Hood's Motive in Attempting the Impossible at Nashville--Diversity
of Opinions Concerning that Battle--No Orders on Record for the
Battle of December 16--That Battle due to the Spontaneous Action
of Subordinate Commanders--Statements in the Reports of the Corps
Commanders--Explanation of the Absence of Orders--The Phraseology
of General Thomas's Report.
The official records, Hood's statement, and Sherman's estimate,
made at the time, agree pretty closely in placing Hood's infantry
force at about 30,000 men when he crossed the Tennessee and began
his advance toward Nashville. He lost a considerable number at
Spring Hill on November 29, and over 6000, besides thirteen general
officers, at Franklin on November 30. Therefore 24,000 must be a
liberal estimate of his infantry strength after the battle of
Franklin. The infantry strength of the Fourth and Twenty-third
corps did not exceed 22,000 present for duty equipped, of which
one brigade (Cooper's) of the Twenty-third was sent by General
Thomas to guard the fords of Duck River below Columbia, and did
not rejoin the corps until after the battle of Franklin. Hence
Hood's infantry force at Columbia and Franklin was nearly one half
greater then mine. The disparity in cavalry was still greater at
first, but was reduced very considerably by the arrival of cavalry
sent from Nashville by General Thomas, especially Hammond's brigade,
which arrived in the field on the 29th, too late to assist in
holding the line of Duck River.
HOOD'S MOTIVE AT NASHVILLE
It follows that Hood had an opportunity to conduct operations
against an adversary of, at the most, only two thirds his own
strength in infantry and in cavalry--an opportunity such as had
never before been presented to any Confederate general. That he
thought his chance a very brilliant one is not remarkable. If he
could cut off my retreat or force me to a pitched battle, he had
full reason to hope for the most decisive results. This fact should
be given full weight in connection with the question why Hood did
not avoid intrenched positions and make a raid into Kentucky, which
he could easily have done at that time, because Thomas was not yet
ready to meet him in the open field. The moral effect of such a
raid would, of course, have been very great; but it must have proved
disastrous in the end, for the reason that Thomas would in a short
time have had in Hood's rear a far superior force to cut off his
retreat and force him to a decisive battle; whereas if Hood could
defeat and seriously cripple, if not destroy, the only organized
army in the field then opposed to him, he could afterward attend
to Thomas's scattered detachments in succession, or invade Kentucky,
as he might think expedient. As Hood was operating in the country
of his own friends, he did not lack full and accurate information
of the strength and movements of his adversary. Indeed, we were
also fully informed in due time of all of Hood's movements, but
overestimated his strength because we did not have friends residing
in his camps.
But the defeat of Hood at Franklin, and Thomas's concentration of
troops at Nashville, completely reversed the situation. When Hood
recovered from the blow received at Franklin sufficiently to make
any further move, he found himself confronted no longer by an
inferior force, but by one of more than twice his own strength in
infantry, and not far, if at all, inferior to him in cavalry. The
artillery in the field is not specially considered in any of these
estimates, because it was ample in quantity and efficient in quality
on both sides, and need not be compared. This formidable army was
now in Hood's immediate front at Nashville, while the important
strategic points of Murfreesboro' and Chattanooga were strongly
garrisoned and fortified, and the railroads strongly guarded. It
had become too late for Hood to attempt a raid into Kentucky.
Thomas would have been close upon his rear with an army at least
twice as strong, with all the important points in Tennessee still
securely held. But successful operations against Nashville were
far less possible to Hood than an invasion of Kentucky. While no
commander could possibly think of destroying his own army by
assaulting a fortified place in which the garrison was more than
double his own strength, or indulge the hope of any valuable results
from a less than half investment of such a place, so bold a commander
as Hood might possibly attempt a raid into Kentucky, as the only
thing he could possibly do except retreat across the Tennessee
River, and thus abandon his cause as lost. It was this view of
the situation by General Grant and the authorities in Washington
that caused such intense anxiety on account of the delay of General
Thomas in attacking Hood at Nashville. It was perfectly evident
that Thomas could beat Hood whenever he chose to attack him, and
that Hood must be fully aware of that fact. Hence it was naturally
apprehended that Hood would either make a raid into Kentucky or
else retreat across the Tennessee River without suffering any
further damage. To those who were watching Hood closely at Nashville,
and especially to those who understood his character, there seemed
no ground for either apprehension. All his operations indicated
a serious attempt to besiege Nashville, though it was impossible
to imagine what he could hope to accomplish, unless it was to wait
in the most convenient place while his adversary, with all the
great resources of the country at his back, got ready to crush him.
