"William Iselin of Havre, in connection with Mr. Calley St. Paul,

for the Havre and New-York line; the necessary capital of

$3,200,000 is subscribed; their intention is to have a weekly

departure from Havre to New-York, by making the fortnightly

departures of the French boats alternate with American Havre and

Bremen boats.

"For the line from Nantes to the West-Indies the Company Gautier

is said to have given a tender; but it is doubtful if they can

make up their capital."

The _Messageries Imperiales_ is one of the largest and strongest

companies in all Europe. They have the following different lines: the

Italian, the Constantinople direct, the Levant, the Egyptian, the

Syrian, that of the Archipelago, the Anatolia, the Thessalian, the

Danubian, the Trebizond, the Algiers, the Oran, and the Tunis lines,

and forty-seven sea-steamers. They have already obtained the Brazilian

service.

Mr. Iselin and others have proposed for the United States line, and

will doubtless get it.

The Company Gautier may not get the West-India service, it is said.

They had the line from Havre to New-York, with the steamers Alma,

Cadis, Barcelona, Franc-Contois, Vigo, and the Lyonnaise, and without

subvention. They found it impossible to run it without subsidy, and

hence, sought a new home for their steamers. They attempted to run

from Havre to New-Orleans; but this again failed, after four voyages.

They had also the 1,800 ton ether ships, "Francois Arago," and

"Jacquart," which broke down. These ether engines were built on the

principle of De Tremblay; but the Company are now substituting steam

for the ether engines. Thus, the experience of this Company proves two

important positions which I have taken; that ocean mail steamers can

not run on their receipts, and that many of the gazetted improvements

on steam propulsion and the ordinary methods are valueless.

The _Compagnie Gautier_ have a contract with Spain, for semi-monthly

voyages between Cadiz and Havana, and receive $25,000 per round voyage

for each steamer. They are all English built, iron vessels, of about

1,800 tons each. Lyons is the home of the Company.

PAPER D.

STEAM LINES BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA.

COLLINS, steamers Adriatic, Atlantic, and Baltic; (running:)

HAVRE, steamers Arago, and Fulton; "

BREMEN, steamers North Star, and Ariel; "

HAVRE, _in connection with the Bremen_. Steamer Vanderbilt; (laid up:)

CUNARD, steamers Persia, Arabia, Asia, Africa, Canada, America,

Niagara, and Europa; (running:)

CUNARD, screw-steamers Etna, Jura, Emue, Lebanon, and Cambria,

(side-wheel; all running:)

GLASGOW, screw-steamers Glasgow, Edinburgh, and New-York; (running:)

BREMEN, steamer Ericsson; run temporarily by Mr. Sands; (laid up:)

LIVERPOOL AND PORTLAND, screw-steamers Khersonese and Circassian,

General Williams and Antelope; the two latter about 1,500 each,

running _via_ St. John's, N. F., the two former chartered for the

East-Indies:

LONDON AND MONTREAL, screw-steamers; (names not known:)

LIVERPOOL AND QUEBEC, screw-steamers; " " "

LIVERPOOL AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers City of Manchester, City of

Baltimore, City of Washington, and Kangaroo, (running;) (line ran to

Philadelphia and was withdrawn:)

HAMBURG AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Borussia and Hammonia; building

two more steamers, each 2,000 tons, in the Clyde, for same line;

(running:)

ANTWERP AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Belgique, Constitution, Leopold

I., Duc de Brabant, and Congress. _Taken off and chartered to British

Government for transporting troops. Names altered:_

LONDON, CORK AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Minna and Brenda; (laid up:)

HAVRE AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Barcelona, Jacquart, Alma, and

Francois Arago, _withdrawn, and running from Spain to Cuba_. (_See

Paper C._)

BREMEN AND NEW-YORK. The North Dutch Lloyds are building four

screw-steamers in the Clyde, of near 3,000 each, to run between Bremen

and New-York:

THE CONTINENT, SOUTHAMPTON AND NEW-YORK. Croskey's lino consists of

the following screws, of about 2,300 tons each: the Argo, Calcutta,

Queen of the South, Lady Jocelyn, Hydaspes, Indiana, Jason, and Golden

Fleece. (_Most of these steamers have been withdrawn from the route,

and five of them are chartered for troops for India._)

PAPER E.

The following numerous extracts from the Senate Reports of 1850 and

1852, and also from the letter of Judge Collamer, then Post Master

General, as well as from a letter by the Hon. Edwin Croswell, will

present in detail a strong corroboration of the views which I have

taken in the preceding Sections. I copy first from the Report of 1852.

The Committee was composed of Hon. Thomas J. Rusk, Chairman, and

Messrs. Soule, Hamlin, Upham, and Morton. The Report says:

"Your Committee desire to have it understood at the outset, that,

regarding the ocean mail service as the offspring of the wants of

all of the producing classes of the country, they have not felt at

liberty to consider the propositions which have been presented to

them, in any other point of view than as connected with and

subservient to the general policy of the government, which

embraces alike every section of the country, and can not know nor

recognize any personal or local influence.

"The system of ocean steam navigation was adopted by the

Government for the joint purpose of extending and advancing the

commercial and other great interests of the country, and, at the

same time, providing a marine force which might be easily made

available for the protection of American rights, in the event of a

collision with foreign powers. The attainment of this double

object was the motive which, in the opinion of Congress, justified

the advance of public funds in aid of private enterprise,

inasmuch as it was calculated to insure to the country the

acquisition of a powerful means of maritime defense, with little

or no expense, eventually, as the money so advanced was to be

reimbursed in money or in mail service at the option of the

parties concerned, while commerce and the arts would be promoted

during the time of peace.

"At the time when this system was commenced, the ocean mails along

our whole Southern coast were in the hands of foreign carriers,

sustained and encouraged by the British Government, under the

forms of contracts to carry the British mails; while the Cunard

line between Liverpool and Boston, _via_ Halifax, constituted the

only medium of regular steam mail communication between the United

States and Europe. In this way the commercial interests of the

United States were, on the one hand, entirely at the mercy of

British steamers which plied along our Southern coast, entering

our ports at pleasure, and thereby acquiring an intimate knowledge

of the soundings and other peculiarities of our harbors--a

knowledge which might prove infinitely injurious to us in the

event of a war with Great Britain; and on the other, of a foreign

line of ocean mail steamers, which, under the liberal patronage of

the British Government, monopolized the steam mail postage and

freights between the two countries. Under such a state of things,

it became necessary to choose whether American commerce should

continue to be thus tributary to British maritime supremacy, or an

American medium of communication should be established through the

intervention of the Federal Government, in the form of advances of

pecuniary means in aid of individual enterprise. It had been found

to be impossible for our merchants to contend successfully, single

handed, against the joint efforts of the British Government and

British commercial influence. Our noble lines of packet ships

which had far outstripped the sailing vessels of all other

nations, in point of beauty and swiftness, had been superseded by

the introduction of steamers, the power and capacity of which

recommended them, as the best means of inter-communication by

mail, and of transportation for lighter and more profitable

freights, and American interests were becoming every day more and

more tributary to British ascendency on the ocean.

"Under the circumstances above stated, it was impossible for

Congress to hesitate for a moment which course to pursue, and it

was determined to adopt a policy which, while it would be in

strict accordance with the spirit of our free institutions, should

place the country in its proper attitude, and render its commerce

and postal arrangements independent of all foreign or rival

agencies.

"Of the correctness of this determination, experience has

furnished the most ample evidences in the results which thus far

have attended the prosecution of the system. The line between

New-York and Chagres _via_ New-Orleans and its auxiliaries, have,

by their superiority in point of swiftness and accommodation,

already superseded the British steamers which had previously plied

along our Southern maritime frontier, and the United States mails

for Mexico, South-America, and our possessions on the Pacific are

no longer in the hands of foreign carriers, but are transported in

American steamers of the first class, convertible, at a very small

expense, into war steamers, should occasion require, which have

commanded the admiration of the world by their fleetness and the

elegance of their accommodations for the travelling public. Our

Southern ports are, consequently, no longer frequented by British

steamers, commanded by officers of the British crown, whose

legitimate business it is to collect intelligence respecting the

approaches to and defenses of the harbors which they visit, to be

made available for their own purposes, in the event of the

existence of hostile relations.

"A similar result has, to a certain extent, attended the

establishment of the American, or Collins line, between New-York

and Liverpool. Previously to the commencement of this line, the

transportation of the United States mail matter, as well as the

finer and more destructible descriptions of merchandise, requiring

rapidity of transmission to and from Europe, had been monopolized

by the British Cunard line; and the British Government had, within

the short space of six years, from the postage on this route

alone, derived a _clear income_ of no less than five million two

hundred and eighty thousand eight hundred dollars, after deducting

the amount paid to the concern under the contract to carry the

mails.

"Since the establishment of the Collins line, notwithstanding the

combined efforts of the British Government and commercial

interests to confine their freights and postages to the Cunard

line, the revenue to the Post Office Department of the United

States has amounted to several hundreds of thousands of dollars

per annum, whilst a large proportion of the money for freights has

been received by American citizens. The effects of this measure

have, it is true, thus far been but partial, because the trips of

this line have been but twice a month, while those of its rival

have, for a considerable portion of the time been weekly. During

the intervals between the trips of the American line, the postages

and freights must, of necessity, enure to the advantage of the

British, and, consequently, the evil referred to has been but

partially remedied."

Speaking of the large steamers built, the Report says:

"It is not to be supposed that engines of such vast dimensions

could have been constructed in a country where there were, as yet,

no workshops adapted to the purpose and where labor is very high,

as cheaply as in a country where every appliance of the kind

already existed and where the prices of labor are proverbially

low. Nor can it be reasonably imagined that vessels of this

description could have been navigated on as good terms, by men

taken from this country, where there was little or no competition

in this peculiar branch of maritime service, as by those who were

easily to be found in a country in which the density of population

and consequent competition for employment, caused the wages to be

small.

"An attempt seems to have been made, in certain quarters, to

create an impression that the aid heretofore extended by the

Government to the individuals engaged under contracts to carry the

ocean mail, has been induced by feelings of personal friendship,

on the part of members of Congress. Such is not the case. The

friends of the system of ocean mail steam navigation, have, so far

as your Committee are advised, considered this important subject

as a matter of great national concern and independently of the

very secondary motive of individual interest. The question

presented to their minds has not been whether A, B, or C should

have a privilege extended to him, but whether the commerce,

manufactures, and agriculture of the country would be benefited by

the performance of a public service through the instrumentality of

individual enterprise, under proper conditions and restrictions.

As matters stood at the period when the system was adopted, Great

Britain was exerting herself, successfully, to make the United

States, in common with the rest of the world, tributary to her

maritime supremacy. She possessed the monopoly of steam connection

between the United States and Europe, the West-Indies and

South-America. There was not a letter sent by ocean steam

conveyance, in these quarters, which did not pay its tribute to

the British crown, and not a passenger nor parcel of merchandise

transported, by the agency of steam, upon the ocean, which did not

furnish profit to the British capitalist. Great Britain asserted

her right to be the 'queen of the ocean,' and, as such, she levied

her imposts upon the industry and intelligence of all of the

nations that frequented that highway of the world.

