“This six months’ session has worn me down to a state of almost
total incapacity for business,” wrote President Jefferson to his
attorney-general.[178] “Congress will certainly rise to-morrow night,
and I shall leave this for Monticello on the 5th of May, to be here
again on the 8th of June.” More earnestly than ever he longed for
repose and good-will. “For myself,” he said,[179] “I have nothing
further to ask of the world than to preserve in retirement so much of
their esteem as I may have fairly earned, and to be permitted to pass
in tranquillity, in the bosom of my family and friends, the days which
yet remain to me.” He could not reasonably ask from the world more than
he had already received from it; but a whole year remained, during
which he must still meet whatever demand the world should make upon
him. He had brought the country to a situation where war was impossible
for want of weapons, and peace was only a name for passive war. He
was bound to carry the government through the dangers he had braved;
and for the first time in seven years American democracy, struck with
sudden fear of failure, looked to him in doubt, and trembled for its
hopes.
Fortunately for Jefferson’s ease, no serious opposition was made in
the Republican party to his choice of a successor. Giles and Nicholas,
who managed Madison’s canvass in Virginia, caused a caucus to be
held, January 21, at Richmond, where one hundred and twenty-three
members of the State legislature joined in nominating electors for
Madison. Randolph’s friends held another caucus, at which fifty-seven
members of the same legislature joined in nominating electors for
Monroe. To support the Virginia movement for Madison, a simultaneous
caucus was held at Washington, where, January 20, Senator Bradley of
Vermont issued a printed circular inviting the Republican members of
both Houses to consult, January 23, respecting the next Presidential
election. Bradley’s authority was disputed by Monroe’s partisans,
and only Madison’s friends, or indifferent persons, obeyed the
call. Eighty-nine senators and members attended; and on balloting,
eighty-three votes were given for Madison as President, seventy-nine
for George Clinton as Vice-President; but the names of the persons
present were never published, and the caucus itself seemed afraid of
its own action. About sixty Republican members or senators held aloof.
John Randolph and sixteen of his friends published a protest against
the caucus and its candidate:--
“We ask for energy, and we are told of his moderation. We ask for
talents, and the reply is his unassuming merit. We ask what were his
services in the cause of public liberty, and we are directed to the
pages of the ‘Federalist,’ written in conjunction with Alexander
Hamilton and John Jay, in which the most extravagant of their
doctrines are maintained and propagated. We ask for consistency as a
Republican, standing forth to stem the torrent of oppression which
once threatened to overwhelm the liberties of the country. We ask
for that high and honorable sense of duty which would at all times
turn with loathing and abhorrence from any compromise with fraud and
speculation. We ask in vain.”[180]
Jefferson had commanded the warm and undisputed regard of his
followers; Madison held no such pre-eminence. “Every able diplomatist
is not fit to be President,” said Macon. George Clinton, who had
yielded unwillingly to Jefferson, held Madison in contempt. While
Monroe set up a Virginia candidacy which the Republicans of Randolph’s
school supported, George Clinton set up a candidacy of his own, in
New York, supported by Cheetham’s “Watch-Tower,” and by a portion of
the country press. Before long, the public was treated to a curious
spectacle. The regular party candidate for the Vice-presidency became
the open rival of the regular candidate for the Presidency. Clinton’s
newspapers attacked Madison without mercy, while Madison’s friends
were electing Clinton as Madison’s Vice-president.
In this state of things successful opposition to Madison depended upon
the union of his enemies in support of a common candidate. Not only
must either Monroe or Clinton retire, but one must be able to transfer
his votes to the other; and the whole Federalist party must be induced
to accept the choice thus made. The Federalists were not unwilling;
but while they waited for the politicians of Virginia and New York to
arrange the plan of campaign, they busied themselves with recovering
control of New England, where they had been partially driven from
power. The embargo offered them almost a certainty of success.
