Such was the situation October 26, when Congress assembled in obedience
to the President’s call. An unusually large number of members
attended on the opening day, when for the first time the House was
installed in a chamber of its own. After seven years of residence at
Washington, the government had so far completed the south wing of the
Capitol as to open it for use. A covered way of rough boards still
connected the Senate Chamber in the north wing with the Chamber of
Representatives in the southern extension of the building, and no one
could foresee the time when the central structure, with its intended
dome, would be finished; but the new chamber gave proof that the task
was not hopeless. With extraordinary agreement every one admitted
that Jefferson’s and Latrobe’s combined genius had resulted in the
construction of a room equal to any in the world for beauty and size.
The oval hall, with its girdle of fluted sandstone columns draped
with crimson curtains, its painted ceiling, with alternate squares of
glass, produced an effect of magnificence which was long remembered.
Unfortunately, this splendor had drawbacks. Many and bitter were
Randolph’s complaints of the echoes and acoustic defects which marred
the usefulness of the chamber.
That Randolph should feel no love for it was natural. The first
scene it witnessed was that of his overthrow. Macon, who for six
years had filled the chair, retired without a contest, dragged down
by Randolph’s weight; and of the one hundred and seventeen members
present, fifty-nine, a bare majority, elected Joseph Bradley Varnum
of Massachusetts their Speaker; while the minority of fifty-eight
scattered their votes among half-a-dozen candidates. Varnum, ignoring
Randolph, appointed George Washington Campbell of Tennessee chairman of
the Ways and Means Committee. Troublesome as the Virginia leader had
been, he was still the only member competent to control the House, and
his fall was greatly regretted by at least one member of the Cabinet.
“Varnum has, much against my wishes, removed Randolph from the Ways
and Means, and appointed Campbell of Tennessee,” wrote Gallatin.[117]
“It was improper as related to the public business, and will give me
additional labor.”
October 27 the President’s Message was read.
“The love of peace,” it began, “so much cherished in the bosoms of our
citizens, which has so long guided the proceedings of their public
councils and induced forbearance under so many wrongs, may not insure
our continuance in the quiet pursuits of industry.”
An account of Monroe’s negotiation and treaty followed this threatening
preamble; and the warmest friends of Monroe and Pinkney could hardly
find fault with the President’s gentle comments on their conduct.
“After long and fruitless endeavors to effect the purposes of their
mission, and to obtain arrangements within the limits of their
instructions, they concluded to sign such as could be obtained, and
to send them for consideration; candidly declaring to their other
negotiators, at the same time, that they were acting against their
instructions, and that their Government, therefore, could not be
pledged for ratification.”
The provisions of the proposed treaty proved to be, in certain points,
“too highly disadvantageous,” and the minister had been instructed to
renew negotiation. The attack on the “Chesapeake” followed, aggravated
by the defiant conduct of the British commanders at Norfolk. Lord
Howick’s Order in Council had swept away by seizures and condemnations
the American trade in the Mediterranean. Spain, too, had issued a
decree in conformity with Napoleon’s decree of Berlin. Of France alone
no complaint was made, and the President could even say that commerce
and friendly intercourse had been maintained with her on their usual
footing. He had not yet heard of the seizures made two months before,
by Napoleon’s order, in the ports of Holland.
In the face of these alarming events, it had been thought better to
concentrate all defensive resources on New York, Charleston, and New
Orleans; to purchase such military stores as were wanted in excess
of the supply on hand; to call all the gunboats into service, and to
warn the States to be ready with their quotas of militia. “Whether a
regular army is to be raised, and to what extent, must depend on the
information so shortly expected.”
If this language had the meaning which in other times and countries
would have been taken for granted, it implied a resort to measures of
force against foreign aggressions; yet neither the President nor his
party intended the use of force, except for self-defence in case of
actual invasion. The Message was, in reality, silent in regard to peace
and war. The time had not yet come for avowing a policy; but even had
the crisis been actually at hand, Jefferson would not have assumed the
responsibility of pointing out a policy to Congress. The influence he
exerted could rarely be seen in his official and public language; it
took shape in private, in the incessant talk that went on, without
witnesses, at the White House.
