_Gen. corr._ i. 1; 314 a 11. Others assert that matter is more than one,

as Empedokles and Leukippos and Anaxagoras, but there is a difference

between these. And Anaxagoras even ignores his own word, for he says

that he has shown genesis and destruction to be the same as change,

but like the others, he says there are many elements.... Anaxagoras et

al. say there are an infinite number of elements. For he regards the

homoeomeries as elements, such as bone and flesh and marrow, and other

things of which the part (μέρος) has the same name as the whole.

_De anima_ i. 2; 404 a 25. In like manner Anaxagoras says that soul is

the moving power, and if any one else has said that mind moved the all,

no one said it absolutely as did Demokritos.

_De anima_ i. 2; 404 b 1. Anaxagoras speaks less clearly about these

things; for many times he rightly and truly says that mind is the cause,

while at other times he says it is soul; for (he says) it is in all

animals, both great and small, both honoured and dishonoured. But it is

not apparent that what is intelligently called mind is present in all

animals alike, nor even in all men.

_De anima_ i. 2; 405 a 13. Anaxagoras seems to say that soul and mind are

different, as we said before, but he treats both as one in nature, except

that he regards mind especially as the first principle of all things; for

he says that this alone of all things is simple and unmixed and pure. And

he assigns both to the same first principle, both knowledge and motion,

saying that mind moves the all.[91]

_De anima_ i. 19; 405 b 19. Anaxagoras alone says that mind does not

suffer change, and has nothing in common with any of the other things.

_De anima_ iii. 4; 429 a 18. It is necessary then that it be unmixed

since it knows [νοεῖ] all things, as Anaxagoras says, in order that it

may rule, that is, that it may know [γνωρίζῃ].

_De part. anim._ iv. 10; 687 a 7. Anaxagoras says that man is the most

intelligent of animals because he has hands.

_De plant._ i.; 815 a 16. Anaxagoras said that plants are animals and

feel pleasure and pain, inferring this because they shed their leaves and

let them grow again.

_De plant._ i.; 816 b 26. Anaxagoras said that plants have these (motion

and sensation) and breathing.

_De plant._ i.; 817 a 26. Anaxagoras said that their moisture is from the

earth, and on this account he said to Lechineos that the earth is mother

of plants, and the sun father.

_De X. Z. G._ ii.; 976 b 20. Anaxagoras busying himself on this point,

was satisfied with saying that the void does not exist, nevertheless he

says beings move, though there is no void.

_Meta._ i. 3; 984 a 11. Anaxagoras of Klazomenae, who preceded him

(Empedokles) in point of age and followed him in his works, says that

the first principles are infinite in number; for nearly all things being

made up of like parts (homoeomeries), as for instance fire and water, he

says arise and perish only by composition and separation, and there is no

other arising and perishing, but they abide eternal.

_Meta._ i. 3; 984 b 8. Besides these and similar causes, inasmuch as they

are not such as to generate the nature of things, they (again compelled,

as we said, by the truth itself) sought the first principle which lay

nearest. For perhaps neither fire nor earth nor any other such thing

should fittingly be or be thought a cause why some things exist and

others arise; nor is it well to assign any such matter to its voluntary

motion or to chance. Moreover one who said that as mind exists in

animals, so it exists in nature as the cause of the universe and of all

order, appeared as a sober man in contrast with those before who spoke

rashly.

_Meta._ i. 4; 985 a 18. Anaxagoras uses mind as a device by which to

construct the universe, and when he is at a loss for the cause why

anything necessarily is, then he drags this in, but in other cases he

assigns any other cause rather than mind for what comes into being.

