When the power of taxation is unlimited, as in the case of the national

government and the sovereign States, there can be no question as to the

ability of the political unit to meet its obligation, and the question

becomes entirely one of good faith. It is probable that the obligations

of the United States Government, by reason of the fact that the

per-capita debt of the country is so small, the wealth of the country so

great, and the good faith of the American people so clearly established,

represent the highest type of security to be found in the world. It is

quite possible, therefore, that the 2-per-cent United States Consols

would sell in any case at a relatively higher price than the obligations

of any other country, but it can not be denied that the chief reason

which causes them to sell at the remarkably high price which they have

attained is the fact that they are required by national banks as

security for circulation. This fact is doubtless the controlling element

in their market position, and at once accounts for their special

strength and removes them from the field of private investment.

Only less secure than United States bonds are the obligations of the

sovereign States of the Union. State bonds usually sell upon a basis

which may be taken as the equivalent of pure interest, with no element

of risk or speculation involved. The obligations of different States

sell at different prices, in accordance with market conditions and the

relations of supply and demand, but there can be no question of the

equal ability of all States to pay their obligations. Repudiation of

State debts has occurred in our history, but only in cases where an

overwhelming majority of the citizens were opposed to the creation of

the debt at the time of its issue, but lacked the means to control the

situation. Such instances are chiefly to be found in the case of the

so-called carpet-bag governments of the Southern States after the Civil

War.

Municipal bonds--_i.e._, the bonds of cities, counties, and

townships--are indirectly a first lien upon all taxable property in the

municipality, and take precedence of every form of mortgage or judgment

lien. This lien is enforced through a tax levy to meet interest and

principal, and this tax levy the courts will compel in the rare cases in

which a municipality attempts to repudiate a valid bond. This priority

of the tax lien is the foundation of the prime position of municipal

bonds. The case rarely occurs where a bond held valid by the courts

proves uncollectable if sufficient taxing power existed when the bond

was issued to provide for its redemption. It is only when the

municipality itself diminishes in population and taxable property to the

vanishing-point that such a default can occur. An investor can judge for

himself as to the likelihood of such a catastrophe in any particular

community, and can feel sure that his bond, if valid and protected by a

sufficient taxing power, is as secure in its principal and interest as

the municipality which issues it is secure in its continued existence.

The following are the chief points which should be considered in the

investigation of a municipal bond: (1) The proportion which the total

debt of the municipality bears to the assessed valuation of the property

subject to taxation. Usually a maximum rate is fixt by constitutional

provision which rarely exceeds 10 per cent. (2) The purpose of issue.

This must be a proper and suitable one. (3) The proceedings under which

the bonds were issued. These proceedings, the form of bonds, their

execution, and their legal details must be in full compliance with the

law.

If these points are found to be satisfactory, the investor may rest

content that no other form of security is so greatly safeguarded and

that his bond ranks upon a substantial equality with government and

State obligations.

The rate of income to be derived from investment in municipal bonds

varies in accordance with the obligations selected. Like other forms of

security, municipal bonds are controlled by market conditions, and their

price is determined by the relations of supply and demand, and by

adjustment to prevailing money rates. While differing only moderately

from one another in point of safety and income return, municipal bonds

may be divided into two distinct classes in accordance with the degree

of convertibility which they possess. Some municipal bonds possess great

convertibility; others almost none. The feature which chiefly determines

the activity or inactivity of a municipal issue is the size and

importance of the municipality, together with the amount of bonds which

it has outstanding. The bonds of large and important cities, whose

outstanding debt reaches considerable proportions, usually possess great

activity. They are constantly traded in and command a broad market

because dealers are willing to buy or sell them in blocks at prices

within a fraction of 1 per cent apart.

On the other hand, the bonds of counties, townships, and small cities

are usually quite inactive. Transactions rarely occur in them, dealers

do not make a market in them, and they can be sold only to genuine

investors. It is often impossible to have them even quoted.

