The Militia--American Intentions--Instability of the Volunteer
Principle--The Drilling of Militia--The Commission of 1862--The
Duke of Newcastle’s Views--Militia Schemes--Volunteer
Force--Apathy of the French Canadians--The First Summons.
In a country situated as Canada is, without well-defined
obligations as regards the sovereign power, there can be but two
kinds of military force available for defence--a militia and an
organisation of volunteers. The first is essentially the proper
constitutional force on which Canada must mainly rely in case of
invasion. The second, notwithstanding its enormous importance and
value, is but accidental. Unless Canada assumed towards us the
relations of a protected state, like India, and raised an army
officered by the British such as was that of Oude, or as that, to a
certain extent, of some states at the present day, her volunteers
could have no fixed and adequate value in a general scheme of
defence. The Canadian militia must constitute the chief strength
of Canada in operations on her territory. It would be impossible
for Great Britain to do more than provide officers, money, arms,
artillery, and ammunition--perhaps the head and backbone of the
force which would be needed for a large system of campaigns. The
only enemy Canada has to fear is the Northern Republic. I am quite
willing to do every justice to the moderation of Mr. Seward, and to
the pacific policy of Mr. Lincoln, but it cannot be disputed that
the strength of the central Government will be much diminished on
the cessation of the present conflict, and that whatever way it
ends the Cabinet of Washington will be little able to oppose the
passions of the people in the crisis which peace, whether it be
one of humiliation or of triumph, will bring with it. Passion, the
passion wrought of pride, love of dominion, national feeling, and
the like, is far stronger than the silken bond of commerce. There
is danger of war with Great Britain as soon as this war in America
is over; and the question is, how far Canada will be able to aid
herself? Because if she does not contribute largely to her own
defence, it seems certain that British statesmen will not strive
very strenuously to avert her doom. At the moment I write there is
not, in a state of organised efficiency, one regiment of militia
in the length, which is great, and the breadth, which is small,
of Canada. Party violence has set at nought all warnings and all
solicitations. The Canadians appear to rely on the traditions of
the past, and on the result of the small campaigns in the war with
America, without any appreciation of the vast changes which have
taken place since. Northern Americans, reaching their boundaries
with pain and many a toilsome march, filtered small corps upon
their soil--far inferior in numbers and equipment to those which
now represent the quota of the smallest state in the Union. In
my letters from America I called attention to the significant
fact that the northernmost point of the territory claimed by the
Southern Confederacy was within 120 miles of the lake which forms
the southern boundary of Canada. It may not be likely that the
Confederacy will ever make good its claim to Western Virginia,
and fix its standard in undisturbed supremacy at Wheeling, but
it is nevertheless true that a strong passionate instinct urges
the people of the North to consolidate the states of the West and
those of the East by the absorption of Canada, which, with its
lakes and its St. Lawrence, would be ample recompense for the
loss of the South; and, with the South in the Union, would be the
consummation of the dream of empire in which Americans wide-awake
pass their busy restless lives. The Americans are well aware of
the vast advantage of striking a sudden blow. The whole subject
of Canadian invasion lies developed in well-considered papers in
the bureau drawers of Washington. At the time of the Trent affair
I was assured by an officer high in rank in the government that
General Winfield Scott had come back from France solely to give the
State the benefit of his counsels and experience in conducting an
invasion of Canada; and I cannot think it doubtful that the Federal
Government would, in four or five weeks after a declaration of war
with England, be prepared to pour 120,000 or 150,000 men across
the British frontier. What has Canada done to meet the danger? In
May, 1862, the Honourable John Macdonald proposed that a minimum
of 30,000 men or a maximum of 50,000 men should be enrolled and
drilled for one month every year for three or for five years, but
it was considered that Canada could not spare so large a number
of men from the pursuits of trade, and above all of agriculture,
during the open season when drill would be practicable. The
measure was rejected. Mr. Sandfield Macdonald, after the failure
of this proposal, introduced and carried a measure which gave the
Government a permissive power to call out the unmarried militiamen
for six days’ drill in every year, and which provided that militia
officers might be attached to the regular regiments serving in
Canada for two months every year in order to learn their duties.