More pointed than the allusion to England was the menace to
Chief-Justice Marshall. The threat against the court, which the
President made in the summer, reappeared in the Message as a distinct
invitation to Congress.
“I shall think it my duty to lay before you the proceedings and the
evidence publicly exhibited on the arraignment of the principal
offenders before the Circuit Court of Virginia. You will be enabled
to judge whether the defect was in the testimony or in the law, or in
the administration of the law; and wherever it shall be found, the
Legislature alone can apply or originate the remedy. The framers of
our Constitution certainly supposed they had guarded as well their
government against destruction by treason, as their citizens against
oppression under pretence of it; and if these ends are not attained,
it is important to inquire by what means more effectual they may be
secured.”
This strong hint was quickly followed up. Burr’s trial at Richmond had
hardly closed when the President sent this Message to Congress; and
within another month, November 23, another Message was sent, conveying
a copy of the evidence and judicial opinions given at the trial, on
which Congressional action might be taken.
So far as concerned foreign relations, no one could say with certainty
whether the Annual Message leaned toward war or toward peace; but
Gallatin’s Report, which followed November 5, could be understood only
as an argument to show that if war was to be made at all, it should be
made at once. The Treasury had a balance of seven or eight millions in
specie; the national credit was intact; taxes were not yet reduced;
the Bank was still in active existence; various incidental resources
were within reach; the first year of war would require neither increase
of debt nor of taxation, and for subsequent years loans, founded on
increased customs duties, would suffice. Calmly and easily Gallatin
yielded to the impulse of the time, and dropping the objects for
which--as he said--he had been brought into office, took up again the
heavy load of taxation and debt which his life had been devoted to
lightening. No one could have supposed, from his language in 1807, that
within only ten years he and his party had regarded debt as fatal to
freedom and virtue.
“An addition to the debt is doubtless an evil,” he informed Congress;
“but experience having now shown with what rapid progress the revenue
of the Union increases in time of peace, with what facility the debt
formerly contracted has in a few years been reduced, a hope may
confidently be entertained that all the evils of the war will be
temporary and easily repaired, and that the return of peace will,
without any effort, afford ample resources for reimbursing whatever
may have been borrowed during the war.”
If Gallatin was so willing to abandon his dogma, the Federalists might
at least be forgiven for asking why he had taken it up. For what
practical object had he left the country helpless and defenceless for
six years in order to pay off in driblets the capital of a petty debt
which, within much less than a century, could be paid in full from
the surplus of a single year? The success of his policy depended on
the correctness of Jefferson’s doctrine, that foreign nations could
be coerced by peaceable means into respect for neutral rights; but
Gallatin seemed to have already abandoned the theory of peaceable
coercion before it had been tried.
The same conflict of ideas was felt in Congress, which had nothing to
do but to wait for news from Europe that did not arrive. The month of
November was passed in purposeless debate. That the time had come when
some policy must be adopted for defending the coasts and frontiers was
conceded, but no policy could be contrived which satisfied at once
the economical and the military wants of the country. In this chaos
of opinions, Jefferson alone held fixed theories; and as usual his
opinions prevailed. He preferred gunboats to other forms of armament,
and he had his way.
The Cabinet had not adopted the gunboat policy without protest. When
in the preceding month of February the President sent to Congress
his Message recommending that two hundred gunboats should be built,
at a cost, as Gallatin thought, of a million dollars, the secretary
remonstrated. In his opinion not one third that number were needed
in peace, while in case of war any required number could be built
within thirty days. “Exclusively of the first expense of building
and the interest of the capital thus laid out, I apprehend that,
notwithstanding the care which may be taken, they will infallibly
decay in a given number of years, and will be a perpetual bill of
costs for repairs and maintenance.”[118] The President overruled these
objections, affirming that the necessary gunboats could not be built
even in six months; that after the beginning of a war they could not
be built in the seaports, “because they would be destroyed by the enemy
on the stocks;” and the first act of the enemy “would be to sweep
all our seaports of their vessels at least;” finally, the expense of
building and preserving them would be trifling.[119] Gallatin did not
persist in the argument. Jefferson was determined to have gunboats, and
gunboats were built.