HOOD'S MOTIVE AT NASHVILLE
As stated in his report, Thomas estimated Hood's strength as being
at least equal to his own, and with all the deliberation of his
nature, he insisted upon making the full preparations which he
considered essential to success not only in battle, but in pursuit
of a defeated enemy. From his point of view, Thomas was unquestionably
right in his action. How he came to make so great an overestimate
of the Confederate strength, in view of the means of information
in his possession and the estimate General Sherman had given him
before he started for Savannah, it is difficult to conjecture.
But the fact is now beyond question that Thomas made all those
elaborate preparations to attack an enemy of less than half his
own strength, under the belief that his adversary was at least
equal in strength to himself. That Hood then knew his own exact
strength is a matter of course, and that he did not underestimate
the strength of his adversary is almost equally certain. During
the two weeks in which his army lay in front of Nashville, if not
before, he must have ascertained very closely the strength of the
Union forces in his front. Hence Hood's "siege" of Nashville for
two weeks could not be regarded otherwise than as a stupendous
farce, were it not for the desperate bravery with which he thus
kept up the appearance of still fighting for a lost cause rather
than be the first to admit by his own action that it was indeed
lost. It is now well known that the feeling among the Southern
people and that of some of the highest officers of the Confederate
government made it impossible for any officer of their army to
admit in any public way the failure of the Confederacy until after
the enforced surrender of Lee's army in Virginia. Indeed, it
required much moral courage on the part of General Johnston
voluntarily to enter into a capitulation even after the capture of
Lee.
This is unquestionably the explanation of Hood's desperate act in
waiting in front of Nashville and inviting the destruction or
capture of his army. The crushing blow he there received was like
a death-blow delivered by a giant full of strength and vigor upon
a gladiator already beaten and reduced in strength nearly to
exhaustion. Sherman was not very far wrong when he said that "the
battle of Nashville was fought at Franklin." The gladiator had
been reduced to less than one third of his former strength by a
long series of combats with a more powerful antagonist all the past
summer, and finally by his unexpected repulse at Franklin. It
required only one or two more blows from the powerful enemy at
Nashville to complete his destruction. Any estimate of the battle
of Nashville which fails to take into account the foregoing facts
must be essentially erroneous, and it is not doing any honor to
the great soldier who fought that battle to compare it with his
previous achievements when he heroically met and defeated superior
numbers of fresh and vigorous troops.
A wide diversity of opinion has always existed among military men
in respect to the battle of Nashville, ranging all the way from
the view taken in historical accounts heretofore published to the
opinion expressed by General Sherman, in language intended of course
to be hyperbolical, namely that "the battle of Nashville was fought
at Franklin." The truth is to be found somewhere between these
two extremes. But the exact truth respecting that battle can
perhaps hardly yet be told. I will, however, state such facts of
my own knowledge and experience, and make such references to data
to be found in the voluminous records, as it seems to me may assist
the future historian, together with such comments as I deem
appropriate upon the information now available. As will be explained
hereafter, some important documents which originally formed part
of the records have disappeared therefrom. Their influence upon
historical opinion, if ever recovered, may now only be suggested.
NO ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF DECEMBER 16
It must be observed as a very notable fact that the official records,
replete with orders and instructions issued every day, and almost
every hour, contain no record whatever of any written order or
instructions from General Thomas, given after the close of operations
on December 15, for the operations which actually took place the
next day. The only indications in the records, so far as I have
been able to discover, that any orders were given by General Thomas,
either orally or in writing, on the night of December 15, are the
following "orders of the day" for the Fourth Army Corps, issued by
General Wood after a personal interview with General Thomas that
night; the order in writing from General Thomas to General Wilson,
December 15; and the despatch from General Wilson to myself, dated
December 16, 10:10 A. M. They are as follows:
"Headquarters Fourth Army Corps,
"Near Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864, 11:20 P. M.
"Orders of the day for the Fourth Army Corps for to-morrow, December
16, 1864:
"If the enemy is in their front at daylight to-morrow morning,
division commanders will advance at that time, attack, and carry
whatever may be before them. If the enemy retreats to-night, we
will follow them. General Elliott, commanding Second Division,
will cross to the east of the Franklin pike, then move southward
parallel to it. He will deploy two regiments, connect with
skirmishers, and the rest of his division will move by flank.
General Kimball will follow, then General Beatty. The batteries
attached to each division to-day will accompany them to-morrow.
