as to the teachings of his predecessors. Xenophanes is once spoken of
as the founder of the Eleatic school and of its doctrine of unity.
Parmenides is a far more interesting character to Plato, and the highest
regard is expressed for him.[101] When his position as to the unity of
being and the non-existence of not-being is discussed, there is no reason
to think that his opinions are not correctly given; but when Parmenides
is introduced as a speaker, we are not to believe that he states the
opinions of the real Parmenides any more than the Platonic Sokrates
states the positions of the real Sokrates. Of Zeno we learn that he was
skilled in the art of dialectic.[102] Zeno’s statement of the occasion
and purpose of his book[103] is of course Plato’s deduction from the book
itself. The speculations of Anaxagoras are several times mentioned.[104]
The statement that he regarded the heavenly bodies as ‘λίθοι’ is a
welcome addition to our knowledge of his doctrines; and Plato’s criticism
of Anaxagoras’ use of his fundamental principle is most important.
Of Empedokles we hear but little; the statement of his doctrine of
sense-perception is a happy exception to the rule. The accuracy of
Plato’s statements where they can be tested gives an added importance to
what he says about the Pythagoreans.[105] In a word all the data which we
have from Plato are valuable, but these data are much fewer than we might
expect.
§ 3. Both the citations from earlier philosophers and the statement of
their opinions are much more frequent in the writings of Aristotle.
Two of his references to the sayings of Herakleitos are not new to
the reader of Plato; indeed Fr. 41 _ap._ Meta. 1010 a 13 is cited with
direct reference to the passage where it is cited in Plato. Fr. 37,
if we may accept the conjecture of Patin,[106] is a sarcastic phrase
of Herakleitos which Aristotle has introduced seriously into a theory
of sense-perception. Fr. 46 and 57 are summary phrases stating the
fundamental positions of Herakleitos; Fr. 51 and 55 proverbial sayings
attributed to him; Fr. 59 alone has the form of a genuine quotation.[107]
It is evident that summary phrases give the philosopher’s impression,
just as proverbial sayings may come through the medium of popular
thought, so that neither have quite the value of direct quotation.
From Xenophanes Aristotle gives two _mots_, which were attributed
naturally enough to the poet-skeptic. There is no proof that Xenophanes
was the original author of either of them.
From Parmenides four passages are quoted; strangely enough three of them
are passages that had been quoted by Plato. Lines 52-53 in our texts
of Aristotle repeat the same error that appears in our texts of Plato;
ll. 103-105 are not so near to what seems to be the original (judged
by the quotation in Simplicius) as is the Platonic version. Unless our
MSS. are greatly at fault, two of the four passages were very carelessly
reproduced, and we have reason to believe that they were drawn from
Plato. The fourth passage, given by Aristotle and Theophrastos, has the
appearance of careful quotation, though one verb has an unmetrical form
in our Aristotle (where Theophrastos gives a correct form). Aristotle
does not quote directly from either Zeno or Melissos.
Coming now to Empedokles, we find two extended passages which can only be
regarded as genuine quotations, namely ll. 287-311 and 316-325. On the
other hand several phrases (ll. 208, 326, 443) give only a general idea
of the language of Empedokles. Most of the quotations consist of from one
to four lines preserving their metrical form, so that they deserve the
name of quotations; but their accuracy is doubtful in matters of detail.
This is most clearly seen by an examination of the ten cases where the
same passage is quoted twice by Aristotle, namely: lines 36-39, 104-107,
146-148, 167, 208, 244, 270-271, 330-332, 333-335. In only three of
these instances (38-39, 270-271, 333-335) is the quotation identical; in
the other cases there is some slight difference in the text, although
commonly both versions scan correctly. An examination of the lines quoted
only once in Aristotle shows very frequent deviation from the same lines
as quoted by others. In two instances a line is omitted from the context
(37 and 99); a case is changed, a connecting particle changed or omitted
entirely, a common word is substituted for a rarer one (236-237) or an
Aristotelian word for the word required by the full context (e.g. _Meta._
1015 a 1), or finally only the substance of the line is given (e.g. lines
91, 92). These variations are so numerous as to justify the conclusion
that the text furnished by Simplicius or by Sextus Empiricus deserves
quite as much weight as that furnished by Aristotle, since the latter
cares only for the thought and not at all for the exact language in which
the thought had been clothed.
