Grant Orders Thomas to Attack Hood or Relinquish the Command--
Thomas's Corps Commanders Support Him in Delay--Grant's Intentions
in Sending Logan to Relieve Thomas--Change of Plan before the Battle
of Nashville--The Fighting of December 15--Expectation that Hood
would Retreat--Delay in Renewing the Attack on the 16th--Hopelessness
of Hood's Position--Letters to Grant and Sherman--Transferred to
the East--Financial Burden of the War--Thomas's Attitude toward
the War.
The perilous character of the situation in Tennessee, in which it
was left by Sherman's premature start for the sea and Thomas's
tardy concentration of troops, wholly disappeared with the repulse
of Hood at Franklin. There was no further obstacle to the
concentration of Thomas's forces at Nashville, the organization
and equipment of his army, and the necessary preparations to assume
the offensive. Hood's army was too much shattered and crippled to
make any serious movement for some days, during which it was easy
for Thomas to prepare for battle all his troops except the cavalry,
of which latter, however, it required a longer time to complete
the remount. Indeed, Thomas could have given battle the second or
third day after Franklin with more than a fair prospect of success.
Considering the feeling of nervous anxiety which prevailed in
Washington and throughout the country at the time, possibly he
ought to have assumed the offensive on the 2d or 3d of December.
But that state of anxiety was at first unknown at Nashville, even
to General Thomas, and was never fully appreciated or understood.
No one at Nashville, so far as I am aware, shared that feeling.
We knew, or thought we knew, that Hood could do nothing, unless it
were to retreat, before we would be prepared to meet him, and that
every day's delay strengthened us far more that it possibly could
him. His operations, which were closely watched every day, indicated
no intention to retreat; hence all at Nashville awaited with
confidence the period of complete preparation which was to give us
the decisive victory.
THOMAS TO ATTACK HOOD OR RELINQUISH THE COMMAND
The anxiety felt elsewhere, especially by General Grant, was probably
due to some doubt of the wisdom of Sherman's plan of going off with
his main army before disposing of Hood, contrary to Grant's first
advice; to the discovery of Sherman's error in supposing he had
left Thomas in complete condition to cope with Hood; to some
misapprehension as to the degree in which the situation in Tennessee
had been changed by the battle of Franklin; as well as to lack of
confidence in General Thomas on account of his well-known deliberation
of thought and action.
Little was known of this state of anxiety by me, or, I believe, by
the corps commanders, until December 9, when General Thomas, calling
us together at his headquarters, informed us that he was ordered
to attack Hood at once or surrender his command (not saying to
whom), and asked our advice as to what he ought to do. One of the
officers present asked General Thomas to show us the order, which
he declined to do. This confirmed the belief which I had at first
formed that the successor named by General Grant could be no other
than myself--a belief formed from the fact that I was, next to
General Thomas, the highest officer in rank on the ground where
immediate action was demanded, and from my knowledge of General
Grant's confidence, which belief has since been fully justified by
the record. This, as I conceived, imposed upon me the duty of
responding at once to General Thomas's request for advice, without
waiting for the junior members of the council, according to the
usual military custom. Hence I immediately replied: "General
Thomas, I will sustain you in your determination not to fight until
you are fully ready." All the other commanders then promptly
expressed their concurrence.
I do not know whether or not my declaration of purpose to sustain
General Thomas was made known to General Grant, or to any one in
Washington, either then or afterward. I have never made any inquiry
on that subject. Of course such information must have been conveyed
confidentially and indirectly, if at all, and hence would probably
not appear in the official records, though despatches and letters
marked "confidential" are sometimes published as official. I have
only conjectured that some knowledge of my opinion and decision
may, perhaps, have influenced General Grant's final determination
to go to Nashville himself. If some officer must go there to fight
a battle, Grant could get there about as soon as any other he could
well select. The records now published seem to verify the belief
then (December 9, 1864) existing in my mind, that I had only to
withhold my support from General Thomas in his determination to
delay, and the chief command would have fallen to my fortune, where
I believed brilliant victory was as nearly certain as anything in
war can be. But I never had the remotest idea of superseding
General Thomas. As I explained to General Sherman, I volunteered
to go back to Tennessee, not to supersede Thomas, but to help him.