The “Chesapeake” disaster riveted the gunboat policy on the
government. Nearly every one, except the Federalists, agreed in
Randolph’s unwillingness to vote money for the support of a “degraded
and disgraced navy.”[120] Robert Smith made no apparent attempt to
counteract this prejudice; he sacrificed the frigates for gunboats.
October 22, 1807, at a full Cabinet meeting, according to Jefferson’s
memoranda, the following order was taken in regard to the frigates, in
view of war with England:[121]--
“The ‘Constitution’ is to remain at Boston, having her men discharged;
the ‘Wasp’ is to come to New York; the ‘Chesapeake’ to remain at
Norfolk; and the sending the ‘United States’ frigate to New York is
reserved for further consideration, inquiring in the mean time how
early she could be ready to go. It is considered that in case of war
these frigates would serve as receptacles for enlisting seamen, to
fill the gunboats occasionally.”
A government which could imagine no other use for its frigates than as
receiving ships for gunboats in time of war naturally cared to build
none. When Congress took up the subject of naval defence, gunboats
alone were suggested by the department. November 8 Robert Smith wrote
to Dr. Mitchill, chairman of the Senate Committee on defences, a
letter asking for eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars to build
one hundred and eighty-eight more gunboats in order to raise the
whole number to two hundred and fifty-seven.[122] A bill was at once
introduced, passed the Senate without a division, and went to the
House, where the Federalists sharply assailed it. Randolph ridiculed
the idea of expelling by such means even so small a squadron as that
which at Lynnhaven Bay had all summer defied the power of the United
States. Josiah Quincy declared that except for rivers and shallow
waters these gunboats were a danger rather than a defence; and that at
all times and places they were uncomfortable, unpopular in the service,
and dangerous to handle and to fight. Imprisonment for weeks, months,
or years in a ship of the line was no small hardship, but service
in a coop not wide enough to lie straight in, with the certainty of
oversetting or running ashore or being sunk, in case of bad weather or
hostile attack, was a duty intolerable to good seamen and fatal to the
navy.
All this and much more was true. Fulton’s steamer, the “Clermont,”
with a single gun would have been more effective for harbor defence
than all the gunboats in the service, and if supplemented by Fulton’s
torpedoes would have protected New York from any line-of-battle ship;
but President Jefferson, lover of science and of paradox as he was,
suggested no such experiment. By the enormous majority of 111 to 19,
the House, December 11, passed the bill for additional gunboats. A
million dollars were voted for fortifications. In all, an appropriation
of one million eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars for defences
was the work accomplished by Congress between October 26 and December
18, 1807. In face of a probable war with England, such action was
equivalent to inaction; and in this sense the public accepted it.
While Congress wrangled about systems of defence almost equally
inefficient,--gunboats and frigates, militia and volunteers, muskets,
movable batteries, and fixed fortifications,--the country listened with
drawn breath for news from England. Time dragged on, but still the
“Revenge” did not return. About the end of November, despatches[123]
dated October 10 arrived from Monroe, announcing that Canning refused
to couple the “Chesapeake” affair with the impressment of merchant
seamen; that he was about to send a special envoy to Washington with
the exclusive object of settling the “Chesapeake” affair; that Monroe
had taken his final audience of King George, and that William Pinkney
was henceforward sole minister of the United States in London. Of the
treaty not a hope seemed to exist. Monroe’s return was ominous of
failure.