Ten ambulances and five ammunition-wagons will follow each division.
"By the order of Brigadier-General Wood:
"J. S. Fullerton,
"Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General."
"Headquarters, Department of the Cumberland,
"Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864.
"Major-General J. H. Wilson, Commanding Cavalry Corps, Military
Division of the Mississippi.
"General: I am directed by the major general commanding to say to
you that you will remain in your present position until it is
satisfactorily known whether the enemy will fight or retreat. In
case he retreats, you will move your command on the Hillsborough
pike across the Harpeth, and then take the most direct road or
roads to the Franklin pike, and endeavor to capture or destroy the
enemy's trains in their rear.
"I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully your obedient
servant,
"Robt. H. Ramsey, Assistant Adjutant-General."
Both of these orders indicate a not unnatural state of doubt as to
whether the enemy would "fight or retreat." The former directs
what is to be done by the Fourth Corps in either case, while the
latter directs what shall be done in case the enemy retreats, but
says nothing about what shall be done if he does not retreat.
"Hdqrs. Cavalry Corps, Mil. Div. of the Mississippi,
"In the Field, December 16, 1864, 10:10 A. M.
"Major-General Schofield, Commanding Twenty-third Army Corps.
"General: The regiment sent to the Granny White pike reports it
strongly picketed toward us, with troops moving to our left. This
is probably Chalmers' division. I have heard nothing from Johnson
this morning; but, from what General Croxton reports, there is no
doubt that Chalmers crossed the Hardin pike, moving toward Brentwood.
The country on the left of the Hillsboro' pike, toward the enemy's
left, is too difficult for cavalry operations. It seems to me if
I was on the other flank of the army I might do more to annoy the
enemy, unless it is intended that I shall push out as directed last
night.
"Very respectfully,
"J. H. Wilson, Brevet Major-General."
"(Indorsement.)
"Respectfully forwarded to Major-General Thomas.
"J. M. Schofield, Major-General."
NO ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF DECEMBER 16
This last, while showing that General Wilson had not received at
10:10 A. M. on the 16th any orders from General Thomas later than
that above quoted, appears to indicate that he had received some
previous order, referred to in the words "unless it is intended
that I shall push out as directed last night"; for the order above
quoted from the records did not indicate any intention that he
should "push out" unless the enemy was in retreat.
An order in writing, as heretofore stated, was received by me very
soon after dark on the 15th. It has disappeared from the official
records, both those of General Thomas and mine. If any other orders
were issued by General Thomas, I have no personal knowledge of the
fact.
In my judgment, whatever orders were issued by General Thomas on
the night of December 15 or in the morning of the 16th are essential
to truthful history; and I am sure they must have been more creditable
to General Thomas, though they may have been based upon erroneous
foresight of the enemy's action, which is necessarily very common
in war, than the absence from the records of any orders from him
to govern the operations of the army the next day, and the fact,
which appears from the records, that some of the troops at least
did not receive any orders from General Thomas, at any time, upon
which they could act on December 16.
It seems at least strange that this absence of orders given in the
night of the 15th or morning of the 16th should have passed without
comment, especially in view of the very full orders issued on the
14th and in the night of the 16th.
It will also be observed that General Thomas, in his official report
of the battle of Nashville, dated January 20, 1865, makes no mention
of any orders issued in the night of December 15 or morning of the
16th. He simply says in that regard: "The whole command bivouacked
in line of battle during the night on the ground occupied at dark,
whilst preparations were made to renew the battle at an early hour
on the morrow"; but does not say what those preparations were.
Then, after describing what had been done in the forenoon of the
16th, he says: "As soon as the above dispositions were completed,
and having visited the different commands, I gave directions that
the movement against the enemy's left flank should be continued";
but no sub-report mentions the receipt of any such directions.
The report then proceeds to give a graphic and, I believe, nearly
accurate though brief description of what followed.
It may also be observed that in my official report of the battle
of Nashville, dated December 31, 1864, the following appears: "In
the night of the 15th I waited upon the major-general commanding
at his headquarters, and received his orders for the pursuit of
the enemy on the following day." This report was, of course, before
General Thomas when he wrote his own, and had necessarily been read
by him and doubtless by some of his staff officers; yet no reference
was made in his report to the subject referred to in the words
above quoted from mine. These facts from the records may perhaps
be accepted as sufficient indication of the general purport of
whatever orders were issued in the night of the 15th, after the
close of that day's operations, and sufficient evidence that no
orders of a general character were given by General Thomas, either
oral or written, on the 16th until after he had "visited the
different commands."