_Meta._ i. 8; 989 a 30. And if any one were to assume that Anaxagoras

said the elements were two, he certainly would assume it according to a

principle which that one did not describe distinctly; nevertheless he

would follow along a necessary path those who guided him. For though it

is strange particularly that he said all things had been mixed together

at first, and that they must first have existed unmixed because they came

together, and because chance had not in its nature to be mingled with

chance; and in addition to this it is strange that he should separate

qualities and accidental characteristics from essences (for there is

mixture and separation of these), nevertheless if any one should follow

him and try to put together what he wanted to say, perhaps he would seem

to speak in a very novel manner. For when nothing was separated, clearly

it was not possible to say anything true of that essence, I mean to

say that anything was white or black or grey or any other colour, but

everything was necessarily colourless; for it might have any of these

colours. In like manner it is tasteless, nor according to the same line

of argument could it have any other of the like qualities; for it could

not have any quality, or quantity, or anything. For then one of what are

sometimes called forms would exist for it, and this is impossible when

all things are mixed together; for it would have been already separated,

and he says that all things are mixed together except mind, and this

alone is unmixed and pure. It results from these views that he says the

first principles are unity (for this is simple and unmixed), and what is

different from unity, such as we suppose the undefined to be before it

was defined and partook of any form. So he does not speak rightly or

clearly, still he means something like those who spoke later and with

greater clearness.

_Meta._ iii. 5; 1009 b 25. And he called to mind the saying of Anaxagoras

that just such things as men assume will be real for them.

_Meta._ iii. 7; 1012 a 26. The thought of Anaxagoras ... that some

things exist between contradictory propositions, so that all things are

false; for when they are mixed together, the mixture is neither good nor

not-good, so that there is nothing true to be said.[92]

_Meta._ x. 6; 1063 b 25. According to the position of Herakleitos, or of

Anaxagoras, it is not possible to speak the truth.

_Ethic._ vi. 5; 1141 b 3. Wherefore they say that Thales and Anaxagoras

and such wise men are lacking in intelligence, when they see them

ignorant in things that are for their own advantage, and they say they

know things extraordinary and wonderful and dreadful and divine, but

these are of no use, because they do not seek human good.

_Ethic._ x. 9; 1179 a 13. And Anaxagoras did not seem to regard the rich

man nor yet the powerful man as the happy one when he said he would not

be surprised if any one appeared strange to the many; for these judge by

what is outside, for that is all they can see.

PASSAGES IN THE DOXOGRAPHISTS REFERRING TO ANAXAGORAS.

Aet. _Plac._ i. 3; _Dox._ 279. Anaxagoras of Klazomenae declared that

homoeomeries are the first principles of things. For he thought it most

difficult to understand how anything should arise out of not-being, or

perish into not-being. Certainly we take simple food of one kind, such

as the bread of Demeter, and we drink water; and from this nourishment

there are nurtured hair, veins, arteries, sinews, bones, and the other

parts. Since these arise we must acknowledge that in the nourishment that

is taken are present all realities, and from them everything will grow.

And in that nourishment there are parts productive of blood and of sinews

and bones and the rest; these are the parts that may be discovered by

contemplation. For it is not necessary to perceive everything by sense,

how that bread and water give rise to these things, but the parts may

be discovered in them by contemplation. From the fact that parts exist

in the nourishment like the things that are generated, he called them

homoeomeries, and declared that they are the first principles of things;

and he called the homoeomeries matter, but the active cause that arranges

all things is mind. And he began thus: All things were together and

mind arranged and disposed them. So we must assert that he associated

an artificer with matter. i. 7; 299. Anaxagoras says that bodies are

established according to first principles, and the mind of God arranged

them and caused the generations of all things. i. 7; 302. The mind that

made the universe is God. i. 14; 312. Anaxagoras: The homoeomeries are

of many shapes. i. 17; 315. Anaxagoras and Demokritos: The elements are

mixed by juxtaposition. i. 24; 320. (See p. 241. i. 29; 326.) Anaxagoras

and the Stoics: Cause is not evident to human reason; for some things

happen by necessity, and others by fate, and others by purpose, and

others by chance, and others of their own accord. i. 30; 326. Anaxagoras:

Origination is at the same time composition and separation, that is,

genesis and destruction.

Aet. _Plac._ ii. 1; 327. The universe is one. ii. 4; 331. The universe

is perishable. ii. 8; 337. Diogenes and Anaxagoras: After the universe

arose and the animals were brought forth out of the earth, it tipped

somehow of its own accord towards its south part, perhaps intentionally,

in order that some parts of the universe might be inhabited and others

uninhabited according as they are cold, or hot, or temperate. ii. 13;

341. Anaxagoras: The surrounding aether is of a fiery nature, and

catching up stones from the earth by the power of its rotation and

setting them on fire it has made them into stars. ii. 16; 345. Anaxagoras

et al.: All the stars move from east to west. ii. 21; 351. Anaxagoras:

The sun is many times as large as the Peloponnesos. ii. 23; 352.

