December 22 Jefferson signed the Embargo Act; four days afterward
George Rose arrived at Norfolk. The avowed object of his mission
was to offer satisfaction for the attack upon the “Chesapeake;” the
true object could be seen only in the instructions with which he was
furnished by Canning.[141]
These instructions, never yet published, began by directing that in
case any attempt should be made to apply the President’s proclamation
of July 2 to Rose’s frigate, the “Statira,” he should make a formal
protest, and if the answer of the American government should be
unsatisfactory, or unreasonably delayed, he should forthwith return
to England. Should no such difficulty occur, he was on arriving at
Washington to request an audience of the President and Secretary of
State, and to announce himself furnished with full powers to enter into
negotiation on the “Chesapeake” affair, but forbidden to entertain any
proposition on any other point.
“With respect to that object, you will express your conviction that
the instructions under which you act would enable you to terminate
your negotiation amicably and satisfactorily. But you will state
that you are distinctly instructed, previously to entering into
any negotiation, to require the recall of the proclamation of the
President of the United States, and the discontinuance of the measures
which have been adopted under it.”
After explaining that the disavowal and recall of Admiral Berkeley had
taken away the excuse for interdicting free communication with British
ships, and that thenceforward the interdict became an aggression,
Canning directed that if the request be refused, Rose should declare
his mission at an end; but supposing the demand to be satisfied, he was
to disavow at once the forcible attack on the “Chesapeake.”
“You will state further that Admiral Berkeley has been recalled from
his command for having acted in an affair of such importance without
authority. You will add that his Majesty is prepared to discharge
those men who were taken by this unauthorized act out of the American
frigate; reserving to himself the right of reclaiming such of them
as shall prove to have been deserters from his Majesty’s service, or
natural-born subjects of his Majesty; and further, that in order to
repair as far as possible the consequences of an act which his Majesty
disavows, his Majesty is ready to secure to the widows and orphans
(if such there be) of such of the men who were unfortunately killed
on board the ‘Chesapeake’ as shall be proved not to have been British
subjects, a provision adequate to their respective situation and
condition in life.”
This disavowal, and the removal of Berkeley from command, were to be
the limit of concession. The circumstances of provocation under which
Berkeley had acted, greatly extenuated his procedure; “and his Majesty
therefore commands me to instruct you peremptorily to reject any
further mark of his Majesty’s displeasure toward Admiral Berkeley.”
The remainder of Canning’s instructions admits of no abridgment:--
“You will next proceed to state that after this voluntary offer
of reparation on his Majesty’s part, his Majesty expects that the
Government of the United States will be equally ready to remove
those causes of just complaint which have led to this unfortunate
transaction.
“His Majesty requires this, not only as a due return for the
reparation which he has thus voluntarily tendered, but as
indispensable to any well-founded expectation of the restoration and
continuance of that harmony and good understanding between the two
governments which it is equally the interest of both to cultivate and
improve.
“However much his Majesty may regret the summary mode of redress which
has been resorted to in the present instance, it cannot be supposed
that his Majesty is prepared to acquiesce in an injury so grievous to
his Majesty as the encouragement of desertion from his naval service.
“The extent to which this practice has been carried is too notorious
to require illustration; but the instance of the ‘Chesapeake’ itself
is sufficient to justify the demand of adequate satisfaction.
“The protestation of Commodore Barron is contradicted in the face of
the world by the conviction and confession of one of those unhappy men
who had been seduced from his allegiance to his Majesty, and to whom
Commodore Barron had promised his protection.
“His Majesty, however, does not require any proceeding of severity
against Commodore Barron; but he requires a formal disavowal of that
officer’s conduct in encouraging deserters from his Majesty’s service,
in retaining them on board his ship, and in denying the fact of their
being there; and he requires that this disavowal shall be such as
plainly to show that the American government did not countenance such
proceedings, and to deter any officer in their service from similar
misconduct in future.
