IBRAHIM THE DIPLOMAT
We must now turn from Turkey’s internal affairs to her foreign
relations. Turkish political history during the sixteenth century
was so interwoven with that of the European states, the influence
of Ottoman interference upon the wars and negotiations of Christian
princes was so marked, that a study of Suleiman’s foreign relations
becomes almost a study of contemporary Europe.[87] The two sultans who
succeeded Mohammed the Conqueror had not extended Turkish power in
Europe, Bayazid having failed in his attempts at conquest, and Selim
having turned his attention from Europe to the East. This caused a
period of transition and preparation for the great events of Suleiman’s
reign.
When Suleiman came to the throne, he found certain relations
established with Ragusa and Venice, the two commercial cities of the
Adriatic, whose large carrying trade made an _entente cordiale_ with
the Porte very desirable.[88] Ragusa was the first foreign state to
reach the new sultan with her congratulations on his accession,[89] and
the sultan renewed with the Ragusan republic the commercial privileges
it had enjoyed in Egypt.
After Venice had been defeated by Turkey in the battle of Sapienza
in 1499 and had been obliged to sue for peace, she had received the
following answer from the then grand vizir: “You can tell the doge
that he has done wedding the sea, it is our turn now.”[90] This boast
became steadily more completely realized as Turkish conquest in the
Mediterranean continued, and Venice soon saw that her chance of freedom
on the seas lay in keeping on good terms with the Turk, whom she could
not conquer. In vain she sought for help against the Moslems; in vain
she carried on a single‐handed struggle against their encroachments,
earning the title of “Bulwark of Christianity”. Had she not “learned
to kiss the hand that she could not cut off,”[91] she could not have
continued to exist as even the second‐rate power in the Levant to which
she had been reduced. Frequent missions were sent from Venice to the
Porte, and a Venetian baillie was kept at the Porte. These baillies
were very good statesmen, and they not only kept Venice on good terms
with Turkey for thirty‐three years, but they made an invaluable
contribution to recorded history by sending frequent and detailed
reports to the signories.
Russia also sent an embassy to the Porte, after the conquests of
Belgrad and Rhodes had demonstrated the power of Turkey; and the Tsar,
recognizing the value of an alliance with the Porte, made two attempts
to form one, but without success. Suleiman saw no advantage in such an
alliance, but he never assumed an unfriendly attitude towards Russia,
at that time still an unimportant power. In a letter written later in
his reign he recalls the amicable relations that had existed between
the Porte and Russia, and recommends his Ottoman merchants to buy furs
and merchandise in Moscow.[92]
As Suleiman’s conquests naturally threw him into antagonism with the
House of Hapsburg, it is desirable to review briefly the political
conditions in the Holy Roman Empire at this time.
The accession of Charles of Spain to the Imperial throne took place in
October of the same year as Suleiman’s accession, 1520. Handicapped
in every possible way by the German princes, for whose safety and
prosperity the emperor assumed the entire responsibility without
receiving in return any equivalent whatever,[93] Charles V presented a
great contrast to Suleiman, whose slightest word was law throughout his
extensive dominions. With the empire, Charles acquired the enmity of
Francis I of France, his unsuccessful rival, and hereafter his constant
foe. Another rival not outwardly so dangerous, but destined to be a
great source of anxiety and weakness to the empire was Ferdinand, the
emperor’s brother. Concerning him, Charles’ counsellor, de Chièvres,
is reported to have said to Charles,[94] “Do not fear the king of
France nor any other prince except your brother”. Ferdinand’s ambition
had been early recognized. His grandfather, Ferdinand of Aragon,
had attempted to construct an Italian kingdom for him, but failed.
Charles, after his election to the Empire, tried to satisfy Ferdinand’s
craving for power by conferring on him the old Austrian provinces, and
further by marrying him to Anna, heiress of the kingdom of Hungary
and Bohemia, whose child‐king, Lewis, was weak physically and not
destined for a long reign. This opened to Ferdinand a large sphere of
activity in the southeast, and brought him into direct contact with the
steadily encroaching Suleiman; a sphere that effectually absorbed his
energies and made him but a source of weakness to the Empire.
Thus Charles V, in name the imperial ruler of Central Europe, was
confronted with four rivals who desired to divide with him the
supremacy; Francis I, a relentless foe; his brother Ferdinand, an
ambitious claimant: the conquering Suleiman; and the Protestant Revolt.
The weakness and disunion of Christendom was the strength of Suleiman,
and he was far too shrewd not to trade on it.
It had in fact been long since Europe had been sufficiently united to
oppose with any vigor the oncoming Turks. The Popes of Rome had been
the most persistent foes of Turkish advance in Europe; notably Calixtus
III, who in 1453 tried in vain to save Europe from Mohammed’s
conquering armies; Pius II, who having for his master—thought the
freeing of Europe from Islam, preached a general crusade, and even
attempted to convert Mohammed by letter; Paul II, who gave lavish aid
to Scanderbeg and the armies in Hungary and Albania in their struggle
against Turkish invasion; Alexander VI, who held Prince Jem, the
mutinous brother of Sultan Bayazid, as hostage for the friendliness
of the sultan whom he attacked after Jem’s death; and Julius II,
who planned a crusade early in the sixteenth century, but failed to
execute it.[95] All this time Turkish conquest continued practically
unhindered. By the close of the fifteenth century the Turks were
accepted as a permanent political factor in Europe. Nevertheless, when
Charles became a candidate for election to the headship of the Holy
Roman Empire, he emphasized his fitness for the high office by alleging
that his vast possessions, united to the Imperial dignity, would enable
him to oppose the Turks successfully.[96] But the sudden rise of
revolt within the Church tended to force the dread of Islam into the
background, even in the face of the loss of Belgrad and Rhodes. At
least such was the case with Charles V and the German princes; it was
of necessity otherwise with little King Lewis, who saw with terror
the preparations of the Turkish conquerors for war to the death with
Hungary.
As Suleiman’s conquests naturally threw him into antagonism with
Austria, equally naturally he had common interests with Francis I.
Friendly relations between the Porte and France were not unprecedented,
although strongly disapproved by the more religious among the French.