Anaxagoras: The solstices are due to a repulsion of the air towards the

south, for the sun compressed it and by condensation made it strong. ii.

25; 356. Anaxagoras and Demokritos: The moon is a fiery solid body having

in itself plains and mountains and valleys. ii. 29; 360. Anaxagoras, as

Theophrastos says, attributed eclipses to bodies below the moon which

sometimes come in front of it.[93] ii. 30; 361. Anaxagoras says that the

unevenness of the composition (the surface of the moon) is due to the

mixture of earthy matter with cold, since the moon has some high places

and some low hollows. And the dark stuff is mingled with the fiery,

the result of which is the shadowy appearance; whence it is called a

false-shining star.

Aet. _Plac._ iii. 1; 365. Anaxagoras: The shadow of the earth falls

along this part of the heaven (the milky way), when the sun is beneath

the earth and does not shed light on all things. iii. 2; 366. Anaxagoras

and Demokritos: (Comets etc.) are due to the conjunction of two or more

stars, and the combination of their rays. 367. The so-called shooting

stars come darting down from the aether like sparks, and so they are

immediately extinguished. iii. 3; 368. Anaxagoras: When the hot falls

on the cold (that is, aether on air), it produces thunder by the noise

it makes, and lightning by the colour on the black of the cloud, and

the thunderbolt by the mass and amount of the light, and the typhoon by

the more material fire, and the fiery whirlwind by the fire mixed with

cloud. iii. 4; 371. Anaxagoras: Clouds and snow are formed in somewhat

the same manner; and hail is formed when, already cooled by its descent

earthwards, it is thrust forth from frozen clouds; and it is made round.

iii. 5; 373. Anaxagoras: (The rainbow) is a reflection of the sun’s

brightness from thick cloud, and it is always set opposite the star

which gives rise to the reflection. And in a similar way he accounts

for the so-called parhelia, which take place along the Pontos. iii. 15;

379. Anaxagoras: (Earthquakes take place) when the air falls on the

thickness of the earth’s surface in a sheltered place, and it shakes the

surrounding medium and makes it tremble, because it is unable to effect

a separation. iii. 16; 381. Anaxagoras: When the moisture which was at

first gathered in pools was burned all around by the revolution of the

sun, and the fresh water was evaporated into saltness and bitterness, the

rest (of the sea) remained.

Aet. _Plac._ iv. 1; 385. Anaxagoras: The Nile comes from the snow in

Ethiopia which melts in summer and freezes in winter. iv. 3; 387.

Anaxagoras et al.: The soul is of the nature of air. iv. 5; 392. The

intelligence is gathered in the breast. The soul is imperishable. iv. 9;

396. Anaxagoras et al.: Sensations are deceptive. 397. Sensations arise

part by part according to the symmetry of the pores, each particular

object of sense corresponding to a particular sense (organ). iv. 19; 409.

Anaxagoras: Sound arises when wind falls on solid air, and by the return

of the blow which is dealt to the ear; so that what is called an echo

takes place.

Aet. _Plac._ v. 7; 420. Anaxagoras, Parmenides: Males are conceived when

seed from the right side enters the right side of the womb, or seed from

the left side the left side of the womb; but if its course is changed

females are born. v. 19; 430. As Anaxagoras and Euripides say: Nothing

of what is born dies, but one thing separated from one part and added to

another produces different forms. v. 20; 432. Anaxagoras: All animals

have reason that shows itself in activity, but they do not have a sort

of intelligence that receives impressions, which may be called the

interpreter of intelligence. v. 25; 437. Anaxagoras: Sleep is due to a

weariness of the body’s energy; for it is an experience of the body, not

of the soul; and death is the separation of the soul from the body.

Theophr. _Phys. opin._ Fr. 4; _Dox._ 479. Theophrastos says that the

teaching of Anaxagoras is much like that of Anaximandros; for Anaxagoras

says that in the separation of the infinite, things that are akin come

together, and whatever gold there is in the all becomes gold, and

whatever earth becomes earth, and in like manner each of the other

things, not as though they came into being, but as though they were

existing before. And Anaxagoras postulated intelligence (νοῦν) as the

cause of motion and of coming into being, and when this caused separation

worlds were produced and other objects sprang forth. He might seem, he

says, to make the material causes of things taking place thus infinite,

but the cause of motion and of coming into being one. But if one were to

assume that the mixture of all things were one nature undefined in form

and in amount, which he seems to mean, it follows that he speaks of two

first principles, the nature of the infinite and intelligence, so that

he appears to treat all the material elements in much the same manner as

Anaximandros.

