The embargo had lasted less than four months, when April 19 the
President at Washington was obliged to issue a proclamation announcing
that on Lake Champlain and in the adjacent country persons were
combined for the purpose of forming insurrections against the laws,
and that the military power of the government must aid in quelling
such insurrections.[195] Immense rafts of lumber were collecting near
the boundary line; and report said that one such raft, near half a
mile long, carried a ball-proof fort, and was manned by five or six
hundred armed men prepared to defy the custom-house officers. This
raft was said to contain the surplus produce of Vermont for a year
past,--wheat, potash, pork, and beef,--and to be worth upward of three
hundred thousand dollars.[196] The governor of Vermont ordered out a
detachment of militia to stop this traffic, and the governor of New
York ordered another detachment to co-operate with that of Vermont.
May 8 rumors of a battle were afloat, and of forty men killed or
wounded.[197] The stories were untrue, but the rafts escaped, the
customs officials not venturing to stop them.
Reports of this open defiance and insurrection on the Canada frontier
reached Washington at the same time with other reports which revealed
endless annoyances elsewhere. If the embargo was to coerce England
or France, it must stop supplies to the West Indian colonies, and
prevent the escape of cotton or corn for the artisans of Europe. The
embargo aimed at driving England to desperation, but not at famishing
America; yet the President found himself at a loss to do the one
without doing the other. Nearly all commerce between the States was by
coasting-vessels. If the coasting-trade should be left undisturbed,
every schooner that sailed from an American port was sure to allege
that by stress of weather or by the accidents of navigation it had
been obliged to stop at some port of Nova Scotia or the West Indies,
and there to leave its cargo. Only the absolute prohibition of the
coasting-trade could prevent these evasions; but to prohibit the
coasting-trade was to sever the Union. The political tie might remain,
but no other connection could survive. Without the coasting-trade New
England would be deprived of bread, and her industries would perish;
Charleston and New Orleans would stagnate in unapproachable solitude.
Jefferson proclaimed the existence of an insurrection on the Canadian
frontier shortly before the adjournment of Congress. Immediately after
the adjournment he took in hand the more serious difficulties of the
coasting-trade. The experiment of peaceable coercion was at last to
have full trial, and Jefferson turned to the task with energy that
seemed to his friends excessive, but expressed the vital interest he
felt in the success of a theory on which his credit as a statesman
depended. The crisis was peculiarly his own; and he assumed the
responsibility for every detail of its management.
May 6 the President wrote to Gallatin a letter containing general
directions to detain in port every coasting-vessel which could be
regarded as suspicious. His orders were sweeping. The power of the
embargo as a coercive weapon was to be learned.
“In the outset of the business of detentions,” said the
President,[198] “I think it impossible to form precise rules. After
a number of cases shall have arisen, they may probably be thrown
into groups and subjected to rules. The great leading object of the
Legislature was, and ours in execution of it ought to be, to give
complete effect to the embargo laws. They have bidden agriculture,
commerce, navigation to bow before that object,--to be nothing when
in competition with that. Finding all their endeavors at general
rules to be evaded, they finally gave us the power of detention as
the panacea; and I am clear we ought to use it freely, that we may by
a fair experiment know the power of this great weapon, the embargo.”