I knew him and his subordinates well, as I did also the antagonist,
my West Point classmate, whom they would have to meet. I appreciated
Thomas's high qualities, his distinguished services, and, above
all, the profound affection and confidence of his troops--an element
of strength in a commander far greater than is generally understood,
even by military men, some of whom appear to be altogether ignorant
of its value as a factor in war. A doubt of our complete success
under his leadership, after our troops were united, never entered
my mind, much less a desire to diminish or dim the laurels he might
win.
GRANT'S INTENTION IN SENDING LOGAN
General Grant's great anxiety on account of the situation at
Nashville was manifested for several days by urgent despatches to
General Thomas to attack at once without waiting for further
preparations; then by an order to Thomas to turn over the chief
command to me, Thomas to become subordinate, which order was
suspended; and finally by starting for Nashville himself to direct
operations in person. In the meantime he ordered General John A.
Logan to go to Nashville to relieve Thomas in command of the Army
of the Cumberland, without thought, as he has said, of the question
whether Logan or myself should command the combined armies of the
Cumberland and of the Ohio. Grant had reached Washington from City
Point, and Logan had gone as far as Louisville, when the report of
Thomas's victory of December 15 made it unnecessary for either of
them to proceed farther. The following letters from Grant to Logan
are interesting as explaining the reasons and motives of his action
in sending Logan to Nashville, as well as his estimate of the
services I had rendered in the preceding operations:
"New York, February 14, 1884.
"Hon. John A. Logan, U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C.
"Dear Sir: In reply to your letter of the 11th, I have to say that
my response must be from memory entirely, having no data at hand
to refer to; but in regard to the order for you to go to Louisville
and Nashville for the purpose of relieving General Thomas, I never
thought of the question of who should command the combined armies
of the Cumberland and the Ohio. I was simply dissatisfied with
the slowness of General Thomas moving, and sent you out with orders
to relieve him. No doubt if the order had been carried out, the
question would immediately have arisen as to who was entitled to
the command, provided General Schofield was senior in rank to you,
which I do not know that he was. I know that his confirmation as
a major-general took place long after yours, but I do not know the
date of his commission. The question, in that case, of the command
of the whole would have been settled in a very few hours by the
use of the telegraph between Nashville and Washington. I was in
Washington when you arrived at Louisville and telegraphed me that
General Thomas had moved, and, as I remember the telegram, expressing
gratification that he had done so. I was then on my way to Nashville
myself, and remained over a day in Washington, hoping that Thomas
might still move. Of course I was gratified when I learned that
he had moved, because it was a very delicate and unpleasant matter
to remove a man of General Thomas's character and standing before
the country; but still I had urged him so long to move that I had
come to think it a duty. Of course in sending you to relieve
General Thomas, I meant no reflection whatever upon General Schofield,
who was commanding the Army of the Ohio, because I thought that he
had done very excellent service in punishing the entire force under
Hood a few days before, some twenty-five miles south of Nashville.
Very truly yours,
"U. S. Grant
"(_per_ Frank F. Wood)."
GRANT'S INTENTIONS IN SENDING LOGAN
"New York, February 23, 1884.
"Gen. John A. Logan, U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C.
"Dear General: Since I have been confined to my room I have
conducted all my correspondence through a secretary, who is a
stenographer, and he takes my dictation to the office and writes
the letters out there as dictated, and by my direction signs my
name. I intended that the letter which I wrote to you should be
brought back to me for my own signature, and I sign this myself to
show my entire responsibility for the one which you have just
received, and which I hope was satisfactory to you.
"Very truly yours,
"U. S. Grant."
The passion and prejudice begotten in the minds of Thomas's soldiers
and their friends by injustice, real or fancied, done or proposed
to be done to him by his superiors in rank, have rendered impossible
any calm discussion of questions touching his military career.
There is not yet, and probably will not be in our lifetime, a proper
audience for such discussion. But posterity will award justice to
all if their deeds have been such as to save their names from
oblivion.