“He requires a disavowal of other flagrant proceedings,--detailed in
papers which have been communicated to you,--unauthorized, his Majesty
has no doubt, but with respect to which it ought to be known to the
world that the American government did not authorize and does not
approve them.
“You will state that such disavowals, solemnly expressed, would
afford to his Majesty a satisfactory pledge on the part of the
American government that the recurrence of similar causes will not
on any occasion impose on his Majesty the necessity of authorizing
those means of force to which Admiral Berkeley has resorted without
authority, but which the continued repetition of such provocations as
unfortunately led to the attack upon the ‘Chesapeake’ might render
necessary, as a just reprisal on the part of his Majesty.
“And you will observe, therefore, that if the American government is
animated by an equally sincere desire with that which his Majesty
entertains to preserve the relations of peace between the two
countries from being violated by the repetition of such transactions,
they can have no difficulty in consenting to make these disavowals.
“This consent is to be the express and indispensable condition of your
agreeing to reduce into an authentic and official form the particulars
of the reparation which you are instructed to offer.”
Rose came, not to conciliate, but to terrify. His apology was a
menace. So little was the President prepared for such severity, that
from the moment of his consent to treat the “Chesapeake” affair by
itself he rather regarded the mission and reparation as a formality.
So completely had Monroe been beguiled by Canning’s courteous manners,
that no suspicion of the truth crossed his mind or crept into his
despatches. No prominent American, except Giles, ventured to hint that
this mission of peace and friendship was intended only to repeat the
assertion of supremacy which had led to the original offence.
George Henry Rose was chiefly remembered as the father of Lord
Strathnairn; but his merits were quite different from those of his son.
Without the roughness which sometimes marked English character, Rose’s
manners betrayed a dignified and slightly patronizing courteousness,--a
certain civil condescension,--impressive to Americans of that day,
who rarely felt at ease in the presence of an Englishman, or were
quite certain that an American gentleman knew the habits of European
society. Benevolent superiority and quiet assumption, so studied as
to be natural and simple, were the social weapons with which George
Rose was to impose an unparalleled indignity on a government which, in
professing contempt for forms, invited discourtesies. No man could have
been chosen with qualities better suited for enforcing Canning’s will
on the yielding moods of Jefferson.
Rose’s first act after arriving in Hampton Roads was to notify the
President that he could not land until assured that the proclamation of
July 2 would not be enforced against his ship. Canning had been already
officially informed that the proclamation expressly excepted vessels on
a service like that of the “Statira,” as he might have seen for himself
by a moment’s inquiry; but his instructions were written to suit the
temper of Tory constituents. Rose was obliged to wait from December
26 until January 9 before leaving his ship, while messengers carried
explanations and notes between Norfolk and Washington.
Monroe, who sailed from England a day later than Rose, reached
Washington December 22. Rose arrived only January 14. January 16 he
was received by the President, and made no complaint of the mode of
reception. In the four years that had passed since Merry’s arrival,
Jefferson had learned to be less strict in Republican etiquette; but
although Rose suffered no indignity at the White House, he found
much to disapprove in the government. January 17, in a despatch to
Canning, he mentioned that Congress contained one tailor, one weaver,
six or seven tavern-keepers, four notorious swindlers, one butcher,
one grazier, one curer of hams, and several schoolmasters and Baptist
preachers.[142]
The most aristocratic American of the twentieth century will probably
agree with the most extreme socialist in admitting that Congress, in
1808, might with advantage have doubled its proportion of tailors,
butchers, and swindlers, if by doing so it could have lessened the
number of its conspirators. To the latter class belonged Senator
Pickering, whose power for mischief and whose appetite for intrigue
combined to make him a valuable ally for Rose. Within forty-eight
hours after Rose’s arrival, the senator from Massachusetts had fallen
under the fascination of the British envoy’s manners and conversation.
