close the river to belligerents. In August 1914 English reënforcements
were thus forbidden to relieve Antwerp, although their purpose was to
maintain Belgian neutrality, while Belgian troops were denied exit by
the river and forced, to the number of several thousand, to suffer
internment in Holland. Such control of the river nullifies the centre
of Belgium’s defensive system at Antwerp; it might also permit the
turning of her Flemish defences in case of a war with Holland. The
Dutch maintain that the neutrality of the Scheldt during the Great War
was of real assistance to the Allies, who would otherwise have suffered
from German submarine bases along its banks; but the Belgians point out
that the closing of the river in war destroys at one blow the whole
foreign commerce of Antwerp, a result that might ensue even in a war in
which Holland was a party and Belgium neutral.
The simplest solution of the problem of the Scheldt would be the
elimination of Holland from its southern shore, which she has held
for more than three hundred years. This land, called Maritime or
Zealand Flanders (Flandre zélandaise, Ryksvlaanderen), has an area of
275 square miles and a population of 78,677, chiefly Catholic. Its
economic relations are mainly with Belgium, but it has manifested no
desire to change its political affiliations, and has recently been
assiduously cultivated by Holland. A less drastic measure would be the
admission of Belgium to co-sovereignty on the lower Scheldt, leaving
Holland in possession of its banks. Still another possibility would
be the complete internationalization of the river, under the League
of Nations. These solutions, especially the first two, have been
energetically opposed in Holland as infringements on her sovereignty.
The question of her boundaries was not, she declared, a matter for the
Peace Conference.
It was indeed suggested at Paris that Holland might be induced to
relinquish Zealand Flanders and Limburg in return for a compensation
in the Prussian territory on her eastern frontier, either in East
Friesland or in the region of Cleves and Wesel on the lower Rhine,
districts which once had much in common with the adjacent portions
of the Netherlands. There was, however, no indication of any desire
on the part of the inhabitants of these territories to change their
political allegiance, nor was Holland in the least disposed to face the
uncertainties arising out of any such exchange. The whole idea smacked
too strongly of the methods of the Congress of Vienna.
One matter affecting Holland did, however, concern the Conference,
namely Belgium’s compulsory and guaranteed neutrality, and it was
the Belgian contention that this involved also her frontiers. The
international status of Belgium rests upon the three treaties of April
19, 1839, one between the Five Great Powers and Belgium, one between
these powers and Holland, and one between Holland and Belgium. These
documents, in substance identical, fix the boundaries of Belgium at the
same time that they establish her as an independent and perpetually
neutralized state, “bound to observe the same neutrality toward all
other states.” This whole system of neutrality collapsed in 1914, and
Belgium wanted no more of it. By the time of the Peace Conference
Prussia, Austria, and Russia were certainly in no position to guarantee
Belgium’s neutrality, while France and England joined with Belgium in
considering a revision of the treaties necessary. Upon the advice of
its Commission on Belgian Affairs, the Conference took the position
that the treaties, as constituting a single entity, should be revised
in the entirety of their clauses, at the joint request of these three
powers, and that Holland as a signatory of one of the treaties should
take part in the revision, together with the Great Powers whose
interests were general. The declared object of the revision was “to
free Belgium from that limitation on her sovereignty which was imposed
on her by the treaties of 1839, and, in the interest both of Belgium
and of general peace, to remove the dangers and disadvantages arising
from the said treaties.” Belgium and Holland were accordingly invited
to appear before the Conference in order to set forth their views with
regard to such a revision.
This action was taken by the Council of Ten March 8; but the Conference
was busy with more pressing things, and it was not until May 19 and
20 that the representatives of the two countries were at last heard.
The Belgians maintained that Belgium had been given weak frontiers in
1839 on the ground that she was to be protected by the Powers; such
protection having failed disastrously in 1914, she should be given
frontiers which would enable her to hold her own with her neighbors,
in war and in peace. The unlimited sovereignty which had been promised
her in President Wilson’s seventh point ought to carry with it the
frontiers denied her in the days of her weakness. Holland had no
objection to the abandonment of Belgium’s neutrality, which had been
guaranteed to her as well as to Belgium, but she would not consider for
a moment any cession of her own territory. She declared, however, that
she was ready to discuss amicably with Belgium any adjustments of the
conditions of navigation, etc.