From the first moment of the embargo, even during the secret debate of
Dec. 19, 1807, its opponents raised the cry of French influence; and so
positively and persistently was Jefferson charged with subservience to
Napoleon, that while a single Federalist lived, this doctrine continued
to be an article of his creed. In truth, Jefferson had never stood on
worse terms with France than when he imposed the embargo. He acted in
good faith when he enclosed Armstrong’s letter and Regnier’s decision
in his Embargo Message. Turreau was annoyed at his conduct, thinking
it intended to divert public anger from England to France in order to
make easier the negotiation with Rose. Instead of dictating Jefferson’s
course, as the Federalists believed, Turreau was vexed and alarmed
by it. He complained of Armstrong, Madison, and Jefferson himself.
The Embargo Message, he said, exposed the Administration in flank to
the Federalists, and gave the English envoy free play. “For me it
was a useless proof--one proof the more--of the usual awkwardness of
the Washington Cabinet, and of its falsity (_fausseté_) in regard to
France.”[181] His contempt involved equally people, Legislature, and
Executive:--
“Faithful organs of the perverse intentions of the American
people, its representatives came together before their usual time,
in accordance with the President’s views, and in their private
conversation and in their public deliberations seemed entirely to
forget the offences of England, or rather to have been never affected
by them. This temper, common to the men of all parties, proved very
evidently what was the state of popular opinion in regard to Great
Britain, against whom no hostile project will ever enter into an
American’s thoughts. The Annual Message was not calculated to inspire
energy into the honorable Congress. All these political documents from
the President’s pen are cold and colorless.”[182]
The result of Rose’s negotiation confirmed Turreau’s disgust:--
“It can be no longer doubtful that the United States, whatever insults
they may have to endure, will never make war on Great Britain unless
she attacks them. Every day I have been, and still am, met with the
objection that the decrees of the French government have changed
the disposition of the members of the Executive, and especially of
members of Congress. Both have seized this incident as a pretext to
color their cowardice (_lâcheté_), and extend it over their system of
inaction; since it is evident that however severe the measures of the
French government may have been, they weigh light in the balance when
set in opposition to all the excesses, all the outrages, that England
has permitted herself to inflict on the United States.”[183]
During the winter and spring nothing occurred to soothe Turreau’s
feelings. On the contrary, his irritation was increased by the
President’s communication to Congress of Champagny’s letter of January
15, and by the “inconceivable weakness” which made this letter public:--
“Although I could hardly have calculated on this new shock, which
has considerably weakened our political credit in the United States,
I well knew that we had lost greatly in the opinion of the Cabinet
at Washington and of its chief. After Mr. Rose’s departure,--that is
to say, about three weeks before the end of the session,--I quitted
the city for reasons of health, which were only too well founded. I
had seen Mr. Jefferson only a week before I went to take leave of
him. Perhaps I should tell your Excellency that I commonly see the
President once a week, and always in the evening,--a time when I am
sure of finding him at home, and nearly always alone. I never open
upon the chapter of politics, because it seems more proper for me to
wait for him to begin this subject, and I never wait long. At the
interview before the last I found him extremely cool in regard to the
interests of Europe and the measures of the Powers coalesced against
England. At the last interview he asked me if I had recent news from
Europe. I told him--what was true--that I had nothing official since
two months. ‘You treat us badly,’ he replied. ‘The governments of
Europe do not understand this government here. Even England, whose
institutions have most analogy with ours, does not know the character
of the American people and the spirit of its Administration,’ etc.
I answered that Great Britain having violated the law of nations in
regard to every people in succession, the nature and the difference of
their institutions mattered little to a Power which had abjured all
principles. He interrupted me to say: ‘When severe measures become
necessary we shall know how to take them, but we do not want to be
dragged into them (_y être entrainés_).’ Although this was directly
to the address of the minister of France, I thought best to avoid a
retort, and contented myself with observing that generally France gave
the example of respect for governments which sustained their dignity,
and that the object of the coalition of all the European States
against England was to constrain that Power to imitate her. The rest
of the conversation was too vague and too insignificant to be worth
remembering. Nevertheless, Mr. Jefferson repeated to me what he tells
me at nearly every interview,--that he has much love for France.”
Turreau drew the inference “that the federal government intends to-day
more than ever to hold an equal balance between France and England.”
Erskine saw matters in the same light. Neither the Frenchman nor the
Englishman, although most directly interested in the bias of President
Jefferson, reported any word or act of his which showed a wish to serve
Napoleon’s ends.
