THE CHARLESTON FORTS
[Sidenote] Foster to De Russey, November 24, 1860. W.R. Vol. I.,
p. 76.
Major Anderson reached Fort Moultrie and assumed command on the 21st
of November, 1860. Having from his several interviews with the
President, Secretary of War, and Lieutenant-General Scott become fully
impressed with the importance of his trust, he proceeded as a first
duty to acquaint himself thoroughly with his situation and resources.
The great Charleston secession celebration on the 17th had been held
while he was on his way; the glare of its illumination was
extinguished, the smoke of its bonfires had been dissipated by the
fresh Atlantic breezes, and its holiday insurgents had returned to
the humdrum of their routine employments. It was, therefore, in
uninterrupted quiet that on the 23d of November he in company with
Captain Foster made a tour of inspection to the different forts, and
on the same day wrote out and transmitted to the War Department a
somewhat detailed report of what he saw with eyes fresh to the scenes
and surroundings, which, as he already felt, were to become the
subjects of his most intense solicitude. On the main point, indeed,
there was no room for doubt. Agreeing with General Scott, with Colonel
Gardner, and with Major Porter, he gave the Government its fourth
warning that the harbor must be immediately and strongly reenforced.
[Sidenote] Anderson to Adjutant-General, November 23, 1860. W.R.
Vol. I., p. 74.
... The garrison now in it [Moultrie] is so weak as to invite an
attack, which is openly and publicly threatened. We are about
sixty, and have a line of rampart of 1500 feet in length to
defend. If beleaguered, as every man of the command must be either
engaged or held on the alert, they will be exhausted and worn down
in a few days and nights of such service as they would then have
to undergo.
Such, in brief, was the condition of the fort he had been sent to
hold. Moultrie was clearly the weak point of the situation. Already
informed, to some extent at least, by the superior military genius of
General Scott, in his recent interviews with that distinguished
commander, Major Anderson now more forcibly, from personal inspection,
comprehended its strong points. What was then perfectly obvious to the
trained military insight of Scott and Anderson is now in the light of
historical events quite as obvious to the civilian. Look at any good
map of Charleston harbor, and it will be seen that the city lies on
the extreme point of a tongue of land between the Ashley and Cooper
rivers, every part being within easy range under the guns of Castle
Pinckney, on a small island, three-quarters of a mile distant. Four
miles to seaward is the mouth of the harbor, and nearly midway therein
stood the more extensive and imposing work of Fort Sumter, its guns
not only sweeping all the approaches and ship-channels, but the shores
and islands on either hand. It needs but a glance at the map to see
that with proper garrisons and armaments Fort Sumter commanded the
harbor. and Castle Pinckney commanded the city.
If the Government could hitherto plead ignorance of these advantages
against the rising insurrection, that excuse was no longer left after
the report of Major Anderson. In this same report he calls attention
to them in detail. Though not in a complete state of defense, he gives
notice that Fort Sumter "is now ready for the comfortable
accommodation of one company, and indeed for the temporary reception
of its proper garrison. Captain Foster states that the magazines
(four) are done and in excellent condition; that they now contain
forty thousand pounds of cannon-powder and a full supply of ammunition
for one tier of guns. This work [Sumter] is the key to the entrance of
this harbor; its guns command this work [Moultrie], and could soon
drive out its occupants. It should be garrisoned at once."
Still more strenuously does he insist upon the value of Castle
Pinckney. "Castle Pinckney, a small casemated work, perfectly
commanding the city of Charleston, is in excellent condition with the
exception of a few repairs, which will require the expenditure of
about five hundred dollars.... It is, in my opinion, essentially
important that this castle should be immediately occupied by a
garrison, say, of two officers and thirty men. The safety of our
little garrison would be rendered more certain, and our fort would be
more secure from an attack by such a holding of Castle Pinckney, than
it would be from quadrupling our force. The Charlestonians would not
venture to attack this place [Moultrie] when they knew that their city
was at the mercy of the commander of Castle Pinckney.... If my force
was not so very small I would not hesitate to send a detachment at
once to garrison that work." So full of zeal was Major Anderson that
the Government should without delay augment its moral and material
strength, that in default of soldiers he desired to improvise a
garrison for it by sending there a detachment of thirty laborers in
charge of an officer, vainly hoping to supply them with arms and
instruct them in drill, and hold the work until reënforcements should
come. Having in detail proposed protective measures, he again, in the
same letter, forcibly presents the main question of the hour to the
Secretary of War, whose weakness and treachery were as yet
unsuspected.
