OUR LEADER.
THE ROMANCE OF A PATRIOT’S LIFE.
From San Pablo we despatched men on to Apurito, where we proposed
crossing the river with the cattle, to make preparations for this
toilsome work; and then started for Achaguas, the inhabitants of which
town had tendered our Leader an earnest invitation to visit his old
head-quarters. After an easy ride of about three hours, we forded on
horseback the arm of the Apure River which, running in a south-easterly
direction, forms with the Arauca and the main channel of the former the
island of Achaguas, on which the capital of the province, a collection
of mud hovels, is situated. A brood of scaly crocodiles basking in the
sun, and a herd of tame cattle refreshing themselves in the middle of
the stream, were the only signs of animation we perceived on our
approach to the renowned capital of the Apure. In spite of its present
dilapidated condition, Achaguas did not fail to interest me more than
any other spot in Apure, being my birthplace, and the stronghold for
many years of my country’s independence. The Governor of the province,
Señor Arciniega, accompanied by the few officials in the place, came out
after a while to greet our Leader, as did also the veteran General
Cornelio Muñoz, former Commander of the famous _Guardia de Honor_, or
_Colorados de Paez_, which under the leadership of both these generals,
performed so many prodigies during the long struggle between Royalists
and Patriots, which resulted in the final overthrow of Spanish
domination in Colombia. At that epoch of historical interest to the
friends of liberty in America, Achaguas held the most conspicuous
position as the headquarters of the patriot armies, led by the subject
of the following remarks.
The arms of the republic were at first unsuccessful, and Venezuela
submitted to the government of the mother country, the Spanish
commander, Don Domingo Monteverde, having triumphed over the patriot
forces in 1812. By this time, however, a new champion of the republican
cause was rising in the south, amidst the wild scenes I have endeavored
to depict in the foregoing pages. This champion was Captain José A.
Paez, then a youth of twenty Aprils, who conceived the happy idea of
collecting a horde of undisciplined Llaneros in the plains of Casanare
to oppose the overwhelming forces of Spain. His intimate acquaintance
with the country, and his thorough mastery in all the sports of the
Llaneros, admirably fitted him to carry out his plans successfully. How
he came there, and by what means he acquired the requisite proficiency
for the arduous enterprise, the following anecdote of his early career
will explain. When seventeen years of age, an uncle of his, the good
Priest of Araure, his native place, entrusted him with a large sum of
money to deliver safely into the hands of the curate of a distant
parish, furnishing him for the journey with a mule, an old pistol, and a
rusty sword; for, even at that period of comparative quiet and peace
(1807) it was dangerous for a traveller to venture over the roads alone,
and carrying with him the tempting metal. The future President of the
Republic, highly elated at the great confidence reposed in him, with the
usual inexperience of youth, spoke freely about his commission in the
first inn he stopped at to get his meals. The consequence of this
imprudence was, that shortly after he left the inn, he was attacked on
the road by three men, who, as a matter of course, demanded _la bolsa ó
la vida_. The youthful traveller, however, dismounted with the old
pistol in his hand already cocked, and now threatening one and then the
other of his assailants, endeavored to repel them. At last, being too
closely pressed, he fired the pistol at the nearest robber, with such
good aim that he killed his adversary on the spot, while the fragments
of the barrel, which burst at the same time, struck another in the face.
Then charging resolutely upon the third bandit with the rusty sword, he
quickly put both to flight, leaving behind them the corpse of their
wretched comrade. Notwithstanding the obvious propriety of his conduct
on this occasion, acting as he did in self-defence, the young man feared
the consequences; he imagined himself already accused, persecuted,
without the means of proving his innocence, and therefore determined to
hide himself by going into the interior of the plains, hoping thus to
escape a punishment which his error made him regard as inevitable.
Determined to gain an honest livelihood, he sought employment on the
cattle farm of La Calzada, in the province of Barinas, where he soon
became inured to the fatigues of the ranger’s life; acquiring at the
same time, under the tuition of a cruel negro majordomo, that
proficiency in horsemanship which later in life gave him the superiority
over the enemy.
Proud and jealous at the same time of his white apprentice, whom he
imagined had been sent there by his master to spy his actions, the negro
overseer of La Calzada spared no opportunity to put to the test the
courage and strength of the future champion of those plains, sometimes
compelling him to break in the most vicious horses, which often led him
off for days into the open fields; at other times ordering him away upon
the most hazardous ventures of the Llanos. Not satisfied with this show
of authority over his pupil, the brutal black Mentor of young Paez ended
the fatigues of a hard day’s labor by ordering him to bring a pail of
water and wash his muddy feet! But the tide of fortune soon changed; the
whirlwind of revolution offered Paez a new field of adventure, and the
humble peon of La Calzada rapidly gained the highest posts in the
patriot army, while the haughty overseer went to increase the ranks of
the opposing foe. In the course of events the majordomo was brought one
day a prisoner to Paez, who not only spared his life, but kept him
always near his person, his only revenge being to imitate the tone of
his former tyrant when calling upon young Paez to exercise the functions
of the slave: “_Niño José Antonio!_ bring a bowl of water to wash my
feet!” to which the old negro humbly replied, “I see, _niño_, you have
not forgotten your old tricks.”