January 18 he wrote to his nephew Timothy Williams,[143]--
“I now take up my pen merely to mention an unexpected interview with
Mr. Rose. I met him last Saturday [January 16] at Georgetown, at the
table of Mr. Peter, whose lovely wife is a granddaughter of Mrs.
Washington. Mr. Rose’s face is indicative of a placid temper, and his
conversation confirms it. He possesses good sense and a disposition
perfectly conciliatory. Such also is the disposition of the minister,
Canning, by whom he was selected for this mission. Canning was his
school-fellow and intimate friend. It seemed to me a sort of friendly
compulsion that sent him hither. It was a sacrifice for a domestic
man who left a wife and seven children behind him, and from whom
he had never before been separated. Thus much I gathered from his
conversation with me, which was marked with ease and candor; indeed
with singular openness, as if I had been an old acquaintance. He
expressed his surprise that the real state of the negotiation with
Mr. Monroe had not become officially known to the people by an open
communication to Congress. No minister of Great Britain, he observed,
would have used such concealment as existed here. He manifested
a solicitude even to anxiety for a pacific adjustment of all our
differences. What our Government will demand as a reparation for
the attack on the ‘Chesapeake’ I do not know, nor what Mr. Rose is
authorized to concede; but I run no hazard in saying that nothing
in reality will be denied, and that if after all a war with England
should ensue, the fault will be our own.”
In giving this account of Rose’s singular openness and candor, Senator
Pickering did not repeat his own remarks in the conversation; but they
could be inferred from the rest of his letter.
“I wrote last week to Mr. Cabot that I had the best authority
for saying that our Government had abandoned the ground taken in
London,--to treat of the ‘Chesapeake’ affair only in connection with
the old subjects of dispute. They have now determined to negotiate on
this separately, and even say that it is an affair by itself and ought
to be so treated. Perhaps they may demand that Admiral Berkeley be
brought to a British court-martial,--that at any rate he be removed
from command; and that the three rascals of deserters who remain
unhung should be restored.
“_Confidence_ now seems to be in Mr. Jefferson’s hands as effectual
in producing a compliance with his recommendations as soldiers in
the hands of Bonaparte in procuring submission to his commands. With
the like implicit, blind confidence which enacted the Embargo, the
legislatures of Virginia and Maryland have approved it. To this day
if you ask any member of Congress the cause and the object of the
Embargo, he can give no answer which common-sense does not spurn at.
I have reason to believe that Mr. Jefferson expected to get some
credit for it by having it ready just in time to meet the retaliating
order of England for Napoleon’s decree of Nov. 21, 1806. With much
solicitude he, two or three weeks ago, expressed his wonder that it
did not arrive, apparently desiring it as a material justification
with the people for the Embargo. He will doubtless be utterly
disappointed.”
That Jefferson in recommending the Embargo had the Orders in Council
in his mind was therefore known to Pickering,[144] and was the general
talk of Federalists in Washington during the month which followed the
Embargo Act; but the orders themselves reached America only the day
after this letter was written, and were published in the “National
Intelligencer” of January 22. In full view of the official command that
American trade with Europe should pass through British ports and pay
duty to the British Treasury, doubt as to the wisdom of an Embargo
seemed at an end. No further dispute appeared possible except on the
question whether or when the Embargo should be raised in order to
declare war. Already, January 11, Senator Adams offered a Resolution
for appointing a committee to consider and report when the Embargo
could be taken off and vessels permitted to arm; but the Senate
silently rejected the Resolution, January 21, by a vote of seventeen to
ten.[145] Neither decision nor debate on so serious a point could be
profitably undertaken before the result of Rose’s diplomacy should be
revealed.