A few days later Jefferson repeated the warning in stronger language:
“I place immense value in the experiment being fully made, how far
an embargo may be an effectual weapon in future as well as on this
occasion.”[199]
“Where you are doubtful,” continued the instructions to Gallatin,
“consider me as voting for detention;” and every coasting-vessel
was an object of doubt. On the same day with the letter of May 6
to the Secretary of the Treasury, the President wrote a circular
to the governors of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, South Carolina,
Georgia, and Orleans,--portions of the Union which consumed more
wheat than they produced,--requesting them to issue certificates for
such quantities of flour as were likely to be needed beyond their
local supply. The certificates, directed to the collector of some
port usually exporting flour, were to be issued to “any merchant
in whom you have confidence.”[200] All other shipments of produce
were objects of suspicion. “I really think,” wrote the President
to Gallatin, “it would be well to recommend to every collector to
consider every shipment of provisions, lumber, flaxseed, tar, cotton,
tobacco, etc.,--enumerating the articles,--as sufficiently suspicious
for detention and reference here.” He framed new instructions to
the governors on this idea: “We find it necessary to consider
every vessel as suspicious which has on board any articles of
domestic produce in demand at foreign markets, and most especially
provisions.”[201]
Gallatin, having early declared his want of faith in the embargo as
a coercive measure, was the more bound to prove that his private
opinion did not prevent him from giving full trial to the experiment
which Executive and Legislature had ordered him to make. He set
himself resolutely to the unpleasant task. Instead of following
the President’s plan of indiscriminate suspicion and detention, he
preferred to limit the suspicious cargo in value, so that no vessel
could carry provisions to the amount of more than one-eighth of the
bond; but before he could put his system in force, new annoyances
arose. Governor Sullivan of Massachusetts, under the President’s
circular, issued certificates before July 15 to the amount of fifty
thousand barrels of flour and one hundred thousand bushels of corn,
besides rice and rye. Gallatin complained to the President,[202] who
instantly wrote to the governor of Massachusetts an order to stop
importing provisions:--
“As these supplies, although called for within the space of two
months, will undoubtedly furnish the consumption of your State for a
much longer time, I have thought advisable to ask the favor of your
Excellency, after the receipt of this letter, to discontinue issuing
any other certificates, that we may not unnecessarily administer
facilities to the evasion of the embargo laws.”[203]
That Massachusetts already on the brink of rebellion should tolerate
such dictation could hardly be expected; and it was fortunate for
Jefferson that the Federalists had failed to elect a governor of their
own stripe. Even Sullivan, Democrat as he was, could not obey the
President’s request, and excused his disobedience in a letter which
was intended to convince Jefferson that the people of Massachusetts
were the best judges of the amount of food they needed.
“The seaport towns,” Sullivan wrote,[204] “are supported almost
entirely by bread from the Southern and Middle States. The interior
of this State live on a mixture of Indian corn and rye in common
regimen, but their fine bread and pastry depend on the importations
from the southward, carted into the interior. The country towns
consume more imported flour than is equivalent for all the grain
they carry to market in the seaport towns. Their hogs and poultry
consume much Indian corn. The rice imported here from the southward,
since the Embargo Act, has been very inconsiderable. The Indian
corn is in greater quantities, but that would not find a market in
the British or French dominions if there was no embargo. This is an
article of great demand here, not as bread, but as sustenance for
carriage-horses, draft-horses, etc., and the quantity consumed is
really astonishing.”
Sullivan admitted that the habits of the Massachusetts people,
contracted under the royal government and still continued, led to the
evasion of commercial laws; but he told the President what would be
the result of an arbitrary interference with their supplies of food:--
“You may depend upon it that three weeks after these certificates
shall be refused, an artificial and actual scarcity will involve this
State in mobs, riots, and convulsions, pretendedly on account of
the embargo. Your enemies will have an additional triumph, and your
friends suffer new mortifications.”[205]
Governor Sullivan was a man of ability and courage. Popular
and successful, he had broken the long sway of Federalism in
Massachusetts, and within a few months had carried his re-election
against the utmost exertions of the Essex Junto; but he had seen John
Quincy Adams fall a sacrifice to the embargo, and he had no wish to
be himself the next victim of Jefferson’s theories. His situation
was most difficult, and he warned the President that the embargo was
making it worse:--
“The embargo has been popular with what is denominated the Republican
part of the State; but as it does not appear from anything that has
taken place in the European Powers that it has had the expected
effect there, it has begun to lose its support from the public
opinion.... There are judicious men in this State who are friends
to the present Administration, and who have been in favor of the
embargo as a measure of expedience which ought to have been adopted
by the government, but who now express great doubts as to the power
of enforcing it much longer under present circumstances. They do
not perceive any of the effects from it that the nation expected;
they do not perceive foreign Powers influenced by it, as they
anticipated. They are convinced, as they say, that the people of this
State must soon be reduced to suffering and poverty.... These men
consider the embargo as operating very forcibly to the subversion
of the Republican interest here. Should the measure be much longer
continued, and then fail of producing any important public good, I
imagine it will be a decisive blow against the Republican interest
now supported in this Commonwealth.”[206]
Jefferson resented Sullivan’s conduct. A few days afterward he wrote
to General Dearborn, the Secretary of War, who was then in Maine,
warning him to be ready to support the measure which Sullivan had
declined to adopt.
