IBRAHIM THE GENERAL
Suleiman’s reign was one of continuous war, and for the most part,
conquest. His two most redoubtable enemies were the infidel Hungarians
and the heretic Persians. His first great campaign was directed
against Belgrad, which important city he took in 1521. This conquest
he followed quickly by the victorious siege of Rhodes in 1522. In
these two campaigns, Ibrahim seems to have taken no part, although he
accompanied Suleiman to Rhodes in his capacity of favorite.[144] But in
the first Hungarian campaign the grand vizir Ibrahim was placed second
in command, the sultan himself leading the expedition.
D’Ohsson gives an account of the ceremonial that used to precede war
in Turkey.[145] He says that the Porte never failed to legitimize a
war by a _fetva_ from the Sheik‐ul‐Islam given in grand council, after
which the sheiks of the imperial mosques met in the Hall of the Divan
and listened to the intoning of a chapter from the Koran, consecrated
to military expeditions. The first war measure was the arrest of the
ambassador of the country to be attacked, who was taken to the Seven
Towers. The next day a manifesto was published and sent to each foreign
legation; then followed a _Hat‐i‐Shereef_ conferring command on the
grand vizir. With the order he received a richly caparisoned steed
and a jeweled sabre, at a most brilliant ceremonial. Generally war was
declared in the autumn, the winter was occupied in preparation, and the
campaign was undertaken in the spring. At the day and hour appointed by
the court astrologer, the imperial standard was planted in the court
of the grand vizir or the Sultan, while imams[146] filled the air with
blessings and chants. Forty days later the first encampment was set up
with further ceremonies.
The splendor of the Turkish tents, arms and dress were admired by all
observers. A Turkish camp was a lively place, crowded by priests,
dervishes, adventurers and volunteers, irregular soldiers, servants,
tents, and baggage; and, on the homeward way, laden with slaves and
booty.
The Turkish army was at that time the finest in Europe, both in extent
and discipline. The Turks were a fighting people, whose arms had
steadily won them place and power from the time when their colonel
Othman interfered in a Seljuk quarrel to the time when Suleiman’s
armies were the terror of Europe, and the few hundred tents of Othman
had become the extensive and powerful Ottoman Empire. The army grew
and developed with the demands of the state, for as we have seen
above, the army _was_ the state. As Mr. Urquhart puts it:[147] “The
military branch includes the whole state. The army was the estates of
the kingdom. The Army had its Courts of Law, and its operations on the
field have never been abandoned to the caprice of a court or a cabinet.”
Mr. Urquhart classifies the Turkish army under three main heads:[148]
I. Permanent troops: janissaries, hired cavalry and regimental spahis
of the grand artillery, etc.
II. Feudal troops.
III. Provincial troops (_Ayalet Askeri_).
He reckoned the number of troops at the close of the sixteenth century
as follows:
PERMANENT.
Janissaries 50,000
Spahis 250,000
Artillery, armourers, etc. 50,000
Guards besides those drafted from Janissaries and Spahis—war levies:
Akinji 40,000
Ayab 100,000
Ayalet Askeri (cavalry) 40,000
Miri Askeri (infantry) 100,000
Some explanation of these names will be desirable. The feudal and
provincial troops were those whose military service was demanded by
the feudal tenure of the _timars_ or fiefs. Of the permanent troops,
the celebrated body of the Spahis was recruited from the fiefs, sons
of the Spahis being preferred, and were required to follow the banner
of the Sultan himself. The Akinji were the light horse, the terror
of the Germans and the Hungarians. The Ayab were infantry, a sort of
Cossack on foot, as the Akinjis were Cossacks on horseback—without
either the pay of the janissaries or the fiefs of the spahis. The
famous corps of the janissaries was the heart of the army,—the most
privileged, the most terrible, the most efficient of the soldiery.
