Under these circumstances the blow glanced from the British dominions.

At the first announcement of the embargo, prices of provisions and

lumber rose heavily in the West Indies; but reaction set in, as the

leaks in the dam became manifest and copious. The British Government

fostered the rebellious evasions of American citizens by a

proclamation, issued April 11, directing commanders of cruisers not to

interrupt any neutral vessel laden with provisions or lumber, going to

the West Indies; no matter to whom the property belonged, nor whether

the vessel had any clearance, or papers of any kind. A principal

method of eluding the embargo, Gallatin informed Jefferson, was by

loading secretly and going off without clearing. "Evasions are chiefly

effected by vessels going coastwise."[247] The two methods were not

incompatible. Besides the sea-going vessels already mentioned as lying

in New York alone, there were there over four hundred coasters. It was

impossible to watch so many. The ridiculous gunboats, identified with

this Administration, derisively nicknamed "Jeffs"[248] by the

unbelieving, were called into service to arrest the evil; but neither

their numbers nor their qualities fitted them to cope with the

ubiquity and speed of their nimble opponents. "The larger part of our

gunboats," wrote Commodore Shaw[249] from New Orleans, "are well known

to be dull sailers." "For enforcing the embargo," said Secretary

Gallatin, "gunboats are better calculated as a stationary force, and

for the purpose of stopping vessels in certain places, than for

pursuit."[250] A double bond was a mockery, when in West Indian ports

the cargo was worth from four to eight times what it was at the place

of loading. These were the palmier days of the embargo breakers; the

ease and frequency with which they escaped soon brought prices down.

Randolph, in the House, asserted that in the first four months of

embargo one hundred thousand barrels of flour had been shipped from

Baltimore alone; and the West India planters, besides opening new

sources of supply, devoted part of their ground to raising food. They

thus turned farmer, after the Jefferson ideal, supporting themselves

off their own grounds; an economical error, for sugar was their better

crop, but unavoidable in the circumstances. With all this, the

difficulty in the way of exportation so cheapened articles in the

United States as to maintain a considerable disproportion in prices

there and abroad, which kept alive the spirit of speculation, and

maintained the opportunity of large profits,[251] at the same time

that it distressed the American grower.

Upon the whole, after making allowance for the boasts which succeeded

the first fright in the West Indies, the indications seem to be that

they escaped much better than had been expected, either by themselves

or by the American Government. Just before adjourning, Congress had

passed a supplementary measure, which, besides drawing restrictions

tighter, authorized the President to license vessels to go abroad in

ballast, in order to bring home property belonging to American

citizens. These dispersed in various directions, and in very large

numbers.[252] Many doubtless remained away; but those which returned

brought constant confirmation of the numerous American shipping in

the various ports of the West Indies, and the general abundance of

American produce. A letter from Havana, September 12, said: "We have

nearly one hundred American vessels in port. Three weeks ago there

were but four or five. If the property, for which these vessels were

ostensibly despatched, had been really here, why have they been so

long delayed? The truth is, the property is not here. A host of people

have been let loose, who could not possibly have had any other motive

than procuring freight and passengers from merchants of this country,

or from the French, who are supposed to be going off with their

property [in consequence of the Spanish outbreak]. The vast number of

evasions and smugglers which the embargo has created is surprising.

For some days after the last influx of American vessels, the quays and

custom-house were every morning covered with all kinds of provisions,

which had been landed during the preceding night."[253]

To Quebec and Halifax the embargo was a positive boon, from the

diversion upon them of smuggling enterprise, by the lakes and by land,

or by coasters too small to make the direct voyage to the West Indies.

In consequence of the embargo, these towns became an _entrepot_ of

commerce, such as the Orders in Council were designed to make the

British Islands. There was, of course, a return trade, through them,

of British manufactures smuggled into the United States. These imports

seem to have exceeded the exports by the same route. A New Bedford

town meeting, in August, affirmed that gold was already at a premium,

from the facility with which it was transported through the country,

and across the frontier, in payment of purchases.[254] At the end of

the summer one hundred and fifty vessels were despatched from Quebec

with full cargoes, and it may be believed they had not arrived empty.

"From a Canada price current now before us, it will be seen that since

the embargo was laid the single port of Quebec has done more foreign

business than the whole United States. In less than eleven months

there cleared thence three hundred and thirty-four vessels."[255] An

American merchant visiting Halifax wrote home: "Our embargo is an

excellent thing for this place. Every inhabitant of Nova Scotia is

exceedingly desirous of its continuance, as it will be the making of

their fortunes."[256] Independent of the _entrepot_ profit, the

British provinces themselves produced several of the articles which

figured largely among the exports of the middle and eastern states;

not to the extent imagined by Sheffield, sufficient to supply the West

Indies, but, in the artificial scarcity caused by the embargo, the

enhanced prices redounded directly to their advantage. Sir George

Prevost, governor of Nova Scotia, summed up the experience of the year

by saying that "the embargo has totally failed. New sources have been

resorted to with success to supply deficiencies produced by so sudden

an interruption of commerce, and the vast increase of export and

import of this province proves that the embargo is a measure well

adapted to promote the true interests of his Majesty's American

colonies."[257]

Upon the British Islands themselves the injury was more appreciable

and conspicuous. It was, moreover, in the direction expected by

Jefferson and his supporters. The supply of cotton nearly ceased. Mr.

Baring, March 6, 1809, said in the House of Commons that raw material

had become so scarce and so high, that in many places it could not be

procured. "In Manchester during the greatest part of the past year,

only nine cotton mills were in full employment; about thirty-one at

half work, and forty-four without any at all."[258] Flaxseed,

essential to the Irish linen manufactures, and of which three fourths

came from America, had risen from L2-1/2 to L23 the quarter.[259] The

exports for the year 1808 had fallen fifteen per cent; the imports the

same amount, involving a total diminution in trade of L14,000,000. An

increase of distress was manifested in the poor rates. In Manchester

they had risen from L24,000 to L49,000. On the other hand, the harvest

for the year, contrary to first anticipation, had been very good; and,

in part compensation for intercourse with the United States, there was

the opening of Spain, Portugal, and their extensive colonies, the

effect of which was scarcely yet fully felt.

There was, besides, the relief of American competition in the carrying

trade. This was a singularly noteworthy effect of the embargo; for

this industry was particularly adverse to United States navigation,

and particularly benefited by the locking up of American shipping. On

April 28, 1808, there was not in Liverpool a vessel from Boston or New

York.[260] The year before, four hundred and eighty-nine had entered,

paying a tonnage duty of L36,960.[261] In Bristol at the same time

there were only ten Americans. In consequence of the loss of so much

tonnage, "those who have anything to do with vessels for freight or

charter are absolutely insolent in their demands. For a ship of 330

tons from this to St. Petersburg and back L3,300 have been paid;

L2,000 for a ship of 199 tons to Lisbon and back."[262] At the end of

August, in Liverpool, the value of British shipping had increased

rapidly, and vessels which had long been laid up found profitable

employment at enormous freights.[263]

Thus, while the effect of the embargo doubtless was to raise prices of

American goods in England, it stopped American competition with the

British carrying trade, especially in West India produce. This

occurred also at the time when the revolt of Spain opened to British

navigation the colonies from which Americans hitherto had been the

chief carriers. The same event had further relieved British shipping

by the almost total destruction of French privateering, thenceforth

banished from its former ports of support in the Caribbean. From all

these causes, the appreciation quoted from a London letter of

September 5 seems probably accurate. "The continuance of the embargo

is not as yet felt in any degree adequate to make a deep impression on

the public mind.... Except with those directly interested [merchants

in the American trade], the dispute with the United States seems

almost forgotten, or remembered only to draw forth ironical gratitude,

that the kind embargo leaves the golden harvest to be reaped by

British enterprise alone."[264]

Upon the whole, through silent popular resistance, and the concurrence

of the Spanish revolution, the United States by cutting its own throat

underwent more distress than it inflicted upon the enemy. Besides the

widespread individual suffering,[265] already mentioned, the national

revenue, dependent almost wholly on customs, shrank with the imports.