“Yours of July 27 is received,” Jefferson said.[207] “It confirms
the accounts we receive from others that the infractions of the
embargo in Maine and Massachusetts are open. I have removed Pope, of
New Bedford, for worse than negligence. The collector of Sullivan
is on the totter. The Tories of Boston openly threaten insurrection
if their importation of flour is stopped. The next post will stop
it. I fear your Governor [Sullivan] is not up to the tone of these
parricides, and I hope on the first symptom of an open opposition of
the law by force you will fly to the scene, and aid in suppressing
any commotion.”
Blood was soon shed, but Jefferson did not shrink. The new army
was stationed along the Canada frontier. The gunboats and frigates
patrolled the coast. On every side dangers and difficulties
accumulated. “I did not expect a crop of so sudden and rank growth of
fraud and open opposition by force could have grown up in the United
States.”[208] At Newburyport an armed mob on the wharf prevented the
custom-house officers from detaining a vessel about to sail. The
collectors and other officers were ill-disposed, or were harassed by
suits at law for illegal detentions. Rebellion and disunion stared
Jefferson in the face, but only caused him to challenge an outbreak
and to invite violence.
“That the Federalists may attempt insurrection is possible,” he wrote
to Gallatin,[209] “and also that the governor would sink before
it; but the Republican part of the State, and that portion of the
Federalists who approve the embargo in their judgments, and at any
rate would not court mob law, would crush it in embryo. I have some
time ago written to General Dearborn to be on the alert on such an
occasion, and to take direction of the public authority on the spot.
Such an incident will rally the whole body of Republicans of every
shade to a single point,--that of supporting the public authority.”
The Federalists knew when to rebel. Jefferson could teach them little
on that subject. They meant first to overthrow Jefferson himself,
and were in a fair way to gratify their wish; for the people of New
England--Republican and Federalist alike--were rapidly rallying to
common hatred of the President. As winter approached, the struggle
between Jefferson and Massachusetts became on both sides vindictive.
He put whole communities under his ban. He stopped the voyage of
every vessel “in which any person is concerned, either in interest
or in navigating her, who has ever been concerned in interest or in
the navigation of a vessel which has at any time before entered a
foreign port contrary to the views of the embargo laws, and under any
pretended distress or duress whatever.”[210] When a permit was asked
for the schooner “Caroline,” of Buckstown on the Penobscot, Jefferson
replied,--
“This is the first time that the character of the place has
been brought under consideration as an objection. Yet a general
disobedience to the laws in any place must have weight toward
refusing to give them any facilities to evade. In such a case we may
fairly require positive proof that the individual of a town tainted
with a general spirit of disobedience has never said or done anything
himself to countenance that spirit.”[211]
Jefferson went still further in his reply to a petition from the
island of Nantucket for food. “Our opinion here is that that place has
been so deeply concerned in smuggling, that if it wants it is because
it has illegally sent away what it ought to have retained for its own
consumption.”[212]
Of all the old Republican arguments for a policy of peace, the
commonest was that a standing army would be dangerous, not to foreign
enemies, but to popular liberties; yet the first use of the new army
and gunboats was against fellow-citizens. New England was chiefly
controlled by the navy; but in New York the army was needed and was
employed. Open insurrection existed there. Besides forcible resistance
offered to the law, no one was ignorant that the collectors shut
their eyes to smuggling, and that juries, in defiance of court and
President, refused to indict rioters. Governor Tompkins announced
that Oswego was in active insurrection, and called on the President
to issue a proclamation to that effect.[213] Jefferson replied by
offering to take into the United States service the militia required
to suppress the riots, and begged Governor Tompkins to lead his
troops in person. “I think it so important in example to crush these
audacious proceedings and to make the offenders feel the consequences
of individuals daring to oppose a law by force, that no effort should
be spared to compass this object.”[214]