Saturday, January 16, before meeting Senator Pickering at dinner, Rose
had delicately explained to Madison that the President’s “Chesapeake”
proclamation was likely to prove a stumbling-block. In conversations
which consumed another week he urged its withdrawal, while Madison
replied that the exclusion of British ships was not a punishment but
a precaution, that the “Leopard’s” attack was but one of its causes,
and that it was a measure taken in the interests of peace. Argument
against Canning’s positive instructions answered no purpose. Rose could
not give way, and when he had been one week in Washington, January 21,
the negotiation was already at a stand-still. There it would under any
other Administration have been permitted to remain. Rose had come to
offer an apology and to restore the captured seamen. He had only to do
this and go home.
Rose, after an interview with the Secretary of State about January 21,
waited until January 27 before writing to Canning. Then he resumed his
story:[146]--
“Within a few hours after my last conference with Mr. Madison, an
indirect and confidential communication was made to me from one of
the members of the Government to the following purport: that the real
difficulty as to the recall of the proclamation was that of finding
grounds upon which the President could found his declared motives for
such a measure without exposing himself to the charge of inconsistency
and disregard of the national honor, and without compromising his
own personal weight in the State; that it was earnestly wished that
I could make, as it were, a bridge over which he might pass; and
that I would develop just so much of the tenor of my instructions
as to the conditions of reparation as might justify him in the
course which I required should be taken; that should however this
be impossible, and should the negotiation fail, the United States
would not commence war with Great Britain, but would continue their
Embargo, and adopting a sort of Chinese policy would shut themselves
up from the rest of the world; that if we attacked them they would
sally out just far enough to repel us, and would invade Canada....
Communications of a similar nature were repeated to me on subsequent
days; and it did not seem advisable to address Mr. Madison in writing
until the utmost point to which they would go was ascertained. At
length I had a conversation with the gentleman in question. He avowed
to me that what had passed was with the knowledge of the President,
whose difficulty arose from the sacrifice of public opinion which he
apprehended must follow from the abandonment of the proclamation. He
said I must be aware how dear to Mr. Jefferson his popularity must be,
and especially at the close of his political career, and that this
consideration must be held particularly in view by him; and he pressed
me earnestly to take such steps as would conciliate the President’s
wish to give his Majesty satisfaction on the point in question and
yet to maintain the possession of what was pre-eminently valuable
to him. He expressed his own personal anxiety for the accommodation
of the present difference,--an anxiety heightened by his knowledge
that the United States had forever lost all hope of obtaining the
Floridas, the negotiation for them having totally failed, and by his
intimate persuasion that France is the dormant owner of them. He
said, moreover, that since America could not obtain those provinces,
he sincerely wished to see them in the hands of Great Britain, whose
possession of them could never be anxious to the United States.”
The supplications of this Cabinet minister were reinforced by
entreaties from leading Federalists, who begged Rose not to follow
a course which would aid the President in rousing popular feeling
against England; but the British envoy could yield only so far as not
to break the negotiation abruptly. January 26 he wrote to the Secretary
a note, in courteous language announcing himself authorized to express
the conviction--which he certainly could not have felt--that if the
proclamation were withdrawn, he should be able “to terminate the
negotiation amicably and satisfactorily.” Madison sent no answer to the
note, but kept the negotiation alive by private interviews. January
29 Rose suggested the idea of his friendly return to England with a
representation of the difficulty. Madison reported this suggestion to
the President, who on the following Monday, February 1, decided against
the idea, preferring to yield the point of dignity so far as to offer a
recall of the proclamation, conditional upon an informal disclosure by
Rose of the terms in which the atonement would be made.[147]
Throughout this tortuous affair Rose stood impassive. He made no
advance, offered no suggestion of aid, showed no anxiety. Republicans
and Federalists crowded about him with entreaties and advice. Rose
listened in silence. Amateur diplomacy never showed its evils more
plainly than in the negotiation with Rose; and when Madison allowed
the President to take the affair into his own hands, employing another
Cabinet officer to do what no Secretary of State could permit himself
to undertake, the nuisance became a scandal. In the despatch of January
27 Rose concealed the name of the deputy Secretary of State; but in a
despatch of February 6 he revealed it:--
“I should here add that a member of the Cabinet (the Secretary of the
Navy), who informed me that all his communications with me were with
the President’s knowledge, assures me that a rupture with France is
inevitable and at hand.”