Commercial agreements had existed for some time between the two
states.[97] The accession of Francis I, January 1, 1515, marked an
epoch in the Eastern Question. Francis’ Oriental policy began on the
conventional lines; he made an agreement with Leo X to drive the Turks
from Europe but refused to subsidize Hungary in the interests of this
purpose. The pope called for a truce in Europe and a crusade against
the common enemy, but the death of Maximilian and the outbreak of the
Protestant Revolt put a complete stop to this plan. The only result was
the extension of the circle of European politics to include Eastern
affairs and the Ottoman Empire, and to bring the Eastern Question home
to all the European powers. Those who had been furthest away were now
drawn in; France, Spain, and even England began to step within the
circle of Eastern influence.
The battle of Pavia marked a crisis in European affairs. The captivity
of the French king, his falling into the hands of his bitterest foe,
Charles of Hapsburg, destroyed any scruples that the French court
had felt against seeking Turkish aid. The first French mission to
Suleiman I did not reach the Porte, the ambassador being assassinated
en route.[98] This first attempt was quickly followed by another.
The Croat Frangipani brought two letters to the Sultan, one written
by Francis from his Madrid prison, the other from his distracted
mother, the queen‐regent. Francis also sent a letter to Ibrahim Pasha,
who later gave an account of this embassy to Cornelius Scepper and
Hieronymus von Zara, envoys of Ferdinand.[99]
“Post hec tempora, inquit Ibrahim, accedit quod rex Francie captus
fuit. Tunc mater ipsius regis ad ipsum Caesarem Thurcarum scripsit hoc
modo. ‘Filius meus Rex Francie captus est à Carolo, Rege Hispanie.
Speravi quod ipse liberaliter ipsum demitteret. Id quo non fecit,
sed iniuste cum eo agit. Confugimus ad te magnum Caesarem ut tu
liberalitatem tuam ostendas et filium meum redimas’.”[100]
Frangipani demanded that Suleiman should undertake an expedition by
land and sea to deliver the king of France, who otherwise would make
terms which would leave Charles master of the world. This exactly
fitted into the plans of Suleiman, whose European expeditions were
naturally directed against the possessions of the house of Hapsburg; so
he graciously acceded to all the demands of the French mission. Ibrahim
later stated[101] that this embassy decided the Sultan to prepare his
army immediately for an expedition into Hungary. The knowledge of this
successful embassy was one of the reasons that led Charles to sign the
Treaty of Madrid in January, 1526. By the time of this treaty Francis
promised to send five thousand cavalry and fifteen thousand infantry
against his recent allies, the Turks,—but of course he had no intention
of keeping his word.
Since the capture of Belgrad by the Turks in 1521, hostilities on
the Hungarian frontier had never ceased, and the Turkish danger had
been constantly before the Reichstag and in the mind of the Pope. In
April, 1526, Suleiman started with a large army for his first regular
Hungarian campaign. The Hungarian nobles, continually at feud with
one another, were utterly unprepared to resist him, and the treasury
was exhausted. The first city to be taken was Peterwardein, which was
stormed by Ibrahim Pasha. Then fell Illok and Esek. But the decisive
victory of the campaign was the battle of Mohacz, August 29, 1526. In
this brief but bloody conflict little King Lewis fell, and the country
was laid open to the sultan. The keys of Buda, the capital of Hungary,
were handed over to him and he entered the city on September 1st. In
spite of the express prohibition of the sultan, his soldiers accustomed
to regard war as an opportunity for rapine, burned two quarters of the
city, including the great church, while the akinji (scouts) burned
neighboring villages and slaughtered the peasants. Other victories
followed until at last the sultan, promising the Hungarians that John
Zapolya should be their king, withdrew his army to Constantinople,
carrying with him an immense amount of booty.
The death at Mohacz of King Lewis without direct heirs left the thrones
of Hungary and Bohemia vacant. The Archduke Ferdinand, as the husband
of Lewis’ sister, and recognized as Lewis’ successor by official acts
of his brother, the Emperor Charles, passed at the Diets of Worms and
Brussels on April 28, 1521, and March 18, 1522, was the legal heir
to the throne. But the sovereignty was claimed also by John Zapolya,
voivode of Transylvania, a vigorous fighter and an unscrupulous
politician. Both of these claimants had themselves been recognized
in Hungary and crowned with the Iron Crown,[102] and both of them
turned for substantial aid in support of their claims to Suleiman,
regardless of possible loss of independence. Suleiman, as conqueror of
the strongholds of Hungary, and as a court of appeal for the rivals,
considered himself to have in his hand the disposition of the crown.
He did not want it himself. He had expressly declared that he invaded
Hungary to avenge insults, not to take the kingdom from Lewis; but
the death of the latter forced him to choose between the two rival
claimants. His word had been pledged for the support of Zapolya, and
his dislike of the Hapsburgs and his friendship for the French king
inclined him to keep it.
Ferdinand and Zapolya both hastened to send embassies to the Turks,
Ferdinand taking the first step. He sent envoys to Upper Bosnia and to
Belgrad to ask the governors to refuse aid to Zapolya, offering three
to six thousand ducats for their alliance.[103] One of the governors
died before the embassy reached him, and from neither of them were
there any results from this mission.[104] At the same time Ferdinand
attacked Zapolya, driving him from Ofen and back towards Transylvania.
Zapolya in distress despatched his first mission to the Porte. His
envoy, Hieronymus Laszky, was empowered to effect a defensive and
offensive alliance with the sultan. The mission was successful,
Suleiman accepting Zapolya’s offer of devotion, and promising him the
crown of Hungary and the protection of the Porte against his enemies.
Although the mission from Zapolya was kept as secret as possible, it
soon became known to Ferdinand, who dispatched the embassy he had long
planned, in the hope of counteracting Zapolya’s move. One embassy
failed to reach Constantinople,[105] and the first ambassadors from
the archduke of Austria to reach the Porte were John Hobordonacz and
Sigmund Weixelberger, in May, 1528. They demanded the Kingship of
Hungary for their master Ferdinand, and the restoration to Hungary
of all the places taken by Suleiman. The sultan refused both of
these demands and in his turn offered to make peace on the payment
of tribute. The embassy accomplished nothing, its sequel being the
campaign in Hungary in 1529. Three days before the final answer to
Ferdinand, Suleiman had in full divan delivered to Ibrahim a commission
making him serasker or general‐in‐chief of the expedition against the
Hapsburgs. The Peace of Cambrai in 1529 left the Austrians free to
fight the Turks.