Time works legitimate "revenge," and makes all things even. When
I was a boy at West Point I was court-martialed for tolerating some
youthful "deviltry" of my classmates, in which I took no part
myself, and was sentenced to be dismissed. Thomas, then already
a veteran soldier, was a member of the court, and he and one other
were the only ones of thirteen members who declined to recommend
that the sentence be remitted. This I learned in 1868, when I was
Secretary of War. Only twelve years later I was able to repay this
then unknown stern denial of clemency to a youth by saving the
veteran soldier's army from disaster, and himself from the humiliation
of dismissal from command on the eve of victory. Five years later
still, I had the satisfaction, by intercession with the President,
of saving the same veteran general from assignment to an inferior
command, and of giving him the military division to which my
assignment had been ordered. When death had finally relieved him
from duty, and not till then, did I consent to be his successor.
In 1879 I had the satisfaction, after many months of patient
investigation, of rendering justice to the other of those two
unrelenting soldiers who, of all the thirteen, could not find it
in their hearts to recommend clemency to an erring youth; I was
president of the board which reversed the judgment of the court-
martial in the case of Fitz-John Porter.
I believe it must now be fully known to all who are qualified to
judge and have had by personal association or by study of history
full opportunities to learn the truth, that General Thomas did not
possess in a high degree the activity of mind necessary to foresee
and provide for all the exigencies of military operations, nor the
mathematical talent required to estimate "the relations of time,
space, motion, and force" involved in great problems of war. His
well-known high qualities in other respects obscured these
imperfections from the great majority of those who surrounded him
during the war, and rendered the few educated soldiers who were
able to understand his true merits the more anxious to aid him and
save him from personal defeat. And no one, I am sure, of his
comrades in arms desires to detract from the great fame which is
justly his due; for, according to the best judgment of mankind,
moral qualities, more than intellectual, are the foundation of a
great and enduring fame. It was "Old Pap" Thomas, not General
Thomas, who was beloved by the Army of the Cumberland; and it is
the honest, conscientious patriot, the firm, unflinching old soldier,
not the general, whose name will be most respected in history.
CHANGE OF PLAN BEFORE THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE
Of the general details of the battle of Nashville I do not propose
to speak, but simply to notice a few of its most important points.
The plan of battle, as published, placed my command--the Twenty-
third Corps--in the left center of our line, where only a feint
was to be made. The Fourth Corps was to carry a salient advanced
line, while the main attack was to be made on the enemy's extreme
left by A. J. Smith's corps and the cavalry. After the order was
prepared I went to General Thomas with a map of the position showing
the exact length of the several parts of the enemy's line, and
explained to him that the force he had assigned to our left wing
was at least 10,000 men more than could be used to any advantage
unless for a real attack; and that, on the other hand, Smith's
force was not large enough for the real attack, considering the
extent of the ground occupied by the enemy on that flank. Hence
I suggested that my corps should support Smith instead of remaining
on the left of Wood. To this suggestion General Thomas readily
acceded, and orally authorized me to carry it into effect, but made
no change in his written order. The result of this change of plan
was that the close of the first day's engagement found the Twenty-
third Corps on the extreme right of our infantry line, in the most
advanced position captured from the enemy. Yet General Thomas, in
his official report, made no mention of this change of plan, but
said "the original plan of battle, with but few alterations, [was]
strictly adhered to."( 1) The "alterations" were certainly "few".
A change from 10,000 to 20,000 infantry in the main attacking force
may not properly be described as _many_ "alterations," but it looks
like one very _large_ one--sufficient, one would suppose, to
determine the difference between failure and success.
The plan of battle issued December 14 had been matured and made
known to the principal subordinate commanders several days before,
when General Thomas intended to attack, but was prevented by the
storm. Hence there had been ample time for critical consideration
and discussion of the details of that plan, the result of which
was the modification made at the conference in the afternoon or
evening of December 14, which modification was not embodied in the
written order, but was orally directed to be carried out. If
General Thomas had caused that clerical work to be done in the
evening of December 14, his published orders and his battle of
December 15 would have been in complete harmony. There would not,
so far as I know, have been even a "few alterations." In this
connection, the difference between the "Special Field Order No.
