On February 15, a month after Pinkney's notification of his intended

departure, Wellesley wrote him that the Prince Regent, whose authority

as such dated only from February 5, had appointed Mr. Augustus J.

Foster minister at Washington. The delay had been caused in the first

instance, "as I stated to you repeatedly," by the wish to make an

appointment satisfactory to the United States, and afterwards by the

state of his Majesty's Government; the regal function having been in

abeyance until the King's incapacity was remedied by the institution

of the Regent. Wellesley suggested the possibility of Pinkney

reconsidering his decision, the ground for which was thus removed; but

the minister demurred. He replied that he inferred, from Wellesley's

letter, that the British Government by this appointment signified its

intention of conceding the demands of the United States; that the

Orders in Council and blockade of May, 1806, would be annulled;

without this a beneficial effect was not to be expected. Wellesley

replied that no change of system was intended unless France revoked

her Decrees. The effect of this correspondence, therefore, was simply

to place Pinkney's departure upon the same ground as the new

Non-Intercourse Act against Great Britain.

Mr. Augustus John Foster was still a very young man, just thirty-one.

He had but recently returned from the position of minister to Sweden,

the duties of which he had discharged[344] during a year very critical

for the fortunes of that country, and in the event for Napoleon and

Europe. Upon his new mission Wellesley gave him a long letter of

instructions,[345] in which he dealt elaborately with the whole course

of events connected with the Orders in Council and Bonaparte's Decree,

especially as connected with America. In this occurs a concise and

lucid summary of the British policy, which is worth quoting. "From

this view of the origin of the Orders in Council, you will perceive

that the object of our system was not to crush the trade of the

continent, but to counteract an attempt to crush British trade; that

we have endeavored to permit the continent to receive as large a

portion of commerce as might be practicable through Great Britain, and

that all our subsequent regulations, and every modification of the

system, by new orders, or modes of granting or withholding licenses,

have been calculated for _the purpose of encouraging the trade of

neutrals through Great Britain_,[346] whenever such encouragement

might appear advantageous to the general interests of commerce and

consistent with the public safety of the nation,--the preservation of

which is the primary object of all national councils, and the

paramount duty of the Executive power."

In brief, the plea was that Bonaparte by armed constraint had forced

the continent into a league to destroy Great Britain through her

trade; that there was cause to fear these measures would succeed, if

not counteracted; that retaliation by similar measures was therefore

demanded by the safety of the state; and that the method adopted was

retaliation, so modified as to produce the least possible evil to

others concerned. It was admitted and deplored that prohibition of

direct trade with the ports of the league injuriously affected the

United States. That this was illegal, judged by the law of nations,

was also admitted; but it was justified by the natural right of

retaliation. Wellesley scouted the view, pertinaciously urged by the

American Government, that the exclusion of British commerce from

neutral continental ports by the Continental System was a mere

municipal regulation, which the United States could not resist.

Municipal regulation was merely the cloak, beneath which France

concealed her military coercion of states helpless against her policy.

"The pretext of municipal right, under which the violence of the enemy

is now exercised against neutral commerce in every part of the

continent, will not be admitted by Great Britain; nor can we ever deem

the repeal of the French Decrees to be effectual, until neutral

commerce shall be restored to the conditions in which it stood,

previously to the commencement of the French system of commercial

warfare, as promulgated in the Decrees."

Foster's mission was to urge these arguments, and to induce the repeal

of the Non-Intercourse law against Great Britain, as partial between

the two belligerents; who, if offenders against accepted law, were in

that offenders equally. The United States was urged not thus to join

Napoleon's league against Great Britain, from which indeed, if so

supported, the direst distress must arise. It is needless to pursue

the correspondence which ensued with Monroe, now Secretary of State.

By Madison's proclamation, and the passage of the Non-Intercourse Act

of March 2, 1811, the American Government was irretrievably committed

to the contention that France had so revoked her Decrees as to

constitute an obligation upon Great Britain and upon the United

States. To admit mistake, even to one's self, in so important a step,

probably passes diplomatic candor, and especially after the blunder in

Erskine's case. Yet, even admitting the adequacy of Champagny's

letter, the Decrees were not revoked; seizures were still made under

them. In November, 1811, Monroe had to write to Barlow, now American

minister to France, "It is not sufficient that it should appear that

the French Decrees are repealed, in the _final decision_ of a cause

brought _before a French tribunal_. An active prohibitory policy

should be adopted _to prevent seizures_ on the principle."[347] This

was in the midst of his correspondence with Foster. The two disputants

threshed over and over again the particulars of the controversy, but

nothing new was adduced by either.[348] Conditions were hopeless, and

war assured, even when Foster arrived in Washington, in June, 1811.

One thing, however, was finally settled. In behalf of his Government,

in reparation for the "Chesapeake" affair, Foster repeated the

previous disavowal of Berkeley's action, and his consequent recall;

and offered to restore to the ship herself the survivors of the men

taken from her. Pecuniary provision for those who had suffered in the

action, or for their families, was also tendered. The propositions

were accepted, while denying the adequacy of Berkeley's removal from

one command to another. The men were brought to Boston harbor, and

there formally given up to the "Chesapeake."

Tardy and insufficient as was this atonement, it was further delayed,

at the very moment of tendering, by an incident which may be said to

have derived directly from the original injury. In June, 1810, a

squadron of frigates and sloops had been constituted under Commodore

John Rodgers, to patrol the coast from the Capes of the Chesapeake

northward to the eastern limit of the United States. Its orders,

generally, were to defend from molestation by a foreign armed ship all

vessels of the United States within the marine league, seaward, to

which neutral jurisdiction was conceded by international law. Force

was to be used, if necessary, and, if the offender were a privateer,

or piratical, she was to be sent in. So weak and unready was the

nominal naval force of the United States, that piracy near her very

shores was apprehended; and concern was expressed in Congress

regarding vessels from Santo Domingo, thus converted into a kind of

local Barbary power. To these general instructions the Secretary of

the Navy attached a special reminder. Recalling the "Chesapeake"

affair, as a merely exaggerated instance of the contumely everywhere

heaped upon the American flag by both belligerents, he wrote: "What

has been perpetrated may be again attempted. It is therefore our duty

to be prepared and determined at every hazard to vindicate the injured

honor of our navy, and revive the drooping spirit of the nation. It is

expected that, while you conduct the force under your command

consistently with the principles of a strict and upright neutrality,

you are to maintain and support at every risk and cost the dignity of

our flag; and that, offering yourself no unjust aggression, you are to

submit to none, not even a menace or threat from a force not

materially your superior."

Under such reminiscences and such words, the ships' guns were like to

go off of themselves. It requires small imagination to picture the

feelings of naval officers in the years after the "Chesapeake's"

dishonor. In transmitting the orders to his captains, Rodgers added,

"Every man, woman, and child, in our country, will be active in

consigning our names to disgrace, and even the very vessels composing

our little navy to the ravages of the worms, or the detestable

transmigration to merchantmen, should we not fulfil their

expectations. I should consider the firing of a shot by a vessel of

war, of either nation, and particularly England, at one of our public

vessels, whilst the colors of her nation are flying on board of her,

as a menace of the grossest order, and in amount an insult which it

would be disgraceful not to resent by the return of two shot at least;

while should the shot strike, it ought to be considered an act of

hostility meriting chastisement to the utmost extent of all your

force."[349] The Secretary indorsed approval upon the copy of this

order forwarded to him. Rodgers' apprehension for the fate of the navy

reflected accurately the hostile views of leaders in the dominant

political party. Demoralized by the gunboat system, and disorganized

and browbeaten by the loud-mouthed disfavor of representative

Congressmen, the extinction of the service was not unnaturally

expected. Bainbridge, a captain of standing and merit, applied at this

time for a furlough to make a commercial voyage to China, owing to

straitened means. "I have hitherto refused such offers, on the

presumption that my country would require my services. That

presumption is removed, and even doubts entertained of the permanency

of our naval establishment."[350]

The following year, 1811, Rodgers' squadron and orders were continued.

The British admirals of adjacent stations, acting doubtless under

orders from home, enjoined great caution upon their ships of war in

approaching the American coast.[351] While set not to relax the Orders

in Council, the ministry did not wish war by gratuitous offence.

Cruising, however, continued, though charged with possibilities of

explosion. Under these circumstances Rodgers' ship, the "President"

frigate, and a British sloop of war, the "Little Belt," sighted each

other on May 16, 1811, fifty miles east of Cape Henry. Independent of

the general disposition of ships of war in troublous times to overhaul

and ascertain the business of any doubtful sail, Rodgers' orders

prescribed the capture of vessels of certain character, even outside

the three-mile limit; and, the "Little Belt" making sail from him, he

pursued. About 8 P.M., it being then full dark, the character and

force of the chase were still uncertain, and the vessels within range.