By the fundamental law of Canada the Government has the power of
calling out in time of war, first, all eligible unmarried men
between 18 and 45 years of age; secondly, married men between 18
and 45; and finally, those males fit to carry arms between 45 and
60 years of age. Under these laws Canada should have a force of
470,000 men available for service, and of these there are actually
on the muster rolls of the militia 197,000 unmarried men between
18 and 31 years of age, whose service would be compulsory in case
of need. The Canadian Parliament voted half a million of dollars
in each of the years 1863 and 1864 for military purposes, but the
greater proportion of these sums was expended on the volunteers and
on the staff of the militia. There has been no adequate return for
the heavy drain such a sum causes on the Provincial exchequer. The
best commentary on the voluntary system in militia drills is to be
found in the fact that less than 10,000 men have been in attendance
on them.
With the experience we have had of the unstable character of
volunteer forces in the field, it is not prudent for Canada to
rely on her volunteers so much as she does. They have within their
very body the seeds of dissolution. Some corps can decree their
disbandment at two months’, others at six months’ notice--in other
words, they may melt away at the very crisis of the war. Does
American volunteering teach us nothing? In all human probability
the South would have been struck to the earth at the first Battle
of Bull Bun, if the Pennsylvania volunteers had not presented to
the world the extraordinary and disgraceful spectacle of whole
battalions under arms marching off from the field, as their
unfortunate General McDowell expressed it, “to the sound of the
enemy’s guns.” That was no isolated case. The desertion, at
the same time, of other volunteer battalions under the equally
unfortunate General Patterson in the Shenandoah Valley, left him
unable to prevent the Confederate General Johnston marching with
all his men to the aid of Beauregard. Over and over again the
Federal leaders have been paralysed by similar defections, and it
was not till they became strong enough to hold the volunteers by
force, as Meade did before he made his attempt against Richmond,
that the evil was cured. Had the Federals gained Bull Bun, they
were ready to have marched on Richmond at once--they would have
found the city defenceless, and the South disorganised. Such a
proof of Federal power as a decisive victory would, I believe, from
what I saw in the South, have crushed the Secession party, and have
strengthened the adherents of the Union, who were then numerous
in many of the States. It might not have stopped the civil war,
but it would have certainly given the most enormous preponderance
to the North. The defeat mainly caused by McDowell’s weakness in
men, and the reinforcements received by the enemy in consequence
of Patterson’s inability to hinder their arrival, which was caused
by the wholesale disbandment of volunteers, gave such an impetus
to the Confederates, that their principle was carried triumphantly
over the States, and crushed all opposition. We have seen what
that defeat has cost the Federals since. In Canada the volunteers
belong almost exclusively to the urban population--only a fifth
come from rural districts; and as the towns in Canada are very
small, it is plain that the volunteer system would operate very
injuriously on the trade of the cities, and would in all likelihood
break down, without any imputation on the courage and patriotism
of the townsmen. It is, of course, beyond the power of Canada to
cope with the people of the United States single-handed, but the
agencies which England could bring to bear against the enemy on the
American seaboard, and on all the seas furrowed by her ships, would
damp the ardour which the Northerners would exhibit at the first
onslaught. It would be, no doubt, a very deplorable and a very
disgraceful contest, but Great Britain would not be responsible for
the beginning of hostilities.
Just in proportion to the celerity and magnitude of their first
successes would be the efforts of the Americans to secure their
conquest. It is far easier to repel than to expel. A handful of
militia, ill-drilled, supported by a similar force of volunteers
of similar inefficiency, could offer no resistance to the swarms
of invaders, and would but increase the stress to which the
little army of Queen’s troops in garrison here and there would be
subjected at the outbreak of war. To all argument and entreaty, to
insinuations and menace, Canada opposes the grand simplicity of her
_non possumus_. She is burthened with debt, and even without any
expenditure for the militia her outlay is considerably more than
her income. A party in Canada called for a regular agreement with
the Government at home to regulate the amount to be paid by Canada,
and the troops to be furnished by her, as a part of the British
Empire. These troops were to consist of militia of the first class,
to be drilled by detachments in each succeeding year, till the
whole number, whether it were 50,000 or 100,000, should be properly
disciplined. It was proposed by some advocates of this scheme that
each body of militia should be called out for six months; and that
when that period expired the men should be entitled to immunity
from further drills till war broke out, when they would become
liable for ten years’ service, after which they would go into a
reserve only to be used in great emergencies.