Despite the relief afforded by cargoes bound home when the embargo

passed, and the permits issued to bring in American property abroad,

the income from this source sank from over $16,000,000 to

$8,400,000.[266] "However dissimilar in some respects," wrote Gallatin

in a public report, "it is not believed that in their effect upon

national wealth and public revenue war and embargo would be materially

different. In case of war, some part of that revenue will remain; but

if embargo and suspension of commerce continue, that which arises from

commerce will entirely disappear."[267] Jefferson nevertheless clung

to the system, even to the end of his life, with a conviction that

defied demonstration. The fundamental error of conception, of course,

was in considering embargo an efficient alternative for war. The

difference between the two measures, regarded coercively, was that

embargo inflicted upon his own people all the loss that war could, yet

spared the opponent that which war might do to him. For the United

States, war would have meant, and when it came did mean, embargo, and

little more. To Great Britain it would have meant all that the

American embargo could do, plus the additional effort, expense, and

actual loss, attendant upon the increased exposure of her maritime

commerce, and its protection against active and numerous foes,

singularly well fitted for annoyance by their qualities and situation.

War and embargo, combined, with Napoleon in the plenitude of his

power, as he was in 1808, would sorely have tried the enemy; even when

it came, amid the Emperor's falling fortunes, the strain was severe.

But Jefferson's lack of appreciation for maritime matters, his dislike

to the navy, and the weakness to which he had systematically reduced

it, prevented his realizing the advantages of war over embargo, as a

measure of coercion. To this contributed also his conviction of the

exposure of Canada to offensive operations, which was just, though

fatally vitiated by an unfounded confidence in untrained troops, or

militia summoned from their farms. Neither was there among his

advisers any to correct his views; rather they had imbibed their own

from him, and their utterances in debate betray radical

misapprehension of military considerations.

Among the incidents attendant upon the embargo was the continuance

abroad of a number of American vessels, which were there at the

passage of the Act. They remained, willing exiles, to share the

constant employment and large freights which the sudden withdrawal of

their compatriots had opened to British navigation. They were

doubtless joined by many of those which received permission to sail in

quest of American property. One flagrant instance of such abuse of

privilege turned up at Leghorn, with a load of tropical produce;[268]

and the comments above quoted from an Havana letter doubtless depended

upon that current acquaintance with facts which men in the midst of

affairs pick up. It was against this class of traders specifically

that Napoleon launched the Bayonne Decree, April 17, 1808. Being

abroad contrary to the law of the United States, he argued, was a

clear indication that they were not American, but British in

disguise. This they were not; but they were carrying on trade under

the Orders in Council, and often under British convoy.[269] The fact

was noteworthy, as bearing upon the contention of the United States

Government soon after, that the Non-Intercourse Law was adequate

security for the action of American merchant vessels; a grotesque

absurdity, in view of the embargo experiences. That it is not

consonant with national self-esteem to accept foreign assistance to

carry out national laws is undeniable; but it is a step further to

expect another nation to accept, as assured, the efficiency of an

authority notoriously and continually violated by its own subjects.

Under the general conditions named, the year 1808 wore on to its

close. Both the British Orders in Council and the Decrees of the

French Emperor continued in force and received execution;[270] but so

far as the United States was concerned their effect was much limited,

the embargo retaining at home the greater part of the nation's

shipping. The vessels which had remained abroad, and still more those

which escaped by violation of the law, or abuse of the permission to

sail unloaded to bring back American property, for the most part

purchased immunity by acquiescence in the British Orders. They

accepted British licenses, and British convoy also, where expedient.

It was stated in Congress that, of those which went to sea under

permission, comparatively few were interrupted by British

cruisers.[271] Napoleon's condemnations went on apace, and in the

matter of loss,--waiving questions of principle,--were at this moment

a more serious grievance than the British Orders. Nor could it be said

that the grounds upon which he based his action were less arbitrary or

unjust. The Orders in Council condemned a vessel for sailing for an

enemy's port, because constructively blockaded--a matter as to which

at least choice was free; the Milan Decree condemned because visited

by a British cruiser, to avoid which a merchant ship was powerless.

The American brig "Vengeance" sailed from Norfolk before the embargo

was laid, for Bilboa, then a port in alliance with France. On the

passage the British frigate "Iris" boarded her, and indorsed on her

papers that, in accordance with the orders of November 11, she must

not proceed. That night the "Vengeance" gave the cruiser the slip, and

pursued her course. She was captured off Bilboa by a French vessel,

sent in as a prize, and condemned because of the frigate's visit.[272]

This case is notable because of the pure application of a single

principle, not obscured by other incidental circumstances, as often

happens. The brig "George", equally bound to Bilboa, after visitation

by a British vessel had been to Falmouth, and there received a British

license to go to her destination. She was condemned for three

offenses: the visit, the entrance to Falmouth, and the license.[272a]

These cases were far from isolated, and quite as flagrant as anything

done by Great Britain; but, while not overlooked, nor unresented, by

the supporters of the embargo, there was not evident in the debates of

Congress any such depth of feeling as was aroused by the British

measures. As was said by Mr. Bayard, an Opposition Senator, "It may be

from the habit of enduring, but we do not feel an aggression from

France with the same quickness and sensibility that we do from

England."[273]

Throughout the year 1808, the embargo was maintained by the

Administration with as much vigor as was possible to the nature of the

administrator, profoundly interested in the success of a favorite

measure. Congress had supplemented the brief original Act by a

prohibition of all intercourse with foreign territories by land, as

well as by sea. This was levelled at the Florida and Canada frontiers.

Authority had been given also for the absolute detention of all

vessels bound coastwise, if with cargoes exciting suspicion of

intention to evade the laws. Part of the small navy was sent to

cruise off the coast, and the gunboats were distributed among the

maritime districts, to intercept and to enforce submission. Steps were

taken to build vessels on Lakes Ontario and Champlain; for, in the

undeveloped condition of the road systems, these sheets of water were

principal means of transportation, after snow left the ground. To the

embargo the Navy owed the brig "Oneida", the most formidable vessel on

Ontario when war came. All this restrictive service was of course

extremely unpopular with the inhabitants; or at least with that

active, assertive element, which is foremost in pushing local

advantages, and directs popular sentiment. Nor did feeling in all

cases refrain from action. April 19, the President had to issue a

proclamation against combinations to defy the law in the country about

Champlain. The collector at Passamaquoddy wrote that, with upwards of

a hundred vessels in port, he was powerless; and the mob threatened to

burn his house.[274] A Kennebec paper doubted whether civil society

could hang together much longer. There were few places in the region

where it was safe for civil officers to execute the laws.[274a] Troops

and revenue vessels were despatched to the chief centres of

disturbance; but, while occasional rencounters occurred, attended at

times with bloodshed, and some captures of smuggled goods were

effected, the weak arm of the Government was practically powerless

against universal connivance in the disaffected districts. Smuggling

still continued to a large extent, and was very profitable; while the

determination of the smugglers assumed the character commonly styled

desperate.

Such conditions, with a falling revenue, and an Opposition strong in

sectional support, confronted the supporters of the Administration

when Congress again met in November. Confident that embargo was an

efficient coercive weapon, if relentlessly wielded, the President

wished more searching enactments, and power for more extensive and

vigorous enforcement. This Congress proceeded to grant. Additional

revenue cutters were authorized; and after long debate was passed an

Act for the Enforcement of the Embargo, approved January 9, 1809.[275]

The details of this law were derived from a letter[276] addressed to a

Committee of Congress by Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, upon

whom the administration of the embargo system chiefly fell. The two

principal difficulties so far encountered were the evasions of vessels

bound coastwise, and departure without clearance. "The infractions

thus practised threaten to prostrate the law and the Government

itself." Even to take cargo on board should not be permitted, without

authorization from the collector of the district. "The great number of

vessels now laden and in a state of readiness to depart shows the

necessity of this provision."

It was therefore enacted that no vessel, coasting or registered,

should load, without first having obtained permission from the

custom-house, and given bond, in six times the value of the cargo,

that she would not depart without a clearance, nor after clearing go

to any foreign port, or transfer her lading to any other vessel. The

loading was to be under the inspection of revenue officers. Ships

already loaded, when notice of the Act was received, must unload or

give bonds. Further to insure compliance, vessels bound coastwise

must, within two months after sailing, deposit with the collector at

the port of clearance a certificate from the collector at the port of

destination, that they had arrived there. If going to New Orleans from

the Atlantic coast, four months were allowed for this formality.