Erskine, uneasy at hearing these reports, hastened to the White
House, and without delay reported Jefferson’s conversation to his
Government:[124]--
“I found from my interview with the President that he was much
disappointed at the result of the discussions which had taken
place, and, as he expressed himself, greatly alarmed by some of the
passages in your letters that a satisfactory redress of the injuries
complained of was not likely to be afforded to the United States. He
informed me that the reasons which had induced him to instruct the
American ministers to endeavor to obtain some arrangement upon the
point of impressment of British seamen out of American ships, at the
same time that a reparation for the attack on the ‘Chesapeake’ by
his Majesty’s ship ‘Leopard’ was demanded, were that he conceived
that if a satisfactory security against the injuries arising to
the United States from such impressments could have been obtained,
a redress for the attack upon their national ship would have been
much easier settled; but that if the point of honor was to be taken
into consideration by itself, he foresaw greater difficulties in
the way of an amicable adjustment of it.... The President further
observed, however, that although he feared the separating the two
subjects would increase the difficulty of the negotiation, and that he
considered the determination of his Majesty’s government to postpone
the consideration of the point of impressment--which he said was
the most serious ground of difference--as an unfavorable symptom of
their ultimate intentions upon that subject, yet that he certainly
would not refuse upon the ground of form only that the affair of the
‘Chesapeake’ should be first concluded; but expressed a hope that the
minister who should be sent to this country to settle that subject
of complaint should also be invested by his Majesty with powers to
negotiate upon the point of impressment.”
The sanguine temperament which challenged a duel accorded ill with
the afterthought which shrank from it. Voluntarily, coolly, with
mature reflection, Jefferson had invited Canning’s blow; and when
Canning struck, Jefferson recoiled. Monroe might well claim that such
conditions as were imposed on him should never have been made, or
should never have been withdrawn; that at moments of violent irritation
no nation could afford to tease another with demands not meant to be
enforced.
To increase the President’s embarrassment, the Secretary of War
Dearborn made a natural mistake. The original instructions to
Monroe, decided in Cabinet meeting July 2,[125] did not connect the
“Chesapeake” outrage with impressments of merchant seamen. Neither
July 4 nor July 5, when full Cabinet meetings were held, did the
subject come up.[126] The final instructions, dated July 6, changed
the original demand by extending the required redress over all cases
of impressment; but meanwhile General Dearborn had left Washington for
New York, and was not told of the change.[127] So it happened that when
in October the Federalist newspapers began to attack Jefferson, on the
authority of the English press, for coupling the subject of general
impressment with the attack on the “Chesapeake,” Dearborn, who chanced
to be in Massachusetts, denied the charge; and on his authority the
Republican newspapers asserted that the alleged instructions had not
been given. This denial created no little confusion among Republicans,
who could not understand why the instructions had been changed, or on
what ground the Administration meant to defend them.
In truth, the change had been an afterthought, founded on the idea that
as abandonment of impressments was a _sine qua non_ in the commercial
negotiation, and a point on which the Government meant inflexibly
to insist, it should properly be made a _sine qua non_ in this or
any other agreement.[128] This decision had been made in July, with
knowledge that England would rather fight than yield a point so vital
to her supposed interests. In December, on hearing that Canning refused
to yield, the President told Erskine that the _sine qua non_, so
formally adopted, would be abandoned.
That conduct in appearance so vacillating should perplex Jefferson’s
friends and irritate his enemies was natural; but in reality nothing
vacillating was in the President’s mind. These negotiations were but
outpost skirmishes, and covered his steady retreat to the fortress
which he believed to be impregnable. He meant to coerce Canning, but
his method of coercion needed neither armies nor negotiators. While
telling Erskine that the _sine qua non_ should not prevent a settlement
of the “Chesapeake” affair, he set in motion the first of the series
of measures which were intended to teach England to respect American
rights.
December 14, against strong remonstrances from the merchants, the
Non-importation Act of April 18, 1806, went into effect. The exact
amount of British trade affected by that measure was not known.