Many modes of raising, maintaining, and drilling this force have
been suggested; but as the principle was not adopted they are
scarcely worth discussing. Drills for short periods are certainly
of little or no avail; and if money cannot be borrowed to put
100,000 men in a state of readiness, the organisation of 50,000 men
to be drilled for three months in each year in bodies of 12,000
or 15,000 does not seem at all unreasonable. The rate of wages
in Canada is very high, and the lowest estimate for the support,
pay, and clothing of a militiaman for six months comes to about
£20 per man. It is, therefore, a simple sum in multiplication to
arrive at the ultimate figure of Canadian _possumus_ in regard to
the paying power of the Provinces. It is not true that if one man
can be kept for £20 for six months two men can be kept for the
same sum for three months. The levy of 50,000 militiamen for six
months would cost Canada, if she were alone, one million sterling.
Mr. Cartwright has pointed out that Canada could discipline 100,000
militia, with half a year’s instruction each, for as much as
would support a standing army of 2,000 men for the same period.
We may be very angry with the Canadians for their happy security.
It is not so very long ago since the Duke’s letters to Sir John
Burgoyne startled us out of a similar _insouciance_. We may feel
that the sudden development of the United States has placed us in
a very doubtful military position. It is not so easy to shake off
the obligations incurred by conquest and by emigration under the
flag of Great Britain. In the face of very frigid warnings from
the press, and very lukewarm enunciations of policy from her best
friends, Canada had some reason to fear that there is a secret
desire “to let her slide,” and that nothing would please England so
much as a happy chance which placed the Provinces beyond our care
without humiliation or war.
The duty of Canadians to their own country is very plain indeed
if the people of England refuse to give them distinct guarantees
that under certain conditions they will give them the whole aid
of money, men, and ships that is required; but these guarantees
are implied in the very fact of suzerainty of the Crown. It
must, however, be made known--if it be not plain to every
Englishman--that the abandonment of Canada implies a surrender of
British Columbia, of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward’s,
Newfoundland, if not also the West India Islands. Many bitter words
written and spoken here rankle in the breasts of the Canadians, and
I have quoted the words in which a Canadian statesman has placed
before Englishmen the terrible consequences which Canada may suffer
from war, because she is a part of the British empire, engaged in
a quarrel on imperial grounds with the Government of the United
States. We do undoubtedly owe something to Canada, from the bare
fact that for many years she resisted temptation, and remained
under our flag unmoved by the blandishments and threats of the
United States. In my poor judgment the abandonment of Canada would
be the most signal triumph of the principle of democracy, and the
most pregnant sign of the decadence of the British empire which
could be desired by our enemies. No matter by what sophistry or by
what expediency justified, the truth would crop out through the
fact itself that we were retiring as the Romans did from Britain,
Gaul, and Dacia, but that the retreat would be made in the face
of united and civilised enemies, and that the sound of our recall
would animate every nation in the world to come forth and despoil
us.
As yet there is no reason for such a pusillanimous policy.
The Commission of 1862 laid it down as their opinion that an
active force of 50,000, with a reserve of the same number, would
be required for Canada; but as the bill founded on their report
did not become law, the Canadian Government had no power to borrow
arms from the home Government for the whole number, as would have
been the case had they passed the bill. Lord Monck, however,
procured from the home Government a considerable augmentation
of the supplies in store of artillery, small arms, ammunition
and accoutrements. But the rejection of the Militia Bill of
1862 filled the home Government with apprehension. The Duke of
Newcastle, on the 20th of August of that year, wrote as follows:--
“If I urge upon you the importance of speedily resuming measures
for some better military organisation of the inhabitants of
Canada than that which now exists, it must not be supposed
that Her Majesty’s Government is influenced by any particular
apprehension of an attack on the Colony at the present moment,
but undoubtedly the necessity for preparation which has from time
to time been urged by successive Secretaries of State is greatly
increased by the presence, for the first time on the American
Continent, of a large standing army, and the unsettled condition
of the neighbouring States. Moreover, the growing importance
of the Colony, and its attachment to free institutions, make
it every day more essential that it should possess in itself
that without which no free institutions can be secure--adequate
means of self-defence. The adequacy of those means is materially
influenced by the peculiar position of the country. Its extent
of frontier is such that it can be safe only when its population
capable of bearing arms is ready and competent to fight. That
the population is ready, no one will venture to doubt; that it
cannot be competent, is no less certain, until it has received
that organisation, and acquired that habit of discipline which
constitute the difference between a trained force and an armed
mob. The drill required in the regular army, or even in the best
volunteer battalion, is not necessary, nor would it be possible,
in a country like Canada, for so large a body of men as ought
to be prepared for any emergency; but the Government should be
able to avail itself of the services of the strong and healthy
portion of the male adult population at short notice, if the
dangers of invasion by an already organised army are to be
provided against.
