Possible dangers--The future danger--Open to attack--Canals
and railways--Probable lines of invasion--Lines of attack and
defence--London--Toronto--Defences of Kingston--Defences
of Quebec.
The return of able-bodied males fit for military service in
Montcalm’s time, exceeded the whole number of volunteers now
actually enrolled; but the present force is possessed of seven
field batteries, of several squadrons of cavalry, and of 15,000 men
armed with rifled muskets. There must be at this moment in Canada
at least 50,000 rifles of the best kind. There were four 18-pound
batteries, two 20-pound Armstrong batteries, a large number of
howitzers, and an immense accumulation of stores last year, which
have received constant accessions ever since, as the threats of the
New York press have produced to us in increased expense some of the
evil results of war. There are also in the stores great quantities
of old-fashioned brass and iron field and siege guns, of shot and
shell, of mortars, and of ammunition.
The Americans can find no fault with us for taking steps, in view
of contingencies which they have threatened, to obviate, as far
as possible, the disadvantages to which distance from the mother
country exposes the Provinces. It was enough that before the days
of steam, which has greatly increased the disparity between us,
Great Britain submitted to conditions in regard to the Lakes which
could only be justified by the supposition that Canada was the
western shore of Great Britain. By the articles of the Treaty of
1817, the United States of America and Great Britain are limited
to one vessel with one 18-pounder and a crew of one hundred men
each on Lake Ontario, Lake Champlain, and the upper lakes. No other
vessels of war are to be built or armed, and six months’ notice is
required to terminate the treaty obligations.
It will have been observed that the Americans of the Northern
States are spoken of as the only enemies whom Canada has to fear.
They are the only people who threaten from time to time the
conquest and annexation of the Provinces, and who have declared by
the mouths of their statesmen, that they intend to insist, when
they are strong enough, on the fulfilment of the doctrine that the
whole continent is theirs; for the natural basis of the Monroe
dogma is, the right of the Americans to lay down the doctrine at
all, and if they can say to the nations of Europe, “You shall make
no further settlements on this soil,” they can say, when it pleases
them, with just as much right, “You who are now occupying this soil
must either leave it or own allegiance to the Union.” The Union is
now, what it never was before, a sovereignty, and Americans in its
name fancy that they can do what they please. The Canadians are by
no means well-disposed towards their neighbours’ institutions,
manners, and customs, and do not desire to be incorporated with
them. The annexation must, therefore, be effected by force,
sufficiently great to overpower the resistance of the inhabitants,
whether singly, or supported by the British army and navy.
It fortunately happens that the freedom of speech and writing
prevalent in the United States are safety-valves for the popular
steam, and that words are not always indicative of immediate or
even of remote action. It would be difficult to estimate the nature
of the influences which shall prevail when the American civil war
is over. If the North succeeds in overcoming the South, no great
danger of war with Great Britain or of invasion of Canada will
exist. It will need every man of the Federal army to occupy the
Southern States. If, on the other hand, the North should be obliged
to abandon her project of forcing the carcase of the South back
into the Union by the sword, she will suddenly find herself with a
large army on her hands, with a ruined exchequer, and an immense
fund of mortified ambition and angry passion to discount.
It is possible that the sober and just-minded men who form a large
part of American society may be able to avert a conflict, if the
American soldiery and statesmen entertain the views attributed to
them; but that is just the point on which no information exists.
It is not easy to ascertain the actual weight of the classes who
would naturally oppose the press and the populace in a crusade
against Great Britain. My own experience, limited and imperfect
as it is, leads me to think that there is in the States a very
great number, if not an actual majority, of people whose views
are not much influenced by violent journals or intemperate
politicians, who rarely take part in public affairs, but exercise,
nevertheless, their influence on those who do. There is not a
community in the Northern States which does not contain a large
proportion of educated, intelligent, and upright men, who shrink
from participation in party struggles and intrigue; and I regret
that they are not more largely known. Their existence is marked by
no outward sign which foreign nations can recognise. It is on them,
however, that the safety and reputation of the Federal Government
depends; it will be on them that their country’s reliance must be
placed when the legions return home.