Failing this, proof of total loss at sea would alone relieve the

bond. "Neither capture, distress, nor any other accident, shall be

pleaded or given in evidence." Collectors were empowered to take into

custody specie and goods, whether on vessels or land vehicles, when

there was reason to believe them intended for exportation; and

authority was given to employ the army and navy, and the militia, for

carrying out this and the other embargo legislation. A further

provision of thirty armed vessels, to stop trade, was made by this

Congress; which otherwise, like its predecessors and successors, was

perfectly faithful to the party tradition not to protect trade, or

seek peace, by providing a navy.

All this was sitting on the safety valve. However unflattering to

national self-esteem it might be to see national legislation

universally disregarded, the leakage of steam by evasion had made the

tension bearable. The Act also opened to a number of subaltern

executive officers, of uncertain discretion, an opportunity for

arbitrary and capricious action, to which the people of the United

States were unaccustomed. Already a justice of a circuit court had

decided in opposition to instructions issued by the President himself.

The new legislation was followed by an explosion of popular wrath and

street demonstrations. These were most marked in the Eastern states,

where the opposition party and the shipping interest were strongest.

Feeling was the more bitter, because the revolt of Spain, and the

deliverance of Portugal, had exempted those nations and their

extensive colonies from the operation of the British Orders in

Council, had paralyzed in many of their ports the edicts of Napoleon,

and so had extended widely the field safe for neutral commerce. It was

evident also that, while the peninsula everywhere was the scene of

war, it could not feed itself; nor could supplies for the population,

or for the British armies there, come from England, often narrowly

pressed herself for grain. Cadiz was open on August 26; all neutrals

admitted, and the British blockade raised. Through that portal and

Lisbon might flow a golden tide for American farmers and shipmen. The

town meetings of New England again displayed the power for prompt

political agitation which so impressed the imagination of Jefferson.

The Governor of Connecticut refused, on constitutional grounds, to

comply with the President's request to detail officers of militia, to

whom collectors could apply when needing assistance to enforce the

laws. The attitude of the Eastern people generally was that of mutiny;

and it became evident that it could only be repressed by violence, and

with danger to the Union.

Congress was not prepared to run this risk. On February 8, less than a

month after the Enforcement Act became law, its principal supporter in

the Senate[277] introduced a resolution for the partial repeal of the

Embargo Act. "This is not of my choice," he said, "nor is the step one

by which I could wish that my responsibility should be tested. It is

the offspring of conciliation, and of great concession on my part. On

one point we are agreed,--resistance to foreign aggressions. The

points of difficulty to be adjusted,--and compromised,--relate to the

extent of that resistance and the mode of its application. In my

judgment, if public sentiment could be brought to support them, wisdom

would dictate the combined measures of embargo, non-intercourse, and

war. Sir, when the love of peace degenerates into fear of war, it

becomes of all passions the most despicable." It was not the first

time the word "War" had been spoken, but the occasion made it doubly

significant and ominous; for it was the requiem of the measure upon

which the dominant party had staked all to avoid war, and the

elections had already declared that power should remain in the same

hands for at least two years to come. Within four weeks Madison was

to succeed his leader, Jefferson; with a Congressional majority,

reduced indeed, but still adequate.

The debate over the new measure, known as the Non-Intercourse Act, was

prolonged and heated, abounding in recriminations, ranging over the

whole gamut of foreign injuries and domestic misdoings, whether by

Government policy or rebellious action; but clearer and clearer the

demand for war was heard, through and above the din. "When the late

intelligence from the northeast reached us," said an emotional

follower of the Administration,[278] "it bore a character most

distressful to every man who valued the integrity of the Government.

Choosing not to enforce the law with the bayonet, I thought proper to

acknowledge to the House that I was ready to abandon the embargo....

The excitement in the East renders it necessary that we should enforce

it by the bayonet, or repeal. I will repeal, and could weep over it

more than over a lost child." There was, he said, nothing now but war.

"The very men who now set your laws at defiance," cried another, "will

be against you if you go to war;" but he added, "I will never let go

the embargo, unless on the very same day on which we let it go, we

draw the sword."[279]

Josiah Quincy, an extremist on the other side, gave a definition of

the position of Massachusetts, which from his ability, and his known

previous course on national questions, is particularly valuable. In

the light of the past, and of what was then future, it may be

considered to embody the most accurate summary of the views prevailing

in New England, from the time of the "Chesapeake" affair to the war.

He "wished a negotiation to be opened, unshackled with the impedimenta

which now exist. As long as they remained, people in the part of the

country whence he came would not deem an unsuccessful attempt at

negotiation cause for war. If they were removed, and an earnest

attempt at negotiation made, unimpeded by these restrictions, and

should not meet with success, they would join heartily in a war. They

would not, however, go to war to contest the right of Great Britain to

search American vessels for British seamen; for it was the general

opinion with them that, if American seamen were encouraged, there

would be no need for the employment of foreign seamen."[280] Quincy

therefore condemned the retaliatory temper of the Administration, as

shown in the "Chesapeake" incident by the proclamation excluding

British ships of war, and in the embargo as a reply to the Orders in

Council. The oppression of American trade, culminating in the Orders,

was a just cause of war; but war was not expedient before a further

attempt at negotiation, favored by a withdrawal of all retaliatory

acts. He was willing to concede the exercise of British authority on

board American merchantmen on the high seas.

In the main these were the coincident opinions of Monroe, although a

Virginian and identified with the opposite party. At this time he

wrote to Jefferson privately, urging a special mission, for which he

offered his services. "Our affairs are evidently at a pause, and the

next step to be taken, without an unexpected change, seems likely to

be the commencement of war with both France and Great Britain, unless

some expedient consistent with the honor of the Government and Country

is adopted to prevent it." To Jefferson's rejection of the proposition

he replied: "I have not the hope you seem still to entertain that our

differences with either Power will be accommodated under existing

arrangements. The embargo was not likely to accomplish the desired

effect, if it did not produce it under the first impression....

Without evidence of firm and strong union at home, nothing favorable

to us can be expected abroad, and from the symptoms in the Eastern

states there is much cause to fear that tranquillity cannot be secured

at present by adherence only to the measures which have heretofore

been pursued."[281] Monroe had already[282] expressed the opinion--not

to Jefferson, who had refused to ratify, but to a common

intimate--that had the treaty of December 31, 1806, signed by himself

and Pinkney, been accepted by the Administration, none of the

subsequent troubles with France and Great Britain would have ensued;

that not till the failure of accommodation with Great Britain became

known abroad was there placed upon the Berlin Decree that stricter

interpretation which elicited the Orders in Council, whence in due

sequence the embargo, the Eastern commotions, and the present alarming

outlook. In principle, Quincy and Monroe differed on the impressment

question, but in practical adjustment there was no serious divergence.

In other points they stood substantially together.

Under the combined influences indicated by the expressions quoted,

Congress receded rapidly from the extreme measures of domestic

regulation embodied in the various Embargo Acts and culminating in that

of January 9. The substitute adopted was pronouncedly of the character

of foreign policy, and assumed distinctly and unequivocally the hostile

form of retaliation upon the two countries under the decrees of which

American commerce was suffering. It foreshadowed the general line of

action followed by the approaching new Administration, with whose

views and purposes it doubtless coincided. Passed in the House on

February 27, 1809, it was to go into effect May 20, after which date

the ports of the United States were forbidden to the ships of war of

both France and Great Britain, except in cases of distress, or of

vessels bearing despatches. Merchant vessels of the two countries were

similarly excluded, with a provision for seizure, if entering.

Importation from any part of the dominions of those states was

prohibited, as also that of any merchandise therein produced. Under

these conditions, and with these exceptions, the embargo was to stand

repealed from March 15 following; but American and other merchant

vessels, sailing after the Act went into operation, were to be under

bonds not to proceed to any port of Great Britain or France, nor during

absence to engage in any trade, direct or indirect, with such port.

From the general character of these interdictions, stopping both

navigation and commerce between the United States and the countries

proscribed, this measure was commonly called the Non-Intercourse Act.