“We have the opinions of the best military authorities, that no
body of troops which England could send would be able to make
Canada safe without the efficient aid of the Canadian people.
Not only is it impossible to send sufficient troops, but if
there were four times the numbers which we are now maintaining
in British North America, they could not secure the whole of the
frontier. The main dependence of such a country must be upon its
own people. The irregular forces which can be formed from the
population, know the passes of the woods, are well acquainted
with the country, its roads, its rivers, its defiles: and for
defensive warfare (for aggression they will never be wanted),
would be far more available than regular soldiers.
“It is not therefore the unwillingness, or the inability of
Her Majesty’s Government to furnish sufficient troops, but the
uselessness of such troops without an adequate militia force,
that I wish to impress upon you.
“In your despatch of the 17th May last, you informed me that
there were then 14,760 volunteers enrolled, besides others
who had been more or less drilled. It is far, indeed, from my
intention to discredit either the zeal or the efficiency of
these volunteers, who have, I hope, greatly increased in number
since the date of your despatch; but they constitute a force
which cannot suffice for Canada in the event of war. They might
form an admirable small contingent; but what would be required,
would be a large army. They might form a force stronger than is
necessary in time of peace to secure internal tranquillity, but
would be inadequate to repel external attack in time of war. Past
experience shows that no reasonable amount of encouragement can
raise the number of volunteers to the required extent.
“It appears to me that the smallest number of men partially
drilled which it would be essential to provide within a given
time, is 50,000. The remainder of the militia would of course be
liable to be called upon in an emergency. Perhaps the best course
would be, to drill every year one or more companies of each
battalion of the sedentary militia. In this manner the training
of a large number of men might be effected, and all companies so
drilled should, once at least in two years, if not in each year,
be exercised in battalion drill, so as to keep up their training.
“I put forward these suggestions for the consideration of the
Canadian Government and Parliament, but Her Majesty’s Government
have no desire to dictate as to details, or to interfere with
the internal government of the Colony. Their only object is so
to assist and guide its action in the matter of the militia as
to make that force efficient at the least possible cost to the
Province and to the mother country.
“The Canadian Government will doubtless be fully alive to the
important fact that a well-organised system of militia will
contribute much towards sustaining the high position with
reference to pecuniary credit, which, in spite of its large debt,
and its deficient revenue for the past few years, the Colony has
hitherto held in the money markets of Europe. A country which,
however unjustly, is suspected of inability or indisposition
to provide for its own defence, does not, in the present
circumstances of America, offer a tempting field for investment
in public funds or the outlay of private capital. Men question
the stable condition of affairs in a land which is not competent
to protect itself.
“It may, no doubt, be argued on the other hand, that the
increased charge of a militia would diminish rather than enlarge
the credit of the Colony. I am convinced that such would not be
the case, if steps were taken for securing a basis of taxation
sounder in itself than the almost exclusive reliance on Customs
duties. It is my belief that a step in this direction would
not only supply funds for the militia, but would remove all
apprehension which exists as to the resources of the Colony.
“Whatever other steps may be taken for the improved organisation
of the militia, it appears to Her Majesty’s Government to be of
essential importance that its administration, and the supply
of funds for its support, should be exempt from the disturbing
action of ordinary politics. Unless this be done there can be no
confidence that, in the appointment of officers, and in other
matters of a purely military character, no other object than the
efficiency of the force is kept in view. Were it not that it
might fairly be considered too great an interference with the
privileges of the representatives of the people, I should be
inclined to suggest that the charge for the militia, or a certain
fixed portion of it, should be defrayed from the consolidated
fund of Canada, or voted for a period of three or five years.