342" of December 14, as recorded in General Thomas's order-book,
and the copy embodied in his official report, as explained in a
foot-note in the War Records, is not unimportant.( 2) In the order-
book he says: "Major-General Schofield _will mass_ the remainder
of his force in front of the works and co-operate with General
Wood, protecting the latter's left flank against an attack by the
enemy"; but in his report the words "_will move with_" are substituted
for "will mass." The latter, in military parlance, meant placing
my corps in reserve, with a view to "co-operate with General Wood,"
etc., whenever such co-operation might be necessary; while the
words used in Thomas's final report meant active co-operation with
General Wood from the beginning of the engagement. In the body of
his report General Thomas spoke of the position of the Twenty-third
Corps as "in reserve," from which position it was ordered to the
right to join A. J. Smith's troops in the attack. Hence it would
seem that a position "in reserve" was what General Thomas had in
mind both when he prepared his order of battle and when he wrote
his report, and that the change to the words "will move with" was
simply a clerical error.
EXPECTATION THAT HOOD WOULD RETREAT
After darkness had ended the first day's battle (December 15), I
received an order in writing from General Thomas, which was in
substance to _pursue the retreating enemy_ early the next morning,
my corps to take the advance on the Granny White pike, and was
informed that the cavalry had been or would be ordered to start at
the same time by a road on the right, and cross the Harpeth below
Franklin. These orders seemed to be so utterly inapplicable to
the actual situation that I rode to the rear to where General
Thomas's headquarters were supposed to be, and there found that he
had gone back to his house in Nashville, to which place I followed
him. He appeared surprised at my suggestion that we would find
Hood in line of battle ready to receive us in the morning, or even
ready to strike our exposed right flank before we could renew the
attack, instead of in full retreat, as he had assumed. I told him
I knew Hood much better than he did, and I was sure he would not
retreat. Finally, after considerable discussion I obtained a
modification of the order so far as to direct the cavalry to remain
where it was until Hood's action should be known, and an order for
some of A. J. Smith's troops to support the right if necessary.
But no orders whatever were given, to my knowledge, looking to a
battle the next day--at least none for my troops or the cavalry.
The next morning revealed the enemy in his new position, his left
remaining where it was the night before, in my immediate front,
but the rest of his line far back from the ground on which the
other portions of Thomas's army had passed the night. Some time
was of course required for the other corps to come up and get in
contact with the enemy, and the whole forenoon was passed by me in
impatient anxiety and fruitless efforts to get from General Thomas
some orders or authority that would enable us all to act together
--that is, the cavalry and the two infantry corps on the right.
At length the cavalry, without order from General Thomas, had worked
well round on the enemy's left so as to threaten his rear; I had
ordered Cox, commanding my right division, to advance his right in
conjunction with the movement of the cavalry, and at the proper
time to attack the left of the enemy's intrenchments covering the
Granny White pike, and that movement had commenced; while, having
been informed by General Darius N. Couch, commanding my left
division, that one of Smith's divisions was about to assault, I had
ordered Couch to support that division, which movement had also
commenced. Then General Thomas arrived near our right, where I
stood watching these movements. This, about four o'clock P. M.,
was the first time I had seen or heard from General Thomas during
that day. He gave no order, nor was there time to give any. The
troops were already in motion, and we had hardly exchanged the
usual salutations when shouts to our left announced that McArthur's
division of Smith's corps had already carried the enemy's work in
its front, and our whole line advanced and swept all before it.
In my judgment, General Thomas gave a little less than full credit
to McArthur's division, and considerably more than full justice to
the other troops, in his description of that assault, which was
distinctly seen by him and by me.
The resistance along the whole left and center of Hood's line cannot
be said to have been strong or obstinate. Our total losses were
comparatively insignificant; and whatever may have been the appearance
to the troops under fire, to a cool observer out of the smoke the
enemy's fire seemed no more than that of an ordinary skirmish.
But with the exception of the comparatively feeble resistance of
the enemy, that splendid assault of McArthur's division, as I saw
it, was very accurately described by its gallant commander in his
official report, and also in that of General A. J. Smith.