Its stormy passage through the House was marked by a number of

amendments and proposed substitutes, noticeable principally as

indicative of the growth of warlike temper among Southern members.

There were embodied with the bill the administrative and police clauses

necessary for its enforcement. Finally, as a weapon of negotiation in

the hands of the Government, there was a provision, corresponding to

one in the original Embargo Act, that in case either France or Great

Britain should so modify its measures as to cease to violate the

neutral commerce of the United States, the President was authorized to

proclaim the fact, after which trade with that country might be

renewed. In this shape the bill was returned to the Senate, which

concurred February 28. Next day it became law, by the President's

signature.

The Enforcement Act and the Non-Intercourse Act, taken together and in

their rapid sequence, symbolize the death struggle between Jefferson's

ideal of peaceful commercial restriction, unmitigated and protracted,

in the power of which he had absolute faith, and the views of those to

whom it was simply a means of diplomatic pressure, temporary, and

antecedent to war. Napoleon himself was not more ruthless than

Jefferson in his desired application of commercial prohibition. Not so

his party, in its entirety. The leading provisions of the

Non-Intercourse Act, by partially opening the door and so facilitating

abundant evasion, traversed Jefferson's plan. It was antecedently

notorious that their effect, as regarded Great Britain, would be to

renew trade with her by means of intermediary ports. Yet that they

were features in the policy of the men about to become prominent under

the coming Administration was known to Canning some time before the

resolution was introduced by Giles; before the Enforcement Act even

could reach England. Though hastened by the outburst in New England,

the policy of the Non-Intercourse Act was conceived before the

collapse of Jefferson's own measure was seen to be imminent.

On January 18 and 22 Canning, in informal conversations with Pinkney,

had expressed his satisfaction at proceedings in Congress, recently

become known, looking to the exclusion of French ships equally with

British, and to the extension of non-importation legislation to France

as well as Great Britain.[283] He thought that such measures might

open the way to a withdrawal of the Orders in Council, by enabling the

British Government to entertain the overture, made by Pinkney August

23, under instructions, that the President would suspend the embargo,

if the British Government would repeal its orders. This he conceived

could not be done, consistently with self-respect, so long as there

was inequality of treatment. In these anticipations he was encouraged

by representations concerning the attitude of Madison and some

intended members of his Cabinet, made to him by Erskine, the British

Minister in Washington, who throughout seems to have cherished an

ardent desire to reconcile differences which interfered with his just

appreciation even of written words,--much more of spoken.

In the interview of the 22d Pinkney confined himself to saying

everything "which I thought consistent with candor and discretion to

confirm him in his dispositions." He suggested that the whole matter

ought to be settled at Washington, and "that it would be well (in case

a special mission did not meet their approbation) that the necessary

powers should be sent to Mr. Erskine."[284] He added, "I offered my

intervention for the purpose of guarding them against deficiencies in

these powers."[285] The remark is noteworthy, for it shows Pinkney's

sense that Erskine's mere letter of credence as Minister Resident, not

supplemented by full powers for the special transaction, was

inadequate to a binding settlement of such important matters. In the

sequel the American Administration did not demand of Erskine the

production either of special powers or of the text of his

instructions; a routine formality which would have forestalled the

mortifying error into which it was betrayed by precipitancy, and which

became the occasion of a breach with Erskine's successor.

The day after his interview with Pinkney, Canning sent Erskine

instructions,[286] the starting-point of which was that the Orders in

Council must be maintained, unless their object could be otherwise

accomplished. Assuming, as an indispensable preliminary to any

negotiation, that equality of treatment between British and French

ships and merchandise would have been established, he said he

understood further from Erskine's reports of conversations that the

leading men in the new Administration would be prepared to agree to

three conditions: 1. That, contemporaneously with the withdrawal of

the Orders of January 7 and November 11, there would be a removal of

the restrictions upon British ships and merchandise, leaving in force

those against French. 2. The claim, to carry on with enemies' colonies

a trade not permitted in peace, would be abandoned for this war. 3.

Great Britain should be at liberty to secure the operation of the

Non-Intercourse measures, still in effect against France, by the

action of the British Navy, which should be authorized to capture

American vessels seeking to enter ports forbidden them by the

Non-Intercourse Act. Canning justly remarked that otherwise

Non-Intercourse would be nugatory; there would be nothing to prevent

Americans from clearing for England or Spain and going to Holland or

France. This was perfectly true. Not only had a year's experience of

the embargo so demonstrated, but a twelvemonth later[287] Gallatin had

to admit that "the summary of destinations of these exports, being

grounded on clearances, cannot be relied on under existing

circumstances. Thus, all the vessels actually destined for the

dominions of Great Britain, which left the United States between April

19 and June 10, 1809, cleared for other ports; principally, it is

believed, for Sweden." Nevertheless, the proposition that a foreign

state should enforce national laws, because the United States herself

could not, was saved from being an insult only by the belief,

extracted by Canning from Erskine's report of conversations, that

Madison, or his associates, had committed themselves to such an

arrangement. He added that Pinkney "recently (but for the first time)"

had expressed an opinion to the same effect.

The British Government would consent to withdraw the Orders in Council

on the conditions cited; and for the purpose of obtaining a distinct

and official recognition of them, Canning authorized Erskine to read

his letter _in extenso_ to the American Government. Had this been

done, as the three concessions were a _sine qua non_, the

misunderstanding on which the despatch was based would have been at

once exposed; and while its assumptions and tone could scarcely have

failed to give offence, there would have been saved the successive

emotions of satisfaction and disappointment which swept over the

United States, leaving bitterness worse than before. Instead of

communicating Canning's letter, Erskine, after ascertaining that the

conditions would not be accepted, sent in a paraphrase of his own,

dated April 18,[288] in which he made no mention of the three

stipulations, but announced that, in consequence of the impartial

attitude resulting from the Non-Intercourse Act, his Majesty would

send a special envoy to conclude a treaty on all points of the

relations between the two countries, and meanwhile would be willing to

withdraw the Orders of January 7 and November 11, so far as affecting

the United States, in the persuasion that the President would issue

the proclamation restoring intercourse. This advance was welcomed, the

assurance of revocation given, and the next day Erskine wrote that he

was "authorized to declare that the Orders will have been withdrawn as

respects the United States on the 10th day of June next." The same

day, by apparent preconcertment, in accordance with Canning's

requirement that the two acts should be coincident, Madison issued

his proclamation, announcing the fact of the future withdrawal, and

that trade between the United States and Great Britain might be

renewed on June 10.

Erskine's proceeding was disavowed instantly by the British

Government, and himself recalled. A series of unpleasant explanations

followed between him and the members of the American Government,[289]

astonished by the interpretation placed upon their words, as shown in

Canning's despatch. Canning also had to admit that he had strained

Erskine's words, in reaching his conclusions as to the willingness of

Madison and his advisers to allow the enforcement of the

Non-Intercourse Act by British cruisers;[290] while Pinkney entirely

disclaimed intending any such opinion as Canning imagined him to have

expressed.[291] The British Secretary was further irritated by the

tone of the American replies to Erskine's notes; but he "forbore to

trouble"[292] Pinkney with any comment upon them. That would be made

through Erskine's successor; an unhappy decision, as it proved. No

explanation of the disavowal was given; but the instructions sent were

read to Pinkney by Canning, and a letter followed saying that

Erskine's action had been in direct contradiction to them. Things thus

returned to the momentarily interrupted condition of American

Non-Intercourse and British Orders in Council; the British Government

issuing a temporary order for the protection of American vessels which

might have started for the ports of Holland in reliance upon Erskine's

assurances. From America there had been numerous clearances for

England; and it may be believed that there would have been many more

if the transient nature of the opportunity had been foreseen. August

9, Madison issued another proclamation, annulling the former.

While Erskine was conducting his side negotiation, the British

Government had largely modified the scope of the restrictions laid

upon neutral trade. In consequence of the various events which had

altered its relations with European states and their dependencies, the

Orders of November, 1807, were revoked; and for them was substituted a

new one, dated April 26, 1809,[293] similar in principle but much

curtailed in extent. Only the coasts of France itself, of Holland to

its boundary, the River Ems, and those of Italy falling under

Napoleon's own dominion, from Orbitello to Pesaro, were thenceforth to

be subject to "the same restrictions as if actually blockaded."