They were recruited from the children, taken in tribute from the
conquered Christian states, a thousand a year, and generally became
Moslems. The janissaries, the artillery and the guards were the only
soldiery paid from the treasury. The Turkish conquerors made war pay
for itself, living on the conquered country and carrying home immense
loot. At the close of his careful pamphlet, Mr. Urquhart makes an
interesting distinction between Janissary and Turkish principles. He
claims that the former are “violence, corruption, and prostration of
military strength, exhaustion of the treasury, resistance to all, and
therefore to beneficial, change.” The Turkish principles, he claims,
are altogether different and finer.[149]
The Turkish artillery was very formidable. It was by means of this and
the setting of mines that Belgrad and Rhodes had been taken. There was
no navy. There were a number of pirates, freebooters who put themselves
at the service of the Sultan and won some considerable naval victories,
but they were not a part of the regular Turkish force.
One constant order of battle was observed. The provincial troops
of Asia formed the right wing, and those of Europe the left, the
center being composed of regular bodies of cavalry and infantry, the
janissaries forming the front line. In Europe the home contingents
occupied the right wing. Thus were combined permanent and disciplined
infantry and cavalry with irregular foot and horse; a feudal
establishment with provincial armaments, and forces raised by
conscription, by enlistment, and by tribute. By this arrangement the
sultan could bring three enormous armies into the field simultaneously
in the heart of Europe and Asia.[150]
A quaint description of the discipline of the Turkish army in 1585
was given by one William Watreman in his book entitled “The Fardle of
Facions”, who thought that the speed, the courage and the obedience of
the Turkish soldiers accounted easily for their great success in war
for two hundred years,[151] and said that they were little given to
mutinies and “stirs”.
Watreman was evidently not speaking of the privileged janissaries
here, for they were greatly given to mutinies and “stirs.” They
realized the immense power that the army possessed, and how definitely
the sultan was in their hands. That part of the army stationed at
Constantinople as guard to His Imperial Majesty had it in their power
to demand the degradation and the head of any hated official, and
usually these demands were granted. Authorized by the laws of their
predecessors and their own as well, they might furthermore imprison
the sultan himself, put him to death, and place on the throne one of
his relatives as his successor. When all the corps of this militia
of Constantinople unite under the orders of the Ulema, who give the
weight of law to the undertaking, the despotic sultan passes from the
throne to a prison cell, where a mysterious and illegal death soon
removes him.[152] The long list of deposed sultans witnesses to this
power. Little wonder then that Suleiman, after punishing the rebellious
janissaries in 1525, planned to employ them immediately in a campaign.
On Monday, April 23rd, Suleiman left Constantinople with 100,000 men
and 300 cannon.[153] His grand vizir had started a week in advance,
commanding the vanguard of the army, largely cavalry. At Sophia both
armies encamped, and the grand vizir is said to have “dressed his tent
like a tulip in purple veilings.”[154] From this point the two armies
separated. Ibrahim Pasha threw a bridge across the Save, and advanced
to Peterwardein, a natural fort on the foot‐hills of the Fruska‐Gora
mountains, which was manned by a thousand poorly equipped soldiers.
Suleiman ordered Ibrahim Pasha to take Peterwardein, assuring him it
would be but a bite to last him till breakfast in Vienna.[155] The
sultan then proceeded to Belgrad. The grand vizir began preparations
for the siege, storming ladders were laid, and on July 15th the first
attack was made and repulsed with loss. The next night Ibrahim sent a
division of the army to the other side of the Danube, and the fight
continued all the following day until late evening, both by river
and land, a flotilla of small boats being on the Danube. In a second
assault the Turks pressed into the lower city, but they were again
repulsed. Ibrahim, convinced that storming was less easy then he had
thought, now prepared for a regular siege. After several day’s fighting
a great building in the fort fell, and the walls were broached in
several places. Nevertheless the besieged withstood two more assaults,
and made a sally by which the Turks sustained great loss. At length
Ibrahim laid mines under the walls of the fort, and on the 23rd day of
July, twelve days from the first attack, an explosion, followed by a
great assault and hard fighting, resulted in the taking of the place.
Only ninety men were left to lay down their arms. The Turkish loss also
had been heavy.[156]
The successful siege, and doubtless also the rich reward of his
padisha, decided Ibrahim Pasha to besiege Illok on the Danube, which he
took in seven days. The sultan now announced that the objective point
of the expedition was Buda. The Turkish army advanced along the Danube,
devastating as it went, to the marshy plain of Mohacz. Here there was
a battle of the first importance in its political results, as we have
seen above, for it routed the Hungarian army, killed King Lewis, and
gave Hungary into Suleiman’s hands. It was a brief and bloody battle,
lasting but two hours. Petchevi gives picturesque scenes before the
battle, and tells of the vast enthusiasm that seized “the holy army”,
while Kemalpashazadeh gloats particularly on “the bloody festival.”