“It has further occurred to me, that the whole of the British
Provinces on the continent of North America have, in this
matter of defence, common interests and common duties. Is
it impossible that, with the free consent of each of these
Colonies, one uniform system of militia training and organisation
should be introduced into all of them? The numbers of men to
be raised and trained in each would have to be fixed, and the
expenses of the whole would be defrayed from a common fund,
contributed in fair proportion by each of the Colonies. If the
Governor-General of Canada were Commander-in-Chief of the whole,
the Lieutenant-Governors of the other Colonies would act as
Generals of Division under him; but it would be essential that an
Adjutant-General of the whole force, approved by Her Majesty’s
Government, should move to and fro, as occasion might require, so
as to give uniformity to the training of the whole, and cohesion
to the force itself.
“As such a scheme would affect more than one Colony, it must, of
course, emanate from the Secretary of State, but Her Majesty’s
Government would not entertain it unless they were convinced
that it would be acceptable both to the people of Canada and
to the other Colonies; and they desire to know, in the first
instance, in what light any such plan would be viewed by the
members of your Executive Council. I understand that the
Lieutenant-Governors of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, availing
themselves of the leave of absence lately accorded to them,
intend to meet you in Quebec in the course of the ensuing month.
This visit will afford you a good opportunity for consulting them
upon this important question.
“The political union of the North American Colonies has often
been discussed. The merits of that measure, and the difficulties
in the way of its accomplishment, have been well-considered; but
none of the objections which oppose it seem to impede a union
for defence. This matter is one in which all the Colonies have
interests common with each other, and identical with the policy
of England.”
The Government of the day presented a scheme which was rightly
characterised by Lord Monck as containing no principle calculated
to produce effective results, and to be entirely illusory and
nugatory as far as the enrolment of the militia was concerned.
Lord Monck enclosed the heads of a plan for the reorganisation
and increase of the active militia, based mainly on the voluntary
principle, with rules for the erection of armouries, drill-sheds
and rifle-ranges, and the appointment of brigade-majors and
sergeants, &c., and other means of a perfect organisation. The
scheme was to raise an active battalion for each territorial
division of the country corresponding with the regimental district
of the sedentary militia, to be increased in number as needed,
each active battalion to be taken from the sub-division of the
district. Mr. Macdonald thought no Government could exist which
would venture to recommend the raising of 50,000 partially trained
militia, although the cost, spread over five years, would scarcely
exceed the annual appropriations. In fact, at the root of all these
various schemes and plans lay the evil of uncertainty. Canada
did not know how far England would go in her defence, and seemed
fearful of granting anything, lest it might be an obligation which
the mother country would have otherwise incurred, whilst England,
by withholding any definite promise, or indulging only in vague
remonstrances, sought to make the Canadians show their hands.
Each was anxious for an answer to the question, “How much will you
give us?” The Military Commissioners reported that Canada ought to
provide 150,000 men, including the reserves, which force, large
as it is, would be less than that furnished by states of smaller
population in the Northern Union; but Canada is very poor, and not
unnaturally makes the most of the argument that she can have no war
of her own, and that her defence should be our affair. No one, I
apprehend, will allow himself to be beaten to death because there
is no policeman by.