The two accounts of what followed differ diametrically; but the

British official version[352] is less exhaustive in matter and manner

than the American, which rests upon the sworn testimony of numerous

competent witnesses before a formal Court of Inquiry.[353] By this it

was found proved that the "Little Belt" fired the first gun, which by

Rodgers' statement cut away a backstay and went into the mainmast. The

batteries of both ships opened, and an engagement followed, lasting

twelve or fifteen minutes, during which the "Little Belt," hopelessly

inferior in force, was badly cut up, losing nine killed and

twenty-three wounded. Deplorable as was this result, and whatever

unreconciled doubts may be entertained by others than Americans as to

the blame, there can be no question that the affair was an accident,

unpremeditated. It was clearly in evidence that Rodgers had cautioned

his officers against any firing prior to orders. There was nothing of

the deliberate purpose characterizing the "Chesapeake" affair; yet Mr.

Foster, with the chariness which from first to last marked the British

handling of that business, withheld the reparation authorized by his

instructions until he had received a copy of the proceedings of the

court.

On July 24, 1811, the President summoned Congress to meet November 4,

a month before the usual time, in consequence of the state of foreign

affairs. His message spoke of ominous indications; of the inflexible

hostility evidenced by Great Britain in trampling upon rights which no

independent nation can relinquish; and recommended legislation for

increasing the military force. As regarded the navy, his words were

indefinite and vague, beyond suggesting the expediency of purchasing

materials for ship-building. The debates and action of Congress

reflected the tone of the Executive. War was anticipated as a matter

of course, and mentioned freely in speeches. That the regular army

should be enlarged, and dispositions made for more effective use of

the militia, was granted; the only dispute being about the amount of

development. In this the legislature exceeded the President's wishes,

which were understood, though not expressed in the message. Previous

Congresses had authorized an army of ten thousand, of which not more

than five thousand were then in the ranks. It was voted to complete

this; to add twenty-five thousand more regulars, and to provide for

fifty thousand volunteers. Doubts, based upon past experience, and

which proved well founded, were expressed as to the possibility of

raising so many regular troops, pledged for five years to submit to

the restrictions of military life. It was urged that, in the

economical conditions of the country, the class did not exist from

which such a force could be recruited.

This consideration did not apply to the navy. Seamen could be had

abundantly from the merchant shipping, the activities of which must

necessarily be much curtailed by war with a great naval power.

Nevertheless, the dominance of Jefferson, though in this particular

already shaken, remained upon the mass of his party. The new Secretary

of the Navy was from South Carolina, not reckoned among the commercial

states; but, however influenced, he ventured to intimate doubts as to

the gunboat system. Of one thing there was no doubt. On a gunboat a

gun cost twelve thousand dollars a year; the same on a frigate cost

but four thousand.[354] In the House of Representatives, the strongest

support to the development of the navy as a permanent force came from

the Secretary's state, backed by Henry Clay from Kentucky, and by the

commercial states; the leading representative of which, Josiah Quincy,

expressed, however, a certain diffidence, because in the embittered

politics of the day the mere fact of Federalist support tended rather

to damage the cause.

So much of the President's message as related to the navy--three

lines, wholly non-committal--was referred to a special committee. The

report[355] was made by Langdon Cheves of South Carolina, whose clear

and cogent exposition of the capabilities of the country and the

possibility of providing a force efficient against Great Britain,

under her existing embarrassments, was supported powerfully and

perspicuously by William Lowndes of the same state. The text for their

remarks was supplied by a sentence in the committee's report: "The

important engine of national strength and national security, which is

formed by a naval force, has hitherto been treated with a neglect

highly impolitic, or supported by a spirit so languid, as, while it

has preserved the existence of the establishment, has had the effect

of loading it with the imputations of wasteful expense, and

comparative inefficiency.... Such a course is impolitic under any

circumstances." This was the condemnation of the party's past. Clay

found his delight in dealing with some of the oratory, which on the

present occasion still sustained--and for the moment successfully

sustained--the prepossessions of Jefferson. Carthage, Rome, Venice,

Genoa, were republics with free institutions and great navies;

Carthage, Rome, Venice, and Genoa had lost their liberties, and their

national existence. Clearly navies, besides being very costly, were

fatal to constitutional freedom. Not in reply to such _non sequitur_,

but quickened by an insight which was to receive earlier vindication

than he could have anticipated, Quincy prophesied that, amid the

diverse and contrary interests of the several states, which the lack

of a common object of affection left still imperfectly unified in

sentiment, a glorious navy, identified with the whole country because

of its external action, yet local to no part, would supply a common

centre for the enthusiasm not yet inspired by the central government,

too closely associated for years back with a particular school of

extreme political thought, narrowly territorial and clannish in its

origin and manifestation. Within a twelvemonth, the "Constitution,"

most happily apt of all names ever given to a ship, became the

embodiment of this verified prediction.

The report of the committee was modest in its scope. "To the defence

of your ports and harbors, and the protection of your coasting trade,

should be confined the present objects and operations of any navy

which the United States can, or ought, to have." To this office it was

estimated that twelve ships of the line and twenty frigates would

suffice. Cheves and Lowndes were satisfied that such a fleet was

within the resources of the country; and to insure the fifteen

thousand seamen necessary to man it, they would be willing to limit

the number of privateers,--a most wholesome and necessary provision.

By a careful historical examination of Great Britain's past and

present exigencies, it was shown that such a force would most probably

keep clear the approaches to all American ports, the most critical

zone for shipping, whether inward or outward bound; because, to

counteract it, the enemy would have to employ numbers so largely

superior that they could not be spared from her European conflict. The

argument was sound; but unhappily Cheves, Lowndes, Clay, and Quincy

did not represent the spirit of the men who for ten years had ruled

the country and evolved the gunboat system. These, in their day of

power, not yet fully past, had neither maintained the fleet nor

accumulated material, and there was no seasoned timber to build with.

The Administration which expired in 1801 had left timber for six

74-gun ships, of which now remained only enough for four. The rest had

been wasted in gunboats, or otherwise. The committee therefore limited

its recommendations to building the frigates, for which it was

believed materials could be procured.

Even in this reduced form it proved impossible to overcome the

opposition to a navy as economically expensive and politically

dangerous. The question was amply debated; but as, on the one hand,

little doubt was felt about the rapid conquest of Canada by militia

and volunteers, so, on the other, the same disposition to trust to

extemporized irregular forces encouraged reliance simply upon

privateering. Private enterprise in such a cause undoubtedly has from

time to time attained marked results; but in general effect the method

is a wasteful expenditure of national resources, and, historically,

saps the strength of the regular navy. In the manning of inefficient

privateers--and the majority were inefficient and ineffective--were

thrown away resources of seamen which, in an adequate naval force,

organized and directed as it would have been by the admirable officers

of that period, could have accomplished vastly more in the annoyance

of British trade,--the one offensive naval undertaking left open to

the nation. Even with the assistance of the Federalists the provision

for the frigates could not be carried, though the majority was

narrow--62 to 59. The same fate befell the proposition to provide a

dockyard. All that could be had was an appropriation of six hundred

thousand dollars, distributed over three successive years, for buying

timber. These votes were taken January 27, 1812, in full expectation

of war, and only five months before it was declared.

Early in April, Congress, in secret session, passed an Act of Embargo

for ninety days, which became law on the fourth by the President's

signature. The motive was twofold: to retain at home the ships and

seamen of the nation, in anticipation of war, to keep them from

falling into the hands of the enemy; and also to prevent the carriage

of supplies indispensably necessary to the British armies in Spain.