§ 4. In addition to these quotations we find in the writings of Aristotle
a comparatively full statement of the opinions of the pre-Sokratic
philosophers. Aristotle was interested in the work of his predecessors,
since he rightly regarded his own system as the crowning result of
partial views that had been set forth before. All that is valuable in
their work he would give its place in his own philosophy, and their false
or partial opinions he would controvert. Accordingly his ordinary method
is to commence the discussion of a theme by stating the opinions of his
predecessors and criticising them; and it is natural that the early
thinkers who first set forth characteristic views with force and vigour
should receive the fullest consideration, for indeed this position is
still due to them in the history of philosophy.
Inasmuch as Aristotle set the fashion for later philosophic writers
in collecting and criticising the opinions of earlier thinkers, it is
important to form a clear conception of both the excellence and the
defects of his method.
On a first examination of his statements of these opinions the student
is struck by their fullness and comparative accuracy. Emminger[108] has
collected and discussed these data, and arrives at the conclusion in
every instance that Aristotle’s statement is based on a use of the best
materials at his command, and that it reproduces correctly the view of
the philosopher in question. It is true that Emminger takes the position
of an apologist. There is no doubt, however, that Aristotle was very
familiar with the poems of Empedokles, the arguments of Zeno, the system
of the Pythagoreans; when he cannot verify his opinions, as in the case
of Thales, they are commonly introduced with a λέγεται of caution;
and where the views of earlier thinkers seem to be distorted, it is
generally due to one of several simple causes which we can estimate with
considerable accuracy.
My own conclusion is that the data given by Aristotle are of the greatest
value for the study of his predecessors, though they are to be used with
caution.
Turning to the defects of the Aristotelian method, I would point out
that there is apparently no little difference in the care with which
Aristotle had studied the writings of his predecessors. His general
attitude towards the Eleatic school is well known, and there is no
evidence that he was really familiar with the works of Xenophanes or
Parmenides or Melissos. The fact that three of the four quotations from
Parmenides were at least suggested by Plato’s writings should not receive
undue weight, yet it is certainly suggestive. Several _sayings_ are
quoted from Herakleitos, and his logic is severely criticised; we do not,
however, obtain from Aristotle any conception of the real importance of
Herakleitos. In fact, Aristotle does not seem at all to have understood
the meaning of Herakleitos’ work, whether we are to attribute it to
his inability to put himself in sympathy with so different a thinker,
or to his failure to study his writings. If we had only the data from
Aristotle, we should really know more of the significant work of
Anaximandros than of Herakleitos.
The conception of the earlier Greek thinkers which we obtain from
Aristotle’s writings is distorted along four lines.
1. Whether or not it was due to his failure to study certain of these
thinkers, Aristotle’s comparative estimate of them is not one with which
we can agree. As for Herakleitos, we can say that Aristotle assigns him
a very important place in early thought, even though he gives us but
little clue to what his work really was. Perhaps he overestimates the
work of Anaximandros and Anaximenes because he finds in them so clear an
anticipation of his own thought. Certainly he does not give due weight to
the Eleatic school as a whole, and in particular to Melissos. Melissos
was not a great original thinker along entirely new lines, but his work
in systematising Eleatic thought was very important. Perhaps because
he resembled Aristotle in what he sought to do, although from so very
different premisses, he is handled with the greater disdain.
2. We may get from Aristotle a slightly distorted view of the earlier
thinkers because he stated their views in the terms of his own
philosophic system. The commonest philosophical terms, such as ἄπειρον,
ἕν, φύσις, κενόν, τὰ ὄντα, στοιχεῖον, σῶμα, οὐσία, πάθη, slightly
changed their meanings as they gradually took their place in a definite
philosophical terminology. ἄρχη is regularly used by Aristotle to denote
the original principle of all things which the early thinkers sought,
εἶδος is used in the statement of Herakleitos’ position[109] and of the
Pythagorean philosophy[110]: the latter a word introduced into philosophy
by Plato, the former probably not used in this sense before Aristotle
himself.