A commission was then appointed, representing Belgium and Holland as
well as the principal Allied and Associated Powers, but its field was
specifically restricted to “proposals involving neither transfer of
territorial sovereignty nor the creation of international servitudes.”
As any thoroughgoing settlement satisfactory to Belgium could not help
touching in some way the sovereignty of Holland, and as the regime of
the Scheldt already constituted an international servitude, the terms
of reference were generally regarded as a triumph for the Dutch. The
commission went to work in the summer in two sections, one military
and the other economic, but no final results had been reached when
the Peace Conference dissolved in December. The reference of such
outstanding matters to the governments concerned is another victory
for Holland, who desires no change in the existing situation. In
these matters Belgium has derived little advantage from the support
of her allies. Holland still holds the lower Scheldt and the lower
Meuse; Luxemburg seems permanently lost; except in the matter of her
neutrality, Belgium stands substantially where she stood in 1839.
If the territorial status of Belgium has not been essentially bettered
by the war, her economic status is certainly worse. No share in a
problematic indemnity will compensate her for her direct losses, not
to speak of her other expenses--the stripping of her resources, the
enforced idleness of her factories, the disappearance of her foreign
markets and her transit trade. Dependent in an extraordinary degree on
the outside world, Belgium was cut off from it for nearly five years,
and it is a question how fully she can recover her previous position. A
hero in 1914, is Belgium to remain a cripple for the future? The German
is gone, but he left ruin and disillusion behind him. Small wonder that
many a Belgian asks whether it was all worth while, as he contrasts his
lean and hungry country with the prosperity of neutral Holland. Small
wonder that the neutral world, as it looks to the future, is encouraged
to imitate the Holland that stood pat, the Luxemburg that succumbed,
rather than the Belgium that resisted. The neutral is more prosperous
than the ally.
In order to get a just perspective in the face of such considerations,
it is necessary to go back a few months. Germany’s plan was not merely
to use Belgium as a highroad to France, but to make Belgium permanently
subject to German interests, if not politically subject, at least
under complete military and economic control. The German literature of
the war, official and unofficial, is full of plans for the permanent
control of Belgium--political annexation, at least of that great
Flemish-speaking half of the country which the German administration
had separated from the rest of Belgium, and which, if not annexed
outright, was to remain apart as the great support of German policy
in the Belgium of the future; military control, of railroads and
telegraphs, perhaps of the Flemish coast and the fortresses of the
Meuse; economic control, through a customs union, railway tariffs,
port privileges, and the domination of Belgian industrial enterprises.
Now Belgium has at least escaped all this. She has maintained her
independence while she has saved her soul. When discouraged about the
present state of the world, it is well to remind ourselves that the war
accomplished, at least for the time being, one great thing it set out
to secure, the destruction of German militarism and the protection of
small states against the imperial ambitions of Germany. Belgium has
also improved her colonial position, not only by frustrating German
plans against the Belgian Congo, but by receiving a mandate over an
adjacent portion of German East Africa.
For the future Belgium’s security lies in a strong League of Nations
and in what such a League stands for. At first Belgian statesmen took
the League somewhat coldly, for the treaty of 1839 was an international
covenant, and they had ample experience of the futility of mere paper
guarantees. If the League covenant were merely another piece of paper,
they would be right. The hopeful side of the League lies rather in
its assurance of general coöperation, its growth as an administrative
and informing body, its development of an international habit of
mind and an international conscience. After all, it was the sense of
international right that brought the world to Belgium’s side in the
Great War, and it is in the broadening and deepening of that sense
that the chief hope lies in the future. For centuries the position of
Belgium surrounded by France, Germany, and England has made it the
battleground of Europe, and it is only by diminishing the likelihood of
battles that it can hope to escape this fate. The best guarantees of
the security of small states are a stronger sense of right and justice
throughout the world.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
On the problem of Schleswig the best collection is the _Manual
historique de la question du Slesvig_, ed. F. de Jessen (Copenhagen,
1906); supplemented by _Le Slesvig du Nord, 1906-1914_ (Copenhagen,
1915). For a German view, see E. Daenell, _Das Dänentum in
Nordschleswig seit 1864_ (Kiel, 1913). After the armistice Daenell
protested strongly against the surrender of any part of Schleswig to
Denmark: _Has Denmark a claim to North Sleswick?_ (Münster, 1918).
