the opportunity of requiring that the vessels should be
constructed in a manner that would render them as serviceable for
national defense in war as steam-packets belonging to the Crown
would have been if employed in their stead. A provision to this
effect was first inserted in the contract with the Royal Mail
Company in 1840; and in most of the existing contracts
stipulations are to be found requiring that the vessel should be
of a construction and strength fit to carry such an armament as
the Admiralty may think proper. In several cases they must be
built of wood and not of iron; and there are some contracts which
confer on the Admiralty the right of taking the ships at a
valuation when it may be thought desirable to do so.
"Generally speaking, these stipulations have been fulfilled, as
appears from a return which has been laid before us by the
Surveyor of the Navy, showing the number, tonnage, and power of
the vessels constructed by the various companies under contract
with the Admiralty for the conveyance of the mails,
distinguishing those built of wood from those built of iron, and
stating whether the companies have in any cases violated the terms
of the contracts, and if so, whether any authority has been given
by the Board of Admiralty for the deviation. It results from this
return that out of 98 vessels which had been surveyed by the
Government officers, one only (the 'Australian') has been reported
as incapable of carrying guns if required, and two iron vessels
(the 'Levantine' and the 'Petrel') have been accepted instead of
wooden vessels, on Mr. Cunard's Halifax and Bermuda line. Two
other vessels--one belonging to the Australian Royal Mail Company,
and the other to Mr. Macgregor Laird's West Coast of Africa
line--had also been accepted (temporarily) by Admiralty authority,
although of less tonnage and power than the contracts prescribed.
"The Surveyor's report upon most of these vessels, as regards
their fitness for war purposes, is in the following terms: 'Not
fitted for armament, but capable of carrying guns when so fitted.'
This report accords with the opinion expressed by the Committee of
Naval and Artillery officers upon the vessels which have come
under their notice. It appears, however, from the statements of
that Committee, that although the packets they have examined are
for the most part of sufficient strength to carry and fire a
certain number of guns, the expense of the alterations which would
be necessary before they could be got ready for service would be
very considerable, and that even when such alterations had been
made, the efficiency of the vessels would be very small in
proportion to their size, and that they could not encounter
hostile vessels of equal tonnage without endangering the honor of
the British flag.
"With reference to future contracts, we are decidedly of opinion
that no expense should be incurred for the sake of imposing
conditions for giving a military character to the postal vessels.
We believe the imposition of such conditions to be a measure of
false economy. _Should a war suddenly break out, the immediate
demand for mail steamers would probably be greater than ever, and
it might be exceedingly inconvenient to withdraw them at such a
time from their legitimate use for the purpose of arming them for
battle._ Moreover, the high charge for the packet service has been
borne with the greater readiness, because it has been supposed by
some to include a provision of large but unknown amount, for the
defense of the country; while on the other hand the Naval
Estimates have sometimes been complained of as excessive, on the
ground that the force provided for was in addition to the large
reserve of postal war steamers. We accordingly recommend that for
the future the contracts for the conveyance of the mails should be
wholly free from stipulations of the nature we have been
describing, though it may be desirable in some cases to retain the
power in the Government to take possession of the vessels in the
event of national emergency."
Again, in the _resume_, after considering each of the British lines
separately, the committee say:
"An erroneous impression appears to have prevailed among the
public as to the efficiency of our postal steamers for direct
purposes of warfare. We do not believe that those who are charged
with the direction of the military affairs of the country have
ever regarded them as likely to be of any great service in an
engagement; but their advantages as an auxiliary force will be
very considerable. They will be available, in the event of the
breaking out of hostilities, for the rapid conveyance of
dispatches, of specie, and, to a certain extent, of troops and
stores. Their speed will be such as probably to secure them from
the risk of capture, and will render them highly valuable for
procuring intelligence of hostile movements. They may also be
expected to furnish the Queen's ships with men trained to
steam-navigation, and possessing an amount of local knowledge
which can not fail to be valuable in several ways."
We have arrived at about the same conclusions in this country as those
presented by the British Post Master General to Parliament in 1853, on
this subject. And yet, with our small navy we may at any time need all
of our steam packets for actual service, and the Government should
always have the right to demand them for transport service. We have
abundant evidence that our mail packets are well fitted for carrying
an armament, and being highly efficient in war duty. The testimony of
Commodore M. C. Perry, Mr. Cunningham, and others, as published in the
Special Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1852, is conclusive on
this point. They found that they were built with extraordinary
strength and of good materials.
Many expedients have been proposed for the transmission of our foreign
mails. It is said that the late Post Master General entertained the
purpose of paying some of the foreign screw lines to carry the mails,
if Congress would permit it; but however all parties disapprove of the
contracted policy proposed by that gentleman, I can not believe that
he entertained any purpose so unpatriotic, and so subversive of
American shipping interests. It is true, however, that, as he
frequently said, he would prefer returning to the old packet system,
and carrying the mails by sail, if private enterprise could not carry
them across the ocean without a subsidy. But it is a consoling
reflection that these singular views of that worthy gentleman never
anywhere took root in Congress. Certainly there is no reason why this
great, and rich, and proud nation should resort, like some little
seventh rate power, to expedients in the carriage of our ocean mails.
We are not so poor as to have to live by practices; not so degraded as
to be willing to catch at any little thing that may pass along for
resources. We have a teeming prosperity, an abundant wealth, unending
resources, and a people everywhere clamorous for liberal expenditures
for adequate mails. Why shall we degrade ourselves by depending upon
others for our mail facilities? It alway humbles and mortifies me to
see one human being lick the hand of another; one who acknowledges
himself a stupid drone that must needs have a master to direct and
protect him. And so with our nation when she stoops to subserviency
and begging, for even so much as the postal charities of other
enterprising and commanding nations.
It has been suggested that the Government could secure the transit of
the mails on the receipts, taking both ocean and inland postage; and
indeed a temporary arrangement was made with two of our contending
companies running to Europe, to transport them on these terms; but
such arrangements are temporary only, and can not be made the basis of
regular action. They would operate most unequally on different lines.
While on the European lines they would pay probably one half the sum
of subsidy required, on many other, and especially on new and untried
lines, they would not at first pay probably one tenth. And granting
that on a given line, the receipts during fifteen years would amount
to as much as the whole subsidy required for that time; yet no company
could live on them, as for the first few years the receipts from the
mail would be very small, while the general income of the line from
passengers and freight would also be smaller than at any other time.
Moreover, almost every steam company has to borrow money largely
during its first years, in anticipation of the larger income from
increased trade during the last years of its existence. Thus, while
the system of the receipts would operate most unequally, the same
aggregate sum given in the form of a regular annual subsidy operates
as an assurance for the company and keeps it alive. But the postal
receipts are not adequate to the support of any ocean line. In the
report before cited, the Committee say, at page 5, that the sum of
subsidy then paid was L822,390 per annum, whereas the postal receipts
were only L443,782, or but a fraction over one half. There is probably
no regular service in the world where the postal receipts would pay
for the transport, especially where competition existed.
In making our contracts common-sense must dictate the lines necessary,
and the general treasury should pay for them. There is no good reason
why the sums of subsidy to be paid for mail transportation should be
chargeable on the Post Office Department. Nor is it really of much
consequence where the account is settled, as the general treasury must
after all meet the bills. It may create some misapprehension as to the
services on which the sums annually voted are bestowed. But the
service, whether sea or inland, is alike incapable of sustaining
itself, and is alike beneficial to every citizen of the Republic. And
as this service so greatly benefits commerce, it is well that it
should be paid from the general revenues of the country; from the
duties which it creates. At any rate, almost every Post Master General
will feel better disposed to subsidize ocean mail steamers adequately
if the bills are payable by the treasury department, and not
chargeable upon his own.
It would be well in all new contracts that the law of Congress
authorizing them should require strength of vessel, a fair dynamic
efficiency of performance, water-tight bulkheads for the safety both
of the vessel, and passengers and mails, and all those other
safeguards compatible with speed and mail efficiency. But the most
essential point is the mode of making the contracts. We have pursued
two system in this country, that of the lowest bidder, and that of
Congressional contracts. Some have supposed that as the land mails are
submitted to the lowest bidder, so those of the ocean ought to be
also. But the cases are very unlike. The land service is a familiar
thing, which every farmer understands, because running a wagon is one
of the first things in life that he learns. Every body is familiar
with the land service, and every body has more or less experimented in
it, or in something very similar to it. But it is far otherwise with
that of the ocean. Steamshipping is a comparatively new, a very
difficult, and a very little understood science. But few who know its
difficulties will undertake its hazards. Steam power and its expenses
are by no means understood by the people; and the first mistake made
by those unacquainted with it is in supposing it much cheaper than it
really is. This mistake leads to fatal consequences in bidding for the
ocean service, as most of those unacquainted with the business would
engage to perform a given service for less than the actual price that
it would cost them, and certainly for much less than practical,
experienced men would. And herein consists one of the evils of the
lowest bidder system, that inexperienced persons taking such contracts
either perform them inefficiently, or appeal constantly to Congress
for relief, or for increase of their pay. Such cases are exceedingly
numerous. Post Master General Campbell said that the lowest bidder
system was "a nuisance." Senator Mallory declared in a debate about
the close of the last Congress, that it was a system which never
wrought efficiently, which never gave final satisfaction, and which
generally brought in a set of adventurers. The department and members
of Congress had experienced the annoyance and inefficiency of the
system in the contract for carrying the mails between Key West and
New-Orleans through the Gulf. It was several times given to the
lowest bidder, and as often fell through; being finally awarded by
private arrangement to other parties, at more than double the prices
of the lowest bidders.
In the elaborate Report made in 1852 to the Senate by Gen. Rusk, as
Chairman of the Committee on the _Post Office and Post Roads_, of
which Messrs. Soule, Hamlin, Upham, and Morton were members, in
speaking on this subject the Committee said:
"Contracts to carry the ocean mail should, like all other
contracts made by the Government, be the subjects of a fair
competition, and granted with reference to the public good, due
regard being had to the excellence of the proposals made, under
all the circumstances of the cases which may present themselves.
Your committee are aware that it has been too much the practice to
regard the _lowest_ as the _cheapest_ bid; but experience has
taught them that _lowness of price_ and _cheapness in the end_,
are not convertible terms, as the daily applications, from _low
bidders_, to Congress for indemnity against losses incurred in the
public service, will amply demonstrate. For examples of the kind
the committee would respectfully refer to the numerous
applications for remuneration, in connection with the public
printing, which have for years past occupied the time and
attention of Congress, and threaten to continue to do so to a most
alarming extent, involving, in the end, an accumulation of expense
infinitely beyond the cost that would have attended the
performance of the work, at a fair and liberal compensation. This
may be, by some, called economy, but it is the very worst sort of
economy. It excludes the honest workman, who knows the real value
of the service to be performed, and is unwilling to undertake to
do his duty well, at the expense of himself and family; while it
lets in the needy and greedy speculator who, having nothing to
lose in point of character or money, will readily undertake what
he can not perform, and become dependent upon the magnanimity of
Congress for remuneration for his losses, real or fictitious. An
honest and fair liberality should characterize the dealings
between the Government and individuals, just as much as those
between private citizens; and, when contracts are made, they
should be entered into in the spirit of good faith, and with a
full knowledge of the risks to be run, and the expenses to be
incurred."
It is claimed on the other hand that in contracts made by Congress the
two Committees have every opportunity of testing the value of the
service to be performed, of ascertaining the sum of subsidy really
necessary to its support, of giving to every applicant a fair and
impartial hearing, and of presenting to Congress any case of doubt
and difficulty, or of contested right. When the committees take any
line into consideration it is in effect inviting competition and
proposals from every one else than the projector who supposes that he
has better claims to it, or can perform the service at cheaper rates.
Such proceedings are always open and advertised to the world for
months and sometimes for years. And there are many persons who will
come forward and make a low bid for a service after some one else has
brought it to the attention of the Government and labored it through
Congress, who would not turn their fingers over, or risk a dollar in
bringing it before the nation, and securing for it a due
consideration. These are the adventurers who never produce any thing
themselves by a legitimate and honest effort, but who alway stand back
to take the chances of wresting from some enterprising, more
far-seeing, and more industrious person the fruits of the toil perhaps
of years. There are many enterprises in which the public have taken no
interest because ignorant of the facts. Some enterprising individual
goes zealously to work, travels thousands and tens of thousands of
miles, ascertains all of the facts bearing upon the question,
determines its feasibility or its impracticability, spends years of
time and toil, and many thousands of dollars of money, indoctrinates
the people of his country with the new and interesting facts, travels,
writes, labors day and night for years, finally secures the attention
of the Government and Congress, and asks a fair and reasonable
compensation for the necessary service which he proposes performing
for the public. He has contended with every species of opposition,
overcome unwonted embarrassments, foiled the machinations of selfish,
interested parties who would through all time mislead the public if
they could but continue a monopoly of trade, and finally succeeded in
getting a bill through Congress for the establishment of the
long-sought line.