* * * * *
When the revolution broke out, on the 19th of April, 1810, Paez enlisted
in the militia of Barinas as a common soldier, and soon after was
promoted to the rank of sergeant of cavalry. This, however, being rather
a slow process of promotion, he proceeded to organize an independent
body of cavalry, with which he rendered important service to the cause
of independence. But the path of glory was not without thorns, and our
young leader found himself a prisoner in the hands of the merciless
Spaniards, owing his preservation, as it was then believed, to the
influence of a miracle. In those days a war without quarter was fiercely
waged. The province of Barinas having been again occupied by the
royalist forces, Paez fell into the hands of the cruel Puy, was thrown
into prison and ordered to be executed in the city of Barinas the next
day. At that time military executions of captured enemies were conducted
by leading them out during the night to some lonely spot, where they
were despatched with the lance or the sword. Paez and a number of his
fellow-prisoners were thus being led out one night, when he observed, as
he was leaving the prison, that he was uncovered; believing himself to
be only going to make his deposition before the Governor, he requested
his companion in the cell to lend him his hat. The Spanish officer in
charge of the mournful cortege, failing to recognize him under this
guise, ordered him back to be exchanged for the owner of the hat, who,
he supposed, was the identical “captain of the rebels.” Thus he obtained
unwittingly a respite of one day. The following night he was awakened
about eleven o’clock by a great noise of horsemen and infantry in the
street. He imagined they were coming to lead him and the rest of his
fellow-prisoners to the place of execution. He prepared, therefore, to
die; but Providence saved his life once more. The noise of arms and
horses in the street had been occasioned by an alarm in consequence of
information received by Governor Puy, that a considerable army of
patriots was encamped on the banks of the Santo Domingo river, on which
Barinas is situated, and was about marching on the city. Several
parties, coming from different directions, confirmed the information
received by the Governor, and the panic became general. It was supposed
that the patriots in large numbers intended to take the Spanish garrison
by surprise and seize upon the Governor. The latter, therefore,
immediately abandoned Barinas with his forces, leaving only a few men to
guard the prison, for in his hurry he had forgotten to execute the
prisoners, as he had done before on similar occasions. This was the time
for Paez to make a bold effort to save his life. The next morning he
embraced the opportunity, broke his fetters, helped to release his
fellow-prisoners, and overpowered one of the sentinels, who attempted to
oppose his escape. Paez then fled to put himself once more at the head
of a small band of patriots, to harass the enemy in the same province
of Barinas. On the morning succeeding the alarm, the royalists could not
discover an enemy for more than fifty miles around the city. The alarm
and panic occasioned by the reported approach of an enemy in the night,
confirmed by so many persons, some of whom had gone out to reconnoitre,
and the most singular disappearance, or absence, of this host on the
following morning, gave rise to the popular belief, existing to this day
among the common people, that the life of Paez was saved by the friendly
intercession and miraculous appearance of an army of departed spirits,
known as the _Ejército de las Animas_.
The next exploit of the future champion of the Llanos took place amongst
the rugged mountains of Merida, to which point the remnants of the
republican forces were retreating after the disasters of 1814. Utterly
disheartened and surrounded on all sides by enemies, they hardly knew
which way to turn. The column to which Paez belonged finding itself
unexpectedly confronted on their march to Bailadores by a superior
force, made a stand at a place called Etanques, while the enemy
endeavored to gain the intermediate heights. The road which led to these
was a narrow and deep cut on the sides of the steep mountain, which did
not permit a force to deploy on being attacked; observing which, Paez,
who had no command of his own, and only figured as an _attaché_ to a
small body of cavalry under Capt. Antonio Rangel, who commanded the
advanced post, strenuously urged the captain to pursue the royalists on
their march; Rangel, however, contented himself with exchanging a few
shots with the latter, and returned to occupy his position. Unable to
restrain himself, Paez, who rode a spirited charger, dashed onward,
making a great noise, as if proceeding from many voices, discharging a
blunderbuss on the rear of the column, which killed the sergeant.
Alarmed with the voices and the report of the gun, the royalists were
seized with a sudden panic, and fled in consternation, throwing down
their arms, and upsetting everything and one another in their
precipitate flight, thus presenting an easier mark to the terrible lance
of their pursuer. The only opposition encountered by the latter was from
one José Maria Sanchez, a man renowned for his courage and much feared
by the people of Merida, who compelled Paez to dismount and struggle
hard with him for the possession of the exterminating weapon. Victorious
at last over his formidable antagonist, the reckless champion remained
complete master of the field. It was then that Paez, once again free to
act according to his own judgment and impulses, conceived the idea of
going through the centre of New Granada to the plains of Casanare, south
of the province of Apure. This plan was the result of experience, which
convinced him that the patriots could not triumph, notwithstanding their
unheard-of efforts, while the Spaniards held possession of the plains
and controlled the supply of horses. The acquisition of the Llanos gave
the superiority to the Spaniards, as, by means of it, they had a source
of supplies and a safe retreat. Paez determined, therefore, to make
that wild region the base of his military operations, and with this
object organized a body of horsemen in the plains of Casanare, which he
soon after led into the province of Apure.
In the language of another, “no man was better calculated to command the
love and respect of his wild soldiery. Great bravery, a thorough
knowledge of localities, an affable and familiar treatment of his
followers, procured for Paez great popularity and an unlimited sway over
the minds of his men. He was one of the best riders in a district of
country celebrated for good horsemen, and understood the management of
the lance, his favorite weapon, almost to perfection. He possessed great
bodily strength and agility, and few could compete with him in the wild
sports of the Llaneros, or inhabitants of the immense plains of
Venezuela.”