For a summary of conditions under Prussian rule, see L. M. Larson,
in _American Historical Review_, xxiv, pp. 227-252 (1919); and M.
Mackeprang, _Nordslesvig_ (Copenhagen, 1910; German translation,
1912). For the Danish discussion in 1919, see Miss Karen Larsen,
in _Political Science Quarterly_, December, 1919. G. Rosendal’s
_Sönderjylland_ (Odense, [1919]) contains convenient maps and
statistics. See also the British _Handbook_.
* * * * *
For the history of Belgium, the standard work of H. Pirenne has not
advanced beyond 1648; there are brief sketches by L. van der Essen
(Chicago, 1916) and L. Vander Linden (Paris, 1918). General economic
conditions are described by W. Bürklin, _Handbuch des belgischen
Wirtschaftslebens_ (Göttingen and Berlin, 1916); and by Gehrig and
Wäntig, _Belgiens Volkswirtschaft_ (Leipzig, 1918). An admirable
special study of Belgian commerce will be found in A. Demangeon,
“Le port d’Anvers,” in _Annales de géographie_, 1918, pp. 307-339,
elaborated in the second volume of the _Travaux du Comité d’Etudes_.
For Belgium’s coal and mineral resources, see P. Krusch, _Die
nutzbaren Lagerstätten Belgiens_ (Essen, 1916). The British Handbook
on _Belgium_ (1920) is particularly convenient, as are the related
pamphlets in the same series.
German plans for permanent control of Belgium are illustrated in
S. Grumbach, _Das annexionistische Deutschland_ (Lausanne, 1917;
abbreviated translation, New York, 1917); and in Notestein and Stoll,
_Conquest and Kultur_ (Washington, 1918). A specimen of this vast
literature of annexation may be seen in the work of a Bonn professor:
E. Zitelmann, _Das Schicksal Belgiens beim Friedensschluss_ (third
edition, Munich, 1917), where the systematic subjection of Belgium
is planned. The exploitation of the Flemish question by the Germans
is described by F. Passelecq, _La question flamande et l’Allemagne_
(Paris and Nancy, 1917).
The problems of Belgium’s frontiers are not covered in any single
book. The Belgian point of view will be found in P. Nothomb, _La
barrière belge_ (Paris, 1916); one chapter also as _Histoire belge
du grand duché de Luxembourg_ (Paris, 1918). See also E. Bourgeois,
_La frontière orientale du royaume de Belgique_, in _Travaux du
Comité d’Etudes_, ii. For Luxemburg in general, see Miss Ruth Putnam,
_Luxemburg and her Neighbors_, with bibliography (second edition, New
York, 1920). The question of the Scheldt is summarized by A. Rotsaert,
_L’Escaut depuis le traité de Munster_ (Brussels and Paris, 1918);
numerous documents in Guillaume, _L’Escaut depuis 1830_ (Brussels,
1903). For a Dutch view, see Den Beer Poortugael, _La neutralité sur
l’Escaut_ (The Hague, 1911). For this question at Paris, cf. Cammaerts
and Geyl in _The New Europe_, July 31 and August 14, 1919. On Belgian
neutrality and the treaties of 1839, see F. L. Warrin, Jr., _The
Neutrality of Belgium_ (Washington, 1918).
The history of Belgium’s frontiers can be traced in the following
historical atlases: L. van der Essen, _Atlas de géographie historique
de la Belgique_ (Brussels and Paris, 1919-), notably Map 10 (1786)
by F. L. Ganshof; _Geschiedkundige Atlas van Nederland_ (The Hague,
1912); _Geschichtlicher Atlas der Rheinprovinz_ (Bonn, 1898-),
especially the maps of 1789.
[Illustration: BELGIUM AND HER NEIGHBORS]
FOOTNOTES:
[8] Articles 109-114, with official map.
[9] Articles 380-386.
[10] Article 115.
[11] Articles 34-39, with official map.
[12] Articles 32, 33.
[13] Articles 40, 41.
[14] Article 361.
[15] Article 9, § 2.