This done, he supposes that he is of course to be rewarded for the
effort, the toil, and the expenditure of years, and that he will have
an opportunity of indemnifying himself for his losses and sacrifices.
He hears many beautiful apostrophes to the principles of equal justice
and right which are said to characterize the legislation of his
country, and control the action of the Government; but he is not
prepared to hear that some adventurer has carried off his prize simply
because by chance or by concert he has made his bid one thousand or
ten thousand dollars lower than the prime projector. He becomes
disheartened; finds that the country neither appreciates nor desires
honorable effort and enterprise; that it will not reward the citizen
in his self-sacrificing attempts to benefit the country and himself
together; and that it will look on with careless indifference while
his almost vested, his equitably vested rights, are neglected or
stricken down. This is certainly one of the practical and demoralizing
effects of the lowest bidder system, which respects no rights, however
sacred, simply because based upon a dogma which is technically true.
The system of the lowest bidder is technically correct, but
practically wrong. It can not be carried out in practice without
abandoning equity and honest rights under the plea of technicalities
and the action of chances. It is in reality but a species of gambling,
a miserable lottery, in which those who are most honest and truthful
are invariably sacrificed. It is proper, then that Congress should not
only establish the postal routes, but also determine either
specifically or proximately the compensation to be paid; or leave this
entirely to the discretion and the largest liberty of action of the
Post Master General. Responsibility must attach somewhere if justice
is obtained. With the lowest bidder system it rests and operates
nowhere; and the most important operations of the Government are taken
out of the hands of a wise public functionary and the intelligent
legislators of the country, and put into a great wheel of fortune,
where the proper person has, probably, but one chance in a hundred.
This although true in every case of contract, is eminently so in cases
of untried lines, where the experiment is to be made, and where it is
generally necessary that an individual shall have spent years in
bringing it to light.
I come to the conclusion, therefore, that the Government can discharge
the clear and unquestionable duty of affording liberal mail facilities
to the people, only by establishing all of the lines which the
commerce and convenience of the country and the Government require; by
maintaining them as a fixed policy of the country from generation to
generation; by encouraging enterprising companies to continue
well-performed services, and enterprising citizens to open new avenues
of trade and wealth; and by paying for the same from the general
treasury of the people, and from the revenues which these postal
facilities, more than any other series of influences, conspire to
produce and to conserve. (_See Report of Lord Canning, Section IX.:
also Report of Gen. Rusk, Paper E: also remarks of Hon. Edwin
Croswell, Paper E._)
SECTION IX.
THE BRITISH SYSTEM, AND ITS RESULTS.
STEAM MAIL SYSTEM INAUGURATED AS THE PROMOTER OF WEALTH, POWER,
AND CIVILIZATION: THE EFFECT OF THE SYSTEM ON COMMERCE: THE LONG
PERIOD DESIGNATED FOR THE EXPERIMENT: NEW LINES, WHEN, HOW, AND
WHY ESTABLISHED: THE WORKINGS OF THE SYSTEM: FIRST CONTRACT MADE
IN 1833, LIVERPOOL AND ISLE OF MAN: WITH ROTTERDAM IN 1834:
FALMOUTH AND GIBRALTAR, 1837; ABERDEEN, SHETLAND, AND ORKNEYS,
1840: THE "SAVANNAH," THE FIRST OCEAN STEAMER: THE SIRIUS AND
GREAT WESTERN: CUNARD CONTRACT MADE IN 1839: EXTRA PAY "WITHIN
CERTAIN LIMITS:" MALTA, ALEXANDRIA, SUEZ, EAST-INDIES, AND CHINA
IN 1840: THE PENINSULAR AND ORIENTAL COMPANY: WEST-INDIA SERVICE
ESTABLISHED IN 1840: POINTS TOUCHED AT: PROVISIONAL EXTRA PAY:
PANAMA AND VALPARAISO LINE ESTABLISHED IN 1845: HOLYHEAD AND
KINGSTON IN 1848: ALSO THE CHANNEL ISLANDS: WEST COAST OF AFRICA
AND CAPE OF GOOD HOPE IN 1852: CALCUTTA VIA THE CAPE IN 1852, AND
ABANDONED: PLYMOUTH, SYDNEY, AND NEW SOUTH WALES ALSO IN 1852, AND
ABANDONED: INVESTIGATION OF 1851 AND 1853, AND NEW AUSTRALIAN
CONTRACT IN 1856: HALIFAX, NEWFOUNDLAND, BERMUDA, AND ST. THOMAS
IN 1850: NEW-YORK AND BERMUDA SOON DISCONTINUED: COMPARISON OF
BRITISH AND AMERICAN SUBSIDIES, RATES PER MILE, TOTAL DISTANCES,
AND POSTAL INCOME: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT PAYS HIGHER SUBSIDIES
THAN THE AMERICAN: WORKINGS AND INCREASE OF THE BRITISH SERVICE:
GEN. RUSK'S VIEWS: SPEECH OF HON. T. B. KING: COMMITTEE OF
INVESTIGATION, 1849: NEW INVESTIGATION ORDERED IN 1853, AND
INSTRUCTIONS: LORD CANNING'S REPORT AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS: GREAT
BRITAIN WILL NOT ABANDON HER MAIL SYSTEM: THE NEW AUSTRALIAN
LINE: TESTIMONY OF ATHERTON AND MURRAY: MANY EXTRACTS FROM THE
REPORT: STEAM INDISPENSABLE: NOT SELF-SUPPORTING: THE MAIL
RECEIPTS WILL NOT PAY FOR IT: RESULT OF THE WHOLE SYSTEM: ANOTHER
NEW SERVICE TO INDIA AND CHINA: SHALL WE RUN THE POSTAL AND
COMMERCIAL RACE WITH GREAT BRITAIN? CANADA AND THE INDIES.
It is admitted that it is the clear and unquestionable duty of the
Government to establish ample foreign mail facilities for the nation,
and that the only means of accomplishing this is by guaranteeing a
liberal allowance for a long term of years for the transport of the
mails, and paying for the same from the general treasury of the
country. We will, therefore, now examine the British ocean steam mail
system, and shall see that the practice of that great nation fully
corroborates and sustains the views which have been advanced in the
preceding chapters.
The steamship policy of that nation has not been treated as a matter
of slight or secondary importance. British statesmen from the earliest
days of the development of marine steam power saw the influence which
it was likely to exert in the revolutions of commerce and the control
of the nations of the world, and determined, with the sagacious
foresight and the firm, fixed purpose for which they are
distinguished, that it should be at once inaugurated as the great
instrument of individual wealth and national power. They properly
conceived that the nation which used this transforming agent most
freely in commerce, defenses and diplomacy would unquestionably exert
a high controlling influence over the nations of the earth, and make
every land tributary to its wealth and power. The end justifies the
effort, and the few temporary sacrifices and insignificant
expenditures which have been made. The British nation launched at once
into an extended foreign mail system which has been twenty years
maturing and untouched, and which, on a small annual expenditure, has
given it the profitable control of every trade and every market on the
face of the globe. It was wisely conceded that a long period would be
necessary to make the great experiment of marine steam mails, and that
term was granted in the outset. When the first term of twelve years
had ended, the contracts were renewed for another term of twelve
years, in every instance with the companies first authorized, and the
sums of subsidy were in every case increased. Not only thus. New lines
were established all along the course of these experiments, in a quiet
executive way, without agitation, without lobbying, without
corruption, just as the Post Master General would put some short and
necessary land route into operation. The last of these lines
established was that in 1856, between Southampton and Australia for
seven years, at an annual subsidy of L185,000, or $925,000. And this
line was established, not because there was no postal communication;
for the Government already had a semi-monthly line to China, India,
and Australia, and another around Africa; but because the increased
demands of British trade, and convenience to the British public, made
it necessary.
During all of this time the system has operated with unbroken
regularity. Established on a great general principle, as well as the
highest possible expediency, it has been regarded as a fixed policy of
the Government and the people, and has been suffered to do its
excellent work quietly and undisturbed. The legislation introducing it
was not an accident. It was not a spasm of generosity to the people;
but it was a fixed purpose of the British public; the wise and only
adequate means adapted to accomplish an important, an indispensable
end. The first contract for carrying the mails in steamers, was made
by the Post Master General in 1833, with the "Mona Isle Steam
Company," to run semi-weekly between Liverpool and the Isle of Man at
L850 per annum. This Company has run the line ever since, a period of
twenty-four years, and at the same price per annum. After this, a
contract was made in 1834 with the "General Steam Navigation Company,"
for the semi-weekly conveyance of the mails between London and
Rotterdam, and London and Hamburg, at L17,000 per year. The contract
was not annulled until 1853, nineteen years, when it was found best to
send the mail by a new route; that is, to Ostend, and over the
railways of Belgium. The first contract for a long voyage was made
with Richard Bourne, in 1837, to convey the mails weekly from Falmouth
to Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar, for L29,600 per annum.
The contract was transferred in 1843 to the "Peninsular and Oriental
Company," Southampton was substituted for Falmouth, the weekly trips
were changed to three per month, and the subsidy was reduced
accordingly, or to L20,500 per annum. The service has been performed
on these terms ever since. The Aberdeen and Shetland contract was made
in 1840, at L900 per year, after a failure to run on L600, by a
previous arrangement. It now continues as then made.
It is known that the first passage across the Atlantic was made in the
American steamer "Savannah," which left Savannah, Georgia, on the 25th
May, 1819, and at the end of twenty-two days arrived in Liverpool,
steaming only fourteen days of the time. The Savannah was only 350
tons tonnage, and had an engine of ninety horses' power. Captain Moses
Rogers was her commander. The "Sirius" arrived in New-York on the 23d
of April, 1838. The steamer "Great Western" next followed, in the same
year. And although this was only nineteen years ago, it is instructive
to notice the observations which the _London Times_ made at that day.
That journal said, March 31, 1838:
"There is really no mistake in this long-talked of project of
navigating the Atlantic ocean by steam. There is no doubt of the
intention to make the attempt, and to give the experiment, as such, a
fair trial. The Sirius is actually getting under way for America."
On the 4th of July, 1839, the British Government entered into a
contract with Samuel Cunard of Halifax for a semi-monthly mail line
between Liverpool, and Halifax, and Boston, at the sum of L60,000 or
$300,000 per annum. That contract inaugurated a new era in our
American commerce with the old world, and gave an impulse to those
international interests and those commercial amities which have bound
Great Britain and the United States in the bonds of enduring
friendship and mutual, neighborly dependence. Boston soon proved
inadequate to the support of the entire line, and half of the steamers
were sent to New-York; and thus they continue to run to this day. It
is a singular fact that since that contract was made, eighteen years
ago, there has never been one transatlantic steamer except those of
Mr. Cunard running to or from that port. This contract was renewed
with Mr. Cunard in 1850, when weekly trips were required for the
greater portion of the year, and the subsidy was advanced, not in the
ratio of the service, which was only doubled, but as three to one,
from L60,000 to L173,340, or from $300,000 to $866,700. The experience
of twelve years had demonstrated both the necessity of continuing the
line, and of increasing the subsidy which the Government paid, to such
a sum as would secure good steamers, regularity of trips, and
efficiency of service. The Company now has nine steamers, with 18,406
tons aggregate tonnage, and 6,418 horses' power. The contract, which
is to continue for twelve years, until 1862, was so altered in 1852 as
to provide for a weekly service as well in winter as in summer; and it
will continue in force from 1862 until twelve months after notice may
be given for the discontinuance of the line. The compensation for the
same is at the rate of 11_s_ 4-1/2_d_ per mile. Lord Canning's Report
to Parliament in 1853, before noticed, in particularizing on this
line, said:
"An additional allowance, _within certain limits_, is to be made to
the contractors in the event of an increase in the rate of insurance
on steam vessels, or in the freight or insurance of coals, as compared
with the rates payable at the date of the contract, if proved to the
satisfaction of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty."
