the decision arrived at by the Judicial Committee a mistaken one. But
he thinks that it would be a greater and a worse mistake to make this
decision, wrong as it may be, a reason for looking favourably on
disestablishment as a remedy for what is complained of. We are glad to
note the judgment of so fair an observer and so distinguished a lawyer,
himself a member of the Privy Council, both on the intrinsic
suitableness and appropriateness of the position[6] which has been
ruled to be illegal, and on the unsatisfactoriness of the
interpretation itself, as a matter of judicial reading and
construction. A great deal has been said, and it is plain that the
topic is inexhaustible, on the unimportance of a position. We agree
entirely--on condition that people remember the conditions and
consequences of their assertion. Every single outward accompaniment of
worship may, if you carry your assertion to its due level, be said to
be in itself utterly unimportant; place and time and form and attitude
are all things not belonging to the essence of the act itself, and are
indefinitely changeable, as, in fact, the changes in them have been
countless. Kneeling is not of the essence of prayer, but imagine, first
prohibiting the posture of kneeling, and then remonstrating with those
who complained of the prohibition, on the ground of postures being
unimportant. It is obvious that when you have admitted to the full that
a position is in itself unimportant, all kinds of reasons may come in
on the further question whether it is right, fitting, natural. There
are reasons why the position which has been so largely adopted of late
is the natural and suitable one. Sir John Coleridge states them
admirably:--
[6]
The Eastward Position at the celebration of the Holy Communion.
As to the place of standing at the consecration, my _feeling_ is
with them. It seems to me not desirable to make it essential or
even important that the people should see the breaking of the
bread, or the taking the cup into the hands of the priest, and
positively mischievous to encourage them in gazing on him, or
watching him with critical eyes while so employed. I much prefer
the _spirit of_ the Rubric of 1549--First Book of Edward
VI.--which says, "These words before rehearsed are to be said
turning still to the Altar, without any elevation, or showing the
Sacraments to the people." The use now enforced, I think, tends to
deprive the most solemn rite of our religion of one of its most
solemn particulars. Surely, whatever school we belong to, and even
if we consider the whole rite merely commemorative, it is a very
solemn idea to conceive the priest at the head of his flock, and,
as it were, a shepherd leading them on in heart and spirit,
imploring for them and with them the greatest blessing which man
is capable of receiving on earth; he alone uttering the
prayer--they meanwhile kneeling all, and in deep silence
listening, not gazing, rather with closed eyes--and with their
whole undistracted attention, joining in the prayer with one heart
and without sound until the united "Amen" breaks from them at the
close, and seals their union and assent.
But, of course, comes the further question, whether, an English
clergyman is authorised to use it. He is not authorised if the Prayer
Book tells him not to. Of that there is no question. But if the Prayer
Book not only seems to give him the liberty, but, by the _prima facie_
look of its words, seems to prescribe it, the harshness of a ruling
which summarily and under penalties prohibits it is not to be smoothed
down by saying that the matter is unimportant. Sir John Coleridge's
view of the two points will be read with interest:--
You will understand, of course, that I write in respect of the
Report recently made by the Judicial Committee in the Purchas
case. I am not about to defend it. No one, however, ought to
pronounce a condemnation of the solemn judgment of such a tribunal
without much consideration; and this remark applies with, special
force to myself, well knowing as I do those from whom it
proceeded, and having withdrawn from sharing in the labours of the
Committee only because age had impaired, with the strength of my
body, the faculties also of my mind; and so disabled me from the
proper discharge of any judicial duties. With this admission on my
part, I yet venture to say that I think Mr. Purchas has not had
justice done to him in two main points of the late appeal; I mean
the use of the vestments complained of and the side of the
communion-table which he faced when consecrating the elements for
the Holy Communion. Before I state my reasons, let me premise that
I am no Ritualist, in the now conventional use of the term. I do
not presume to judge of the motives of those to whom that name is
applied. From the information of common but undisputed report as
to some of the most conspicuous, I believe them entitled to all
praise for their pastoral devotedness and their laborious,
self-denying lives; still, I do not shrink from saying that I
think them misguided, and the cause of mischief in the Church. So
much for my _feeling_ in regard to the vestments. I prefer the
surplice at all times and in all ministrations.