The plan of the battle was made by the sultan in conjunction with his
grand vizir, who visited the former several times during the evening
preceding the battle. At dawn on August 29th, 1526, the Turkish army
emerged from a wood and appeared before the Hungarians. First came
the army of Roumelie, a part of the janissaries, and the artillery
under Ibrahim Pasha. Then came 10,000 janissaries and the artillery of
Anatolia under Behram Pasha; behind him was the Sultan and his body
guards, janissaries and cavalry.
Towards noon the Sultan occupied the height commanding the town and
saw his enemies ranged before him. The first attack was made by the
Hungarians and was successful in producing confusion in the Turkish
ranks. But the Turks rallied, and the Akinjis drew off the attack.
Ibrahim was always in the forefront, animating his men and “fighting
like a lion.” “By acts of intrepidity he snatched from the hearts
of his heroes the arrow of the fear of death. He restored their
failing spirits. Before the most fearful weapons he never moved
an eyelash.”[157] King Lewis, with thirty brave followers, pushed
towards the Sultan in a desperate attempt to take his life, but it was
the young king himself who fell instead in the terrible fight. The
artillery, discharging its first volley, caused frightful confusion
especially in the left wing. The Hungarian right wing, surrounded on
all sides, broke and fled, being cut down by the Turks, or drowned in
the marsh. The slaughter was fearful, as no prisoners were taken.[158]
The battle was so tragic to the Hungarians that to this day, when
disaster overtakes one of them, the proverb is quoted: “No matter, more
was lost on Mohacz field.”[159]
The artillery of the grand vizir seems to have turned the day and
rendered the victory decisive for the Turks. The following day
Suleiman, seated under a scarlet pavillion, on a golden throne brought
from Constantinople, received the congratulations of his vizirs and
beylerbeys and with his own hand placed an aigrette of diamonds on the
head of his grand vizir. In gruesome contrast to this splendor was a
pyramid of one thousand heads of noble Hungarians piled before the
imperial tent. Mohacz was burned, and the Akinjis harried the country
in horrid fashion,[160] while the main army marched on to Buda. Here
the keys of the city were offered to Suleiman, and the campaign was
ended, except for the march back to Constantinople, with its details of
massacre and spoliation.[161]
The credit for this successful Hungarian campaign is ascribed to
the grand vizir by three very good authorities. Ibrahim himself,
in a speech to the ambassador von Zara, claims to have conquered
Hungary:[162] the sultan, in a letter of victory to his provinces,
gives honor to Ibrahim; and the sheik‐ul‐Islam Kemalpashazadeh, in his
epic history of the battle of Mohacz, lavishes praise on the grand
vizir as commander of the armies on that field. “Heaven has never
seen,” he rhapsodizes, “and never will see a combat equal to that by
the prince of the champions of the faith, of this Asaf of Wisdom,
this experienced general, this lion‐hearted Ardeshir, I mean Ibrahim
Pasha.[163] The enemy of the enemies of the Holy War, in an instant he
repulsed the shock of the enemies of the faith.”[164]
Suleiman in his letter gives Ibrahim credit for the taking of
Peterwardein and Illok. As to Mohacz he says:[165]
“The accursed king (Lewis) accompanied by the soldiers
of perdition fell before the army of Roumelie, which was
commanded by the Beylerbey of Roumelie, my grand vizir,
Ibrahim Pasha (May Allah glorify him eternally!). It was then
that the hero displayed all his innate valor.”