"In this condition of affairs, the law instituting the system of

American ocean mail steam transportation in its present form was

enacted, as the best, if not the only means of correcting a great

evil, and, at the same time, building up a naval force which

should be available for national defense in the event of a war.

The system so instituted was deemed to be not only calculated to

draw forth and reward the enterprise of American citizens, but it

avoided the difficulty of keeping upon hand, in time of peace, a

large and, for the moment at least, useless military marine, which

could only be preserved in a condition for effective service by a

vast annual outlay of the public money.

"_It was right and proper, then, in the opinion of your

Committee, that these ocean steam facilities should exist, through

the intervention of the Government, more especially as they were,

in all probability, beyond the reach of private means._

"The transportation of the ocean mails, with the greatest possible

advantage to the important interests of the country at large, is

an object of paramount importance; but which, however desirable,

can only be effected at great expense. It is a matter of

comparatively small moment at what precise time this expense is to

be paid, provided that the end in view can be attained with

certainty. The temporary loan of a part of the means required,

under proper securities for reimbursement, appears to be the

readiest mode by which the purpose can be effected. How is this

security to be acquired? Simply, by taking due care that the funds

advanced shall be faithfully and honestly applied to the object

for which they are intended, and then holding a lien upon the

ships, for the construction of which they are appropriated, in

such a manner as to insure the reimbursement of the sums advanced

in the form of mail service or money; or, should circumstances

require, of ships suitable for national purposes, as war steamers.

This has been done. In all cases the contractors for the

transportation of the ocean mails, have been required to cause

their ships to be built and equipped under the immediate

superintendence of experienced naval officers and under the

direction of naval constructors, appointed by the Government, in

such manner as to be convertible, at the smallest possible

expense, into war steamers of the first class.

"Nor has experience caused any regret, on the part of the friends

of the system, further than that in some cases, owing to the

increase in the tonnage and power of the ships and other

circumstances, the expenses incurred by the contractors have

outrun the receipts, and they have incurred heavy losses, which

might even prove ruinous, if they were forced to sell the property

acquired in this form. It should always be borne in mind, however,

that in these cases, the increase of expenditure thus incurred has

been caused by a laudable ambition on the part of the proprietors

of these lines to do even more than they were required to do under

their contracts, with a view to secure the confidence of the

Government and the public. It should also be remembered that in

thus increasing the cost and consequent value of their ships,

these companies have enlarged the security of the Government for

the money loaned, and promoted the safety and comfort of

passengers. It has, in no instance, been charged that the

companies referred to have, in any way, misapplied the aid

extended to them, or given to it an improper direction. The

products of their expenditures, even admitting them to have been

greater than they might have been, show for themselves, in placing

the American steam mail service, as far as it has gone, at the

head of all others, in point of accommodation, elegance, strength,

and swiftness. Nor is this all. The establishment of these lines

is not to be regarded merely with reference to the immediate

profits arising from the system, in connection with the

transportation of the mails. Millions of money have been saved to

American citizens, which, in the absence of these ocean steam

lines, would have gone to fill foreign coffers. The Committee will

refer to one fact in illustration of the truth of this

proposition. Before the Collins line was established, the Cunard

line was receiving L7 10_s_ sterling per ton for freights; at

present (1852) the rate is about L4 sterling. By whom were these

L7 10_s_ sterling paid? By the _American consumer_, in most

instances, upon articles of _British manufacture brought to this

country by a British line_. At present the American consumer pays

but L4 sterling per ton; and, presuming that the American merchant

makes his importations in the American line, this freight is paid

to our own people and goes to swell the sum of our national

wealth. Thus, it will be seen that, formerly, the American

consumer paid _very nearly twice as much for the service_, and

enriched the British capitalist; whereas, at present, he not only

saves _one half of the former cost of freight to himself_ but, in

paying the remaining half, benefits his fellow citizen, who in

return aids in consuming perhaps the very merchandise which he has

imported.

"Under these circumstances, can any reasonable man doubt the

propriety, even in a pecuniary point of view, of sustaining the

present system, which, at its very commencement, has given such

ample proofs of its usefulness? Your Committee think not, and do

not hesitate to give it as their opinion that, _merely as a matter

of dollars and cents_, the service in question should be liberally

sustained by Congress, and will in the end make ample returns.

"But your Committee regard this proposition as one, the mere money

feature of which is of minor consequence, when brought into

comparison with other more important considerations. The question

is no longer whether certain individuals shall be saved from loss

or enabled to make fortunes, but whether the _American_ shall

succumb to the British lines, and Great Britain be again permitted

to monopolize ocean mail steam transportation, not only between

Europe and America, but throughout the world. We are aspiring to

the first place among the nations of the earth, in a commercial

point of view--a place which belongs to us as a matter of

right--and are we to suffer ourselves to be overcome by British

commercial capitalists under the auspices of the British crown?

Shall it be said that, at the very moment when our steamships are

admitted to excel those of any other people on the face of the

globe, our enterprising citizens have been forced to relinquish

the proud position they have attained, for the want of a few

thousands of dollars, when the national treasury is full to

overflowing? Let this end be attained and our great commercial

rival will have postages and freights all her own way, while we

shall be compelled to contribute, as heretofore, to her undisputed

supremacy.

"With a view to a full and fair understanding of this important

subject, your Committee have communicated, through their Chairman,

with the Executive Departments of the Government and the

presidents of the various companies engaged in carrying the ocean

mail by steam, and will now proceed to lay before the Senate the

results of their careful inquiries. It may not be improper here

again to note, by way of illustration, the benefits to be derived

from ocean steam mail transportation, when in successful

operation, as manifested in the case of the British Cunard line,

under the auspices of the British Government. During the first six

years of its existence, the line above named received from the

Government no less than $2,550,000, while the Government received

from the Company, in the form of postages, the enormous sum of

$7,836,800, or $5,826,800 net revenue.

"The Government has paid to the line, (the Collins,) for mail

service, in the two years, $770,000, and has received from the

line $513,546.80. If the receipts be deducted from the outlay, the

balance against the Government is $256,453.20 for the whole time,

or $128,226.60 per annum.

"Thus it appears, that from a fair statement of the account

current between the line and the Government, the latter is out of

pocket, at the end of the two first years of the undertaking and

under circumstances the most disadvantageous to the line,

$256,453.20, or in other words, has paid $128,226.60 per annum,

for carrying the ocean mail by steam over about six thousand miles

of the greatest commercial thoroughfare in the world, for which,

as yet, it has received nothing in return. But your Committee

would ask, what has _the country_ received in return for this

$256,453.20? They will furnish the answer. The country has

received through the proprietors of this line, in the form of

freights and passage money, a no less amount than $1,979,760.85,

in cash; and, if the reduction in the prices of freight formerly

paid to the British line be taken into account, nearly as much

more, by saving the difference in freights and passage money, to

say nothing of the general advantages derived by all of our

producing interests from the existence of this American line,

which, as your Committee believe, are incalculable. The money

account will then stand as follows: Government debtor to

$256,453.80; Country creditor to $1,979,760.85 _in cash_; and if

the former be deducted from the latter, the balance in favor of

the country will stand $1,723,307.05, _in cash alone_, leaving out

of view the duties on increased importations caused by the

establishment of the American line."

Speaking of the Pacific Mail Steam Company, the Report says:

"It will be seen from the above, that the total cost of the six

vessels which have been accepted by the officers whose duty it was

to supervise them and decide whether they had been built in

accordance with the requisitions of the law and terms of the

contract, and whose decision is presumed, by your Committee, to be

conclusive in the premises, has been $1,555,069, and that their

aggregate tonnage is 7,365 tons, instead of 5,200 tons, the amount

agreed for. In addition to these ships, as your Committee are

informed, the company has in the Pacific seven steamers, with an

aggregate tonnage of five thousand tons, not yet accepted by the

Government. The additional steamers are, and have been, always

kept ready to replace the mail steamers in the event of detention.

The cost of these additional steamers has been, it is stated,

about two thirds of that of the accepted steamers of the same

class, say about $1,036,712, making in all an outlay for

steamships alone, of $2,518,337.

"It appears that the whole number of passengers, of all classes,

transported by the Pacific Mail Ship Company, the line in

question, previously to December 31, 1851, from Panama northward,

has been 17,016, and from Oregon southward, 13,332. The prices of

passage have constantly fluctuated, but, on the date above named,

the 31st of December, 1851, the average rates were, for the first

cabin, two hundred and twenty-two dollars; second cabin, one

hundred and sixty dollars, and steerage, one hundred and seven

dollars, between Panama and San Francisco. In the early stages of

emigration the prices were increased in consequence of the

enormous prices of labor and supplies on that comparatively

unsettled coast, but were subsequently reduced. At the

commencement of the undertaking, the Company incurred, of

necessity, vast expenses in the selection of proper harbors for

taking in provisions, water, coal, etc., and in the construction

of _depots_; and even at present, coal and supplies of every

description are sent to the Pacific _via_ Cape Horn, a distance of

from thirteen thousand to fifteen thousand miles.

"The freights from Panama northward, have been small in amount,

and confined to the lighter descriptions of articles sent by

express, while the mails have been very large, amounting in some

instances to one hundred and fifty bags, each, and, together with

coal, water, etc., occupying all of the space not required for

passengers. From California, the freights southward, have

consisted of treasure, amounting, it is supposed, to the value of

seventy millions of dollars, but it is extremely difficult to

compute the worth accurately, as a large portion of the gold,

etc., sent has been in the possession of passengers, and the value

does not appear in the manifests."

In noticing the Panama Railroad and the California lines, the Report

says:

"Nearly two millions of dollars have already, as your Committee

are informed, been expended on this important work, by a company

possessed of ample means, and the completion of it can not fail to

open the way for a vast commerce, between the Atlantic and Pacific

oceans, and at the same time cause our fellow-citizens in

California and Oregon no longer to be regarded as exiles. This

road being once opened, the passage of the Isthmus, now so much

dreaded, will be effected with perfect ease and comfort in a

couple of hours, instead of two or three days, as at present, and

families, instead of individuals, will be enabled to seek homes in

the fertile valleys of our possessions on the Pacific coast. The

value of the lines of ocean steamers, of which your Committee have

been speaking, to the commercial and other great interests of our

country and the world at large, can not well be estimated until

this road shall have been finished and put into full operation.

When such shall be the case, the trade between California and

Oregon, as well as that of China and the islands of the Pacific

and Indian oceans and the Atlantic States and Europe, which now

passes around Cape Horn, a distance of some fifteen thousand

miles, will be enabled to take a direct course across the Isthmus

of Panama, the passage of which will require but two or three

hours. The United States mail, from San Francisco to New York, has

already been transported within the space of twenty-five days and

eighteen hours, a day less than the time claimed to have been

taken by any other route, at a period, too, when there were but

seven or eight miles of the road in operation. On a late occasion,

five hundred government troops were sent to California by this

route, and were placed at the point of their destination in a

little more than thirty-five days, without any serious desertion

or accident of any kind. A similar operation by the way of Cape

Horn would have occupied six months at least. The store-ship

Lexington, which sailed from New-York for San Francisco, during

the last year, arrived at the latter place on the last day of

February, 1852, after a passage of _seven months and one day_. In

a country the military establishment of which is so small as that

of the United States, facilities of concentrating troops at points

distant from each other, in a short time, are of incalculable

value, and may be said to add manifold to the efficiency of the

military force.

