interesting chapter, which we must pass over in order to gain time for
an analysis of the question about which that history revolved. Taken
as a whole, the period must be regarded as an unsuccessful attempt on
the part of the rulers to assimilate by force an unwilling population.
The German government had great resources on its side--compulsory
education on the German model and in the German tongue, the repressive
measures of the greatest army and the strongest administrative system
in Europe, the influx of immigrants from beyond the Rhine, the
development of communication with the other parts of the empire, an
extraordinary material prosperity in which the Reichsland shared. Its
policy alternated between harsh repression and clumsy efforts to win
the people’s good will. There were periods when it seemed to be making
headway, by the mere lapse of time and the apparent hopelessness of
resistance, if by nothing else; the argument from prosperity had its
effects; the protesting leaders turned toward more immediate measures
of amelioration within the empire. Then an episode like the Zabern
affair of 1913 would occur to show that the country was still governed
by military force, and the pro-French feeling would blaze out again.
The relative strength of the French and German parties was a subject
of acrimonious and inconclusive debate. The fact remained that there
was a large French party, just how large nobody knew, which maintained
a vigorous tradition of French speech and sympathies, by the fireside,
among the clergy, in intercourse with France itself. Its existence was
shown in the midst of the war by a project brought before the Reichstag
for colonizing Alsace-Lorraine with ‘reliable’ subjects. The survival
of this French party through fifty years of persecution is one of the
finest public examples of the triumph of the inner over the outer life.
A peasant who was waving an old French flag at Strasburg at the great
reception to the French troops in November 1918 was asked how he had
obtained it. “My father,” he said, “in 1871 put this under a plank
of his barn, and every Sunday of his life he knelt over it in prayer
for the return of Alsace to France. When he died, he handed on the
charge to me to keep until that day should come.” The two elements in
the population are well illustrated at Metz, where a German-speaking
majority of soldiers, officials, and tradesmen came in, and a new
quarter sprang up about the railroad station in the latest and heaviest
style of neo-German architecture, but the old French town still
remained, with its narrow streets, its mediaeval gates (especially that
great eastern portal called the ‘German Gate’), its hôtel de ville, and
its Gothic cathedral. And the three ages of Metz may be typified by
this French cathedral of the thirteenth century, with the statue of
William II as a prophet filling a niche in one of its portals, and the
final inscription below this figure, attached by handcuffs after the
armistice, “Sic transit gloria mundi!”
* * * * *
For more than half a century the problem of Alsace-Lorraine has been
debated back and forth with arguments which have had no effect on the
opposite sides of the controversy.
To Germans the Reichsland is a German country, save for the
French-speaking strip along the western border. It was occupied by
German tribes in the fifth century; its speech is German; it was a
portion of the mediaeval Empire until violently torn away in the
seventeenth century; in 1871 Germany was simply reclaiming her lost
provinces. Furthermore, as stated in 1871, Metz and the Vosges were a
necessary defence of the Fatherland against French aggression, which
had been experienced under the two Napoleons and might be expected
again. Finally, as stated now but not openly in 1871, the iron of
Lorraine was absolutely necessary to the economic life of modern
Germany. Germany held Alsace-Lorraine by right of nationality and
by right of conquest, the symbol of her national unity achieved in
the war by which it was recovered; it was a part of Germany, not an
international question, and she would not give it up or discuss giving
it up.
To the French Alsace and Lorraine had become and remained
fundamentally French, having been assimilated gradually and without
violence in the eighteenth century, French most of all by having
entered fully into the spirit of the French Revolution and taken
an active part therein. They begged to remain a part of France in
1871, as the unanimous protests of their representatives show, and
they continued French at heart against the strongest pressure in
the opposite direction. In spite of differences of language, such
as exist in other parts of France, Alsace and Lorraine were French
in social structure, in political ideals, and in the sympathies of
the population. Without these lost provinces France was a mutilated
country, not fully France. Furthermore, the possession of Metz and the
Vosges by a military power like Germany constituted a standing menace
to a peaceful country like the French Republic; it also menaced the
economic life of France and its defence by making possible, as in 1914,
immediate seizure of the richest part of its iron supply. France was
robbed of these provinces by force in 1871, and the wrong had to be
righted, not only in the interest of France but for the sake of the
inhabitants.