When permission was asked to establish a packet on Lake Champlain,
“I do not think this is a time,” replied Jefferson, “for opening new
channels of intercourse with Canada and multiplying the means of
smuggling.”[215] The people who lived on the shores of Lake Champlain
might object to such interference in their affairs, but could not deny
the force of Jefferson’s reasoning. Another application of a different
kind was rejected on grounds that seemed to give to the President
general supervision over the diet of the people:--
“The declaration of the bakers of New York that their citizens will
be dissatisfied, under the present circumstances of their country,
to eat bread of the flour of their own State, is equally a libel on
the produce and citizens of the State.... If this prevails, the next
application will be for vessels to go to New York for the pippins of
that State, because they are higher flavored than the same species of
apples growing in other States.”[216]
The same sumptuary rule applied to Louisiana. “You know I have been
averse to letting Atlantic flour go to New Orleans merely that they
may have the _whitest_ bread possible.”[217]
The President seemed alone to feel this passionate earnestness on
behalf of the embargo. His Cabinet looked on with alarm and disgust.
Madison took no share in the task of enforcement. Robert Smith sent
frigates and gunboats hither and thither, but made no concealment
of his feelings. “Most fervently,” he wrote to Gallatin, “ought we
to pray to be relieved from the various embarrassments of this said
embargo. Upon it there will in some of the States, in the course of
the next two months, assuredly be engendered monsters. Would that we
could be placed on proper ground for calling in this mischief-making
busy-body.”[218] Smith talked freely, while Gallatin, whose opinion
was probably the same, said little, and labored to carry out the law,
but seemed at times disposed to press on the President’s attention the
deformities of his favorite monster.
“I am perfectly satisfied,” wrote Gallatin to the President July
29,[219] “that if the embargo must be persisted in any longer,
two principles must necessarily be adopted in order to make it
sufficient: First, that not a single vessel shall be permitted to
move without the special permission of the Executive; Second, that
the collectors be invested with the general power of seizing property
anywhere, and taking the rudders, or otherwise effectually preventing
the departure of any vessel in harbor, though ostensibly intended to
remain there,--and that without being liable to personal suits. I am
sensible that such arbitrary powers are equally dangerous and odious;
but a restrictive measure of the nature of the embargo, applied to
a nation under such circumstances as the United States, cannot be
enforced without the assistance of means as strong as the measure
itself. To that legal authority to prevent, seize, and detain, must
be added a sufficient physical force to carry it into effect; and
although I believe that in our seaports little difficulty would be
encountered, we must have a little army along the Lakes and British
lines generally.... That in the present situation of the world every
effort should be attempted to preserve the peace of this nation,
cannot be doubted; but if the criminal party-rage of Federalists
and Tories shall have so far succeeded as to defeat our endeavors
to obtain that object by the only measure that could possibly have
effected it, we must submit and prepare for war.”
“I mean generally to express an opinion,” continued the secretary,
“founded on the experience of this summer, that Congress must either
invest the Executive with the most arbitrary powers and sufficient
force to carry the embargo into effect, or give it up altogether.”
That Jefferson should permit a member of his Cabinet to suggest the
assumption of “the most arbitrary powers;” that he should tolerate
the idea of using means “equally dangerous and odious,”--seemed
incredible; but his reply showed no sign of offence. He instantly
responded,--
“I am satisfied with you that if Orders and Decrees are not repealed,
and a continuance of the embargo is preferred to war (which
sentiment is universal here), Congress must legalize all means which
may be necessary to obtain its end.”[220]
If repeated and menacing warnings from the people, the State
authorities, and officers of the national government failed to
produce an impression on the President’s mind, he was little likely
to regard what came from the Judiciary; yet the sharpest of his
irritations was caused by a judge whom he had himself, in 1804,
placed on the Supreme Bench to counteract Marshall’s influence.