Both objects were defeated by the action of Quincy, in conjunction

with Senator Lloyd of Massachusetts and Representative Emott of New

York. Learning that the President intended to recommend the embargo,

these gentlemen, as stated by Quincy on the floor of the House,

despatched at once to Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, expresses

which left Washington March 31, the day before Madison's letter was

dated. Four or five days' respite was thus secured, and the whole

mercantile community set zealously to work to counteract the effects

of the measure. "Niles' Register," published in Baltimore, said:

"Drays were working night and day, from Tuesday night, March 31, and

continued their toil till Sunday morning, incessantly. In this

hurly-burly to palsy the arm of the Government all parties united. On

Sunday perhaps not twenty seamen, able to do duty, could be found in

all Baltimore." A New York paper is quoted as saying, "The property

could not have been moved off with greater expedition had the city

been enveloped in flames." From that port forty-eight vessels cleared;

from Baltimore thirty-one; Philadelphia and Alexandria in like

proportions. It was estimated that not less than two hundred thousand

barrels of flour, besides grain in other shapes, and provisions of all

kinds, to a total value of fifteen million dollars, were rushed out of

the country in those five days, when labor-saving appliances were

nearly unknown.[356]

Jonathan Russell, who was now _charge d'affaires_ at London, having

been transferred from Paris upon the arrival of Armstrong's successor,

Joel Barlow, wrote home, "The great shipments of provisions, which

were hurried from America in expectation of the embargo, have given

the Peninsula a supply for about two months; and at the expiration of

that period the harvest in that region will furnish a stock for about

three months more.... The avidity discovered by our countrymen to

escape from the embargo, and the disregard of its policy, have

encouraged this Government to hope that supplies will still continue

to be received from the United States. The ship 'Lady Madison,' which

left Liverpool in March, has returned thither with a cargo taken in

off Sandy Hook without entering an American port. There are several

vessels now about leaving this country with the intention not only of

procuring a cargo in the same way, but of getting rid, illicitly, of

one they carry out."[357]

It was, indeed, a conspicuous instance of mercantile avidity, wholly

disregardful of patriotic considerations, such as is to be found in

all times and in all countries; strictly analogous to the constant

smuggling between France and Great Britain at this very time. Its

significance in the present case, however, is as marking the

widespread lack of a national patriotism, as distinct from purely

local advantage and personal interests, which unhappily characterized

Americans at this period. Of this Great Britain stood ready to avail

herself, by extending to the United States the system of licenses, by

which, combined with the Orders in Council, she was combating with a

large degree of success Napoleon's Continental System. She hoped, and

the sequel showed not unreasonably, that even during open hostilities

she could in the same manner thwart the United States in its efforts

to keep its own produce from her markets. Less than a fortnight after

the American Declaration of War was received, Russell, who had not yet

left England, wrote to the Secretary of State that the Board of Trade

had given notice that licenses would be granted for American vessels

to carry provisions from the United States to Cadiz and Lisbon, for

the term of eight months; and that a policy had been issued at Lloyds

to a New York firm, insuring flour from that port to the peninsula,

warranted free from British capture, and from capture or detention by

the Government of the United States.[358]

The British armies were thus nourished and dependent, both in Spain

and in Canada. The supplying of the latter scarcely fell short of

treason, and decisively affected the maintenance of the war in that

quarter. It is difficult to demonstrate a moral distinction between

what was done there, disregardful of national success, in shameful

support of the enemy, and the supplying of the peninsula; but an

intuitive sympathy extends to the latter a tolerance which the motives

of the individual agents probably do not deserve, and for which calm

reason cannot give a perfectly satisfactory account. But it was the

misfortune of American policy, as shaped by the Administration, that

it was committed to support Napoleon in his iniquitous attack upon the

liberties of Spain; that it saw in his success the probable fulfilment

of its designs upon the Floridas;[359] and that its chosen ground for

proceeding against Great Britain, rather than France, was her refusal

to conform her action to a statement of the Emperor's, the illusory

and deceptive character of which became continually more apparent.

To declare war because of the Orders in Council was a simple,

straightforward, and wholly justifiable course; but the flying months

made more and more evident, to the Government and its agents abroad,

that it was vain to expect revocation on the ground of Napoleon's

recall of his edicts, for they were not recalled. Having entered upon

this course, however, it seemed impossible to recede, or to

acknowledge a mistake, the pinch of which was nevertheless felt.

Writing to Russell, whose service in Paris, from October, 1810, to

October, 1811, and transfer thence to London, made him unusually

familiar, on both sides of the Channel, with the controversy over

Champagny's letter of August 5, 1810, Madison speaks "of the delicacy

of our situation, having in view, on the one hand, the importance of

obtaining from the French Government confirmation of the repeal of the

Decrees, and on the other that of not weakening the ground on which

the British repeal was urged."[360] That is, it would be awkward to

have the British ministry find out that we were pressing France for a

confirmation of that very revocation which we were confidently

asserting to them to be indisputable, and to require in good faith the

withdrawal of their Orders. Respecting action taken under the

so-called repeal, Russell had written on March 15, 1811, over three

months after it was said to take effect, "By forbearing to condemn, or

to acquit, distinctly and loyally, [the vessels seized since November

1], this Government encourages us to persevere in our non-importation

against England, and England to persist in her orders against us. This

state of things appears calculated to produce mutual complaint and

irritation, and cannot probably be long continued without leading to a

more serious contest, ... which is perhaps an essential object of this

country's policy."[361] July 15, he expressed regret to the Duke of

Bassano, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the proceedings

concerning captured American vessels "had been so partial, and

confined to cases which from their peculiar circumstances proved

nothing conclusively in relation to the revocation of the French

Edicts."[362]

Russell might have found some light as to the causes of these delays,

could he have seen a note addressed by the Emperor to the

Administration of Commerce, April 29. In this, renewing the reasoning

of the Bayonne Decree, he argued that every American vessel which

touched at an English port was liable to confiscation in the United

States; consequently, could be seized by an American cruiser on the

open sea; therefore, was equally open to seizure there by a French

cruiser--the demand advanced by Canning[363] which gave such just

offence; and if by a French cruiser at sea, likewise in a French port

by the French Government. She was in fact no longer American, not even

a denationalized American, but an English vessel. Under this

supposition, Napoleon luminously inferred, "It could be said: The

Decrees of Berlin and Milan are recalled as to the United States, but,

as every ship which has stopped in England, or is destined thither, is

a ship unacknowledged (_sans aveu_), which American laws punish and

confiscate, she may be confiscated in France." The Emperor concluded

that should this theory not be capable of substantiation, the matter

might for the present be left obscure.[364] On September 13 the ships

in question had not been liberated.

Coincidently with his note to Bassano, Russell wrote to Monroe, "It is

my conviction that the great object of their policy is to entangle us

in a war with England. They therefore abstain from doing any act which

would furnish clear and unequivocal testimony of the revocation of

their decrees, lest it should induce the extinction of the British

Orders, and thereby appease our irritation against their enemy. Hence,

of all the captured vessels since November 1, the three which were

liberated were precisely those which had not violated the

Decrees."[365] Yet, such were the exigencies of the debate with

England, those three cases were transmitted by him at the same time to

the American _charge_ in London as evidence of the revocation.[366] To

the French Minister he wrote again, August 8, "After the declarations

of M. de Champagny and yourself, I cannot permit myself to doubt the

revocation; ... but I may be allowed to lament that no fact has yet

come to my knowledge of a character unequivocally and incontrovertibly

to confirm that revocation." "That none of the captured vessels have

been condemned, instead of proving the extinction of the edicts,

appears rather to be evidence, at best, of a commutation of the

penalty from prompt confiscation to perpetual detention."[367] The

matter was further complicated by an announcement of Napoleon to the

Chamber of Commerce, in April of the same year, that the Berlin and

Milan Decrees were the fundamental law of the Empire concerning

neutral commerce, and that American ships would be repelled from

French ports, unless the United States conformed to those decrees, by

excluding British ships and merchandise.[368] Under such conditions,

argument with a sceptical British ministry was attended with

difficulties. The position to which the Government had become reduced,

by endeavoring to play off France and Great Britain against each

other, in order to avoid a war with either, was as perplexing as

humiliating. "Great anxiety,"[369] to which little sympathy can be

extended, was felt in Washington as to the evidence for the actuality

of the repeals.

The situation was finally cleared up by a clever move of the British

Cabinet, forcing Napoleon's hand at a moment when the Orders in

Council could with difficulty be maintained longer against popular

discontent. On March 10, 1812, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs,

in a report to the Senate, reiterated the demands of the Decrees, and

asserted again that, until those demands were conceded by England, the

Decrees must be enforced against Powers which permitted their flags to

be denationalized. The position thus reaffirmed was emphasized by a

requirement for a large increase of the army for this object. "It is

necessary that all the disposable forces of France be available for

sending everywhere where the English flag, and other flags,

denationalized or convoyed by English ships of war, may seek to

enter."[370] No exceptions in favor of the United States being

stated, the British ministry construed the omission as conclusive

proof of the unqualified continuance of the Decrees;[371] and the

occasion was taken to issue an Order in Council, defining the

Government's position, both in the past and for the future. Quoting

the French minister's Report, as removing all doubts of Napoleon's

persistence in the maintenance of a system, "as inconsistent with

neutral rights and independence as it was hostile to the maritime

rights and commercial interests of Great Britain," the Prince Regent

declared that, "if at any time thereafter the Berlin and Milan Decrees

should be absolutely and unconditionally repealed, by some authentic

act of the French Government, publicly promulgated, then the Orders in

Council of January, 1807, and April, 1809, shall without any further

order be, and the same are hereby declared from thenceforth to be,

wholly and absolutely revoked."[372] No exception could be taken to

the phrasing or form of this Order. The wording was precise and

explicit; the time fixed was definite,--the date of the French Repeal;

the manner of revocation was the same as that of promulgation, an

Order in Council observant of all usual formalities.

