidity without equal in history; they
knew how to profit by all the discoveries of science, and above all did
not let the great lesson escape them which a formidable civil war in
North America soon taught, a war so rich in experiments and inventions
of every kind. In spite of the obstacles which were thrown in their way
without cessation from all sides, these two men, at the end of six
years, produced an armed force, entirely new, powerful, invincible; and
"the instrument," still rough and rudimentary in 1860, proved its ill
omened "perfection" on the calamitous day of Sadowa! Not less erroneous
is the opinion, very generally spread, however, that the Prussian people
had demanded of its government victories and aggrandizement; to refute
these perfectly gratuitous suppositions, it suffices to remember that
the different parliaments of Berlin did not cease to oppose military
reform, and that they had on their side the almost unanimous voice of
the people. The ideas of German greatness, of German power, of the
German mission, haunt the imagination of professors and authors much
more than that of the people; they were academic themes, choice morsels
of rhetoric and opposition, still they are much more in vogue south of
the Main than north of this river,--and precisely there appears the
astounding art of M. de Bismarck in having known how, to speak with
Muenchausen, "to condense mists into stones of size for a gigantic
edifice," and to make of a dream of _savans_ a popular passion. The
force of will, the force of character, and in one word the genius, can
still, even in a century of democratic leveling and uniform mediocrity
play a _role_, of which our poor philosophy of history scarcely had a
suspicion, which drowns so skillfully all responsibility and initiative
in the blind fatality of the "masses," and, as a Teutonic proverb says,
cannot distinguish the trees on account of looking at the forest. Take
from the most recent history of Prussia three or four men who answer to
the names of William I., Moltke, Roon, and Bismarck, and the old
Barbarossa would very probably up to the present time have continued his
secular sleep in the cave of the Kyffhaeuser.
Nature delights as well in analogies as in contrasts, and it is thus
that the antecedents of this prince regent, who to-day bears the name of
William I., Emperor of Germany, does not fail to present some similarity
with the past of the extraordinary man, who, at the destined hour, was
to forge for him, _ferro et igne_, the imperial crown of Barbarossa. In
order to be enlightened concerning these antecedents, it is necessary
to turn to the posthumous "Journal" of M. Varnhagen von Ense,--the
liberal, crabbed Dangeau, compromising in the highest degree, amiable as
a whole, of the court of Berlin,--the same "Journal" whose defense we
have seen M. de Bismarck undertake in a confidential letter, against the
clamors which this publication had awakened in the capital of Prussia.
There is no doubt that Prince William made an energetic opposition to
the liberal desires which had signaled the _debuts_ of the reign of his
brother, King Frederick William IV. He had begun to work out at this
epoch _memoirs for consulting_ which established his right of _veto_ in
every amendment of the fundamental laws of the state. The rumor of a
formal protest in his name and in that of his descendants against every
project of constitution, found credit for a moment even in the heart of
the ministry; and under no conditions would he give his consent to the
feudal "charter" granted by his brother the 3d of February, 1847, except
on the express reservation that the States should not decide on the
budget, and should never occupy themselves with foreign affairs. And the
unpopularity of the heir presumptive was great before the revolution of
1848; during the fatal month of March of that year, it was against him
especially that the fury of the inhabitants of Berlin was let loose, who
attributed to him (and wrongly) the order given to the troops to fire on
the people. He was then forced to leave the country on a "mission" to
London, and the multitude did not forego the satisfaction of inscribing
on the palace of the fugitive the words of _national property_. Returned
from England after the appeasement of the revolutionary effervescence,
he placed himself, in 1849, at the head of the troops to stifle in Baden
a ridiculous insurrection, and feigned "important military operations,"
which kept him in the south of Germany, so as not to be present at the
solemn session of the 6th February, 1850, when King Frederick William
IV. took his oath to the definite statute.
Afterwards, however, especially towards the last years of the
disenchanted and morose reign of his brother, the Prince of Prussia
commenced to relax in his "reactionary" vigor, and especially made a
sufficiently marked opposition to the "pietist" influences at the court
of Potsdam. Affections and family considerations contributed also in
creating for the prince a peculiar situation. The esteem and tenderness
with which Frederick William IV. surrounded his wife did not always
console her for the sterility with which she was afflicted, and the
sight of a sister-in-law a happy mother of children destined for the
throne, probably to be called some day to occupy the throne, produced
coolness and irritation which the wife of the heir presumptive sharply
resented. The Princess Augusta was not of a disposition to bear certain
thrusts. Sprung from that House of Weimar which was always distinguished
by its taste for arts and pleasure, she early had her own acquaintances,
friendships, and a bearing sufficiently different from the ordinary way
of the court to resemble occasionally a divergence sought after with
intention. The wishes of the Princess Augusta did not fail to finally
exercise their influence on her husband, and the project, long nursed
by the august couple, realized at last in 1857, of uniting their eldest
son with the daughter of Queen Victoria, was regarded as the first
concession made to popular opinion. In fact, courtiers were not wanting
at Potsdam, the terrible M. de Varnhagen tells us, who asked in their
soul and conscience if it were quite worthy of the House of Hohenzollern
to ally itself by blood with a dynasty which was only half sovereign,
and held in dependence by a house of commons! How the times and customs
have changed at this court of Potsdam which last year saw the heiress
presumptive of the throne of Prussia and Germany, this same daughter of
Queen Victoria, send affectionate telegrams to Doctor Strauss when
dying, and render to the author of the "Life of Jesus" an homage _in
extremis_ which transported with enthusiasm all the valiant cavaliers of
the _combat of civilization_!