In the meanwhile French diplomacy continued actively. Francis I was
disturbed by the result of the invasion of Hungary which he had himself
urged, for the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia seemed now to be falling
into the hands of his enemies of Austria. More than ever he had need of
the Ottoman alliance, and he determined on an alliance with Zapolya. He
sent Rincon to the latter to form an offensive and defensive alliance,
claiming as his reward the reversion of the kingdom of Hungary for
his second son, Henry, should Zapolya die without heirs.[106] On the
20th of September, 1528, Sultan Suleiman renewed a former act called
by old French historians “la trêve marchande,”[107] giving commercial
privileges to the Catalonian and French merchants in the Mediterranean,
and placing all French factories, consuls, and pilgrims, under the
protection of the Sublime Porte. The French were thus able to reappear
with confidence in the Levant, and were welcomed by the Christians
in the East. The pilgrimages to Jerusalem recommenced. Even Francis
expressed a desire to go to the Holy Land and to visit en route “his
dear patron and friend, Suleiman.”[108] A question concerning the Holy
Places in Palestine was also brought up by Francis at this time, which
is of very great significance, as it marks the beginning of the train
of developments that resulted in the conception of the protection of
Turkey’s Christian subjects by the European Powers. Francis and Venice
united in asking that a certain church in Jerusalem, long before
converted into a mosque, be restored to the Christians.[109] Ibrahim
replied that had the King of France demanded a province, the Turks
would not have refused him, but in a matter of religion they could
not gratify his desire. Nevertheless the Sultan made the following
general promise which was later used as a basis for further demand by
the Catholics. He wrote to Francis:[110] “The Christians shall live
peaceably under the wing of our protection; they shall be allowed to
repair their doors and windows; they shall preserve in all safety
their oratories and establishments which they actually occupy, without
any one being allowed to oppose or torment them.”[111]
On the 10th day of May, 1529, Suleiman set out to settle matters by
force with Charles V. Before the end of August the Turks were again
encamped with a vast army on the fatal plain of Mohacz. Here John
Zapolya met his overlord and did him homage. Three days later the Turks
advanced to Buda, and took it from Ferdinand, crowning Zapolya a second
time within the walls of the capital. By September 27, Suleiman was
encamped before Vienna.
On the 19th day of October, 1529, Ferdinand, in great distress,
wrote to his brother the Emperor; after referring to the horrors
that followed the siege of Vienna, he says: “I do not know what he
(Suleiman) intends to do, whether to betake himself to his own country
or to stay in Hungary and fortify it and the fortresses, with the
intention of returning next spring to invade Christendom, which I
firmly believe he will do. I therefore beg you Sire, to consider my
great need and poverty, and that it may please you not to abandon me
but to assist me with money.”[112]
The invasion of Austria had convinced Charles that he must support
Ferdinand against Turkey, and the royal brothers agreed on their
Oriental policy, namely, peace at almost any price. To this end another
embassy was fitted out and despatched to treat with Suleiman. On the
17th day of October, 1530, Nicholas Juritschitz and Joseph von Lamberg
arrived in Constantinople. Their instructions were practically the same
as those given Juritschitz the previous year.[113] The mission was
hopeless from the start, for the ambassadors could accept peace only on
the condition of the evacuation of Hungary by the Turks, and to this
the Sultan would not listen.
Ferdinand however, who had just failed in a military attack on Zapolya
and had accepted a truce, saw no hope but in another embassy to the
Porte. Therefore he sent Graf Leonhard von Nogarola and Joseph von
Lamberg, who were to attempt to buy peace by the payment of annual
pensions to Suleiman and Ibrahim. The sultan, who had already left
Constantinople at the head of a great army for his fifth Hungarian
campaign, was intercepted at his camp near Belgrad by the Austrian
envoys. The only result of this embassy was a letter to Ferdinand
from Suleiman saying that the latter was starting for Ofen, where he
would treat with Ferdinand in person, a threat which he followed up
immediately.
By April, 1531, Suleiman was ready to avenge his failure before Vienna.
At Belgrad he was met by the French ambassador Rincon. France was now
anxious to prevent the Sultan’s expedition against Austria, not in the
interests of the Hapsburgs but against them, for he was afraid that
the Turkish danger would unite Catholic and Protestant Germany against
the common foe of Christianity. Suleiman received Rincon hospitably
but assured him he had come too late, for while on account of his
friendship with the King of France he would like to oblige the latter,
he could not give up the expedition without giving the world occasion
to think that he was afraid of the “King of Spain”, as he always called
Charles V.[114]
The Ottoman army entered Hungary. Fourteen fortresses sent the Sultan
their keys as he approached.[115] But the forces did not advance to
Vienna as their enemies expected, but turned into Styria and besieged
the little town of Güns. For three weeks seven hundred brave defenders
held the little fort against the might of Turkish arms, and finally
made a highly honorable capitulation. After a general devastation of
the country and much looting, the great army of Suleiman returned to
Constantinople. Suleiman was incited to this course by the active
preparations which were being made by Charles and Ferdinand to receive
him at Vienna, and by the naval successes in the Mediterranean of
Andrea Doria, admiral of the Italian fleet. Thus what promised to be a
great duel between the two “Masters of the World” was allowed by both
of them to degenerate into a plundering expedition.
Affairs in Persia were in great need of Suleiman’s presence, and the
capture of Koron and Patras by Doria made the Sultan more ready to
listen to overtures of peace. Charles and Ferdinand took advantage of
this fact to send Hieronymus von Zara and Cornelius Duplicius Schepper
to the Porte in 1533. The ambassadors, after weeks of patience and
adroitness succeeded in winning from the Sultan a treaty of peace,
to last as long as Ferdinand should remain peaceful. Ferdinand was
to retain the forts he had taken in Hungary and Zapolya to keep the
others; the Emperor Charles might make peace by sending his own
embassy to the Porte. As soon as Ferdinand received the news of this
humiliating success, he sent word all over the kingdom, to Carniola,
Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia that any violation of the truce would be
severely punished; “denn daran ... mug der Turghisch Kaeser erkhennen
dass wir den Frieden angenommen derselben zu halten gaentzlich
entschlossen und so dawider gehandelt wurf, dass mit ernst zu shafen
willen haben.”[116] Such were the humiliating terms of the first peace
concluded by the House of Austria with the Porte (1533).