That Robert Smith acted in the matter as negotiator for the President
was afterward made known by Jefferson himself.[148]
Jefferson clung with touching pathos to the love and respect of his
fellow-citizens, who repaid his devotion with equal attachment; but
many an American President who yearned no less passionately for the
people’s regard would have died an outcast rather than have trafficked
in their dignity and his own self-respect in order to seek or save a
personal popularity. Perhaps Jefferson never knew precisely what was
said of him by his Secretary of the Navy,--a passing remark by such a
man as Robert Smith, repeated through such a medium as George Rose,
need count for little; but the truth must be admitted that in 1808--for
the first and probably for the last time in history--a President of the
United States begged for mercy from a British minister.
In obedience to the President’s decision, Madison yielded to the
British demand on condition that the Executive should not be exposed
to the appearance of having yielded.[149] He arranged with Rose the
“bridge” which Robert Smith had previously prepared for the President
to cross. In a “secret and confidential” despatch dated Feb. 6, 1808,
Rose explained to Canning, with evident uneasiness, the nature of the
new proposal:[150]--
“The proposition made to me by Mr. Madison at the close of our
conference of yesterday was that he should put into my hands a
proclamation recalling the original proclamation, sealed and signed by
the President, bearing date on the day of adjustment of differences,
and conceived in such terms as I should agree to; that on this
being done we should proceed to sign the instruments adjusting the
reparation. I answered that positive as my instructions were to the
effect I had invariably stated to him, such was the knowledge I had
of the disposition of his Majesty’s government to act with the utmost
conciliation toward this country that I would attempt the experiment,
but premising distinctly that it must be made unofficially through
the whole of it, and with the assurance of our mutual good faith
to that effect; and that as it must be completely and essentially
informal,--for the purpose of getting over difficulties which appeared
insuperable in any other way,--it must be distinctly understood that
if the attempt failed, the regular and official communication must be
resumed on my explanatory note of January 26, and on that alone.”
In the defence which Rose offered for thus disregarding his
instructions, the cause of his embarrassment was plain. Duty required
him to act as though England had hitherto endured with magnanimity
the wrongs inflicted by America, but might find herself obliged soon
to resent them. This attitude could have been maintained against
ordinary forms of diplomacy, but Rose found himself stifled in the
embraces of men whose hatred was necessary to warrant his instructions.
He would gladly have assumed that Madison’s concessions and Robert
Smith’s cajoleries were treacherous; but his Federalist friends, whose
interests were actively English, assured him that if America could
avoid a war with England, she would inevitably drift into a war with
France. The temptation to show equal courtesy to that which was shown
to him, the instinctive shrinking from a harsh act, the impossibility
of obeying instructions without putting himself in the wrong, and
finally perhaps an incapacity to understand the full humiliation
implied in his unrevealed demands,--led him to give way, and to let
Madison partially into the secret of Canning’s instructions.
On the evening of February 5 Rose and Erskine went to the house of
the Secretary, and a draft of the proposed proclamation was there
offered to them and accepted. The next day, at the Department, Rose
delicately began to reveal the further disavowals he was instructed to
demand. Even then he seemed ashamed to betray the whole, but delayed
and discussed, knowing that he had done too much or too little for the
objects of his mission. Not until after repeated interviews did he at
last, February 14, mention “with an apology for omitting it before,
when he intended to do it,” that a disavowal of Commodore Barron would
be required.[151]
So cautious was Madison on his side that he offered to make a part of
the required disavowals, provided these should be mutual. Rose declined
this offer, but proposed nothing more, and seemed rather to invite a
friendly failure of agreement. He ended the conversation of February
14 by addressing to Madison the usual words of rupture: “I will not
dissemble that I leave you with the most painful impressions.”[152]
February 16 Madison closed these informal interviews with the dry
remark that the United States could not be expected to “make as it were
an expiatory sacrifice to obtain redress, or beg for reparation.”[153]
The delay had strengthened Rose by weakening the President. The embargo
was beginning to work. That the people should long submit to it was
impossible, reported Rose; even North Carolina was turning against it.