_Phys. op._ Fr. 19; _Dox._ 493. See Aet. ii. 29; _Dox._ 360, translated

above, p. 255.

_Phys. opin._ Fr. 23; _Dox._ 495. And the third opinion about the sea

is that the water which filters and strains through the earth becomes

salt because the earth has such flavours in it; and they point out as a

proof of this that salt and saltpetre are dug up out of the earth, and

there are bitter flavours at many places in the earth. Anaxagoras and

Metrodoros came to be of this opinion.

Theophr. _de sens._ 27; _Dox._ 507. Anaxagoras held that sensation takes

place by opposite qualities; for like is not affected by like. And he

attempts to enumerate things one by one. For seeing is a reflection

in the pupil, and objects are not reflected in the like, but in the

opposite. And for many creatures there is a difference of colour in

the daytime, and for others at night, so that at that time they are

sharpsighted. But in general the night is more of the same colour as the

eyes. And the reflection takes place in the daytime, since light is the

cause of reflection; but that colour which prevails the more is reflected

in its opposite. In the same manner both touch and taste discern; for

what is equally warm or equally cold does not produce warm or cold when

it approaches its like, nor yet do men recognise sweet or bitter by

these qualities in themselves, but they perceive the cold by the warm,

the drinkable water by the salt, the sweet by the bitter, according

as each quality is absent; for all things are existing in us. So also

smell and hearing take place, the one in connection with breathing, the

other by the penetration of sound into the brain; for the surrounding

bone against which the sound strikes is hollow. And every sensation is

attended with pain, which would seem to follow from the fundamental

thesis; for every unlike thing by touching produces distress. And this

is evident both in the duration and in the excessive intensity of the

sensations. For both bright colours and very loud sounds occasion pain,

and men are not able to bear them for any long time. And the larger

animals have the more acute sensations, for sensation is simply a matter

of size. For animals that have large, pure, and bright eyes see large

things afar off, but of those that have small eyes the opposite is true.

And the same holds true of hearing. For large ears hear large sounds

afar off, smaller ones escape their notice, and small ears hear small

sounds near at hand. And the same is true of smell; for the thin air has

the stronger odour, since warm and rarefied air has an odour. And when a

large animal breathes, it draws in the thick with the rarefied, but the

small animal only the rarefied, so that large animals have a better sense

of smell. For an odour near at hand is stronger than one far off, because

that is thicker, and what is scattered is weakened. It comes about to

this, large animals do not perceive the thin air, and small animals do

not perceive the thick air.

Cic. _de Nat. Deor._ i. 11; _Dox._ 532. Whence Anaxagoras, who was a

pupil of Anaximenes, first taught that the separation and character

of all things were determined and arranged by the power and reason

of infinite mind; but in this he fails to see that no motion can be

connected with and contiguous to infinite sensation, and that no

sensation at all can exist, by which nature as a whole can feel a shock.

Wherefore if he meant that mind is as it were some sort of living being,

there will be something inside of it from which that living being is

determined. But what could be inside of mind? So the living being would

be joined with an external body. But since this is not satisfactory, and

mind is ‘open and simple,’ joined with nothing by means of which it can

feel, he seems to go beyond the scope of our intelligence.

Hipp. _Phil._ 8; _Dox._ 561. After him came Anaxagoras of Klazomenae,

son of Hegesiboulos. He said that the first principle of the all is mind

and matter, mind the active first principle, and matter the passive.