III
ALSACE-LORRAINE
The fate of Alsace-Lorraine was, in general, a problem of the war
rather than of the Peace Conference. Nothing had done more, in
President Wilson’s phrase, “to unsettle the peace of the world for
nearly fifty years”; nothing was more earnestly discussed throughout
the World War; nothing was settled more simply and quickly once the
war was over. The completeness of the Allied victory and the immediate
evacuation of Alsace-Lorraine required by the terms of the armistice
left no doubt of the return of the lost provinces to France. The
Peace Conference had only to determine certain necessary details.
“The territories which were ceded to Germany in accordance with the
Preliminaries of Peace signed at Versailles on February 26, 1871,
and the Treaty of Frankfort of May 10, 1871, are restored to French
sovereignty as from the date of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.” So
runs Article 51 of the treaty of Versailles, and the rest follows from
that.
Nevertheless, no account of the territorial problems of the Peace
Conference would be complete which did not treat the question of
Alsace-Lorraine and its background, and treat it with sufficient
fulness to give the proper perspective to this major issue of the war.
Moreover, Alsace-Lorraine is the necessary basis for any consideration
of the whole matter of the Franco-German frontier, with its specific
issues of the Rhine, the Left Bank, and the Saar valley. Let us begin
with a minimum of history and description, followed by a fuller
analysis of the recent aspects of the problem.
Alsace-Lorraine (German Elsass-Lothringen) was an imperial territory
(_Reichsland_) of the German empire formed in 1871 by the union of the
two districts then taken from France. It had an area of 5600 square
miles (Connecticut and Rhode Island 6000) and a population in 1910
of 1,874,000 (Connecticut and Rhode Island 1,657,000). On the east
the Rhine separates it from the grand duchy of Baden; on the south
it touches the Swiss frontier; on the north it was bounded by the
Palatinate, Prussia, and the grand duchy of Luxemburg. The French
frontier on the west was formed in the south by the summit of the
Vosges and farther north by an artificial line of demarcation drawn in
1871.
Geographically considered, Alsace consists of the eastern slopes of the
Vosges and the rich plain of the valley of the Rhine and its tributary
the Ill, Lorraine of a plateau cut in the west by the Moselle. Alsace
is a rich agricultural region, producing grain, potatoes, hay, tobacco,
and wine; it has also important manufactures in its towns, cottons
being a specialty of Mulhouse and other towns of Upper Alsace. Lorraine
is less productive in agriculture but richer in mineral resources and
the furnaces and iron mills which these support. Alsace has important
oil wells at Pechelbronn, and one of the richest potash deposits in
the world at Wittelsheim. Lorraine has important salt mines, and
valuable coal fields lie on its border in the valley of the Saar; and
on its western edge it shared with France the ‘minette’ iron field,
the greatest iron deposit in Europe, from the German portion of which
before the war came 74 per cent of all the iron mined in the German
empire.
The people of Alsace and eastern Lorraine are preponderantly
German-speaking; those of western Lorraine speak French. French is also
much spoken in the towns of Alsace. 76 per cent of the whole population
is Catholic, 22 per cent Protestant.
Alsace-Lorraine as a single political division was a creation of the
German government in 1871; the two districts have different origins
and a different history, indeed each of them is made up of parts with
histories still further separate and distinct. All have in common the
fact that they form part of a region which since the ninth century
has been debated ground between Germany and France. In the sixteenth,
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the territory which now forms
Alsace and Lorraine was acquired bit by bit by France; in 1871 it was
transferred in one lump to the new German empire.
In the later Middle Ages Lorraine formed a duchy, within which lay
a number of small and in some cases independent feudal states and
the city of Metz, a free city of the Holy Roman Empire whose people
spoke French. In 1552, on the petition of certain German Protestant
princes, Metz was placed under the protection of the king of France,
who took possession of the city and the surrounding territory subject
to it. In 1613 the bishopric of Metz and its lands were taken over
by the French king, the whole being combined with Toul and Verdun
into the province of the Three Bishoprics (Trois Evêchés), and the
cession was confirmed by the Emperor in the treaty of Westphalia of
1648. Further acquisitions made in the seventeenth century, notably
Sierck and Saarlouis, gave France a strategic line of communication
through Lorraine to Alsace. The duchy of Lorraine, which had likewise
been dependent on the Holy Roman Empire, was declared free by Emperor
Charles V and was gradually drawn into the French sphere of influence.