All articles of leather, silk, hemp, glass, silver, paper, woollen
hosiery, ready-made clothing, millinery, malt liquors, pictures,
prints, playing-cards, and so forth, if of English manufacture, were
henceforward prohibited; and any person who had them in his possession
incurred forfeiture and fine. The measure was in its nature coercive.
The debates in Congress showed that no other object than that of
coercion was in the mind of the American government; the history of the
Republican party and the consistent language of Jefferson, Madison,
and the Virginian school proclaimed that the policy of prohibition was
their substitute for war. England was to be punished, by an annual fine
of several million dollars, for interference with American trade to
the continent of Europe.
Two days after this law went into effect Madison received from the
British government a document which threw the Non-importation Act
into the background, and made necessary some measure more energetic.
The King’s proclamation of October 17, requiring all British naval
officers to exercise the right of impressment to its full extent over
neutral merchant-vessels, was printed in the “National Intelligencer”
of December 17; and if Sir William Scott’s decision in the case of
the “Essex” required the Non-importation Act as its counterpoise, the
Impressment Proclamation could be fairly balanced only by a total
cessation of relations.
In rapid succession the ships which had sailed a month before from
Europe arrived in American harbors, after unusually quick voyages.
Monroe, in the “Augustus,” reached Norfolk December 13; the “Edward”
arrived at Boston December 12; the “Brutus” got in at New York December
14, preceded December 12 by the “Revenge.” All these ships brought news
to the same effect. Armstrong’s despatches by the “Revenge” announced
Napoleon’s enforcement of the Berlin Decree. London newspapers of
November 12 agreed in predicting some immediate and sweeping attack
by the British government upon American commerce; and from Pinkney
and Monroe came the official papers which put an end to all hope
of a commercial treaty with England. Private letters bore out the
worst public rumors. Among other persons who were best informed as
to the intentions of the British government was Senator Pickering
of Massachusetts, whose nephew Samuel Williams had been removed by
Jefferson from the London consulate, and remained in that city as an
American merchant, in connection with his brother Timothy Williams
of Boston. December 12 Timothy Williams in Boston wrote to his uncle
Senator Pickering at Washington,[129]--
“My brother writes me on the 9th of November ‘that he was informed
the Government would in a few days declare Cuba, Martinique, and
Guadeloupe in a state of blockade, and restrict still more the trade
of neutrals with the Continent.’ The British no doubt had or would
issue an Order above referred to, to counteract our friend Bonaparte’s
decree of Nov. 21, 1806. I cannot however think the intercourse with
the Continent will be entirely cut off. The influence of the West
Indian planters will procure the blockading of the enemy’s islands,
no doubt. What has not this country lost by the miserable policy of
the Administration! Your prudence will know to whom you can or cannot
communicate any of the above paragraphs.”
“With much solicitude respecting the present state of things,” Timothy
Williams concluded this letter of warning; and his anxiety was shared
by every one who read the newspapers which proclaimed the danger of
war. At Washington the alarming news arrived December 17, at the heels
of the Impressment Proclamation. The President instantly called his
Cabinet together. Under less serious circumstances in 1794, Congress
had imposed an embargo for thirty days, forbidding clearances to all
foreign-bound vessels while the question of war or peace was deciding.
By common consent an embargo was the proper measure to be taken in
the face of an expected attack on commerce. On reading the news from
France and England, every one assumed that an embargo would be imposed
until the exact nature of the French and British aggressions should
be learned; but safe precedent required that the law should restrict
its own operation within some reasonable limit of time. An embargo
for thirty or sixty days, or even for three months, might be required
before reaching some decision as to peace or war.