Further, no permission was given, as in the former Orders, to

communicate with the forbidden ports by first entering one of Great

Britain, paying a transit duty, and obtaining a permit to proceed. In

terms, prohibition was now unqualified; and although it was known that

licenses for intercourse with interdicted harbors were freely issued,

the overt offence of prescribing British channels to neutral

navigation was avoided. Within the area of restriction, "No trade save

through England" was thus converted, in form, to no trade at all. This

narrowing of the constructive blockade system, combined with the

relaxations effected by the Non-Intercourse Act, and with the food

requirements of the Spanish peninsula, did much to revive American

commerce; which, however, did not again before the war regain the fair

proportions of the years preceding the embargo. The discrepancy was

most marked in the re-exportation of foreign tropical produce, sugar

and coffee, a trade dependent wholly upon war conditions, and

affecting chiefly the shipping interest engaged in carrying it. For

this falling off there were several causes. After 1809 the Continental

system was more than ever remorselessly enforced, and it was to the

Continent almost wholly that Americans had carried these articles.

The Spanish colonies were now open to British as well as American

customers; and the last of the French West Indies having passed into

British possession, trade with them was denied to foreigners by the

Navigation Act. In 1807 the value of the colonial produce re-exported

from the United States was $59,643,558; in 1811, $16,022,790. The

exports of domestic productions in the same years were: 1807,

$48,699,592; in 1811, $45,294,043. In connection with these figures,

as significant of political conditions, it is interesting to note that

of the latter sum $18,266,466 went to Spain and Portugal, chiefly to

supply demands created by war. So with tropical produce; out of the

total of $16,022,790, $5,772,572 went to the Peninsula, and an equal

amount to the Baltic, that having become the centre of accumulation,

from which subsequent distribution was made to the Continent in

elusion of the Continental System. The increasing poverty of the

Continent, also, under Napoleon's merciless suppression of foreign

commerce, greatly lessened the purchasing power of the inhabitants.

The great colonial trade had wasted under the combined action of

British Orders and French Decrees, supplemented by changes in

political relations. The remote extremities of the Baltic lands and

the Spanish peninsula now alone sustained its drooping life.

Coincident with Erskine's recall had been the appointment of his

successor, Mr. Francis J. Jackson, who took with him not only the

usual credentials, but also full powers for concluding a treaty or

convention.[294] He departed for his post under the impulse of the

emotions and comments excited by the manner and terms in which

Erskine's advances had been met, with which Canning had forborne to

trouble Pinkney. Upon his arrival in Washington, disappointment was

expressed that he had no authority to give any explanations of the

reasons why his Government had disavowed arrangements, entered into by

Erskine, concerning not only the withdrawal of the Orders in

Council,--as touching the United States,--but also the reparation for

the "Chesapeake" business. This Erskine had offered and concluded,

coincidently with the revocation of the Orders, though not in

connection with it; but in both instances his action was disapproved

by his Government. After two verbal conferences, held within a week of

Jackson's arrival, the Secretary of State, Mr. Robert Smith, notified

him on October 9 that it was thought expedient, for the present

occasion, that further communication on this matter should be in

writing. There followed an exchange of letters, which in such

circumstances passed necessarily under the eyes of President Madison,

who for the eight preceding years had held Smith's present office.

This correspondence[295] presents an interesting exhibition of

diplomatic fencing; but beyond the discussion, pro and con, of the

matters in original and continuous dispute between the two countries,

the issue turned upon the question whether the United States had

received the explanation due to it,--in right and courtesy,--of the

reasons for disavowing Erskine's agreements. Smith maintained it had

not. Jackson rejoined that sufficient explanation had been given by

the terms of Canning's letter of May 27 to Pinkney, announcing that

Erskine had been recalled because he had acted in direct contradiction

to his instructions; an allegation sustained by reading to the

American minister the instructions themselves. In advancing this

argument, Jackson stated also that Canning's three conditions had been

made known by Erskine to the American Government, which, in declining

to admit them, had suggested substitutes finally accepted by Erskine;

so that the United States understood that the arrangement was reached

on another basis than that laid down by Canning. This assertion he

drew from the expressions of Erskine in a letter to Canning, after the

disavowal. Smith replied that Erskine, while not showing the despatch,

had stated the three stipulations; that they had been rejected; and

that the subsequent arrangement had been understood to be with a

minister fully competent to recede from his first demand and to accept

other conditions. Distinctly he affirmed, that the United States

Government did not know, at any time during the discussion preceding

the agreement, that Erskine's powers were limited by the conditions in

the text of his instructions, afterwards published. That he had no

others, "is now for the first time made known to this Government," by

Jackson's declaration.

[Illustration: JAMES MADISON

From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in Bowdoin College,

Brunswick, Me.]

Jackson had come prepared to maintain, not only the British

contention, but the note set by Canning for British diplomatic

correspondence. He was conscious too of opposing material force to

argument, and had but recently been amid the scenes at Copenhagen,

which had illustrated Nelson's maxim that a fleet of ships of the line

were the best negotiators in Europe. The position has its advantages,

but also its dangers, when the field of warfare is that of words, not

deeds; and in Madison, who superintended the American case, he was

unequally matched with an adversary whose natural dialectical ability

had been tempered and sharpened in many campaigns. There is

noticeable, too, on the American side, a labored effort at acuteness

of discrimination, an adroitness to exaggerate shades of difference

practically imperceptible, and an aptitude to give and take offence,

not so evident under the preceding Administration. These suggest

irresistibly the absence, over Madison the President, of a moderating

hand, which had been held over Madison the Secretary of State. It may

be due also to the fact that both the President and his Cabinet were

somewhat less indisposed to war than his predecessor had been.

In his answer to Smith Jackson reiterated, what Smith had admitted,

that Erskine had made known the three conditions. He added, "No

stronger illustration of the deviation from them which occurred can be

given than by a reference to the terms of the agreement." As an

incidental comment, supporting the contention that Erskine's departure

from his sole authority was so decisive as to be a sufficient

explanation for the disavowal of his procedure, the words were

admissible; so much so as to invite the suspicion that the opponent,

who had complained of the want of such explanation, felt the touch of

the foil, and somewhat lost temper. Whatever impression of an

insinuation the phrase may have conveyed should have been wholly

removed by the further expression, in close sequence, "You are already

acquainted with the instruction given; and _I have had_[296] the honor

of informing you it was the only one." Smith's knowledge that

Erskine's powers were limited to the one document is here attributed

explicitly to Jackson. The Secretary (or President) saw fit not to

recognize this, but took occasion to administer a severe rebuke, which

doubtless the general tone of Jackson's letter tended to provoke. "I

abstain, sir, from making any particular animadversions on several

irrelevant and improper allusions in your letter.... But it would be

improper to conclude the few observations to which I purposely limit

myself, without adverting to your repetition of a language implying a

knowledge, on the part of this Government, that the instructions of

your predecessor did not authorize the arrangement formed by him.

After the explicit and peremptory asseveration that this Government

had no such knowledge, and that with such a knowledge no such

arrangement would have been entered into, the view which you have

again presented of the subject makes it my duty to apprise you that

such insinuations are inadmissible in the intercourse of a foreign

minister with a Government that understands what it owes to itself."

Whatever may be thought of the construction placed upon Jackson's

words by his opponent, this thrust should have made him look to his

footing; but arrogance and temper carried the day, and laid him open

to the fatal return which he received. By drawing attention to the

qualifying phrase, he could have shown that he had been misunderstood,

but he practically accepted the interpretation; for, instead of

repelling it, he replied: "In my correspondence with you I have

carefully avoided drawing conclusions that did not necessarily follow

from the premises advanced by me, and least of all should I think of

uttering an insinuation where I was unable to substantiate a fact. To

facts, such as I have become acquainted with them, I have scrupulously

adhered, and in so doing I must continue, whenever the good faith of

his Majesty's Government is called in question," etc. To this outburst

the reply was: "You have used language which cannot but be understood

as reiterating, and even aggravating, the same gross insinuation. It

only remains, in order to preclude opportunities which are thus

abused, to inform you that no further communications will be received

from you, and that the necessity for this determination will, without

delay, be made known to your Government." Jackson thereupon quitted

Washington for New York, leaving a _charge d'affaires_ for transacting

current business.