If the war were over in 1865 there would probably be 600,000 men
under arms, and there would be at least 200,000 more men in the
States who had served, and would take up arms against England with
alacrity. A considerable proportion of that army would indeed seek
their discharge, and go quietly back to their avocations; but the
Irish, Germans, &c., to whom the license of war was agreeable,
would not be unwilling to invade Canada, and a percentage of
Americans would doubtless eagerly seek for an opportunity of
gaining against a foreign enemy the laurels they had not found
whilst contending with their fellow countrymen. Commerce indeed
would suffer--the Americans would find for the first time what it
was to enter upon a quarrel single-handed with the British nation.
They have hitherto met only the side blows and stray shots of the
old mother country--and they believe they have encountered the
full weight of her arm, and the utmost extent of her energies.
The wicked men who are striving to engage the two States in a
quarrel which would cover the seas of the world with blood and
wreck, cannot be deterred from their horrible work by any appeals
to fear or conscience; but the influence of the past, and of the
Christian and civilised people of the ex-United States will, it
is to be hoped, defeat their efforts, seconded though they may be
by the prejudice, religious animosity, and national dislike of a
portion of the people. If the war party prevail they will have no
want of pretexts--the San Juan question alone would suffice them if
they had not a whole series of imaginary wrongs to resent arising
from the incidents of the present war, and a multitude of claims to
prefer to which England can never listen.
At some day, near or remote, Canada must become either independent
in whole or in part, or a portion of a foreign state. It will be
of no small moment for those then living in Great Britain whether
they have alienated the affections or have won the hearts of the
newly-created power. Those who doubt this may consider how a
Gaul now rules over the ruler of Rome, and how all that remains
of an evidence of the occupancy of this Island by the masters
of the world for four hundred years, are tumuli, ruined walls,
stratified roads, and bits of tile and pottery. The climate
of Canada is not more severe than that of Russia--her natural
advantages are much greater--her inland seas are never frozen--her
communications with Europe are easy--she offers a route to all the
world from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The United States will
be no longer a country for the poor man to live in; the load of
taxation will force emigration to Canada, and the States lying
on the left banks of the lakes and of the St. Lawrence will be
enriched by the demands of America for her produce, in proportion
as the waste lands are occupied, and the Union is filled with
a tax-paying swarming population. It is astonishing how soon a
man liberates himself from the traditions and allegiance of his
native country in the land of his adoption, when his interests and
his pride are touched. The attitude of our immediate colonies in
face of the transportation question will at once satisfy us that
the mother country has little to expect from old associations,
whenever her interests are made to appear antagonistic to those
of her colonies. Canada has the most liberal institutions in the
world--her municipal freedom is without parallel--education is
widely disseminated--religious toleration restrains the violence of
factions. The cold is by no means as great as that which is borne
by the inhabitants of the greater part of northern Europe, and is
far less dangerous to health than the more temperate climates of
lower latitudes, where rain and tempest are substituted for snow
and hard frosts.
The frontier of Canada is assailable at all points. In some places
it is constituted by a line only visible on a map, in others it is
a navigable inland sea, in others a line drawn in water, in others
the bank of a river or the shore of a lake. Coincident with it runs
the frontier of the United States.
The best guarantee against invasion would be, complete naval
supremacy on the lakes and rivers, because they constitute the
most accessible roads for the invaders, and the most serviceable
barriers for defenders if they have the proper means of defence.
To give any chance of successful resistance, some equality of
naval force on the part of the invaded is almost indispensable.