DELAY IN RENEWING THE ATTACK ON THE 16TH
The fact is that Hood's left wing had been much weakened to strengthen
his right, which had been heavily pressed a short time before, as
fully described by General Thomas, and his army was already
substantially beaten. Its spirit seemed to be gone. What little
fight was left in it after November 30 had been greatly diminished
on December 15. Hood, almost alone of that army, was not whipped
until the 16th. He, the responsible leader of a desperate cause,
could not yield as long as there was a ray of hope. Under any
ordinary circumstances a commander even of the most moderate capacity
must have admitted his campaign a failure the morning after Franklin.
It would be absurd to compare the fighting of Hood's troops at
Nashville, especially on the second day, with the magnificent
assaults at Atlanta and Franklin. My own appreciation of the result
was expressed in the following despatch:
"Headquarters, Army of the Ohio,
"December 16, 1864, 7:45 P. M.
"Major-General George H. Thomas,
"Commanding Department of the Cumberland.
"General: I have the honor to report four pieces of artillery and
a considerable number of prisoners captured by General Cox's division
this afternoon. General Cox also reported four other pieces and
caissons captured in the valley between the hill carried by General
McArthur and that taken by General Cox. I learned, however, upon
inquiry, that General McArthur's troops claimed, and I have no
doubt justly, the honor of capturing the last four. My provost-
marshal reports seventy-four prisoners captured this P. M. I have
conversed with some of the officers captured, and am satisfied
Hood's army is more thoroughly beaten than any troops I have ever
seen.
"I congratulate you most heartily upon the result of the two days'
operations. My messenger will wait for any orders you may have to
send me. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"J. M. Schofield, Major-General."
It now appears to be fully established by the records that Hood's
infantry force in the battle of Nashville was very far inferior to
that of Thomas, and he had sent a large part of his cavalry, with
some infantry, away to Murfreesboro'. This disparity must have
been perfectly well known to Hood, though not to Thomas. Hence it
would seem that Hood must have known that it was utterly impossible
for his army to resist the assaults which he must expect on December
16. Since all this has become known, it is impossible not to see
now that the comparatively feeble resistance offered by the
Confederate troops at Nashville was due not so much, perhaps, to
any lack of valor on the part of those troops, as to their
comparatively small numbers. I recall distinctly the conversation
I had with a Confederate field-officer a few minutes after he was
captured that day, and which I reported to General Thomas that
evening. In answer to my question as to when the Confederate troops
recognized the fact that they were beaten, he answered, "Not till
you routed us just now." I did not believe him then, for I thought
they must have recognized their defeat at Franklin, or at least on
the 15th, at Nashville. But now I think he probably told me the
exact truth. I doubt if any soldiers in the world ever needed so
much cumulative evidence to convince them that they were beaten.
"Brave boys were they!" If they had been fighting in a cause that
commanded the sympathy and support of the public conscience of the
world, they could never have been beaten; it is not necessary to
search for any other cause of the failure of the Confederate States.
DELAY IN RENEWING THE ATTACK ON THE 16TH
The most notable failure, on our side, of the battle of December
16 was the wasting of nearly the entire day, so that operations
ended with the successful assault at dark. What was left of Hood's
army had time to retreat across the Harpeth during the night and
destroy the bridges before the pursuit could be commenced.
But the results of the two days' operations at Nashville were too
gratifying to admit of contemporaneous criticism. The battle has
been generally accepted as a perfect exemplification of the art of
war. It is certainly a good subject for the study of military
students, and it is partly for their benefit that I have pointed
out some of its prominent defects as I understood them. Its
commendable features are sufficiently evident; but in studying the
actions that have resulted in victory, we are apt to overlook the
errors without which the victory might have been far more complete,
or even to mistake those errors for real causes of success.
The pursuit from Nashville was necessarily an imperfect one from
the start, simply because the successful assault having been made
at the close of day, the broken enemy had time to get across the
Harpeth and destroy the bridges before morning. The singular
blunder by which General Thomas's pontoon-train was sent toward
Murfreesboro' instead of Franklin added somewhat to the delay, but
probably did not essentially change the result.