Thus, instead of abandoning this line after an experiment of twelve
years, and finding that it could never be self-supporting, the British
Government wisely determined to let their policy produce its full
fruits, and continued it for another similar term of years, with three
times the former subsidy, for only twice the old service. (_See
Collins and Cunard Lines, Sec. X._)
A contract was made in 1840 for steam to Malta, Corfu, and Alexandria,
and the service was extended in 1845 to Suez, Bombay, Ceylon,
Calcutta, Hong Kong, and Shanghae. It was renewed again in 1853,
terminable in 1862, or after twelve months' notice, with a service
between Sydney and Singapore, with the "Peninsular and Oriental
Company;" and the subsidy for the whole service was increased from
L199,600 or $998,000 per annum, to $1,224,000 per annum. The Company
have thirty-nine vessels of 48,835 tons, and 12,850 horses' power, and
run 796,637 annually, at 6_s_ 1-3/4_d_ per mile. The steamers run the
whole service of 796,637 miles annually, at this low rate because much
of the service is confined to the Mediterranean, as for example, their
line from Southampton to Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar;
and also that between Marseilles and Malta. This is but like the
coasting trade at the utmost, and is not ocean navigation proper.
Before the contract was renewed the same company got for the service
between Hong Kong and Ceylon, 12_s_ 7_d_ per mile, and for that
between Suez and Calcutta, L1, 0_s_ 1-1/2_d_ per mile.
The contract with the "West-India Royal Mail Packet Company" was made
in 1840 for a semi-monthly service to the West-Indies, Central
America, and Mexico, at L240,000, and for 547,296 nautical miles per
annum. The contract was renewed on the same terms in 1846, and again
in 1850, when the Brazil service was added, and the subsidy increased
to L270,000 or $1,350,000 per annum, for twelve years, or until 1862,
and one year after notice shall have been given. The length of the
routes now run by the Company is 37,000 nautical miles, with
thirty-four stopping places. The West-India service of 393,432 miles,
is performed at the rate of 10_s_ 10-1/2_d_ per mile, under special
contract; no advertisement ever having been made for tenders. The
Brazilian portion of the service embraces 153,864 miles annually. Pay
per mile for the whole Royal Mail service is 9_s_ 10_d_ per mile. This
Company has twenty steamers, of 29,454 tons, and 9,308 horses' power.
On the Brazil portion of the service the touches are at Lisbon,
Madeira, Teneriffe, St. Vincent, Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio de Janiero,
Monte Video, and Buenos Ayres. On the West-India division, St. Thomas
is the central depot, after touching at the Azores. Ten branch lines
radiate from St. Thomas to Antigua, Barbados, Blewfields, Carriacou,
Carthagena, Aspinwall, (which they call Colon,) Demarara, Dominica,
Grenada, Greytown, Gaudaloupe, Havanna, Honduras, Jacmel, Jamaica,
Martinique, Porto Rico, St. Kitt's, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Santa
Martha, Tampico, Tobago, Trinidad, and Vera Cruz. Lord Canning says:
"It is stipulated that if at any time, from causes recognized by the
Lords of the Treasury as being of a 'distinctly public and national
character,' the insurance on steam vessels shall rise above 6_l_ 6_s_
per cent., the freight of coals above 1_l_ 2_s_ 6_d_ per ton, and the
insurance on coals above 2_l_ 2_s_ per cent., the Company shall
receive an additional sum, to be settled by arbitration, but not to
exceed 75,000_l_ a year in the whole."
The special contract for the West Coast of South-America, with the
"Pacific Steam Navigation Company," for three round trips per month
between Panama and Valparaiso, touching at Buenaventura, Guayaquil,
Payta, Lambayeque, Huanchaco, Santa, Pisco, Islay, Arica, Iquique,
Cobija, Copiapo, Huasco, and Coquimbo, was made in 1845, at L20,000,
or $100,000 per annum, for five years. It was renewed in 1850 for ten
years; and hence, expires in 1860, if notice may be given to that
effect; the trips being only semi-monthly, and the subsidy increased
to L25,000 per annum. The Company has seven steamers, of 5,719 tons,
and 2,396 horses' power. (_See List of British Mail Lines, Paper B,
page 193._)
The contract for running fast packets between Holyhead and Kingston,
in Ireland, was made in 1848 with the "City of Dublin Steam Packet
Company," for L25,000 per annum, and is terminable at twelve months'
notice after 1860. The line is run twice every day. The service to the
Channel islands, from Southampton to Jersey and Guernsey, was
established in 1848, at L4,000 per annum, for three trips per week.
That of the West Coast of Africa was established in 1852, at L21,250
per annum. Leaving Plymouth, the steamers touch at Madeira, Teneriffe,
Goree, Bathurst, Sierra Leone, Monrovia, Cape Coast Castle, Accra,
Whydah, Badagry, Lagos, Bonny, Old Calabar, Cameroon, and Fernando Po.
This contract was made with the "African Steamship Company," for a
monthly service, and terminates in 1862 if twelve months' notice be
given. There must be three steamers of 700 tons each, and the pay is,
for 149,880 miles annually, at 2_s_ 6_d_ per mile. The contract with
the "General Screw Steamshipping Company," for service semi-monthly
from Plymouth to the Cape of Good Hope and Calcutta, touching on the
return voyage at St. Vincent, Ascension, Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius,
Point de Galle, Madras, and St. Helena, for L50,000 per year, to be
reduced after two years to L40,000 annually, and that to the Cape of
Good Hope and Port Natal, touching at Mossel and Algoa bays, Buffalo,
and Port Francis, for L3,000 per annum, with the same Company, were
both made in 1852; but the service was found impracticable on the
terms, and was abandoned. That from Plymouth every two months to
Sydney and New South Wales, with the "Australian Royal Mail Steam
Navigation Co.," for L26,000 per annum, and touching at St. Vincent,
Simon's Bay, or Table Bay, Cape of Good Hope, King George Sound, Port
Philip, and St. Helena, was made also in 1852; but was likewise soon
abandoned, as the subsidy in each case was too small.
About this time the Chancellor of the Exchequer requested a thorough
investigation into the foreign steam packet system. This was made in
the most searching manner in 1853; and such was the effect that it was
determined not only to sustain all of the existing lines in all of
their integrity, but to extend the system and afford additional
facilities to British commerce and the British people. Accordingly, a
new contract was made last year, 1856, with the "European and
Australian Mail Steam Packet Company" for a monthly service between
Southampton, Marseilles, Malta, Alexandria, Suez, and Sydney, at an
annual subsidy of L185,000, or $925,000. The Company has seven
steamers of 13,410 tons, and 3,290 horses' power. They run 336,000
miles per annum, and receive 11_s_ per mile from the Government. It
must be borne in mind, too, that when this line was established there
were already two lines to the East-Indies and China, and one to
Australia. This makes two to Australia, and three to the East
generally.
There is also a contract, made in 1850 with Mr. Cunard, for running
monthly between Halifax and Newfoundland, and Halifax, Bermuda, and
New-York, as well as between New-York and Bermuda and St. Thomas.
New-York was soon dropped from the list, doubtless because the British
steamers yielded us more advantage than was gained by the mother
country or the Provinces, and the line is now continued, at the
original compensation, L14,700, or $73,500, between Halifax and
Newfoundland, and Halifax, Bermuda, and St. Thomas, connecting with
the Cunard steamers. The steamers are small coasters, and run at the
rate of 3_s_ per mile. Hence, they make 98,000 miles per annum.
The ocean mail steamers of Great Britain run 2,532,231 miles per year,
at a total cost to the Admiralty of L1,062,797, or $5,333,985. The
ocean mail steamers of the United States run 735,732 miles per year,
at a total charge on the Post Office Department of $1,329,733. The
British steamers run three and a half times as many miles as ours do,
and receive for it a sum more than four times as large. The average
price paid to their principal companies, as the West-India Royal Mail,
the Cunard, the Australian, and the Peninsular and Oriental, including
its Mediterranean coasting service, is 9_s_ 7_d_, or $2.39 per mile;
while the average price paid by us, or for the Collins, Havre, Bremen,
Aspinwall, and Panama, San Francisco and Oregon, is $1.80-3/4 per
mile. The highest sum paid per mile by the British Government is 11_s_
4-1/4_d_, or $2.83-1/2, to the Cunard Company, $2.75 to the
Australian, and $2.46 to the West-India; and the lowest, 6_s_
1-3/4_d_, or $1.53-1/2 to the Peninsular and Oriental, much of whose
service is coasting. This is saying nothing of the Pacific and the
African coasting lines. The highest sum which we pay is to the Collins
line, $3.10-1/2 per mile; and the lowest to the Havre, $1.00-1/2 per
mile; while the sums paid to all of the other companies range but
little above the last figures. The lowest rate per mile paid to any of
the lines under the contract, was to the Pacific Mail, $1.70. It must
not be forgotten that the low rates per mile of the Havre and Bremen
result from those lines taking the postages, since their contracts
expired; a sum by no means adjusted to the service done. They had
ships that they could not let lie idle. Under their regular contracts
the pay per mile of the Bremen line was $2.08, and of the Havre
$1.76-1/2. While the British Government pays to four of her principal
transmarine services an average of $2.39 per mile, we pay to five of
ours an average of $1.80-3/4 only, or but about two thirds as much as
she does. While our total annual expenditure for foreign mails is
$1,329,733, a sum by $20,267 less than that paid to the single service
of the West-India Royal Mail Company, that of Great Britain is
$5,333,985. And, while our total income from transmarine postages is
$1,035,740, a sum but little short of that paid in subsidy, taking the
present Bremen and Havre services at the estimates of last year for
sea and inland postages combined, the income from the whole
transmarine service of Great Britain, including ocean and inland
postage, was, when the last report was made in 1853, L591,573, or
$2,957,865; but little above half the sum paid in subsidy, and
including the French, Belgian, and Dutch routes, where the postal
yield was much greater than from the ocean lines. The estimates which
I present below have been made with great care from distances and
subsidies furnished me by the reliable First Assistant Post Master
General, Hon. Horatio King, from the last report of the late Post
Master General, and from the report of the British Post Master
General, Lord Canning, before noticed. Every item is consequently
authentic.
AMERICAN.
----------+------+----------+----------+----------+-------+------------------
| | | | Gross | Total |
Line. |Trips.|Distances.| Subsidy. | Postage. | Miles | Pay per Mile.
----------+------+----------+----------+----------+-------+------------------
Collins, | 20| 3,100| $385,000| $415,867|124,000| $3.10-1/2
Bremen, | 13| 3,700| 128,987| 128,937| 96,000| 1.34
Havre, | 13| 3,270| 88,484| 88,484| 85,020| 1.00-1/2
Aspinwall,| 24| 3,200| 290,000| 139,610|153,600| 1.88-3/4
Pacific, | 24| 4,200| 348,250| 183,238|201,600| 1.70
Havana, | 24| 669| 60,000| 6,288| 32,112| 1.86-1/2
Vera Cruz,| 24| 900| 29,062| 5,960| 43,200| .67
| | |==========|==========|=======|==================
| | |$1,329,733|$1,035,740|725,732|$1.80-3/4 Average.
----------+------+----------+----------+----------+-------+------------------
Total average per mile, $1.80-3/4. Average of five principal lines, $1.80-3/4.
BRITISH.
KEY:
A: Cunard,
B: Royal Mail,
C: Pen. and Oriental,
D: Australian,
E: Bermuda and St. Thomas,
F: Panama and Valparaiso,
G: West Coast Africa,
H: Channel Islands,
I: Holyhead and Kingston,
J: Liv. and Isle of Man,
K: Shetland and Orkneys,
-----+------+----------+----------+------------+---------+--------------------
| | | | Gross | Total |
Line.|Trips.|Distances.| Subsidy. | Postage. | Miles | Pay per Mile.
-----+------+----------+----------+------------+---------+--------------------
A | 52| 3,100| L173,340|L143,667.10s| 304,000|11s 4-1/2d $2.38-1/2
B | 24| 11,402| 270,000| 106,905.00 | 547,296| 9s10 $2.46
C | 24| [F]| 244,000| 178,186.11 | 796,637| 6s 1-3/4 $1.53-1/2
D | 12| 14,000| 185,000| 33,281.12 | 336,000|11s00 $2.75
E | 24| 2,042| 14,700| | 98,000| 3s00 $0.75
F | 24| 2,718| 25,000| 5,715.00 | 130,434| 3s10 $0.96
G | 12| 6,245| 23,250| 3,196.02 | 149,880| 2s 6 $0.62-1/2
| | | | French | |
| | | | Belgian, | |
| | | | and Dutch | |
| | | | Postage. | |
H | 156| 132| | {74,430.08 | 41,184|
I | 730| 64| | {36,158.09 | 93,440|
J | 112| 70| | {10,032.15 | 14,560|
K | 52| 200| | | 20,800|
| | |==========|============|=========|====================
| | |L1,062,797|L591,573.07s|2,532,231| 9s 7d $2.39
-----+------+----------+----------+------------+---------+--------------------
Total Average per Mile, $2.10-1/3. Average of four principal lines, $2.39.