In substance, this well-timed State Paper challenged Champagny's

letter of August 5, 1810, and the American Non-Importation Act based

upon it. Both these asserted the revocation of the French Decrees. The

British Cabinet, seizing a happy opportunity, asked of the world the

production of the revocation, or else the justification of its own

course. The demand went far to silence the growing discontents at

home, and to embarrass the American Government in the grounds upon

which it had chosen to base its action. It was well calculated also

to disconcert the Emperor, for, unless he did something more definite,

dissension would increase in the United States, where, as Barlow

wrote, "It is well known to the world, for our public documents are

full of it, that great doubts exist, even among our best informed

merchants, and in the halls of Congress itself, whether the Berlin and

Milan Decrees are to this day repealed, or even modified, in regard to

the United States." The sentence is taken from a letter[373] which he

addressed to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 1, 1812, when

he had received the recent British Order. He pointed out how astutely

this step was calculated to undo the effect of Champagny's letter, and

to weaken the American Administration at the critical moment when it

was known to be preparing for war. He urged that the French Government

should now make and publish an authentic Act, declaring the Berlin and

Milan Decrees, as relative to the United States, to have ceased in

November, 1810. "Such an act is absolutely necessary to the American

Government; and, though solicited as an accommodation, it may be

demanded as a right. If it was the duty of France to cease to apply

those Decrees to the United States, it is equally her duty to

promulgate it to the world in as formal a manner as we have

promulgated our law for the exclusion of British merchandise. She

ought to declare and publish the non-application of these Decrees in

the same forms in which she enacted the Decrees. The President has

instructed me to propose and press this object."

At last the demand was made which should have been enforced eighteen

months before. After sending the letter, Barlow had "a pretty sharp

conversation" with Bassano, in which he perceived a singular

reluctance to answer his letter. At last the Duke placed before him a

Decree, drawn up in due and customary form, dated a year

before,--April 28, 1811,--declaring that "the Decrees of Berlin and

Milan are definitively, and to date from the first day of November

last, [1810], considered as not having existed in regard to American

vessels."[374] This Decree, Bassano said, had been communicated to

Russell, and also sent to Serrurier, the French minister at

Washington, with orders to convey it to the American Government. Both

Russell and Serrurier denied ever having received the paper.[375]

Barlow made no comment upon the strange manner in which this document

was produced to him, and confined himself to inquiring if it had been

published. The reply could only be, No; a singular admission with

regard to a formal paper a year old, and of such importance to all

concerned. He then asked that a copy might be sent him. Upon receipt,

he at once hastened it to Russell in London, by the sloop of war

"Wasp," then lying in a French port. He wrote, "You will doubtless

render an essential service to both Great Britain and the United

States by communicating it without loss of time to the Foreign

Secretary. If by this the cause of war should be removed, there is an

obvious reason for keeping the secret, if possible, so long as that

the "Wasp" may not bring the news to this country in any other manner

but in your despatch. This Government, as you must long have

perceived, wishes not to see that effect produced; and I should not

probably have obtained the letter and documents from the Minister, if

the Prince Regent's Declaration had not convinced this Government that

the war was now become inevitable."[376]

Russell transmitted the Decree to the British Foreign Secretary May

20, 1812. The Government was at the moment in confusion, through the

assassination, May 11, of Mr. Perceval, the Prime Minister; who,

though not esteemed of the first order of statesmanship by his

contemporaries and colleagues, had been found in recent negotiations

the only available man about whom a cabinet could unite. A period of

suspense followed, in which the difficulty of forming a new

government, owing to personal antagonisms, was complicated by radical

differences as to public policy, especially in the cardinal point of

pursuing or relinquishing the war in the peninsula. Not till near the

middle of June was an arrangement reached. The same ministry,

substantially, remained in power, with Lord Liverpool as premier;

Castlereagh continuing as Foreign Secretary. This retained in office

the party identified with the Orders in Council, and favoring armed

support to the Spanish revolt.

The delay in settling the government afforded an excuse for postponing

action upon the newly discovered French Decree. It permitted also time

for reflection. Just before Perceval's death, Russell had noted a firm

determination to maintain the Orders in Council, conditioned only by

the late Declaration of April 21; but at the same time there was

evident apprehension of the consequences of war with the United

States.[377] This, he carefully explained, was due to no apprehension

of American military power. Even Lord Grenville, one of the chief

leaders of the Opposition, was satisfied that the United States could

not conquer Canada. "We are, indeed, most miserably underrated in

Europe." "It is not believed here, notwithstanding the spirited report

of the Committee on Foreign Relations, that we shall resort to any

definitive measures. We have indeed a reputation in Europe for saying

so much and doing so little that we shall not be believed in earnest

until we act in a manner not to be mistaken." "I am persuaded this

Government has presumed much on our weakness and divisions, and that

it continues to believe that we have not energy and union enough to

make effective war. Nor is this confined to the ministry, but extends

to the leaders of the Opposition." "Mr. Perceval is well known to

calculate with confidence that even in case of war we shall be obliged

to resort to a license trade for a supply of British manufactures."

"He considers us incapable even of bearing the privations of a state

of hostility with England, and much more incapable of becoming a

formidable enemy." On March 3 Perceval in a debate in the House had

indicated the most positive intentions of maintaining the Orders, and

asserted that, in consequence of Napoleon's Decrees, Great Britain was

no longer restrained by the law of nations in the extent or form of

retaliation to which she may resort upon the enemy. "I cannot perceive

the slightest indication of apprehension of a rupture with the United

States, or any measure of preparation to meet such an event. Such is

the conviction of our total inability to make war that the five or six

thousand troops now in Canada are considered to be amply sufficient to

protect that province against our mightiest efforts."[378] A

revolution of sentiment was to be noted even in the minds of former

advocates. Castlereagh, at a levee on March 12, said to Russell that

the movements in the United States appeared to him to be nothing but

party evolutions.

There was, however, another side to the question which occasioned more

concern to the British ministry. "It is the increasing want of our

intercourse," wrote Russell May 9, "rather than the apprehension of

our arms which leads to a conciliatory spirit" which he had recently

noticed. "They will endeavor to avoid the calamity of war with the

United States by every means which can save their pride and their

consistency. The scarcity of bread in this country, the distress of

the manufacturing towns, and the absolute dependency of the allied

troops in the Peninsula on our supplies, form a check on their conduct

which they can scarcely have the hardihood to disregard."[379] Two

days after these words were written, the murder of Perceval added

political anarchy to the embarrassments of the Government. The crisis

then impending was indeed momentous. War between France and Russia was

certain. Upon its outcome depended the fall of the Continental System,

or its prevalence over all Europe in an extent and with a rigor never

yet reached. "Some of the Powers of Europe," said the Emperor, "have

not fulfilled their promise with respect to the Continental System. I

must force them to it." In carrying this message to the Senate, the

Minister of Foreign Affairs said: "In whatever port of Europe a

British ship can enter there must be a French garrison to prevent

it;"[380] an interesting commentary upon the neutral regulations to

which the United States professed that neither she nor Great Britain

had any claim to object, because municipal. Great Britain had already

touched ruin too nearly to think lightly of the conditions. By her

Orders in Council she had so retorted Napoleon's Decrees as to induce

him, in order still further to enforce them, into the Peninsular War,

and now into that with Russia. To uphold the latter, her busy

negotiators, profiting by his high-handedness, had obtained for the

Czar peace with Sweden and Turkey. More completely to sustain him, it

was essential to support in fullest effect the powerful diversion

which retained three hundred thousand French troops in Spain. To do

this, the assistance of American food supplies was imperative.

If peace with the United States could be maintained, the triumph of

British diplomacy would be unqualified. The announcement of the

alleged Decree of April 28, 1811, came therefore most opportunely to

save their pride and self-consistency. On June 23 Castlereagh

transmitted to Russell an Order in Council published that day,

revoking as to the United States the celebrated Orders of January 7,

1807, and April 26, 1809. "I am to request you," ran his letter, "that

you will acquaint your Government that the Prince Regent's ministers

have taken _the earliest opportunity, after the resumption of the

Government_, to advise his Royal Highness to the adoption of a measure

grounded upon the document communicated by you to this office on the

20th ultimo;"[381] that is upon the Decree of April 28. No one

affected to believe that this had been framed at the date it bore.