For when all things were together, mind entered and disposed them. The

material first principles are infinite, and the smaller ones of these he

calls infinite. And all things partake of motion when they are moved by

mind and like things come together. And objects in the heavens have been

ordered by their circular motion. The dense and the moist and the dark

and the cold and all heavy things come together into the midst, and the

earth consists of these when they are solidified; but the opposite to

these, the warm, the bright, the dry, and the light move out beyond the

aether. The earth is flat in form, and keeps its place in the heavens

because of its size and because there is no void; and on this account

the air by its strength holds up the earth, which rides on the air. And

the sea arose from the moisture on the earth, both of the waters which

have fallen after being evaporated, and of the rivers that flow down into

it.[94] And the rivers get their substance from the clouds and from the

waters that are in the earth. For the earth is hollow and has water in

the hollow places. And the Nile increases in summer because waters flow

down into it from snows †at the north.†[95]

Sun and moon and all the stars are fiery stones that are borne about by

the revolution of the aether. And sun and moon and certain other bodies

moving with them, but invisible to us, are below the stars. Men do not

feel the warmth of the stars, because they are so far away from the

earth; and they are not warm in the same way that the sun is, because

they are in a colder region. The moon is below the sun and nearer us.

The sun is larger than the Peloponnesos. The moon does not have its own

light, but light from the sun. The revolution of the stars takes them

beneath the earth. The moon is eclipsed when the earth goes in front of

it, and sometimes when the bodies beneath the moon go in front of it;

and the sun is eclipsed when the new moon goes in front of it. And the

solstices are occasioned because the sun and the moon are thrust aside

by the air. And the moon changes its course frequently because it is not

able to master the cold. He first determined the matter of the moon’s

phases. He said the moon is made of earth and has plains and valleys in

it. The milky way is a reflection of the light of the stars which do not

get their light from the sun. The stars which move across the heavens,

darting down like sparks, are due to the motion of the sphere.

And winds arise when the air is rarefied by the sun, and when objects are

set on fire and moving towards the sphere are borne away. Thunders and

lightnings arise from heat striking the clouds. Earthquakes arise from

the air above striking that which is beneath the earth; for when this is

set in motion, the earth which rides on it is tossed about by it. And

animals arose in the first place from moisture, and afterwards one from

another; and males arise when the seed that is separated from the right

side becomes attached to the right side of the womb, and females when

the opposite is the case. He was in his prime in the first year of the

eighty-eighth Olympiad, at the time when it is said Plato was born. They

say that he became endowed with knowledge of the future.

Herm. _I. G. P._ 6; _Dox._ 652. Anaxagoras takes me aside and instructs

me as follows:—Mind is the first principle of all things, and it is

the cause and master of all, and it provides arrangement for what is

disarranged, and separation for what has been mixed, and an orderly

universe for what was disorderly.

APPENDIX

THE SOURCES OF THE FRAGMENTS.

The value of a quotation depends on two things, (1) the habit of

accuracy in the person who quotes it, and (2) whether it is quoted

from the original or from some intermediate source. Consequently the

careful student of the early Greek philosophers, who depends wholly on

quotations for his direct knowledge of these thinkers, cannot neglect the

consideration of these two questions. Closely connected with the accuracy

of quotations is the question as to the accuracy of later writers in the

opinions which they have attributed to these thinkers. These topics I

propose to consider very briefly, that the student may have at least some

clue to guide him in his studies.

I.

§ 1. We find in Plato[96] scarcely any quotations, since the literary

character of the dialogue excludes anything that might seem pedantic.

There are allusions to certain phrases of Herakleitos which had

already become all but proverbs:—the Herakleitean sun, the harmony

of opposites, ‘all in motion’ with the example of the river; and

the comparison ‘god:man::man:ape’ is also given as the teaching of

Herakleitos.[97] Similarly phrases of Anaxagoras are brought into the

dialogues—‘all things were together,’ ‘νοῦς disposed all things,’[98]

but they hardly deserve the name of quotations. Other allusions to his

theory do not even suggest a quotation. The only real quotations are

from Parmenides,[99] and in two of these passages the text as read

by Simplicius was corrupt and unmetrical. Simplicius quotes the same

passage at one time from Plato, at another time apparently from the

original,[100] so that he enables us to correct the form of the quotation

which he (or the writer from whom he drew) read in his MS. of Plato.

Plato’s writings betray no particular interest in any of the pre-Sokratic

thinkers except Parmenides and the Pythagorean school, nor do they convey

any hint as to the value of the work of the other early thinkers. So it

need not surprise us that he alludes to popular phrases and seems rather

to avoid exact quotation.

The first philosophers of Greece · 第 16 / 20 段