In February, 1863, a report of the state of the militia of the
Province was prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel de Salaberry and
Lieutenant-Colonel Powell, of the Adjutant-Generals of Militia
Department in Lower and Upper Canada, respectively, from which it
appears that there were then 25,000 volunteers organised, of whom
10,230 belonged to Lower, and 14,780 belonged to Upper Canada. Of
these there were proportionately 33 for every 1000 in the cities,
and 7⅓ for every 1000 in the counties; those in the upper section
contributing less than those in the lower section, and Upper Canada
contributing a larger number on the 1000 than Lower Canada. In the
enumeration of the various companies--field batteries, troops of
horse, companies of artillery, engineers, rifles, infantry, naval
and marine companies--it is to be observed that only one naval
company appears as having performed twelve days’ drill. Some steps
should be taken to develop naval and marine companies in the passes
along the shores of the lakes. The importance of having trained
sailors and gunners stationed just where they are wanted cannot be
exaggerated, but it is not very likely that Brigade-Majors will
look after such a force. It must be remembered that the national
force of Canada consists of two different organisations--the
volunteer militia and the regular militia. Canada is divided into
twenty-one military districts, eleven in Lower and ten in Upper
Canada. In each district there is a Brigade-Major to superintend
the drill and instruction of all volunteer companies, furnish
monthly reports thereon, and by inspections and active organisation
to promote the efficiency of the volunteer service as far as
possible. The appointment of these officers has been attended
with very good results in this branch of the Militia Staff. In
August, 1862, forty-six non-commissioned officers were sent out
by Government, and paid by the Canadian Parliament, to drill
volunteers; and sixty-eight sergeants were subsequently applied for
to meet the increasing demand for instruction. The report of the
Deputy Adjutant-Generals of Militia, presented to Lord Monck in
1863, stated----
“Taking population as a basis, these Volunteer Corps are
distributed as follows:--
“Population all Canada (census 1861), 2,506,752,--present
Volunteer force, 25,010, or say 10 Volunteers for each 1,000
inhabitants.
“Population--Lower Canada.
1,110,664 Volunteers, 10,230,--or say 9¼ for each 1,000.
Upper Canada.
1,396,088 Volunteers, 14,780,--or say 10⅔ for each 1,000.
--------- ------
2,506,752 25,010
“Population all Canada, showing proportion of Volunteers in
cities and counties.
Cities, 257,273 Volunteers 8,525,--or say 33 for each 1,000.
Rural, 2,249,479 ” 16,485,--or say 7⅓ for each 1,000.
--------- ------
2,506,752 25,010
“Population of Cities.
Lower Canada, 153,389 Volunteers, 5,500, or say 36 for each 1,000.
Upper Canada, 103,884 ” 3,025, or say 29 for each 1,000.
------- -----
257,273 8,525
“Population of Rural Parts.
Lower Canada, 957,275 Volunteers, 4,730, or say 5 for each 1,000.
Upper Canada, 1,292,204 ” 11,755, or say 9 for each 1,000.
--------- ------
2,249,479 16,485
“It will thus be seen that in the cities of Canada, those in the
Upper Section of the Province contribute less, in proportion to
their population, than do those in the Lower Section; while in
the rural parts, Upper Canada contributes a larger number for
each 1,000 inhabitants than does Lower Canada.
“The volunteering, thus far, has been the free-will offering of
the people, and it is gratifying to observe that in the counties
of Upper Canada, with the exception of three, nearly every one
has furnished its quota of the 25,000 now organised, while in
many instances they are considerably beyond the proportionate
number.
“In Lower Canada, until of late, volunteer corps have been
chiefly organised in the cities, but within the last six months
a considerable number of volunteers have been organised in the
rural parts, and now evidences are not wanting that ere long
applications will be received at this department for permission
to increase this number considerably.
“The present volunteer force comprises field batteries, troops
of cavalry, foot companies of artillery, engineer companies,
rifle companies, companies of infantry, and naval and marine
companies, and is divided properly into three classes, viz.:
Class A, and two divisions of Class B.
“Corps in Class A are those who have furnished their own
uniforms, and who have been paid $6.00, for each man uniformed,
for 12 days’ drill performed in 1862.
“First corps in Class B who have furnished their own uniforms,
and who have been paid $6.00 in lieu of clothing, after 12 days’
drill performed in 1862.
“Second corps in Class B who have been organised upon the
understanding that they receive no pay for the 12 days’ drill,
but that the Government will provide them with uniforms and drill
instruction.
“Of the corps in Class A, 6 field batteries, 11 troops of
cavalry, 2 companies of foot artillery, and 33 rifle companies
have certified to the performance of 12 days’ drill in accordance
with the General Order of the 4th November last, and have
received from the Government $22,672 therefor.
“Of the corps in Class B, 3 troops of cavalry, 8 foot companies
of artillery, 2 engineer corps, 49 rifle companies, 15 companies
of infantry and one naval company have certified to the
performance of 12 days’ drill in accordance with the General
Order of the 4th November last, and have received from the
Government $20,952 therefor.”