The state of all the roads except the one turnpike, the soft
condition of the fields everywhere, the bad weather,--rain, sleet,
and ice,--made the movements of troops which were necessary to an
effective pursuit extremely difficult, and often impossible. The
energy and determination of General Thomas and of all who could
take any active part in that pursuit were probably never surpassed
in military history, but the difficulties to be overcome were often
insurmountable. Under the conditions at that season of the year
and in that state of weather, the only possible chance of reaping
fruits commensurate with the brilliant victory at Nashville and
with the great preparations which had been made for pursuit was to
make the final assault at Nashville early enough in the day to
leave time before dark to prevent the enemy from crossing the
Harpeth and destroying the bridges.
If Hood had retreated in the night of December 15, as Thomas presumed
he would, the result would doubtless have been even less serious
to the enemy; for he would not have suffered at Nashville the great
losses and demoralization which occurred to him on the 16th, and
would have been in better condition to make an effective retreat,
and even better able to cross the Harpeth in the night and destroy
the bridges. But this would have been difficult, if not impossible,
to prevent on the 15th, on account of the great extent and nature
of the movements necessarily required to open the battle on that
day. I now recall very distinctly the desire manifested by General
Thomas that those initial operations might, if possible, be expedited.
As we sat together on horseback just in rear of Wood's right and
of Smith's left, on ground overlooking nearly the entire field,
the general would frequently reach for my glasses, which he had
occasionally used before and said were the only field-glasses he
had ever found of much use to him, and try to peer through the
misty atmosphere far over the woods and field where his infantry
and cavalry were advancing against the enemy's left. After thus
looking long and earnestly, he would return the glasses to me, with
what seemed to be a sign of irritation or impatience, for he uttered
very few words in that long time, until late in the afternoon,
when, after using my field-glasses for the last time, he said to
me, with the energy which battle alone could arouse in his strong
nature: "Smith has not reached far enough to the right. Put in
your troops!"
Occasionally, when a shell struck and exploded near where we were,
causing his horse to make a slight start, and only a slight one,--
for the nature of the horse was much the same as that of the rider,
--the only change visible in the face or form of that stout-hearted
soldier was a slight motion of the bridle-hand to check the horse.
My own beautiful gray charger, "Frank Blair," though naturally more
nervous than the other, had become by that time hardly less fearless.
But I doubt if my great senior ever noticed that day what effect
the explosion of a shell produced on either the gray horse or his
rider. He had on his shoulders the responsibilities of a great
battle, while I then had better than ever before opportunity to
study the character of my chief.
HOPELESSNESS OF HOOD'S POSITION
A wiser commander than Hood might very probably have saved his army
from that terrible and useless sacrifice of December 16. But that
last and bravest champion of a desperate cause in the west appears
to have decided to remain and invite the total destruction of his
army. The position which the Confederates occupied in the morning
of the 16th was so close to that of more than half of the Union
troops that Hood's left could easily have been crushed by an infantry
assault and his rear reached by Thomas's cavalry before noon, and
nothing less than a miracle could have prevented the capture of
Hood's army.
It is worthy of note as instructive comparison that on November
30 Hood advanced from Spring Hill to Franklin and made his famous
assault in just about the same length of time that it took our
troops to advance from the first to the second position at Nashville
and make the assault of December 16; and that the Fourth and Twenty-
third corps on November 29 and 30 fought two battles--Spring Hill
and Franklin--and marched forty miles, from Duck River to Nashville,
in thirty-six hours. Time is an element in military problems the
value of which cannot be too highly estimated, yet how seldom has
it been duly appreciated!
The remnant of Hood's army having made its escape across the
Tennessee River, the pursuit terminated, and General Thomas issued
his remarkable General Orders No. 169, announcing that "the rear-
guard of the flying and dispirited enemy was driven across the
Tennessee River. . . ."( 3)
Orders were then issued by General Thomas distributing his army
along the Tennessee River in winter quarters, and he commenced
planning a campaign for the ensuing spring, the general features
of which he telegraphed me, asking my opinion. His proposition
seemed to show so different an appreciation from my own of the
actual state of the war and of the demands of the country upon its
army at that momentous crisis, and views so different from mine in
respect to the strategic principles that should govern future
operations, that I wrote to General Grant and General Sherman,
giving them briefly my views upon the subject, and requesting an
order to join them on the Atlantic coast, to aid in terminating
the rebellion. My letter to General Grant was promptly followed
by a telegram to General Thomas directing him to send me east with
the Twenty-third Corps, which enabled me to participate in the
closing campaign of the war.