"From what has been already said, it will be seen that the Pacific

Mail Steamship Company, independently of the associate line on

this side of the Isthmus, and without taking into view the cost of

the railroad, has expended in the construction of mail steamers

alone $2,518,337; and if to this be added $2,606,440.45, the

expense incurred for a similar purpose by the Company on the

Atlantic side of the Isthmus, the entire cost of steamships, to

the two companies engaged in the transportation of the California

and Oregon mails, has been $5,124,777.

"It is no more than sheer justice that your Committee should state

that the California lines, east as well as west of the Isthmus of

Panama, have proved themselves worthy in all respects of the

confidence of the country. In no single instance has an accident

occurred involving loss of life or serious injury in any way to

the travelling public. Such is the strength of the vessels

employed, that on two several occasion when, owing to dense fogs

and under-currents, cooperating with the defectiveness of the

charts of the Pacific coast, one of the ships of the Aspinwall

line struck, at one time, upon a soft bottom, and, at another,

upon a hard sandy bar, she was steamed off, after thumping,

without the slightest injury whatever. Facts such as these are the

more important, inasmuch as several steamers have lately been lost

on the same coast with a great sacrifice of human life, evidently

owing to a want of the strength necessary to resist, effectually,

the force of the winds and waves. In the opinion of your

Committee, the security afforded to travellers by the strong

fastenings and heavy timbers of the ocean mail steamers, built as

they are, under the supervision of naval officers, who are

selected on account of their thorough acquaintance with and

experience in such matters, and made capable of sustaining heavy

armaments, is a matter of the greatest moment. Experience has

shown that, in the race after gain, our countrymen are, perhaps,

more regardless of risk to human life than the people of any other

country in the world. Scarcely a day passes without fresh

evidences of the truth of this proposition. The river, as well as

the sea-going steamers, are generally built with reference to

speed and lightness, coupled with smallness of draft of water, and

hence, in case of touching the ground, or of violent storms, it is

found that if one portion of the frame gives way, the breaking up

of the entire structure follows with a rapidity that is but too

well calculated to show the slight manner in which these vessels

are constructed. Your Committee think that the additional

expenditure of a few hundreds of thousands of dollars is a matter

not worthy of consideration, when brought into comparison with the

loss of life, and would rather see even millions devoted to the

construction of _strong steamers_, than witness the sudden and

heart-rending ruptures of the dearest ties of our nature, caused

by the accidents that so frequently occur. Such is their feeling

of stern disapprobation of the reckless indifference respecting

the safety of passengers, daily manifested by some of the

proprietors and officers of steam lines, that they are resolved,

so far at least as they are concerned, not in any way to

countenance, directly or indirectly, such a course of proceeding.

In the extension of the system of ocean mail transportation which

they propose to recommend, care will be taken, that the steamers

which carry the Government mails shall be regarded as national

ships, to a certain extent, and as such, under the charge of the

law-making power, and be so built as to secure safety to

travellers; and that, in all contracts, this consideration shall

be regarded as one of paramount importance."

Regarding a few sailing-ship owners in New-York and Boston, who had

memorialized Congress against the Collins and other lines, the Report

says:

"The memorialists are loud in their complaints respecting the

alleged improper interference of the Government with matters that

should be left, as they say, entirely to individual enterprise,

which in their opinion becomes paralyzed under the effects of

Government patronage bestowed upon some to the exclusion of

others. If the authors of this memorial will take a fair and

dispassionate view of the matter, they will, as your Committee

think, be convinced that they are wrong in their supposition, and

that the Government has not gratuitously meddled in concerns with

which it should have nothing to do. The merchants and ship-owners

referred to seem to forget, in the first place, that the system of

ocean steam mail navigation is intended to secure adequate

protection for our commerce from foreign aggression in the event

of war; and in the second, that it was instituted at a moment when

the fine packet ships, to which the memorialists refer with such

becoming pride, had in fact been driven from the ocean to a

certain extent by the overwhelming power of a British mail steam

line, sustained by the British Government, which had monopolized

ocean mail and passenger steam transportation, as well as the

freights of lighter and more perishable descriptions of

merchandise. If, as these gentlemen have stated, the sailing ships

have been made to succumb, it has been under the force of an

agency more certain and not less powerful than the one named by

them--wielded by foreign capitalists and directed by a foreign

government claiming for itself the supremacy of the ocean. The

Cunard line of ocean steamers had been in possession of a monopoly

of freights, letter postage, and passage money for years, in

despite of the attempts of the memorialists to resist,

successfully, before the Government of the United States, seeing

that American interests were made tributary to foreign capital,

aided by a foreign government, adopted the wise course of

correcting the evil by kindred means, and placing, at least, to a

certain extent, American interests under the auspices of American

intelligence and enterprise. What would have been the condition of

the New-York lines and other ships had not the Government of the

United States thought proper to extend its aid to the

establishment of the Collins line? Would it have been any better

than at present? or rather would it not have been infinitely

worse? Had the Cunard line continued to prosper, as it must have

done in the natural course of things, would it not in all

probability have increased its number of ships until it would have

monopolized every description of ocean transportation? Would not

the trade with the United States have been entirely carried on in

British steamers, navigated at small expense, and therefore able

to do the carrying trade at low prices? Again, what would have

been the condition of the Southern coasting business, so far as

mails, passengers, and light freights, at least, are concerned,

had the fourteen British steamers then employed been permitted to

operate, unchecked by the American line of mail steamers, between

New-York and Chagres? Would it not have been entirely at the mercy

of the commissioned agents of the British crown, who so well know

how to avail themselves of opportunities to promote their own

interests by advancing those of their government? To carry the

inquiry further, what would have been the condition of our

possessions on the Pacific coast, visited as they would have been

by British steamers--for where is the spot on the inhabited or

inhabitable globe to which they do not bear the union jack of old

England--had not the Aspinwall line been established? Such is the

universal pervasion of the money power in British hands, that at

present, as is well known, the Cunard line has extended a branch

to Havre, to transport goods to England almost free of cost, with

a view to appropriate to itself the freights from that quarter,

and thus not only crush the American line of steamers to Havre,

but be enabled to underbid the Collins line, and, if possible,

again monopolize the trade with the United States over that route.

Would all this have raised the prices of freights in American

sailing vessels, and given an advantage to the memorialists in

question, who had at one time monopolized to themselves the

freights, postage, and passage money in sailing ships? or would

not, on the contrary, such a state of things have operated so to

give a British tendency to trade everywhere, and to furnish

freights to British ships, at prices at which the American ship

owners could not afford to navigate their vessels?

"What, the Committee would ask, has the Government of the United

States done in the premises? Having under its charge the control

and direction of the United States mails upon land and sea, it has

thought proper to say that it would pay for the transportation of

the mails in _American steamers_, which can, if necessary, be

converted, at a small expense, into war steamers, and adopted, if

need be, into the navy proper, at an appraised value, and thereby

become efficient protectors of American commerce in the event of a

war. This is the head and front of the Government's offending, and

has, forsooth, aroused the ire of the commercial monopolists of

New-York, Boston, and elsewhere, because they can not any longer

enjoy the gains which, for more than a quarter of a century, they

had wrested from the mass of consumers throughout the land, north,

south, east, and west. Your Committee must say that, in their

opinion, such complaints come with a bad grace from such quarters,

and it is to be feared that victorious steam will ere long,

without the aid of the Federal Government, supersede the sailing

ships of the memorialists, through the instrumentality of the

discoveries daily in progress, whereby the navigation of vessels

propelled by that power will be made a matter of comparatively

small cost."

Speaking of steam communication with Para and Rio de Janeiro, the

Report further says:

"When the almost unbounded capacity for trade of the basins of the

La Plata and Amazon is taken into view, embracing as it does a

great variety of useful products which may be advantageously

exchanged for the manufactures and agricultural productions of our

own country, the mind is at a loss what limit to assign to the

trade to which civilization and the extension of commercial

facilities must eventually give rise. Nor are the advantages of

this great prospective commerce to be confined to the immediate

intercourse between this country and the regions to which we

refer. While the prevalence of certain winds, and the form of the

coast of South-America, are favorable to a direct trade with the

continent of North-America, they are such as to compel the

commerce with Europe to pass along our shores, and thus constitute

our Atlantic seaports so many stopping places at which the ships

of the old world may touch in their voyages to and fro. Heretofore

the policy of the governments which occupy the regions watered by

the La Plata and the Amazon, and their respective tributaries, has

been so exclusive in its character as to trammel, if not entirely

prevent, their intercourse with distant nations. The different

sovereignties which have sprung into existence since South-America

became independent of European control, have been so jealous of

each other that they have appeared to try which should be most

succesful in expelling foreign commerce, lest it might bring to

some one of them benefits which others did not and could not

possess. A wiser policy, however, appears to be about to prevail

since the fall of Rosas, and there is good reason to believe that,

hereafter, the commerce of those communities with the rest of the

world, will be placed upon a more liberal foundation. Should such

be the case, Rio de Janeiro can not fail to become the great

centre of a largely increased trade in the southern hemisphere."

"Should it be preferred to limit the extent of the American line

to Para, at the mouth of the Amazon, the largest river in the

world, there is at present a Brazilian line between that point and

Rio de Janeiro, which, with the lines between Rio and the mouth of

the La Plata, will render the connection complete.

"Of the Amazon, it is proper to state that it is navigable by the

largest vessels, and presents a line of shore of not less than

six thousand miles, abounding in every description of product,

with climates of all temperatures and soils adapted to all sorts

of vegetable growth. As the regions through which this vast river

passes are peopled by communities to which manufacturing is

unknown, it will at once be seen what an immense market will be

opened to American industry in the various departments of the

useful arts. The proposed connection would, together with the

intercourse by steam, which will inevitably be established on the

Amazon, draw to that river the trade of the interior, which at

present passes over the Andes on the backs of sheep and mules to

the Pacific ocean, and constitutes a large portion of the

commodities that are transported around Cape Horn. With a view to

this river navigation, Brazil has already entered into a boundary

treaty with Peru, by which she has engaged to establish steamboat

navigation on the Peruvian tributaries of the Amazon, and is

preparing to put seven steamers upon the river, where none have

heretofore been.

"The experience of the world has shown that nations do not become

commercial or manufacturing, so long as the products of the soil

are sufficiently abundant to yield them wealth; and, hence, it may

be reasonably inferred that the carrying trade to and from

South-America will, if proper measures be taken, fall into the

hands of American ship-owners. By way of ascertaining what the

extent of this trade will be, if reference be had to the interior

or back country as the standard of the commercial resources

furnished by rivers, it will be found that the total area drained

by the rivers of the world is as follows:

_Sq. Miles._

Europe, emptying into the Atlantic, 532,940

Africa, emptying into the Mediterranean, 198,630

----------

Total Old World, 1,731,570

==========

Asia, emptying into the Pacific, 1,767,280

Asia, emptying into the Indian ocean, 1,661,760

----------

Total Asiatic, 3,429,040

==========

North-America, including St. Lawrence and

Mississippi emptying into the Atlantic, 1,476,800

==========

South-America, emptying into the Atlantic--

Amazon and its confluents, 2,048,480

La Plata and all others, 1,329,490

----------

Total South-American 3,377,970

==========

Total American to the Atlantic, 4,854,770

==========

"From the above statement it will be seen that the proposed line

of steam communication will bring within thirty days of each

other, the commercial outlets of navigable streams which drain a

back country greater in extent than that which is drained by all

of the navigable streams which empty themselves into the Atlantic,

the Pacific, and the Indian oceans, from those portions of Europe,

Asia, and Africa, which are accessible to American commerce.

