MAJOR ANDERSON
President Buchanan and his Administration could not, if they would,
shut their eyes to the treasonable utterances and preparations at
Charleston and elsewhere in the South; but so far neither the speeches
nor bonfires nor palmetto flags, nor even the secession message of
Governor Gist or the Convention bill of the South Carolina
Legislature, constituted a statutory offense. For twelve years the
threat of disunion had been in the mouths of the Southern slavery
extremists and their Northern allies the most potent and formidable
weapon of national politics. It was declaimed on the stump, elaborated
in Congressional speeches, set out in national platforms, and paraded
as a solemn warning in executive messages.
Mr. Buchanan had profited by the disunion cry both as politician and
functionary; and now when disunion came in a practical and undisguised
shape he was to a degree powerless to oppose it, because he was
disarmed by his own words and his own acts. The disunionists were his
partisans, his friends, and confidential counselors; they constituted
a remnant of the once proud and successful party which, by his
compliance and coöperation in their interest, he had disrupted and
defeated. Their programme hitherto had been the policy upon which he
had staked the success or failure of his Administration, so that in
addition to every other tie he was bound to them by the common sorrow
of political disaster.
[Illustration: GENERAL ROBERT ANDERSON.]
Being in such intimate relations and intercourse with the leaders of
the Breckinridge wing of the Democratic party during the progress of
the Presidential canvass, and that party being made up so exclusively
of the extreme Southern Democrats, the President must have had constant
information of the progress and development of the disunion sentiment
and purpose in the South. He was not restricted as the other parties
and the general public were to imperfect reports and doubtful rumors
current in the newspapers.
But in addition there now came to him an official warning which it was
a grave error to disregard. On October 29, one week before the election,
the veteran Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, General-in-Chief of
the Army, communicated to him in writing his serious apprehensions
of coming danger, and suggested such precautions as were then in the
power of the Administration. Beginning life as a farmer's boy,
collegian, and law student, General Scott from choice became a
soldier, devoting himself to the higher aims of the profession of
arms, and in a brilliant career of half a century had achieved
world-wide renown as a great military captain. In the United States,
however, the military is subordinated to the civic ambition, and Scott
all his life retained a strong leaning to diplomacy and statesmanship,
and on several important occasions gave his country valuable service
in essentially civic functions. He had been the unsuccessful
Presidential candidate of the Whig party in 1852, a circumstance which
no doubt greatly increased his personal attention to current politics,
then and afterwards. As the first military officer of the nation, he
was also the watchful guardian of the public peace.
[Sidenote] Lieut.-General Winfield Scott, "Autobiography," Vol. I.,
p. 234.
The impending rebellion was not to him, as it was to the nation at
large, a new event in politics. Many men were indeed aware, through
tradition and history, that it was but the Calhoun nullification
treason revived and pushed to a bolder extreme. To General Scott it
was almost literally the repetition of an old experience. A generation
before, he was himself a prominent actor in opposing the nullification
plot. About the 4th of November, 1832, upon special summons, he was
taken into a confidential interview by President Jackson, who, after
asking Scott's military views upon the threatened rebellion of the
nullifiers in Charleston harbor, by oral orders charged him with the
duty of enforcing the laws and maintaining the supremacy of the Union;
the President placing at his orders the troops and vessels necessary
for this purpose. Scott accepted the trust and went to Charleston, and
while humoring the nullification Quixotism existing there, he executed
the purpose of his mission, by strengthening the defenses and
reenforcing; the Federal forts.[1] His task was accomplished with the
utmost delicacy, but with firmness. The rebellion was indeed abandoned
upon pretense of compromise; but had a conflict occurred at that time
the flag of the Union would probably not have been the first to be
lowered in defeat.
It was, therefore, most fitting that in these new complications
Lieutenant-General Scott should officially admonish President
Buchanan. He addressed to him a paper entitled "Views suggested by the
imminent danger (October 29, 1860) of a disruption of the Union by the
secession of one or more of the Southern States"; and also certain
supplementary memoranda the day after, to the Secretary of War, the
two forming in reality but a single document. General Scott was at
this time residing in New York City, and the missives were probably
twenty-four hours in reaching Washington. This letter of the commander
of the American armies written at such a crisis is full of serious
faults, and is a curious illustration of the temper of the times,
showing as it does that even in the mind of the first soldier of the
republic the foundations of political faith were crumbling away. The
superficial and speculative theories of Scott the politician stand out
in unfavorable contrast to the practical advice of Scott the soldier.