LETTER TO GRANT
The following are the letters, above referred to, to Grant and
Sherman, whose appreciation of the views therein expressed is
sufficiently shown by the published history of subsequent operations,
and the orders sent to Thomas by General Grant and the War Department
during that time:
"(Unofficial.)
"Columbia, Tenn., December 27, 1864.
"Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, Commanding U. S. Armies, City
Point, Va.
"General: My corps was sent back to Tennessee by General Sherman,
instead of remaining with him on him march through Georgia, according
to his original design, for two reasons, viz.: First, because
General Thomas was not regarded strong enough after it became
evident that Hood designed to invade Tennessee; and, second, in
order that I might fill up my corps from the new troops then arriving
in Tennessee. These reasons now no longer exist. By uniting my
troops with Stanley's, we were able to hold Hood in check at Columbia
and Franklin until General Thomas could concentrate at Nashville,
and also to give Hood his death-blow at Franklin. Subsequent
operations have shown how little fight was then left in his army,
and have taken that little out of it. He now has not more than
fifteen thousand infantry, about ten thousand of whom only are
armed, and they greatly demoralized. With time to reorganize and
recruit, he could not probably raise his force to more than half
the strength he had at Franklin.
"General Thomas has assigned several new regiments to my command,
and I hope soon to make them effective by distributing them in old
brigades. I will have from fifteen to eighteen thousand effective
men, two thirds of whom are the veterans of the campaigns of East
Tennessee and Georgia: A small force, it is true, yet one which
would at least be an appreciable addition to your army in Virginia
or elsewhere where decisive work is to be done.
"It may not be practicable now for me to join General Sherman, but
it would not be difficult to transfer my command to Virginia.
"I am aware that General Thomas contemplates a 'spring campaign'
into Alabama or Mississippi, with the Tennessee River as a base,
and believe he considers my command a necessary part of the operating
force. Without reference to the latter point, permit me to express
the opinion that such a campaign would not be an economical or
advantageous use of so many troops.
"If aggressive operations are to be continued in the Gulf States,
it appears to me it would be much better to take Mobile and operate
from that point, thus striking vital points, if there are any such,
of rebel territory by much shorter lines.
"But it appears to me that Lee's army is virtually all that is left
of the rebellion. If we can concentrate force enough to destroy
that, we will destroy with it the rebel government, and the occupation
of the whole South will then be but a matter of a few weeks' time.
"Excuse, General, the liberty I have taken in expressing my views
thus freely and unsolicited. I have no other motive than a desire
for the nation's good, and a personal wish to serve where my little
command can do the most.
"The change I suggest would of course deprive me of my department
command, but this would be a small loss to me or to the service.
The present arrangement is an unsatisfactory one at best. Nominally
I command both a department and an army in the field; but in fact
I do neither. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient
servant,
"J. M. Schofield, Major-General."
LETTER TO SHERMAN
"(Unofficial.)
"Columbia, Tenn., December 28, 1864.
"My dear General: Accept my hearty congratulations on the happy
termination of your 'pleasure excursion' through Georgia. You must
have had a merry Christmas.
"As was predicted, you have had the fun, and we the hard work.
But altogether your plan has been a brilliant success. Hood didn't
follow _you_, . . . but he did _me_. I held him at Columbia several
days, and hurt him considerably. Finally he got across the Duck
River above, and made for Franklin via Spring Hill. I headed him
off at Spring Hill with a division, and concentrated at Franklin.
There he made the heaviest assaults I have ever seen, but was fairly
repulsed and terribly punished. In fact we pretty much knocked
all the fight out of him on that occasion, and he has shown very
little since. Now I reckon he has n't any left.
"I barely succeeded in delaying Hood until Thomas could get A. J.
Smith and Steedman to Nashville, when he became abundantly strong,
and after getting Wilson's cavalry together moved out and gave Hood
a most thorough beating with all ease. The fact is, Hood's army
showed scarcely any fight at all. I have never seen anybody except
Jeff Thompson so easily beaten.
"Stoneman has cleaned out Breckinridge and destroyed the salt-works
and everything else in southwest Virginia; so all together matters
are in pretty good shape in this part of the military division.