There was a growing disposition to recognize that the problem of
Alsace-Lorraine concerned not merely France and Germany and the
inhabitants of the territory itself, but the world at large. The
settlement of this question became of international moment partly as
it affected the military and economic balance of power between France
on the one hand and a Germany dangerous to international peace on the
other; partly as a vindication of international right, violated by
the forcible annexation of the two provinces in 1871 in defiance of
the express protests of the population; partly in order to eliminate,
in the interests of permanent international order, an issue which had
“unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years.” Whatever the
solution, international interests had to be guarded.
Of the arguments which have been brought forward in support of the
respective points of view, that of race is the least significant.
It is true that most German writers have urged that the people of
Alsace-Lorraine are of Germanic race, akin to the other peoples of the
German empire; but this view lacks support from the anthropologist.
Neither the tall, fair-haired Teuton nor the short, round-headed Alpine
type dominates Alsace-Lorraine. The population is clearly mixed, with
racial affinities reaching in both directions and resulting from the
survival of an original Gallo-Roman substratum in the uplands along
with a considerable infiltration of Teutonic invaders in the valleys.
Whatever the exact percentage of the two races in Alsace-Lorraine,
the fact has no demonstrable historical or political importance. Both
Germany and France are, racially considered, strongly mixed peoples,
all three races being well represented in France, and the non-Teutonic
type in Germany being marked in the southwest and also in the Slavic
regions of the east. To argue from race on either side proves either
too much or too little--too much, if all people of Teutonic type (as in
England, Scandinavia, and northern France) are claimed for the German
empire; too little, if either Germany or France were to be limited
to the regions where the Teutonic or the Alpine type respectively
predominates.
The question of language is more difficult. It is the German view that
Alsace and Lorraine (at least that larger part of Lorraine which speaks
German), as German-speaking countries, ought to belong to Germany.
The French point out that this theory breaks down in principle in the
French-speaking districts of Lorraine; they emphasize the importance
of the French-speaking minority in Alsace as a leading force and the
strong pro-French feeling in a large part of the German-speaking
population; and they deny that language is the proper test of political
allegiance.
By a curious paradox, language is one of the most changeable and one of
the most permanent facts in European history. It is changeable in that
it can be quickly learned or unlearned, especially from one generation
to another, as is convincingly illustrated by European immigrants to
the United States. It is permanent in that the line of demarcation in
the open country shows surprisingly little variation over a period
of several centuries. Hence it is highly important to distinguish
conditions in the towns and among the more conservative peasant
population.
As regards the open country, the linguistic frontier between French
and German shows very slight changes since the Middle Ages, when
it was fixed in each region by the relative preponderance of the
Latin-speaking Gauls or of the Teutonic invaders. Slight advances of
German in the Middle Ages and of French since the sixteenth century
are traceable at certain points, but are relatively unimportant. The
present line of division has never been absolutely determined, but
a local study was made by C. This in 1886 and 1887 on the basis of
personal examination, and his results have been generally accepted
by both French and German scholars. The line follows the political
frontier, here the crest of the Vosges, only for about sixty miles
in Upper Alsace. In the south it includes two districts to the east,
Eteimbes and Montreux, while it dips still farther to the east in the
upper valleys of the Weiss and the Breusch and the middle valley of
the Liepvrette, all of these districts speaking French. In Lorraine
the linguistic frontier lies well to the east of the political
boundary, running in a zigzag fashion from Mount Donon to the northwest
across the open country through or near Sarrebourg and southwest of
Thionville to the Luxemburg boundary. About 6 per cent of the area of
Alsace and about 46 per cent of the area of Lorraine thus contain a
French-speaking majority.