3. This tendency, however, is not limited to the use of philosophical
terms. Aristotle states the general position of earlier thinkers from
the standpoint of his own developed system. The arguments of Zeno and
Melissos are thrown into logical form that he may the better criticise
them. Herakleitean teachings also are stated in Aristotelian logic, and
thereby lose the truth they might have had. Aristotle finds his own
theory of indeterminate potential matter in Anaximandros, and it is no
easy task to discern what is due to Aristotle and what to Anaximandros
in the Aristotelian account. Again in the case of Parmenides we may well
question the statement[111] that his two principles were heat = fire =
_being_, and cold = earth = _not-being_.
4. Finally Aristotle may be said to give a false impression of his
predecessors when he assigns the probable causes for their opinions. Cf.
_Meta._ 983 b 18, supra p. 2; _Phys._ 204 b 26, supra p. 10 ‘in order that
other things may not be blotted out by the infinite;’ _de anima_ 405 a 25,
supra p. 58.
The mere statement of these lines, along which Aristotle may be said
slightly to distort the views of his predecessors, is sufficient to put
the reader on his guard; and it is comparatively easy to make allowance
for them.
§ 5. The fragments of Theophrastos that remain are sufficient only to
show that he studied the work of the pre-Sokratic thinkers even more
carefully than Aristotle; to make any exact inferences as to his method
of making quotations, however, is impossible on the basis of these
fragments. Four of his quotations are also cited by Aristotle,[112]
and it is interesting to notice that in the second and the fourth of
this list Theophrastos gives a text that is probably more correct than
that found in our MSS. of Aristotle. The remaining quotations found in
Theophrastos[113] show a familiarity only with Empedokles. Only one of
these scans correctly, and that by the change of one word, which probably
was erroneously copied. Ll. 191-192 have lost some words, and ll. 423-424
are quite rewritten in prose. Apparently Theophrastos was even more
careless of the form of his quotations than Aristotle, though he knows
the early thinkers at first hand and can correct Aristotle’s quotations.
The statement of the _opinions_ of these thinkers by Theophrastos will be
considered later in connection with the doxographic tradition.
§ 6. From the time of Aristotle to Plutarch we know comparatively little
of the works of the early philosophers, or of the habit of quoting from
them. There is abundant evidence, however, that they were studied; the
positions and sayings of Herakleitos especially seem to have attracted
much attention. The works extant under the name of Hippokrates are
attributed by some writers to a period even before Aristotle. In these
works there are allusions to the positions of Empedokles and Anaxagoras,
and Book I of the treatise περὶ διαιτῆς contains much Herakleitean
material. There is scarcely one direct quotation (cf. Fr. 60), and
Bernays cannot be said to be successful in reconstructing phrases of
Herakleitos from this source. The book, however, is a comparatively early
witness to the work of Herakleitos, and doubly important because it is
independent of that Stoic study to which is due most of our knowledge of
him.
§ 7. More than the other schools that succeeded Aristotle the Stoics
devoted themselves to the history of philosophy, and they were interested
in Herakleitos for the same reason that Aristotle had been interested in
Anaximandros, because they regarded him as a precursor in their own line
of thought. Herakleitean phrases occur already in the hymn of Kleanthes
to Zeus, thus showing that they had already been adopted into the Stoic
phraseology.[114] Philodemos (vii. 81) quotes Chrysippos also as giving a
quotation from Herakleitos.
It is only from later writers, however, that we can ascertain how much
Herakleitos was studied in this period. Apparently collections were
made of his sayings, which soon displaced the more complete form of his
writings. Indeed, it is hard to prove that his book existed at all in
later times, although Sextus Empiricus quotes a passage of some length
which is considered to be the beginning of the work. Further, the works
of at least some Stoic writers must have abounded in quotations from
Herakleitos. In the writings of Philo there are numerous allusions to
sayings of Herakleitos; and the Stoic context, the connection with Stoic
ethics, as well as Philo’s general interest in the Stoic school, make it
probable that he finds his Herakleitos in his Stoic sources. But while
Philo is thus an important witness to the study of Herakleitos among the
Stoics, he is of little value in reconstructing the text of the Ephesian
philosopher. The carelessness of his method of quotation is shown by
the form in which he gives three lines of Empedokles (48-49, 386). To
seven fragments of Herakleitos (1, 22, 24, 46, 56, 64, 70) Philo makes a
mere allusion; in another series of instances (10, 67, 69, 79, 80, 82) a
phrase, often a single word, of Herakleitos is worked into the context.