Monroe’s influence made itself felt.
“I learn this day,” wrote the British envoy February 17, “that Mr.
Monroe has been indefatigable in representing through Virginia the
contrasted systems of Great Britain and France in their true lights,
the certain destruction which must result to America from the
prevalence of the latter, and the necessity of uniting for existence
with the former. He has undoubtedly acquired a very strong party in
that State,--it is now said a decided majority in its legislature, and
one entirely brought over to the views above enounced.”
February 22, only a few days after the rupture of negotiation,
the Milan Decree arrived, and was published in the “National
Intelligencer.” This violent act of Napoleon did much to divert popular
indignation from England. Under the influence of this good fortune,
Rose so little feared war as a consequence of his failure that he
speculated rather as to the policy of accepting the United States as an
ally:
“It would certainly be highly desirable,” he wrote,[154] “that a
rupture between France and America should take place; but the latter
under its present Constitution and Administration could take but a
very feeble part in the warfare, and I know not if it is to be wished
that it should be roused to greater exertions, which must lead to a
more efficient form of government, a knowledge of its strength, and
the development of extensive views of ambition.”
Nothing remained but to revert to Rose’s note of January 26, and to
close the affair by a formal correspondence. No further attempt was
made to conciliate the British envoy, or to obtain concessions from
him; but February 24 he was told by Madison of two steps to be taken
by the Government which bore on his negotiation. The President would
recommend to Congress an increase of the army to ten thousand men,
and a levy of twenty-four thousand volunteers. Madison added that
these were to be considered as “measures of preparation, but not as
leading to war, or as directed against any particular nation.” The
Secretary added that an order had been issued to discharge all British
subjects from national ships,--“an act of complaisance in its effects
which he observed Great Britain could lay no claim to; which was done
gratuitously, but from views of policy and fitness entertained by this
Government.”
March 5 Madison at last sent his reply to Rose’s note of January
26. After repeating the reasons which forbade a withdrawal of the
President’s proclamation, the Secretary closed by informing Rose that
the President “has authorized me, in the event of your disclosing the
terms of reparation which you believe will be satisfactory, and on
its appearing that they are so, ... to proceed to concert with you a
revocation of that act.”[155] Rose waited till March 17, as though
hoping for some further overture, but finally replied, “It is with the
most painful sensations of regret that I find myself ... under the
necessity of declining to enter into the terms of negotiation which by
direction of the President you therein offer.”[156]
Rose’s professions of regret were doubtless sincere. Apart from
the wish felt by every young diplomatist to avoid the appearance
of failure, Rose could not but see that his Government must wish
to be relieved of the three American seamen imprisoned at Halifax,
whose detention, admitted to be an act of violence, must become
a festering sore in the relations of the two countries. That the
American government meant to profit by it was evident. By leaving
the “Chesapeake” affair unsettled, Rose played into the hands of a
national party. For the first time since 1794 language began to be
used to a British minister in the United States which he could not
hear without loss of dignity or sense of discredit. The word “war” was
semi-officially pronounced.
When on Monday, March 21, Rose made his parting visits, he found
the President silent; the Secretary of State studiously avoided all
political topics, while if Rose’s report was accurate, Gallatin and
Robert Smith talked with intentional freedom.