The interests of the Federalists required them to assert the
subservience of Jefferson to France. They did so in the most positive
language, without proof, and without attempting to obtain proof. Had
this been all, they would have done no worse than their opponents
had done before them; but they also used the pretext of Jefferson’s
devotion to France in order to cover and justify their own devotion to
England.
After the failure of Rose, in the month of February, to obtain further
concessions from Madison, the British envoy cultivated more closely the
friendship of Senator Pickering, and even followed his advice. As early
as March 4 he wrote to his Government on the subject,[184]--
“It is apprehended, should this Government be desirous that
hostilities should take place with England, it will not venture to
commence them, but will endeavor to provoke her to strike the first
blow. In such a case it would no doubt adopt highly irritating
measures. On this head I beg leave, but with great diffidence,
to submit the views which I have formed here, and which I find
coincide completely with those of the best and most enlightened
men of this country, and who consider her interests as completely
identified with those of Great Britain. I conceive it to be of
extreme importance in the present state of the public mind in this
nation, and especially as operated upon by the embargo, such as I
have endeavored to represent it in preceding despatches, to avoid
if possible actual warfare,--should it be practicable consistently
with the national honor, to do no more than retort upon America any
measures of insolence and injury falling short of it which she may
adopt. Such a line of conduct would, I am persuaded, render completely
null the endeavors exerted to impress upon the public mind here the
persuasion of the inveterate rancor with which Great Britain seeks the
destruction of America, and would turn their whole animosity,--goaded
on, as they would be, by the insults and injuries offered by France,
and the self-inflicted annihilation of their own commerce,--against
their own Government, and produce an entire change in the politics of
the country. A war with Great Britain would, I have no doubt, prove
ultimately fatal to this Government; but it is to be feared that the
people would necessarily rally round it at the first moment and at
the instant of danger; and an exasperation would be produced which
it might be found impossible to eradicate for a series of years.
Their soundest statesmen express to me the utmost anxiety that their
fellow-citizens should be allowed to bear the whole burden of their
own follies, and suffer by evils originating with themselves; and they
are convinced that the effects of punishment inflicted by their own
hands must ere long bring them into co-operation with Great Britain,
whilst if inflicted by hers, it must turn them perhaps irrevocably
against her.”
“The best and most enlightened men of the country,”--who “considered
her interests as completely identified with those of Great Britain,”
and who thus concerted with Canning a policy intended to bring
themselves into power as agents of Spencer Perceval and Lord
Castlereagh,--were Senator Pickering and his friends. To effect this
coalition with the British ministry Pickering exerted himself to the
utmost. Not only by word of mouth, but also by letter, he plied the
British envoy with argument and evidence. Although Rose, March 4, wrote
to Canning in the very words of the Massachusetts senator, March 13 the
senator wrote to Rose repeating his opinion:[185]--
“You know my solicitude to have peace preserved between the two
nations, and I have therefore taken the liberty to express to you my
opinion of the true point of policy to be observed by your Government
toward the United States, in case your mission prove unsuccessful;
that is, to let us alone; to bear patiently the wrongs we do
ourselves. In one word, amidst the irritations engendered by hatred
and folly, to maintain a dignified composure, and to abstain from
war,--relying on this, that whatever disposition exists to provoke,
there is none to commence a war on the part of the United States.”