The first mention of Ibrahim in this letter is in the following terms:
“The leopard of strength and valor, the tiger of the forest
of courage, the hero filled with a holy zeal, the Rustem of
the arena of victory, the lion of the restoration of dominion,
the precious pearl of the ocean of all power, the champion of
the faith, the Grand Vizir, Beylerbey of Roumelie, Ibrahim
Pasha.”[166]
The flowers of the Sultan’s rhetoric may be accepted as a matter of
course, but the fact that he mentions Ibrahim as deserving of any share
in the glory of the imperial conquests is noteworthy, as in his letters
of victory he usually reserves all the honor for Allah and himself.[167]
The campaign of Vienna was the next military event for Ibrahim. It was
on the eve of this expedition that Suleiman invested the grand vizir
with the office of Serasker.[168]
Says Petchevi:
One day, going from the Divan to the Vizir Khaneh, the great
Lord and Conqueror calling the slaves before his presence
addressed them with eloquent and pearl‐scattering words
and with divine proceedings, saying: “Nothing prevents our
extending our arms at once to all parts of our land, but in
every case we cannot personally conduct affairs. Therefore we
formulate a _berat‐i‐shereef_ that Ibrahim Pasha, in the name
of Serasker may receive obedience and respect.”
Here Petchevi quotes the berat that was given in Chapter III, and then
continues with an account of the splendid presents sent to Ibrahim with
the berat, and the congratulations of all the ulema and vizirs.[169]
According to D’Ohsson, the investiture of Ibrahim was unusually
splendid and solemn. He tells of processions in the streets and visits
to the palace and continued cermonial after the army had started. When
the ambassadors had visited him with congratulations and hopes of his
success, he always replied:
“Marching under the divine protection, under influence of the sacred
banner, under the auspices of the grandest, most powerful of monarchs,
I hope to gain brilliant victories over the enemies of the empire, and
soon return triumphant.”[170]
It is not possible to go into all the details of the famous first siege
of Vienna, to which entire books have been devoted.[171] Our account of
it must be brief. On September 28th, 1529, Ibrahim Pasha stood before
Vienna with the Roumelian troops, and by the 28th the main body of the
army headed by the sultan was encamped before the city. The defenses of
Vienna were in bad repair, with only 16,000 men and 72 guns, against
a Turkish army of 300,000. The garrison was commanded by Philip of
Bavaria, Ferdinand remaining in Linz, in hopes of aid from the German
princes. The defenders of the city made desperate efforts to strengthen
it, tearing down houses that stood too close to the walls, leveling
suburbs that might protect the enemy, and erecting earthen defences and
new walls where necessary. To save some of the horrors of the siege,
the old men, the women and children, and the priests were forced to
leave the city.[172] Suleiman thought the taking of this stronghold
would be easy, and summoned the garrison to surrender, saying that if
they refused he would breakfast in Vienna on the third day, and would
spare no one. But the third day passed and many others and the Turks
were still digging under the towers and walls and laying mines. They
had been compelled by heavy rains to leave their siege guns behind
them, and had only field pieces and musketry. The besieged replied to
mine by countermine and effectually circumvented the Turkish plans.
Storming parties of the Turks were met by sallies from the beleaguered,
and Suleiman’s breakfast, as the Viennese scornfully told him, was
getting cold. Breaches made in the walls on October 9th and 11th were
repaired and defended by the undaunted Austrians, and after a splendid
effort made on October 14th to storm the city, and an equally splendid
and more successful resistance, the sultan was obliged to give up the
siege. It was Suleiman’s first defeat, and he found it hard to accept
it, but winter was coming on, provisions were inadequate for so long a
campaign, the army was discouraged, and furthermore, outside help was
known to be on the way to the beleaguered city from all quarters. On
October 14th the signal for retreat was given. The loss to the Turkish
army was great, and that of the Viennese slight.[173]
Ibrahim Pasha had charge of the operations during the siege, and went
often to reconnoiter the fortifications, disguised in a colored turban
instead of the usual one of white and gold.[174] Count Christopher von
Zedlitz, a prisoner in the Turkish camp, said: “In this expedition
there was Ibrahim Pasha, who in this war counselled and directed
everything.”[175] There were at this siege, as in all campaigns,
frequent largesses to keep up the courage of the soldiers. The grand
vizir was surrounded by sacks of gold, of which he gave by the handful
when an enemy’s head was brought in, or an important capture made.