The Llanos are, in fact, a permanent camp of military instruction for
their intrepid inhabitants. Accustomed from their infancy to subdue the
wild horse, to master the wild bull, to swim across broad streams, and
to grapple in single combat with the crocodile, the tiger and wild boar,
the Llaneros learn to despise danger. When the war turned them from
their ordinary occupations, the enemy found them ready-made soldiers.
Inhabiting a genial atmosphere and endowed with iron constitutions,
their wants are few and insignificant; in peace, the lazo and the horse;
in war, the horse and the lance. Perfectly acquainted with the country
and unencumbered with heavy accoutrements, the dwellers of the Llanos
cannot be conquered except by men of the same region, and Venezuela
possesses in those limitless plains and in the breasts of their valorous
children, the strongest bulwark of her national independence.
Paez, now master of his own military movements, resolved to meet the
enemy there, and, if possible, to bring about an engagement. On the 16th
of February, 1816, he commenced his march in pursuit of the royalist
chief, Don Francisco Lopez, and in three hours’ space met him at a place
called Mata de la Miel, on the right bank of the river Apure. The
royalist leader had two pieces of artillery and sixteen hundred men,
whom he drew up at once in order of battle. Paez’s forces amounted
altogether to about six hundred cavalry. It was evening and the night
fast advancing, on which account many of the patriot officers were of
opinion that the engagement should be postponed until the following day.
This very reason, however, determined the leader to enter at once into
action, as he feared that his soldiers, observing the great superiority
of the enemy in numbers, might take advantage of the night to desert.
Paez accordingly divided his forces in two columns, placing the one,
composed of New Granadians, under command of Captain Genaro Vasquez, and
the other, composed of Venezuelians, under Captain Ramon Nonato Perez.
The royalists were completely routed, and during all that night and the
two following days the forces led by Paez pursued and captured a great
portion of those under Don Francisco Lopez. Such was the action of Mata
de la Miel. There were left dead on the field four hundred royalists,
and a great number of prisoners were taken together with about three
thousand five hundred horses and nearly all the enemy’s arms. Four
months afterward, in June, Lopez again crossed the Apure with twelve
hundred horsemen and four hundred infantry, but Paez met him near
Mantecal and compelled him to retreat, after losing many men and horses.
Notwithstanding these advantages on the part of the patriot forces, the
result of the following campaigns (1814, 1815, and 1816) was most
disastrous to the arms of the republic elsewhere; Venezuela, New
Granada, and the plains of Casanare again fell into the hands of the
vengeful Spaniards. In 1816, a very numerous emigration of patriots,
consisting of men, women, and children, in a state of great destitution
and suffering, fled to the wilderness from the persecution of the
royalists, and took refuge in the camp of Paez. Many persons of
distinction were to be found among the fugitives, and a system of
government was established for the regulation of affairs. A meeting of
officers was held at Arichuna, and Paez appointed supreme chief, with
the rank of General of Brigade. He applied himself immediately to raise
sufficient forces to oppose Don Francisco Lopez and to acquire, if
possible, some resources in his extreme want. The hardships and
privations endured by the patriot army on the plains can scarcely be
conceived. The soldiers were so destitute of clothing as to be compelled
to use for a covering the hides of the cattle freshly killed; very few
had hats, none shoes. The ordinary and only food was beef, without salt
and without bread. There were, in addition to all this, continual
rains, and the rivers and creeks had overflowed and covered over the
country. They wanted horses, and as these are indispensable to the
Llaneros, they must be obtained before any thing else. Only wild horses
could be procured, and they had to be tamed and broken. This was done in
squadrons, and it was a curious spectacle to see five or six hundred
riders at a time struggling to subdue these wild animals. Around the
ground were stationed several officers, mounted on well-trained horses,
whose duty it was to go after those which escaped from their riders, to
prevent them from carrying away the saddles, although these were made of
wood, with thongs of raw hides. Many years after these scenes, an
eye-witness wrote: “We courted danger in order to put an end, with
honor, to such a miserable life.” To provide against this misery, Paez
now turned his attention to the nearest source of supply, Barinas, a
city abounding in all the commodities he stood most in need of. Although
nearly two hundred miles distant, the patriot chieftain did not hesitate
to invade his old antagonist in the midst of the rainy season. The
undertaking could not, however, be executed without great peril and
hardships, he having to contend not only against the inveterate enemies
who occupied all the approaches to the city, but against the inundation
of the savannas at the time. The expedition, moreover, had to be
conducted with great secrecy, avoiding even the few channels left open
in those inland seas for the transit of men on horseback. Not in the
least deterred by obstacles so formidable in themselves, Paez got
together one thousand picked men, and two thousand white horses,
animals of this color being reputed the best swimmers. With these, he
crossed the Apure and several other streams, then at the height of their
flood, being compelled besides to ford extensive lagoons of various
depths to avoid the numerous gunboats of the enemy, stationed at all the
important passes. On one of these, on the river Canaguá, the expedition
was fortunate enough to capture by surprise a gunboat and a large
quantity of hides, which were left behind with a strong guard for future