To support his views Pickering enclosed a letter from Rufus King. “I
also know,” he continued, “that in the present unexampled state of
the world our own best citizens consider the interests of the United
States to be interwoven with those of Great Britain, and that our
safety depends on hers.... Of the opinions and reasonings of such men
I wish you to be possessed.” He held out a confident hope that the
embargo would end in an overthrow of the Administration, and that a
change in the head of the government would alter its policy “in a
manner propitious to the continuance of peace.” A few days afterward he
placed in Rose’s hands two letters from George Cabot. Finally, on the
eve of Rose’s departure, March 22, he gave the British envoy a letter
to Samuel Williams of London. “Let him, if you please, be the medium of
whatever epistolary intercourse may take place between you and me.”[186]
To these advances Rose replied in his usual tone of courteous
superiority:--
“I avail myself thankfully of your permission to keep that gentleman’s
[Rufus King’s] letter, which I am sure will carry high authority where
I can use it confidentially, and whither it is most important that
what I conceive to be right impressions should be conveyed. It is not
to you that I need protest that rancorous impressions of jealousy or
ill-will have never existed there; but it is to be feared that at
some time or another the extremest point of human forbearance may be
reached. Yet at the present moment there is, I think, a peculiarity of
circumstances most strange indeed, which enables the offended party
to leave his antagonist to his own suicidal devices, unless, in his
contortions under them, he may strike some blow which the other might
not be able to dissemble.”[187]
No senator of the United States could submit, without some
overpowering motive, to such patronage. That Pickering should have
invited it was the more startling because he knew better than any
other man in America the criminality of his act. Ten years before, at
a time when Pickering was himself Secretary of State, the Pennsylvania
Quaker, Dr. Logan, attempted, with honest motives, to act as an
amateur negotiator between the United States government and that of
France. In order to prevent such mischievous follies for the future,
Congress, under the inspiration of Pickering, passed a law known as
“Logan’s Act,” which still stood on the statute book:[188]--
“Every citizen of the United States, whether actually resident or
abiding within the same, or in any foreign country, who, without the
permission or authority of the government, directly or indirectly
commences or carries on any verbal or written correspondence or
intercourse with any foreign government, or any officer or agent
thereof, with an intent to influence the measures or conduct of
any foreign government, or of any officer or agent thereof, in
relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States,
or to defeat the measures of the government of the United States;
and every person ... who counsels, advises, or assists in any such
correspondence, with such intent, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than five thousand dollars, and by imprisonment during not less
than six months, nor more than three years.”
When Pickering defied fine and imprisonment under his own law, in
order to make a concert of political action with George Canning to
keep the British government steady in aggression, he believed that his
end justified his means; and he avowed his end to be the bringing of
his friends into power. For this purpose he offered himself to Canning
as the instrument for organizing what was in fact a British party in
New England, asking in return only the persistence of Great Britain in
a line of policy already adopted, which was sure to work against the
Republican rule. Pickering knew that his conduct was illegal; but he
had in his hands an excuse which justified him, as he chose to think,
in disregarding the law. He persuaded himself that Jefferson was
secretly bound by an engagement with Napoleon to effect the ruin of
England.
Then came Pickering’s master-stroke. The April election--which would
decide the political control of Massachusetts for the coming year,
and the choice of a senator in the place of J. Q. Adams--was close
at hand. February 16, the day when Rose’s negotiation broke down,
Pickering sent to Governor Sullivan of Massachusetts a letter intended
for official communication to the State legislature.[189] “I may
claim some share of attention and credit,” he began,--“that share
which is due to a man who defies the world to point, in the whole
course of a long and public life, at one instance of deception, at
a single departure from Truth.” He entered into speculations upon
the causes which had led Congress to impose the embargo. Omitting
mention of the Orders in Council, he showed that the official reasons
presented in the President’s Embargo Message were not sufficient to
justify the measure, and that some secret motive must lie hidden from
public view:--
“Has the French Emperor declared that he will have no neutrals?
Has he required that our ports, like those of his vassal States
in Europe, be shut against British commerce? Is the embargo a
substitute, a milder form of compliance, with that harsh demand,
which if exhibited in its naked and insulting aspect the American
spirit might yet resent? Are we still to be kept profoundly ignorant
of the declarations and avowed designs of the French Emperor,
although these may strike at our liberty and independence? And in
the mean time are we, by a thousand irritations, by cherishing
prejudices, and by exciting fresh resentments, to be drawn gradually
into a war with Great Britain? Why amid the extreme anxiety of the
public mind is it still kept on the rack of fearful expectation by
the President’s portentous silence respecting his French despatches?
In this concealment there is danger. In this concealment must be
wrapt up the real cause of the embargo. On any other supposition it
is inexplicable.”
Never was Jefferson’s sleight-of-hand more dexterously turned against
him than in this unscrupulous appeal to his own official language.