The question arises, who shall provide this naval force? Canada
cannot. She is prevented by Imperial treaties, by want of means,
and even if she had them, she is forbidden to use the means, by
the principle which forbids a dependency equipping ships of war in
times of peace. Great Britain has no doubt a powerful fleet, but
the far inferior navy of the United States, close at hand, contains
more vessels suitable for warlike operations in inland waters and
canals than we possess, 4000 miles away. In fact we ought to have a
very great preponderance of small vessels to give us a fair start,
and even then it would be difficult to begin hostilities on equal
terms. Lake Michigan, with the enormous resources of Chicago,
is entirely American, and the possession of such a base is an
advantage which is by no means counterbalanced by our position on
Lake Huron. To prevent the enemy clearing all before them on the
lakes, by an energetic naval sortie from their ports, it would be
necessary to have the means of furnishing a flotilla as soon as
hostilities became imminent, and to watch every point, particularly
such as that of Sorel, where communication from Richelieu to the
St. Lawrence might be interrupted. But it is thought we cannot
hope to cope with the Americans on equal terms in all the lakes,
and that we must be content with concentrating our strength on
Lake Ontario and in the St. Lawrence. All our water-ways are
very much exposed. Whilst Great Britain retains her supremacy,
the St. Lawrence is open during the summer, and can be kept free
by iron-plated vessels as far up as Montreal. The day of wooden
gunboats has passed, and it becomes requisite for the Government
to take immediate steps to secure an adequate supply of armoured
vessels on the spot as soon as hostilities become probable. It
is gratifying to know that the Canadian Legislature is about to
fortify the harbour and arsenal at Kingston, so as to cover the
infant naval force. Under any circumstances, it is not possible
to defend a canal by guarding the locks, or by placing forts at
particular places, and yet the canals are of vital importance
to us. The Beauharnais Canal runs on the right bank of the St.
Lawrence, and is peculiarly unfortunate in its military position.
The Welland Canal is of consequence, but it would be better to
destroy it than permit an enemy to hold it. The Rideau Canal, which
runs from Lake Huron to Kingston, is a very valuable communication,
but it needs to be deepened and enlarged at the Rapids. All the
canals require to be enlarged and improved, but they are far better
placed, bad as their state and position are, than the roads and
railways. The Grand Trunk Railway is open to attack for many miles
at different parts of its course, and in some places trains could
be fired upon from American territory! Our reinforcements last
winter were sent through New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, in sleighs,
along a route which for miles could be cut across at any time
by the enemy from Maine, and it would be necessary, to make all
safe, for us to follow the Metapodliac road, or to construct the
intercolonial railway.
The harbours of Halifax and of St. John’s are not closed in winter,
and the mode which was adopted of sending troops into Canada by
those points would no doubt be reverted to till some better means
shall be provided. From St. Andrew’s, in New Brunswick, there is
a railroad to Woodstock, which lies near the state boundary of
Maine. Here the route from St. John’s meets the St. Andrew road,
and united the line follows the course of the St. John River, and
may be divided into four days’ marches--to Florenceville, 1; to
Tobique, 2; to Grand Falls, 3; to Little Falls, 4. All this route
lies close to the American frontier, and is therefore quite unfit
for the march of troops in detachments. The St. John’s route also
takes four days to Woodstock. Even with the advantages afforded
by the line of railroad, it must be remembered that the snows of
winter may often mar all combinations;--our first detachments
suffered considerably from cold in the railway carriages, and it
may be readily conceived that the course of an army in sleighs to
Rivière du Loup on the St. Lawrence, where the Grand Trunk Railway
begins or terminates, might be rendered very unsafe by no more
formidable agencies than violent snow-storms alone.
Our military authorities do not, it is said, fear a winter
campaign, but the Americans have already shown that they are not
to be deterred by frost and snow from moving troops into Canada.
To ensure moderate security the Metis road, notwithstanding its
greater length, should be improved and adapted for military
purposes, and the railway should be constructed to complete the
work. In considering the three modes of invasion of which I shall
speak, it may be inferred that Montreal will be the most likely
point of attack, and that Quebec will be comparatively safe at
first, but it would not be wise to act on the hypothesis as if it
were an absolute certainty.
In the State of New York, at its capital of Albany, the Americans
possess an admirable base of operations against us. Except in
winter, the Hudson is an open highway between Albany and New York,
and the sea and railways connect it with the shores of the lakes
and with the vast centres of American resource and industry. Albany
is specially capable of serving as a base against the very places
most likely to be assailed, Montreal and Quebec. There is no
necessity for any argument to show that the loss of these places
would be equivalent to the overthrow of the British in Canada.