[F] The Peninsular and Oriental Company run twice per month between
Southampton and Alexandria, and between Suez and Calcutta and Hong
Kong; twice per month between Marseilles and Malta; between Singapore
and Sydney every two months; and three times per month between
Southampton and Gibraltar, touching at Vigo, O Porto, Lisbon, and
Cadiz.
It would hardly be expected that the lines of this country should run
at cheaper rates than those of Great Britain, as the prime cost of
ships and their repairs, fuel, wages, insurance, etc., are much
cheaper there, and as they have more paying freights, in their
manufactured goods. It only explains to us, what has alway seemed a
mystery; that while the regular companies in England were making
money, nearly all of those in the United States not only had not made
money, but were embarrassed more or less, and were selling their
stocks at sixty to eighty cents on the dollar.
It is pleasing and instructive to examine the steam mail service of
Great Britain, and see the gradual, unfaltering progress that she has
made from year to year, since 1833; increasing the mail facilities and
the sums paid for them by constant accretion based on system, rather
than by any spasmodic legislation, or the ruling caprices of the
moment. These improvements have not come all in a mass, or in any one
year. Neither have they been abandoned at times of financial
embarrassment, or commercial depression. At such periods they have
been as regularly fostered as in the times of the most flush
prosperity; and have ever been properly considered one of the prime
agents and necessities for restoring commerce to its normal condition
and a safe equilibrium. The transmarine service, which cost but
L583,793, or $2,918,965, per annum until 1850,[G] now costs
L1,062,797, or $5,333,985; within a fraction of double the sum. While
the increase has not been slow, it has been steady and systematic,
just as it was necessary to meet the wants of British commerce
throughout the world. The language of the Hon. Senator Rusk on this
subject, in his Report made to the Senate, Sep. 18th, 1850, found in
Senate Ex. Doc. No. 50, 1st Session of 32d Congress, in Special Rep.
Secretary of the Navy, 1852, is forcible and worthy of remembrance. He
says:
[G] See Second Report, Steam Communication with India, 1851. Appendix,
page 419.
"The importance of the steam mail service, when considered with
reference to the convenience which it affords to the social
intercourse of the country, is as nothing when compared with its
vast bearing upon the commerce of the world. Wherever facilities
of rapid travel exist, trade will be found with its attendant
wealth. Of the truth of this proposition, no country, perhaps,
affords a more forcible illustration than Great Britain, as none
has ever availed itself, to so great an extent, of the benefits of
easy and rapid intercommunication between the various portions of
her almost boundless empire. The commercial history of England has
shown that mail facilities have uniformly gone hand in hand with
the extension of trade; and wherever British subjects are found
forming communities, there do we find the hand of the government
busy in supplying the means of easy and safe communication with
the mother country. With a view to this, we have beheld England
increasing her steam marine at an enormous expense, and sustaining
packet lines connecting with every quarter of the globe, even in
cases where any _immediate_ and _direct_ remuneration was out of
the question. The great object in view was, to draw together the
portions of an empire upon which the sun never sets, and the
martial airs of which encircle the globe, and to make British
subjects who dwell in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and even
Oceanica, all feel alike that they are Britons."
The Hon. Thomas Butler King, formerly Chairman of the Naval Committee,
in a speech in the House, 19th July, 1848, said on this subject:
"In the year 1840 a contract was made by the Admiralty with the
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, at two hundred and forty thousand
pounds sterling, or one million two hundred thousand dollars per
annum, for fourteen steamers to carry the mails from Southampton
to the West-Indies, the ports of Mexico in the Gulf, and to
New-Orleans, Mobile, Savannah, and Charleston. These ships are of
the largest class, and are to conform in all respects, concerning
size and adaptation to the purposes of war, to the conditions
prescribed in the Cunard contracts. They are to make twenty-four
voyages or forty-eight trips a year, leaving and returning to
Southampton semi-monthly.
"Another contract has recently been entered into, as I am
informed, for two ships to run between Bermuda and New-York. The
West-India line, in consequence of some disasters during the first
years of its service, was relieved from touching at the ports of
the United States; but in the spring of last year it was required
to resume its communication with New-Orleans, and is at any time
liable to be required to touch at the other ports on our coast
which I have named. Thus it will be perceived that this system of
mail steam-packet service is so arranged as not only to
communicate with Canada and the West-Indies, the ports on the
Spanish Main and the Gulf coast of Mexico, but also to touch at
every important port in the United States, from Boston to
New-Orleans.
"These three lines employ twenty-five steamers of the largest and
most efficient description, where familiarity with our seaports
and the whole extent of our coast would render them the most
formidable enemies in time of war. It is scarcely possible to
imagine a system more skillfully devised to bring down upon us, at
any given point, and at any unexpected moment, the whole force of
British power. More especially is this true with respect to our
_southern_ coast, where the great number of accessible and
unprotected harbors, both on the Atlantic and the Gulf, would
render such incursions comparatively safe to them, and terrible to
us. And when we reflect that the design of this system is, that it
shall draw the means of its support from our own commerce and
intercourse, we should surely have been wanting in the duty we
owed to ourselves and to our country, if we had failed to adopt
measures towards the establishment of such an American system of
Atlantic steam navigation as would compete successfully with it."
Previous to the renewal of the several foreign mail contracts, in
1850, the Treasury ordered, 26th April, 1849, the formation of a
Committee in these words: "_Ordered_, that a Select Committee be
appointed to inquire into the CONTRACT PACKET SERVICE." That Committee
was composed of Sir James Hogg, Mr. Cardwell, Sir Wm. Clay, Mr.
Cowper, Mr. Alderman Thompson, Mr. Fitz Roy, Mr. Hastie, Mr. Mangles,
Mr. Thomas Baring, Mr. Bankes, Mr. William Brown, Mr. Childers, Mr.
Wilcox, Mr. Crogan, and Mr. Henley. Mr. Elliot was added in the place
of Mr. Baring. The Committee sat seventeen days, and examined fifteen
witnesses under oath, many of these being commanders in the Navy,
Secretaries, Presidents, and engineers of the Companies, and other
eminent men in steam. Mr. Cunard was among the witnesses. After taking
evidence and papers extending over about seven hundred and
eighty-three octavo pages, they said in their report, after
recommending that great care should be exercised in making all future
contracts:
"1. That so far as the Committee are able to judge, from the evidence
they have taken, it appears that the mails are conveyed at a less cost
by Hired Packets than by Her Majesty's Vessels.
"2. That some of the existing Contracts have been put up to public
tender, and some arranged by private negotiation; and that a very
large sum beyond what is received from postage is paid on some of the
lines; but considering that at the time these contracts were arranged
the success of these large undertakings was uncertain, Your Committee
see no reason to think that better terms could have been obtained for
the public."
This investigation was made to enable the Government to proceed
intelligently with the many contracts which were to expire in 1850;
and its immediate consequence was, not only the renewal of all the old
contracts with the same parties at the same or larger pay, but the
establishment of several new services.
The British system had operated to the very highest satisfaction of
the public and the Government for twenty years, until 1853, as it has
done ever since; but at that time it was put to a second and very
severe test. It had been suggested, probably by the Lords of the
Admiralty, who had to pay the bills from the Naval fund, that the
packet system was too costly, and should be remodelled, and perhaps
reduced. Complaint was thus made to the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
who, in a Treasury Minute, dated March 1, 1853, says:
"Important as it is to secure rapid and certain communication with
the remote dependencies of this country, and with other distant
states, for national purposes, it is doubtless, under all common
circumstances, from commercial considerations that such facility
of correspondence derives its highest value."
"Her Majesty's Government conceive the time to have arrived when
the entire charge of the packet service should be deliberately
examined and reviewed, with joint reference to the questions--how
far the purposes with which the present system was begun have been
accomplished--how far the total amount of service rendered to the
State is adequate to the total annual expense--how far there may
be cause for a more than commonly jealous and scrupulous
consideration of such further schemes of extension of the system
as particular interests or parties may press, or even such as
public objects may recommend from time to time; lastly, how far,
on account of the early period at which certain of the contracts
are terminable, or on account of requisitions put in by the
contractors themselves for the modification of the terms, or for
any other reason, it may be prudent to entertain the question of
any revision of those terms, or of laying down any prospective
rules with regard to them; such only, of course, as may comport
with the equitable as well as the legal rights of the parties, and
may avoid any disappointment to the just expectations of those
classes who may have felt a peculiar interest in the establishment
and extension of these great lines of communication."
After remarking that some of the vessels of some few Companies were
unfit for purposes of war, the "Minute of the Treasury," in
instructing the Committee, further says:
"At the same time, it is not to be conceived that, on account of
this failure in a portion of the design, the country has cause to
regret having paid a larger price than was intended to be paid
simply for the establishment of these noble chains of
communication, which well nigh embrace the world. The organization
of a complete postal system upon the ocean, with absolute fixity
of departures, and a general approach to certainty in arrivals,
was a great problem, of high interest and benefit, not to England
only, but to all civilized countries; and this problem may now be
said to have been solved by England, for the advantage of mankind
at large. It was to all appearance altogether beyond the reach of
merely commercial enterprise; and if the price paid has been high,
the object has been worthy, and the success for all essential
purposes complete."
As a consequence of this "Minute," the Lords Commissioners of Her
Majesty's Treasury appointed a Committee, consisting of Viscount
Canning, Post Master General of Great Britain, as President; Hon. Wm.
Cowper, on behalf of the Board of Admiralty; Sir Stafford H.
Northcote, Bart.; and Mr. R. Madox Bromley, Secretary to the Board of
Audit. The Committee organized, examined the Evidence and Report of
the Committee of 1849, also the three large volumes of Evidence and
Report taken by the Committee in 1851 on "Steam Communication with
India and Australia," and the many elaborate documents of this class
published by the Admiralty. After discussing thoroughly all of the
political, financial, commercial, ethical, and social questions
connected with rapid steam mail communication, they made an elaborate
and detailed examination of all the contracts existing with the
Government, and of the affairs of the various companies, with a view
to deciding whether the ocean mail service should be abridged, or
continued, or extended. They reported to both Houses of Parliament,
July 8th, 1853. The conclusion of the Committee was, not only that the
present service was demanded by every interest of the country and
should be sustained, but that it should be judiciously extended, so as
to meet all of the wants of the British public of whatever class. As
elsewhere remarked, the new line established last year to Australia
and India, at a cost of $925,000 per annum, for seven years, was a
legitimate result of that test and that report, made in the most
searching manner by the very ablest men of the kingdom; and this,
notwithstanding the reports purposely circulated in this country every
few years that Great Britain intends abandoning her steam mail system.
She will abandon that system, as her practice plainly indicates, only
when her people shall have discovered some means of making and
preserving wealth without effort, enterprise, commerce, or
manufactures. (_See page 99, Mr. Atherton's Reply._) The Report says:
"Before the application of steam to the propulsion of ships, the
contracts were often made for short periods, the Government being
able to find, among the vessels already employed in trade, some of
speed sufficient for the purpose; but when it became requisite to
dispatch the mails by steam, the ordinary supply of trading
vessels would no longer suffice, and the Government had to call
into existence a new class of packets.
"The postal service between England and the adjacent shores of
Ireland, France, and Belgium, was at first performed by steam
packets belonging to the Crown; but for the longer voyages it was
thought better to induce commercial companies to build steamers;
and with that view the contracts were at first made for periods
which, unless previously terminated by failure to fulfill their
engagements, would secure to the company the full benefit of their
original outlay, by continuing the employment of their vessels
until they might be expected to require extensive repairs, or to
become unfit for continued service. In 1837 steam communication
was created with Portugal and Gibraltar; in 1840 with Egypt, with
the West-Indies, and with North-America.
"When the public interest requires the establishment of a postal
line on which the ordinary traffic would not be remunerative for
steamers, the subsidy to be allowed in the contract may be
ascertained either by the test of public competition, or by
calculating the amount which, on an estimate of the probable
receipts and expenditure, will cover the deficiency of receipts,
or by comparing it with the cost of war vessels if employed for
the same purpose."
"The objects which appear to have led to the formation of these
contracts, and to the large expenditure involved, were--to afford
a rapid, frequent, and punctual communication with those distant
ports which feed the main arteries of British commerce, and with
the most important of our foreign possessions; to foster maritime
enterprise; and to encourage the production of a superior class of
vessels which would promote the convenience and wealth of the
country in time of peace, and assist in defending its shores
against hostile aggression.