At first sight, it would appear that active municipal bonds would be

much more desirable, but inactive municipals possess a special advantage

which the active ones do not enjoy. They possess more stability of

market price. It is true that their stability of value is due to the

fact that they are not traded in or quoted and is, therefore, largely

fictitious, but nevertheless it accomplished a useful purpose. It

enables the investor to carry inactive municipals at cost price upon

his books through periods in which active market bonds would require

to be marked down in conformity with prevailing market prices. No

other class of investment except real-estate mortgages possesses to

the same degree this quality of price stability. For many classes of

buyers--savings-banks, for example--stability of price is a consideration

of prime importance. The preservation of the savings-bank's surplus and,

indeed, the continued solvency of the institution depend upon maintaining

the integrity of the principal which it has invested. A savings-bank

requires, also, great safety of principal and interest; _i.e._, the

certainty that principal and interest instalments will be paid at

maturity. It needs only a fair but not high yield, and it does not need

to place emphasis upon convertibility or prospect of appreciation in

value. Comparison of these requirements with the characteristics of

inactive municipal bonds discloses a striking adaptability on their

part to the real needs of the case. As a consequence, it is not

surprizing to discover that inactive municipals are greatly sought

by savings-banks.

The desirability of inactive municipals for savings-bank investment was

never more forcibly illustrated than on the first of last January, when

the savings-banks came to make up their annual statements. Broadly

speaking, there can be no doubt that they were saved by the large

quantity of inactive municipals and real-estate mortgages which they

carried. Had any considerable portion of their assets consisted of

railroad bonds and active municipals, upon which they should have had to

write off a loss of ten to fifteen points, their solvency would almost

certainly have been impaired.

But we are chiefly concerned in these pages with the advantages and

disadvantages of different forms of investment from the point of view of

a business man, both for the investment of his business surplus and of

his private funds. Do municipal bonds, either active or inactive,

conform to the requirements of the business surplus? It can not be said

that they do. Municipal bonds possess either convertibility without

stability of price or stability of price without convertibility. Both

qualities are necessary for a business surplus. The only form of

municipal security which is at all adapted for the investment of a

business surplus is a short-term issue of an active municipal bond. If

it has only a very few years to run, its constant approach to maturity

will invest it with the necessary stability of price. But even in this

case equal safety and equal stability of price combined with a higher

yield can probably be found in some high-grade railroad issue--either a

short-term mortgage or equipment bond.

For private investment the case is somewhat different. Enough has been

said in the preceding chapters to impress upon the reader the importance

of buying securities only in accordance with his real requirements. If

any investor, after careful comparison of the characteristics of

municipal bonds, either active or inactive, with his necessities,

decides that he can more closely satisfy his requirements with

municipals than with any other form of security, he should not hesitate

to purchase them. It is the opinion of the writer, however, that a

thorough survey of the field of investment will generally disclose to

the investor some security in either the railroad or corporation field

which will suit his requirements as well as the municipal bond and at

the same time provide him with a greater income.

VIII

STOCKS

Passing to the consideration of stocks as investments, it is necessary

at the outset that the reader should have clearly in mind the

fundamental difference between stocks and bonds. This distinction was

drawn in the introductory chapter, but it will be well to amplify it

here, even at the risk of carrying the reader over familiar ground.

The distinction between bonds and stocks is that between _promises to

pay_ and _equities_. Bonds, loans on collateral, and real-estate

mortgages represent some one's promise to pay a sum of money at a future

date; and if the promise be valid and the security ample, the holder of

the promise will be paid the money on the date due. Stocks, on the other

hand, represent only a beneficial interest or residuary share in the

assets and profits of a working concern after payment of its obligations

and fixt charges. The value of the residuary share may be large or

small, may increase or diminish, but in no case can the holder of such a

share require any one, least of all the company itself, to take his

share off his hands at the price he paid for it, or, indeed, at any

price. If a man buys a $1,000 railroad bond, he knows that the railroad,

if solvent, will pay him $1,000 in cash when the bond matures, but if he

buys a share of railroad stock his only chance of getting his money

back, if he should wish it, is that some one else will want to buy his

share from him at the price he paid for it or more. If he buys a bond he

becomes a creditor of the company, without voice in its management, but

entitled to receive his principal and interest when due under pain of

forfeiture of the security which the company made over to the trustee to

insure payment. If he buys stock, he becomes a partner in a business

enterprise, exercising his proportionate share in the direction of the

company's affairs, and sharing ratably in its profits and losses. In the

one case he buys a promise to pay and in the other an equity.