From the Hudson there is a canal to Lake Champlain, on the upper
extremity of which, and almost on the railroad connecting Montreal
with New York, is situated a casemated work popularly known as
Rouse’s Point, about two days’ march from the commercial capital
of Canada. Rouse’s Point would serve as an immediate base for the
collection of supplies and the concentration of an army, whilst
Albany would become the great dépôt for the war. It is probable
that the Americans would try to strike several blows at once. They
might direct one expeditionary force from Rouse’s Point against
Montreal, and others from Albany and Rouse’s Point against Quebec.
They might also menace, or actually attack, the frontier at Detroit
or at Niagara. As a war with Great Britain would be popular, and
no lack of men would be found, it would also be practicable for
them to direct from either of those points an expedition to attack
Ottawa, or the towns west of the river Ottawa.
Kingston would also be a point of attack, as much from its
importance to us as from its value to the enemy, who would, by the
possession of it, command the Rideau Canal, which connects the
river Ottawa with Lake Ontario. It is plain that if the points
liable to attack were left in their present state, there would be
little hope of our ability to defend them by fighting in the open
field. United, the Americans are to the Canadians as about eight
to one. The State of New York alone is as populous, and is richer,
than the Canadas. Great Britain, thousands of miles away, could not
hope, by any expenditure of money, or by any display of military
skill, to equalise the conditions of the assailants and the
defenders of her sovereignty. The engineers are right, therefore,
in the argument, that the only way of enabling the Canadians and
their British allies to make way against the Republicans, is to
establish fortified works supported by or supporting a naval
force. The Americans have an idea that it is possible to carry on
operations during winter. Our engineers start with the assumption
that it is impossible to do so on any large scale, and that it is
out of the question for some five months of the year in Canada.
The obstructions to siege operations might not be so serious,
but they would be so considerable as to render the undertaking
of them exceedingly hazardous, and little likely to succeed. The
question, then, presents itself whether Canada can be defended for
the time in each year during which operations are practicable,
and if so, in what manner the defence is to be conducted. Our
military authorities are of opinion that Canada can be defended.
The Americans, as far as I could judge from their remarks on the
subject, and from conversations with several of their officers,
conceive that Canada lies at their mercy whenever they choose to
attack it. As a chain of great frontier fortresses could not be
established or maintained, the means suggested for the purposes of
defence are principally of a provisional character. To meet the
flood of invasion, it is proposed to cover the approaches to the
vulnerable points. Ottawa, Montreal, and Quebec would be defended
by forces posted in earthworks, and covered by entrenched camps at
Prescott and Richmond, and other suitable places.
If we examine the modes of proceeding to which the enemy would
probably resort, we shall find them classified under five heads.
First, a naval descent on Goderich. Second, the descent of a force
between Detroit and London. Thirdly, the descent of a force on
Niagara. Fourthly, the passage of a force between the St. Lawrence
and Ogdensburg. Fifthly, an attack by several columns converging
in concert on a point between Derby and Huntingdon, with a view
of concentrating on Montreal, and cutting the communications with
Kingston as well as with Quebec. Let us take a glance at the
present state of the principal points, and consider what is needed
to improve their condition.
If we look at the map of Upper Canada, the position of Paris at
once attracts the eye as a favourable site for the main body of
the defensive force; whilst Stratford and London, being points of
railway junction, would naturally be held as long as possible.
Guelph would serve as a point of concentration for troops obliged
to fall back from London or from Stratford, according to the
direction from which the enemy came. Toronto would become the
natural point of concentration for troops obliged to retire from
Guelph, and under the conditions necessitating such a retreat the
force defending the Niagara frontier would be obliged to fall back
upon Hamilton to the entrenched position covering that town. If
the Americans attack the western settlements near Georgian Bay,
it seems impossible to oppose them with assured advantage. A calm
consideration of the subject has led the best authorities to the
conclusion that we cannot hope at present to establish a naval
force on either Lake Huron or Lake Erie. The Welland Canal is,
in its present state, unsuited to the purposes of modern naval
warfare, and a canal is at all times, and under the most favourable
circumstances, very little to be depended upon. With the aid of
fortified harbours there is, however, no reason to fear for our
naval supremacy on Lake Ontario, and it is to that object our
best efforts should be directed. It would of course be impolitic
to leave Toronto and Hamilton open to naval demonstrations, but
the principal efforts of the authorities should be directed to
establish permanent works to protect Ottawa, Montreal, Kingston,
and Quebec, and to prepare positions for entrenched camps and
earthworks on the points most likely to be assailed.