[Sidenote] Anderson to Adjutant General, Nov. 23, 1860. W.R. Vol.
I., pp. 75-6.
Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney must be garrisoned immediately if
the Government determines to keep command of this harbor. I need
not say how anxious I am--indeed determined, so far as honor will
permit--to avoid collision with the citizens of South Carolina.
Nothing, however, will be better calculated to prevent bloodshed
than our being found in such an attitude that it would be madness
and folly to attack us.... The clouds are threatening and the
storm may break upon us at any moment. I do, then, most earnestly
entreat that a reënforcement be immediately sent to this garrison,
and that at least two companies be sent at the same time to Fort
Sumter and Castle Pinckney--half a company, under a judicious
commander, sufficing, I think, for the latter work.... With these
three works garrisoned as requested, and with a supply of ordnance
stores, for which I shall send requisitions in a few days, I shall
feel that, by the blessing of God, there may be a hope that no
blood will be shed, and that South Carolina will not attempt to
take these forts by force, but will resort to diplomacy to secure
them. If we neglect, however, to strengthen ourselves, she will,
unless these works are surrendered on their first demand, most
assuredly immediately attack us.
[Sidenote] Adjutant-General to Anderson, Nov. 24, 1860. W.R. Vol.
I., p. 76.
[Sidenote] Ibid., Nov 28, 1860, W.R. Vol. I., p. 77.
If Major Anderson had added no further word to the clear and
straightforward statement and recommendation thus far quoted, his
professional judgment and manly sense of duty would stand honorably
vindicated before posterity. But his language of loyalty, of wisdom,
of humanity, of soldierly devotion, which ought to have elicited a
reply as inspiring as a drum-roll or a trumpet-blast, brought him no
kindred echo. There was fear in the Executive Mansion, conspiracy in
the Cabinet, treason and intrigue in the War Department. Chilling
instructions came that he might employ civilians in fatigue and police
duty, and that he might send his proposed party of laborers to Castle
Pinckney. Meanwhile some of his suggestions would be under
consideration; besides, he was cautioned to send his communications to
the Adjutant-General or Secretary of War, with the evident purpose to
forestall and prevent any patriotic order or suggestion which might
otherwise reach him from General Scott.
Nevertheless, Anderson did not weary in his manifest duty. His letters
of November 28 and December 1, though perhaps not as full and urgent,
are substantial repetitions of his former recommendations. The growing
excitement of the Charleston populace and the increasing danger to the
forts are restated with emphasis. He says that there appears to be a
romantic desire urging the South Carolinians to have possession of
Fort Moultrie. Various reports come, that as soon as the State should
secede the forts would be demanded, and if not surrendered, they would
be taken. All rumors and remarks indicate a fixed purpose to have
these works. The Charlestonians are drilling nightly, and making every
preparation for the fight which they say must take place.
[Sidenote] Anderson to Adjutant-General, Nov. 28, 1860. W.R. Vol.
I., pp. 78-9.
[Sidenote] Ibid., Dec. 1, 1860. W.R. Vol. I. pp. 81-2.
Once more he repeated that the security of Fort Moultrie would be more
greatly increased by throwing garrisons into Castle Pinckney and Fort
Sumter than by anything that could be done in strengthening its own
defenses. He sent a detailed report of his command to force again upon
the attention of the Department his fatal deficiency in numbers, and
to show the practical impossibility of repelling an assault, or
resisting a siege with any reasonable hope of success. His letters
reached the same inevitable conclusion: "The question for the
Government to decide--and the sooner it is done the better--is,
whether, when South Carolina secedes, these forts are to be
surrendered or not. If the former, I must be informed of it, and
instructed what course I am to pursue. If the latter be the
determination, no time is to be lost in either sending troops, as
already suggested, or vessels of war to this harbor. Either of these
courses may cause some of the doubting States to join South Carolina.