On a loose sheet of letter-paper, which happened to bear the address of
General Mason, the President wrote a hasty draft of an embargo message
to Congress.[130] After referring to Armstrong’s despatch announcing
the Emperor’s decision to enforce the Berlin Decree, Jefferson’s draft
noticed the threatened orders of England:--
“The British regulations had before reduced us to a direct voyage
to a single port of their enemies, and it is now believed they will
interdict all commerce whatever with them. A proclamation, too, of
that Government (not officially, indeed, communicated to us, yet so
given out to the public as to become a rule of action with them)
seems to have shut the door on all negotiation with us, except as to
the single aggression on the ‘Chesapeake.’ The sum of these mutual
enterprises on our national rights is that France and her allies,
reserving for future consideration the prohibiting our carrying
anything to the British territories, have virtually done it by
restraining our bringing a return cargo from them; and Great Britain,
after prohibiting a great proportion of our commerce with France and
her allies, is now believed to have prohibited the whole. The whole
world is thus laid under interdict by these two nations, and our
vessels, their cargoes, and crews are to be taken by the one or the
other for whatever place they may be destined out of our own limits.
If, therefore, on leaving our harbors we are certainly to lose them,
is it not better, as to vessels, cargoes, and seamen, to keep them
at home? This is submitted to the wisdom of Congress, who alone are
competent to provide a remedy.”
Unfortunately, no official document could be produced in proof of the
expected British interdict, and mere newspaper paragraphs could not
be used for the purpose. To avoid this difficulty Madison wrote, in
pencil, another draft which omitted all direct mention of the expected
British order. He proposed to send Congress the official letter in
which the Grand Judge Regnier announced that the Berlin Decree would
be enforced, and with this letter a copy of the British Impressment
Proclamation as printed in the “National Intelligencer.” On these two
documents he founded his draft of a Message:--
“The communications now made showing the great and increasing danger
with which our merchandise, our vessels, and our seamen are threatened
on the high seas and elsewhere by the belligerent Powers of Europe,
and it being of the greatest importance to keep in safety these
essential resources, I deem it my duty to recommend the subject to
the consideration of Congress, who will doubtless perceive all the
advantages which may be expected from an immediate inhibition of the
departure of our vessels from the ports of the United States.”[131]
The Cabinet, every member being present, unanimously concurred in the
recommendation to Congress;[132] but at least one member would have
preferred that the embargo should be limited in time. The Cabinet
meeting was held in the afternoon or evening of December 17, and early
the next morning Gallatin wrote to the President suggesting a slight
change in the proposed measure, and adding a serious warning which
Jefferson would have done well to regard:--
“I also think,” said Gallatin,[133] “that an embargo for a
limited time will at this moment be preferable in itself and less
objectionable in Congress. In every point of view--privations,
sufferings, revenue, effect on the enemy, politics at home, etc.--I
prefer war to a permanent embargo. Governmental prohibitions do always
more mischief than had been calculated; and it is not without much
hesitation that a statesman should hazard to regulate the concerns of
individuals, as if he could do it better than themselves. The measure
being of a doubtful policy, and hastily adopted on the first view
of our foreign intelligence, I think that we had better recommend
it with modifications, and at first for such a limited time as will
afford us all time for reconsideration, and if we think proper, for an
alteration in our course without appearing to retract. As to the hope
that it may have an effect on the negotiation with Mr. Rose, or induce
England to treat us better, I think it entirely groundless.”
To this remarkable letter the President immediately replied by
summoning the Cabinet together at ten o’clock in the morning.[134] No
record of the consultation was preserved; but when the Senate met at
noon the Message was read by the Vice-president as it had been shaped
by Madison. The suggestion of Gallatin as to a limit of time had not
been adopted.
The Senate instantly referred the Message to a committee of five, with
General Smith and J. Q. Adams at its head:--
“We immediately went into the committee-room,” recorded Senator Adams
in his Diary,[135] “and after some discussion, in which I suggested
very strong doubts as to the propriety of the measure upon the papers
sent with the President’s Message, I finally acquiesced in it as a
compliance with the special call for it in the Message. I inquired
whether there were other reasons for it besides the diplomatic papers
sent with the Message, as _they_ appeared to me utterly inadequate to
warrant such a measure. Smith, the chairman, said that the President
wanted it to aid him in the negotiation with England upon which Mr.