Settlement and cultivation will, in the course of time, make these

American river basins as rich in products as those of the old

world.

"The question next arises, who are to be the carriers of the trade

which is hereafter to spring out of these American river basins,

the English or the Americans? If Great Britain be suffered to

monopolize commerce as she has heretofore done by her steam

navigation, her people will enjoy this great boon; but if, on the

contrary, the United States take advantage of circumstances as

they should, the prize will be won by Americans."

"Your Committee would remark, in concluding this Report, that,

regarding as they do the existence and rapid extension of the

system of ocean mail steam navigation, as absolutely essential to

the dignity and permanent prosperity of the country, and as the

only means, consistent with the genius and policy of our free

institutions, of acquiring a maritime strength, which, by keeping

pace with the improvements of the age, shall place us upon an

equal footing with other civilized countries of the world, without

the necessity of an overgrown and expensive naval establishment

proper, in time of peace, they would feel themselves derelict in

the performance of their duties, did they not recommend the

measure, with the earnestness which its importance demands.

"Circumstances indicate, with a clearness not to be misunderstood,

that in any future struggle for superiority on the ocean, the

contest will be decided by the power of steam. With a view to this

result, England has applied herself with even more than her wonted

energy to the construction of a regular steam navy which shall be

superior to all others. The number of ships which Great Britain

has of this kind, is at present two hundred and seventy-one, and

there are no less than nine royal war steamers in progress of

construction, to say nothing of the mail and other steamers which

are being built. The course thus pursued by the great commercial

rival of the United States, renders a corresponding energy and

activity on our part absolutely necessary, in a national point of

view; a steam navy must be provided for future emergencies in the

way proposed by the Committee, or war steamers must be built at an

enormous outlay of public money and kept ready in the navy yards,

or in commission, at an expense which is appalling to every lover

of judicious economy, or the stripes and stars of our country,

which have heretofore floated so triumphantly on every sea, must

grow dim, not only before the 'meteor flag of England,' but the

standards of the secondary powers of Europe. If members of

Congress are prepared to adopt either of these latter two

alternatives, let them say so, and let a system which promises,

under an honest and faithful discharge of duty on the part of the

executive branch of the Government, to realize the most sanguine

expectations of its friends, be at once abandoned. Let Great

Britain be again the guardian of our commercial interests and the

beneficiary of American trade. Let the Liverpool, Bremen, Havre,

California, and other lines, which have furnished twenty-four as

noble sea steamers as ever floated, be abandoned to their fate,

and let the Cunard line and other British steam mail lines and

royal steamers supply their places on the Atlantic and Pacific

oceans, and our Southern seas.

"Your Committee would again repeat that the question to be

considered is not one of mere dollars and cents, or whether

certain individuals are to be sustained, or not, but one of

infinitely greater consequence--whether this proud republic shall

now and hereafter exist as a power competent to maintain her

rights upon the ocean. The present condition of political affairs

in Europe is such as, in the opinion of many, to threaten a

general war among the nations of that quarter of the globe, and

the United States should stand ready, and able too, to protect the

rights of her citizens upon the ocean, in such an event. Were such

a crisis to take place to-morrow, or the next year, or within the

next five years, is the country prepared for it? The steam navy

proper amounts to sixteen steamers of all classes, which, together

with the twenty-four ocean mail steamers in the employ of the Post

Office Department, would give us a steam naval force not exceeding

forty in all. Is this the position we should occupy, while Great

Britain has at command upwards of three hundred war and mail

steamers? France has, it is believed, upwards of a hundred, and

the secondary powers of Europe have naval steam armaments in

proportion, most of them exceeding our own. This question will be

decided by the continuation or rejection of the system under

consideration, which, with all the difficulties attendant upon new

enterprises and under the most embarrassing circumstances, has

gone very far to sustain itself, and promises, at no distant

period, to become a source of large revenue to the Government, and

incalculable commercial advantages, pecuniarily and otherwise, to

the country."

The following is copied from the Report made by Mr. Rusk in 1850, and

published in Special Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1852.

Speaking of the services of the mail steamers in our system of

defenses, the Report says:

"The truth is, that, in the opinion of your Committee, the temper

of the times requires that we shall keep pace with the rapid

improvements of other nations in their commercial and military

marine, and that the only choice is, whether it is to be done by

constructing vessels for the packet service, at a boundless

expense to the Government, or by aiding private enterprise, and

thus not only eventually avoiding expense, but adding largely to

the revenues of the country. It will be seen from the above

extract from Mr. King's speech, that, in the course of five years,

the balance in favor of the Government from the Cunard line alone

was $5,286,000. The New-York and Liverpool and Bremen lines will

come in for a large, if not by far the greater, share of the

postage and freightage heretofore enjoyed by the Cunard line; and

the line to Chagres, for the advantages that have, up to the time

of its partial commencement, been in the exclusive possession of

the British packet establishment in that direction. Nor are the

freightage and postage moneys the only sources of profit. In

proportion to the increase of these facilities will be the

extension of trade, and consequently the Government will receive

the duties payable upon all foreign merchandise brought into the

country. Besides, persons _in transitu_ will leave much money in

our cities and along their routes, to say nothing of the porterage

and costs of transportation of goods. To benefit our people is to

benefit our Government; as the more we enrich the former, the more

able are they to contribute to the support of the latter.

"To construct ships and keep them in our navy-yards, subject to

the injuries of time and casualties, does not consist with the

notions of the American people, on the score of economy; nor is it

in accordance with received opinions in regard to the propriety of

placing excessive patronage in the hands of the General

Government. At the same time, it is in perfect unison with the

spirit of our free institutions that the arts of peace shall be

made tributary to the purposes of defense, and the same energies

which extend the commerce and manufactures of our country shall,

in the event of necessity, be capable of being made use of for our

protection. While the crowned heads of the Old World keep in

constant pay vast armies and navies sustained by the heart's blood

of the oppressed people, for the protection and preservation of

their unhallowed power, it is the proud boast of our country that

our soldiers are our citizens, and the sailors, who, in time of

peace, spread the canvas of our commercial marine throughout the

world, are the men who, in time of war, have heretofore directed,

and will continue to direct, our cannon against our foes."

"The simple fact that the ships employed in it [the mail service]

_may hereafter, if the Government thinks proper_, be purchased and

commissioned as regular war steamers, to be officered and manned

as ships of war, should not and can not prevent the construction

of steam or sailing vessels for ordinary naval purposes. Your

Committee are of opinion that, so far from being an impediment to

the proper increase of the Navy, the prosperity of the ocean steam

packet service must operate in favor of an enlargement of the

naval force, the necessity for which is increased in proportion to

the extension of our commercial relations with foreign countries.

The routes upon which lines of steam packets can be sustained and

made profitable to the owners are comparatively few, when we take

into view the infinitely diversified ramifications of trade. Great

Britain, with her vast colonial and general commerce, had, in

1848, but fifteen lines in which national or contract vessels were

employed, including the home stations, as they are called, or

points of connection between the British islands. Nor has the

ocean steam packet system hindered, in the slightest degree, her

progress in the construction of steam or sailing vessels for the

naval service. In speaking of steam vessels available for naval

service, Captain W. H. Hall, of the British Navy, in the course of

his examination before the special Committee of the House of

Commons, hereinbefore referred to, says: 'I some time ago sent to

the Admiralty a plan for making the whole of the merchant steamers

available in case of need; and if there were an Act of Parliament

that these ships should be strengthened forward and aft to carry

guns, it might be then done with a very trifling expense; that

would give this country more power than any other country in the

world. We have nearly one thousand steam vessels, half of which,

at least, might be made available in case Government required

their services. Our mercantile steamers are some of the finest in

the world, and five hundred of them might be turned to account.

They should all be numbered and classed, so that Government would

merely have to ask for the number of vessels they wanted, when

they might go to Woolwich, or other places, and put the guns on

board, and then they would be ready for service.'

"Here is the opinion of a _captain in the British Navy_ with

reference to the availability of steam vessels for national

defense; and what a lesson does it teach to us in America, where

steam navigation is found penetrating every portion of the Union,

and spreading itself on our maritime and lake frontier in every

direction! Here is found no expression of apprehension lest the

mercantile steamers might interfere with the growth or efficiency

of the Navy to which the witness belonged. This opinion, moreover,

is expressed in a country where, according to the testimony before

the Committee already named, there were, in 1848, 174 _war

steamers, with an aggregate horse-power of_ 44,480 _horses_; and

where Mr. Alexander Gordon states, in a letter addressed to the

same Committee, the Steam Navy had then cost the country

L6,000,000 sterling, or $30,000,000, '_exclusive of all

reinstatements and expenses during commission_;' the same

gentleman also alleging that the annual repairs amounted

to L108,000

Annual cost for coals, 110,000

Depreciation at a moderate allowance, 600,000

---------

Making the total amount of annual cost, L818,000

Or $4,094,000

===========

"The regular employment of the best engineers on board of contract

vessels, and the great experience they would acquire from being

constantly on active duty, would furnish to the naval service, in

the event of a war, a corps that would be invaluable. In speaking

of the superiority of the engineers on board of contract vessels

in the employ of the British Government over those on board of the

Queen's ships, a witness before the select Committee of the House

of Commons says: 'Last year there was a universal complaint of the

inferiority of the engineers and all persons connected with steam

employed in her Majesty's service. It was explained, and very

easily explained, by the superior advantages in the merchant

service, and particularly the high wages paid. In all contract

steam packets, they have men on board the vessels who are

competent to superintend any alterations or repairs in the

machinery which may be required.'"

Secretary Graham said on this subject to the Senate Committee, 20

March, 1853:

"While their discussions [mail steamers] justify the conclusion

that vessels of this description can not be relied on to supersede

those modelled and built only for purposes of war, it is

respectfully suggested that a limited number of them, employed in

time of peace in the transportation of the mails, would be found a

most useful resource of the Government on the breaking out of war.

"If conforming to the standards required by these contracts, their

readiness to be used at the shortest notice, their capacity as

transports for troops and munitions of war, and their great

celerity of motion, enabling them to overhaul merchantmen, and at

the same time escape cruisers, would render them terrible as

guerrillas of the ocean, if fitted with such armaments as could be

readily put upon them in their present condition."

Post Master General Collamer also said on this subject, June 27, 1850:

"There are three modes which have been mentioned of transporting

the mail. The first is by naval steamships, conducted by the Navy,

as a national service. This will occasion so enormous an expense

that it is not probable the project will be entertained.