NO ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF DECEMBER 16
The report of General Steedman, dated January 27, 1865, says:
"December 16, at 6 A. M., in obedience to the orders of Major-
General Thomas, my command moved on the enemy's works." It is not
stated whether these orders were oral or written. No copy of them
appears in the records, nor any mention of a personal interview
with General Thomas or any of his staff. (Steedman was the man
who published a falsehood about an alleged telegram from me to
Grant about Thomas. See page 296.)
General T. J. Wood's report, dated January 5, 1865, after describing
the operations of the morning of December 16, says: "After the
dispositions above recounted had been made, the commanding general
joined me near our most advanced position on the Franklin pike,
examined the positions of the troops, approved the same, and ordered
that the enemy should be vigorously pressed and unceasingly harassed
by our fire. He further directed that I should be constantly on
the alert for any opening for a more decisive effort, but for the
time to bide events. The general plan of the battle for the
preceding day--namely, to outflank and turn his left--was still to
be acted on. Before leaving me, the commanding general desired me
to confer with Major-General Steedman, whose command had moved out
that morning from Nashville by the Nolensville pike, and arrange
a military connection between his right and my left." This appears
from General Wood's report to have occurred a short time before
noon, and seems to have been the first information given to any of
the corps commanders of the general plan of operations for December
16. General Wood's report does not suggest that even he, who had
visited the commanding general the night before, had been given
any information about any such general plan; and that statement of
Wood's, "the general plan of the battle for the preceding day--
namely, to outflank and turn his left--was still to be acted on,"
was written many days after the battle, and then did not say that
General Thomas had at any time so ordered.
In the report of General A. J. Smith, dated January 10, 1865, occurs
the following: "About 3 P. M. (December 10) General McArthur sent
word that he could carry the hill on his right by assault. Major-
General Thomas being present the matter was referred to him, and
I was requested to delay the movement until he could hear from
General Schofield, to whom he had sent. . . . General McArthur,
not receiving any reply, and fearing that if the attack should be
longer delayed the enemy would use the night to strengthen his
works, directed the first brigade (Colonel W. L. McMillen, 95th
Ohio Infantry, commanding) to storm the hill on which was the left
of the enemy's line," etc. This statement, which appears to be
nowhere dissented from, seems to show that very nearly the hour of
the day--not very long after 3 P. M.--when was initiated by General
McArthur the general attack which resulted in the brilliant and
final success of the day; that this initial movement was not made
in pursuance of any orders or directions from General Thomas, but,
on the contrary, during a period in which General Thomas had
requested General Smith to "delay the movement."
General Wilson's report, dated December 21, says: "About 4:30 P. M.
the enemy, pressed in front, flank, and rear, broke in disorder.
Croxton's brigade, which had been held in reserve on the Hillsboro'
pike, as soon as the success of these dispositions had become
apparent was ordered to march rapidly across the country to the
Granny White pike, and beyond the right flank of Hammond's brigade;
but owing to the lateness of the hour and heaviness of the road
over which he was compelled to move, he secured but few prisoners."
This report also seems to be silent in respect to any order from
General Thomas.
There was another good reason why the cavalry secured but few
prisoners at that time: There were very few left to secure behind
_that part_ of the line, the infantry having captured nearly all
of them.
STATEMENTS IN THE REPORTS OF CORPS COMMANDERS
My own official report, dated December 31, gave the following
account of the operations of December 16, to the accuracy of which
no exception was taken by General Thomas. The only order therein
mentioned as coming from General Thomas was that received in the
night of the 15th, "for the pursuit of the enemy on the following
day."
"In the night of the 15th I waited upon the major-general commanding
at his headquarters, and received his orders for the pursuit of
the enemy on the following day. Our operations during the 15th
had swung the right and right center forward so that the general
direction of the line was nearly perpendicular to that before the
attack; only the right was in contact with the enemy, and was
therefore much exposed. Apprehensive that the enemy, instead of
retreating during the night, would mass and attack our right in
the morning, I requested that a division of infantry be sent to
reinforce the right, which was ordered accordingly from Major-
General Smith's command. In response to this order, General Smith
sent five regiments and a battery (about 1600 men), which were put
in reserve near the right. In the morning it was found that the
enemy still held his position in our front, of which the hill in
front of General Couch was the key, and had thrown up considerable
breastworks during the night. He had also increased the force on
his left during the night, and continued to mass troops there during
the early part of the day. During the morning, therefore, our
operations were limited to preparations for defense and co-operation
with the cavalry, which was operating to strike the Granny White
pike in rear of the enemy. About noon, the troops on my left
(Generals Smith and Wood) having advanced and come in contact with
the enemy in his new position, the enemy again withdrew from his
left a considerable force to strengthen his right and center, when
I ordered General Cox to advance in conjunction with the cavalry,
and endeavor to carry a high wooded hill beyond the flank of the
enemy's intrenched line, and overlooking the Granny White pike.