Habituated in a manner, and for several years already, to consider the
brother of the king as reconciled to modern ideas and favorable to the
cause of progress, the nation was much less astonished than charmed to
hear him, on his accepting the regency, use liberal and constitutional
language. A "new era" was to commence for Prussia; that word was almost
officially adopted to designate the change of system, and in a memorable
address, delivered on the 8th November, 1858, to the cabinet which he
had formed, the prince regent sketched the programme of a reparative
policy. He besought his councilors to bring about ameliorations in that
which was arbitrary or contrary to the wants of the epoch. While
defending himself against a dangerous _laisser aller_ towards liberal
ideas, and expressing the will "to courageously hinder that which has
not been promised," he did not the less proclaim the duty of keeping
with loyalty the contracted engagements, and of not hindering useful
reforms. The address ended with the phrase become celebrated, and since
then so frequently cited, "that Prussia should make '_moral conquests in
Germany_.'"
The harmony between the regent and the nation was not, however, of long
duration; the relations were not slow in cooling and proceeding towards
a complete rupture, thanks especially to the projected reform of the
army. The prince had this reform at heart: the wants of 1859 had only
convinced him of the absolute urgency of a measure with which his mind
had been occupied for many years; but the deputies of the nation refused
to follow him in this road, and opposed him tenaciously and firmly. They
did not understand the obstinacy which the prince displayed in a project
which answered neither to the wants nor to the aspirations of the
country, and they laughed at those who pretended that once in possession
of his new "instrument," the Hohenzollern, would _do great things_! They
had resisted judiciously, says a German author, the temptation of the
parliament of Frankfort in 1849, and the provocation of Olmuetz in 1850;
they had let pass the opportunities which the wars of 1854 and 1859
presented. The love of peace was absolute, there was a complete absence
of ambition, they were perfectly resigned to the political situation
which they occupied, and on the other side no one wished to admit that
a kingdom so peaceable could be menaced by neighbors. In such a state of
affairs, every aggrandizement of the army drawing after it an increase
of military and financial charges, already heavy enough for the
citizens, only seemed to the country an inconceivable caprice of its
rulers.[35] The chambers refused the demanded credit; the government
went its way and continued its expenditures. The military question thus
became a question of budget, and soon transformed itself into an
irremediable constitutional conflict. Towards the end of 1861, no other
remedy could be seen for the situation but a _coup d'etat_.
Not less profound and irresistible was soon the change in the ideas of
the court of Potsdam, as regarded the external policy. In proportion as
the "instrument" perfected itself (and it perfected itself rapidly), one
began to ask one's self about the most practical and fruitful employment
for it. One did not yet distinctly know what one wished, but one wished
it with strength, with the strength which one drew from the battalions
increasing without cessation. Assuredly one always saw nothing but moral
conquests in Germany, but one thought that a moral in action, aided
somewhat by needle guns, would give excellent results. The atmosphere
was charged with electricity and with the principles of nationality, and
it was not only the professors and orators of the _National Verein_ who
recommended a "united Germany with a Prussian point (_mit preussischer
Spitze_)." When, in the month of October, 1860, the envoy of Prussia,
Count Brassier de Saint-Simon, read to Count Cavour the famous note of
M. de Schleinitz against the Italian annexations, the president of the
Sardinian council listened in silence to the harangue, then expressed
his great regret at having displeased the government of Berlin on this
point, but declared that he consoled himself with the thought that
"Prussia would one day, thanks to Piedmont, profit by the example which
he had given it." In France, the journals of the democratic authority,
the devoted organs of the "new right," did not cease to praise the
"Piedmontese mission" of the House of Hohenzollern, and we have recalled
above the encouragements which Napoleon III. sent to Berlin after 1858.
The visit made by King William I.[36] to the Emperor of the French at
Compiegne in the month of October, 1861, was in this respect a symptom
more significant, since none of the sovereigns of the North had till
then given this mark of courtesy to the choice of universal suffrage.
Strange rumors began to spread concerning the alliance of the three
courts of the Tuileries, of St. Petersburg, and of Berlin, and they
continued up to the month of March, 1863. Publications of mysterious
origin, but which denoted a very specious knowledge of political
affairs, spoke of the "_great combination of states_ summing up in three
races,--the Roman, Germanic, and Sclavic,--to which corresponded three
centres of gravity, France, Prussia, and Russia, and of the definite
establishment of the peace of the world by means of a _triple alliance
of universal monarchies_, in which their full expression (_Abschluss_)
would not only find the three principal races of the European system,
but also the three great Christian churches!"[37] Lord Palmerston
declared at this very epoch in parliament, with his Britannic
_desinvolture_, "that the situation seemed pregnant with at least half a
dozen respectable wars;" and in spite of the obscurity which still
covers the transactions of the years 1861-1862, it is not doubtful that
Napoleon III. had then occasionally brought up in his scheming mind a
combination embracing at once the Orient and the Occident, a combination
as vague as gigantic, and of which Prince Gortchakof prepared to profit
with his tried dexterity. Whatever these shadowy projects were, the
Hohenzollern had only to be satisfied with his sojourn at Compiegne,
which he was to recall with a certain tenderness two years later in his
polite reply to the invitation of the Congress. In October, 1861,
Napoleon III., at Compiegne, probably made use of no other language than
that which he had used in 1858 at Berlin by the mediation of the Marquis
Pepoli, the fatidical language, "on the great destinies which awaited
Prussia in Germany, and which Germany expected from it."