"There was something so very much like fraud on the face of it," wrote

Russell, "that in several conversations which I have since had with

Lord Castlereagh, particularly at a dinner at the Lord Mayor's, when I

was placed next his lordship, I have taken care not to commit the

honor of my Government by attempting its vindication. When his

lordship called it a strange proceeding, a new specimen of French

diplomacy, a trick unworthy of a civilized government, I have merely

replied that the motives or good faith of the Government which issued

it, or the real time when it was issued, were of little importance as

to the effect which it ought to have here; that it was sufficient that

it contained a most precise and formal declaration that the Berlin and

Milan Decrees were revoked, in relation to America, from November 1,

1810."[382]

This was true; but the contention of the British Government had been

that the system of the Decrees was one whole; that its effect upon

America could not be dissociated from that upon continental neutral

states, where it was enforced under the guise of municipal

regulations; and that it must be revoked as a whole, in order to

impose the repeal of the Orders in Council. This position had been

reaffirmed in the recent Order of April 21. Opinion will therefore

differ as to the ministry's success in escaping, under the cover of

the new Decree, from the dilemma in which they were placed by the

irresistible agitation against the Orders in Council spreading through

the nation, and the necessity of avoiding war with the United States,

if possible, because of the affairs of the Peninsula. They made the

best of it by alleging, as it were, the spirit of the Order of April

21; the disposition "to take such measures as may tend to re-establish

the intercourse between neutral and belligerent nations upon its

accustomed principles." For this reason, while avowing explicitly that

the tenor of the Decree did not meet the requirements of the late

Order, the Orders in Council were revoked from August 1 next

following; and vessels captured after May 20, the date of Russell's

communicating the Decree, would be released. The ministry thus receded

gracefully under compulsion; and for their own people at least saved

their face.

Superficially the British diplomatic triumph for the moment seemed

complete. They had withdrawn their head from the noose just as it

began to tighten; and they had done so not on any ground of stringent

requirement, but with expressions of desire to go even farther than

their just claims, in order to promote conciliation. Russell naturally

felt a moment of bitter discomfiture. "In yielding, the ministers

appear to have been extremely perplexed in seeking for a subterfuge

for their credit. All their feelings and all their prejudices revolted

at the idea of publicly bending to the Opposition, or truckling to the

United States, and they were compelled to seize on the French Decree

of April 28, 1811, as the only means of saving themselves from the

degradation of acknowledging that they were vanquished. Without this

decree they would have been obliged to yield, and I almost regret that

it existed to furnish a salvo, miserable as it is, for their pride.

Our victory, however, is still complete, and I trust that those who

have refused to support our Government in the contest will at least be

willing to allow it the honors of a triumph."[383]

Russell wrote under the mistaken impression that the repeal of the

Orders had come in time to save war; in which event the yielding of

the British ministry, identified as it was with the Orders in Council,

might be construed as a triumph for the system of peaceable coercion,

by commercial restrictions, which formed the whole policy of Jefferson

and Madison. The triumph claimed by him must be qualified, however, by

the reflection that it was obtained at the expense of becoming the

dupe of a French deception, on its face so obvious as to deprive

mistake of the excuse of plausibility. The eagerness of the

Government, and of its representatives abroad, for a diplomatic

triumph, had precipitated them into a step for which, on the grounds

taken, no justification existed; and they had since then been dragged

at the wheels of Napoleon's chariot, in a constant dust of

mystification, until he had finally achieved the end of his scheming

and landed them in a war for which they were utterly unprepared, and

which it had been the chief object of commercial reprisals to avoid.

Thus considered, the triumph was barren.

On June 1, 1812, President Madison sent to Congress a message,[384]

reciting the long list of international wrongs endured at the hands of

Great Britain, and recommending to the deliberations of Congress the

question of peace or war. On June 4 the House of Representatives, by a

vote of seventy-nine yeas to forty-nine nays, declared that a state of

war existed between the United States and Great Britain. The bill then

went to the Senate, where it was discussed, amended, and passed on

June 17, by nineteen yeas to thirteen nays. The next day the House

concurred in the Senate's amendments, and the bill thus passed

received the President's signature immediately. The war thus began,

formally, on June 18, 1812, five days before the repeal of the British

Orders in Council.

While the Declaration of War was still under debate, the Secretary of

War, Eustis, on June 8 reported to the Senate that of the ten thousand

men authorized as a peace establishment, there were in service six

thousand seven hundred and forty-four. He was unable to state what

number had been enlisted of the twenty-five thousand regulars provided

by the legislation of the current session; a singular exhibition of

the efficiency of the Department. He had no hesitation, however, in

expressing an unofficial opinion that there were five thousand of

these recruits. It is scarce necessary to surmise what the condition

of the army was likely to be, with James Wilkinson as the senior

general officer of consecutive service, and with Dearborn, a man of

sixty, and in civil life ever since the War of Independence, as the

first major-general appointed under the new legislation. The navy had

a noble and competent body of officers, in the prime of life, a large

proportion of whom had seen instructive service in the Barbary

conflict; but, as has been seen, Congress had no faith in a navy, and

refused it any increase. In this distrust the Administration shared.

Mr. Monroe, indeed, probably through his residence abroad, had

attained a juster view of the influence of a navy on foreign

relations. He has already been quoted in this connection,[385] but in

a letter to a friend, two years before 1812, he developed his opinions

with some precision. "I gave my opinion that our naval force ought to

be increased. In advising this, I urged that the naval force of the

United States ought not to be regulated by reference to the navies of

the Great Powers, but to the strength of the squadrons which they

usually stationed in time of war on our coasts, at the mouths of great

rivers, and in our harbors. I thought that such a force, incorporated

permanently with our system, would give weight at all times to our

negotiations, and by means thereof prevent wars and save money."[386]

Monroe at this time was not in the Administration. Such a policy was

diametrically opposed to that of Jefferson, Madison, and Gallatin; and

when war came, ships had not been provided. Under the circumstances

the disposition of the Government was to put the ships they had under

a glass case.

"At the commencement of the war," wrote Monroe to Jefferson, "I was

decidedly of your opinion, that the best disposition which could be

made of our little navy would be to keep it in a body in a safe port,

from which it might sally, only on some important occasion, to render

essential service. Its safety, in itself, appeared an important

object; as, while safe, it formed a check on the enemy in all

operations along our coast, and increased proportionately his

expense, in the force to be kept up, as well to annoy our commerce as

to protect his own. The reasoning against this, in which all naval

officers have agreed, is that, if stationed together in a port,--New

York, for example,--the British would immediately block up this, by a

force rather superior, and then harass our coast and commerce, without

restraint, and with any force, however small. In that case a single

frigate might, by cruising along the coast, and menacing continually

different parts, keep in motion great bodies of militia; that, while

our frigates are at sea, the expectation that they may be met together

will compel the British to keep in a body, whenever they institute a

blockade or cruise, a force equal at least to our own whole force;

that they, [the American vessels] being the best sailors, hazard

little by cruising separately, or together occasionally, as they might

bring on an action, or avoid one, as they saw fit; that in that

measure they would annoy the enemy's commerce wherever they went,

excite alarm in the West Indies and elsewhere, and even give

protection to our own trade by drawing the enemy's squadron from our

own coast.... The reasoning in favor of each plan is so nearly equal

that it is hard to say which is best."[387] It is to be hoped that the

sequel will show which was best, although little can be hoped when

means, military and naval, have been allowed to waste as they had

under the essentially unmilitary Administrations since 1801.

On November 25, 1811, seven months before the war began, the Secretary

of the Treasury, Gallatin, communicated to the Senate a report on the

State of the Finances,[388] in which he showed that since 1801, by

economies which totally crippled the war power of the nation, the

public debt had been diminished from $80,000,000 to $34,000,000,--a

saving of $46,000,000, which lessened the annual interest on the debt

by $2,000,000. A good financial showing, doubtless; but, had there

been on hand the troops and the ships, which the saved money

represented, the War of 1812 might have had an issue more satisfactory

to national retrospect. Gallatin also showed, in this paper, that by

the restrictive system, enforced against Great Britain in consequence

of the Administration's decision that Napoleon's revocation of his

Decrees was real, the revenue had dropped from $12,000,000 to

$6,000,000; leaving the nation with a probable deficiency of

$2,000,000, on the estimate of a year of peace for 1812.

FOOTNOTES:

[172] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 152.

[173] Ibid., p. 147.

[174] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 290.

[175] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii. p. 488.

[176] That is, as restrictive of neutral shipping.

[177] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 410.

[178] Wellesley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Pinkney, Dec. 29,

1810; also, Feb. 11, 1811. American State Papers, Foreign Relations,

vol. iii. pp. 409, 412. See also Sir Wm. Scott, in the Court of

Admiralty, Ibid., p. 421.

[179] Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire,

chaps. xvii., xviii.

[180] Declaration of the King's reservations, Dec. 31, 1806. American

State Papers, vol. iii. p. 152.

[181] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 159.

[182] Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. x. p. 1274.

[183] Aug. 12, 1805. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol.

iii. p. 104.

[184] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 158.