In the twenty-one districts there were recorded 468 battalions of
sedentary militia. Seventy-six drill associations, composed of
the officers and non-commissioned officers, had been formed, and
were to be supplied with arms and instructors, to which number
considerable additions have since been made. The total number
of militiamen in Lower Canada was estimated at 190,000; in Upper
Canada, at 280,000. In the former, 63,000 first-class service men;
in the latter, only 33,000 first-class service men. Second-class,
58,000 and 83,000 respectively. Reserve, 20,000 and 25,000
respectively. The cities of Upper Canada gave 29 volunteers for
every 1000--the rural districts only 9 volunteers for every 1000.
In three counties containing 50,000 people there was no volunteer
or volunteer corps. In thirteen counties the average number of
volunteers was 250, and in sixteen counties it was only 125.
In Lower Canada, however, the zeal of the people for militia
volunteering was by no means remarkable. Thirty counties, with
a population of 450,000, had not a single volunteer corps, nor
one volunteer. The towns gave 36 volunteers per 1000, the rural
districts only 5 per 1000. In fact, the people of French descent
appeared to consider militia volunteering a sort of playing at
soldiers, which had no particular attractions for them. England had
taken them in charge, and might do as she liked with them.
By degrees, a great change occurred in the sentiments if not in
the actions of the people. A little more address in dealing with
their prejudices; a little more of a conciliatory tone; somewhat
greater tact in legislative business, produced beneficial results.
The foundation, at all events, was laid of a sound militia bill.
The Commissioners who reported in 1862, including Mr. Cartier,
Mr. John A. Macdonald, Mr. Galt, and Colonel Lysons, proposed
a scheme which was very comprehensive and ably conceived; but
it was not considered suitable to the means of the country by
the politicians, and the debates which arose on the Militia
Bill prepared in accordance with its recommendations, were
characterised by an acrimony and party spirit which flavoured
the subsequent discussions on the same subject. They recommended
complete battalions as the base of the system, for reasons
which are in the abstract irrefutable. They then recommended
that the Province should be divided into military districts,
as the Commander-in-Chief might direct, and that each military
district should be divided into regimental divisions. They further
recommended as follows:--
“That in order to facilitate the enrolment, relief and
reinforcement of an active force, each regimental division be
divided into ‘sedentary battalion divisions,’ and be sub-divided
into ‘sedentary company divisions.’
“That each regimental division shall furnish one active and one
reserve battalion, to be taken as nearly as practicable in equal
proportions from the male population of such division, between
the ages of 18 and 45.
“That each company of an active battalion, together with its
corresponding reserve company, be taken from within the limits of
a defined territorial division, the boundary of which shall be
identical with that of a sedentary battalion division, or of a
distinct portion of such division.
“That in order to accommodate the sedentary battalion divisions
to the organisation of the active battalions, the limits of the
former be, where necessary, re-arranged.
“We recommend that each of the principal cities of the Province,
namely--Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa, Kingston, Toronto, Hamilton,
and London, with such portions of the surrounding country as may,
from time to time, be added to them by the Commander-in-Chief,
shall constitute a military district, to be divided into
regimental and sedentary battalion divisions, as hereinbefore
detailed; that they be allowed to furnish volunteer militia
of the three arms in the proportions hereinafter detailed in
lieu of active battalions of regular militia. In the event
of these cities failing to furnish their full complement of
volunteers, they shall in part, or altogether, fall under the
general regulations of the regular militia, in such manner as the
Commander-in-Chief shall direct.”
The recommendations of the Commissioners were to some extent acted
upon; and since the foregoing pages were written the first-fruits
of the volunteer organisation have been witnessed, in the actual
appearance on service of a number of companies, which have been
dispatched to guard the frontiers of Canada from being made the
base of offensive operations against the Northern States by
Confederate partisans sheltered for the time under the British
banner. These are but the advance guard of the 80,000 men who have
been ordered to hold themselves in readiness for active service.
The summons of the Governor-General has been heard and obeyed in
the best spirit. The people of Canada have answered to the call
with an honourable alacrity, and have displayed a temper which
gives the fairest guarantee of their services; but they have not
indulged in threats or offensive language, and the most irritable
of Federal Republicans must admit that the cause which has called
them from their homes is entitled to consideration and respect.