use. When near Barinas, Paez sent a detachment to surprise also the town
of Pedraza, to the south-east of the capital, with the object of drawing
the attention of the royalists in that direction. The ruse succeeded
admirably; the small detachment of men carried every thing before them,
penetrating as far as the plaza, and then retreated, according to
instructions, to rejoin the main body. Enraged at their audacity, the
Spanish commander at Barinas sent out a large force in pursuit of the
attacking party, thus weakening his own force. Paez then advanced
against Barinas, disposing his line of march in single file, each
horseman followed by his spare horse, tied to the tail of his own
sumpter. The object of this arrangement was to deceive the royalists
also in regard to the real numbers of the enemy, which from a distance
presented a very imposing appearance. Barinas is situated on the border
of an extensive plain, bounded on the south by the _mesa_ of the same
name, through which Paez made his entry into the doomed city when the
sun was in the meridian. The dreaded army of “departed spirits” did not
produce a more appalling consternation among the royalists than the
apparition of this unexpected body of ragged horsemen. They knew full
well that, owing to the overflow of the savannas, no advance could be
made upon the city from the south. They felt equally secure against any
attack from the north and from the east, which were then entirely under
their control, while on the west they were still better protected by the
lofty Sierra Nevada. Without stopping to ascertain the real character of
the force before them, the royalists collected together in a great hurry
whatever valuables they prized most, and had already loaded several
mules with them, when the enemy, dashing forward in full gallop, arrived
in time to secure the rich booty, after dispersing the owners and their
troops. The half-clad followers of Paez then fell upon the stores and
abandoned houses of the royalists with the eagerness of men who had not
seen a respectable garment in a long time. One of the officers was
fortunate enough to capture a mule loaded with thirty thousand dollars
in gold, while every man in the party got more goods than he could
carry.
Paez only remained a sufficient time at Barinas to arrange the
transportation of the booty, which took up nearly all the spare horses
brought along for this purpose; without these and the hides seized at
Canaguá, it would have been impossible to remove it to the patriot camp
in the wilderness. Owing to the presence of a strong flotilla of
gunboats at the mouth of the river, the captured vessel had to be
abandoned after a while, and the wearisome route across the inundated
savannas resumed by the returning caravan. The hides served the double
purpose of covering for the goods and lighters to ferry them over the
streams. This species of leather canoe is an ingenious contrivance
frequently resorted to in those wild regions wherever there is a
scarcity of boats, and consists in a bag or trough formed by passing a
rope through a number of holes round the rim of the hide, and gathering
it over the goods. One end of the rope of sufficient length is then
handed over to a good swimmer, who takes it between his teeth and tows
the lighter after him. In this manner, the immense booty obtained at
Barinas was successfully transported over one hundred miles of inundated
plains, to the inconceivable joy of the wretched emigrants at the camp
of Arichuna.
After allowing his troop sufficient time to rest from their fatigues,
and finding it to his advantage to resume the offensive, at least to
occupy the attention of his soldiers, Paez commenced his march toward
Achaguas, although the season was still very severe. The march was slow,
as, besides the difficulties of the road, they were encumbered by
numerous emigrants, and compelled, at every step, to procure supplies on
account of the want of stores. The great multitude of men, women, and
children, moving with the army, represented to the life the picture of a
nomadic people without home or country, who, after consuming the
resources of the district they have occupied, raise their tents to
conquer another.[42] In this manner they arrived at the sand hills or
Médanos de Araguayuna, where, having left the emigrants under the
protection of a resolute band of horsemen, Paez incorporated all the men
capable of bearing arms in his ranks, and marched against Lopez, whom he
supposed to be at Achaguas. But after proceeding a short distance, he
learned that the enemy, to the number of seventeen hundred horsemen and
four hundred infantry, was at the cattle farm called Yagual. Paez then
changed his course and took his position between the enemy and the city
of Achaguas. His army was divided into three columns, commanded by
Generals Urdaneta and Servier, and by Colonel Santander; they were
nearly all armed with lances, very few with muskets or carabines, and
the supply of ammunition was scanty. On the 8th of October, they came in
sight of the enemy, and although their number much exceeded that of the
patriot forces, Paez did not hesitate to give them battle. The conflict
was long and severe, but it was decidedly in favor of the patriots. Don
Francisco Lopez was compelled to abandon his position, after sustaining
a severe loss; on the next day he refused to renew the battle, and fell
back upon Achaguas, having previously shipped on the river Arauca all
his artillery and wounded for San Fernando. On the 13th, Lopez, having
made a short resistance, abandoned the town, of which Paez took
possession. Shortly after this, Lopez being attacked by surprise on the
banks of the Apure, was utterly defeated, his forces dispersed, and he
himself lost his life.
At the head of his brave soldiers, Paez rescued the province of Apure, a
part of that of Barinas, in Venezuela, and recovered that of Casanare,
in New Granada. Having increased his force by the new levies raised in
these provinces and in others, he formed that army which subsequently
rendered such important services in the cause of freedom, and whose
exploits have been so much admired.