Rose is coming out, and that perhaps it might enable us to get rid of
the Non-importation Act. I yielded. But I believe there are yet other
reasons, which Smith did not tell. There was no other opposition in
committee.”
Senator Adams was right in believing that other reasons existed; but
although the “National Intelligencer” of the same morning had published
the warnings of British newspapers,--doubtless in order to affect the
action of Congress,--no one of the Republican senators seemed to rely
on the expected British order as the cause of the embargo. In foreign
affairs Jefferson maintained the reserve of a European monarch. He
alone knew what had been done or was doing, and on him rested the
whole responsibility of action. The deference paid by the Senate to
the Executive in matters of foreign policy seemed patriotic, but it
proved fatal to one senator at least, whose colleague had grievances
to revenge. When the committee, after a short deliberation, reported
an Embargo Bill, and some of the senators appealed for delay, Adams,
who was chafing under the delays which had already lowered the
self-respect of Government and people, broke into a strenuous appeal
for energy. “The President has recommended the measure on his high
responsibility. I would not consider, I would not deliberate; I would
act!” The words were spoken in secret session, but Senator Pickering
noted them for future use.[136] Among the antipathies and humors of
New-England politics none was more characteristic than this personal
antagonism, beginning a new conspiracy which was to shake the Union to
its foundations.
The Senate agreed with the committee that if an embargo was to be
laid it should be laid promptly; and the bill, probably drawn by
the President, passed through its three stages on the same day, by
a vote of twenty-two to six. At the second reading it was strongly
opposed by Hillhouse, Pickering, and Sumter of South Carolina; while
William H. Crawford, the new senator from Georgia, asked only time for
consideration.[137] Within four or five hours after hearing the Message
read, the Senate sent its Embargo Act to the House.
Meanwhile the House also had received the President’s Message, and
had, like the Senate, gone at once into secret session. No sooner was
the Message read than John Randolph and Jacob Crowninshield sprang
at the same moment to their feet. The Speaker recognized Randolph,
who instantly offered a Resolution, “that an embargo be laid on all
shipping, the property of citizens of the United States, now in port,
or which shall hereafter arrive.” After some time passed in discussion,
on receiving the Senate bill the House laid Randolph’s Resolution
aside, and in secret session began a long and warm debate, which
continued all day, and was not concluded on Saturday, December 19, when
the House adjourned over Sunday.
The loss of this debate was unfortunate; for no private citizen ever
knew the reasons which Congress considered sufficient to warrant a
strain of the Constitution so violent as a permanent embargo implied.
The debate was certainly dramatic: it was not only the first great
political crisis witnessed in the new scenery of the Representatives’
Chamber, but it also brought John Randolph forward in an attitude
which astonished even those who had witnessed the Virginian’s growing
eccentricity. On Friday Randolph “scrambled” with Crowninshield for
the floor, eager to force on the House a policy of embargo which he
had again and again recommended as the only proper measure of national
defence. On Saturday he rose again, but only to denounce his own
measure as one that crouched to the insolent mandates of Napoleon, and
led to immediate war with England.[138] The cry of French influence,
raised by him and by the Federalist members, began on that day, and
echoed in louder and louder tones for years.
On Monday, December 21, the debate closed, and the House consumed
the day in voting. Amendment after amendment was rejected. Most
significant of all these votes was the list of yeas and nays on the
question of limiting the embargo to the term of two months. Forty-six
members voted in the affirmative; eighty-two in the negative. The New
England and Pennsylvania Democrats obeyed the wishes of Jefferson, and
riveted a permanent embargo on the people, without public discussion of
the principle or explanation of the effect which was expected from a
measure more trying than war itself to patriotism. The bill then passed
by a vote of eighty-two to forty-four.
So small a part was played in this debate by the expected Order in
Council that members afterward disputed whether the subject was
mentioned at all. Probably the Administration preferred silence in
public, either for fear of prejudicing the expected negotiation with
Rose, or of weakening the effect of arguments which without the order
were sufficiently strong; but in private no such reticence was shown.