Shortly after the embassy of von Zara and Schepper, Suleiman left
Europe to wage war against the Persians. As usual when planning a
campaign in one direction, he made careful arrangements to keep matters
quiet on other frontiers. He treated in secret with Francis I, agreeing
to despatch Barbarosa with a fleet to ravage the coasts of the Empire;
this was a great success for French diplomacy, for the advantage was
all in favor of France. Then, fearing lest the rivals for the Hungarian
throne should come to an agreement in his absence, and thus menace his
suzerainty, Suleiman delegated Luigi Gritti to determine the frontiers
between the possessions of the two kings. This was a clever move, for
it prolonged the intrigues between the royal competitors until the
return of the sultan. The successes of Barbarosa, the victories and
defeats of Charles V on the Mediterranean, and the continuation of
French diplomacy are outside the limits of our subject, which ends with
the death of Ibrahim Pasha in 1535. Gévay preserves several letters
written by Ferdinand to Ibrahim in 1535–6, in the interest of peace in
Hungary, the last being dated March 14, 1536, a year after Ibrahim’s
death. The last international act in which Ibrahim Pasha had a part was
the celebrated treaty of commerce made with France in February, 1535.
Francis I had received a Turkish mission, not from the haughty Sultan,
but from his admiral Barbarosa,[117] and in return the king sent a
clever diplomat named La Forest, to thank Barbarosa for his kind
offers of aid, and then to seek the sultan in Persia and conclude a
definite treaty with him.[118] Suleiman received La Forest in his
military camp, keeping him till his own return to Turkey in 1535.
The treaty is dated February, 1535; it formed the basis of the economic,
religious, and political protectorate of France in the Levant. The
French might carry on commerce in the Levant by paying the same dues
as did the subjects of the Sultan, and the Turks could do the same in
France. The French were to be judged by their consul at Alexandria or
by their ambassador at Constantinople. This treaty ended the commercial
predominance of Venice in the Mediterranean. After this, all Christians
except the Venetians were forced to put themselves under the protection
of the French flag, which alone guaranteed inviolability.[119] This
commercial freedom and political influence gained by France involved
a sort of economic protection and was supplemented by a religious
protectorate over the Catholics in the Levant and the Holy Places.
After this sketch of the beginnings of diplomatic relations between
the Porte and the two rival powers of Europe, the House of Hapsburg
and the House of Valois, we are ready to consider the significance of
these relations and to take up some of the details that will serve to
bring out the share of Ibrahim Pasha in Turkish diplomacy, and his
characteristics as a diplomat.
Diplomatic relations between the Porte and Europe, relations other
than those of conqueror and conquered, relations reciprocal and more
or less friendly, began in the reign of Suleiman I, and the first
French embassy to the Porte in 1526 already described was the beginning
of a complete change in the European attitude towards Turkey. Before
this time, the religious differences between Moslem and Christian had
effectually absorbed attention, but now political interests began
to push aside religious concern. The masses of the people in Europe
still feared a Moslem invasion of the North, but this was no longer a
real danger. A general rising of Christians, such as a crusade, was
no longer necessary to hold back the Turk; the regular means and the
ordinary efforts of a few states combined sufficed, as was proved by
the successful resistance of Güns and Vienna. It was decreed that
the Turk was not to pass Vienna. Francis might therefore seek the
friendship of the Ottoman without betraying the cause of Christianity.
There were, it is true, plenty of Christians who cried out against the
impious alliance of the Crescent and the Lily,[120] but the outcry was
largely political and as we have seen soon even the Austrians were
seeking terms of peace with the Turks.
When Suleiman came to the throne, he attended closely to the business
of government, but by 1526 he was leaving practically the whole
responsibility on the shoulders of his grand vizir Ibrahim. Ambassadors
to the Porte had their first audience always with Ibrahim, after
which they sometimes had audiences with the other vizirs. Generally
a very formal ceremony of hand‐kissing was permitted by the Sultan,
after which Ibrahim concluded the business. At some audiences with
the grand vizir, Suleiman would be present, concealed behind a little
window,[121] but oftener he was not present at all.
In his early diplomatic work, Ibrahim, feeling himself unprepared,
turned to Luigi Gritti, natural son by a Greek mother of Andreas
Gritti, who had been ambassador and at one time doge of Venice. Ibrahim
was very well served by Luigi Gritti, who was intelligent as well
as experienced, especially in Christian dealings, clever, able, and
tactful.[122] Zapolya’s ambassador Laszky, knowing this, persuaded
Gritti to take up his affairs, hoping through him to win Ibrahim,
and through Ibrahim, Suleiman. The event justified him.[123] Ibrahim
frankly acknowledged Gritti’s influence, saying to Laszky: “Without the
Doge Gritti and his son we should have destroyed the power of Ferdinand
and of thy master (Zapolya), for the conflict of two enemies who ruin
each other is always favorable to the third who survives.”
We may get an idea of the manner of conducting embassies at the
Porte, as well as the functions and characteristics of Ibrahim as
diplomat as such by following the report of Hobordanacz to Ferdinand.
Hobordanacz sent an official and detailed report of the embassy to his
master, written in Latin, which is preserved in Gévay’s _Urkunden und
Actenstuecke_.[124]
The two ambassadors Hobordanacz and Weixelberger were received
with splendor on their entrance into Constantinople by a guard of
four hundred knights, and were immediately conducted to the grand
vizir. This ceremonious reception greatly encouraged the hopes of
Hobordanacz.[125] After greetings to Ibrahim, “Supremum Nomine”, the
Hungarians offered him presents and then retired to quarters assigned
them. On the third day forty horsemen escorted the royal nuncios to the
Imperial palace. Hobordanacz was greatly impressed with the splendid
array of janissaries and guards in gorgeous costumes. They were
received by the three vizirs, Ibrahim, Cassim, and Ayas Pasha, while
from his little window his Majesty watched the audience, himself unseen.