It is not my purpose to enter here into a detailed account of the events
of that epoch; the limits of this chapter, and the relationship existing
between the author and the subject of this hasty sketch, preclude the
possibility of such an undertaking, especially when better pens have
compiled them in the _Encyclopædia Britannica_--articles, Colombia and
Bolívar; in the _American Cyclopædia_--articles, Paez and Venezuela;
also in _Campaigns and Cruises in Venezuela_, and various other works by
English officers who served in the ranks of the patriot armies at the
time, to which English and American readers of history are especially
referred for a more comprehensive view of that fearful struggle. My
object is to give my readers some idea respecting the nature of that
contest in that part of Venezuela which, after years of unheard-of
privations and almost insurmountable difficulties, furnished at last the
elements which decided the fate of Colombia upon the plains of Carabobo,
Junin, and Boyacá.
Vain were, after this, the efforts of the Spanish invaders to destroy
what they contemptuously called the _Gang of Apure_, in their official
documents. Several expeditions were despatched from Spain about this
time, under the command of the ablest generals, and provided with all
the material for a vigorous campaign. One of these, led by
Lieut.-General Don Pablo Morillo, set sail from Cadiz on the 18th of
February, 1815. It consisted of sixty-five transport ships and other
smaller vessels, convoyed by the line-of-battle ship San Pedro Alcantara
(lost afterwards during the blockade of the Island of Margarita),
mounting seventy-four guns. The total number of men composing this
expedition, including marines, amounted to fifteen thousand. The ships
carrying this formidable armament cast anchor, on the third of April,
1815, in Puerto Santo, to the windward of Carupano, in Venezuela.
Morillo, the commander of this expedition, was a brave, active, and
energetic officer, cool in action, a severe disciplinarian, and was
beloved by his soldiers. Besides this force, there was a royalist army
of five thousand men in Venezuela, commanded by Morales.
At first, General Morillo met with little or no opposition, until, going
to the interior, he encountered the wild horsemen of the plains. The
haughty temper of the Spanish commander-in-chief could not bear that a
handful of demi-savages, as he was pleased to style them, should insult
the pennant of Castile any longer, and he therefore prepared to capture
every one of them, with what results, the sequel of this narrative will
show.
In the early part of January, 1817, the Spanish commanders, La Torre and
Calzada, effected a junction at Guasdualito, on the plains of Apure.
About the same time, the royalist brigadier, Don Ramon Correa, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Don Salvador Gorrin, left San Fernando, and with
their cavalry and infantry attacked the line of the patriots, and
completely routed Guerrero, the republican general, forcing him to fall
back upon Paez, after a bloody battle, in which the patriots sustained a
considerable loss. The siege of San Fernando being raised in consequence
of this triumph, the attention of La Torre and Calzada was directed to
Paez, who presented the greatest obstacle to their occupation of the
river Apure and its adjacent plains. An army of four thousand veteran
soldiers of all arms, including seventeen hundred of the cavalry
commanded by Colonel Remijio Ramos, presented a force sufficient to
inspire the Spanish commander with confidence, particularly as La Torre,
who was a brave and accomplished soldier, was anxious to distinguish
himself among his companions in arms. He, therefore, marched to the town
of San Vicente, following the right bank of the river Apure, with the
intention of attacking Paez, who was then in Mantecal. On the 28th of
January, the patriots and royalists met on the plain of Mucuritas; the
former, with a body of cavalry amounting only to eleven hundred
horsemen, and the latter with the forces already mentioned. The result
of the engagement was as unfortunate to La Torre as it proved
advantageous to the patriots under Paez, who on this occasion made up
for his inferiority in numbers by means of a stratagem which nearly
resulted in the destruction of the entire Spanish army. The order of
battle adopted by the royalist leader was the best which the nature of
the ground and the enemy he had to contend with would permit; his
infantry presented a strong and compact front, while his cavalry was
posted on the wings and on the rear. Paez having only cavalry, could not
come within the range of the enemy’s muskets without running the risk of
being wholly destroyed; and he consequently conceived the idea of
separating the royalist horse from the infantry. The presumptuous
confidence of Colonel Ramos and the inexperience of La Torre in the
Llanero’s tactics, facilitated the execution of Paez’s plan. Having
formed two columns with a portion of his forces, Paez ordered them to
attack the enemy’s flanks, and then immediately to retreat, as if they
had been repulsed. His object was to draw out the enemy’s cavalry in the
heat of the pursuit, and at once surround them with two other columns,
which he had ready prepared for that purpose. This simple manœuvre
had the desired effect, and La Torre’s cavalry was speedily destroyed.
The European hussars alone escaped, because they advanced with less
precipitancy and in better order. The republican leader now ordered the
dry grass of the plain to be set on fire, and it instantly became a sea
of flame. Fortunately for La Torre, his infantry retreating
precipitately in close column, succeeded in reaching a spot which had
been burned some time before. Even there his infantry sustained several
charges from Paez’s cavalry, compelling him ultimately to seek a refuge
in a dense wood on the right bank of the Apure, where the pursuit
ceased for want of infantry on the part of the patriots. Of this battle,
General Morillo wrote: “Fourteen consecutive charges upon my wearied
battalions convinced me that these men were not a small gang of cowards,
as had been represented to me.” On the following morning Morillo joined
La Torre, and continued with him his march to San Fernando without
crossing the Apure, and always in sight of the republican cavalry; Paez
finally perceiving that the enemy avoided a new engagement, retired to
San Juan de Payara.
In 1817, General Bolívar appeared in the province of Guayana, and his
first effort was to open his communication with Paez, who did not
hesitate to recognize his authority, although widely separated from the
Liberator’s head-quarters.