It is plain that a navy alone can prevent descents on the land
line of such extensive waters, and that the possession of Rouse’s
Point enables the Americans to turn the line of the Richelieu and
threaten Montreal. Let us run rapidly over the positions, beginning
with the west. If works were thrown up at Goderich and Sydenham on
points there which are suitable for defensive positions, it might
be possible to check any adventurous force intent on speedy victory
and conquest; but no fortifications could be maintained on those
remote points for permanent occupation, as the enemy could operate
on the flanks and rear and turn them from Huron or Georgian Bay.
A permanent work on Point Edward Sarnia, to command the St. Clair
River, has been suggested, and it has been recommended that the
defences of Fort Maldon and Bar Island should be made permanent
works, but other engineers have considered it unwise to erect
fortifications at Sarnia or Amherstburg, and contend that the
Niagara and Detroit frontiers are too much exposed to be tenable by
any works. Guelph should also be rendered worthy of its important
position. London, being a railway station, is, in event of a war,
an important point to hold for the carriage of troops; and although
there is no ground close at hand admitting of tenacious grip, there
is a tolerably good line of defence at Konoska, which the spade
could convert into a fair position.
When we come to consider the condition of the Toronto district it
becomes apparent that two points require especial attention--Fort
Dalhousie and Port Colborne. It is unwise to leave these places
without defences to cover the garrisons, and to enable them to
protect the shore against desultory operations and isolated
detachments. Domville and Maitland are open to predatory attacks
which might be prevented by ordinary fortifications or earthworks
on eligible sites. It is impossible to defend a canal; but much
good might be done by enlisting the employés on the Welland as a
sort of guard, whose local knowledge would be available in time
of danger. Although, as I have said, strong reasons are urged
against any outlay for the defence of the Niagara frontier, on
the ground of its exposure, there are distinguished authorities
who insist that a permanent work is required at Fort Erie; and
who contend that another fort should be erected at Niagara, in
support of an entrenched camp, which would exercise a most powerful
influence over the movements of an invading force, particularly
if there were gunboats placed on the Chippewa. One of the painful
necessities of war between the United States and Great Britain
would be the destruction of the suspension bridges over the river.
Hamilton is generally considered as incapable of defence, but it
lies in a district which presents two lines of hills capable of
being adapted to defensive purposes, and earthworks there might be
stiffly held, in case of attack, by the troops of the district, to
enable the forces to concentrate and retire along routes previously
determined. Toronto itself may be regarded as an open place equally
incapable of defence by ordinary works; but it should not be left
open to such a _coup_ by a single cruiser, as might be obviated
by the erection of a fort on the site of the new barracks: and it
would be necessary to construct a strong entrenched camp to cover
it and protect the troops retiring before the enemy. A chain of
earthworks might be placed on the elevated ridges which run from
the Don River towards Humber Bay. A casemated fort on the island
is also most desirable. Toronto has something more than its mere
strategical importance to recommend it. It has special claims to
consideration as an important centre of civilised life, commerce,
enterprise, and learning.
The defences of Kingston are more worthy of its ancient importance.
In fact, the only works in Canada suited to modern warfare are
those at Kingston and Quebec. The latter are capable of much
improvement, as has been already pointed out. Both need to be
strengthened, and to be extended. If the Americans have beaten us
by treaty, why should we not at all events have iron-plated vessels
sent up the St. Lawrence as far as treaty will allow them to go,
and prepare naval establishments and encourage naval volunteers
for times of danger at Kingston? Port Henry, Fort Frederick, an
earthen work, and the Market Battery, are in good condition, but
much must be done before the place can be regarded as being in
a satisfactory state. The Shoal Tower, the Cedar Island Tower,
and the Murney Tower, constructed of stone, are placed on points
covering the water approaches to Kingston. But all the guns in
these works, with one exception, are _en barbette_, and to render
Kingston safe it would be necessary to erect strong works to resist
the advance of an enemy landing either above or below the town.