[185] Jonathan Russell to the Secretary of State, Nov. 15, 1811. U.S.

State Department MSS.

[186] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. pp. 154,

160.

[187] Ibid., p. 166.

[188] The British Commissioners to Monroe and Pinkney, Nov. 8, 1806.

Ibid., p. 140.

[189] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 187.

[190] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 188.

Author's italics.

[191] Monroe to Madison, Aug. 4, 1807. American State Papers, Foreign

Relations, vol. iii. p. 186.

[192] That is, all vessels, including merchantmen.

[193] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. pp. 183-185.

Author's italics.

[194] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. pp. 191-193.

[195] American State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 199, 200.

[196] American State Papers, vol. iii. p. 202. Author's italics.

[197] Ibid., Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 201.

[198] Ibid., p. 202.

[199] Ibid., p. 203.

[200] The principal part of the correspondence between Rose and

Madison will be found in American State Papers, Foreign Relations,

vol. iii. pp. 213-220. Rose's instructions from Canning were first

published by Mr. Henry Adams, History of the United States, vol. iv.

pp. 178-182. They were of a character that completely justify the

caution of the American Government in refusing to go further without

knowing their contents, concerning which, indeed, Madison wrote that a

glimpse had been obtained in the informal interviews, which showed

their inadmissibility. Madison to Pinkney, Feb. 19, 1808, U.S. State

Department MSS.

[201] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 300.

[202] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 200.

[203] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 243.

[204] Ibid., pp. 244-245.

[205] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 243.

[206] Armstrong to Smith, U.S. Secretary of State, Jan. 28, 1810.

Ibid., p. 380. Author's italics.

[207] American State Papers, vol. iii. p. 380. Author's italics.

[208] Barlow to Bassano, Nov. 10, 1811. U.S. State Department MSS.

Author's italics.

[209] Barlow to Monroe, Dec. 19, 1811. U.S. State Department MSS.

[210] Feb. 22, 1808. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol.

iii. p. 206.

[211] Giles, Annals of Congress, 1808-09, pp. 123-125.

[212] N.Y. Evening Post, May 12, 1808.

[213] Jefferson, under date of Nov. 15, 1807, alludes to such a

report. (Jefferson's Works, vol. v. p. 211.) Already, indeed, on Aug.

19, 1807, an Order in Council, addressed to vessels bearing the

neutral flags of Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, Papenburg, or Kniphausen, had

been issued, which, though brief, imposed precisely the same

restrictions as the later celebrated ones here under discussion.

(Annual Register, 1807, State Papers, p. 730; Naval Chronicle, vol.

xviii. p. 151.) The fact is interesting, as indicative of the date of

formulating a project, for the execution of which the "Horizon"

decision probably afforded the occasion.

[214] Erskine's communication was dated Feb. 23, 1808. (American State

Papers, vol. iii. p. 209.) Pinkney, however, had forwarded a copy of

the Orders on November 17. (Ibid., p. 203.) Canning's letter, of which

Erskine's was a transcript, was dated Dec. 1, 1807. (British Foreign

Office Archives.)

[215] Senator Giles of Virginia. Annals of Congress, 1808-09, p. 218.

[216] The following are instances: Philadelphia, February 23. The ship

"Venus," King, hence to the Isle of France, has returned to port.

January 17, Lat. 25 deg. N., Long. 34 deg. W., fell in with an English

merchant fleet of thirty-six sail, under convoy of four ships of war.

Was boarded by the sloop of war "Wanderer," which endorsed on all her

papers, forbidding to enter any port belonging to France or her

allies, they all being declared in a state of blockade. Captain King

therefore put back. (N.Y. Evening Post, Feb. 24, 1808.) Salem, Mass.,

February 23. Arrived bark "Active," Richardson. Sailed hence for

Malaga, December 12. January 2, Lat. 37 deg. N., Long. 17 deg. W., boarded by

a British cruiser, and papers endorsed against entering any but a

British port. The voyage being thus frustrated, Captain Richardson

returned. Marblehead, February 29. Schooner "Minerva" returned, having

been captured under the Orders in Council, released, and come home.

Ship "George," from Amsterdam, arrived at New York, March 6, via

Yarmouth. Was taken by an English cruiser into Yarmouth and there

cleared. (Evening Post, March 6.)

[217] N.Y. Evening Post, March 24, 1808.

[218] Letter of John Quincy Adams to Harrison Gray Otis.

[219] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 245.

Author's italics.

[220] Correspondence of Thomas Barclay, p. 272.

[221] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 206.

[222] "We expected, too, some effect from coercion of interest."

(Jefferson to Armstrong, March 5, 1809. Works, vol. v. p. 433.) "The

embargo is the last card we have to play short of war." (Jefferson to

Madison, March 11, 1808. Ibid., p. 258.) "The coercive experiment we

have made." (Monroe to John Taylor. Works, vol. v. p. 89.) "I place

immense value on the experiment being fully made how far an Embargo

may be an _effectual weapon_ in future, as well as on this occasion."

(Jefferson. Works, vol. v. p. 289.) "Bonaparte ought to be

particularly satisfied with us, by whose unyielding adherence to

principle England has been forced into the revocation of her Orders."

(Jefferson to Madison, April 27, 1809. Works, vol. v. p. 442.) This

revocation was not actual, but a mistake of the British minister at

Washington. "I have always understood that there were two objects

contemplated by the Embargo Laws. The first, precautionary; the

second, coercive, operating upon the aggressive belligerents, by

addressing strong appeals to the interests of both." (Giles of

Virginia, in Senate, Nov. 24, 1808.) "The embargo is not designed to

affect our own citizens, but to make an impression in Europe."

(Williams of South Carolina, in House of Representatives, April 14,

1808.)

[223] The writer, in a previous work (Sea Power in the French

Revolution), believes himself to have shown that the losses by capture

of British traders did not exceed two and one half per cent.

[224] Letter to Otis.

[225] To Thomas Paine, concerning an improved gunboat devised by him.

Sept. 6, 1807. (Jefferson's Works, vol. v. p. 189.)

[226] Jefferson's Works, vol. v. pp. 417, 426.

[227] June 14, 1809. Works, vol. v. p. 455.

[228] An American ship putting into England, leaky, reported that on

Dec. 18, 1807, she had been boarded by a French privateer, which

allowed her to proceed because bound to Holland. The French captain

said he had captured four Americans, all sent into Passage, in Spain;

and that his orders were to bring in all Americans bound to English

ports. (N.Y. Evening Post, March 1, 1808.) This was under the Berlin

Decree, as that of Milan issued only December 17. The Berlin Decree

proclaimed the British Islands under blockade, but Napoleon for a time

reserved decision as to the mere act of sailing for them being an

infringement. Mr. James Stephen, in Parliament, stated that in 1807

several ships, not less than twenty-one, he thought, were taken for

the mere fact of sailing between America and England; in consequence,

insurance on American vessels rose 50 per cent, from 2-1/2 to 3-3/4.

(Parliamentary Debates, vol. xiii. p. xxxix. App.) In the Evening Post

of March 3, 1808, will be found, quoted from a French journal, cases

of four vessels carried into France, apparently only because bound to

England.

[229] Henry Adams's History of the United States, vol. v. p. 242.

[230] "Nothing can establish firmly the republican principles of our

government but an establishment of them in England. France will be the

apostle for this." (Jefferson's Works, vol. iv. p. 192.) "The

subjugation of England would be a general calamity. Happily it is

impossible. Should invasion end in her being only republicanized, I

know not on what principles a true republican of our country could

lament it." (Ibid., p. 217; Feb. 23, 1798.)

[231] Jefferson to Richard M. Johnson, March 10, 1808. Works, vol. v.

p. 257.

[232] London Times of August 6, quoted in N.Y. Evening Post of Oct.

10, 1808.

[233] Annals of Congress, 1808-09, p. 1032.

[234] Captains' Letters, U.S. Navy Department MSS. Jan. 11, 1808.

[235] Thomas Barclay's Correspondence, p. 274. Author's italics.

[236] N.Y. Evening Post, Sept. 1, 1808.

[237] Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. xii. p. 326.

[238] Life of Sir William Parker, vol. i. p. 304.

[239] Barlow to Bassano, Nov. 10, 1811. U.S. State Department MSS.

[240] N.Y. Evening Post, Feb. 18, June 30, 1808; Feb. 24, 1809.

[241] Senator White of Delaware. Annals of Congress, 1808-09, p. 52.

[242] Works, vol. v. p. 336.

[243] "Trinidad, July 1, 1808. We have just received 15,000 barrels of

flour from Passamaquoddy, and not a week passes but some drops in from

Philadelphia, Norfolk, etc. Cargo of 1,000 barrels would not now

command more than twelve dollars; a year ago, eighteen." (N.Y. Evening

Post, July 25.)