When the lure of gold was insufficient to arouse the ebbing courage
of the soldiers in the prolonged siege, the officers with the grand
vizir at their head urged them forward with blows of sticks and whips
and sabres. On October 12th Ibrahim assembled the beys of Roumelie,
spoke frankly of the discontent and hunger of the army, and urged
one more assault, promising whether it were successful or not, to
sound the retreat thereafter.[176] As we have seen, the assault was
made and failed, and the siege was raised and the retreat commenced.
When Suleiman left Vienna the grand vizir remained for some time with
cavalry in the neighborhood of the city, partly to cover the retreat,
and partly to rally the akinji scattered on plundering expeditions.
He also received proposals for an exchange of prisoners, to which he
replied as follows:
Ibrahim Pasha, by the grace of God First Vizir, Secretary
and Chief Councillor of the glorious, great and invincible
Emperor, Sultan Suleiman, head and minister of his whole
dominion, of his slaves and sandjaks, Generalissimo of his
armies:
High‐born, magnanimous officers and commanders; having
received your writing sent by your messenger, we have digested
its contents. Know that we are not come to take your city into
our possession, but only to seek out your Archduke Ferdinand,
whom however we have not found, and hence have waited here so
many days, without his appearing. Yesterday moreover we set
free three of your prisoners, for which measure you should
fain to do likewise of those in your possession, as we have
desired your messenger to explain to you by word of mouth. You
may therefore send hither one of your own people to seek out
your countrymen, and without anxiety for our good faith, for
what happened to those of Pesth was not our fault but their
own.
In this letter Ibrahim makes the statement which Suleiman sent forth
officially, namely,—that the Turks did not wish to take Vienna, but
only to meet Ferdinand. A mile away from the camp the sultan halted and
received congratulations as for a victory, and dispensed rewards, the
grand vizir receiving four costly pellisses and five purses.[177]
The next fortress to be besieged by Ibrahim Pasha was Güns, in 1532.
This was the critical point of Suleiman’s fifth Hungarian campaign.
After the sultan alone had reduced some thirteen minor forts, he
associated the grand vizir with him in this great siege. The little
fortress of Güns was brilliantly defended by Nicholas Juritschitz, who
had met Ibrahim in former days when ambassador at the Porte.
On August 9th the grand vizir encamped before Güns, and three days
later Suleiman arrived. Many small cannon were used in this siege,
the largest sending a ball the size of a goose egg, which was,
nevertheless, very effective in destroying the battlements. Besides
continual assaults, mines were laid, but it was twelve days before
Ibrahim summoned the sturdy Juritschitz to surrender. Even then another
assault was necessary, which was at first unsuccessful owing to a very
curious event. The old men, women and children within the city, seeing
the banners of the janissaries planted on the walls, uttered such
piercing cries of fear and horror that the assailants were seized with
a panic as at something supernatural, and fled from the spot. But their
return was so fierce that a breach was made, and the brave Juritschitz,
wounded and helpless, was obliged to accept Ibrahim‘s terms.[178]
Using his knowledge of the grand vizir’s nature obtained during his
embassy to the Porte, he played on his vanity and obtained very good
conditions.[179] Güns was not pillaged, and only formally capitulated,
ten janissaries being allowed to remain an hour in the place in order
to erect a Turkish standard. So Juritschitz, writing to Ferdinand
exclaims: “God Almighty delivered me and this people from the hand of
tyranny, which honor all my life has not deserved.”
The delay and practical defeat sustained at Güns, together with the
defeat of another Turkish army which was to enter Austria by the
Semmering Pass proved the saving of Vienna. Suleiman had announced
that he did not intend to attack Vienna on this campaign; nevertheless
his vast preparation and the counter‐preparations of Charles V and of
Germany suggested a more ambitious campaign than that which he carried
out. In any case Suleiman decided to withdraw, and immediately after
investing Gratz, which was well defended, he abandoned the enterprise
and returned to the Porte.
When the Sultan made peace with Ferdinand in 1533, and temporarily
ceased operations on his northern frontier, he turned his attention
to conquests in two other directions, namely to the extension of his
sea power, and to the reduction of Persia. The romantic story of the
exploits of his great admiral Khaireddin Barbarosa does not come into
our field, but the Persian campaign is the next object of our attention.