"The next mode suggested is the sending the mails, from time to

time, by the fastest steamers which are first going. This has one

advantage: it gives occasional aid to the enterprising; but there

are many and great objections to it:

"1st. It is entirely inconsistent with fixed periods of departure

and arrival.

"2d. It makes all connections on or with the route uncertain.

"3d. A price must be fixed, to prevent undue exactions of the

Government; and yet no one would be under obligation to take the

mail at the price, so that it would be uncertain of going at all.

"4th. It would be impracticable to send agents with all those

mails, to take care of them and make distributions, except at an

enormous cost.

"5th. There would be constant difficulty with slow and unsafe

boats.

"6th. The great object of obtaining steamships, so constructed,

under the inspection of the Navy Department, as to be suitable for

war vessels, and subject to exclusive appropriation and use as

such, would be sacrificed.

"The third project is the making of contracts, for a stated term

of years, _upon proposals advertised for in the ordinary method

adopted for mail-coach service_. This would not answer for ocean

steam service, unless provision were made for security, in the

strength, capacity, and adaptation of the vessels, with their

machinery, etc."

Regarding our steam service in the Gulf, and in reviewing the contract

made by the United States Mail Steamship Company, the Hon. Edwin

Croswell, and associates, in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate

Postal Committee, presented the following important reflections:

"As early as the year 1835, the attention of the British

Government was directed to the plan of changing the mode of

conveying the mails by the ships of the East-India Company and the

Government, and adopting the contract system with individuals and

companies, with a view to combining the essential properties of a

naval and commercial steam marine.

"In consequence of the Report of the Commissioners appointed by

Parliament to inquire into the management of the English Post

Office Department in 1836, the mail steam packet service was

transferred to the Admiralty. The Report stated the conviction of

the Commissioners of Inquiry that 'the advantages which a System

of contract must generally secure to the public over one of the

establishment, however well conducted, were such that they wish

they could have felt justified in recommending that it should be

universally and immediately adopted.'

"The Secretary of the Admiralty stated that, 'in acting upon this

opinion, the Admiralty entered into contracts for conveying the

mails by steam vessels to and from Spain and Portugal, and

subsequently between Alexandria and England, with the Peninsular

and Oriental Steam Navigation Company. Contracts were also entered

into for the conveyance of the mails between England and

North-America, and England and the West-Indies and Mexico.' That

'the execution of all these contracts, with the exception of the

latter, had given general satisfaction. But for this exception,

the extent and complication of the plan at its commencement

afforded some apology.' That 'the spirit in which the steam

contractors had generally executed their contracts merited notice,

as they had in almost every instance exceeded the horse-power

stipulated in their agreements, and thus insured an accuracy in

the delivery of mails which experience has shown, if the letter of

the contract had been adhered to by them, would not have been the

case.' And that 'the contract system had been generally

satisfactory to the Admiralty and the public, and had tended

largely to increase the steam tonnage of this country, (England,)

to encourage private enterprise in scientific discovery, and the

regulation and economical management of steam.'

"Such, certainly, were among the valuable results of the system;

but these were not the only considerations that led to its

adoption. The English Government, with the forecast for which that

far-reaching power is distinguished, saw the advantages which an

extended steam marine would give to its commerce over that of

every other nation in the world. It saw also the value of

connecting this great branch of the national service with the

commercial and practical skill of the country. It soon formed and

matured its plan, embracing within its scope nearly the entire

commercial world. Steam lines, as stated in the preceding extract

from the Admiralty Report, were established, radiating from

England to all the prominent European ports, to the Mediterranean,

to Egypt, the East-Indies and China, the West-India Islands,

South-America and Mexico, the ports in the Gulf of Mexico and

Havana, the United States and the English colonial possessions in

North-America, and to the islands and ports in the Pacific ocean.

This vast chain of intercourse was not only completely

established, but it became a matter of national policy to enlarge,

strengthen, and maintain it. By it much of the commerce of the

world by steam, and nearly all the letter-carrying by steam

between this continent and the European ports, and even the

distant parts of our own territory, were engrossed by British

ships."

"Important national considerations, aside from the design to

engross for British bottoms and British capital the trade and

intercourse of the commercial world, and especially with the

American continent and islands, entered into the Government plan.

It was ascertained to be a far less expensive mode of maintaining

a naval steam force adapted to the purposes of Government, and to

any emergency that might require these ships for other than mail

purposes, than to build, equip, and keep in service national

steamships of war. The experiment has proved its adequacy to the

intended object; and it continues not only to receive the approval

of the Admiralty and Government of England, but to be continually

undergoing enlargement and expansion."

"The West-India mail steam line was proposed to the British

Government in April, 1839, by sundry merchants of London. A

charter was granted to the contractors in that year, under the

title of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. It embraced the

following routes:

"1. _Outward Atlantic Route._--From Southampton to Madeira,

Barbados and Grenada--steamer, every 15 days.

"2. _Trinidad Route._--From Grenada to Trinidad and

Barbados--steamer, every 15 days.

"3. _Demarara Route._--From Grenada to Courland Bay,

(Tobago)--steamer, every 15 days.

"4. _Northern Islands Route._--From Grenada to St. Vincent, St.

Lucia, Martinique, Dominique, Guadalupe, Antigua, Montserrat,

Nevis, St. Kitt's, Tortola, St. Thomas, and St. John's, (Porto

Rico)--steamer, every 15 days.

"5. _Jamaica and Mexican Route._--From Grenada to Jacmel, (Hayti,)

Kingston, Havana, Vera Cruz, and Tampico--steamer, every 30 days.

"6. _Jamaica and St. Iago de Cuba Route._--From Grenada to Jacmel,

Kingston, St. Iago de Cuba, St. Juan's, (Porto Rico,) and St.

Thomas--steamer, every 30 days.

"7. _Bermuda, Havana, and Jamaica Route._--From St. Thomas to

Bermuda, Nassau, Havana, Kingston, Jacmel, St. Juan's, and St.

Thomas--steamer, every 30 days.

"8. _Homeward Fayal Route._--From St. Thomas to

Southampton--steamer, every 30 days.

"9. _Laguayra Route._--From Grenada to Laguayra, Porto Cabello,

and St. Thomas--steamer, every 30 days.

"10. _Panama and St. Iago de Cuba Route._--From Kingston (Jamaica)

to Santa Martha, Carthagena, Chagres, and St. Juan de

Nicaragua--steamer, every 30 days.

"11. _Honduras Route._--From Havana to Balize, (Honduras)--sailing

schooner, every 30 days."

"The contract system, combining the efficient features of an

extended commercial and Government steam marine, was thus adopted

after full investigation on the subject by the Board of Admiralty,

the Treasury, and the different Government Departments, including

the Post Master General. The merits and benefits of this system

have been tested by England. That Government was the first to

engage in it, and, as we have already stated, fully approve, and

are constantly extending it. The Committee of Inquiry of

Parliament, as we have already quoted, say truly that it 'had

tended largely to increase the steam tonnage of that country, to

encourage private enterprise in scientific discovery, and the

regulation and economical management of steam.' After an

examination of it in the most scientific and practical manner,

that Government regards it as altogether more economical for the

nation, and for the general public interests, than the exclusive

employment of Government vessels. The ships built by the contract

companies have far exceeded in speed and other essential qualities

the ships constructed by Government. A far greater amount of

service was obtained, at a cost much less than would be incurred

by Government in building, equipping, manning, and running

national vessels for even a partial performance of the same

service. Individual and associated skill, enterprise, and capital

were called into requisition, and, aided by Government means,

contributed to enlarge, extend, and fortify the naval and

commercial power of England.

"The practical operation of this great system of steam lines was

to place within the reach of English vessels, of a semi-national

character, and ready to be converted into ships of war, our entire

Southern coast and harbors, besides yielding to them the foreign

trade, commerce, and letter-carrying, by steam, to and from all

parts of our country. To meet and counteract this state of things,

became the object and duty of the American Congress and

Government. It was the more obvious at that time particularly,

engaged as we were in a war with Mexico, and our only means of

coast defense of any force being a single steamer, and she not

capable of entering the Southern harbors, while English steam

fleets literally filled and occupied our waters. To counteract, so

far as was demanded by the requirements of our own commerce, and

the defense of our coast, a monopoly so formidable, which had

grown up under the direct and liberal cooperation of the English

Government, and the supposed superiority of English machinery,

required the aid of Congress; for it was evident that unaided

American enterprise and capital could not cope with it.

Accordingly, at the close of the session of 1847, the Congress of

the United States passed an act authorizing the Secretary of the

Navy to contract with sundry parties and different steam lines for

the construction of ocean steamships, as part of the plan of a

combined naval and commercial steam marine, in connection with the

mail service."

After enumerating the various lines established by Congress, he

further says:

"These (with the previously authorized line from New-York to

Bremen) were the various parts of a complete and important plan

adapted to the growing wants of the public service, and for

providing an adequate steam marine, whenever the exigencies of

the country might require it, and for facilitating intercourse and

the transmission of the mails between remote parts of our own

country and other nations. For the due performance of it in all

its ramifications, it required a large aggregate of capital,

skill, and intelligent enterprise. After a lapse of nearly three

years, portions of the undertaking have gone into efficient

operation; and already the fruits of it--its utility, and its

advantages and benefits to the American government and

people--have been demonstrated. When the various parts shall be

completed, and the plan in all its features shall be in full

operation, its immediate practical results, aside from its

prospective effectiveness in furnishing a class of war steamers

for any ultimate purpose of the American Government, will be found

fully to justify the action of Congress and the participation and

favor of the Government, and confirm the public confidence in its

great utility and value."

"When it came to the knowledge of the English government that

Congress had entered into contracts establishing steam lines to

Chagres, Havana, and New-Orleans, its first movement to counteract

or discourage the proposed American line in that direction was to

run branches of the Royal West-India mail line from Bermuda to

New-York, and from Jamaica to New-Orleans and Mobile. Now that the

American line to Chagres has gone into full operation, and the

news from the Pacific comes by this line to New-York, and thence

to Liverpool, some fifteen days sooner than the same news brought

by the British line,[J] the English government has revised,

enlarged, and extended its West-India line. It has entered into a

new contract with the Royal Mail Steam-Packet Company, a material

feature of which is to run a mail line direct from Southampton to

St. Thomas, and thence to Chagres and back, twice a month, with

steamers of larger capacity and power, and with a proposed speed

of from twelve to fourteen miles per hour. For this line, five or

six new steamships are, under the contract, to be built, while the

old vessels are to form branches from this main line or trunk to

other of the routes of this great and extended plan of steam

intercourse and letter-carrying; at the same time that government

will withdraw its branches to the Balize, Mobile, and New-York,

extend its line to Rio de Janeiro, and enlarge its line in the

Pacific, from Panama to Valparaiso, converting it from a monthly

to a semi-monthly route. These movements show not only the

immediate results of American enterprise in ocean steamships, and

the important consequences, aside from any purposes of coast and

harbor defense, to which it has already led, but the strong public

reasons on the part of our Government to foster, continue, and

encourage it. It has already counteracted the best efforts of the

large and long-established English steam lines, and transferred

the commerce and letter-carrying so long exclusively enjoyed by

them to American ships. If promoted and favored by the Congress of

the United States, it will still meet and counteract the new

efforts of the English Government to recover the ground which

American skill, enterprise, and capital, aided by the Government,

have won from them.