Once break the Union by political madness, reasons Scott the politician,
and any attempt to restore it by military force would establish
despotism and create anarchy. A lesser evil than this would be to form
four new confederacies out of the fragments of the old.[2] And on this
theme he theorizes respecting affinities and boundaries and the folly
of secession.
[Sidenote] "Mr. Buchanan's Administration," Appendix, p. 289.
The advice of Scott the soldier was wiser and more opportune. The
prospect of Lincoln's election, he says, causes threats of secession.
There is danger that certain forts of national value and importance,
six totally destitute of troops, and three having only feeble and
insufficient garrisons, may be seized by insurgents. "In my opinion
all these works should be immediately so garrisoned as to make any
attempt to take any one of them, by surprise or _coup de main_,
ridiculous." There were five companies of regulars within reach,
available for this service. This plan was provisional only; it
eschewed the idea of invading a seceded State; and he suggested the
collection of customs duties, outside of the cities.
[Sidenote] "Mr. Buchanan's Administration," p. 104.
[Sidenote] Buchanan, in the "National Intelligencer," Oct. 1, 1862.
Eight to ten States on the verge of insurrection--nine principal
sea-coast forts within their borders, absolutely at the mercy of the
first handful of street rabble that might collect, and only about four
hundred men, scattered in five different and distant cities, available
to reënforce them! It was a startling exhibit of national danger from
one professionally competent to judge and officially entitled to
advise. His timely and patriotic counsel President Buchanan treated
with indifference and neglect. "From the impracticable nature of the
'Views,' and their strange and inconsistent character, the President
dismissed them from his mind without further consideration." Such is
Mr. Buchanan's own confession. He indulges in the excuse that to have
then attempted to put these five companies in all or part of these
nine forts "would have been a confession of weakness instead of an
exhibition of imposing and overpowering strength." "None of the Cotton
States had made the first movement towards secession. Even South
Carolina was then performing all her relative duties, though most
reluctantly, to the Government," etc. "To have attempted such a
military operation with so feeble a force, and the Presidential
election impending, would have been an invitation to collision and
secession. Indeed, if the whole American army, consisting then of only
sixteen thousand men, had been 'within reach' they would have been
scarcely sufficient for this purpose."
The error of this reasoning was well shown by General Scott in a
newspaper controversy which subsequently ensued.[3] He pointed out
that of the nine forts enumerated by him, six, namely, Forts Moultrie
and Sumter in Charleston harbor, Forts Pickens and McRae in Pensacola
harbor, and Forts Jackson and St. Philip guarding the Mississippi
below New Orleans, were "twin forts" on opposite sides of a channel,
whose strength was more than doubled by their very position and their
ability to employ cross and flanking fire in mutual support and
defense. These works, together with the three others mentioned by
General Scott, namely, Fort Morgan in Mobile harbor, Fort Pulaski
below Savannah, and Fortress Monroe at Hampton Roads, were all,
because of their situation at vital points, not merely works of local
defense, but of the highest strategical value. The reënforcements
advised would surely have enabled the Government to hold them until
further defensive measures could have been arranged; and the effect of
such possession on the incipient insurrection may be well imagined
when we remember the formidable armaments afterwards employed in the
reduction of such of them as were permitted, without an effort on the
part of President Buchanan to prevent it, to be occupied by the
insurgents.
But the warning to the Administration that the Southern forts were in
danger came not alone from General Scott. Two of the works mentioned
by him as of prime importance were Forts Moultrie and Sumter in
Charleston harbor. There was still a third fort there, Castle
Pinckney, in a better condition of repair and preparation than either
of the former, and much nearer the city. Had it been properly occupied
and manned, its guns alone would have been sufficient to control
Charleston. But there was only an ordnance sergeant in Castle
Pinckney, only an ordnance sergeant in Fort Sumter, and a partial
garrison in Fort Moultrie. Both Sumter and Moultrie were greatly and
Castle Pinckney slightly out of repair. During the summer of 1860
Congress made an appropriation for these works; and the engineer
captain who had been in charge for two years had indeed been ordered
to begin and prosecute repairs in the two forts.
[Sidenote] Report, F.J. Porter. W.R.[4] Vol. I., pp. 70-72.
[Sidenote] Craig to Floyd, Oct. 31, 1860, with Floyd's indorsement.
W.R. Vol. I., pp. 67-8.