I shall go steadily on preparing for the worst, trusting hopefully in
the God of battles to guard and guide me in my course."
While Anderson was thus penning the plain issue, as it lay in the
clear light of a soldier's conception of right and conviction of duty,
another pen was framing the reply agreed upon by the President and
his advisers at Washington. Major Anderson might have faith in the
God of battles, but what faith could he have in a Government holding
one-third of a vast continent peopled by thirty millions of freemen
which could not or would not, in face of the most urgent reiterated
appeals and the most imminent and palpable necessity, send him two or
three companies of recruits, when the possession of three forts, the
peace of a city, the allegiance of a State, if not the tremendous
alternative of civil war, hung in the balance?
[Sidenote] Adjutant-General to Anderson, Dec. 1, 1860. W.R. Vol.
I., pp. 82, 83.
"It is believed,"--so ran the reply, and apparently the final decision
of the Government,--"from information thought to be reliable, that an
attack will not be made on your command, and the Secretary has only to
refer to his conversation with you, and to caution you that should his
convictions unhappily prove untrue, your actions must be such as to be
free from the charge of initiating a collision. If attacked, you are,
of course, expected to defend the trust committed to you to the best
of your ability. The increase of the force under your command, however
much to be desired, would, the Secretary thinks, judging from the
recent excitement produced on account of an anticipated increase, as
mentioned in your letter, but add to that excitement and might lead to
serious results."
This renunciation by the War Department of the proper show of authority
and power, demanded by plain necessity and repeatedly urged by its
trusted agents, must have touched the pride of Anderson and his brother
officers. But a still deeper humiliation was in store for them, The
same letter brought him the following notice: "The Secretary of War has
directed Brevet Colonel Huger to repair to this city as soon as he can
safely leave his post, to return there in a short time. He desires you
to see Colonel Huger, and confer with him prior to his departure on the
matters which have been confided to each of you."
[Sidenote] Abner Doubleday, "Reminiscences of Forts Sumter and
Moultrie," p. 42.
Colonel Huger was an ordnance officer of the army, then stationed for
duty in Charleston, of distinguished connections in that city, and
having on that account as well as personally great local influence.
What the precise nature of the instructions were, which the Department
sent him, does not appear from any accessible correspondence. The
result of the action which the two officers took thereunder is,
however, less doubtful.
It appears to have been, in effect, a mission by two army officers of
honorable rank, in obedience to direct commands from the Secretary of
War, to humbly beg the Charlestonians not to assault the forts. Major
Anderson on his part dismisses the distasteful mission with a
significantly curt report: "I have the honor to acknowledge the
receipt on the 4th of your communication of the 1st instant. In
compliance therewith I went yesterday to the city of Charleston to
confer with Colonel Huger, and I called with him upon the Mayor of the
city, and upon several other prominent citizens. All seemed
determined, as far as their influence or power extends, to prevent an
attack by a mob on our fort; but all are equally decided in the
opinion that the forts must be theirs after secession."
What a bitter confession for a brave and sensitive soldier, who knew
that with half a company of artillerymen in Castle Pinckney, as he had
vainly demanded, the Charleston mob, with the conspiring Governor and
insurgent secession convention, would have been compelled to accept
from him, as the representative of a forbearing Government, the safety
of their roof-trees and the security of their hearthstones.
[Sidenote] Anderson to Adjutant-General, Dec. 6, 1860. W.R. Vol.
I., pp. 87, 88.
But, his duty was to obey, and so he resigned himself without a
murmur to the hard conditions which had fallen to his lot. "I shall,
nevertheless," adds Anderson, "knowing how excitable this community
is, continue to keep on the _qui vive_ and, as far as is in my power,
steadily prepare my command to the uttermost to resist any attack that
may be made.... Colonel Huger designs, I think, leaving Charleston for
Washington to-morrow night. He is more hopeful of a settlement of
impending difficulties without bloodshed than I am."