Amidst profound silence, Ibrahim Pasha addressed the first nuncio,
asking him politely whether they were treated well in their quarters,
to which Hobordanacz answered that they had everything in abundance, as
was fitting in the palace of so great an emperor. Ibrahim then began
to interrogate them concerning the journey and their king, explaining
that he was not asking about the king of Hungary, for Lewis of Hungary
had been killed in battle, but was inquiring about the king of Bohemia
and Germany. The Hungarian nuncios took the opportunity to boast of the
greatness of Ferdinand, provoking a smile from Ibrahim. Hobordanacz
said they had come to admire and to congratulate the emperor of the
Turks that God had made him a nearer neighbor to Ferdinand than
previously. He said that the Emperor Maximilian had given Hungary to
Ferdinand, whereupon Ibrahim broke in: “By what right, when Sultan
Suleiman has subjugated Hungary?” He asked them if they did not know
that the Sultan had been to Buda. The Hungarians responded rudely that
there were signs enough by which they could know of Suleiman’s visit,
as the country lay waste. Ibrahim went on: “The fortress of Buda, how
does it stand?” “Whole and undamaged,” they replied. When he asked why,
they suggested that it was because it was the king’s castle. Ibrahim
denied this and said it was because the sultan had saved the citadel
for himself, and intended to keep it with divine aid. Ibrahim here
explained that Suleiman and he had not wished so much harm done in
Hungary, and had ordered the soldiers not to burn Buda and Pesth, but
could not hold them back from devastating. This was naturally a sore
subject with the Hungarians who after expressions of admiration for
the great obedience they saw in Turkey, even when the sultan was not
present, asked pertinently why then he could not have saved Buda and
Pesth. This seems to have been too much for Ibrahim who remarked “Let
us omit these things.” Turning therefore to a more congenial subject,
he uttered a Turkish dictum, “Wherever the hoof of the sultan’s horse
has trod, there the land belongs to him.” Hobordanacz replied somewhat
sarcastically that they knew such was the sultan’s idea, but that even
Alexander the Great had not been able to carry out all his ideas.
Cutting through all these generalities, Ibrahim said sharply, “Then
you say that Buda does not belong to Suleiman!” Hobordanacz replied
stoutly, “I can say no more than that my king holds Buda.” Said
Ibrahim, “Why has he then sent you to ask for peace and friendship
if he holds Buda, which the sultan has conquered?” The nuncio told a
long story of Zapolyta’s usurpation of the throne, and of Ferdinand’s
merits to which Ibrahim sarcastically remarked, “You have talked of the
many virtues of your lord! Very noble if they be true!” He then asked
Hobordanacz if he were a relative of Ferdinand’s and how long he had
served the Archduke. The nuncio replied that he had served him since
the latter became king of Hungary. “Then,” said the pasha triumphantly,
“if you have served him so short a time, how do you know he is so wise
and virtuous and powerful?” A curious contest of wits followed with no
practical object.
Ibrahim: “Tell us what wisdom you see in Ferdinand and
how you know that he is wise.”
Hobor.: “Because when he has won great victories, he
ascribes the glory to God.”
I.: “What does wisdom seem to you to be like?”
H.: “In our books and in yours, the beginning of wisdom
is said to be the fear of God.”
I.: “True, but what other wisdom do you find in
Ferdinand?”
H.: “He works deliberately and with foresight and taking
of counsel; also he undertakes no affairs that he cannot
finish.”
I.: “If he does this, he is praiseworthy. Now what
boldness and courage do you find in him?”
Ibrahim’s next question as to the victories of Ferdinand received a
long and clever answer. Ibrahim further inquired as to Ferdinand’s
wealth. Hobordanacz claimed endless treasure for his master. Ibrahim
then asked, “What have you to say about the power of your master?”
Hobordanacz claimed many powerful friends and neighbors, the greatest
being his brother Charles. Ibrahim inflicted one of his battle‐axe
strokes; “We know that these so‐called friends and neighbors are
his enemies.” The Hungarian replied sententiously, “Unhappy is the
king without rivals, whom all favor.” Ibrahim at length stopped the
discussion of Ferdinand’s merits by saying, “If this be so, it is
well.” Then he asked whether they came in peace or in war, to which
Hobordanacz replied that Ferdinand wished friendship from all his
neighbors and enmity from none.
After this sprightly introduction, Ibrahim led the nuncios in
a brilliant procession to the presence of the sultan. Here the
janissaries received gifts for the sultan from the servants of the
ambassadors, and showed them to all in turn; in the next room seven
eunuchs took the gifts and spread them out on tables. The three pashas
first went to salute Suleiman, leaving the nuncios before the door.
Ibrahim Pasha and Cassim Pasha then, holding them by their two arms,
led each of the nuncios in turn to salute the sultan, who sat with his
hands on his knees and looked them over. When they had saluted him,
they returned to their place by the door where stood the interpreter.
Hobordanacz was greatly annoyed because the interpreter, familiar with
the flowery and courtly Oriental speech, embellished the somewhat curt
address of the Hungarian, but Ibrahim told the interpreter to repeat
exactly what the envoy said. After this he asked Hobordanacz to state
his business. After this statement of Ferdinand’s wishes, Suleiman
called Ibrahim to him and whispered in his ear. Ibrahim then resumed
negotiations while Suleiman looked on.
Taking up his grievance against Ferdinand once again, Ibrahim inquired
how the latter, in addressing the Sultan, dared declare himself so
powerful when other princes were content to commend themselves to
Suleiman’s protection and to offer him their services. To Hobordanacz’
question who these princes were, Ibrahim named the rulers of France,
Poland, and Transylvania, the Pope and the Doge of Venice, and added
that these princes (except the voivode of Transylvania) were the
greatest in Europe. The Austrian nuncios seemed to be impressed
and indeed the statement was a sufficiently startling one and was
moreover borne out by the facts. After that Hobordanacz spoke with
greater meekness, expressing his master’s desire for the friendship
of the sultan, if the latter were willing to grant it. “If he is not
willing,” said Ibrahim sharply, “what then?” Hobordanacz, recovering
his boldness, said haughtily, “Our master forces no man’s friendship.”