From this period the patriots began to extend their operations; a series
of brilliant actions took place at various points, and the republican
cause appeared to revive on the line of the Apure and the Orinoco
rivers. The acquisition of Guayana under Piar was an important and
decisive event in the history of the war; by means of it, Bolívar was in
a situation to harass the posts occupied by the royalists, on any point
of the immense line embraced by the Orinoco and its numerous
tributaries.
In the latter part of January, 1818, Bolívar joined him with two
thousand five hundred disciplined troops, among them the famous British
legion lately arrived, increasing the republican forces to about ten
thousand infantry and the same number of cavalry, which last was
composed of well-trained men, accustomed to victory on the plains of
Apure. The plan of the campaign having been arranged between Bolívar and
Paez, they resolved to cross over the river Apure and march forthwith on
Calabozo, where Morillo had established his headquarters. But here a
great difficulty presented itself; the patriot forces had no boats in
which to cross that broad and deep river. It was then that Paez
conceived and executed the extraordinary plan of capturing with cavalry
the gun-boats of the enemy stationed on the river, opposite the point
toward which they were marching. An eye-witness and impartial foreigner,
attached to the British Legion, thus describes this hazardous
undertaking: “Bolívar stood on the shore gazing at these (the gun-boats)
in despair, and continued disconsolately parading in front of them, when
Paez, who had been on the look-out, rode up and inquired the cause of
his disquietude. His Excellency observed, ‘I would give the world to
have possession of the Spanish flotilla, for without it I can never
cross the river, and the troops are unable to march.’ ‘It shall be yours
in an hour,’ replied Paez. ‘It is impossible,’ said Bolívar, ‘and the
men must all perish.’ ‘Leave that to me,’ rejoined Paez, and galloped
off. In a few minutes he returned, bringing up his guard of honor,
consisting of 300 lancers selected from the main body of the Llaneros,
for their proved bravery and strength, and leading them to the bank,
thus briefly addressed them: ‘We must have these _flecheras_, or die.
Let those follow Tio[43] who please.’
[Illustration: CAPTURE OF SPANISH GUNBOATS BY LLANERO CAVALRY.]
And at the same moment, spurring his horse, dashed into the river and
swam towards the flotilla. The guard followed him with their lances in
their hands, now encouraging their horses to bear up against the current
by swimming by their sides and patting their necks, and then shouting to
scare away the alligators, of which there were hundreds in the river,
till they reached the boats, when, mounting their horses, they sprang
from their backs on board them, headed by their leader, and, to the
astonishment of those who beheld them from the shore, captured every one
of them. To English officers, it may appear inconceivable that a body of
cavalry, with no other arms than their lances, and no other mode of
conveyance across a rapid river than their horses, should attack and
take a fleet of gun-boats amidst shoals of alligators; but, strange as
it may seem, it was actually accomplished, and there are many officers
now in England who can testify to the truth of it.”
The unprejudiced author of this narrative, which I am compelled to
shorten for want of space, then adds:--“In short, he is altogether a
most wonderful man; and were the numerous and extraordinary incidents of
his life to be formed into a narrative, it would have more the semblance
of romance than authentic biography. He is, above all things, a sincere
patriot, and certainly a bright ornament to his country.”[44]
This dangerous manœuvre was performed at a distance of two miles from
San Fernando, which, from that moment, was cut off from all
communication with Morillo. The patriot army being thus provided with
the means of transportation across the Apure, a body of cavalry was
immediately despatched in the direction of the road leading to Calabozo,
and succeeded in capturing by surprise a party of twenty-five men, who
composed the advanced post of the enemy. In consequence of this
manœuvre, Morillo was also taken by surprise on the 11th of February,
at a time when his hussars and a portion of the battalion of Castille
were at a place called Mision de Abajo, about three miles to the south
of Calabozo. Only a few men from both regiments, with a Colonel,
succeeded in making their escape to the intrenchments in the city. The
sturdy veteran, Morillo, could not believe the report of his Colonel,
that the whole patriot army was marching upon him. Haughtily accusing
that officer of cowardice, he sallied forth in person with his staff to
reconnoitre what he supposed to be a band of guerrillas; but he himself
had to flee for safety into the city, narrowly escaping death through
the stoical heroism of his insulted Colonel, who threw himself between
the Commander-in-chief and the lance of one of Paez’s staff officers.
Instead of investing the royalists at once, Bolívar committed the error
of encamping for the night with all his troops at the village of El
Rastro, about four miles this side of Calabozo. Morillo improved this
opportunity to abandon the city under cover of night, and fell back on
Caracas, by the mountainous route of El Sombrero, where the patriots
could not follow him on account of the inferiority of their infantry.
Paez then returned to the Apure, while Bolívar remained with the bulk of
the army, to be soon after entirely annihilated at La Puerta by the
royalist General. But the Genius of the Andes was untiring in his
efforts to see his country, and the rest of the South American
Continent, free from European oppression.
On the 16th January, 1819, Bolívar joined Paez again at San Juan de
Payara with a newly organized _corps d’armée_, and their united forces
amounted to four thousand men. Bolívar, as a recompense for the
important services rendered by Paez to his country, raised him to the
rank of General of Division, and left him in command of all the forces,
while he proceeded to Angostura, where Congress was to meet in February.