The hill was occupied by the enemy in considerable force, but was
not intrenched. My order was not executed with the promptness or
energy which I had expected, yet probably with as much as I had
reason to expect, considering the attenuated character of General
Cox's line and the great distance and rough ground over which the
attacking force had to move. The hill was, however, carried by
General Wilson's cavalry (dismounted), whose gallantry and energy
on that and other occasions which came under my observation cannot
be too greatly praised.
"Almost simultaneously with this attack on the extreme right, the
salient hill in front of General Couch was attacked and carried by
General Smith's troops, supported by a brigade of General Couch's
division; and the fortified hill in front of General Cox, which
constituted the extreme flank of the enemy's intrenched line, was
attacked and carried by Colonel Doolittle's brigade of General
Cox's division, the latter capturing eight pieces of artillery and
200 to 300 prisoners. These several successes, gained almost
simultaneously, resulted in a complete rout of the enemy. The
cavalry had cut off his line of retreat by the Granny White pike,
and such of his troops as were not captured on the line could only
escape by climbing the Brentwood Hills. It is believed all of the
artillery along the left and center of the enemy's line fell into
our hands. Our troops continued the pursuit across the valley and
into the Brentwood Hills, when darkness compelled them to desist,
and they bivouacked for the night."
In the histories of the battle of Nashville heretofore published,
it appears to have been assumed that the plan of battle issued to
the troops before the movement of December 15 was equally applicable
to the operations of the 16th, was so understood by the subordinate
commanders, and was the authoritative guide for their action during
the entire day of the 16th. Hence it has seemed to me necessary
to direct attention to the above extracts from the official records,
as well as to give my own personal recollections, for the benefit
of future historians.
EXPLANATION OF THE ABSENCE OF ORDERS
Unquestionably the _general plan_ of battle embraced in the orders
of December 14 for the attack on the 15th was well applicable to
the situation which actually existed in the morning of the 16th.
It was requisite only to direct in what manner the several corps
of the army should act in _concert_ in the _changed situation_ of
both armies, as had so clearly been done for the 15th, in the
_situation then existing_. But the detailed orders requisite for
such joint action given in the plan for the battle of the 15th,
were _absolutely inapplicable_ in most essential particulars to
the situation of the 16th, or to the battle actually fought on that
day. In view of the fact that much time had very wisely been spent
by General Thomas in remounting his cavalry and in making all other
preparations necessary to insure not only the defeat, but the
destruction or capture of the enemy, and of the further fact that
the operations of the 15th had so damaged the enemy that his retreat
that night was thought at least probable, if not certain, it hardly
seems possible that General Thomas could have been willing to
postpone a renewal of the attack until he could have time to visit
"the several commands" in person, and see for himself what the
situation actually was the next day, as if the operations he had
to determine on and order were the original plans of a battle yet
to be opened, instead of the final blow to be struck against an
enemy already substantially beaten and quite probably already in
full retreat.
The only possible explanation of this very remarkable absence of
timely orders from General Thomas for the battle of December 16,
and of the long delay on that day, seems to be found in his well-
known constitutional habit, sometimes spoken of by his brother
officers who had long been familiarly acquainted with him. Unless
the opinions of those familiar acquaintances and friends were
substantially erroneous, General Thomas's habit of great deliberation
did not permit him to formulate in the night of December 15 the
comparatively simple orders requisite for the several corps to
_resume_, in the morning of the 16th, the movement "against the
enemy's left flank," which he says he "directed" to be "continued"
some time in _the afternoon_ of that day--so late, however, that
some of the troops, at least, becoming impatient at the long delay,
did not wait even for the orders they had asked for, but initiated
on their own responsibility the action which resulted in victory
before any directions whatever from General Thomas had reached
them. Or else, if General Thomas had clearly in his mind the
appropriate action of his several corps suggested by the condition
of the enemy _as he himself had seen it_ just before dark, or as
it might be modified during the night, he must, it would seem, have
felt so sure of Hood's retreat in the night that he did not think
it worth his while to give any orders except for pursuit. However
this may be, it seems to be clearly established by the records that
the movements which prepared the way for the final assault, and
that assault itself, were both made under the orders of subordinates,
and not in obedience to any orders or directions from General
Thomas, nor in accordance with any general plan which he had informed
them was to be the guide for their action that day.