In all Pickering’s voluminous writings this letter stood out alone,
stamped by a touch of genius.
“By false policy,” he continued, “or by inordinate fears, our country
may be betrayed and subjugated to France as surely as by corruption.
I trust, sir, that no one who knows me will charge it to vanity
when I say that I have some knowledge of public men and of public
affairs; and on that knowledge, and with solemnity, I declare to
you that I have no confidence in the wisdom or correctness of our
public measures; that our country is in imminent danger; that it
is essential to the public safety that the blind confidence in our
rulers should cease; that the State legislatures should know the
facts and the reasons on which important general laws are founded;
and especially that those States whose farms are on the ocean and
whose harvests are gathered in every sea, should immediately and
seriously consider how to preserve them.”
To those Federalists leaders who had been acquainted with the plans
of 1804, the meaning of this allusion to the commercial States could
not be doubtful. Least of all could Pickering’s colleague in the
Senate, who had so strenuously resisted the disunion scheme, fail to
understand the drift of Pickering’s leadership. John Quincy Adams, at
whose growing influence this letter struck, had been from his earliest
recollection, through his father’s experience or his own, closely
connected with political interests. During forty years he had been the
sport of public turbulence, and for forty years he was yet to undergo
every vicissitude of political failure and success; but in the range
of his chequered life he was subjected to no other trial so severe as
that which Pickering forced him to meet. In the path of duty he might
doubtless face social and political ostracism, even in a town such as
Boston then was, and defy it. Men as good as he had done as much, in
many times and places; but to do this in support of a President whom
he disliked and distrusted, for the sake of a policy in which he had
no faith, was enough to shatter a character of iron. Fortunately for
him, his temper was not one to seek relief in half-way measures. He
had made a mistake in voting for an embargo without limit of time;
but since no measure of resistance to Europe more vigorous than the
embargo could gain support from either party, he accepted and defended
it. He attended the Republican caucus January 23, and voted for George
Clinton as President; and when Pickering flung down his challenge in
the letter of February 16, Adams instantly took it up.
Governor Sullivan naturally declined to convey Senator Pickering’s
letter to the Legislature; but a copy had been sent to George Cabot,
who caused it, March 9, to be published. The effect was violent.
Passion took the place of reason, and swept the Federalists into
Pickering’s path. Governor Sullivan published a vigorous reply, but
lost his temper in doing so, and became abusive where he should have
been cool.[190] When Pickering’s letter was received at Washington,
Adams wrote an answer,[191] which reached Boston barely in time to be
read before the election. He went over the history of the embargo;
pointed out its relation to the Orders in Council; recapitulated
the long list of English outrages; turned fiercely upon the British
infatuation of Pickering’s friends, and called upon them to make their
choice between embargo and war:--
“If any statesman can point out another alternative I am ready
to hear him, and for any practicable expedient to lend him every
possible assistance. But let not that expedient be submission to
trade under British licenses and British taxation. We are told
that even under these restrictions we may yet trade to the British
dominions, to Africa and China, and with the colonies of France,
Spain, and Holland. I ask not how much of this trade would be left
when our intercourse with the whole continent of Europe being cut off
would leave us no means of purchase and no market for sale. I ask not
what trade we could enjoy with the colonies of nations with which
we should be at war. I ask not how long Britain would leave open
to us avenues of trade which even in these very Orders of Council
she boasts of leaving open as a special indulgence. If we yield the
principle, we abandon all pretence to national sovereignty.”
Thus the issue between a British and American party was sharply
drawn. Governor Sullivan charged Pickering with an attempt to
excite sedition and rebellion, and to bring about a dissolution
of government. Adams made no mention of his colleague’s name. In
Massachusetts the modern canvass was unknown; newspapers and pamphlets
took the place of speeches; the pulpit and tavern bar were the only
hustings; and the public opinions of men in high official or social
standing weighed heavily. The letters of Pickering, Sullivan, and
Adams penetrated every part of the State, and on the issues raised by
them the voters made their choice.