[244] N.Y. Evening Post, Jan. 17, 1809.

[245] Ibid., February 6.

[246] Mitchill of N.Y. Annals of Congress, 1808-09, pp. 86, 92.

[247] Jefferson's Works, vol. v. pp. 298, 318.

[248] N.Y. Evening Post, Aug. 31, 1808.

[249] Feb. 17, 1812. Captains' Letters, U.S. Navy Department MSS.

[250] American State Papers, Finance, vol. ii. p. 306.

[251] With flour varying at short intervals from $30 to $18, and $12,

a barrel, it is evident that speculation must be rife, and also that

only general statements can be made as to conditions over any length

of time.

[252] Orchard Cook, of Massachusetts, said in the House of

Representatives that 590 vessels sailed thus by permission. Annals of

Congress, 1808-09, p. 1250.

[253] N.Y. Evening Post, Oct. 3, 1808.

[254] Ibid., Sept. 2, 1808.

[255] N.Y. Evening Post, Feb. 28, 1809.

[256] Ibid., Sept. 21, 1808.

[257] Ibid., Dec. 8, 1808.

[258] Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. xii. p. 1194.

[259] Lord Grenville in House of Lords. Ibid., p. 780.

[260] N.Y. Evening Post, June 28, 1808.

[261] Ibid., April 8.

[262] Ibid., June 28.

[263] Ibid., October 27. The same effect, though on a much smaller

scale, was seen in France. Deprived, through the joint operation of

the embargo and the Orders in Council, of colonial produce brought by

Americans, a number of vessels were fitted out, and armed as letters

of marque, to carry on this trade. These adventures were very

successful, though they by no means filled the void caused by the

absence of American carriers. See Evening Post of Dec. 29, 1808, and

March 22 and 28, 1809. One of these, acting on her commission as a

letter of marque, captured an American brig, returning from India,

which was carried into Cayenne and there condemned under the Milan

Decree. Ibid., Dec. 6, 1808.

[264] N.Y. Evening Post, Nov. 23, 1808.

[265] For some instances see: Annals of Congress, 1808-09, p. 428;

N.Y. Evening Post, Feb. 5, 8, 12; May 13; Aug. 26; Sept. 27, 1808.

Gallatin, in a report dated Dec. 10, 1808, said, "At no time has there

been so much specie, so much redundant unemployed capital in the

country;" scarcely a token of prosperity in so new a country.

(American State Papers, Finance, vol. ii. p. 309.)

[266] American State Papers, Finance, vol. ii. pp. 307, 373, 442. The

second figure is an average of the two years, 1808, 1809, within which

fell the fifteen months of embargo.

[267] Ibid., p. 309 (Dec. 10, 1808).

[268] "The schooner 'John,' Clayton, from La Guayra, with two hundred

thousand pounds of coffee, has been seized at Leghorn, and it was

expected would be condemned under the Bayonne Decree. The 'John'

sailed from Baltimore for La Guayra, by permission, under the fourth

supplementary Embargo Act. By some means or other she found her way to

Leghorn, where it was vainly hoped she might safely dispose of her

cargo." (N.Y. Evening Post, Dec. 20, 1808.) "The frigate 'Chesapeake,'

Captain Decatur, cruising in support of the embargo, captured off

Block Island the brig 'Mount Vernon' and the ship 'John' loaded with

provisions. Of these the former, at least, is expressly stated to have

cleared 'in ballast,' by permission." (Ibid., Aug. 15, 1808.)

[269] Two or three quotations are sufficient to illustrate a condition

notorious at the time. "Jamaica. Nine Americans came with the June

fleet, (from England) with full cargoes. At first it was thought these

vessels would not be allowed to take cargoes, (because contrary to

Navigation Act); but a little reflection taught the Government better.

Rum is the surplus crop of Jamaica, and to keep on hand that which

they do not want is too much our way (_i.e._ embargo). The British

admiral granted these vessels convoy without hesitation, which saved

them from five to seven and one half percent in insurance." (N.Y.

Evening Post, Aug. 2, 1808.) "Gibraltar. A large number of American

vessels are in these seas, sailing under license from Great Britain,

to and from ports of Spain, without interruption. Our informant sailed

in company with eight or ten, laden with wine and fruit for England."

(Ibid., June 30.) Senator Hillhouse, of Connecticut: "Many of our

vessels which were out when the embargo was laid have remained out.

They have been navigating under the American flag, and have been

constantly employed, at vast profit." (Annals of Congress, 1808, p.

172.)

[270] "At Gibraltar, between January 1 and April 15, eight vessels

were sent in for breach of the Orders, of which seven were condemned."

(N.Y. Evening Post, May 25, 1808.) "Baltimore, Sept. 30. 1808. Arrived

brig. 'Sophia' from Rotterdam, July 28, _via_ Harwich, England.

Boarded by British brig 'Phosphorus', and ordered to England. After

arrival, cargo (of gin) gauged, and a duty exacted of eight pence

sterling per gallon. Allowed to proceed, with a license, after paying

duty. In company with the 'Sophia', and sent in with her, were three

vessels bound for New York, with similar cargoes." (Ibid., Oct. 3.)

"American ship 'Othello,' from New York for Nantes, with assorted

cargo. Ship, with thirty hogsheads of sugar condemned on ground of

violating blockade;" _i.e._ Orders in Council. (Naval Chronicle, vol.

xx. p. 62.) Besides the 'Othello' there are two other cases, turning

on the Orders, by compliance or evasion. From France came numerous

letters announcing condemnations of vessels, because boarded by

British cruisers. (N.Y. Evening Post, Sept. 10, Oct. 5, Oct. 27, Dec.

6, Dec. 10, 1808; March 17, 1809.) Proceedings were sometimes even

more peremptory. More than one American vessel, though neutral, was

burned or sunk at sea, as amenable under Napoleon's decrees. (Ibid.,

Nov. 3 and Nov. 5, Dec. 10, 1808.) See also affidavits in the case of

the "Brutus", burned, and of the "Bristol Packet", scuttled. (Ibid.,

April 5 and April 7, 1808.)

[271] Hillhouse in the Senate (Annals of Congress, 1808, p. 172), and

Cook, of Massachusetts, in the House. "Of about five hundred and

ninety which sailed, only eight or ten have been captured." (Ibid.,

1808-09, p. 1250.) Yet many went to Guadaloupe and other forbidden

French islands. At Saint Pierre, Martinique, in the middle of

September, were nearly ninety American vessels. "Flour, which had been

up to fifty dollars per barrel, fell to thirty dollars, in consequence

of the number of arrivals from America." (N.Y. Evening Post, Sept. 20,

1808.) This shows how the permission to sail "in ballast" was abused.

[272] N.Y. Evening Post, Sept. 7, 1808.

[273] Annals of Congress, 1808-09, p. 406.

[274] N.Y. Evening Post, May 4 and 13, 1808.

[275] For the text of the Act see Annals of Congress, 1808-09, pp.

1798-1803.

[276] Ibid., p. 233.

[277] Giles of Virginia. Annals of Congress, 1808-09, pp. 353-381.

[278] Williams of South Carolina. Annals of Congress, 1808-09, p.

1236.

[279] Nelson of Maryland. Annals of Congress, 1808-09, p. 1258.

[280] Annals of Congress, 1808-09, pp. 1438-1439.

[281] Monroe to Jefferson, Jan. 18 and Feb. 2, 1809. Monroe's Works,

vol. v. pp. 91, 93-95.

[282] To John Taylor, January 9. Ibid., p. 89.

[283] Pinkney, in connection with these, speaks of the "expected" Act

of Congress. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p.

299.

[284] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 299.

[285] This sentence was omitted in the papers when submitted to

Congress.

[286] State Papers, p. 300.

[287] February 7, 1810. American State Papers, Commerce and

Navigation, vol. i. p. 812.

[288] The correspondence between Erskine and the Secretary of State on

this occasion is in American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol.

iii. pp. 295-297.

[289] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. pp. 304-308.

[290] Ibid., p. 303.

[291] Ibid.

[292] Ibid., p. 301.

[293] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 241.

[294] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 318.

[295] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. pp. 308-319.

[296] Author's italics.

[297] See Madison's Works, vol. ii. p. 499.

[298] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. 319-322.

[299] The italics in this quotation (American State Papers, vol. iii.

p. 300) are introduced by the author, to draw attention to the words

decisive to be noted.

[300] The italics are Smith's. They serve exactly, however, to

illustrate just wherein consists the perverseness of omission (the

words "operation of"), and the misstatement of this remarkable

passage.

[301] Secretary Smith subsequently stated that this sentence was added

by express interposition of the President. (Smith's Address to the

American people.)