Captain J.G. Foster, the engineer to whom this duty was confided, was
of New England birth and a loyal and devoted soldier. He began work on
the 12th of September; and not foreseeing the consequences involved,
employed in the different works between two and three hundred men,
partly hired in Charleston, partly in Baltimore. There were in the
several forts not only the cannon to arm them, but also considerable
quantities of ammunition and other government property; and aware of
the hum of secession preparation which began to fill the air in
Charleston, Captain Foster in October asked the Ordnance Bureau at
Washington for forty muskets, with which to arm twenty workmen in Fort
Sumter and twenty in Castle Pinckney. "If," wrote the Chief of
Ordnance to the Secretary of War, "the measure should on being
communicated meet the concurrence of the commanding officer of the
troops in the harbor, I recommend that I may be authorized to issue
forty muskets to the engineer officer." Upon this recommendation,
Secretary of War Floyd wrote the word "approved." Under the usual
routine of peaceful times the questions went by mail to Colonel
Gardner, then commander of the harbor, "Is it expedient to issue forty
muskets to Captain Foster? Is it proper to place arms in the hands of
hired workmen? Is it expedient to do so?"
[Sidenote] Gardner to Craig, November 5, 1860. W.R. Vol. I.,
pp. 68-9.
To this Colonel Gardner replied, under date of November 5, that,
repeating what he had already written, his fears were not of any
attack on the works, authorized by the city or State, but there was
danger of such an attempt from a sudden tumultuary force; and that
while in such an event forty muskets would be desirable, he felt
"constrained to say that the only proper precaution--that which has no
objection--is to fill these two companies with drilled recruits (say
fifty men) at once, and send two companies from Old Point Comfort to
occupy, respectively, Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney."
[Sidenote] Dawson, "Historical Magazine," January, 1872, p. 37.
[Sidenote] F.J. Porter to Cooper, November 11, 1860. W.R. Vol. I.,
pp. 70-72.
His answer and recommendation were both business-like and soldierly,
and contained no indications that justify any suspicion of his loyalty
or judgment. Meanwhile, on the heels of this official call for
reënforcements, came a still more urgent one. It is alleged on the one
hand that complaints of the inefficiency of Colonel Gardner had
reached Washington, and that, in consequence thereof, either the
Secretary of War or the President sent for specific information in
regard to it. Major Fitz John Porter, then Assistant Adjutant-General,
on duty in the War Department, went in person to Charleston, and made
the examination. There are, on the other hand, several vague
allegations by the insurgents, to the substantial effect that this
call for reënforcements was Colonel Gardner's real offense; leaving
the implication that Major Fitz John Porter's inspection was purposely
instituted to find reasons for removing the Colonel and thus
frustrating the obligation to send him additional troops. The order
for Major Porter's visit was made on November 6; he returned to
Washington and made an oral statement, and on the 11th of November
wrote out his report for the Department in due form.
[Sidenote] Doubleday, "Forts Sumter and Moultrie," p. 19.
According to this report, while Colonel Gardner had been remiss in a
few minor details, he had in reality been vigilant, loyal, and
efficient in main and important matters. He had foreseen the coming
danger, had advised the Government, and called for reënforcements; had
recommended not only strengthening the garrison of Moultrie, but the
effective occupation of both Sumter and Castle Pinckney; and had made
an effort in good faith to remove the public arms and goods from their
exposed situation in the arsenal in the city of Charleston, to the
security of the fort. Though Southern in feeling and pro-slavery in
sentiment, he was true to his oath and his flag; and had he been
properly encouraged and supported by his Government, would evidently
have merited no reproach for inefficiency or indifference.
[Sidenote] 1860.
But the fatal entanglement of Buchanan's Administration with the
slavery extremists had the double effect of weakening loyalty in army
officers and building up rebellion among the Southern people. Instead
of heeding the advice of Colonel Gardner to reënforce the forts, it
removed him from command, and within two months the President
submitted silently to the taunt of the South Carolina rebel
commissioners that it was in punishment for his loyal effort to save
the Government property. Whatever the motive may have been, the
Government was now fully warned, as early as November 11, a week
before the first secession jubilee in Charleston, and more than a
month before the passage of the secession ordinance, of the imminence
of the insurrection and danger to the forts. General Scott had warned
it, Colonel Gardner had warned it, and now again Major Porter, its
special and confidential agent, had not only repeated that warning,
but his report had been made the basis of Government discussion in the
change of commanders.