Fr. 68 and 85 are quoted very carelessly, and 76 and 89 have assumed a
form very different from that which they originally had. Commonly the
name of the author (Herakleitos) is not given.
Cicero quotes Herakleitos 113 in Greek without the author’s name, and
translates 114 carefully; Bywater, p. x, suggests that he found the
latter in somebody’s _de exilio commentatio_. Returning to the Stoic
school, we find in Seneca an accurate translation of Herakleitos 77 and
81, so that we are inclined to trust his version of 120. What seems to
be Herakleitos 113, however, is assigned to Demokritos in an expanded
form. The epistles attributed to Herakleitos belong to approximately
this period, and are interesting only as additional evidence to the
study of Herakleitos by Stoic philosophers. Stobaeos quotes several
Herakleitean phrases from Musonius. Fr. 20 and 69 are given only in
substance, a phrase from 114 is worked into the context, and 75 is quoted
in a later form. Fr. 75 as well as 27 and 67 is found in the second and
third books of Clement’s _Paedagogos_, books which draw largely from
Musonius. The use of Herakleitean material by Lucian, especially in his
_Vitarum auctio_, ch. xiv., is doubtless based on a Stoic source, as is
indicated by the work ἐκπύρωσις. We may conclude this survey of Stoic
writers with Marcus Aurelius. In his writings we find bare allusion to
Herakleitos 2, 5, 20, 73, and perhaps to 97; a word or two of 34, 84, and
98 are worked into the text; while 25, 69, 90, 93, 94 are half quoted
in the text. Apparently all are allusions to, or abbreviated citations
of, sentences with which the reader was supposed to be familiar. It is
wholly improbable that citations made in this manner were drawn from
the book itself; rather they seem to point to a collection of ‘sayings’
of Herakleitos which must have been quite generally known. Unless such
a collection is assumed, they must be regarded as phrases which were
familiar to all because they were so often quoted. The former hypothesis
seems to me the more tenable.
§ 8. We find in Plutarch one of the principal sources of our fragments.
Nearly fifty fragments of Herakleitos are quoted more or less fully
in his writings. Many of these quotations consist of a single phrase
containing perhaps only a word or two of the original writer, so that
they are not of much value for purposes of reconstruction. Sometimes the
citation is given in Plutarch’s own words;[115] sometimes there is only
a careless allusion, as to Fr. 41, 43, and 120. Even when we seem to
have a real quotation, it may be expanded, as in the case of Fr. 108 ap.
_Moral._ 143 D compared with _Moral._ 644 F, or Fr. 31 ap. _Moral._ 98 D
as compared with _Moral._ 957 A. So I am inclined to regard Fr. 11, 22,
and 44 as having been expanded by Plutarch. We cannot therefore place
much reliance on the form of Plutarch’s quotations from Herakleitos. As
to the source of these quotations we should notice that two of them (Fr.
41 and 45) had been mentioned by Plato, and others (38, 41, 43, and 105)
by Aristotle; it is probable that Plutarch quotes these because they were
familiar to the readers of Plato and Aristotle. Fr. 20, 22, 24, 25, 34,
44, 75, and 85 occur in Stoic writers, and Plutarch himself refers 91 to
the Stoics. Fr. 45-56 are made Stoic in Plutarch by the addition of the
word κόσμου (defining ἁρμονίη) which does not appear e.g. in Plato; and
Fr. 19, 20, 74, 75, and 87 have a decided Stoic colouring. Thus we may
suspect that about half the quotations from Herakleitos were drawn from
Stoic sources. On the other hand 78 with its context seems to be based
on a considerable passage of Herakleitos, and 11, 12, and 127 have the
appearance of careful quotation.