This is _feeling_--and I see no word in the sober language of our
rubric which interferes with it--but my _feeling_ is of no
importance in the argument, and I mention it only in candour, to
show in what spirit I approach the argument.
Now Mr. Purchas has been tried before the Committee for offences
alleged to have been committed against the provisions of the "Act
of Uniformity"; of this Act the Common Prayer Book is part and
parcel. As to the vestments, his conduct was alleged to be in
derogation of the rubric as to the ornaments of the Church and the
ministers thereof, which ordains that such shall be retained and
be in use as were in the Church of England by the authority of
Parliament in the second year of the reign of King Edward VI. The
Act of Uniformity is to be construed by the same rules exactly as
any Act passed in the last session of Parliament. The clause in
question (by which I mean the rubric in question) is perfectly
unambiguous in language, free from all difficulty as to
construction; it therefore lets in no argument as to intention
otrier than that which the words themselves import. There might be
a seeming difficulty in _fact_, because it might not be known what
vestments were in use by authority of Parliament in the second
year of the reign of King Edward VI.; but this difficulty has been
removed. It is conceded in the Report that the vestments, the use
of which is now condemned, were in use by authority of Parliament
in that year. Having that fact, you are bound to construe the
rubric as if those vestments were specifically named in it,
instead of being only referred to. If an Act should be passed
to-morrow that the uniform of the Guards should henceforth be such
as was ordered for them by authority and used by them in the 1st
George I., you would first ascertain what that uniform was; and,
having ascertained it, you would not inquire into the changes
which may have been made, many or few, with or without lawful
authority, between the 1st George I. and the passing of the new
Act. All these, that Act, specifying the earlier date, would have
made wholly immaterial. It would have seemed strange, I suppose,
if a commanding officer, disobeying the statute, had said in his
defence, "There have been many changes since the reign of George
I.; and as to 'retaining,' we put a gloss on that, and thought it
might mean only retaining to the Queen's use; so we have put the
uniforms safely in store." But I think it would have seemed more
strange to punish and mulct him severely if he had obeyed the law
and put no gloss on plain words.
This case stands on the same principle. The rubric indeed seems to
me to imply with some clearness that in the long interval between
Edward VI. and the 14th Charles II. there had been many changes;
but it does not stay to specify them, or distinguish between what
was mere evasion and what was lawful; it quietly passes them all
by, and goes back to the legalised usage of the second year of
Edward VI. What had prevailed since, whether by an Archbishop's
gloss, by Commissions, or even Statutes, whether, in short, legal
or illegal, it makes quite immaterial.
I forbear to go through the long inquiry which these last words
remind one of--not, I am sure, out of any disrespectful feeling to
the learned and reverend authors of the Report, but because it
seems to me wholly irrelevant to the point for decision. This
alone I must add, that even were the inquiry relevant, the
authorities on which they rely do not appear to me so clear or
cogent, nor the analogies relied on so just, as to warrant the
conclusion arrived at. For it should never be forgotten that the
defendant in a criminal case, acquitted as to this charge by the
learned judge below, was entitled to every presumption in his
favour, and could not properly be condemned but by a judgment free
from all reasonable doubt. And this remark acquires additional
strength because the judgment will be final not only on him but on
the whole Church for all time, unless reversed by the Legislature.
On the second point he thus speaks, in terms which for their guarded
moderation are all the more worth notice:--
Upon the second point I have less to say, though it is to me much
the most important. The Report, I think, cannot be shown
conclusively to be wrong here, as it may be on the other; still it
does not seem to me to be shown conclusively to be right. You have
yourself given no reason in your second letter of the 8th March
for doubting at least.