The result showed that Pickering’s calculation on the embargo
was sound. He failed to overthrow Governor Sullivan, who won his
re-election by a majority of some twelve hundred in a total vote of
about eighty-one thousand; but the Federalists gained in the new
Legislature a decided majority, which immediately elected James
Lloyd to succeed J. Q. Adams in the Senate, and adopted resolutions
condemning the embargo. Adams instantly resigned his seat. The
Legislature chose Lloyd to complete the unfinished term.
Thus the great State of Massachusetts fell back into Federalism.
All, and more than all, that Jefferson’s painful labors had gained,
his embargo in a few weeks wasted. Had the evil stopped there no
harm need have been feared; but the reaction went far beyond that
point. The Federalists of 1801 were the national party of America;
the Federalists of 1808 were a British faction in secret league with
George Canning.
The British government watched closely these events. Rose’s offensive
and defensive alliance with Timothy Pickering and with the Washington
representatives of the Essex Junto was not the only tie between
Westminster and Boston. Of all British officials, the one most
directly interested in American politics was Sir James Craig, then
Governor of Lower Canada, who resided at Quebec, and had the strongest
reason to guard against attack from the United States. In February,
1808, when the question of peace or war seemed hanging on the fate
of Rose’s mission, Sir James Craig was told by his secretary, H. W.
Ryland, that an Englishman about to visit New England from Montreal
would write back letters as he went, which might give valuable hints
in regard to the probable conduct of the American government and
people. The man’s name was John Henry; and in reporting his letters to
Lord Castlereagh as they arrived, Sir James Craig spoke highly of the
writer:--
“Mr. Henry is a gentleman of considerable ability, and, I believe,
well able to form a correct judgment on what he sees passing. He
resided for some time in the United States, and is well acquainted
with some of the leading people of Boston, to which place he was
called very suddenly from Montreal, where he at present lives, by
the intelligence he received that his agent there was among the
sufferers by the recent measures of the American government. He
has not the most distant idea that I should make this use of his
correspondence, which therefore can certainly have no other view
than that of an unreserved communication with his friend who is my
secretary.”[192]
Sir James Craig had something to learn in regard to volunteer
diplomatists of Henry’s type; but being in no way responsible for the
man, he read the letters which came addressed to Ryland, but which
were evidently meant for the Governor of Canada, and proved to be
worth his reading. The first was written March 2, from Swanton in
Vermont, ten miles from the Canada border:--
“You will have learned that Congress has passed a law prohibiting
the transport of any American produce to Canada, and the collector
at this frontier post expects by this day’s mail instructions to
carry it into rigorous execution. The sensibility excited by this
measure among the inhabitants in the northern part of Vermont is
inconceivable. The roads are covered with sleighs, and the whole
country seems employed in conveying their produce beyond the line
of separation. The clamor against the Government--and this measure
particularly--is such that you may expect to hear of an engagement
between the officers of government and the sovereign people on the
first effort to stop the introduction of that vast quantity of lumber
and produce which is prepared for the Montreal market.”
From Windsor in Vermont, March 6, Henry wrote again, announcing that
the best-informed people believed war to be inevitable between the
United States and England. From Windsor Henry went on to Boston,
where he found himself at home. Acquainted with the best people, and
admitted freely into society,[193] he heard all that was said. March
10, when he had been not more than a day or two in Boston, he wrote
to Ryland, enclosing a Boston newspaper of the same morning, in which
Senator Pickering’s letter to Governor Sullivan appeared and the
approaching departure of Rose was announced. Already he professed to
be well-advised of what was passing in private Federalist councils.
“The men of talents, property, and influence in Boston are resolved
to adopt without delay every expedient to avert the impending
calamity, and to express their determination not to be at war
with Great Britain in such a manner as to indicate resistance to
the government in the last resort.... Very active, though secret,
measures are taken to rouse the people from the lethargy which if
long continued must end in their subjection to the modern Attila.”
March 18 Henry wrote again, announcing that the fear of war had
vanished, and that Jefferson meant to depend upon his embargo and a
system of irritation:--
“It is, however, to be expected that the evil will produce its own
cure, and that in a few months more of suffering and privation of
all the benefits of commerce the people of the New England States
will be ready to withdraw from the confederacy, establish a separate
government, and adopt a policy congenial with their interests and
happiness. For a measure of this sort the men of talents and property
are now ready, and only wait until the continued distress of the
multitude shall make them acquainted with the source of their misery,
and point out an efficient remedy.”