The British minister on Monday, before the bill had become law,
notified Canning not only that an embargo was about to be laid, but of
the cause which produced the measure:[139]--
“It has been confidentially communicated to me that an embargo on
all the shipping in the United States has been proposed in Congress,
and although it is strongly resisted, it is expected that it will
be carried, on the ground of expecting that a proclamation by his
Majesty will be issued declaring France and her dependencies in a
state of blockade. I hasten to send you this letter for fear of the
effect of an embargo.”
The person from whom Erskine received this confidential communication
was probably the Secretary of State; for two days afterward, when
the British minister wrote to say that the embargo had been laid, he
added:[140]--
“I propose to send off his Majesty’s packet-boat with this
intelligence immediately, and avail myself of this opportunity by a
private ship to inform you that the embargo is not intended, as this
Government declares, as a measure of hostility against Great Britain,
but only as a precaution against the risk of the capture of their
ships in consequence of the decree of Bonaparte of Nov. 21, 1806,
which they have just learned is to be rigorously enforced; and also
from an apprehension of a retaliatory order by Great Britain.”
Thus the embargo was imposed; and of all President Jefferson’s feats
of political management, this was probably the most dexterous. On his
mere recommendation, without warning, discussion, or publicity, and in
silence as to his true reasons and motives, he succeeded in fixing upon
the country, beyond recall, the experiment of peaceable coercion. His
triumph was almost a marvel; but no one could fail to see its risks.
A free people required to know in advance the motives which actuated
government, and the intended consequences of important laws. Large
masses of intelligent men were slow to forgive what they might call
deception. If Jefferson’s permanent embargo should fail to coerce
Europe, what would the people of America think of the process by which
it had been fastened upon them? What would be said and believed of the
President who had challenged so vast a responsibility?
FOOTNOTES:
[117] Adams’s Gallatin, p. 363.
[118] Gallatin’s Writings, i. 330.
[119] Jefferson to Gallatin, Feb. 9, 1807; Works, v. 42.
[120] Annals of Congress, 1807-1808, p. 823.
[121] Cabinet Memoranda, Oct. 22, 1807; Jefferson MSS.
[122] Robert Smith to S. L. Mitchill, Nov. 8, 1807; Annals of Congress,
1807-1808, p. 32.
[123] Monroe to Madison, Oct. 10, 1807; State Papers, iii. 191.
[124] Erskine to Canning, Dec. 2, 1807; MSS. British Archives.
[125] See p. 31.
[126] Cabinet Memoranda; Jefferson MSS.
[127] Dearborn to Jefferson, Oct. 18, 1807; Jefferson MSS.
[128] R. Smith to Jefferson, July 17, 1807; Jefferson MSS.
[129] T. Williams to T. Pickering, Dec. 12, 1807; Pickering MSS.
[130] Jefferson to Gen. J. Mason; Works, v. 217. Cf. Jefferson to
Madison, July 14, 1824; Works, vii. 373.
[131] Draft of Embargo Message, Jefferson MSS. Cf. Jefferson to
Madison, July 14, 1824; Works, vii. 373.
[132] Jefferson to John G. Jackson, Oct. 13, 1808; Jefferson MSS.
[133] Gallatin to Jefferson, Dec. 18, 1807; Gallatin’s Writings, i. 368.
[134] Jefferson to Gallatin, Dec. 18, 1807; Gallatin’s Writings, i. 369.
[135] Diary of J. Q. Adams, Dec. 18, 1807, i. 491.
[136] Pickering’s Letter to Governor Sullivan, April 22, 1808. Cf.
New-England Federalism, p. 174, n.
[137] Diary of J. Q. Adams, i. 491, 492.
[138] Adams’s Randolph, p. 227.
[139] Erskine to Canning, Dec. 21, 1807; MSS. British Archives.
[140] Erskine to Canning, Dec. 23, 1807; MSS. British Archives.