Before leaving the city, however, Jackson, through the channel of the

_charge_, made a statement to the Secretary of State. In this he

alleged that the facts which he considered it his duty to state, and

to the assertion of which, as facts, exception was taken, and his

dismissal attributed, were two. One was, that the three conditions had

been submitted by Mr. Erskine to the Secretary of State. This the

Secretary had admitted. "The other, namely: that that instruction is

the only one, in which the conditions were prescribed to Mr. Erskine,

for the conclusion of an arrangement on the matter to which it

related, is known to Mr. Jackson by the instructions which he has

himself received." This he had said in his second letter; if somewhat

obscurely, still not so much so but that careful reading, and

indisposition to take offence, could have detected his meaning, and

afforded him the opportunity to be as explicit as in this final paper.

If Madison, who is understood to have given special supervision to

this correspondence,[297] meant the severe rebuke conveyed by his

reply as a feint, to lead the British minister incautiously to expose

himself to a punishment which his general bearing and that of his

Government deserved, he assuredly succeeded; yet it may be questioned

who really came best out of the encounter. Jackson had blundered in

words; the American Administration had needlessly intensified

international bitterness.

Prepossession in reading, and proneness to angry misconception, must

be inferred in the conduct of the American side of this discussion;

for another notable and even graver instance occurs in the

despatch[298] communicating Jackson's dismissal to Pinkney, beyond

whose notice it probably was not allowed to go. Canning, in his third

rejected condition, had written:

Great Britain, for the purpose of securing _the operation of_

the embargo, and _of_ the bona fide intention of America to

prevent her citizens from trading with France, and the Powers

adopting and acting under the French decrees, is to be

considered as being at liberty to capture all such American

vessels as shall be found attempting to trade with the ports of

such Powers;[299]

and he explained that, unless such permission was granted, "the

raising of the embargo nominally as to Great Britain, would raise it,

in fact, with respect to all the world," owing to the evident

inability of the United States to enforce its orders beyond its own

ports.

In the passage quoted, both the explanatory comment and the syntax

show that the object of this proposed concession was to secure _the

operation_, the effectual working, of the _bona fide_ intention

expressly conceded to the American Government. The repetition of the

preposition "of," before _bona fide_, secures this meaning beyond

peradventure. Nevertheless Smith, in labored arraignment of the whole

British course, wrote to Pinkney as follows:

In urging this concession, Mr. Canning has taken a ground

forbidden by those principles of decorum which regulate and mark

the proceedings of Governments towards each other. In his

despatch the condition is stated to be for the purpose of

_securing the bona fide intention_ of America, to prevent her

citizens from trading with France and certain other Powers; in

other words to secure a pledge to that effect against the _mala

fide_ intention of the United States. And this despatch too was

authorized to be communicated _in extenso_ to the Government, of

which such language was used.[300]

Being addressed only to Pinkney, a man altogether too careful and

shrewd not to detect the mistake, no occasion arose for this grave

misstatement doing harm, or receiving correction. But, conjoined with

the failure to note that Jackson in his second letter had attributed

to his own communication the American Government's knowledge that

Erskine had no alternative instructions, the conclusion is

irresistible that the President acted, perhaps unconsciously, under

impulses foreign to the deliberate care which should precede and

accompany so momentous an act as the refusal to communicate with an

accredited foreign minister. It will be remembered that this action

was taken on grounds avowedly independent of the reasonableness or

justice of the British demands. It rested purely on the conduct of the

minister himself.

This incident powerfully furthered the alienation of the two nations,

for the British Government not only refused to disapprove Jackson's

conduct, but for nearly two years neglected to send a successor, thus

establishing strained diplomatic relations. Before finally leaving

this unlucky business, it is due to a complete appreciation to mention

that, in its very outset, at the beginning of Erskine's well-meant but

blundering attempt, the United States Government had overpassed the

limits of diplomatic civility. Canning was a master of insolence; he

could go to the utmost verge of insult and innuendo, without

absolutely crossing the line which separates them from formal

observance of propriety; but it cannot be said that the American

correspondence in this instance was equally adroit. In replying to

Erskine's formal offer of reparation for the "Chesapeake" affair,

certain points essential to safeguarding the position of the United

States were carefully and properly pointed out; then the reparation,

as tended, was accepted. There the matter might have dropped;

acceptance is acceptance; or, if necessary, failure of full

satisfaction on the part of the United States might have been candidly

stated, as due to itself. But the Secretary[301] proceeded to

words--and mere words--reflecting on the British Sovereign and

Government. "I have it in express charge from the President to state,

that, while he forbears to insist upon the further punishment of the

offending officer, he is not the less sensible of the justice and

utility of such an example, nor the less persuaded that it would best

comport with what is due from his Britannic Majesty to his own honor."

To the writer nothing quite as bad as this occurs in Jackson's

letters, objectionable as they were in tone. With the opinion he

agrees; the further employment of Berkeley was indecent, nor was he a

man for whom it could be claimed that he was indispensable; but it is

one thing to hold an opinion, and another to utter it to the person

concerned. Had Madison meant war, he might have spoken as he did, and

fought; but to accept, and then to speak words barren of everything

but useless insult, is intolerable. Jackson very probably believed

that the American Government was lying when it said it did not know

the facts as to Erskine's instructions.[302] It would be quite in

character that he should; but he did not say so. There was put into

his mouth a construction of his words which he heedlessly accepted.

Jackson's dismissal was notified to the British Government through

Pinkney, on January 2, 1810.[303] Some time before, a disagreement

within the British Cabinet had led to a duel between Castlereagh and

Canning, in which the latter was severely wounded. He did not return

to the Foreign Office, but was succeeded by the Marquis Wellesley,

brother of the future Duke of Wellington. After presenting the view of

the correspondence taken by his Government, Pinkney seems to betray a

slight uneasiness as to the accuracy of the interpretation placed on

Jackson's words. "I willingly leave your Lordship to judge whether Mr.

Jackson's correspondence will bear any other construction than that it

in fact received; and whether, supposing it to have been erroneously

construed, his letter of the 4th of November should not have corrected

the mistake, instead of confirming and establishing it."

Wellesley, with a certain indolent nonchalance, characteristic of his

correspondence with Pinkney, delayed to answer for two months, and

then gave a reply as indifferent in manner as it was brief in terms.

Jackson had written, "There appears to have prevailed, throughout the

whole of this transaction [Erskine's], a fundamental mistake, which

would suggest that his Majesty had proposed to propitiate the

Government of the United States, to consent to the renewal of

commercial intercourse; ... as if, in any arrangement, his Majesty

would condescend to barter objects of national policy and dignity for

permission to trade with another country." The phrase was Canning's,

and summarized precisely the jealous attitude towards its own prestige

characteristic of the British policy of the day. It also defined

exactly the theory upon which the foreign policy of the United States

had been directed for eight years by the party still in power. Madison

and Jefferson had both placed just this construction upon Erskine's

tender. "The British Cabinet must have changed its course under a full

conviction that an adjustment with this country had become

essential."[304] "Gallatin had a conversation with Turreau at his

residence near Baltimore. He professes to be confident that his

Government will consider England broken down, by the examples she has

given in repealing her Orders."[305] "By our unyielding adherence to

principle Great Britain has been forced into revocation."[306] Canning

and his associates intuitively divined this inference, which after all

was obvious enough. The feeling increased their discontent with

Erskine, who had placed his country in the false light of receding

under commercial pressure from America, and probably enough

prepossessed them with the conviction that the American Government

could not but have realized that Erskine was acting beyond his powers.

Wellesley, after his manner,--which was not Canning's,--asserted

equally the superiority of the British Government to concession for

the sake of such advantage. His Majesty regretted the Jackson episode,

the more so that no opportunity had been given for him to interpose,

which "was the usual course in such cases." Mr. Jackson had written

positive assurances that it was not his purpose to give offence; to

which the reply was apt, that in such matters it is not enough to

intend, but to succeed in avoiding offence.[307] "His Majesty has not

marked, with any expression of his displeasure, the conduct of Mr.