These letters, immediately on their receipt at Quebec, were enclosed
by Sir James Craig to Lord Castlereagh in a letter marked “Private,”
dated April 10, and sent by the Halifax mail, as the quickest mode
of conveyance.[194] Meanwhile Henry completed his business in Boston
and returned to Montreal, where he arrived April 11, and three days
afterward wrote again to Ryland at Quebec:--
“I attended a private meeting of several of the principal characters
in Boston, where the questions of _immediate_ and _ultimate_
necessity were discussed. In the first, all agreed that memorials
from all the towns (beginning with Boston) should be immediately
transmitted to the Administration, and a firm determination expressed
that they will not co-operate in a war against England. I distributed
several copies of a memorial to that effect in some of the towns
in Vermont on my return. The measure of ultimate necessity which I
suggested I found in Boston some unwillingness to consider. It was
‘that in case of a declaration of war the State of Massachusetts
should treat separately for itself, and obtain from Great Britain a
guaranty of its integrity.’ Although it was not deemed necessary to
decide on a measure of this sort at this moment, it was considered
as a very probable step in the last resort. In fine, every man whose
opinion I could ascertain was opposed to a war, and attached to the
cause of England.”
That Henry reported with reasonable truth the general character of
Federalist conversation was proved by the nearly simultaneous letters
of Pickering to Rose; but his activity did not stop there. In a final
letter of April 25 he gave a more precise account of the measures to
be taken:--
“In my last I omitted to mention to you that among the details of the
plan for averting from the Northern States the miseries of French
alliance and friendship, individuals are selected in the several
towns on the seaboard and throughout the country to correspond and
act in concert with the superintending committee at Boston. The
benefits of any organized plan over the distinct and desultory
exertions of individuals are, I think, very apparent. Whether this
confederacy of the men of talents and property be regarded as a
diversion of the power of the nation, as an efficient means of
resistance to the general government in the event of a war, or the
nucleus of an English party that will soon be formidable enough to
negotiate for the friendship of Great Britain, it is in all respects
very important; and I have well-founded reason to hope that a few
months more of suffering and the suspension of everything collateral
to commerce will reconcile the multitude to any men and any system
which will promise them relief.”
May 5 the second part of Henry’s correspondence was forwarded by Sir
James Craig to Lord Castlereagh, who could compare its statements with
those of Pickering, and with the reports of Rose. The alliance between
the New England Federalists and the British Tories was made. Nothing
remained but to concentrate against Jefferson the forces at their
command.
FOOTNOTES:
[178] Jefferson to Rodney, April 24, 1808; Works, v. 275.
[179] Jefferson to Monroe, March 10, 1808; Works, v. 253.
[180] Address to the People of the United States, National
Intelligencer, March 7, 1808.
[181] Turreau to Champagny, May 20, 1808; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[182] Turreau to Champagny, May 20, 1808; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[183] Turreau to Champagny, May 20, 1808; Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
[184] Rose to Canning, March 4, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
[185] Pickering to Rose, March 13, 1808; New England Federalism, p.
366.
[186] Pickering to G. H. Rose, March 22, 1808; New England Federalism,
p. 368.
[187] G. H. Rose to Pickering, March 18, 1808; New England Federalism,
p. 367
[188] Rev. Stat. sec. 5335. Cf. Act of Jan. 30, 1799; Annals of
Congress, 1797-1799, p. 3795.
[189] Letter from the Hon. Timothy Pickering to His Excellency James
Sullivan (Boston, 1808).
[190] Interesting Correspondence (Boston, 1808).
[191] Letter to the Hon. Harrison Gray Otis, by John Quincy Adams
(Boston, 1808).
[192] Sir J. H. Craig to Lord Castlereagh, April 10, 1808; MSS.
British Archives.
[193] Quincy’s Life of Josiah Quincy, p. 250.
[194] Sir James Craig to Lord Castlereagh, April 10, 1808; MSS.
British Archives, Lower Canada, vol. cvii.