Let me add that, in my opinion, on such a question as this, where
a conclusion is to be arrived at upon the true meaning of Rubrics
framed more than two centuries since, and certainly not with a
view to any such minute criticism as on these occasions is and
must be applied to them, and where the evidence of facts is by no
means clear, none probably can be arrived at free from reasonable
objection. What is the consequence? It will be asked, Is the
question to receive no judicial solution? I am not afraid to
answer, Better far that it should receive none than that injustice
should be done. The principles of English law furnish the
practical solution: dismiss the party charged, unless his
conviction can be based on grounds on which reasonable and
competent minds can rest satisfied and without scruple. And what
mighty mischief will result to countervail the application of this
rule of justice? For two centuries our Church has subsisted
without an answer to the question which alone gives importance to
this inquiry, and surely has not been without God's blessing for
that time, in spite of all much more serious shortcomings. Let us
remember that Charity, or to use perhaps a better word, Love, is
the greatest of all; if that prevail there need be little fear for
our Faith or our Hope.
Having said this much, Sir John Coleridge proceeds to the second, and
indeed the main object of his letter--to remonstrate against
exaggeration in complaint, both of the particular decision and of the
Court which gave it:--
I now return to your letter. You proceed to attempt to show that
the words of Keble to yourself, which you cite, are justified by
remarks in this Report and some previous judgments of the same
tribunal, which appear to you so inconsistent with each other as
to make it difficult to believe that the Court was impartial, or
"incapable of regarding the documents before it in the light of a
plastic material, which might be made to support conclusions held
to be advisable at the moment, and on independent grounds." I wish
these words had never been written. They will, I fear, be
understood as conveying your formed opinions; and coming from you,
and addressed to minds already excited and embittered, they will
be readily accepted, though they import the heaviest charges
against judges--some of them bishops--all of high and hitherto
unimpeached character. A very long experience of judicial life
makes me know that judges will often provoke and bitterly
disappoint both the suitors before them and the public, when
discharging their duty honestly and carefully, and a man is
scarcely fit for the station unless he can sit tolerably easy
under censures which even these may pass upon him. Yet,
imputations of partiality or corruption are somewhat hard to bear
when they are made by persons of your station and character. When
the Judicial Committee sits on appeals from the Spiritual Courts,
it _may_ certainly be under God's displeasure, the members _may_
be visited with judicial blindness, and deprived of the integrity
which in other times and cases they manifest. Against such a
supposition there is no direct argument, and I will not enter into
such a disputation. I have so much confidence in your generosity
and candour, on reflection, as to believe you would not desire I
should.
In the individual case I simply protest against the insinuation. I
add a word or two by way of general observation.
No doubt you have read the judgments in all the cases you allude
to carefully; but have you read the pleadings and arguments of the
counsel, so as to know accurately the points raised for the
consideration of those who were to decide? To know the offence
charged and the judgment pronounced may suffice in some cases for
an opinion by a competent person, whether the one warranted the
other; but more is required to warrant the imputation of
inconsistency, partiality, or indirect motives. He who takes this
on himself should know further how the pleadings and the arguments
presented the case for judgment, and made this or that particular
relevant in the discussion. Every one at all familiar with this
matter knows that a judgment not uncommonly fails to reflect the
private opinion of the judge on the whole of a great point,
because the issues of law or fact actually brought before him, and
which alone he was bound to decide, did not bring this before him.
And this rule, always binding, is, of course, never more so than
in regard to a Court of Final Appeal, which should be careful not
to conclude more than is regularly before it. Let me add that a
just and considerate person will wholly disregard the gossip which
flies about in regard to cases exciting much interest; passing
words in the course of an argument, forgotten when the judgment
comes to be considered, are too often caught up, as having guided
the final determination.