Jackson, who does not appear, on this occasion, to have committed any

intentional offence against the Government of the United States." A

_charge_ would be appointed to carry on the ordinary intercourse, but

no intention was expressed of sending another minister. Persistence in

this neglect soon became a further ground of bad feeling.

By its own limitations the Non-Intercourse Act was to expire at the

end of the approaching spring session of the new Congress, but it was

renewed by that body to the end of the winter session. During the

recess the Jackson episode occurred, and was the first subject to

engage attention on reassembling, November 27, 1809. After prolonged

discussion in the lower house,[308] a joint resolution was passed

approving the action of the Executive, and pledging to him the support

of the nation. Despite a lucid exposition by Josiah Quincy, that the

offence particularly attributed to the British minister was disproved

by a reasonable attention to the construction of his sentences, the

majority persisted in sustaining the party chief. That disposed of,

the question of commercial restriction was again taken up.

It was conceded on all sides that Non-Intercourse had failed, and

precisely in the manner predicted. On the south, Amelia Island,--at

the mouth of the St. Mary's River, just outside the Florida

boundary,--and on the north Halifax, and Canada in general, had become

ports of deposit for American products, whence they were conveyed in

British ships to Great Britain and her dependencies, to which the Act

forbade American vessels to go. The effect was to give the carrying of

American products to British shipping, in precise conformity with the

astute provisions of the Navigation Acts. British markets were reached

by a broken voyage, the long leg of which, from Amelia and Halifax to

Europe and elsewhere, was taken by British navigation. It was stated

that there were at a given moment one hundred British vessels at

Amelia,[309] the shores of which were encumbered with American goods

awaiting such transportation. The freight from the American ports to

Amelia averaged a cent a pound, from Amelia to England eight

cents;[310] the latter amount going to British pockets, the former to

Americans who were debarred from full transatlantic freight by the

prohibitions of the Non-Intercourse Act. The absence of competition

necessarily raised the prices obtainable by the British shipper, and

this, together with the additional cost of transshipment and delays,

attendant upon a broken voyage, fell upon the American agriculturist,

whose goods commanded just so much less at their place of origin. The

measure was even ingeniously malaprop, considered from the point of

view of its purpose towards Great Britain, whether retaliatory or

coercive. Upon France its effect was trivial, in any aspect. There was

no French navigation, and the Orders in Council left little chance for

American vessels to reach French ports.

All agreed that the Non-Intercourse Act must go; the difficulty was to

find a substitute which should not confessedly abandon the whole

system of commercial restrictions, idealized by the party in power,

but from which it was being driven foot by foot. A first measure

proposed was to institute a Navigation Act, borrowed in broad outline

from that of Great Britain, but in operation applied only to that

nation and France, in retaliation for their injurious edicts.[311]

Open intercourse with the whole world should be restored; but British

and French merchant ships, as well as vessels of war, should be

excluded from American harbors. British and French products could be

imported only in vessels owned wholly by American citizens; and after

April 15, 1810, could be introduced only by direct voyage from the

place of origin. This was designed to prevent the continuance of trade

by way of Amelia or Halifax. It was pointed out in debate, however,

that French shipping practically did not exist, and that in the days

of open trade, before the embargo, only about eight thousand tons of

British shipping yearly entered American ports, whereas from three

hundred thousand to four hundred thousand American tons visited Great

Britain.[312] Should she, by a strict retaliation, resent this clumsy

attempt at injuring her, the weight of the blow would fall on

Americans. American ships would be excluded from British ports; the

carrying trade to Amelia and Halifax would be resumed, to the

detriment of American vessels by a competition which otherwise would

not exist, and British manufactures would be introduced by smuggling,

to the grievous loss of the revenue, as had been notoriously and

abundantly the case under the Non-Intercourse Act. In truth, a purely

commercial war with Great Britain was as injurious as a military war,

and more hopeless.

The bill consequently failed in the Senate, though passed by the

House. In its stead was adopted an Act which repealed that of

Non-Intercourse, but prescribed that in case either Great Britain or

France, before March 3, 1811, should so revoke or modify its edicts as

that they should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United

States, the President should declare the fact by proclamation; and if

the other nation should not, within three months from the date of such

proclamation, in like manner so modify or revoke its edicts, there

should revive against it those sections of the Non-Intercourse Act

which excluded its vessels from American ports, and forbade to

American vessels importation from its ports, or of its goods from any

part of the world whatsoever. The determination of the fact of

revocation by either state was left to the sole judgment of the

President, by whose approval the Act became law May 1, 1810.[313]

As Great Britain and France, by the Orders in Council and the Berlin

and Milan Decrees, were then engaged in a commercial warfare, in which

the object of each was to exhaust its rival, the effect of this Act

was to tender the co-operation of the United States to whichever of

them should embrace the offer. In terms, it was strictly impartial

between the two. In fact, forasmuch as France could not prevent

American intercourse with Great Britain, whereas Great Britain, in

furtherance of her purposes, could and did prevent American trade with

France, the latter had much more to gain; and particularly, if she

should so word her revocation as to save her face, by not appearing

the first to recede,--to show weakening,--as Great Britain had been

made for the moment to seem by Erskine's arrangement. Should this

ingenious diplomacy prove satisfactory to the President, yet fail so

to convince Great Britain as to draw from her the recall of the Orders

in Council, the United States, by the simple operation of the law

itself, would become a party to the Emperor's Continental system, in

its specific aim of reducing his opponent's strength.

At this very moment Napoleon was putting into effect against the

United States one of those perverse and shameless interpretations of

international relations, or actions, by which he not infrequently

contrived to fill his pockets. The Non-Intercourse Act, passed March

3, 1809, had decreed forfeiture of any French or British ship, or

goods, which should enter American waters after May 20, of the same

year. The measure was duly communicated to the French Government, and

no remonstrance had been made against a municipal regulation, which

gave ample antecedent warning. There the matter rested until March 23,

1810, when the Emperor, on the ground of the Act, imposing these

confiscations and forbidding American vessels to visit France, signed

a retroactive decree that all vessels under the flag of the United

States, which, since May 20, 1809, had entered ports of his empire,

colonies, or of the countries occupied by his arms, should be seized

and sold. Commissioners were sent to Holland to enforce there this

edict, known as the Decree of Rambouillet, which was not actually

published till May 14.[314] It took effect upon vessels which, during

a twelvemonth previous, unwarned, had gone to France, or the other

countries indicated. Immediately before it was signed, the American

minister, Armstrong, had written to Champagny, Duke of Cadore, the

French Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Your Excellency knows that there

are not less than one hundred American ships within his Majesty's

possession, or that of his allies;" and he added that, from several

sources of information, he felt warranted in believing that not a

single French vessel had violated the Non-Intercourse law, and

therefore none could have been seized.[315]

The law of May 1 was duly communicated to the two states concerned, by

the United States ministers there resident. Great Britain was informed

that not only the Orders in Council, but the blockade of May,

1806,[316] were included among the edicts affecting American commerce,

the repeal of which was expected, as injurious to that commerce.

France was told that this demand would be made upon her rival;[317]

but that it was also the purpose of the President not to give the law

effect favorable to herself, by publishing a proclamation, if the late

seizures of the property of citizens of the United States had been

followed by absolute confiscation, and restoration were finally

refused.[318] This referred not to the Rambouillet Decree, as yet

unknown in America, but to the previous seizures upon various

pretexts, mentioned above by Armstrong. Ultimately this purpose was

not adhered to; but the Emperor was attentive to the President's

intimation that "by putting in force, agreeably to the terms of this

statute, the non-intercourse against Great Britain, the very species

of resistance would be made which France has constantly been

representing as most efficacious."[319] Thus, the co-operation of

America to the Continental System was no longer asked, but offered.

The Emperor did not wait even for information by the usual official

channels. By some unexplained delay, Armstrong's first knowledge was

through a copy of the Gazette of the United States containing the Act,

which he at once transmitted to Champagny, who replied August 5,

1810.[320] His Majesty wished that the acts of the United States

Government could be more promptly communicated; not till very lately

had he heard of the Non-Intercourse,--a statement which Armstrong

promptly denied, referring Champagny to the archives of his own

department.[321] In view of the Act of May 1, the Emperor's decision

was announced in a paragraph of the same letter, in the following

words:

In this new state of things I am authorized to declare to you,

Sir, that the Decrees of Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that

after the first of November they will cease to have effect; it

being understood that, in consequence of this declaration, the

English shall revoke their Orders in Council, and renounce the

new principles of blockade, which they have wished to establish;

or that the United States, conformably to the Act which you have

just communicated, shall cause their rights to be respected by

the English.