It must not, however, be supposed that the cleavage is adequately
described by any such line. In towns the influence of commerce,
education, government, et cetera, often forms a considerable class
whose speech differs from that of the surrounding country. In the long
period of French occupation a French-speaking class was in this way
created in Strasburg, Colmar, Mulhouse (notably), and many other towns
of Alsace. After 1871 the large immigration of soldiers and officials
to Metz made it appear as a German town in the official statistics (78
per cent German-speaking in 1910). The German majority in Metz has
disappeared automatically with the withdrawal of the German garrison
and civil government, but the French-speaking element in Alsace showed
extraordinary persistence and vitality in the face of every measure of
repression. In spite of the compulsory study of German in all schools
and the official support of their language by all the agencies of the
government, the official German returns show no significant diminution
in the percentage of the French-speaking population since exact
statistics have been kept:
_1900_ _1905_ _1910_
Lower Alsace
German 95.77 95.77 95.80
French 3.72 3.61 3.80
Upper Alsace
German 93.31 93.42 93.00
French 5.59 5.66 6.10
Lorraine
German 70.59 71.30 73.50
French 25.87 23.78 22.30
Alsace-Lorraine
German 86.79 86.80 87.20
French 11.60 11.03 10.90
No map of the distribution of language, however exact, would tell
the whole story. Community of language is undoubtedly an important
influence in producing that ‘consciousness of kind’ upon which
nationality rests, and in facilitating the common life of the modern
state. We prefer our neighbors to speak our language, however
indifferent we may be respecting the shape of their skulls. Community
of language is not, however, a necessary basis for a sound national
life, as appears in such countries as Belgium and Switzerland. The
distinction must also be noted between the local _patois_ and the
general national language taught in schools, for in many European
countries these are quite different. Thus in Italy a north-Italian
cannot understand a Sicilian speaking the local dialect, and there are
also regions where French and German are spoken. In Germany there are
marked differences between the official High German and the Low German
dialects, not to mention the languages of the subject populations.
In France languages quite distinct from French exist in Brittany,
Provence, the Basque region, and the Flemish territory around Dunkirk,
without weakening French nationality or destroying French unity.
In the case of Alsace-Lorraine, it is of fundamental importance
to recognize that sympathy for France or Germany did not follow
linguistic lines. While few of the French-speaking population were
attracted to Germany, there was a very considerable element among the
German-speaking population which favored France. Even German observers
found French sympathies far more widespread than the French language.
It is a well known fact that the anti-German movements of recent years
have been more pronounced in Alsace, especially Upper Alsace, than in
Lorraine with its larger French-speaking population.
Moreover, language, like race, is a two-edged sword for Germany. If
Alsace ought to be part of the empire because it speaks chiefly German,
so ought the German-speaking portions of Austria and Switzerland.
And if France ought to have given up hope of Alsace because of its
German-speaking population, Germany should make no complaint over the
parallel renunciation of Prussian Poland or Upper Silesia. Germany
cannot ask to apply the principle in the west and reject it in the east.
As a matter of history, the linguistic frontier between French and
German has rarely coincided with the political frontier. The national
lines, so far as national lines have been drawn, have been drawn by
other forces. Language is an important element in national life,
but it is not the only element, and in Alsace-Lorraine it has been
subordinated to other considerations. Alsace, in spite of its German
speech, was reasonably contented under French rule. It never became
fully reconciled to German rule, in spite of a large measure of
community of language. The causes for its aspirations and sympathies
lie deeper than dialect. Although surer and clearer than race, language
proved an illusory and insufficient basis for solving the problem of
Alsace-Lorraine.