Some merchants of Charleston, with consent of the collector and
district-attorney, applied for a mandamus to oblige the collector
of that town to clear certain ships for Baltimore. The collector
admitted that he believed the voyage to be intended in good faith,
and that under the Embargo Law he had no right of detention; but he
laid Secretary Gallatin’s instructions before the court. The case
was submitted without argument, and Justice William Johnson, of the
South Carolina circuit,--a native of South Carolina, and a warm friend
of the President,--decided that the Act of Congress did not warrant
detention, and that without the sanction of law the collector was
not justified by instructions from the Executive in increasing the
restraints upon commerce. The mandamus issued.
These proceedings troubled but did not check the President. “I
saw them with great concern,” he wrote to the governor of South
Carolina,[221] “because of the quarter from whence they came, and
where they could not be ascribed to any political waywardness.”
Rodney, the attorney-general, undertook to overrule Justice Johnson’s
law, and wrote, under the President’s instructions, an official
opinion that the court had no power to issue a mandamus in such a
case. This opinion was published in the newspapers at the end of July,
“an act unprecedented in the history of executive conduct,” which in
a manner forced Justice Johnson into a newspaper controversy. The
Judge’s defence of his course was temperate and apparently convincing
to himself, although five years afterward he delivered an opinion[222]
of the whole Supreme Court in a similar case, “unquestionably
inconsistent” with his embargo decision, which he then placed on
technical ground. He never regained Jefferson’s confidence; and so
effective was the ban that in the following month of December the
Georgia grand-jury, in his own circuit, made him the object of a
presentment for “improper interference with the Executive.”
If the conduct of Justice Johnson only stimulated the President’s
exercise of power, the constitutional arguments of Federalist lawyers
and judges were unlikely to have any better effect; yet to a Virginia
Republican of 1798 no question could have deeper interest than that
of the constitutionality of the embargo. The subject had already been
discussed in Congress, and had called out a difference of opinion.
There, Randolph argued against the constitutionality in a speech
never reported, which turned on the distinction between regulating
commerce and destroying it; between a restriction limited in time
and scope, and an interdict absolute and permanent. The opponents of
the embargo system, both Federalists and Republicans, took the same
ground. The Constitution, they said, empowered Congress “to _regulate_
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian tribes;” but no one ever supposed it to grant Congress
the power “to _prohibit_ commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian tribes.” Had such words been
employed, the Constitution could not have gained the vote of a single
State.
History has nothing to do with law except to record the development
of legal principles. The question whether the embargo was or was not
Constitutional depended for an answer on the decision of Congress,
President, and Judiciary, and the assent of the States. Whatever
unanimous decision these political bodies might make, no matter how
extravagant, was law until it should be reversed. No theory could
control the meaning of the Constitution; but the relation between
facts and theories was a political matter, and between the embargo
and the old Virginia theory of the Constitution no relation could be
imagined. Whatever else was doubtful, no one could doubt that under
the doctrine of State-rights and the rules of strict construction the
embargo was unconstitutional. Only by the widest theories of liberal
construction could its constitutionality be sustained.
The arguments in its favor were arguments which had been once regarded
as fatal to public liberty. The first was made by Richard M. Johnson
of Kentucky: “If we have power to lay an embargo for one day, have
we not the power to renew it at the end of that day? If for sixty
days, have we not the power to renew it again? Would it not amount
to the same thing? If we pass a law to expire within a limited term,
we may renew it at the end of that term; and there is no difference
between a power to do this, and a power to pass laws without specified
limit.”[223] This principle, if sound, might be applied to the right
of habeas corpus or of free speech, to the protection of American
manufactures or to the issue of paper money as a legal tender; and
whenever such application should be made, the Union must submit to
take its chance of the consequences sure to follow the removal of
specified limits to power. Another argument was used by David R.
Williams, a representative South Carolinian. “The embargo is not an
annihilation but a suspension of commerce,” he urged,[224] “to regain
the advantages of which it has been robbed.” If Congress had the
right to regulate commerce for such a purpose in 1808, South Carolina
seemed to have no excuse for questioning, twenty years later, the
constitutionality of a protective system. Still another argument was
used by George W. Campbell of Tennessee.