It is estimated that £390,000 would be sufficient for the purpose
of erecting the permanent forts absolutely indispensable for the
safety of the harbour and dockyard establishment. The position of
these works should be chosen with a due regard to all possible
conditions of attack. Wolfe Island, Abraham’s Head, Snake Island,
Simcoe Island, and Garden Island, should be provided with adequate
forts to support the new scheme of defence. The Navy Yard should
be removed, and the points now open to attack at once fortified.
Belleville and Prescott both afford admirable ground for works of
great importance: the former possesses a most advantageous site
for temporary works and for a line of defence; and the latter has
such a commanding situation that a permanent work, with casemates,
should be constructed there to guard what is, according to some of
our engineers, one of the most valuable positions in the province.
When we come to consider the actual state of Montreal, its
importance, its liability to attack and the difficulty of offering
an adequate defence, the best means to adopt are not very obvious.
The best method of defence would doubtless be to construct an
entrenched position, consisting of a parapet strengthened by
redoubts, to cover the approach from the south side. A _tête de
pont_ should be built to cover the approaches now so open and
exposed to attack.
The enlargement of the Ottawa and Rideau canals is of obvious
importance, and outlying works might be traced which could be
used in case of invasion to hold the enemy in check; but still,
as a precautionary measure, it would be desirable to remove the
more important stores at Montreal to Quebec and Ottawa, if it is
in contemplation to make this valuable position subsidiary to any
other place in Canada.
Permanent works might be erected at St. John’s, the Isle aux Noix
and St. Helen’s Island, where forts should be reconstructed on
improved principles. But the most obvious measure, in the opinion
of some engineers, the fortification of the hill over the city,
and the erection of a Citadel upon it, which would render the mere
occupation of the town below valueless to an enemy, is not approved
of by more recent authorities.
Gunboats on Lake St. Louis would prove most valuable in defending
the works at Vaudrueuil.
Quebec is however the key of Canada; and that key can be wrested
from our own grasp at any moment by a determined enemy, unless
the recommendations so strongly urged from time to time by all
military authorities meet with consideration. The old enceinte
should be removed, and the French works restored, according to the
suggestions of scientific officers, and of the ablest engineers we
possess. An entrenched camp might be marked out to the west of the
Citadel, with a line of parapet and redoubts extending from the St.
Lawrence to the St. Charles river. In order to cover the city from
an attack on the south side, it would be necessary to occupy Point
Levi, and to construct a strong entrenched line, with redoubts at
such a distance as would prevent the enemy from coming near the
river to shell the city and citadel. But it is evident that they
are _nil ad rem_, unless behind these works, and in support of
them in the open, can be assembled a force of sufficient strength
to prevent an investment, or to attack the investing armies, and
at the same time to hold front against them in the field. It is
estimated that 150,000 men might hold the whole of the Canadas,
East and West, against twice that number of the enemy. If we are to
judge by what has passed, it is not probable the United States will
be inclined or able for such an effort. Quebec might be held with
10,000 men against all comers. From 25,000 to 30,000 men would make
Montreal safe. Kingston would require 20,000 men, and Ottawa would
need 5000. The greater part, if not all of them, might be composed
of militia, and volunteers trained to gunnery and the use of small
arms. For the protection of the open country, and to meet the enemy
in the field, an army of from 25,000 to 35,000 men would be needed
from Lake Ontario to Quebec. The western district on Lake Erie
could not be protected by less than 60,000 men.
Thus, in case of a great invasion from the United States, Canada,
with any assistance Great Britain could afford her, must have
150,000 men ready for action. What prospect there is of this, may
best be learned from a consideration, not so much of the resources
of Canada, as of the willingness of the people to use them.