Such words are a just rebuke to much of the inconsiderate talk which
follows on any public act which touches the feelings, perhaps the
highest and purest feelings of men with deep convictions. Perhaps Mr.
Liddon's words were unguarded ones. But at the same time it is
necessary to state without disguise what is the truth in this matter.
It is necessary for the sake of justice and historical truth. The Court
of Final Appeal is not like other courts. It is not a pure and simple
court of law, though it is composed of great lawyers. It is doubtless a
court where their high training and high professional honour come in,
as they do elsewhere. But great lawyers are men, partisans and
politicians, statesmen, if you like; and this is a court where they are
not precluded, in the same degree as they are in the regular courts by
the habits and prescriptions of the place, from thinking of what comes
before them in its relation to public affairs. It is no mere invention
of disappointed partisans, it is no idle charge of wilful unfairness,
to say that considerations of high policy come into their
deliberations; it has been the usual language, ever since the Gorham
case, of men who cared little for the subject-matter of the questions
debated; it is the language of those who urge the advantages of the
Court. "It is a court," as the Bishop of Manchester said the other day,
speaking in its praise, "composed of men who look at things not merely
with the eyes of lawyers, but also with the eyes of statesmen."
Precisely so; and for that reason they must be considered to have the
responsibilities, not only of lawyers, but of statesmen, and their acts
are proportionably open to discussion. Sir John Coleridge urges the
impossibility of any other court; and certainly till we could be
induced to trust an ecclesiastical court, composed of bishops or
clergymen, in a higher degree than we could do at present, we see no
alternative. But to say that a clerical court would be no improvement
is not to prove that the present court is a satisfactory one. It may be
difficult under our present circumstances to reform it. But though we
may have reasons for making the best of it, we may be allowed to say
that it is a singularly ill-imagined and ill-constructed court, and one
in which the great features of English law and justice are not so
conspicuous as they are elsewhere. Suitors do not complain in other
courts either of the ruling, or sometimes of the language of judges, as
they complain in this. But when this is made a ground for joining with
the enemies of all that the English Church holds dear, to bring about a
great break-up of the existing state of things, we agree with Sir John
Coleridge in thinking that a great mistake is made; and if care is not
taken, it may be an irreparable one. He writes:--
I hasten to my conclusion too long delayed, but a word must still
be added on a subject of not less consequence than any I have yet
touched on. You say, "Churchmen will to a very great extent indeed
find relief from the dilemma in a third course, viz. _co-operation
with the political forces_, which, year by year, more and more
steadily are working towards disestablishment. This is not a
menace; it is the statement of a simple fact." I am bound to
believe, and I do believe, you do not intend this as a menace; but
such a statement of a future course to depend on a contingency
cannot but read very much like one--and against your intention it
may well be understood as such. You do not say that _you_ are one
who will co-operate with the political party which now seeks to
disestablish the Church in accomplishing its purpose, and I do not
suppose you ever will. But on behalf, not so much of the clergy as
of the laity--on behalf of the worshippers in our churches, of the
sick to be visited at home--of the poor in their cottages, of our
children in their schools--of our society in general, I entreat
those of the clergy who are now feeling the most acutely in this
matter, not to suffer their minds to be so absorbed by the present
grievance as to take no thought of the evils of disestablishment.
I am not foolishly blind to the faults of the clergy--indeed I
fear I am sometimes censorious in regard to them--and some of
their faults I do think may be referable to Establishment; the
possession of house and land, and a sort of independence of their
parishioners, in some cases seems to tend to secularity. I regret
sometimes their partisanship at elections, their speeches at
public dinners. But what good gift of God is not liable to abuse
from men? Taken as a whole, we have owed, and we do owe, under
Him, to our Established clergy more than we can ever repay, much
of it rendered possible by their Establishment. I may refer, and
now with special force, to Education--their services in this
respect no one denies--and but for Establishment these, I think,
could not have been so effectively and systematically rendered. We
are now in a great crisis as to this all-important matter.