"These expectations have not been disappointed. The ocean has been
traversed with a precision and regularity hitherto deemed
impossible--commerce and civilization have been extended--the
colonies have been brought more closely into connection with the
Home Government--and steamships have been constructed of a size
and power that, without Government aid, could hardly, at least for
many years, have been produced.
"It is not easy to estimate the pecuniary value of these results,
but there is no reason to suppose that they could have been
attained at that time at less cost."
After noticing the objects of the postal contracts, the Report says,
in speaking of their results:
"To show what the system is capable of accomplishing, it will be
sufficient that we should call attention to the two great lines of
communication which have been opened, the one between this country
and India, the other between this country and America. The mails
are dispatched twice a month in the one case, and once a week in
the other, and are conveyed to their destination with a regularity
and rapidity which leaves nothing to be desired. The time occupied
in the voyage to and fro between England and Bombay, which, before
the establishment of the Overland Route, averaged about 224 days,
is now no more than 87 days; and the time occupied in the voyage
to and fro between England and the United States, which before
1840 varied from 45 to 105 days, is now reduced to an average
period of 24 days. Nor is the service simply rapid, it is also
regular; and the mercantile community can reckon with the utmost
certainty on the punctual departure of the mails at the appointed
times, and can also calculate with great precision the times of
their arrival.
"The same results have not been so conspicuous on some other
postal lines; but, taking the service as a whole, it has
undoubtedly been brought to a high state of excellence, and its
value to the country, both politically and commercially, is very
considerable."
In speaking further of the objects of the Government postal service,
after inquiring whether the foreign mail service should be extended
any further, it says:
"The object of the Government in undertaking the transmarine
postal service, whether by packets or by the system of ship
letters, is to provide frequent, rapid, and regular communication
between this country and other states, and between different parts
of the British Empire. The reasons for desiring such communication
are partly commercial and partly political. In cases where the
interests concerned are chiefly those of commerce, it is generally
more important that the postal service should be regular, than
that it should be extremely rapid, though of course rapidity of
communication, where it can be obtained without sacrificing other
objects, is of great advantage. It would clearly be the interest
of persons engaged in an important trade, provided there were no
legal impediment in the way, to establish a regular postal
communication in connection with it, even without aid from the
state. This, however, would not extend to many cases in which
there are political reasons for maintaining such services, while
the commercial interests involved are of less magnitude. _Nor is
it probable that private communications would be nearly so rapid
as those directed by the Government; for a high rate of speed can
only be obtained at a great expense, which will generally be found
to be disproportionate to the benefits directly received from it,
unless under peculiar circumstances of passenger traffic._ Lastly,
it is to be considered that there are several services which, if
they were not carried on by the British Government, would probably
be undertaken by the Governments of foreign states, and that it is
not likely that private individuals or associations would in such
cases enter into competition with them.
"From these considerations we infer that, even upon the lines in
the maintenance of which the greatest commercial interests are
involved, private enterprise can not be depended upon for
providing a complete substitute for Government agency; while it is
clear that in others, where regular communications are desired
solely or chiefly for political purposes, such agency is
absolutely indispensable. _It is, however, obvious, that to
establish a Government system in some cases, and to leave others
wholly to private persons, would cause much inconvenience._ The
conclusion therefore follows, that it is right that the Government
should have the management of the whole of the transmarine postal
communication, as it also has that of the communication within the
country.
"In undertaking this duty, the Government will in the first place
have regard to the national interests, whether political, social,
or commercial, involved in the establishment and maintenance of
each particular line. Care must, however, be taken, in cases where
the communication is desired chiefly for commercial purposes, to
guard against an undue expenditure of public money for the benefit
of private merchants. The extension of commerce is undoubtedly a
national advantage, and it is quite reasonable that Parliamentary
grants should occasionally be employed for the sake of affording
fresh openings for it, by establishing new lines of communication,
or introducing new methods of conveyance, the expense of which,
after the first outlay has been incurred, may be expected to be
borne by the parties availing themselves of the facilities offered
them. But this having once been done, and sufficient time having
been allowed for the experiment, the further continuance of the
service, unless required for political reasons of adequate
importance, should be made to depend upon the extent to which the
parties chiefly interested avail themselves of it, and upon its
tendency to become self-supporting."
Noticing the greater or less sums at which private companies may be
induced to undertake short line postal service, and stating that the
line is both benefited and injured by the necessity of punctual
sailing hours, the Report states the reason why subsidies are
required, thus:
"The vessels now under contract with the Government are, however,
for the most part, required to maintain high rates of speed. The
contractors are also subject to a variety of conditions, designed
partly to secure the efficiency of the postal service, and partly
to render their vessels available for other national purposes
wholly unconnected with that service. In return, they are in the
receipt of subsidies largely in excess of the amount of revenue
derived from the mails they carry, and those subsidies are
guaranteed to them for terms of years varying from four to twelve,
most of which have at the present time not less than seven or
eight years to run. An Estimate printed in the Appendix, will show
that while the amount of the subsidies to foreign and colonial
lines, as contracted for in the past year, was no less than
L822,390, the sums received for postage upon these lines can not
be estimated at more than L443,782."
The Report further says, as to the mode by which postal communication
can be procured, "where frequent and rapid communication already
exists, it is only necessary for the Government to secure from time to
time the services of vessels already engaged in private traffic." But
as there are no such cases in the transmarine routes, and as private
enterprise supplies the demand of steam lines only on the short
routes, like the inter-island service of Great Britain, or that to the
Continent, or the service of the Sound, the North River, short coast
routes, etc., in the United States, the Report goes on to say:
"There still remain, however, some cases in which there exists no
private communication sufficient to render such a mode of
proceeding practicable. Where this is so, and where a
communication has to be created, it will be necessary that
contracts of longer duration should be made, _for it is
unreasonable to expect that any person or association of persons
should incur the expense and risk of building vessels, forming
costly establishments, and opening a new line of communication at
a heavy outlay of capital, without some security that they will be
allowed to continue the service long enough to reap some benefit
from their undertaking. It must be borne in mind, that the
expensive vessels built for the conveyance of the mails at a high
rate of speed are not in demand for the purposes of ordinary
traffic, and can not therefore be withdrawn and applied to another
service at short notice_. It is, then, fair, that on the first
opening of a new line, contracts should be made for such a length
of time as may encourage the building of ships for the purpose, by
affording a prospect of their employment for a considerable number
of years. But we see no sufficient reason for continually renewing
such contracts for periods equally long, after the object has once
been attained."
(_For the views of the Committee on the adaptation of the mail packets
to naval service, see pages 146 and 147._)
The Committee in summing up, presents the result of the investigation
and the fruits of the service in the following impressive light:
"The value of the services thus rendered to the State can not, we
think, be measured by a mere reference to the amount of the postal
revenue, or even by the commercial advantages accruing from it. It
is undoubtedly startling, at first sight, to perceive that the
immediate pecuniary result of the Packet System is a loss to the
Revenue of about L325,000 a year; but, although this circumstance
shows the necessity for a careful revision of the service, and
although we believe that much may be done to make that service
self-supporting, we do not consider that the money thus expended
is to be regarded, even from a fiscal point of view, as a national
loss."
It has never been a favorite idea with British statesmen that the
packet service should be self-sustaining; nor have they had any
evidence to believe that steam companies could live on the postal
receipts. It is evident from the following that the packet system is
sustained without any reference whatever to the postal income, and for
commercial, political, and social purposes alone; only using the
income so far as it goes as a part of the contributions by the people
to the general treasury. It says:
"Your Lordships have seen from our Report that in framing these
contracts various objects have entered into the consideration of
the Government, the cost of which ought not in our opinion to be
charged upon the revenues of the General Post Office. A simple
comparison of the receipts and expenditure upon some of the lines
is in itself sufficient to prove this. If the Post Office is to be
considered as a department producing revenue, it is not to be
supposed that a line of vessels which costs the State L240,000 a
year, and brings in no more than L56,002, (as is the case with the
West-Indian packets,) or one for which L25,000 is annually paid,
and which returns little more than one fifth of that sum, (as the
Pacific line,) can be maintained as a part of its machinery; and,
in fact, the contracts for many of the services have been made
without reference to any estimate or opinion on the part of the
Post Master General of their probable value as postal lines."
It thus becomes abundantly evident from the Reports of Parliamentary
Committees, from the "Acts of Parliament," and from the practice of
the Admiralty and Post Office Departments, as well as from the
unvarying experiences of twenty-four years, that the steam mail packet
system of Great Britain was primarily adopted, and ever since
sustained as the choicest means of giving to that nation the
irresistible control of the world. Watching this system from the germ
to its present maturity, we have seen the overshadowing tree reach
higher and higher, and the circle of each year's growth expand more
and more, until the outer ring now embraces the whole civilized and
savage world. An additional evidence of this arrives this very day.
The Atlantic brings intelligence (_New-York papers, Nov. 22d_) that
Great Britain has just completed another mail contract, by which the
Peninsular and Oriental Company are to run a third semi-monthly
service to India and China; so that the Government and people of Great
Britain shall have a weekly communication with those regions, while we
have none except through them, although we are many thousand miles
nearer to those countries.
It has been said that we should not attempt to run the postal and
commercial race with Great Britain. Why not? Because she has many
colonies, and must needs keep up communication with them. And why have
steam instead of sail to them? Because steam is the means of more
readily _controlling_ them. Grant it; and for the very same reason we
wish steam with all the world; not that we may control the world, for
this is costly and unremunerative, as Great Britain finds; but to
conform it, and especially to _control_ its commerce. Great Britain
has possessions in the West-Indies; but they are of the most
insignificant importance when compared with the trade of the many
islands and countries near them, which she does not possess, and with
the Central American, Californian, Mexican, Peruvian, Chilian,
New-Granadian, Venezuelan, and Spanish markets, which she controls and
uses. So with India and the Mauritius. It is a matter of sore
satisfaction that she is compelled to govern them as a means of
reaching their rich trade, which, however rich, is far less important
than that of China for which she so strives. So also with Canada. She
was told some years since that, if she wished to secede from the
Kingdom, because the Government would not assist in building a certain
railroad, she might go, and carry peace, also, with her. The
Government would scout the idea of running the Cunard line to Canada
alone, and would not touch even at Halifax, except that the ships are
compelled to go in sight of the place; as the "great circle" on which
they sail nearly cuts the city. Great Britain runs that line because
her trade with the United States requires it. That trade is worth to
her every year twenty of her Canadas, as that of the West-Indies is
worth a dozen of all the possessions which she has there. As to
running the race of commerce with her, it is simply a _sine qua non_,
on which there is no difference of opinion among Americans who love
their country.
SECTION X.
THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES.
THE MAIL LINES OF THE UNITED STATES: THE HAVRE AND BREMEN, THE
PIONEERS: THE BREMEN SERVICE RECENTLY GIVEN TO MR. VANDERBILT:
BOTH LINES RUN ON THE GROSS RECEIPTS: THE CALIFORNIA LINES:
WONDROUS DEVELOPMENT OF OUR PACIFIC POSSESSIONS: THE PACIFIC MAIL
STEAMSHIP COMPANY: ITS HISTORY, SERVICES, LARGE MATERIEL, AND
USEFULNESS: THE UNITED STATES MAIL STEAMSHIP COMPANY: ITS RAMIFIED
AND LARGE EXTRA SERVICE: EFFECT UPON THE COMMERCE OF THE GULF: ITS
HEAVY LOSSES, AND NEW SHIPS: STEAMSHIP STOCKS GENERALLY AVOIDED:
CONSTANTLY FAR BELOW PAR: THE COLLINS LINE: A COMPARISON WITH THE
CUNARD: ITS SOURCES OF HEAVY OUTLAY, AND ITS ENTERPRISE: THE
AMERICAN MARINE DISASTERS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY HUMAN
FORESIGHT: THE VANDERBILT BREMEN LINE.
It is not my intention to notice the various lines in detail, or in
any wise become their apologist, eulogist, or prosecutor. As a general
thing they have discharged their obligations to the Government and the
people in the most creditable manner; in a much better manner than
could have been expected of them, considering the novelty of such
enterprises in this country and our total want of experience either in
steamship building or ocean steam navigation. It is a cause of great
gratulation and satisfaction that springing into the great arena of
the mail and passenger strife at a single bound, our steamers at once
took the lead in the race, and have ever since distanced those of the
whole world in speed, comfort, general accommodations, and cheap
transit. This may be asserted as a rule without a single exception.