Ibrahim then dismissed them with the parting fling that the sultan
was occupied with much more important business. They never saw the
sultan again. Ibrahim informed them that his master was concerned with
personal affairs, and that he himself would conduct the whole business.
This illustrates the respective shares of Suleiman and Ibrahim in the
business of the state. Doubtless the sultan had a definite policy of
friendship to Zapolya and antagonism to Ferdinand, but it appears
certain that he allowed Ibrahim Pasha to control entirely the details
of diplomacy.
In later audiences with the grand vizir, Hobordanacz expressed the
hope that Ferdinand and Charles V and Sultan Suleiman might become
good friends and neighbors. Ibrahim inquired scornfully how such a
friendship could come about! Hobordanacz declared that it was his
mission to offer friendship, and it seemed to him that Ibrahim’s
influence should be able to bring about advantages for both sides.
Ibrahim again urged him to indicate the method of procedure, saying,
“Your king has seized upon our kingdom, and yet he asks for friendship;
how can that be?” The nuncio said he knew all things at the Porte were
done by Ibrahim’s will and authority; he believed that he could serve
their cause. Ibrahim then proposed peace on condition that Ferdinand
should abandon Hungary. Hobordanacz on the other hand asked for a
definite truce for a term of years and requested the restitution to
Ferdinand of those portions of Hungary taken by Suleiman, giving a list
of twenty‐seven fortresses. This aroused Ibrahim’s bitter wrath. “It is
strange” said he “that your master does not ask for Constantinople.” He
tried to make the ambassadors acknowledge that Ferdinand would attempt
to take these forts by force if they were not conceded to him. “With
what hope does he ask for these forts,” he further inquired, “when he
knows that the sultan took them with great labor and much bloodshed?”
The question of compensation for these forts being opened, Ibrahim
exclaimed indignantly that the sultan was not so poor that he
would sell what his arms had won. Dramatically opening a window he
said “Do you see those Seven Towers! they are filled with gold and
treasure.”[126] He then turned to the question of skill in war, and
after praising the prowess of the Germans, he said, “You know the arms
of the Turks, how sharp they are, and how far they have penetrated,
for you have fled before them many times.” Hobordanacz gave a qualified
assent, but praised his master’s warlike skill. Ibrahim finally
broke in, “Then your master wishes to keep those forts?” Hobordanacz
suggested a middle course, but the grand vizir said decisively: “There
is no other way but for your king to abandon Buda and Hungary and then
we will treat with him about Germany.” Upon Hobordanacz’ refusal to
consider such terms Ibrahim stated, “I conquered Lewis and Hungary, and
now I will build the bridges of the Sultan, and prepare a way for his
Majesty into Germany.” He closed the interview by accusing Ferdinand
and Charles of not keeping faith and said he would give the nuncios a
final reply in three or four days.
The third audience was held in the palace, with Ibrahim presiding,
and Suleiman at his window, and was conducted on similar lines to the
other audiences. Ibrahim informed the Hungarians that their master had
just been defeated by Zapolya with an army of thirty‐six thousand men,
which statement Hobordanacz took the liberty of doubting, saying that
if Zapolya added all the cocks and hens in Transylvania to his army, he
could not make up the number to thirty‐six thousand. The nuncios and
the grand vizir could not agree on terms of alliance; to the Austrian
demands, Ibrahim impatiently exclaimed: “The Emperor Charles and your
master, what do they want more? to rule the whole earth? Do they count
themselves no less than the gods?” Naturally nothing was accomplished
by such recrimination, and finally Suleiman ended the audience,
dismissing the ambassadors with the threat: “Your master has not yet
felt our friendship and neighborliness, but he shall soon feel it. You
can tell your master frankly that I myself with all my forces will come
to him to give Hungary in our person the fortresses he demands. Inform
him that he must be ready to treat me well.”
So ended the mission of Ferdinand for peace. There had been no
possibility of success from the beginning. Suleiman and Ibrahim were
not to be won to friendship for Ferdinand, and had they been, the rude,
independent Hobordanacz was not the man to gain Oriental favor. One
feels that Ibrahim enjoyed the opportunity to sharpen his claws on an
enemy, and to show Europeans his own power and that of his master. The
envoys must have been very uncomfortable, and their discomforts were
not yet at an end, for a Venetian enemy of Ferdinand’s told Ibrahim
that they were not ambassadors but spies, and urged their detention at
the Porte. For five months they were kept in close confinement, after
which a long journey lay between them and the anxious Archduke who had
hoped so much from the embassy.
This treatment of royal ambassadors as though they were spies was not
uncommon at the Porte. The King of Poland had been forced to complain
of the rough handling of his envoys by Sultan Bayazid (Suleiman’s
grandfather), saying they were not only detained for months before
they were given audience, but were thrown into prison, and instead
of being lodged like the envoys of a king, who would naturally feel
that it accorded with his honor to send only the sons of the noblest
families to represent him, were treated as criminals, and that promises
made to such envoys were often broken.[127] Busbequius, himself an
ambassador, who was detained for months and sharply watched, recounted
another instance, that of Malvezzi, whom the Sultan held responsible
for the broken faith of his master Ferdinand, and threw into prison
when Ferdinand took Transylvania in 1551.[128] It was a Turkish maxim
that ambassadors were responsible for the word given by their masters,
and that in their capacity as hostages they must expiate its violation;
moreover power was often conceived to reside in an ambassador, who
therefore was kept in durance in the hope that he could be brought
to terms. Such treatment, however naïve and unjust, is nevertheless
an improvement on the reception by Hungary of the ambassador sent to
announce the accession of Suleiman, whose nose and ears were slit.
Further illustrations of the way ambassadors were liable to be treated
in Europe were the assassination of Rincon, envoy of France, connived
at by Charles V, and the murder of Martinez, a Spanish ambassador to
the Porte, instigated by Ferdinand.
Ibrahim’s usual way of opening an audience was to brow‐beat the
ambassador, and he indulged in frequent sarcasm and scornful laughter.