About this time the royalist Generals, Morillo and La Torre, also joined
their forces at San Fernando, amounting in all to six thousand five
hundred men of all arms. With these they immediately proceeded to attack
the patriots at San Juan in the beginning of February. Paez retreated
toward the Orinoco, transported all his infantry to the island of
Urbana, and took up a position, with his guard and two squadrons of
carabineers, at Cunaviche; the remainder of his horsemen he stationed on
the plains of Rio Claro, and a most cumbersome emigration of ten
thousand patriot refugees, that followed his camp, was taken to
Araguaquen. The plan adopted by Paez on this occasion was precisely the
same as the one always practised by him in former campaigns; yet the
royalist General was so infatuated by his eagerness to destroy the “Gang
of Apure,” that he was easily led away into the wilderness before he was
conscious of his danger. On the 11th of February Morillo forced the pass
of the river Arauca, and the patriots fell back, keeping their adversary
under observation; at night, however, they retraced their steps, and in
the morning appeared situated at a short distance in the opposite
direction. Morillo counter-marched, and for many days wandered over that
wilderness, renewing his efforts to overtake an enemy which kept
constantly before him, like the mirage of the desert, and which did him
great injury by driving away the cattle. The only means he could employ
to overtake his opponent and force him to battle, was to use his
cavalry; but this jeopardized the only force which procured the
subsistence of the army, and might thus compromise its safety. Not even
at night were the royalists allowed to rest in peace. On one occasion
Paez caused a number of wild horses to be brought before the enemy’s
camp, and tying dry hides to the animals’ tails, they were stampeded
with shouts and shots towards the encampment. Imagining themselves
attacked by the whole Llanero cavalry, the royalists sprang to their
arms and opened fire on the affrighted horses, which caused that night
more alarm and confusion among them than the two thousand oxen which
Hannibal hurled against the Roman camp. At length, convinced of the
inutility of his efforts, Morillo recrossed the Arauca, and in the
early part of March established his headquarters at Achaguas.
On the first day of April, General Morillo again resumed the offensive,
marching along the left bank of the Arauca and approaching the position
occupied on the right bank by Generals Paez and Bolívar; the latter had
recently returned from the Congress at Angostura, where he had been
elected President of the Republic, and resumed the command in chief of
the army. Morillo made several feigned movements to the right and to the
left, as if he wished to cross the river, and at noon of the 2d, took up
his position nearly opposite that of Bolívar, out of range of the
cannon. For the purpose of drawing him forth, General Paez crossed the
river with one hundred and fifty horsemen, composed mostly of officers
who volunteered for the hazardous undertaking; with these he formed
three small columns and advanced upon the enemy. Morillo immediately put
all his forces in motion; his infantry and artillery commenced firing,
while the cavalry charged upon the small band of patriots, hoping to
overpower by numbers the weak columns of the enemy; he himself directed
his course toward the bank of the river. Paez, in the mean time,
retreated in order, purposely leaving the pass of the river on his rear.
Morillo, observing this, and supposing him inevitably lost, detached
from the army all the cavalry in pursuit of Paez, and directed his fire
upon the right bank, defended by some light troops. As soon, however, as
the republican General perceived that the enemy’s horse were at a
considerable distance from the army, and in disorder, he faced about
suddenly, attacked his pursuers in front and on the flanks, in small
groups of twenty men, and without giving them time to recover from their
astonishment or to re-form the lines, he routed them, occasioning great
loss. In vain they made the most obstinate resistance--in vain the
carabineers dismounted--all their efforts were useless; disconcerted and
taken by surprise, all those who opposed the vigorous attack were killed
upon the spot. The victors pursued the remnants of the force as far as
the enemy’s lines, slaying all whom they overtook. Their infantry,
thrown into confusion, sought refuge in the woods, the artillery ceased
firing, and night prevented the further destruction of the royalist
army. On the day following this encounter, Bolívar issued a decree,
conferring the cross of Liberators (_Libertadores_) on all the officers,
sergeants, corporals, and soldiers, who fought in this engagement, known
in history by the name of Queseras del Medio; while the following
proclamation announced to the army the success recently obtained by the
republican arms:
SIMON BOLÍVAR PRESIDENT, ETC., ETC.
“_To the Heroes of the Army of Apure_:
“SOLDIERS! You have just performed the most extraordinary action
that can be recorded in the military history of nations--one
hundred and fifty men, or, rather, one hundred and fifty heroes,
led on by the undaunted General Paez, have deliberately attacked in
front the whole Spanish army, under Morillo; artillery, infantry,
cavalry, nothing availed to defend the enemy from the hundred and
fifty companions of the intrepid Paez. The columns of their cavalry
have disappeared under the strokes of our lances; their infantry
sought a shelter in the woods; the roar of their cannon was
silenced before the breasts of our horses, and only the darkness of
night preserved the army of the tyrant from complete and absolute
destruction.
“Soldiers! The deed you have performed is but the prelude of what
you can accomplish. Prepare then for the combat, and reckon on
victory, which you carry on the point of your lances and bayonets.
“BOLÍVAR.
“HEAD-QUARTERS AT POTRERITOS MARREREÑOS, April 3, 1819.”
After this engagement, Morillo, finding himself again deprived of his
cavalry in the heart of the savannas, retreated precipitately to
Achaguas, and finally to San Fernando, which place he fortified
strongly, and recrossing the Apure, sought a more advantageous position
against the attacks of his hovering enemy.