"Thomas has given me nine new regiments, and promises three more.
These will make a pretty good division for new troops.
"All this being true, I take it the objects for which I was left
in this part of the country have been accomplished, and I would
like very much to be with you again, to take part in the future
operations of the Grand Army. Cannot this be brought about?
"Of course I can only conjecture what your operations will now be,
and can hardly judge of the practicability of my joining you, but
I hope I may be able to do so. I have written to General Grant on
this subject, and suggested that if I cannot reach you, I might
with propriety be sent to Virginia. I feel certain that I am no
longer needed here, for without me Thomas is much stronger than
Hood.
"I have not talked with General Thomas on the subject, but intend
to do so as soon as I can see him.( 4) No doubt he will be opposed
to any reduction of his force, but I go for concentrating against
Lee. If we can whip him now, the rebellion will be virtually ended.
"My corps is small, it is true, but it is 'powerful willing,' and
can help some anyhow.
"Please present my kindest remembrances to my old comrades, and
favor me with an early reply. Yours very truly,
"J. M. Schofield, Major-General.
"Major-General Sherman, Com'd'g, etc., Savannah, Ga."
On my passage through Washington in January, 1865, Mr. Stanton,
the Secretary of War, confirmed the view I had taken of the situation,
and gave reasons for it before unknown to me, by telling me it was
regarded by the administration as an absolute financial necessity
that the war be ended in the campaign then about to begin. It is,
perhaps, not strange that General Thomas had not thought of this;
but it does seem remarkable that he had proposed to let a broken
and dispirited enemy have several months in which to recuperate
before annoying him any further.
The expectation and instructions of General Grant and General
Sherman were that General Thomas should, as soon as he was ready
to take the offensive, pursue Hood into the Gulf States. General
Thomas appears to have forgotten that part of his instructions.
As soon as he had driven Hood across the river, he proposed to go
into winter quarters, and "hold the line of the Tennessee" till
some time the next spring. If General Sherman had confided to
General Thomas, as he did to General Grant, his ulterior purpose
to march from Savannah toward Richmond, for which reason he wanted
Hood kept out of his way, Thomas would have perceived the necessity
of pressing the pursuit of Hood into the Gulf States. But if Thomas
supposed, as he might naturally have done, that Sherman had only
shifted his base with a view to further operations in Georgia and
the Gulf States, under the plan of the last autumn, with which
Thomas was perfectly familiar, he may well have seen no necessity
for his pressing the pursuit beyond the Tennessee River in
midwinter.
Some of our military operations in the Civil War remind me of the
spirit of "fair play" shown by our old doctors in the West in the
days of malarial fever. When the poison had fully developed its
power, and threatened the destruction of its victim, the good doctor
would come in and attack the enemy with heroic doses of quinine.
In a few days medical science would prevail. Then the fair-minded
physician would retire, and give the worsted malaria a chance to
recuperate and "come to time" for another attack; and so on
indefinitely until either the man or the malaria--often the man--
finally got "knocked out." It was not until after much study and
some practice of the art of war that I conceived for myself the
idea of giving the enemy of my youth, which still clung to me, no
chance to recover after I once got him down. He has never got the
better of me since.
THOMAS'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR
Had Thomas's plan been carried out, he would have been ready, with
a fine army splendidly equipped and supplied, to start from the
Tennessee River to invade the Gulf States, as had been done the
year before, just about the time the plans actually adopted resulted
in the surrender of all the Confederate armies. In Thomas's mind
war seems to have become the normal condition of the country. He
had apparently as yet no thought of its termination. The campaign
from the Tennessee River as a base had then become, like the "autumn
manoeuvers" of an European army, a regular operation to be commenced
at the proper time every year. In his general order of December
29, he said the enemy, "unless he is mad, must forever relinquish
all hope of bringing Tennessee again within the lines of the accursed
rebellion"; but the possible termination of that rebellion appeared
to be a contingency too remote to be taken into account in planning
future military operations.
[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 39.]
[( 2) See Vol. XLV, part I, p. 37.]
[( 3) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 50.]
[( 4) I did not see General Thomas after this letter was written.]