Plutarch’s method in handling quotations from philosophers who wrote in
poetry is more satisfactory. It is only rarely that the thought is put
in his own words,[116] or that the quotation consists of less than a
full line. Sometimes lines are grouped which do not belong together, as
ap. _Moral._ 607 C and 618 B. In some instances the text itself seems to
be at fault.[117] In general, however, the poetic form protected such
quotations from change, and the poetic form was naturally retained in
quotations for the purpose of embellishment. I may add that Plutarch
rarely neglects to give the name of the author from whom he quotes. As
to the source of these poetic quotations, we cannot doubt that Plutarch
sometimes quotes Empedokles from the original. A literary man could
hardly fail to be acquainted with his poems, and it is by no means
likely that the quotations _Moral._ 607 C, 1111 F, 1113 are taken from
an intermediate source. Five of the quotations from Parmenides, on the
other hand, were not new to the readers of Plato and Aristotle, and the
two remaining ones, together with some of the lines from Empedokles, as I
have tried to show elsewhere,[118] were probably drawn from a collection
of passages on the moon. There is no evidence that Plutarch knew
Parmenides at first hand. Many passages of Empedokles also had become
common property in the time of Plutarch, and in some instances Plutarch
no doubt found collections of quotations suitable for his purpose, so
that we cannot attribute all the single lines quoted from Empedokles to
Plutarch’s own study of his poems.
§ 9. Judged by the Herakleitos fragments which they yield, the works
of Clement and Hippolytos are hardly second in importance to Plutarch
for the student of early Greek philosophy. In the _Protreptikos_ of
Clement there is an interesting series of passages from Herakleitos on
popular worship; in the _Paedagogos_ and the first and fourth books of
the _Stromata_ there are scattered quotations most of which bear clear
marks of their secondary origin; book II contains several quotations
from the introduction to Herakleitos’ works; while the third and fifth
books of the _Stromata_ contain a much larger collection of passages
from Herakleitos, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Empedokles. A casual
glance at the whole series of quotations shows that Clement’s method was
by no means uniform, and that he was often contented with a secondary
source for his quotations, not taking the trouble to look them up in the
original. In the first book of the _Stromata_ the first quotation from
Herakleitos is a proverb familiar in Greek literature, the second passage
a bare allusion to a sentence quoted by Plutarch, and the two remaining
ones refer to two quotations also given by Diogenes. That Clement
used the βίοι which were the basis of the work of Diogenes Laertios is
probable from his quotation of Parmenides 28-30 and Empedokles 26-28,
383-384. It is also highly probable that Clement found much of his
material in Stoic sources. It is generally agreed that in _Paedagogos_
ii. and iii. he freely used Musonius. Hera. 122 _ap._ Clement 188 ‘what
men do not expect at death’ is interpreted by Clement as referring to
Stoic fire, and Clement 649 (Hera. 123) also attributes to Herakleitos
and the Stoics an idea belonging to the latter only. Hera. 77 is alluded
to by Seneca as familiar to his Stoic readers, and other fragments cited
by Clement were apparently found by Philo in his Stoic sources. Hera.
69 _ap._ Clement 718 looks like another form of Hera. 19 which Plutarch
quotes from a Stoic source, and perhaps we may regard 20 also as from the
Stoic source from which Plutarch drew. Hera. 31 _ap._ Clement 87 includes
an added phrase (as to the stars) which appears also in _one_ of the two
passages in Plutarch where it is quoted. One of the lines of Parmenides
and six of the single lines of Empedokles given by Clement are also found
in Plutarch. Consequently I regard it as not improbable that Clement drew
quotations from Plutarch, and as all but certain that he drew from the
Stoic sources of Plutarch. The wrong interpretation of Hera. 116 (_ap._
Clement 699), 122 (_ap._ 18), 67 (_ap._ 261), 79 (_ap._ 111), and perhaps
27 (_ap._ 229) is additional proof that Clement was entirely unfamiliar
with the context in which these passages originally stood, and therefore
probably did not draw from the original. While we are quite unable to
trust Clement’s interpretation of his quotations, it should be remarked
that he is exceedingly careful to give the correct form (e.g. Hera. 101
_ap._ Clement 586 as compared with the same fragment in Hippolytos; in
this quotation he gives the dialect forms with his usual fidelity).