“A limited embargo,” he said,[225] “can only mean an embargo that
is to terminate at some given time; and the length of time, if a
hundred years, will not change the character of the embargo,--it is
still limited. If it be constitutional to lay it for one day, it
must be equally so to lay it for ten days or a hundred days or as
many years,--it would still be a limited embargo; and no one will,
I presume, deny that an embargo laid for such a length of time, and
one laid without limitation, would in reality and to all practical
purposes be the same.”
This reasoning was supported by an immense majority in both Houses
of Congress; was accepted as sound by the Executive, and roused
no protest from the legislature of any Southern State. So far as
concerned all these high political authorities, the principle was thus
settled that the Constitution, under the power to regulate commerce,
conferred upon Congress the power to suspend foreign commerce forever;
to suspend or otherwise regulate domestic and inter-state commerce; to
subject all industry to governmental control, if such interference in
the opinion of Congress was necessary or proper for carrying out its
purpose; and finally, to vest in the President discretionary power to
execute or to suspend the system, in whole or in part.
The Judiciary had still to be consulted. In the September Term, 1808,
an embargo case was argued at Salem before John Davis, judge of the
District Court for Massachusetts; and Samuel Dexter, the ablest
lawyer in New England, urged the constitutional objections to the
embargo with all the force that ability and conviction could give. No
sounder Federalist than Judge Davis sat on the bench; but although the
newspapers of his party were declaiming against the constitutionality
of the law, and although Chief-Justice Parsons, of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, the most eminent legal authority in the State, lent his
private influence on the same side, Judge Davis calmly laid down the
old Federalist rule of broad construction. His opinion, elaborately
argued and illustrated, was printed in every newspaper.
“Stress has been laid in argument,” he said, “on the word ‘regulate,’
as implying in itself a limitation. Power to ‘regulate,’ it is said,
cannot be understood to give a power to annihilate. To this it may
be replied that the Acts under consideration, though of very ample
extent, do not operate as a prohibition of all foreign commerce. It
will be admitted that partial prohibitions are authorized by the
expression; and how shall the degree or extent of the prohibition be
adjusted but by the discretion of the national government, to whom
the subject appears to be committed.”
In the Federalist spirit the Judge invoked the “necessary and proper”
clause, which had been the cloak for every assumption of doubtful
powers; and then passed to the doctrine of “inherent sovereignty,” the
radical line of division between the party of President Washington and
that of President Jefferson:--
“Further, the power to regulate commerce is not to be confined to
the adoption of measures exclusively beneficial to commerce itself,
or tending to its advancement; but in our national system, as in all
modern sovereignties, it is also to be considered as an instrument
for other purposes of general policy and interest. The mode of its
management is a consideration of great delicacy and importance; but
the national right or power to adapt regulations of commerce to
other purposes than the mere advancement of commerce appears to me
unquestionable.”
After drawing these conclusions from the power to regulate commerce,
the Judge went a step further, and summoned to his aid the spirits
which haunted the dreams of every true Republican,--the power of war,
and necessity of State:--
“Congress has power to declare war. It of course has power to
prepare for war; and the time, the manner, and the measure, in
the application of constitutional means, seem to be left to its
wisdom and discretion. Foreign intercourse becomes in such times a
subject of peculiar interest, and its regulation forms an obvious
and essential branch of federal administration.... It seems to have
been admitted in the argument that State necessity might justify
a limited embargo, or suspension of all foreign commerce; but if
Congress have the power, for purposes of safety, of preparation,
or counteraction, to suspend commercial intercourse with foreign
nations, where do we find them limited as to the duration more than
as to the manner and extent of the measure?”
Against this remarkable decision Dexter did not venture to appeal.
Strong as his own convictions were, he knew the character of
Chief-Justice Marshall’s law too well to hope for success at
Washington. One of Marshall’s earliest constitutional decisions
had deduced from the power of Congress to pay debts the right for
government to assume a preference over all other creditors in
satisfying its claims on the assets of a bankrupt.[226] Constructive
power could hardly go further; and the habit of mind which led to such
a conclusion would hardly shrink from sustaining Judge Davis’s law.