[302] Canning in his instructions to Jackson (No. 1, July 1, 1809,

Foreign Office MSS.) wrote: "The United States cannot have _believed_

that such an arrangement as Mr. Erskine consented to accept was

conformable to his instructions. _If_ Mr. Erskine availed himself of

the liberty allowed to him of communicating those instructions in the

affair of the Orders in Council, they must have _known_ that it was

not so." My italics.

[303] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 352.

[304] Writings of James Madison. Published by Order of Congress, 1865.

Vol. ii. p. 439.

[305] Ibid., p. 440. Turreau was the French minister.

[306] Works of Jefferson, vol. v. pp. 442-445.

[307] "When Lord Wellesley's answer speaks of the offence imputed to

Jackson, it does not say he gave no such cause of offence, but simply

relied on his repeated asseverations that he did not mean to offend."

Pinkney to Madison, Aug. 13, 1810. Wheaton's Life of Pinkney, p. 446.

[308] Annals of Congress, 1809-10.

[309] Ibid., January 8, 1810, pp. 1164, 1234.

[310] Ibid., p. 1234.

[311] Annals of Congress, 1809-10, pp. 754, 755.

[312] Ibid., pp. 606, 607.

[313] Annals of Congress, 1810, p. 2582.

[314] For Armstrong's letter and the text of the Decree, see American

State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 384.

[315] Armstrong to Champagny, March 10, 1810. American State Papers,

Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 382.

[316] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 362.

[317] Ibid., p. 385.

[318] Ibid.

[319] The Secretary of State to Armstrong, June 5, 1810. American

State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 385.

[320] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 386.

[321] Ibid., p. 387.

[322] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 364.

[323] Ibid., p. 365.

[324] Jefferson to Madison, April 27, 1809. Works, vol. v. p. 442.

[325] Correspondance de Napoleon. Napoleon to Champagny, July 31, and

August 2, 1810, vol. xx. p. 644, and vol. xxi. p. 1.

[326] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 209.

Author's italics.

[327] Canning to Erskine, Dec. 1, 1807, transmitting the Orders in

Council of November 11. British Foreign Office MSS.

[328] Monroe to Foster, Oct. 1, 1811. American State Papers, Foreign

Relations, vol. iii. p. 445. See also, more particularly, ibid., pp.

440, 441.

[329] U.S. State Department MSS., and State Papers, vol. iii. p. 250.

[330] That is, verbally, before his formal letter of February 23.

[331] Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, vol. x. p. 669. A search

through the correspondence of Canning and Erskine, as well as through

the debates of Parliament upon the Orders in Council, January-April,

1808, reveals nothing confirmatory of the _pari passu_ claim, put

forth in Madison's letters quoted, and afterwards used by Monroe in

his arguments with Foster. But in Canning's instructions to Jackson,

July 1, 1809 (No. 3), appears a sentence which may throw some light on

the apparent misunderstanding. "As to the willingness or ability of

neutral nations to resist the Decrees of France, his Majesty has

always professed ... _a disposition to relax or modify his measures of

retaliation and self-defence in proportion as those of neutral,

nations_ should come in aid of them and take their place." This would

be action _pari passu_ with a neutral; and if the same were expressed

to Erskine, it is far from incredible, in view of his remarkable

action of 1809, that he may have extended it verbally without

authority to cover an act of France. My italics.

[332] Wellesley to Pinkney, Aug. 31, 1810. American State Papers,

Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 366.

[333] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 376.

[334] The American flag was used in this way to cover British

shipping. For instances see American State Papers, Foreign Relations,

vol. iii. p. 342.

[335] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 408.

[336] Author's italics.

[337] Armstrong had sailed for the United States two months before.

[338] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 391.

[339] Russell on November 17 wrote that he had reason to believe that

the revocation of the Decrees had not been notified to the ministers

charged with the execution of them. On December 4 he said that, as the

ordinary practice in seizing a vessel was to hold her sequestered till

the papers were examined in Paris, this might explain why the local

Custom-House was not notified of the repeal. Russell to the Secretary

of State, U.S. State Department MSS.

[340] Langdon Cheves of South Carolina. Annals of Congress, 1810-11,

pp. 885-887.

[341] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 393.

[342] Annals of Congress, 1810-11, p. 990.

[343] Pinkney to the Secretary of State, Jan. 17, 1811. American State

Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 408.

[344] Foster had succeeded as _charge d'affaires_ in May, 1809, by the

departure of Merry, formerly minister to the United States. He was

afterwards appointed minister; but in June, 1810, under pressure from

Bonaparte, Sweden requested him to leave the country.

[345] Pearce, Life and Correspondence of the Marquis Wellesley, vol.

iii. p. 193.

[346] Author's italics.

[347] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 514.

Author's italics.

[348] Ibid., p. 435.

[349] Rodgers to Secretary of the Navy, Aug. 4, 1810. Captains'

Letters.

[350] Bainbridge to the Secretary of the Navy, May 3, 1810. Captains'

Letters. The case was not singular.

[351] Orders of Admiral Sawyer to the Captain of the "Little Belt."

American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 475.

[352] American State Papers, vol. iii. p. 473. In the absence of the

British admiral, the senior officer at Halifax assembled a board of

captains which collected what his letter styles the depositions of the

"Little Belt's" officers. Depositions would imply that the witnesses

were sworn, but it is not so said in the report of the Board, where

they simply "state." In the case of honorable gentlemen history may

give equal credit in either case; but the indication would be that

inquiry was less particular. The Board reports no question by itself;

the "statements" are in the first person, apparently in reply to the

request "tell all you know," and are uninterrupted by comment.

[353] The proceedings of this court are printed in American State

Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. pp. 477-497.

[354] Annals of Congress, 1811-12, p. 890.

[355] Dec. 17, 1811. American State Papers, Naval Affairs, vol. i. p.

247.

[356] Niles' Register, vol. ii. pp. 101-104.

[357] Russell to Monroe, May 30, 1812. U.S. State Department MSS.

[358] Russell to Monroe, August 15 and 21, 1812. U.S. State Department

MSS.

[359] See Jefferson's Works, vol. v. pp. 335, 337, 338, 339, 419,

442-445.

[360] Madison to Russell, Nov. 15, 1811. U.S. State Department MSS.

[361] Russell to Robert Smith, March 15, 1811. U.S. State Department

MSS.

[362] Russell to the Secretary of State, July 15, 1811. Ibid.

[363] Ante, p. 217.

[364] Note dictee en conseil d'Administration du Commerce, April 29,

1811. Correspondance de Napoleon, vol. xxii. p. 144.

[365] Russell to Monroe, July 13, 1811. U.S. State Department MSS.

[366] Russell to J.S. Smith, July 14, 1811. American State Papers,

Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 447.

[367] Russell to Bassano, Aug. 8, 1811. U.S. State Department MSS.

[368] Russell to Robert Smith, April, 1811. Ibid.

[369] Monroe to Russell, June 8, 1811. Ibid.

[370] Reports of the Ministers of Foreign Relations and of War, March

10, 1812. Moniteur, March 16.

[371] Russell to Monroe, April 19, 1812. U.S. State Department MSS.

[372] The copy of this Order in Council which the author is here using

is in the Naval Chronicle, vol. xxvii. p. 466.

[373] This letter, which is given in a very mutilated form in the

American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 602, has been

published in full by the Bureau of Historical Research, Carnegie

Institution, Washington. Report on the Diplomatic Archives of the

Department of State, 1904, p. 64.

[374] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 603.

[375] Barlow's interview with Bassano, and the letters exchanged, will

be found in American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p.

602-603. Russell's denial is on p. 614. Serrurier's is mentioned in a

Report made to the House by Monroe, Secretary of State, ibid., p. 609.

[376] Barlow to Russell, May 10, 1812. U.S. State Department MSS.

[377] Russell to Monroe, May 9, 1812. Ibid.

[378] The passages cited above are from Russell's correspondence with

the State Department, under the dates of January 10, February 3 and

19, March 4 and 20, 1812. U.S. State Department MSS.

[379] Russell to Monroe, May 9, 1812. U.S. State Department MSS.

[380] Barlow to Monroe, March 15, 1812. Ibid. Published by Bureau of

Historical Research, Carnegie Institution, 1904, p. 63.

[381] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 433.

Author's italics.

[382] Russell to Monroe, June 30, 1812. U.S. State Department MSS.

[383] Russell to Monroe, June 30, 1812. U.S. State Department MSS.

[384] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 405.

[385] Ante, p. 106.

[386] To John Taylor, Sept. 10, 1810. Works of James Monroe, vol. vi.

p. 128.

[387] Monroe to Jefferson, Monroe's Works, vol. v. p. 268.

[388] Annals of Congress, 1811-12, p. 2046.

[Illustration: THEATRE OF LAND AND COAST WARFARE]