The Collins steamers and the steamer "Vanderbilt" have beaten the
Cunarders by nearly a day and a half on the average voyages; the Havre
and Bremen steamers make just the same time as the Cunarders; and the
California steamers of both lines have signally beaten those of all
the English lines in the West-Indies, the Mediterranean, and the
Pacific and Indian oceans. Indeed the triumphs of our steamers
generally and specially have been so decided in every valuable point
that we have great reason to be proud of the attainments to which the
legislation of 1846 and '47 led. We have nothing to record to the
credit of our legislation since that period.
The Havre and Bremen services were the first established in the United
States; and as the pioneers in our mail steamshipping they have both
proven themselves valuable to the country. The Bremen line went into
the hands of Mr. Vanderbilt during the present year, on the expiration
of the old contract; the "Ocean Steam Navigation Company" being
unwilling to attempt the performance of the service on the small mail
pay of the gross ocean and inland postages, even with their old ships.
Mr. Vanderbilt having three ships wholly out of employment, determined
to try the service. How far it will prove remunerative we shall not be
able to determine until the steamers shall have run through one or two
winters as well as summers.
The Havre service was continued in the old hands. Mr. Livingston had
two fine new ships, which had been running but little over one year,
and which, adapted specially to the mail, passenger, and transport
trade of France, could not easily be withdrawn from the business for
which they were built; while it would have been quite impossible to
find for them employment in any other trade. He, consequently, made a
temporary arrangement with the Department for one year, agreeing to
transport the mails, as during the old contract, for the gross ocean
and inland postages. With this small remuneration the Havre line gets
a smaller pay than any other running; but one dollar per mile. The
Company have deserved well of the Government for their untiring
efforts to perform their contract; one of the greatest sacrifices
being the necessity of building two costly new steamers just as their
contract was about to expire. They suffered most severely from
disaster. Both of their fine and fast steamers, the "Franklin" and the
"Humboldt," were lost; and they were compelled to supply their places
by chartering at exorbitantly high prices, until they built the two
excellent vessels now running, the "Arago" and "Fulton." These two
steamers run probably more cheaply than any ever built in any country;
otherwise, being as large as they are, about twenty-six hundred tons
each, they could by no means live on the small mail pay now given
them. It may be that both these and the Vanderbilt Bremen steamers are
losing money; although the latter vessels are much smaller, and have
the advantage of an immense emigrant trade. I have no means of knowing
the position of affairs in either company.
But no loss to the Havre Company has ever been so great as that of its
late President, Mr. Mortimer Livingston. An honorable and just man in
his dealings, both with individuals and the Government, he eschewed
every attempt by which some sought to pervert and deprave the
legislation of the country, and presented all of his views in
steamshipping on high, honorable, and tenable grounds. He pursued the
profession in an enlarged spirit of enterprise, and was not unmindful
of his duties to his country, while he endeavored to establish
legitimate trade and preserve a profitable private business which had
been well founded long before the introduction of ocean steam. He was
a worthy and most honorable gentleman, and is a loss to the whole
public.
Prominent among the steamship enterprises of the country stand the two
lines which connect the Atlantic and Gulf seaboard with our large and
rich possessions in the Pacific, California, and Oregon. Established
at a time when California was held by military government, and when
Oregon was a wild untamed wilderness, these lines became the means of
developing the richest portion of the American continent, and binding
the far distant western world in close connection with the old
confederacy, notwithstanding the mighty Cordilleras and Rocky
Mountains which rose like forbidding barriers between them. Important
as these possessions were, naturally and geographically, they acquired
a new interest about the time that the Pacific and the Aspinwall
Steamship Companies were established. The contracts which were made
with these companies would certainly have ruined them but for the
discovery of gold in California. This opened a new and brilliant field
of effort, and the opportunities offered by these companies soon
determined tens of thousands of our hardy and enterprising countrymen
to enter and develop it.
It is pleasing in this connection to trace the almost mysterious
progress of our Pacific territory during the past eight years, and the
agencies producing it. Among these agencies none have been so
effectual as the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. That Company was
compelled to form an establishment of the most effective character
four to five thousand miles away from home, and as it was at the
time, thirteen thousand miles distant. The country was wholly new, so
much so that it was, in most parts of the field which it had to
occupy, extremely difficult to procure ordinary food for their
operatives. Their ships had to make a voyage more than half of that
around the world before they arrived at their point of service; and
they found themselves without a home when there. The steamer
"California," which left New-York on the 6th October, 1848, was the
first to bear the American flag to the Pacific ocean, and the first to
salute with a new life the solitudes of that rich and untrodden
territory. She was soon followed by the "Panama" and "Oregon," and in
due course of time by the "Tennessee," the "Golden Gate," the
"Columbia," the "John L. Stephens," the "Sonora," the "Republic," the
"Northerner," the "Fremont," the "Tobago," the "St. Louis," and the
"Golden Age." From a small beginning that Company now has the finest
steam fleet in the United States, although the difficulties in forming
it were probably much greater than any of our other companies had to
contend with.
These steamers found nothing ready to receive them in the Pacific. The
Company was compelled to construct large workshops and foundries for
their repair, and now have at Benicia a large and excellent
establishment where they can easily construct a marine engine. They
had also to build their own Dry Dock; for that of the Government at
Mare Island was not ready until 1854. Theirs has ever been most useful
to the United States, as it furnished the only accommodations of that
class in the Pacific. They had also to make shore establishments at
Panama, San Francisco, and Astoria, which, with coal depots, etc.,
were extremely costly, owing to materials having to be transported so
far, and labor at the time being so high. The price of labor in
California at all times depends on the profits which can be made by
digging gold, and the prices paid for this species of labor have ever
been enormous. Beyond this most unusual price of labor along the
Pacific seaboard, the coals which they have used, whether from the
Eastern States or from England, have been invariably shipped around
Cape Horn, and have never cost less than twenty dollars per ton. For a
large portion of the time the Company had to pay thirty dollars per
ton for coal, and in one instance fifty dollars. Coal, like all other
provisions of the steamers, has generally been purchased from those
who sent it out on speculation, and took all the advantages of the
peculiar market. Twelve dollars per ton is a low price for freight to
California or Panama. In addition to this, the cost price of the coal,
the handling, the wastage, and the insurance, will amount to about
eight dollars per ton, making it never less than twenty dollars
delivered. I have frequently seen coals sell even in Rio de Janeiro,
which is but about one third of the distance from us, at eighteen to
twenty-four dollars per ton. The nine steamers running consume about
35,000 tons of coal annually. If the vessels transporting it be of
1,000 tons each, it will employ something near thirty-five of these
vessels at profitable rates, in this one item of their business alone.
Such expenditures are not necessary to any other steam company in the
world. The British lines in the Indian Ocean and the China Seas are
supplied with domestic coal which comes at very reasonable prices, and
is shipped but a short distance.
Yet this Company performs this distant and difficult service with
great regularity and at a low price. They have never lost a trip, a
mail-bag, or a passenger by marine disaster during the eight years
that they have been running in the Pacific. This results from the fact
of the Company having thirteen steamers. If all of the steamers now in
commission were sunk, they could supply their place from their reserve
fleet and have no hiatus in their service. Such a spare fleet is an
enormous expense; but it is positively indispensable to regular and
highly efficient service. It is singular that under these
circumstances they can perform the service at $1.70 cents per mile. It
is a notorious fact that these steamers could not have supported
themselves in 1854-55 without the aid which they obtained from the
Government for the services which they performed. They never have
transported much freight, as it would not bear the transhipment at
Panama. The small quantity which they had was during the first years
after the discovery of gold, and then only. They have never at any
time brought any eastward. The Panama Railroad was a splendid
consummation of which the world had dreamed for years, and toward
whose completion this Company was highly instrumental. Yet it did not
enable the steamers to transport freight, and it never will.
These steamers run the 3,300 miles between Panama and San Francisco by
a time-table. They arrive at either end within a very few hours of
thirteen and a half days, including all of the stoppages, which are
also made at specified hours. Thus the average speed of the steamers
is about 254 miles per day. They touch at Acapulco and Mazanilla, and
supply San Diego, Monterey, San Pedro, Santa Barbara, San Luis, and
Obispo, ports of California, from Panama by a branch line. This is an
extra service, and is not taken into account in calculating the
mileage paid the Company.
The steamers have carried probably 175,000 passengers to California,
and have brought back about $200,000,000 in gold. They have also by
their semi-monthly line from San Francisco to Oregon assisted in
populating that rich and beautiful agricultural district, and making
it available for useful purposes as a part of the United States. They
have converted the wilderness of California into a smiling garden, and
will ere long produce the same effect on Oregon. With that coast
comparatively unprotected, and with the small standing army sustained
in this country, they become very important as a ready means of
concentrating on the Pacific coast a large army in a few days. They
also afford a ready transit for the changing crews of our national
vessels, which, when once around the Horn, may remain there several
years; having to change their crews only.
The large property of this Company in the Pacific can be made
available for no other purpose than that for which it was created. Any
company to be thoroughly effective there, must create its own stock,
and support works on the same general plan as those created by the
British East-India Company. Their success in building up this large
establishment on the Pacific was simply an accident; and that accident
the discovery of gold. But for this the Company would have failed in
two years, or gone back pleading to Congress for relief. But the gold
crisis saved it, and the enterprise was very remunerative for the
first few years; but since 1853 the profits have been limited, while
for one or two years the Company have sustained actual loss. They
calculated too largely on the prospective business with California,
and have too large a sum invested to make much for the future. And
yet, with a smaller investment they could not perform the service,
except in that dangerous, cheap, indecent way, of innumerable wants
and deprivations, which the American people have begun to despise.
They have had some few disasters, but none of those of a fatal
character in the Pacific. The "Winfield Scott" was lost in entering
the harbor of Acapulco; the "Tennessee" in entering that of San
Francisco in a dense fog. The "San Francisco" was lost, as will be
remembered, on this side, near our coast, as she sailed with troops
for the Pacific. The Nicaragua Transit Company fared much worse with
their steamers in the Pacific. They lost the "North America," the
"Independence," the "S. S. Lewis," the "Pioneer," and the "Yankee
Blade." Mr. Wm. Brown also lost his steamer "America," which he was
running between San Francisco and Oregon. She was burned.
Their dividends for four years have been but twelve per cent. And
should they be at any time thrown out of the service, more than half
of their property would be irretrievably lost. This percentage of
dividend would be large enough but for such possibilities as these,
which may soon reduce it to a deficit and a loss. Thus it is that
steam stock should declare three times the dividend of other stocks,
to be eventually equal to them. And hence it is that, with the clear
record of this Company before the Government, and with an investment
of between three and four millions of dollars, being at the same time
free from debt, the stock of the Company is selling at thirty-three
per cent. below par. This is a good exemplification of my views in the
preceding Sections regarding the costs, and hazards, and low values of
ocean steam stocks generally. Nor are the stocks of this Company kept
from the public. They are advertised and sold at public auction at
these reduced rates every day in the year in this city; and no one of
the five hundred and four stockholders, among whom these interests are
diffused, seems anxious to put "his all" in the enterprise. And yet
there are some people who call such companies a monopoly. If a
monopoly, why do they not come forward, buy the stocks, keep them in
their own hands, and profit by them; especially as a monopoly must be
doubly good when it can be bought for two thirds the cash originally
paid for it!
I have noticed this Company thus fully, because its extent of stock,
and large field of operation, make it a fit illustration of the views
which I have advanced throughout this work. I have no desire to
depreciate the stock, or in any other way injure the Company, as my
own enterprise gives me quite enough to do.
Many of the views advanced with regard to the Pacific Mail Company
will apply to the United States Mail Steamship Company. That Company,
at the outset, built very fine steamers, and ran them incessantly,
until they were unfit for duty. They have constantly supplied their
place, and have at all times, by building and by chartering at the
highest prices, kept up a large and costly fleet for their ramified
service. The service contemplated in their original contract, at
$1.88-3/4 cents per mile, is but about two thirds of that actually
performed. The contract required them to run 3,200 miles semi-monthly,
but they actually perform semi-monthly 5,200. (_See Mr. King's Letter,
Paper G._) The actual service has required nearly twice the number of
steamers necessary to do that for which they contracted, although a
part of it is in the coasting trade. Consequently the steamers have
been rapidly worn out, from too heavy duty, and the stock of the
Company has never paid as well as it should. The Company have,
morever, suffered severely from disaster. The "Crescent City" was lost
on the Bahama Banks, in 1855; all hands saved. The "Cherokee" was
burned when in active service, in 1853; and the "George Law," or
"Central America," but recently foundered at sea in a terrible gale.