Concurring, as I do heartily, in the praise which has been
bestowed on Mr. Forster, and expecting that his great and arduous
office will be discharged with perfect impartiality by him, and
with a just sense of how much is due to the clergy in this
respect, still it cannot be denied that the powers conferred by
the Legislature on the holder of it are alarmingly great, even if
necessary; and who shall say in what a spirit they may be
exercised by his successor? For the general upholding of religious
education, in emergencies not improbable, to whom can we look in
general so confidently as to the parochial clergy? I speak now
specially in regard to parishes such as I am most familiar with,
in agricultural districts, small, not largely endowed, sometimes
without resident gentry, and with the land occupied by
rack-renting farmers, indifferent or hostile to education.
In what Sir John Coleridge urges against the fatal step of welcoming
disestablishment under an impatient sense of injustice we need not say
that we concur most earnestly. But it cannot be too seriously
considered by those who see the mischief of disestablishment, that as
Sir John Coleridge also says, the English Churrh is, in one sense, a
divided one; and that to pursue a policy of humiliating and crippling
one of its great parties must at last bring mischief. The position of
the High Church party is a remarkable one. It has had more against it
than its rivals; yet it is probably the strongest of them all. It is
said, probably with reason, to be the unpopular party. It has been the
stock object of abuse and sarcasm with a large portion of the press. It
has been equally obnoxious to Radical small shopkeepers and "true blue"
farmers and their squires. It has been mobbed in churches and censured
in Parliament. Things have gone against it, almost uniformly, before
the tribunals. And unfortunately it cannot be said that it has been
without its full share of folly and extravagance in some of its
members. And yet it is the party which has grown; which has drawn some
of its antagonists to itself, and has reacted on the ideas and habits
of others; its members have gradually, as a matter of course, risen
into important post and power. And it is to be noticed that, as a
party, it has been the most tolerant. All parties are in their nature
intolerant; none more so, where critical points arise, than Liberal
ones. But in spite of the Dean of Westminster's surprise at High
Churchmen claiming to be tolerant, we still think that, in the first
place, they are really much less inclined to meddle with their
neighbours than others of equally strong and deep convictions; and
further, that they have become so more and more; and they have accepted
the lessons of their experience; they have thrown off, more than any
strong religious body, the intolerance which was natural to everybody
once, and have learned, better than they did at one time, to bear with
what they dislike and condemn. If a party like this comes to feel
itself dealt with harshly and unfairly, sacrificed to popular clamour
or the animosity of inveterate and unscrupulous opponents, it is
certain that we shall be in great danger.
V
MR. GLADSTONE'S LETTER ON THE ENGLISH CHURCH[7]
[7]
_Guardian_, 29th October 1884.
Mr. Gladstone's Letter, read at the St. Asaph Diocesan Conference, will
not have surprised those who have borne in mind his deep and
unintermitted interest in the fortunes and prospects of the Church, and
his habit of seeking relief from the pressure of one set of thoughts
and anxieties by giving full play to his mental energies in another
direction. Its composition and appearance at this moment are quite
accounted for; it is a contribution to the business of the conference
of his own diocese, and it was promised long before an autumn session
on a great question between the two Houses was in view. Still the
appearance of such a document from a person in Mr. Gladstone's position
must, of course, invite attention and speculation. He may put aside the
questions which the word "Disestablishment"--which was in the thesis
given him to write upon--is likely to provoke--"Will it come? ought it
to come? must it come? Is it near, or somewhat distant, or indefinitely
remote?" On these questions he has not a word to say. But, all the
same, people will naturally try to read between the lines, and to find
out what was in the writer's thoughts about these questions. We cannot,
however, see that there is anything to be gathered from the Letter as
to the political aspect of the matter; he simply confines himself to
the obvious lesson which passing events sufficiently bring with them,
that whatever may come it is our business to be prepared.