Ever since Suleiman’s accession to the throne the relations of the
Porte with the Shah of Persia had been strained. The only reason that
this had not resulted in open war was because Suleiman was more deeply
concerned in Hungarian affairs. There was continual fighting on the
frontier. When Shah Tahmasp succeeded his father Ismail, he was little
inclined to humble himself before the Turkish monarch, so he resented
an overbearing and threatening letter from Suleiman. Now seemed a
favorable moment to execute the threat of war. The excuse was the
betrayal of the Ottomans by the khan of Bitlis, who had gone over to
the shah of Persia, while the Persians were irate because the Persian
governor of Aserbaijan and Baghdad had joined the Turks and had taken
with him the keys of Baghdad. The governor having been assassinated and
Baghdad retaken by the Persians, Suleiman determined on immediate war.
Ibrahim, again invested with the office of serasker, was sent to Persia
to retake Bitlis and Baghdad. He and his army marched as far as Konia,
where he received the head of Sherefbey, after which he advanced to
Aleppo to take up his winter quarters.[180] He occupied his leisure
during the winter by taking several neighboring fortresses. His next
plan was to move on Baghdad, but the defterdar Iskender Chelebi who
accompanied the expedition urged an immediate advance to Tebriz,
recently abandoned by the shah, arguing that the fall of Tebriz would
mean the taking of Baghdad. Ibrahim followed Iskender’s suggestion, and
arrived before Tebriz the 13th of July, 1534. Receiving the submission
of many fortresses en route, he triumphantly entered the Persian
capital. To avert the evils generally incident to a Turkish occupation,
he set up a judge at Tebriz, and a strong guard. This was unusual
self‐restraint in a Turkish conqueror. At this time he suffered the
loss of one of his armies in the defile of Kiseljedagh, but otherwise
he met only with victory and submission.
On the 27th of September Suleiman joined the grand vizir at Aoudjan and
immediately rewarded him and the other beylerbeys for their successes.
The united armies continued their march towards Hamadan. The lateness
of the season made the crossing of the mountains very difficult. Many
pack animals died and the artillery was mired in the bad roads. In that
perilous situation the army was attacked by the enemy and suffered
considerable loss in men and supplies.
At last the army reached Baghdad. The governor sent a letter of
submission, and then to secure his own safety, fled. The grand vizir
immediately took possession of the city, shut the gates to prevent
pillage, and sent the keys of the city to Suleiman who had not yet
come up. Baghdad was the bulwark of the Persian empire and of great
military importance. The army remained there four months while the
sultan organized his new conquests. April 2nd, 1535, the Turkish army
commenced its return to its capital, making a march of three months to
Tebriz and thence of six months to Stambul.
In this campaign Ibrahim had little actual fighting, and slight use for
the artillery and mines in which he was so well versed. The success of
the campaign was due to the terror excited by the reputation of the
Turkish army, and the endurance with which it made terrible marches,
equalling the celebrated marches of the generals of antiquity.[181]
Ferdinand of Hungary wrote Ibrahim congratulating him on this
successful campaign.
This was Ibrahim’s last campaign. His career was cut short at this
point. In this Persian expedition the grand vizir had some personal
experiences which do not properly belong to an account of his
generalship, but rather to the next chapter dealing with his fall.
In these varied campaigns Ibrahim Pasha showed himself an able and
generally successful general. In all of his battles and sieges he was
defeated only at Vienna, and practically, although not nominally, at
Güns. He was brilliant in his attacks, especially with artillery, the
battle of Mohacz being the best illustration of this. He was excellent
in mines and sieges, regardless of the fact that he did not succeed
in reducing Vienna. He was strong in marching, as the great march
across Persia witnesses. He generally had good control over his men,
although at Vienna he failed to incite them to greater efforts. He was
personally brave and fearless, leading his troops and betaking himself
to the point of greatest danger. He seems to have been less cruel than
was usual among Turkish conquerors, although his army committed some
horrid atrocities. He followed the usual custom of looting, which made
war so attractive to the Turkish soldier.[182] He appreciated valor
even in his enemies, as the story of his treatment of the prisoner
Zedlitz and his freeing of him illustrates.[183] The credit for the
conquests of this period must be divided between Sultan Suleiman and
his grand vizir, who was able to push all plans of Suleiman, whether
military or diplomatic, to a fortunate conclusion.