[J] "By the contract of 1846 with the West-India Royal Mail

Steam-Packet Company, the voyage from Chagres to Southampton is

performed in 33 days. By the United States Mail Steamship Company

the voyage from Chagres to New-York, and thence to Liverpool, is

performed in 22 days.

"In relation to the comparative cost to the two governments by

which these lines of ocean steamers, in connection with the naval

and mail service, are maintained, it will be seen that the British

Government pays as much for its single West-India and Chagres line

as the American Government pays for all its lines--Liverpool and

New-York, New-York and Bremen, New-York and Havre, New-York,

Havana, New-Orleans, and Chagres, and Panama and San Francisco.

The entire annual payments by the British Government amount [This

was in 1850.--T.R.] to $3,180,000. Those by the American

Government, when all its lines shall be in full service, will be

$1,215,000. The British-West India Mail Steam-Packet Company are

paid $3.08 per mile for mail service: the United States Mail

Steamship Company, $1.88 per mile."

The Committee presented some few queries to Commodore M.C. Perry on

the capabilities of the postal steamers for war purposes, to which he

replies thus:

"I now proceed to reply to the first division of the inquiry, as

follows:

"Question first: 'Whether the steamships employed in the

transportation of the United States mail, under contract with the

Navy Department, or any other steamships employed in the

transportation of our foreign mails, are, in all respects,

suitable for immediate conversion into steamers for war purposes,

capable of carrying the armament or battery appropriate to the

class specified in the contract?'

"In answer to the foregoing (first) question, I am of opinion that

they are _not_ 'in all respects suitable.'

"Question second: 'And if not suitable for such immediate

conversion, whether they could be altered so as to make them

efficient war steamers?'

"Answer: The following named Atlantic steamers maybe converted, by

slight alteration, into war steamers of the first class:

"_Of Collins's line._ The Atlantic, Pacific, Arctic, and Baltic.

"_Of Law's line._ The Ohio, Georgia, and Illinois.

"_Of Mortimer Livingston's line._ The Humboldt and Franklin.

"_Pacific steamers--of Aspinwall's line._ First class, the Golden

Gate. Second class, the Panama, Oregon, California, and Columbia.

"The foregoing vessels of the respective contracts are variously

constructed as to materials, fastening, strength, and model.

"Question third: 'And if so, what alterations would be necessary

to be made, and at what expense, to make them war steamers of the

first class:'

"Answer: If these vessels had been originally constructed

comformably to the _spirit_ (though it was not called for by the

letter) of the contracts, as they should have been, and all

English mail steamers now are, _in anticipation of their possible

conversion, into war vessels_, the cost of converting them would

be much less.

"Most of them were completed before I was ordered to their

supervision; but I lost no time, after entering upon the duty, in

calling the attention of the contractors to this important

consideration, an observance of which would not have added more

than one per cent upon the cost of construction.

"In altering these vessels so as to make them available for war

purposes, the most simple, expeditious, and economical plan would

be to razee them, or cut off their upper decks and cabins forward

and abaft the wheel-houses; not by tearing them to pieces and

defacing the costly ornamental work, which, though of no value to

the Government, still need not be destroyed.

"The razeeing should be effected by sawing the top timbers, and

cutting off by sections the whole of the upper dock, excepting the

space between the wheel-houses, thus leaving the greater part of

the main deck exposed and for the accommodation of the armament,

and enough of the sides above that deck to answer for bulwarks and

side-ports.

"Below, it would only be necessary to remove the state-rooms not

wanted for the accommodation of the officers, and convert the

after-hold and fore and main orlops into magazines, store-rooms,

shot and shell lockers, etc., etc.

"According to my calculation, the cost of the conversion of either

of the before mentioned vessels, exclusive of armaments, repair of

machinery and ordinary repair, would not, or certainly _ought_

not, exceed, for steamers of the first class, $20,000, and for

those of the second class, $15,000; and it could be readily done

for this at any of our navy yards, provided that _useless_

alterations were not made.

"It should be taken into view that those mail steamers, if called

into service as war vessels, would be considered as forming an

auxiliary force to the regularly constructed ships, and hence the

impolicy of expending much money on them. The requisites of sound

hulls and powerful engines, with efficient armaments, should

alone be considered, leaving superfluous ornament out of the

question.

"The armaments of the respective vessels would, of course, be a

separate cost; and to arrange the guns on the upper deck, it would

only be required to close up three or four of the hatches or

sky-lights; to strengthen the deck by additional beams and

stanchions; to cut ports, and construct the pivot and other

carriages; probably it might be desirable to shift the capstan and

cables.

"With respect to the description and weight of the respective

armaments, I am clearly of opinion that the first-class steamers

already named could easily carry each _four_ 10-inch Paixhan guns

on pivots, two forward and two aft, of the weight of those in the

Mississippi; _ten_ 8-inch Paixhans, as side-guns, ditto.

"The _second-class_ steamers could with equal ease carry each

_two_ 8-inch Paixhans on pivots, one forward and one aft, and

_six_ 6-inch ditto, as side-guns.

"With the additional strengthening recommended, I am perfectly

satisfied that the armaments suggested would not, in the least,

incommode the vessels. Indeed, the weight of armament would be

actually less than that which would be taken away by the removal

of the upper decks and cabins, and the miscellaneous articles

usually stowed on one or the other of two decks--such, for

instance, as ice, of which not less than forty tons is generally

packed in one mass; nor would the munitions and provisions

required for the war vessel be of greater weight than the goods

now carried as freight, saying nothing of the provisions and

stores carried by the steamers for an average of 150 to 250 souls,

including crew and passengers.

"It may again be remarked, that steamers thus brought into service

would be far inferior to regularly constructed and appointed war

vessels; yet in the general operations of a maritime war, they

would render good service, and especially would they be useful,

from their great speed, as dispatch vessels, and for the

transportation of troops, always being capable of attack and

defense, and of overhauling or escaping from an enemy."

Captain Skiddy, the Special Naval Constructor appointed by the

Government to superintend the building of all the mail packets, says

in a letter to Com. Perry:

"In reply I will commence with the first-class ships, which are

the 'Atlantic,' 'Pacific,' 'Baltic,' and 'Arctic,' of Collins'

Liverpool line; the 'Franklin' and 'Humboldt' of Mortimer

Livingston's Havre line.

"These ships, although equal in strength, probably, to any

steamships afloat, are not suitable for _immediate_ war purposes,

but can be made efficient in four or six weeks, capable of

carrying the armament or battery of a first-class frigate--say

four ten-inch guns and twelve eight-inch guns. These alterations

would consist of a removal of the deck-houses, spar or upper deck,

forward and abaft the paddle-wheel boxes, fitting the after and

forward bulwarks in sections, cutting port-holes, fitting hammock

cloths or nettings, putting in extra beams and knees, and

stanchions, moving the windlass below, building magazines,

shell-rooms, officers' rooms, etc., etc. The cost of all these

alterations and fixtures would not exceed ($15,000 or $20,000)

twenty thousand dollars each ship. These ships would then be

relieved of about one hundred and fifty tons weight, or nearly

double the weight of guns and carriages, with less resistance to

water and wind, adding an increase to their already great speed."

In the case of all these steamers, that is, of the Havre and Bremen,

the Collins, the Aspinwall, and the Pacific lines, Commodore Perry

reported that they "_were capable of being easily converted into war

steamers of the first class_."

PAPER F.

OCEAN STEAM LINES OF THE WORLD.

------------------------------+--------------------------------+------+--------

LINE. |SERVICE. |Ships.|Tonnage.

------------------------------+--------------------------------+------+--------

Cunard, Paddle-wheel, |Liverpool, New-York, Boston, and| 8| 12,000

|Halifax, | |

" Screw, | " " " " | 4| 4,800

North Atlantic Steamship Co., |St. John's and Portland, | 3| 4,800

European and American S. S. |Bremen, Antwerp, Southampton, & | 4| 10,000

Co.,|New-York, | |

" " " " |Bremen, Antwerp, Southampton, to| 4| 9,000

|Brazil, | |

London and Canada, |London and Montreal, | 2| 1,870

Liverpool and Canadian, |Liverpool and Quebec, | 4| 5,000

Liv., Philadelphia, and | " " New-York, | 4| 8,700

New-York,| | |

Glasgow and New-York, |Glasgow and New-York, | 3| 6,200

Belgian Transatlantic, |Antwerp and New-York, | 4| 8,800

" " | " " Brazil, | 5| 6,500

Hamburg and American, |Hamburg and New-York, | 4| 7,300

" " Brazilian,[K] |Hamburg and Rio de Janeiro, | 2| 4,500

Genoa and Brazilian, |Genoa, " " | 4| 8,000

Royal Mail Co., |Southampton, West-Indies, | 18| 21,510

| Central America,| |

| South-America,| |

" " | " Per., Rio, Bahia, | 4| 6,820

| and La Plata,| |

Pacific Steam Navigation Co., |Panama to Valparaiso and | 7| 5,719

|intermediate, | |

Peninsular and Oriental Co., |Portugal, Spain, Malta, | 39| 49,416

|Alexandria, East-Indies, China, | |

|and Australia, | |

Europ. and Australian Royal |Southampton, Alexandria, Suez, | 7| 15,500

Mail Co.,|and Sydney, | |

Australian Royal Mail Co., |Transport and other, | 4| 7,800

Rotterdam and Mediterranean, |Rotterdam, Leghorn, and Trieste,| 4| 1,900

North of Europe Steam |African, | 4| 3,200

Navigation Co.,| | |

McIver's, |Liverpool and Mediterranean, | 10| 9,000

" | " " Havre, | 2| 2,000

Bibby's, |Liverpool and Mediterranean, | 11| 11,700

Fowler's, | " " " | 6| 7,500

Dixon's, | " " " | 4| 8,800

Liverpool and Australian, | " and Australia, | 2| 7,000

London " " |London and " | 4| 7,500

African, | " Liverpool, and Africa, | 5| 5,000

Union Screw Co., |Southampton and Cape Good Hope, | 3| 1,800

Luzo-Brazileira, |Lisbon and Brazil, | 4| 8,000

Austrian Lloyds, |Very large Mediterranean | | Unknown

|service, | |

Messageries Imperiales, |Mediterranean, Black Sea, | 50| "[L]

|Levant, | |

W. Hartlepool Steam Navigation|Hartlepool, Hamburg, and St. | 6| "

Co.,|Petersburg, | |

Danube Steam Navigation Co., |Vienna, Galatz, and | 6| "

|Constantinople, | |

Hamburg and Spanish, |Hamburg, Southampton, and all | 2| 2,000

|Spanish ports, | |

East-India Company, |Suez and India, and the Bombay | 12| 11,471

|Mail lines, | |

Spanish and Cuban, |Cadiz, Havana, and Mexico, | 5| 9,000

Companhia Brazileira, |Rio de Janeiro to the Amazon and| 7| 5,500

|La Plata, | |

Collins Company, |New-York and Liverpool, | 3| 9,727

Havre Steam Navigation Co., | " Southampton, and Havre,| 2| 4,548

Cornelius Vanderbilt, | " " " Bremen,| 3| 6,523

United States Mail Steamship |New-York, Havana, Aspinwall, & | 6| 8,544

Co.,|New-Orleans, | |

Pacific Mail Steamship Co., |Panama, California, and Oregon, | 13| 16,421

New-York and New-Orleans, |New-York, Havana, and | 2| 3,198

| New-Orleans,| |

New-York and Alabama, | " " " Mobile, | 1| 1,300

Charleston and Havana, |Charleston, Key West, and | 1| 1,115

|Havana, | |

Savannah Steamship Co., |New-York and Savannah, | 4| 4,793

New-York and Charleston St. S.| " " Charleston, | 4| 4,680

Co.,| | |

" " Virginia, | " Norfolk, and Richmond, | 2| 2,371

Philadelphia and Savannah, |Philadelphia and Savannah, | 2| 2,600

Boston and Baltimore, |Boston and Baltimore, | 2| 1,600

Texas Steamship Co., |New-Orleans and Galveston, | 4| 2,400

Southern Steamship Co., | " " Key West, | 2| 1,000

Mexican Steamship Co., | " Tampico and Vera Cruz,| 1| 960

------------------------------+--------------------------------+------+--------

[K] Building another steamer of 2,500 tons for the Brazil line.