This distinction, which appears plainly marked in theory, has been

much obscured in recent years by the influence of two factors. As the

country grew in size, the large corporations--the railroads, for

example--required greater capital in order to provide facilities for the

handling of their growing business. It was impossible to provide this

capital wholly by means of bond issues without destroying the proportion

between bonds and stocks, which alone could give to the bondholders the

protection of a substantial equity. It was therefore necessary to obtain

a large part of the capital required in the form of stock. The

railway-managers were thus confronted with a difficult problem. It was

imperative that they should obtain more capital, and it was impossible

to dispose of sufficient stock on the basis of a speculative risk in a

business venture. It was therefore necessary for the railway-managers to

emphasize, as far as possible, the investment character of their stock,

and various expedients were adopted to accomplish this purpose. In some

cases preferred stocks were created or resulted from reorganizations,

which possest a first lien upon the assets after payment of the

obligations, and which were entitled to a certain stipulated dividend

before the common stock obtained any distribution from the earnings. In

this way the railway-managers created a compromise security which could

be regarded as a stock, and would thus provide equity from the

bondholders' point of view, and, at the same time, one which could be

disposed of to investors. In other cases, which were probably more

numerous, railway-managers attempted to give their stock an investment

value through stability of income return. In good years when the company

earned 10 or 15 per cent on its stock, their policy was to pay only 5 or

6 per cent in dividends, and hold the rest in their surplus fund in

order to have the means of paying the same dividends the next year if

only 2 or 3 per cent should be earned. By giving their stock stability

of income return they hoped and expected to give it some stability of

market price, and thus make it attractive to genuine investors. The

effect of this policy was unquestionably successful, and one after

another the stocks of our more important transportation systems and

other large undertakings passed into the hands of investors.

The successful adoption of this policy on the part of the

railway-managers and other captains of industry has had one curious

effect which was not contemplated by the originators of the movement,

and which brings us to the second influence mentioned above as having

tended to obscure the distinction between bonds and stocks. When a case

has been brought before the courts in which the contention was advanced

that the charges of the railway or public-service corporation were too

high, the courts appear to have taken the ground that stocks and bonds

should be classed together in order to determine the aggregate

capitalization of the company, and that the justice or injustice of the

contention that the charges are too high should be determined by

ascertaining whether if the charges were made lower the net earnings

would still be sufficient to pay a fair return on the total capital

invested. This is the general line of reasoning pursued by the courts,

both in the case of the Consolidated Gas Company in New York and the

Pennsylvania Railroad in Pennsylvania. The effect of this attitude on

the part of the courts has been to obscure still more greatly the real

distinction between bonds and stocks. It is too early as yet to judge

what will be the final outcome of the changed attitude toward stocks,

but it can not be doubted that the present tendency of opinion on the

subject, so far as large corporations are concerned, is to limit the

return on stocks to a strictly investment basis, instead of leaving the

stockholders free to reap all possible profit from their business

venture subject to the restraints of competition.

The adoption of this attitude by the courts should be a matter for

serious consideration on the part of present and prospective

stockholders. If the maximum return on stock is to be limited to 6 per

cent, or any fair investment basis, and charges reduced to consumers so

that they obtain the benefit of any greater earning power, it would

appear that the stockholders occupy an undesirable position. With their

possible profits limited, but with no fixt return insured to them and no

guaranty against possible loss, it can not be held that the purchase of

stock seems attractive.

These questions, however, will doubtless be settled in the long run in

justice both to the public and to the stockholders, and in the meantime

the stocks of our large and successful railway and industrial

corporations, which have attained a certain stability and permanence of

value, are entitled to consideration when investments are contemplated.

It is not worth while to lay down rules for judging the investment value

of such stocks, because the general principles advanced in the preceding

chapters will be found sufficient for a judgment of their values.

One class of stocks, however, deserves special mention. Bank and

trust-company stocks possess one characteristic in higher degree than

other classes of stock. Owing to the general practise of self-regulated

banking institutions to distribute only about one-half their earnings in

dividends and to credit the rest to surplus account, a steady rise is

assured in the book value of the stock. No other class of stock

possesses quite the same promise of appreciation in value. Bank and

trust-company stocks are especially sought by wealthy men, who can

forego something in the way of income return for the sake of increasing

the amount of their principal. The general characteristics of bank

stocks are great safety, a low rate of income, limited convertibility,

and practical certainty of appreciation in value.

With the present chapter the discussion of specific forms of investments

has come to an end. The next and concluding chapter will explain the

general principles which control the market movements of all negotiable

securities, and will endeavor to point out the indications which may be

relied upon in determining whether or not given conditions are favorable

for the purchase of securities.

IX

MARKET MOVEMENTS OF SECURITIES

There is no question connected with the investment of money more

important than the ability to judge whether general market conditions

are favorable for the purchase of securities.