They were all good ships; but like those other excellent ships, the
"Arctic" and "Pacific," they could not defy the powers of pure
accident. In the same gale the "Empire City" was dismantled, having
all of her upper works swept off, while the "Illinois" was injured by
being on the Colorado Reef. They have both been undergoing most costly
repairs for several weeks. While writing this, the "Philadelphia" is
also in the shop. She recently broke her shaft and her cross-tail, and
had to put into Charleston. All of these repairs cost an immense sum
of money, and are calculated, with the severe losses which the Company
has sustained, to dishearten the most hopeful and enterprising. Yet,
since these disasters, and the completion of the "Moses Taylor," the
Company are about laying the keel of another fine ship. This is
another verification of my statement that the mail companies are in
nearly every instance compelled to build new steamers in the very last
years of their contracted service. The new "Adriatic" attests the same
fact on the part of the Collins Company. (_See pages 141 and 142._)
The Company have had at various times the "Falcon," "Ohio," "Georgia,"
"Crescent City," "El Dorado," "Cherokee," "Empire City," "Illinois,"
and "Philadelphia," and now have the three last-named ships, the
"Granada," the "Star of the West," and the new steamer "Moses Taylor."
The benefits conferred by the Company's lines on the trade of the
country generally, and especially on our southern seaboard and Gulf
connections, have been almost incalculable. They found all of these
ports in the undisputed possession of the British, whose steamers
furnished the only mail and locomotive facilities of the times. By
their superior speed and accommodations the "Georgia" and the "Ohio"
soon drove those enterprising steamers from our coast, and confined
them to the foreign countries of the Gulf and the Carribean Sea, where
they yet rule triumphant in news, transport, and commerce. Our
southern harbors are no longer filled with British cruisers, while in
their stead we have built up a noble war marine, inured thousands of
Americans to the ocean steam service, and made one most effective
movement in the direction of successful defenses. (_See Letter of Hon.
Edwin Croswell, Paper E, page 200._)
Of the Collins Company it is hardly necessary that I should speak.
They have received much the largest subsidy from the Government; but
they have had a most difficult task to perform. Their ships have never
been surpassed in any country, whether as to the excellent style of
their prime construction, their large size, or their very unusual
speed. They have literally been engaged in a continual race across the
ocean for seven years, determined at whatever cost and hazard to far
excel those of the Cunard line. And this they have done most signally
in all points of accommodation and speed. They have gained one and a
half days the advantage over the Cunard line on their average voyages
for the seven years. And this was no small achievement. By reference
to Section IV. it will be seen how great is the cost of attaining and
maintaining such speed with a steamer. The Collins ships, being so
much larger than the Cunarders, the four present an aggregate tonnage
nearly equal to the eight by which they run their weekly line. It is,
moreover, not proportionally so expensive to maintain seven or eight
ships on a line as four. The prime cost and repairs are by no means so
great when engines are duplicated, or two sets built from the same
patterns. Again, the general outlay in docks, shore establishment,
offices, company paraphernalia, advertising, and innumerable items, is
as great for a small as for a large fleet of steamers. The Collins
line has to contend against all this. It also found the Cunard line
long and well established, and inwrought into the public favor. It had
the business, and most important of all, it monopolized the only
freights passing between the two countries; those from England to
America, which British shippers gave of course to British ships. They
have had also to pay much larger prices for construction, repairs,
wages, etc., than the Cunard Company; and not having so large a
service and so large a fleet, they have not had so many reserve ships
to fall back upon; but have been compelled frequently to send their
ships off but half repaired, which of itself entailed immensely heavy
expenses in ultimate repairs. There is very much to be said in favor
of this Company, which has endeavored to build the finest ships in
the world, and navigate them the most rapidly. If they have
prominently failed in any thing it is in building larger ships,
running them faster, and being far more enterprising with them than
was required of the Company by the contract with the Government. Their
disasters have been saddening and severe; and yet they have resulted
from nothing which could have been controlled by human foresight.
There is a great error in supposing that there are more marine
disasters among American than among British ships. Such is not the
case, as a careful examination of the lists will show.
Of the mail line belonging to Mr. Vanderbilt, between New-York and
Bremen, _via_ Southampton, it is impossible now to say any thing. The
steamers "North Star" and "Ariel," the one of 1,867-60/95 tons, and
the other of 1,295-28/95 tons, have but recently commenced the
service, on the gross mail receipts. Whether Mr. Vanderbilt desires to
make the service permanent or not, I am not advised.
The service of the Charleston and Havana line has been performed with
great regularity; and although the return from it in the form of
postages has been small, yet it has been of essential service to the
South, in opening communications toward the Gulf, and in establishing
much needed travelling facilities between Charleston, Savannah, and
Key West.
PAPER A.
LIST OF AMERICAN OCEAN STEAMERS.
The mail service has 8 lines, and 21 steamers in commission, of 48,027
registered tonnage. Much of this tonnage belongs to supply ships, as
for instance those of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. (_See
Section I._)
_Collins Line, 3 steamers, 9,727 tons._
Adriatic, 4,144-74/95 tons: Atlantic, 2,849-66/99 tons: Baltic,
2,733-1/95 tons.
_Havre Line, 2 steamers, 4,548 tons._
Arago, 2,240 tons: Fulton, 2,308 tons.
_Vanderbilt Bremen Line, 3 steamers, 6,523 tons._
North Star, 1,867-60/95 tons: Ariel, 1,295-28/95 tons: Vanderbilt[H],
3,360-54/95 tons.
[H] Independent, running between New-York, Southampton, and Havre, in
connection with the Bremen steamers.
_United States Mail Steamship Company, 6 steamers, 8,544 tons._
Illinois, 2,123-65/95 tons: Empire City, 1,751-21/95 tons:
Philadelphia, 1,238-1/95 tons: Granada, 1,058-90/95 tons: Moses
Taylor, 1,200 tons: Star of the West, chartered, 1,172-1/95,
(contracting for a new ship.)
_Pacific Mail Steamship Company, 13 steamers, 16,421 tons._
Golden Gate, 2,067-35/95 tons: Golden Age, 2,280 tons: J. L. Stephens,
2,189 tons: Sonora, 1,616 tons: St. Louis, 1,621 tons: Panama,
1,087-31/95 tons: California, 1,085-64/95 tons: Oregon, 1,099-9/95
tons: Columbia, 777-34/95 tons: Republic, 850 tons: Northerner, 1,010
tons: Fremont, 576 tons: Tobago, 189 tons.
_Charleston, Savannah, Key West, and Havana, 1 steamer_, the Isabel,
1,115 tons.
_New-Orleans and Mexico, 1 steamer_, the Tennessee, 1,149-1/2 tons.
The Coasting Service has 8 lines, and 23 steamers, of 24,071 tons
registered tonnage.
_New-York, Havana, and New-Orleans_, 2. The Black Warrior, 1,556-1/95
tons: Cahawba, 1,643-1/95 tons = 3,199 tons.
_New-York, Havana, and Mobile_, 1. The Quaker City, 1,428-3/95 tons.
_New-York and Savannah_, 4. Alabama, 1,261-13/95 tons; Florida,
1,261-13/95 tons: Augusta, 1,310-61/95 tons; Star of the South,
(propeller,) 960-1/95 tons = 4,793 tons.
_New-York and Charleston_, 4. Columbia, 1,347 tons: Nashville, 1,220
tons: James Adger, 1,151 tons; Marion, 962 tons = 4,680 tons.
_New-York and Virginia_, 2. Roanoke, 1,071 tons: Jamestown, 1,300 tons
= 2,371 tons.
_Philadelphia and Savannah_, 2. Key Stone State and State of Georgia,
each about 1,300 tons = 2,600 tons.
_Boston and Baltimore_, 2. Joseph Whitney, 800 tons: Unknown, 800 tons
= 1,600 tons.
_New-Orleans and Texas._ The Charles Morgan, Texas, Mexico, and
Atlantic, averaging 600 tons each=2,400 tons.
_New-Orleans and Key West._ The General Rusk, 600 tons, and the
Calhoun, 400 tons = 1,000 tons.
There are also several propellers running: between New-York and
Charleston, New-York and Portland, and between Philadelphia and the
South. They are all, however, small, and irregular in their trade. The
Calhoun is not a regular steamship.
Steamers lying up, 18. Registered tonnage, 24,845 tons.
Queen of the Pacific, 2,801-92/95 tons.
Washington, 1,640-71/91 tons.
Prometheus, 1,207-61/95 tons.
St. Louis, 1,621-14/45 tons.
Brother Jonathan, 1,359-52/95 tons.
Oregon, 1,004-89/95 tons.
Southerner, 900 tons.
Herman, 1,734-45/95 tons.
Northern Light, 1,747-91/95 tons.
Uncle Sam, 1,433-44/95 tons.
California, 1,058 tons.
Northerner, 1,012 tons.
Ericsson, 1,902-1/95 tons.
Star of the West, 1,172-33/95 tons.
Daniel Webster, 1,035 tons.
Orizaba, 1,450-62/95 tons.
Panama, 1,087 tons.
Fremont, 576 tons.
The registered tonnage of these vessels was furnished me by Mr. S. P.
Ingraham, of the New-York Custom-House.
PAPER B.
The following paper, prepared by Mr. Pliny Miles from the reports to
which we have alluded, presents the British steam mail service in
full detail.
"The following tabular statement gives the particulars of the
ocean mail service of Great Britain, now carried on almost
exclusively by steamships. The numbers in the margin, running from
1 to 15, will point out the different lines in the recapitulation
at the close.
LINE OF COMMUNICATION, |
CONTRACTORS, AND CONTRACT PRICE. | PLACES CONNECTED.
---------------------------------+--------------------------------
1.--Liverpool and Isle of Man. | Liverpool and Douglas, Isle of
_Mona Isle Steam Co._ Twice a | Man.
week. $4,250 per annum. |
|
2.--England and Ireland. _City of| Holyhead and Kingstown, near
Dublin Steam Packet Co._ Twice a | Dublin.
day. $125,000 a year. |
|
3.--Scotland and Shetland. | Aberdeen, Wick, Kirkwall,
_Aberdeen, Leith and Clyde | (Orkney,) and Lerwick,
Shipping Co._ Weekly, $6,000 a | (Shetland.)
year. |
|
4.--England, Spain, and | Southampton, Vigo, Oporto,
Gibraltar. _Peninsular and | Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar.
Oriental Steam Navigation Co._ |
Three times a month. $102,500. |
|
5.--Mediterranean, India, and | Southampton, Malta, Alexandria,
China. _Peninsular and Oriental | Suez, Aden, Bombay, Calcutta,
Steam Navigation Co._ Twice a | Singapore, Hong Kong, and
month to India--monthly to China.| Shanghae.
$1,121,500. |
|
6.--England and United States. | Liverpool, Halifax, and Boston;
_Sam. Cunard._ Weekly. $866,700. | and Liverpool and New-York.
|
7.--North America, (Colonial.) | Halifax, Newfoundland, Bermuda,
_Sam. Cunard._ Monthly. $73,500. | and St. Thomas.
|
8.--West-Indies, Mexico and | Southampton, Kingston,
South-America. _Royal Mail Steam | (Jamaica,) St. Thomas, Vera
Packet Co._ Semi-monthly to the | Cruz and Aspinwall; Southampton,
West-Indies and Gulf of Mexico, | Lisbon, Madeira, Teneriffe, St.
and monthly to Brazil. | Vincent, Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio
$1,350,000. | Janeiro, Monte Video, Buenos
| Ayres, and St. Thomas.
|
9.--England, France, and Belgium.| Dover and Calais. Dover and
_Jenkings and Churchward._ Daily | Ostend.
to Calais; thrice a week to |
Ostend. $77,500. |
|
10.--Channel Islands. | Southampton, Jersey, and
_South-western Railway Company._ | Guernsey.
Thrice a week. $20,000. |
|
11.--West Coast of South-America.| Panama, Callao, and Valparaiso.
_Pacific Steam Navigation Co._ | Allowed to touch at Buenaventura,
Twice a month. $125,000. | Guayaquil, Peyta, Lambayeque,
| Huanchaco, Santa, Pisco, Islay,
| Arica, Iquique, Cobija, Gopiapo,
| Huasco, and Coquimbo.
|
12.--Scotland and Orkney. _John | From Scrabster Pier (Thurso) to
Stanger, Esq., of Stromness._ | Stromness, (Orkney.)
Daily in summer; every other day |
in winter. $6,500. |
|
13.--West Coast of Africa. | Plymouth to Madeira, Teneriffe,
_African Steamship Co._ Monthly. | Goree, Bathurst, Sierra Leone,
$106,250. | Monrovia, Cape Coast Castle,
| Accra, Whydah, Badagry, Lagos,
| Bonny, Old Calabar, Cameroon and
| Fernando Po; omitting Cameroon,
| Calabar, and Bonny on return.
|
14.--South-Africa, Mauritius, and| Dartmouth to Cape of Good Hope,
Calcutta. _Adam Duncan Dundas, | Mauritius and Calcutta.