“Mr. Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, has little influence in
the Government, though by far the ablest and best informed member of
it; and he probably does not interfere materially beyond the limits
of his own department; but his utility in that department, in which
no adequate successor to him is contemplated, is such that, as they
feel they cannot do without him, they are anxious to retain him at
the head of it, and consequently are obliged to keep him informed of
their proceedings.... Mr. Gallatin said at once and spontaneously
that _nothing_ of real difficulty remained between the two countries
but his Majesty’s Orders in Council. This he repeated twice, dwelling
upon the word ‘nothing’ with particular emphasis. He added that if the
belligerent Powers persisted in enforcing their restrictions on the
neutral commerce, the embargo must be continued until the end of the
year, and that then America must take part in the war; that England
had officially declared that she would revoke the restrictions she
had imposed if her enemy would do the same; but that though France
had professed as much, she had neither done it to the minister of
the United States at Paris nor directly to this Government; neither
had she made any communication to it of her restrictive edicts,
or relative to them; and that this Government felt sensibly the
difference of the conduct held toward it by those of Great Britain and
France in those respects.”[157]
Gallatin’s assertion that if the Orders in Council were enforced
America within a year must declare war, went far beyond any threat ever
made before by President Jefferson or his party. The Secretary of the
Navy held a somewhat different tone:--
“Mr. Smith told me that all would remain quiet if no new vexations
were committed on their coast, and that the only measure which the
Government would carry into effect would be the levy of the body of
regulars to consist nominally of six thousand, but really of four
thousand men.”
Senator Giles and other Republican leaders avowed readiness for war
with England. Before Rose’s departure, the new policy had become
defined. Its first object was to unite America in resisting England and
France; the second, to maintain the embargo till the country should be
ready for war.
With these ends in view, the Administration threw aside the
“Chesapeake” affair as a matter which concerned England rather than
America. Madison notified Erskine that the subject had lost its
consequence, and that if England wished a settlement she must seek it.
“It will throw some light upon the views of this Government,”
wrote Rose in his last despatch,[158] “if I state that in a recent
conversation with Mr. Erskine, Mr. Madison observed that since England
has thus publicly disclaimed the right of search of national ships
for deserters, and Admiral Berkeley has been recalled from command of
the Halifax squadron, although a more formal mode of terminating the
business would have been more acceptable to this Government, it would
consider itself as satisfied on the restoration of the seamen taken
away by an act of force disavowed by his Majesty; but that it would
not again ask for reparation upon this matter.”
From that moment all eyes turned toward the embargo. The President had
chosen his ground. Unless his experiment succeeded, he might yet be
forced into the alternative of a second submission or war.
FOOTNOTES:
[141] Instructions to G. H. Rose, Oct. 24, 1807; MSS. British Archives.
[142] Rose to Canning, Jan. 17, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
[143] Pickering to T. Williams, Jan. 18, 1808; Pickering MSS.
[144] Cf. Letters addressed to the People of the United States, by Col.
Timothy Pickering. London (reprinted), 1811. Letter xiii. p. 96. Review
of Cunningham Correspondence, by Timothy Pickering (Salem, 1824), pp.
56-58.
[145] Diary of J. Q. Adams, i. 504.
[146] Rose to Canning, Jan. 27, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
[147] Negotiations with Mr. Rose; Madison’s Works, ii. 411.
[148] Jefferson to W. Wirt, May 2, 1811; Works, v. 593.
[149] Negotiations with Mr. Rose, Feb. 4, 1808; Madison’s Works, ii. 12.
[150] Rose to Canning, Feb. 6, 1808; MSS. British Archives. Cf.
Madison’s Writings, ii. 413.
[151] Madison’s Writings, ii. 416.
[152] Rose to Canning, Feb. 16, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
[153] Rose to Canning, Feb. 17, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
[154] Rose to Canning, Feb. 27, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
[155] Madison to Rose, March 5, 1808; State Papers, iii. 214.
[156] Rose to Madison, March 17, 1808; State Papers, iii. 217.
[157] Rose to Canning, March 22, 1808; MSS. British Archives.
[158] Rose to Canning, March 22, 1808; MSS. British Archives. Cf.
Madison to Pinckney, April 4, 1808; State Papers, iii. 221.