[L] These vessels average about 250 horses' power each. Their tonnage

is large, probably 1,200 tons each.

There are several other lines of ocean steamers in Europe; but it is

almost impossible to ascertain anything definite about them. The list

above embraces all of the most important companies of the world. The

lines are continually changing, while the vessels are passing into new

hands almost every week.

PAPER G.

The following official letter from Hon. Horatio King explains itself.

Post-Office Department, }

Washington, Nov. 12, 1857. }

Sir: In answer to your letter of 10th inst., I have to inform you,

that the ocean mail steamship lines now under contract with the

Government for the conveyance of mails, are as follows, namely:

1. The New-York and Liverpool (Collins) Line, performing twenty

round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of $385,000.

Length of route, 3,100 miles.

2. The New-York and Bremen Line, _via_ Southampton, performing

thirteen round trips per annum, for the gross amount of United

States postages, (sea and inland.) Length of route, 3,700 miles.

3. The New-York and Havre Line, _via_ Southampton, performing

thirteen round trips per annum for the gross amount of United

States postages, (sea and inland.) Length of route, 3,270 miles.

4. The New-York, Havana, New-Orleans, and Aspinwall Line,

performing twenty-four round trips per annum, at an annual

compensation of $290,000. Length of routes 2,000 miles from

New-York to Aspinwall _direct_; 2,000 miles from New-York to

New-Orleans _via_ Havana; and 1,200 miles from Havana to

Aspinwall; making in all, 5,200 miles.

5. The Astoria, San Francisco, and Panama Line, performing

twenty-four round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of

$348,250. Length of route, 4,200 miles.

6. The Charleston, Savannah, Key West, and Havana Line, performing

twenty-four round trips per annum, at an annual compensation of

$60,000. Length of route, 669 miles.

7. The New-Orleans and Vera Cruz Line, performing twenty-four

round trips per annum, at $1,210.93 the round trip. Length of

route, 900 miles.

The contracts on these lines expire as follows, namely:

New-York and Liverpool (Collins) Line, 27th April, 1860.

New-York and Bremen Line, 1st June, 1858.

New-York and Havre Line, 1st June, 1858.

New-York, New-Orleans, and Aspinwall Line, 1st Oct., 1859.

Astoria and Panama Line, 1st Oct., 1858.

Charleston and Havana Line, 30th June, 1859.

New-Orleans and Vera Cruz Line, 30th June, 1858.

I am very respectfully your obedient servant,

HORATIO KING.

To DR. THOMAS RAINEY.

PAPER H.

THE FRENCH, ENGLISH, AND AMERICAN NAVIES.

The following list is kindly furnished me by Hon. Wm. A. Harris, of

Washington. The French list is taken from the "_Tableau General des

Batiments a Voiles et a Vapeur composant les Flottes de la Marine

Imperiale Francaise_."

SAILING VESSELS.

SHIPS OF 120 GUNS.--Ocean, Friedland, Ville de Paris, Valmy.

SHIPS OF 100 GUNS.--Hercule, Temmasses, Tage Turenne.

SHIPS OF 90 GUNS.--Jena, Suffren, Bayard, Breslau, Hector,

Achille, Eole, Santi-Petri, Tilsitt, Sceptic, Castiglione.

SHIPS OF 86 GUNS.--Diademe, Neptune, Jupiter.

SHIPS OF 82 GUNS.--Marengo, Trident, Ville de Marsailles, Alger,

Triton, Duperre, Genereux, Latour d'Auvergne, Saint-Louis.

FRIGATES OF 60 GUNS.--Iphigenie, Independante, Didon, Uranie,

Belle-Poulle, Surveillante, Andromaque, Forte, Minerve, Melpomene,

Perseverante, Renomme, Vengeance, Etrepienante, Victoire,

Semiramis, Guerrierre, Pallas, Semillante.

FRIGATES OF 52 GUNS.--Alceste, Calypso, Sirene, Atlante,

Andromede, Nereide, Zenobie, Sybille.

FRIGATES OF 50 GUNS.--Reine Blanche, Cleopatre, Danae, Virginie,

Poursuivante, Pandore, Nemesis, Bellonne, Amazone, Astree, Junon,

Hermione, Dryade, Circe, Flore.

FRIGATES OF 46 GUNS.--Thetis, Armide, Grigone, Margicienne,

Africane, Penelope, Medee.

FRIGATES OF 40 GUNS.--Constitution, Psyche, Clorinde, Heliopolis,

Jeanne d'Arc, Algerie, Resolue, Tiris, Ceres, Armorique.

CORVETTES OF 30 GUNS.--Ariane, Thisbe, Heroine, Alemene,

Embuscade, Sabine, Aventure, Favorite, Jeanne-Hochette, Corneline,

Circe, Cybele.

CORVETTES OF 28 GUNS.--Arethuse, Bayonnaise, Arthemise, Galatee,

Serieuse, Eurydice, Capricieuse, Constantine.

CORVETTES OF 24 GUNS.--Brillante, Naide, Creole, Danaide,

Triomphante.

CORVETTES OF 20 GUNS.--Camille, Bergere, Iguala, Coquette, Echo.

CORVETTES OF 16 GUNS.--Diligente, Cornelie, Egle, Perle, Oritie.

CORVETTES OF 14 GUNS.--Astrolabe, Zelee, Prevoyante, Expeditive,

Recherche, Active, Indienne, Sarcelle, Prudente, Indefatigable,

Emulation.

BRIGS OF 20 GUNS.--Ducouedic, Palinure, Cygene, Alcibiade, Adonis,

Hussard, Chasseur, Griffon, d'Hassar, Meleagre, Acteon, Bisson,

Lapeirousse, Cassard, Oreste, Pylade, Nisus, Euryale, Beaumanvir,

Chevert, Droupot, Alacryti, Voltigeur.

BRIGS OF 18 GUNS.--Mercure, Dragon, Faune, Genie, Faucon,

Grenadier, Entreprenant, Fanfaron, Janus, Victor, Olivier, Zebre,

Obligardo, Alerte, Cuirassier.

BRIGS OF 10 GUNS.--Volage, Surprise, Fleche, Alcyon, Comete,

Sylphe, Dupetit-Lhouars, Bougainville, Argus, Fabert, Lutin, Cerf,

Messaeer, Papillon, Rossignol, Agile, Geyer, Inconstant, Zephir,

Railleur, Russee, Lynx.

BRIGS OF 8 GUNS.--Allouette, Alsacienne, Malouine, Tactique,

Virgie, Eglantine, Panthere.

CORVETTES DE CHARGE 32 GUNS, 800 HORSE POWER.--Proserpine, Adour,

Abondante, Oise, Caravane, Allier, Agathe, Fortune, Aube, Egerie,

Rhin, Somme, Meurthe, Mosselle.

SLOOPS OF 28 GUNS, 600 TONS.--Perdrix, Loire, Provencale,

Marsouin.

SLOOPS OF 20 GUNS, 550 TONS.--Robuste, Giraffe, Chandernagor,

Cormoran.

SLOOPS OF 16 GUNS, 300 TONS.--Hecla, Dore, Cyclope, Vulcain,

Lamproie, Volcan, Bucephale, Licome, Lezard, Mahe, Lionne.

SLOOPS OF 12 GUNS, 200 TONS.--Anna, Pintado, Menagere.

SLOOPS OF 8 GUNS, 150 TONS.--Pourvoyeur, Seudre.

SLOOPS OF 6 GUNS, 90 TONS.--Vigilant, Pilote, Ile d'Oleron,

Mayottais.

SCHOONERS OF 6 GUNS.--Merange, Estafete, Gazelle, Hirondelle,

Topaze, Beaucir, Euroquoise, Decidee, Jouvencelle, Tonguille,

Amaranthe, Fauvette, Legere, Encelade, Etoile, Fine, Doris,

Brestoise, Mouche, Bella Helene, Eugenie, Tafne, Parisienne,

Gentille, Ibir, Mignonne, Souris, Egle, Iris, Papeiti, Sultan,

Agathe, Touronnaise, Daphne, Levrette, Bose, Dorade.

CUTTERS OF 4 GUNS.--Rodeur, Furet, Moustique, Espeigle, Moutin,

Favori, Levrier, Eperlan, Renard, Eclair, Goelund, Chamois,

Emeraude, Esperance, Cupidon, Orglae, Aigle d'Or, Colibi,

Antilope, Seybouse, Pluvier, Ecureuil, No. 1, Ecureuil, No. 2,

Mirmidon, Capelan, Corvril, Boberach, Palmer, Belette, Colombe,

Cigorle, Tafnal, Amiral, Papillon.

SAILING SHIPS CHANGED INTO STEAMSHIPS.

SHIPS OF 120 GUNS.--Montibello 650, Souverain 650, Desaix 650,

Louis XIV. 650, Bretagne 960.

SHIPS OF 100 GUNS.--Fleurus 650, Ulm 650, Dugay-Etains 650,

Annibal 650, Eyleau 650, Prince Jerome 650, Navarin 650,

Austerlitz 650, Wagram 650, Massena 650.

SHIPS OF 90 GUNS.--Inflexible 450, Dugueschin 450, Donnawerth 600,

Fontenoy 600, Charlemagne 450, Duquesne 450, Tourville 450,

Alexandre 600, Jean-Bart 450.

STEAM VESSELS.

SHIPS OF 90 GUNS, 960 HORSE POWER.--Napoleon, Imperiel, Algesiras.

FRIGATES OF 650 HORSE POWER.--Mogador, Isly.

FRIGATES OF 540 HORSE POWER.--Descartes, Vauban.

FRIGATES OF 450 HORSE POWER.--Gomer, Asmodee, Labrador, Magellan,

Montezuma, Cacique, Panama, Eldorado, Pomone, Albatros, Sane,

Orenoque, Ch. Columb, Canada, Ulloa, Darien, Caffarelli.