The battle of the 15th was fought in very close conformity to the
plan prepared, some time before the 14th, doubtless by General
Thomas himself, though spoken of by General Wood, in his confidential
letter of the 14th to Thomas, as "our plan," and modified at the
conference which was called that day upon the suggestion of Wood
in that confidential letter, and, as he said, "at the instance of
Schofield and Smith."( 1) But the battle of the 16th appears to
have been emphatically a battle of the troops themselves, acting
under the independent orders of their own subordinate commanders,
with such co-operation and support as they had arranged among
themselves, in the absence of any orders or instructions from their
common superior.
THE PHRASEOLOGY OF GENERAL THOMAS'S REPORT
It seems proper for me to say that I have never claimed for myself
any part of the credit due to subordinates that day (December 16).
Having failed in the night of December 15 to obtain any appropriate
orders for my action, or for the conjoint action of the corps on
my right and left, and also to obtain any such orders on the 16th,
the only orders I gave were those to support the movements on my
right and left initiated by the subordinate commanders there. For
this action General Thomas, in his report, gave the full credit
due to my troops, and, inferentially at least, more than was due
to me. I must also add, in order that there may be no misunderstanding
on the subject, that General Thomas also gave full credit to me
and to the Twenty-third Corps for the part we took in the battle
of December 15.
The only special credit to which I have thought myself entitled in
respect to Nashville was for two incidental services which General
Thomas did not seem to think worthy even of mention. They were,
in fact, only such services as any efficient staff officer possessed
of unusual knowledge of the character and habits of the opposing
commander could have rendered to General Thomas as well as I could.
The two services referred to were the suggestion relative to the
change in the details of the plan of battle for December 15, by
which the infantry attacking force on our right was increased from
about ten thousand to nearly twenty thousand men; and the information
I gave to General Thomas, in the night of the 15th, that Hood would
not retreat without another fight, about which I had not the
slightest doubt, and which seemed to me more important than the
information I had given about the relative lengths of the several
parts of the enemy's line of defense and of his (General Thomas's)
line of attack, as proposed in his written orders. But these little
services, not worthy of mention in terms of special praise, seemed
to me worthy of record, especially the latter, since I had made a
long ride in a dark night, after having already been in the saddle
from daylight till dark, to carry the information to the commanding
general in person, and try to convince him of its correctness.
A single word signifies sometimes much more than is imagined by
him who uses it. If General Thomas had said _resumed_ instead of
"continued," his statement of what he said he "directed" would have
corresponded very nearly with what was actually done after those
directions were given on December 16. But the continuation, at 3
or 4 P. M. of one day, of action which had been suspended at
nightfall the preceding day, hardly accords with the rule of accuracy
which is demanded in maturely considered military reports. Indeed,
when a military movement is suspended at nightfall on account of
darkness, it is properly spoken of as _resumed_, not "continued,"
even at daylight. The word "continued" was used to express what
was directed to be done at three or four o'clock in the afternoon
--"the movement against the enemy's left flank," which was not any
movement that had been going on that day and which could therefore
be continued, but the movement which, in fact, had ended the day
before in a very important success which had materially altered
the military situation under which the orders for the previous day
had been given. Hence the use of the word "continued" furnishes
food for thought. To have _resumed_, some time in the afternoon,
those operations of the preceding day would have been to state that
they had been suspended, not only during the night on account of
darkness, but during the greater part of the next day for no apparent
reason. That would have been manifestly inconsistent with the
theory that the operations of the second day were only a continuation
of those of the first, all in accordance with the plan of battle
published two days before, upon which theory the reports of General
Thomas and of some of the sub-commanders appear to have been based.
The logical conclusion of this reflection, in view of all the facts
now established by the records, seems to be that the plan of battle
for December 16 was matured and published to the army, as well as
to the world at large, some time after the event.
THE PHRASEOLOGY OF GENERAL THOMAS'S REPORT
It may be worthy of note that none of the officers whose reports
reveal their ignorance of that plan belonged to the Army of the
Cumberland, with which General Thomas had so long been identified.
[( 1) War Records, Vol. XVL, part ii, p. 184.]