Yet the embargo, in spite of Executive, Legislative, Judicial, and
State authorities, rankled in the side of the Constitution. Even
Joseph Story, though in after life a convert to Marshall’s doctrines,
could never wholly reconcile himself to the legislation of 1808.
“I have ever,” he wrote, “considered the embargo a measure which went
to the utmost limit of constructive power under the Constitution.
It stands upon the extreme verge of the Constitution, being in its
very form and terms an unlimited prohibition or suspension of foreign
commerce.”[227]
That President Jefferson should exercise “dangerous and odious”
powers, carrying the extremest principles of his Federalist
predecessors to their extremest results; that he should in doing
so invite bloodshed, strain his military resources, quarrel with
the State authorities of his own party and with judges whom he
had himself made; that he should depend for constitutional law on
Federalist judges whose doctrines he had hitherto believed fatal to
liberty,--these were the first fruits of the embargo. After such an
experience, if he or his party again raised the cry of State-rights,
or of strict construction, the public might, with some foundation of
reason, set such complaints aside as factious and frivolous, and even,
in any other mouth than that of John Randolph, as treasonable.
FOOTNOTES:
[195] Proclamation of April 19, 1808; Annals of Congress, 1808-1809,
p. 580.
[196] New York Evening Post, May, 1808.
[197] National Intelligencer, May 23, 1808.
[198] Jefferson to Gallatin, May 6, 1808; Works, v. 287.
[199] Jefferson to the Secretary of the Treasury, May 15, 1808; Works,
v. 289.
[200] Jefferson to the Governors of Orleans, etc., May 6, 1808; Works,
v. 285.
[201] Jefferson to Gallatin, May 16, 1808; Gallatin’s Writings, i. 389.
[202] Gallatin to Jefferson, July 15, 1808; Gallatin’s Writings, i.
394.
[203] Jefferson to Sullivan, July 16, 1808; Works, v. 317.
[204] Sullivan to Jefferson, July 23, 1808; Jefferson MSS.
[205] Sullivan to Jefferson, July 21, 1808; Jefferson MSS.
[206] Sullivan to Jefferson, July 23, 1808; Jefferson MSS.
[207] Jefferson to Lincoln, Aug. 9, 1808; Works, v. 334.
[208] Jefferson to Gallatin, Aug. 11, 1808; Works, v. 336.
[209] Jefferson to Gallatin, Aug. 19, 1808; Works, v. 346.
[210] Jefferson to Gallatin, Dec. 7, 1808; Works, v. 396.
[211] Jefferson to Gallatin, Nov. 13, 1808; Works, v. 386.
[212] Jefferson to Levi Lincoln, Nov. 13, 1808; Works, v. 387.
[213] Gallatin to Jefferson, July 29, 1808; Gallatin’s Writings, i,
396.
[214] Jefferson to Governor Tompkins, Aug. 15, 1808; Works, v. 343.
[215] Jefferson to the Secretary of the Treasury, Sept. 9, 1808;
Works, v. 363.
[216] Jefferson to Gallatin, July 12, 1808; Works, v. 307.
[217] Jefferson to Gallatin, Sept. 9, 1808; Works, v. 363.
[218] Smith to Gallatin, Aug. 1, 1808; Adams’s Gallatin, p. 373.
[219] Gallatin to Jefferson, July 19, 1808; Gallatin’s Writings, i.
396.
[220] Jefferson to Gallatin, Aug. 11, 1808; Works, v. 336.
[221] Jefferson to Governor Pinckney, July 18, 1808; Works, v. 322.
[222] McIntyre _v._ Wood, March, 1813; 7 Cranch, p. 504.
[223] Annals of Congress, 1807-1808, p. 2091.
[224] Annals of Congress, 1807-1808, p. 2130.
[225] Annals of Congress, p. 2147.
[226] United States _v._ Fisher and others, February Term, 1805;
Cranch’s Reports, ii. 358-405.
[227] Story’s Life of Story, i. 185.