After learning how to judge the value of every form of investment, a man

may still be unsuccessful in the investment of money unless he acquires

also a firm grasp upon the general principles which control the price

movements of securities. By this it is not meant that a man needs to

have an intimate knowledge of technical market conditions whereby to

estimate temporary fluctations of minor importance, but rather that he

should have clearly in mind the causes which operate to produce the

larger swings of prices. If an investor acquires such a knowledge, he is

enabled to take advantage of large price movements in such a way as

materially to increase his income, and, at the same time, avoid

carrying upon his books securities which may have cost much more than

their current market quotations. If he can recognize the indications

which point to the beginning of a pronounced upward swing in securities,

and if he can equally recognize the signs which indicate that the

movement has culminated, he can liquidate the securities which he bought

at the inception of the rise or transfer them to some short-term issues

whose near approach to maturity will render them stable in price,

allowing the downward swing to proceed without disturbing him. It is not

expected, of course, that the average business man will be able to

realize completely this ideal of investment, but it is hoped that the

following analysis will give him a clearer conception of the principles

involved.

Broadly speaking, the market movements of all negotiable securities are

controlled by two influences, sometimes acting in opposition to each

other and sometimes in concert. One of these influences is the loaning

rate of free capital; the other is the general condition of business. A

low rate of interest or the likelihood of low rates has the effect of

stimulating security prices, because banks and other money-lending

institutions are forced into the investment market when they can not

loan money to advantage. Conversely, a high rate of interest or the

prospect of high rates has the effect of depressing prices, because

banking institutions sell their securities in order to lend the money so

released. The automatic working of this process tends to produce a

constant adjustment between the yields upon free and invested capital.

When money rates are low, securities tend to advance to the point where

the return upon them is no greater than that derived from the loaning of

free capital. When rates are high, securities tend to decline to a point

where the return is as great. This explains the influence of the first

factor.

The other factor is the general condition of business. Good business

conditions, or the promise of good conditions, tend to advance security

prices, because they indicate larger earnings and a stronger financial

condition. Poor business conditions, or an unpromising outlook, have the

reverse effect.

The larger movements of security prices are always the resultant of the

interaction of these two forces. When they work together the effect is

irresistible, as when low interest rates and the prospect of good

business conditions occur together, or when high money rates occur in

the face of an indicated falling off in business activity. At such times

all classes of securities swing together. For the most part, however,

money rates and business conditions are opposed in their influence,

rates being low when business is bad and high when business is good.

Usually the worse business conditions become, the easier money grows;

while the more active business becomes, the higher money rates rise. The

effect of this antagonism between the controlling causes is to produce

movements of different proportions and sometimes in different directions

in different classes of securities. High-grade bonds may be declining,

middle-grade bonds remaining stationary, and poor bonds advancing, all

at the same time. This serves to give a very irregular appearance to the

security markets, and appears to justify the widely held opinion that

security prices are a pure matter of guesswork, and that they are

controlled only by manipulation and special influences. A clear

conception of the nature of the influences which are always silently at

work reconciles these apparent inconsistencies and makes it plain that

general price movements are determined by laws as certain in their

operation as the laws of nature.

This may be illustrated by a single example. Let us assume that interest

rates are low and business conditions bad with prospect of still lower

interest rates and still more unpromising business conditions. What will

be the effect upon different classes of securities? High-grade bonds,

such as choice municipals, whose safety can not be impaired by any

extent of depression in business, will advance because their market

price is influenced almost wholly by money rates. If their interest is

certain to be paid, no matter what business conditions may become, they

can not be greatly affected by a reduction of earnings, and consequently

the influence of low money rates is left to act practically alone.

Middle-grade bonds, such as second-class railroad issues, will remain

almost stationary, low money rates tending to advance their price and

the fear of decreased earnings tending to depress them. The lowest grade

of bonds and stocks, whose margin of security even in good times is not

very great, will probably suffer in price because the fear of default in

interest and of reduction in dividends will operate much more strongly

than the mere stimulus of low interest rates. Of course, securities can

not be clearly separated into these three classes, but shade

imperceptibly into one another. The classification is adopted only for

purposes of illustration.

Up to this point we have been concerned merely in showing that the

market movements of negotiable securities are controlled by the

influence of certain factors. A more important question now remains to

be considered, viz.: whether the effect of these two influences is to

produce general swings in prices which may be depended upon with

comparative certainty, and, if so, what indications are afforded to the

investor of the commencement or culmination of such a movement. The

answer must be that the combined effect of the two influences described

is to produce definite and regular swings in prices, and that the

indications which define the movements are not difficult to follow.

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