Esq._ Monthly. $205,000. |
|
15.--England and Australia. _The | Southampton, Marseilles, Malta,
European and Australian Mail | Alexandria, Suez, and Sydney.
Steam Packet Co._ Monthly. |
$925,000. |
The following are the names of the steamers in service in each
line, with the amount of tonnage, the horse power of each, the
draught of water, the number of the officers and crew attached to
each one, and, when it could be obtained, the date that each
vessel was surveyed and approved for the service. Where the date
of survey of a vessel is unknown, it is placed as near as possible
with others surveyed at the same time, the vessels in each line
being arranged in chronological order:
1. LIVERPOOL AND ISLE OF MAN.
Draft of
Horse Water. Date of
Name, Class, etc. Power. Tonnage. F. I. Crew. Survey
----------------------+------+--------+--------+-----+------------
King Orry, 190 429 0 0 22 Dec., 1845
Tynwald, iron, 260 657 8 9 29 Oct., 1846
Benmy Chree, 130 295 6 6 18 June, 1847
Mona's Queen, iron, 220 508 8 6 22 M'ch, 1853
====== ======== =====
Total, 4 vessels, 790 2,089 91
2. ENGLAND AND IRELAND.
Prince Arthur, iron, 220 418 8 8 26 July, 1852
Llewellyn, iron, 342 654 9 6 29 Oct., 1852
Eblana, iron, 372 685 8 11 31 Jan., 1853
St. Columba, iron, 350 650 8 10 29 Sept., 1853
====== ======== =====
Total, 4 vessels, 1,284 2,407 115
3. SCOTLAND AND SHETLAND.
Fairy, 120 350 -- 18 --
Duke of Richmond, 180 500 -- 24 --
====== ======== =====
Total, 2 vessels, 300 850 42
4. ENGLAND, SPAIN, AND GIBRALTAR.
Sultan, iron, 420 1,001 14 0 67 Jan., 1853
Madrid, iron, 133 448 10 2 40 Feb., 1853
Tagus, 280 691 14 8 41 Jan., 1854
Alhambra, 140 642 13 7 52 July, 1855
====== ======== =====
Total, 4 vessels, 973 2,782 200
5. MEDITERRANEAN, INDIA, AND CHINA.
Lady Mary Wood, 270 619 0 0 40 Feb., 1842
Precursor, 520 1,783 18 0 121 July, 1844
Pekin, iron, 415 1,003 14 0 78 Jan., 1847
Oriental, 420 1,427 13 0 78 M'ch, 1848
Achilles, 430 823 16 0 59 June, 1849
Malta, iron, 460 1,222 0 0 82 Sept., 1848
Hindostan, 500 1,595 16 10 53 July, 1849
Singapore, iron, 465 1,189 12 6 96 M'ch, 1851
Ganges, iron, 465 1,189 14 7 69 June, 1851
Pottinger, iron, 450 1,275 17 6 82 April, 1852
Formosa, screw, iron, 177 658 13 6 60 Aug., 1852
Chusan, screw, iron, 100 765 11 3 45 Aug., 1852
Haddington, iron, 450 1,303 17 7 105 Nov., 1852
Vectis, 400 900 0 0 51 --
Shanghae, screw, iron, 90 825 0 0 60 --
Manila, 60 646 0 0 60 --
Bentinck, 520 1,973 19 3 83 Nov., 1852
Euxine, iron, 430 1,071 15 6 72 Jan., 1853
Bengal, screw, 465 2,185 17 6 115 Feb., 1853
Valetta, 400 984 12 2 51 July, 1853
Norna, screw, 230 1,040 0 0 80 Nov., 1853
Colombo, screw, 450 1,808 0 0 118 Dec., 1853
Ripon, iron, 445 1,400 14 9 94 Dec., 1853
Douro, screw, 230 903 13 3 63 Dec., 1853
Bombay, 280 1,240 0 0 84 --
Madras, 288 1,217 0 0 82 --
Indus, iron, 450 1,302 17 9 88 Jan., 1854
Candia, screw, iron, 450 2,212 18 9 115 June, 1854
Nubia, 450 2,095 21 0 122 -- 1855
Pera, screw, iron, 450 2,013 19 0 129 Jan., 1856
Ava, screw, iron, 320 1,372 17 0 94 Feb., 1856
Alma, screw, iron, 450 2,164 20 0 124 M'ch, 1856
Aden, screw, iron, 210 507 18 9 40 Aug., 1856
Delta, screw, 210 985 0 0 64 -- 1856
Delhi, screw, 450 2,400 0 0 125 -- 1856
Unknown, 4 vessels.
====== ======== =====
Total, 39 vessels, 12,850 46,053 2,877
6. ENGLAND AND UNITED STATES.
Europa, 650 1,777 15 6 88 July, 1848
Canada, 680 1,774 19 6 88 Nov., 1848
Niagara, 630 1,774 19 6 88 Dec., 1849
America, 630 1,729 15 3 88 Jan., 1850
Asia, 800 2,073 19 0 105 May, 1850
Africa, 800 2,050 0 0 105 Oct., 1850
Arabia, 870 2,328 16 7 105 Dec., 1852
Persia, 858 3,587 21 0 165 Feb., 1856
====== ======== =====
Total, 8 vessels, 5,918 17,092 922
7. NORTH AMERICA, (Colonial.)
Merlin, 120 451 0 0 26 May, 1850
Delta, screw, iron, 180 700 12 10 34 June, 1852
====== ======== =====
Total, 2 vessels, 300 1,151 60
8. WEST-INDIES, MEXICO, AND SOUTH-AMERICA.
Dee, 410 1,269 18 0 87 May, 1846
Trent, 450 1,293 17 7 87 April, 1848
Eagle, 263 496 11 10 57 July, 1849
Derwent, 280 708 15 0 66 July, 1850
Magdalena, 760 2,250 19 0 108 May, 1852
Medway, 420 1,305 17 6 72 May, 1852
La Plata, 939 2,404 21 10 114 Aug., 1852
Conway, 270 827 12 10 55 Sept., 1852
Orinoco, 800 2,245 20 11 108 Oct., 1852
Avon, 450 2,069 17 0 94 M'ch, 1853
Teviot, 450 1,258 18 1 97 April, 1853
Parana, 800 2,222 21 2 120 May, 1853
Clyde, 430 1,335 19 1 87 June, 1853
Thames, 413 1,285 18 3 72 Aug., 1853
Solent, 420 1,805 14 11 88 Oct., 1853
Camilia, iron, 213 640 9 0 34 Oct., 1853
Wye, screw, iron, 180 818 14 0 45 Feb., 1854
Atrato, iron, 758 2,906 20 6 127 M'ch, 1854
Tamar, 400 1,873 18 7 93 June, 1854
Prince, 200 446 8 8 35 July, 1854
====== ======== =====
Total, 20 vessels, 9,306 29,454 1,667
9. ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND BELGIUM.
Alliance, 120 300 7 3 16 --
Vivid, 120 300 7 0 16 --
Violet, 120 300 7 0 16 --
Empress, 100 308 6 6 16 --
Queen, 100 307 6 6 16 --
Ondine, 80 250 6 0 16 --
====== ======== =====
Total, 6 vessels, 640 1,765 96
10. CHANNEL ISLANDS.
Atalanta, 120 240 8 4 21 Oct., 1846
Wonder, iron, 150 449 0 0 22 Feb., 1853
Courier, iron, 184 440 7 0 18 April, 1853
Dispatch, iron, 183 443 7 6 22 Aug., 1853
Express, iron, 160 380 7 4 24 Nov., 1853
====== ======== =====
Total, 5 vessels, 797 1,852 107
11. WEST COAST OR SOUTH-AMERICA.
New-Granada, iron, 210 600 13 0 41 Nov., 1846
Bolivia, iron, 252 705 0 0 41 Oct., 1849
Inca, iron, 370 549 13 0 55 Aug., 1851
Lima, iron, 370 1,122 10 8 55 Nov., 1851
Bogota, iron, 394 1,122 13 6 61 April, 1852
Valdivia, screw, iron, 480 782 13 2 41 Nov., 1853
Valparaiso, iron, 320 839 13 6 84 --
====== ======== =====
Total, 7 vessels, 2,396 5,719 377
12. SCOTLAND AND ORKNEY.
(Unknown,) 60 250 6 0 16 --
13. WEST COAST OF AFRICA.
Hope, iron, 120 833 15 0 46 --
Charity, iron, 120 1,007 15 6 52 --
Ethiope, 120 674 0 0 42 --
Candace, 120 900 0 0 46 --
Retriever, 120 900 0 0 46 --
Niger, 120 900 0 0 46 --
Gambia, 130 637 14 0 42 --
====== ======== =====
Total, 7 vessels 850 5,951 320
14. SOUTH-AMERICA, MAURITIUS, AND CALCUTTA.
Five screw steamers,
Total, 5 vessels, 2,000 8,000 -- 570 --
15. ENGLAND AND AUSTRALIA.
Oneida, 400 1,600 15 6 84 --
Simla, 630 2,510 17 2 88 --
European, 530 2,200 18 9 115 --
Columbian, 530 2,300 17 6 120 --
(Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 --
(Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 --
(Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 --
====== ======== =====
Total, 7 vessels, 3,290 13,410 671
RECAPITULATION.
KEY:
A: Lines.
B: Number of steamers.
C: Horse Power.
D: Tonnage.
E: Number of men.
F: Service commenced.
G: How often.
H: Annual Compensation.
------+----+--------+--------+-------+------+-----------+-------------
A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H
------+----+--------+--------+-------+------+-----------+-------------
1 | 4 | 790 | 2,089 | 91 | 1833 | 2 a week | $4,250
2 | 4 | 1,284 | 2,408 | 115 | 1850 | 2 a day | 125,000
3 | 2 | 300 | 850 | 42 | 1840 | 1 a week | 6,000
4 | 4 | 973 | 2,782 | 200 | 1852 | 3 a month | 102,500
5 | 35 | 12,850 | 46,053 | 2,877 | 1853 | 2 a month | 1,121,500
6 | 9 | 6,418 | 18,406 | 922 | 1850 | 1 a week | 866,700
7 | 2 | 300 | 1,151 | 60 | 1854 | 1 a month | 73,500
8 | 20 | 9,308 | 29,454 | 1,667 | 1851 | 3 a month | 1,350,000
9 | 6 | 640 | 1,765 | 96 | 1854 | 1 a day | 77,500
10 | 5 | 797 | 1,852 | 107 | 1848 | 3 a week | 20,000
11 | 7 | 2,396 | 5,719 | 378 | 1852 | 2 a month | 125,000
12 | 1 | 60 | 250 | 16 | 1856 | 1 a day | 6,500
13 | 7 | 850 | 5,951 | 320 | 1852 | 1 a month | 106,250
14 | 5 | 2,000 | 8,000 | 575 | 1856 | 1 a month | 205,000
15 | 7 | 3,290 | 13,410 | 671 | 1857 | 1 a month | 925,000
|====|========|========|=======| | |=============
Total, 121 | 42,254 |140,139 | 8,137 | | |$5,114,700[I]
-----------+--------+--------+-------+------+-----------+-------------
[I] There are some lines not here noticed, which swell the sum to
$5,333,985.--T. R.
PAPER C.
PROJET OF FRANCO-AMERICAN NAVIGATION.
Mr. Wm. Iselin, of Havre, kindly furnished me the following:
"The French Government has offered the following contracts:
"Havre to New-York, 26 voyages a year, fr.3,100,000, or $620,000.
"Bordeaux to Rio Janeiro, touching at Lisbon, Goree, Bahia, or
Pernambuco, and a branch line from Rio Janeiro to Montevideo and
Buenos Ayres, 24 voyages a year, fr.4,700,000, or $940,000. The
Government now requires 13 departures from Bordeaux and 13 from
Marseilles at the same price.
"Nantes to St. Thomas, thence to Guadalupe, and thence to
Martinique, with the following branch lines:
"No. 1. St. Thomas to St. Martha or Carthagena, and thence to
Aspinwall.
"No. 2. St. Thomas to Porto Rico, thence to Havana, Vera Cruz, and
Tampico.
"No. 3. From Martinique to Cayenne.
"The subvention offered is fr.6,200,000, or $1,400,000.
"The total amount of subvention offered for the 3 lines is
therefore 14 millions of francs per annum, or $2,800,000.
"The Messageries Imperiales have given a tender for the Brazil
lines.