MIXED FRIGATES--(New Construction.)

800 HORSE POWER, 50 GUNS.--Imperatrice Eugenie, Indomitable,

Foudre, Audacieuse.

CORVETTES OF 400 HORSE POWER.--Infernal, Reine Hortense,

Bertholet, Catinat, Rolland, Phlegeton, Laplace, Primaugnet,

Dassas.

CORVETTES OF 320 HORSE POWER.--Prony, Caton, Colbert.

CORVETTES OF 300 HORSE POWER.--Patriote, Eumenide, Gorgone,

Tanger, Coligny, Tisiphone.

CORVETTES OF 220 HORSE POWER.--Espadon, Veloce, Lavoisier,

Cameleon, Gassendi, Pluton, Archimede, Duchayla, Phoque, Elan,

Caiman, Titan, Cassini, Chaptal, Newton.

ADVICE VESSELS.

OF 200 HORSE POWER.--Monette, Heron, Laborieux, Eclaireur, Phenix,

Lucifer, Biche, Goeland, Promethee, Souffleur, Milan, Aigle,

Megere, Sentinelle.

OF 180 HORSE POWER.--Petrel, Reguin, Epervier, Dauphin.

OF 160 HORSE POWER.--Ardent, Crocodile, Phare, Fulton, Meteore,

Chimere, Vantour, Styx, Acheron, Cerbere, Tartare, Phaeton, Cocyte,

Tonnerre, Gregois, Grondeur, Euphrate, Tenare, Australie, Narval,

Bruddon, Solon, Etna, Sesostris.

OF 120 HORSE POWER.--Castor, Brazier, Flambeau, Vedette,

Passe-Partout, Pelican, Ramier, Salamandre, Ariel, Daim, Flambart,

Marceau.

OF 100 HORSE POWER.--Anacreon, Averne, Tantale, Galilee.

OF 80 HORSE POWER.--Galibi, Voyageur, Marabout, Alecton, Rubis,

Eperlan.

OF 60 HORSE POWER.--Antilope, Chacul, Liamone, Var.

OF 40 HORSE POWER.--Grand-Bassam, Ebrie.

OF 30 HORSE POWER.--Basilic, Serpent, Pinogouin, Guet n'Dar.

OF 20 HORSE POWER.--Oyapock, Acbar.

FLOATING BATTERIES.

Devastation, Lave, Tonnate, Foudroyante.

GUN BOATS.

Stridente, Mitraille, Etincelle, Bombe, Eclair, Flamme, Alarme,

Coulevaine, Doilleuse, Alerte, Meurtriere, Bourasque, Raffale,

Fusee, Foudre, Fleche, Grenade, Mutine, Tourmente.

MIXED TRANSPORTS.

Ariege, Adour, Durance, Loiret, Gironde, Marne, Aube, Rhin,

Charente, Nievre, Rhone, Tarn, Mosselle, Yonne, Saone, Loire,

Isere, Dordogne, Allier, Meurthe, Finestere, Meuse, Oise, Somme,

Garone.

GENERAL RECAPITULATION.

SAILING VESSELS.

Guns.

31 ships of all sizes, mounting an aggregate of 2,866

61 frigates do do 3,028

49 corvettes do do 1,024

57 brigs do do 1,006

14 corvettes de charge do do 448

28 sloops do do 444

38 schooners do do 228

33 cutters do do 132

--- -----

317 sailing vessels, carrying a grand aggregate of 9,176

STEAM VESSELS.

27 ships of all sizes, mounting an aggregate of 2,680

21 frigates do do do 336

4 frigates, (new construction,) do 200

34 corvettes of all sizes do 939

76 advice boats do do 456

4 floating batteries do 64

19 gun boats do 76

25 mixed transports do 150

--- -----

220 steam vessels, mounting an aggregate of 4,901

ORDINARY CLASSIFICATION OF NAVAL OFFICERS.

2 admirals in time of peace, and 3 in time of war; 13 vice

admirals; 22 rear admirals; 113 captains of ships of the 1st and

2d classes; 235 captains of frigates; 679 lieutenants of ships of

the 1st and 2d classes; 550 ensigns of ships; 109 midshipmen of

1st class; 165 midshipmen of the 2d class.

With respect to the classes of midshipmen, the admiral minister of

marine regulates yearly the number of young gentlemen who may be

received in the service.

According to the navy list for 1856, (July,) the effective force

of the navy of Great Britain was at that period:

Guns.

Sailing vessels, 269, carrying an aggregate of 9,362

Steam vessels, 258 do do 4,518

--- ------

Total, 527 do do 13,880

The classification of officers was:

In service. On half pay. Retired. Total.

Admirals, 21 15 --- 36

Vice-admirals, 27 19 --- 46

Rear-admirals, 51 55 129 235

Captains of ships, 396 60 318 774

Commanders, 551 64 286 901

Lieutenants, 1,139 668 --- 1,807

NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES.

SHIPS OF THE LINE, (10.)

----------------+-----+---------------------------

Name. |Rate.| Where | When

| | built. | built.

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

Pennsylvania, | 120 | Philadelphia, | 1837

Columbus, | 80 | Washington, | 1819

Ohio, | 84 | New-York, | 1820

North-Carolina, | 84 | Philadelphia, | 1820

Delaware, | 84 | Norfolk, | 1820

Alabama, | 84 | |

Virginia, | 84 | |

Vermont, | 84 | Boston, | 1848

New-York, | 84 | |

New-Orleans, | 84 | |

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

FRIGATES, (18.)

----------------+-----+---------------------------

Name. |Rate.| Where | When

| | built. | built.

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

Independence, | 56 | Boston, | 1814

United States, | 50 | Philadelphia, | 1797

Constitution, | 50 | Boston, | 1797

Potomac, | 50 | Washington, | 1821

Brandywine, | 50 | Washington, | 1825

Columbia, | 50 | Washington, | 1836

Congress, | 50 | Portsmouth, N. H. | 1841

Cumberland, | 50 | Boston, | 1842

Savannah, | 50 | New-York, | 1842

Raritan, | 50 | Philadelphia, | 1843

Santee, | 50 | |

Sabine, | 50 | |

St. Lawrence, | 50 | Norfolk, | 1847

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

SLOOPS OF WAR, (19.)

----------------+-----+---------------------------

Name. |Rate.| Where | When

| | built. | built.

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

Constellation, | 22 | Rebuilt, Norfolk, | 1854

Macedonian, | 22 | Rebuilt, Norfolk, | 1836

Portsmouth, | 22 | Portsmouth, N.H. | 1843

Plymouth, | 22 | Boston, | 1843

St. Mary's, | 22 | Washington, | 1844

Jamestown, | 22 | Norfolk, | 1844

Germantown, | 22 | Philadelphia, | 1846

Saratoga, | 20 | Portsmouth, N.H. | 1842

John Adams, | 20 | Rebuilt, Norfolk, | 1831

Vincennes, | 20 | New-York, | 1826

Falmouth, | 20 | Boston, | 1827

Vandalia, | 20 | Philadelphia, | 1828

St. Louis, | 20 | Washington, | 1828

Cyane, | 20 | Boston, | 1837

Levant, | 20 | New-York, | 1837

Decatur, | 16 | New-York, | 1839

Marion, | 16 | Boston, | 1839

Dale, | 16 | Philadelphia, | 1839

Preble, | 16 | Portsmouth, N. H. | 1839

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

BRIGS, (3.)

----------------+-----+---------------------------

Name. |Rate.| Where | When

| | built. | built.

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

Bainbridge, | 6 | Boston, | 1842

Perry, | 6 | Norfolk, | 1843

Dolphin, | 4 | New-York, | 1836

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

SCHOONER.

----------------+-----+---------------------------

Name. |Rate.| Where | When

| | built. | built.

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

Fenimore Cooper,| 3 | Purchased, | 1852

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

STEAMERS.

_Screw Steamers, 1st class._

----------------+-----+---------------------------

Name. |Rate.| Where | When

| | built. | built.

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

Franklin, | 50 | |

Merrimack, | 40 | Boston, | 1855

Wabash, | 40 | Philadelphia, | 1855

Minnesota, | 40 | Washington, | 1855

Roanoke, | 40 | Norfolk, | 1855

Colorado, | | |

Niagara, | | |

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

_Screw Steamer, 2d class._

----------------+-----+---------------------------

Name. |Rate.| Where | When

| | built. | built.

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

San Jacinto, | 13 | New-York, | 1850

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

_Screw Steamers, 3d class._

----------------+-----+---------------------------

Name. |Rate.| Where | When

| | built. | built.

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

Massachusetts, | 9 | Transferred from |

| | War Dep't. |

Princeton, | 10 | Rebuilt, Norfolk, | 1851

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

_Side-wheel Steamers, 1st class._

----------------+-----+---------------------------

Name. |Rate.| Where | When

| | built. | built.

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

Mississippi, | 10 | Philadelphia, | 1841

Susquehanna, | 15 | Philadelphia, | 1850

Powhatan, | 9 | Norfolk, | 1850

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

_Side-wheel Steamer, 2d class._

----------------+-----+---------------------------

Name. |Rate.| Where | When

| | built. | built.

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

Saranac, | 6 | Portsmouth, N. H. | 1848

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

_Side-wheel Steamers, 3d class._

----------------+-----+---------------------------

Name. |Rate.| Where | When

| | built. | built.

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

Michigan, | 1 | Erie, Pa., | 1844

Fulton, | 5 | New-York, | 1837

Alleghany, | 10 | Pittsburgh, Pa., | 1847

Water Witch, | 2 | Washington, | 1845

John Hancock, | 2 | Boston, | 1850

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

STEAM TENDERS.

----------------+-----+---------------------------

Name. |Rate.| Where | When

| | built. | built.

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

Despatch, | | Purchased, | 1855

Engineer | | Purchased, |

Arctic, | | Purchased, | 1855

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

STORE-SHIPS.

----------------+-----+---------------------------

Name. |Rate.| Where | When

| | built. | built.

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

Relief, | 6 | Philadelphia, | 1836

Supply, | 4 | Purchased, | 1846

Warren, | | Boston, | 1826

Fredonia, | 4 | Purchased, | 1846

Release, | 2 | Purchased, | 1855

----------------+-----+-------------------+-------

The United States Navy has 64 Captains, 96 Commanders, 311

Lieutenants, 69 Surgeons, 43 Passed Assistant Surgeons, 37

Assistant Surgeons, 64 Pursers, 24 Chaplains, 12 Mathematicians,

24 Masters, 24 Passed Midshipmen, 30 Midshipmen, and 145

Probationary Midshipmen and Students.--_Taken from the Navy

Register of 1857._

+-----------------------------------------------------------------+

| TRANSCRIBERS NOTE. |

| |

| |

| Obvious typographical errors have been corrected silently. |

| |

| Mathematical symbols in the original text have been transcribed |

| as follows: |

| ^ is used to represent 'to the power of' |

| Square/cube root symbols have been written in words. |

| ("The square root of ...") |

| |

| Tables have been reformatted as necessary to limit width of |

| lines. |

| |

+-----------------------------------------------------------------+

Ocean Steam Navigation and the Ocean Post · 第 13 / 13 章