To the envoys of Ferdinand in 1532 he railed at Ferdinand and “his
tricks” and gibed at his faithlessness. “How is a man a king” he said
“unless he keeps his word?”[129] To Lamberg and Juritschitz (1530)[130]
he spoke of the quarrels among Christian rulers, twitting his auditors
with Charles’s treatment of the Pope and of Francis I, declaring that
the Turks would never do “so inhuman a thing,” and following this by a
long talk “full of scorn and irony.”[131]
Ibrahim was enormously inquisitive, seeming to look upon a foreign
embassy as an opportunity for gaining all sorts of general information.
Sometimes he asked about such practical matters as the fortification
of certain forts; at other times he asked such trivial questions as
how old the rulers were, and how they pronounced their names. He
once remarked that a man who did not try to learn all things is an
incompetent man. Several times he boasted that in Turkey they knew all
that was taking place in Europe.
His manner, as we have seen, was usually sharp and rude, but he could
be elaborately courteous when he wished to please, as when he received
an embassy from “our good friend” Francis I, and the Hungarian embassy
of 1534. He was invariably boastful; during the earlier years he
bragged of the sultan, his power and treasure; in the later embassies
he boasted of himself.
One of the most important documents about Ibrahim that we possess is
the account of the peace embassy sent by Ferdinand in 1533, the report
being written by Hieronymus von Zara in Latin in September, 1533. This
shows Ibrahim in a sharper light than we have had elsewhere, and brings
out some traits in his character that have been growing steadily since
his rise to such great power: his ambition and his towering pride.[132]
Ibrahim, splendidly clad, received the ambassadors for their first
audience, without rising. He accepted the rich jewels they offered
him, and appointed a later day for the business of the treaty. On the
appointed day the envoys were permitted to kiss the garments of the
grand vizir, and they saluted him as brother of their sovereigns,
Ferdinand and Queen Marie of Hungary. Ibrahim had never acknowledged
the sovereignty of Ferdinand, and had always spoken of him without any
kingly title, to the amaze of the ambassadors.[133] In this interview
and throughout the whole conference Ibrahim spoke of Ferdinand as his
brother, and as son to Suleiman. This was not mere personal vanity;
under the pretext of the community of good which should exist between
father and son he cloaked the Sultan’s usurpation of Hungary, and the
fraternity of Ferdinand and Ibrahim served to disguise the humiliation
of the former, who was placed in the same rank as a vizir.[134] But in
the long speech that Ibrahim Pasha made to the ambassadors, he revealed
his personal pride. We quote from the speech: “It is I who govern this
vast empire. What I do is done; I have all the power, all offices,
all the rule. What I wish to give is given and cannot be taken away;
what I do not give is not confirmed by any one. If ever the great
Sultan wishes to give, or has given anything, if I do not please it
is not carried out. All is in my hands, peace, war, treasure. I do
not say these things for no reason, but to give you courage to speak
freely.”[135]
When the letters of Emperor Charles were shown him, he examined the
seals, remarking as he did so: “My master has two seals, of which one
remains in his hands and the other is confided to me, for he wishes no
difference between him and me; and if he has garments made for himself,
he orders the same for me; he refuses to let me expend anything in
building; this hall was built by him.”
Ibrahim seems to have lost his head during this, his last embassy,
and to have uttered things that were not safe for any subject of an
Oriental despot, however doting, to utter. Whether he spoke out of the
sheer madness that the gods send upon those whom they would destroy,
or whether he seriously aspired to assume literally and explicitly the
power he held actually is impossible to say. Even as grand vizir of
Turkey he seems never to have forgotten that he was a Greek. For years
he ignored it, and behaved like a Turk and a loyal Moslem, but as he
came to feel more secure in his high position, he became more careless,
and spoke to these Christian ambassadors of the pride and generosity
with which the Greeks are filled. It is a question whether any Greek,
from the fall of Byzantium to our time, has not in his inmost heart
felt his race superior to his Moslem conquerors, and the fitting ruler
of the Eastern Empire. To that feeling are due some of the knottiest
complexities in the Young Turk situation of 1911. Naturally this
attitude has always been profoundly resented by the Turks; therefore
Ibrahim was seriously jeopardizing his standing with the Ottoman Sultan
when he remembered that he was both Greek and Christian by birth.
There were plenty at the court to take immediate advantage of any
such slip. The courtiers had already been scandalized at the freedom
the Pasha took with the Sultan, and thought that he had bewitched
Suleiman.[136] In the same interview he further expresses his relations
to his imperial master in a parable:
The fiercest of animals, the lion, must be conquered not by
force, but by cleverness; by the food which his master gives
it and by the influence of habit. Its guardian should carry
a stick to intimidate it, and should be the only one to feed
it. The lion is the prince. The Emperor Charles is a lion. I,
Ibrahim Pasha, control my master, the Sultan of the Turks,
with the stick of truth and justice. Charles’ ambassador
should also control him in the same way.
From this he went on to expatiate on his own power:
The mighty Sultan of the Turks has given to me, Ibrahim, all
power and authority. It is I alone who do everything. I am
above all the pashas. I can elevate a groom to a pasha. I give
kingdoms and provinces to whom I will, without inquiry even
from my master. If he orders a thing and I disapprove, it
is not executed; but if I order a thing and he disapproves,
it is done nevertheless. To make war or conclude peace is
in my hands, and I can distribute all treasure. My master’s
kingdoms, lands, treasure, are confided to me.
He also boasted of his past accomplishments, speaking of himself as
having conquered Hungary, received ambassadors, and made peace. If
Suleiman knew of these vauntings, he made no sign of resentment, but
continued to repose the same confidence in Ibrahim as hitherto, but the
courtiers held them in their hearts to use when the time should come.