When we come to the historical tradition and affinities of the
district, we find that German writers urge the long membership of
Alsace and Lorraine in the mediaeval Empire down to 1648, the place of
Alsace in the history of German literature, and its affinities with
the German culture of the valley of the Rhine. The French bring out
certain connections of Alsace and Lorraine with France before Louis
XIV, but they urge especially the transformation of these provinces
during the French Revolution into a people profoundly imbued with the
French conceptions of liberty and democracy, in contradistinction to
the political and social traditions and organization of Germany.
Arguments of this sort are by their nature less specific and tangible
than those based upon the concrete facts of language and race, and
judgments in relation to them are likely to be subjective. At certain
points, however, they admit of objective analysis, particularly as
regards political affiliations.
There is, in the first place, no question that both Alsace and Lorraine
formed part of the mediaeval Empire from the tenth century on. It is
also equally clear that the Empire of the Middle Ages was in no way
comparable to the national states of modern Europe, but was a loose
union of tribal duchies which were later dissolved into a mass of
petty feudal states and free cities. The Emperors never succeeded in
establishing a strong monarchy or real national unity, being, by virtue
of their imperial title, often more interested in asserting a shadowy
supremacy over Italy and the valley of the Rhone. In the broader
sense the Empire covered at one time or another a considerable part
of Europe, as, for example, central and northern Italy and eastern
France; in the narrower sense the German kingdom comprised under its
loose and ineffective sway the territory of modern Holland, eastern
Belgium, a good part of Switzerland, Austria, Bohemia, et cetera. As
time went on, the principalities and towns became more rather than
less independent, until the treaty of Westphalia (1648) recognized
the territorial sovereignty of such princes as had not already
established it. Membership in so large and unconsolidated a body would
not establish the German character of any particular member, else it
would be necessary to incorporate many parts of Europe which have long
enjoyed complete independence of Germany.
Moreover, it is important to note that the present German empire is
not a continuation of the mediaeval Empire or a successor thereto.
The old Empire came to an end in 1806, when Francis I laid aside the
imperial crown and assumed the title of emperor of Austria. The modern
German empire was created by Prussia in 1871 as a federation of German
states from which Austria was carefully excluded. If the mediaeval
Emperors had a legitimate successor, it was the Hapsburgs, not the
Hohenzollerns, who were in the days of the older Empire merely one of
many lines of feudal and electoral princes. The Hapsburgs made over to
France their claims to Alsace and Lorraine, to Alsace and Metz in 1648,
to the duchy of Lorraine in 1738.
On the other hand the cultural ties between Germany and Alsace, and
in some measure between Germany and Lorraine, were stronger than
the political. Alsace had its share in the literary and artistic
development of the Rhine valley, and this, while affected by the
French influences which spread eastward in the later Middle Ages,
was preponderantly German. In the matter of speech French historians
admit that “Alsace at the beginning of the seventeenth century was an
absolutely German country,” and its local dialect was the vehicle of
its vigorous local traditions. “At the moment when it passed under
French rule it belonged to Germany in language, habits, institutions,
and feeling.”[17]
The French government from 1648 to 1789 was tender to the traditions
of the conquered territory. Except for the prescription of French in
the courts, no restrictions were put on the use of the German language,
although French naturally made rapid progress in the towns. There
was little change in local institutions. In spite of its centralized
monarchy, France itself abounded in local customs, privileges, and
jurisdictions, and it was natural and prudent to allow even greater
toleration in a newly conquered territory. Subject to the Sovereign
Council and the intendant, local affairs went on very much in their old
way and in large measure in the German tongue. Much was accomplished
for the material wellbeing of the country, and the inhabitants came
to recognize certain advantages in French rule. The old regime was a
period of gradual assimilation without violence.