The engagement of Queseras del Medio was the precursor of new plans and
bold projects, combined between Bolívar and Paez. The plains of
Venezuela, being now entirely rescued from the enemy, these two Generals
arranged the dangerous and important expedition that was to give freedom
to New Granada. Paez had the honor accorded him of choosing which of the
two should command the expedition. They both agreed that Bolívar should
march into New Granada, and that Paez should preserve, at all risks,
the possession of the plains of Apure. Victory crowned the republican
arms in New Granada, and Paez resolutely and successfully defended the
important territory confided to his care and protection.
On the 17th December, 1819, Venezuela and New Granada were united into
one great republic, under the name of Colombia, with a territory
embracing nearly 500,000 square miles.
The year 1821 is celebrated for the important victory obtained by the
republican army, under Bolívar and Paez, on the field of Carabobo, which
secured Venezuela to the patriots. General Bolívar’s forces amounted to
6,000 men. Only the first division of the army, commanded by Paez, took
part in the battle. This division was composed of the gallant British
Legion, already alluded to, the battalion of Apure, and 1,500 horsemen.
The field of Carabobo is a vast and open plain, lying in a southerly
direction from Valencia. An army endeavoring to enter this plain from
Tinaquillo, as the patriot army was attempting to do, is obliged, after
passing the river Chirgua, to penetrate over the defile called Buena
Vista, lying to the northeast. This defile is a formidable position, on
which a few men can easily arrest the progress of an army. If this pass
be gained, and the many obstructions be overcome, which an enemy can
easily oppose over a rough and craggy road of considerable length, there
still remains a narrow valley to be traversed, formed by hills, which
constitute the entrance on the west to the plain of Carabobo; here the
level ground commences. General La Torre, the Spanish commander, had
stationed in the valley and on both sides on the hills commanding it,
several pieces of artillery, as well as strong bodies of infantry. On
the plain near the opening of the valley the extended line of infantry
was deployed in order of battle, with its right resting upon a thicket;
next followed another line, and between the flanks of both, there were
two strong bodies of cavalry. The second line of battle had on its left
the road to El Pao, and the cavalry on the same side was stationed on
the brow of a hill over which that road passes; the summit of the hill
was occupied by a battalion. Such was the military position of the
Spanish forces, amounting on this occasion to 9,000 men. On the 24th of
June, the patriot General occupied the defile, and from that place
observed the position of the enemy. The narrow road pursued by Bolívar
allowed him only the room necessary to file off, and the Spaniards not
only guarded the outlet into the plain, but commanded the valley with
their artillery and a large body of infantry. The position was
impregnable. It was therefore resolved that General Paez, with
considerable risk and difficulty, should penetrate through a foot-path
but little known, and turn the enemy’s right. This path was extremely
hazardous. It begins at the high road leading to San Carlos, to the west
of the valley; goes over the top of a small hill covered with woods,
which was commanded by the Spanish artillery, and leads into a ravine
where the men were compelled to pass singly, because it was very rough
and full of brambles and briars. When the enemy discovered the movement
of the advancing forces under Paez, he directed part of his own against
the latter, and some of his battalions came up to the ravine, as the
patriot battalion of Apure was beginning to pass it, and a vigorous
firing commenced and was continued on both sides. The republican corps
at last succeeded in passing the ravine, but no longer able to sustain
singly the enemy’s charge, was already giving way, when the British
Legion came up to their support. The enemy had by this time brought into
action four of his best battalions, against only one of the patriots.
But the gallant Britons now filed off and formed in order of battle,
under a murderous fire, with almost superhuman coolness, and kneeling
down, they could not be made to yield an inch of ground. Almost all its
officers were either killed or wounded; but the service rendered by
those brave foreigners was great indeed. Their heroic firmness gave time
for the battalion of Apure to rally and return to the charge, while two
companies of _Tiradores_, led on by the gallant Heras, came also into
the action. The enemy at last yielded under the simultaneous charge of
the bayonet made by these different corps and fell back upon the cavalry
for support. By this time the body-guard of General Paez, six hundred
strong, had passed the ravine, and charging the enemy’s horse on the
rear of its columns, routed them completely and decided the action on
that memorable day. Only one battalion, the famous Valencey,
successfully repelled the furious charges of the patriot cavalry, which
pursued the royalists as far as Valencia. General La Torre, with the
remnant of his forces, shut himself up in the fortifications of Puerto
Cabello, which were finally carried by assault on the 7th of November in
the same year by General Paez.
The victory gained at Carabobo was complete and brilliant, decisive of
the fate of the republic, and glorious to the brave soldiers of Apure,
whose favored leader was raised by Bolívar to the rank of
General-in-chief on the field of battle--an appointment which was
subsequently ratified by Congress “in acknowledgment of his
extraordinary valor and military virtues.” How he afterwards became
Supreme Chief of Venezuela; twice President of the Republic: was
banished by a turbulent party calling themselves _Liberales_, narrowly
escaping with his life to the United States of America, from whence,
after an exile of ten years, he was recalled, and placed again at the
head of the nation by popular acclamation; became thoroughly disgusted
with the unruly disposition of his countrymen, and returned to end his
days in
“The land of the free and the home of the brave;”
he has fully recounted in his Autobiography,[45] recently published in
this country.