Ibrahim’s importance and influence are taken for granted by foreign
rulers and envoys. In all his instructions to his ambassadors Ferdinand
tells them to see Ibrahim first, and the queen regent of France wrote
to him, when she wrote to the sultan. The collections of Gévay and
Charrière contain a number of letters from Ferdinand and Francis to
Ibrahim. The Venetian baillies transacted all their business with
Ibrahim and sent many reports to the Signoria of his power in the
state and his influence over the sultan. The envoys brought him
valuable presents which he did not hesitate to accept.[137] He loved
to receive jewels and there was a famous ruby once on the finger of
Francis I which was sent by the first French envoy to the Porte, (the
envoy who was killed in Bosnia) and which somehow came into Ibrahim’s
possession when the Pasha of Bosnia was called to Constantinople to
account for the murder.[138]
But although Ibrahim took presents, and even resented it if they were
not offered him, he refused bribes again and again. Ferdinand empowered
his envoys in three missions to offer an annual pension to Suleiman
(a tribute under a name less offensive to Ferdinand) and at the same
time an annual pension to the grand vizir. When Juritschitz and Lamberg
offered Ibrahim five to six thousand Hungarian ducats[139] annually
for his aid in bringing about peace, he rejected it so indignantly
that they apologized and withdrew their offer. He said that the
previous ambassadors Hobordanacz and Weixelberger had offered him one
hundred thousand florins to buy his protection, but that he said then
and would now repeat that no sort of present could make him desert
the interests of his master, and that he would prefer to aid in the
conquest of the whole world than advise the Sultan to restore conquered
territory.[140]
The passage just quoted would seem sufficient to disprove the assertion
made by contemporary European historians that Ibrahim Pasha had lifted
the siege of Vienna because he had been bought by the gold of the
ambassadors. Suleiman gave him everything that he could have asked and
much more than lay in the power of any European monarch to bestow.
Ibrahim acquired vast wealth, but there is no evidence that his loyalty
to Suleiman could be purchased, and while the Turkish historians
speak often of the avarice of his successor Rustem Pasha, they never
ascribe that quality to Ibrahim. If he had a price, it was too high for
Ferdinand to pay.
It is apparent from what has been said that Ibrahim’s diplomatic
methods were not subtle; they had no need to be. As the diplomacy of
the Porte was usually either the introduction to, or the conclusion of
a military campaign, small wonder that it usually attained its object.
As the favor of the Porte was eagerly sought by France, Venice, Poland,
Russia, Hungary and Austria, it required no finesse of diplomatic
handling to deal with their ambassadors. Ibrahim, holding all the
trumps, needed no great skill to play his cards well. He might be as
rude and boastful as he would, and still the ambassadors would beg
for his influence in making peace. Both Suleiman and Ibrahim treated
Charles V and Ferdinand with great haughtiness, nevertheless pursuing
an entirely successful policy; France, on the other hand, playing a
subtle game, won considerable from the Porte. It would seem that the
test of Turkish diplomacy was not its method but its general plan and
large lines. The question then before us is, what were the objects and
accomplishments of Turkish diplomacy between 1525 and 1540.
Suleiman had two objects, first to extend his conquering power further
into Europe, and second to assist Francis I against the House of
Hapsburg. In these two objects he was successful. His empire was
greatly extended during his reign, both in territory and in influence,
while the power of the rival House of Hapsburg was steadily diminished
and limited. But that which makes of this period an epoch in European
political history is not the territorial aggrandizement of Turkey,
nor the recognition of its power by Europe, but the first entrance
of Turkey into the European concert, if we may anticipate a later
term, and the change from the consideration of the Turks as merely
unbelievers and foes of Christianity to regarding them as political
allies or foes, and as possible factors in the European question. At
the close of the reign of Selim the Grim, Turkey, although it was a
conquering nation, was still an excrescence in Europe. But the time
had come when it must enter into the affairs of the Northern nations,
and for that time Suleiman, unusually tolerant towards the West, with
a great idea of the destiny of Turkey, and aided by his Christian
grand vizir, was ready, and by the end of his reign he had made
himself felt in every court on the continent, and had to be reckoned
with in every European cabinet. But as a natural corollary to this
fact, Turkey was never, after this time, wholly free from European
influence. The fine wedge of French intervention was introduced by La
Forest in the treaty of 1535, and conservative Turks of today look on
Suleiman’s “capitulations” as the beginning of endless troubles for
Turkey, while the French still rejoice over the triumphs of astute and
far‐sighted Francis I. “Suleiman en sortant de son farouche isolement,”
says Zeller, “François I^{_er_} en bravant les préventions de ses
contemporains, accomplirent une véritable revolution dans la politique
de l’Europe.”[141] For four centuries France remained the most weighty
foreign influence at the Porte. A fuller significance lay in what
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe called the “extra‐koranic” character of
the concessions made in this reign, the introduction of extra‐koranic
legislation in both foreign and internal affairs, by the side of the
maxims and rules of the Sheri or Holy Law. Turkey began to discover the
inadequacy of Koran legislation for a modern state.[142]
How much did Ibrahim Pasha influence Suleiman in this policy? He
undoubtedly had the details in his own hands, but did he inspire the
plan? Probably not. Suleiman knew pretty clearly what he wanted, and
he pursued the same policy with the same success after the death of
Ibrahim. His contemporaries ascribed to Ibrahim the brain and the
force of Turkish diplomacy, and later historians have given to him the
exclusive credit of this political evolution. But Zeller’s view[143]
that too much importance may be given to the rôle of Ibrahim Pasha
seems better substantiated. Zeller, nevertheless, in his introduction
to _La Diplomatie Française_, accords to Ibrahim just that credit
that peculiarly belongs to him, if we have rightly understood the work
of the grand vizir, when he says: “Suleiman was not less enlightened
than Francis; he had, as well as the latter, the knowledge of his
own interests, and like him he was partially enfranchised from the
prejudices of his nation.... At the same time we cannot doubt but that
the grand vizir, whose ability and enlightenment are attested by all
the ambassadors, contributed to open the mind of his master to the
ideas outside his realm, to initiate him into a European Policy, to
make him see the menace of the increasing power of Charles V, and the
interest which he had to support France”. In the unusual liberality of
thought and freedom from prejudice that Suleiman showed in his relation
to Europe, we may see the influence of his intelligent favorite.
Thus the two together, Suleiman and Ibrahim, or Ibrahim and Suleiman,
as Ferdinand often spoke of them, started the Ottoman Empire from the
lonely path of independence and semibarbarism to the labyrinthine and
noisy streets of European politics.