Relinquished by its Hapsburg duke in 1736, in 1738 by the treaty of
Vienna it was handed over to a Polish duke, Stanislas Leszcynski, on
condition that at his death it should pass to his son-in-law, Louis XV
of France, by whom it was accordingly acquired in 1766. Certain small
enclaves within Lorraine did not pass to France until the Revolution.
Alsace, except the city of Mulhouse, was annexed to France in the
course of the reign of Louis XIV. The Middle Ages had broken the
country up into a great variety of feudal states and free cities;
the Reformation divided it still further by religious dissensions. In
the Thirty Years’ War France intervened on the side of the Protestant
princes of Germany; at its close France received considerable
possessions in Alsace, in much the same way that Brandenburg (the
future Prussia) then secured valuable additions in the north. The
treaty of Westphalia (1648) assured to France certain lands and certain
governmental rights possessed by the Emperor in his imperial capacity
and as head of the house of Hapsburg, but the provisions were, possibly
with intention, left vague at certain points and became the occasion of
protracted legal and historical disputes. By a combination of undoubted
grants, more or less justified legal interpretations, and the direct
seizure of the city of Strasburg, Louis XIV rounded out his possession
of the whole of Alsace. The sole exception, Mulhouse, allied with the
Swiss Confederation, voluntarily offered itself to France in 1798.
Thus united to France, Alsace and Lorraine retained their boundaries
until the treaty of Vienna. The general principle of the territorial
adjustments of 1814 was to leave to France its frontiers of 1792;
after Napoleon’s return and defeat at Waterloo the treaty of 1815 was
supposed to reduce these to the limits of 1789. In Alsace and Lorraine
two deviations were made from this principle, both to the disadvantage
of France. At the northern end of Alsace France lost to Bavaria the
territory between the Lauter and the Queich, including the fortress
of Landau which she had possessed in 1789. On the northern border of
Lorraine the frontier was readjusted to the advantage of Prussia,
partly for strategic reasons, in connection particularly with the
fortress of Saarlouis, partly in order to take away from France the
valuable coal deposits of the Saar valley.
At the close of the Franco-Prussian war Germany required of France the
cession of Alsace and Lorraine, with a boundary on the west which was
defined by the treaty of Frankfort in 1871.
In the next forty years Alsace-Lorraine passed through various stages
of government, from military dictatorship through a certain amount of
territorial independence to the definite constitution imposed by the
Reichstag in 1911. Those who had hoped for autonomy were disappointed
in this instrument, which failed to elevate the Reichsland to the
position of a federated state of the empire, although an anomalous
provision was made for its representation in the Bundesrat. Legally
Alsace-Lorraine was still a subject territory of the empire.
Under the constitution of 1911 the emperor possessed supreme executive
authority, exercised chiefly through a governor (Statthalter) appointed
and recalled by the emperor and resident in Strasburg. Legislative
power was entrusted to a bicameral Diet (Landtag). The upper house
(First Chamber) consisted of forty-six members, half of them named
directly by the emperor, the others made up of certain ecclesiastical
dignitaries, the president of the Superior Court, and representatives
of cities and economic interests, so that the majority was under
the emperor’s control. The sixty members of the lower house (Second
Chamber) were elected by universal male suffrage. The emperor possessed
the right of veto over the legislative acts of the Landtag; he could
levy taxes if it refused to pass the budget; and he could prorogue it
and issue decrees with the force of law during its recess. Independent
in local matters of the Reichstag, the Reichsland was far from
independent of the emperor.
In imperial matters Alsace-Lorraine had three representatives in the
Bundesrat, appointed by the Statthalter and thus ultimately by the
emperor; but “their votes were counted only when it made no difference
how they were cast.”[16] Alsace-Lorraine had sent representatives to
the Reichstag since 1874; these numbered fifteen, elected by all male
citizens over the age of twenty-five.
For local government Alsace-Lorraine consisted of the three districts
(Bezirke) of Upper Alsace (capital Colmar), Lower Alsace (capital
Strasburg), and Lorraine (capital Metz). Each of these fell into
circles (Kreise), cantons, and communes (Gemeinden). The presidents
of the districts and the directors of the circles were named by the
emperor, as were also the directors of police. The organization of the
local bodies and the distribution of their functions were similar to
the system prevailing in Prussia.