The institutions which the old regime tolerated in Alsace, the
Revolution swept away. German historians naturally emphasize the
excesses and violence of the Revolution, French historians its social
and political reforms; but there is general agreement that it took long
and rapid strides in the direction of making the country French. “It
made an end of all the German mediaeval institutions which remained,”
is the sad summary of Meyer’s _Handlexikon_.[18] The Revolution
destroyed privilege, abolished seigniorial rights and jurisdictions,
and established a democratic social order as fully in Alsace and
Lorraine as in the rest of France. There was of course opposition,
and the anti-religious policy of the Revolution was steadily resisted
by this strongly Catholic population, but in general Alsace and
Lorraine moved with the new movement. The Marseillaise was first
sung at Strasburg; Alsatians served in great numbers in the armies
which carried the principles of 1789 across Europe; and names like
Kléber and Ney illustrate the share of these provinces in the wars of
the Napoleonic era. The acceptance of the Revolution in Alsace and
Lorraine made them at last one with France. “It is the Revolution,
not Louis XIV, which made Alsace French,” wrote Fustel de Coulanges
in 1870. “Since that moment Alsace has followed all our destinies, it
has lived our life. It has shared all our thoughts and feelings, our
victories and defeats, our glory and our defects, all our joys and all
our sorrows.”[19] By 1813, confess the German historians of Alsace,
“all feeling for Germany had been lost,” and “no trace remained of
the ancient community of race between the Alsatians and their German
brothers.”[20]
This participation in the life and ideals of France continued until
1871. There was, it is true, a considerable feeling of particularism
in Alsace, and to a lesser extent in Lorraine, as well as some natural
sympathy between the Protestant minority in Alsace and the Protestants
beyond the Rhine; but there was no movement for separation from France
and no desire manifested therefor. Toward 1870 the desire for the
recovery of these ‘lost provinces’ became more pronounced in Germany,
and it was fanned into flame as the war of 1870 progressed; but
this nationalistic movement found little or no response among the
Alsatians whom it claimed as long-lost kinsmen. If they were still
German “socially and ethically,” “politically and nationally they
were thoroughly French.” They were Germans as members of the family,
Frenchmen as members of the nation.[21] The Germans freely admitted
in 1871 that the Alsatians did not yet desire reunion with Germany,
but this was laid to their French education, and time and experience
of the blessings of German rule were expected to work a rapid change
in their desires. The state of opinion in Alsace at the time of the
Franco-Prussian war is excellently shown by an outside observer,
Sir Robert Morier, then British secretary of legation at Darmstadt,
whence he had opportunity to follow closely the events of the war and
the course of German opinion. Strongly pro-German and anti-French
throughout, he made it his business to inquire from the best German
sources whether there was any party in Alsace which desired annexation
to Germany, and the answer was uniformly in the negative. Among others
he interrogated the Grand Duke of Baden, who had led an army in Alsace,
and “had given himself the greatest trouble to ascertain the feeling of
the population in regard to Germany and ... had come to the conclusion
that not only no annexationist party existed, but that the strongest
possible national French feeling pervaded the whole population.”[22]
The usual German justification of the seizure of Alsace and Lorraine
may be summed up in the words of the historian Ranke in 1870, “We are
fighting Louis XIV.” These provinces had been taken from Germany in
the seventeenth century; they must now be taken back by their rightful
owner. To many people this is still the essence of the problem of
Alsace-Lorraine. Now if the world had not moved in the interval between
Louis XIV and 1871, there would be little to say in answer to this
argument. In the seventeenth century lands and peoples were passed from
one sovereign to another like pieces on a chessboard, and what had been
lost in one game might well be retaken in the next. But as regards this
question the world had changed in three important respects:--
1. Germany had changed. The Germany which lost these provinces to Louis
XIV was, as we have seen, a jumble of small states, loosely united
under the ineffective headship of the Hapsburgs. The Germany which
reclaimed them was a Hohenzollern empire from which much of the old
empire, including the Hapsburgs, had been separated or excluded.
2. Alsace and Lorraine had changed. They had lost their German
institutions and political sympathies and had become in all political
respects French as the result of two centuries of membership in the
French state, and especially of their share in the French Revolution.