The action of the Government was unusually prompt. On November 11, as
we have seen, Major Porter made his written report, and on the 13th he
delivered to Major Robert Anderson in New York the order to take
command of the forts and forces in Charleston harbor. Major Anderson,
suitably qualified by meritorious service, age, and rank, was deemed
especially acceptable for the position because he was a Kentuckian by
birth, and related by marriage to a prominent family of Georgia. Such
sympathies as might influence him were supposed to be with the South,
and his appointment would not, therefore, grate harshly on the
susceptibilities of the Charlestonians.
The statement, many times repeated, that he owned a plantation in the
South is incorrect. He never owned a plantation in Georgia or anywhere
else. On the death of his father he came into possession of a small
number of slaves. These he liberated as soon as the proper papers
could be executed and sent to him at his distant post; and he always
afterwards helped them when they were in need and applied to him.[5]
[Sidenote] F.J. Porter to Dawson. "Historical Magazine," January,
1872, pp. 37, 38.
The army headquarters being then in New York, Major Anderson on the
same day called on General Scott, and in conversation with the veteran
General-in-Chief learned that army affairs were being carried on at
Washington by Secretary Floyd, without consulting him. Under these
circumstances Scott did not deem himself authorized to interfere even
by suggestion. Nevertheless, the whole Charleston question seems to
have been fully discussed, and the relative strength of the forts, and
the possible necessity of occupying Sumter commented upon in such
manner as no doubt produced its effect in the subsequent action of
Anderson. Major Anderson next went to Washington, and received the
personal instructions of Secretary Floyd, and returning thereafter to
New York, General Scott in that city gave him on November 15th formal
written orders to proceed to Fort Moultrie and take command of the
post.
----------
[1] His policy, frankly written in a friendly letter to a prominent
nullifier, could scarcely provoke the most captious criticism:
"You have probably heard of the arrival of two or three companies at
Charleston in the last six weeks, and you may hear that as many more
have followed. There is nothing inconsistent with the President's
message in these movements. The intention simply is that the forts in
the harbor shall not be wrested from the United States.... The
President, I presume, will stand on the defensive, thinking it better
to discourage than to invite an attack--better to prevent than to
repel one."--Lieut.-Gen. Winfield Scott, "Autobiography." Vol. I., p.
242.
[2] "All the lines of demarkation between the new Unions cannot be
accurately drawn in advance, but many of them approximately may. Thus,
looking to natural boundaries and commercial affinities, some of the
following frontiers, after many waverings and conflicts, might perhaps
become acknowledged and fixed:
"1. The Potomac River and the Chesapeake Bay to the Atlantic. 2. From
Maryland along the crest of the Alleghany (perhaps the Blue Ridge)
range of mountains, to some point on the coast of Florida. 3. The line
from say the head of the Potomac to the west or north-west, which it
will be most difficult to settle. 4. The crest of the Rocky Mountains.
"The South-east Confederacy would, in all human probability, in less
than five years after the rupture, find itself bounded by the first
and second lines indicated above, the Atlantic, and the Gulf of
Mexico, with its capital at say Columbia, South Carolina. The country
between the second, third, and fourth of those lines would, beyond a
doubt, in about the same time, constitute another Confederacy, with
its capital at probably Alton or Quincy, Illinois. The boundaries of
the Pacific Union are the most definite of all, and the remaining
States would constitute the Northeast Confederacy with its capital at
Albany."--Scott, "Views," printed in "Mr. Buchanan's Administration,"
pp. 287-288, Appendix.
[3] "But the ex-President sneers at my weak device for saving the
forts. He forgets what the gallant Anderson did with a handful of men
in Fort Sumter, and leaves out of the account what he might have done
with a like handful in Fort Moultrie, even without further augmentation
of men to divide between the garrisons. Twin forts on the opposite
sides of a channel not only give a cross fire on the head of attack,
but the strength of each is more than doubled by the flanking fire of
the other."--Gen. Scott, in the "National Intelligencer" of November
12, 1862.
[4] (As reference to the Government publication, "War of the Rebellion:
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies," will be so
frequent in the course of this work, and under its full title would
require so much space, the authors have decided to adopt the simple
abbreviation "W.R.," as above. Where the number of the series is not
mentioned, Series I. will always be implied.)
[5] We are indebted to Mrs. Anderson, not only for the correction of
this error, but for permission to examine many private papers relating
to Major Anderson's experience in Fort Sumter. It affords us the
highest pleasure to add that though all her relatives in Georgia
became secessionists, she remained enthusiastically and devotedly
loyal to the Union, and that her letters carried constant cheer and
encouragement to her husband during the months he was besieged in
Charleston harbor.