Definition is proverbially difficult; and over this superficially

simple definition of circumstances and conditions, under which the

Decrees of Berlin and Milan stood revoked, arose a discussion

concerning construction and meaning which resembled the wrangling of

scholars over a corrupt text in an obscure classical author.

Clear-headed men became hopelessly involved, as they wrestled with

each others' interpretations; and the most got no farther than

sticking to their first opinions, probably reached in the majority of

cases by sheer prepossession. The American ministers to France and

Great Britain both accepted the words as a distinct, indisputable,

revocation; and Madison followed suit. These hasty conclusions are not

very surprising; for there was personal triumph, dear to diplomatists

as to other men, in seeing the repeal of the Decrees, or of the

Orders, result from their efforts. It has been seen how much this

factor entered into the feelings of Madison and Jefferson in the

Erskine business, and to Armstrong the present turn was especially

grateful, as he was about quitting his mission after several years

buffeting against wind and tide. His sun seemed after all about to set

in glory. He wrote to Pinkney, "I have the honor to inform you that

his Majesty, the Emperor and King, has been pleased to revoke his

Decrees of Berlin and Milan."[322] Pinkney, to whom the recall of the

British Orders offered the like laurels, was equally emphatic in his

communication to Wellesley; adding, "I take for granted that the

revocation of the British Orders in Council of January and November,

1807, April, 1809, and all other orders dependent upon, or analogous,

or in execution of them, will follow of course."[323] The British

Government demurred to the interpretation; but Madison accepted it,

and on November 2 proclaimed it as a fact. In consequence, by the

terms of the Act, non-intercourse would revive against Great Britain

on February 2, 1811.

When Congress met, distrust on one side and assertion on the other

gave rise to prolonged and acute discussion. Napoleon had surprised

people so often, that no wonder need be felt at those who thought his

words might bear a double meaning. The late President, who did not

lack sagacity, had once written to his successor, "Bonaparte's policy

is so crooked that it eludes conjecture. I fear his first object now

is to dry up the sources of British prosperity, by excluding her

manufactures from the Continent. He may fear that opening the ports of

Europe to our vessels will open them to an inundation of British

wares."[324] This was exactly Bonaparte's dilemma, and suggested the

point of view from which his every action ought to be scrutinized.

Then there was the recent deception with Erskine, which, if it

increased the doubts of some concerning the soundness of Madison's

judgment, made it the more incumbent on others to show that on this

occasion at least he had not been precipitate. Certainly, as regards

the competency of the foreign official in either case, there was no

comparison. A simple Minister Resident should produce particular

powers or definite instructions, to guarantee his authority for

concluding so important a modification of national policy as was

accepted from Erskine; but by common usage the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, at a national capital, is understood to speak for the Chief

Executive. The statement of Champagny, at Paris, that he was

"authorized" to make a specific declaration, could be accepted as the

voice of Napoleon himself. The only question was, what did the voice

signify?

In truth, explicit as Champagny's words sound, Napoleon's

memoranda,[325] on which they were based, show a deliberate purpose to

avoid a formal revocation, for reasons analogous to those suggested by

Jefferson. Throughout he used "_rapporter_" instead of "_revoquer_."

In the particular connection, the words are nearly synonymous; yet to

the latter attaches a natural fitness and emphasis, the avoidance of

which betrays the bias, perhaps unconscious, towards seeking escape

from self-committal on the matter in hand. His phrases are more

definite. July 31 he wrote, "After much reflection upon American

affairs, I have decided that to withdraw (_rapporter_) my decrees of

Berlin and Milan would conduce to nothing (_n'aurait aucun effet_);

that it is better you should address a note to Mr. Armstrong, in which

you will acquaint him that you have placed before me the details

contained in the American gazette, ... and since he assures us it may

be regarded as official, he may depend (_compter_) that my decrees of

Berlin and Milan will not receive execution (_n'auront aucun effet_)

dating from November 1; and that he should consider them as withdrawn

(_rapportes_) in consequence of the Act of the American Congress;

provided," etc. "This," he concludes, "seems to me more suitable than

a decree, which would cause disturbance and would not fulfil my aim.

This method seems to me more conformable to my dignity and to the

serious character of the business." The Decrees, as touching the

United States alone, were to be quietly withdrawn from action, but not

formally revoked. They were to be dormant, yet potential. As

convenience might dictate, it would be open to say that they were

revoked [in effect], or not revoked [in form]. The one might, and did,

satisfy the United States; the other might not, and did not, content

Great Britain, against whom exclusion from the continent remained in

force. The two English-speaking peoples were set by the ears. August 2

the Emperor made a draft of the note to be sent to Armstrong. This

Champagny copied almost verbatim in the declaration quoted;

substituting, however, "_revoquer_" for "_rapporter_."

It would be intolerable to attempt to drag readers through the mazes

of analysis, and of comparison with other papers, by which the parties

to the discussion, ignorant of the above memoranda, sought to

establish their respective views. One thing, however, should have been

patent to all,--that, with a man so subtle and adroit as Napoleon, any

step in apparent reversal of a decided and cherished policy should

have been complete and unequivocal, both in form and in terms. The

Berlin Decree was put forth with the utmost formality with which

majesty and power could invest it; the asserted revocation, if

apparently explicit, was simply a paragraph in ordinary diplomatic

correspondence, stating that revocation had taken place. If so, where

was it? An act which undoes another, particularly if an injury, must

correspond fully in form to that which it claims to undo. A private

insult may receive private apology; but no private expression can

atone for public insult or public wrong. In the appreciation of Mr.

Madison, in 1807, so grave an outrage as that of the "Chesapeake"

called for a special envoy, to give adequate dignity to the proffered

reparation. Yet his followers now would have form to be indifferent to

substantial effect. Champagny's letter, it is true, was published in

the official paper; but, besides being in form merely a diplomatic

letter, it bore the signature of Champagny, whereas the decree bore

that of Napoleon. The Decree of Rambouillet, then less than six months

old, was clothed with the like sanction. Even Pinkney, usually so

clear-headed, and in utterance incisive, suffered himself here to be

misled. Does England find inadequate the "manner" of the French

Revocation? he asked. "It is precisely that in which the orders of its

own Government, establishing, modifying, or removing blockades, are

usually proclaimed." But the Decree of Berlin was no mere proclamation

of a blockade. It had been proclaimed, in the Emperor's own name, a

fundamental law of the Empire, until England had abandoned certain

lines of action. This was policy against policy, to which the blockade

was incidental as a method. English blockades were announced and

withdrawn under identical forms of circular letter; but when an Order

in Council, as that of November, 1807, was modified, as in April,

1809, it was done by an Order in Council, not by a diplomatic letter.

In short, Champagny's utterance was the declaration of a fact; but

where was the fact itself?

Great Britain therefore refused to recognize the letter as a

revocation, and could not be persuaded that it was by the opinion of

the American authorities. Nor was the form alone inadequate; the terms

were ambiguous, and lent themselves to a construction which would

deprive her of all benefit from the alleged revocation. She had to

look to her own battle, which reached its utmost intensity in this

year 1810. Except the helpless Spanish and Portuguese insurgents, she

had not an open friend in Europe; while Napoleon, freed from all

opponents by the overthrow of Austria in 1809, had organized against

Great Britain and her feeble allies the most gigantic display of force

made in the peninsula since his own personal departure thence, nearly

two years before. The United States had plain sailing; so far as the

letter went, the Decrees were revoked, conditional on her executing

the law of May 1. But Great Britain must renounce the "new" principles

of blockade. What were these principles, pronounced new by the Decree?

They were, that unfortified ports, commercial harbors, might be

blockaded, as the United States a half century later strangled the

Southern Confederacy. Such blockades were lawful then and long before.

To yield this position would be to abandon rights upon which depended

the political value of Great Britain's maritime supremacy; yet unless

she did so the Berlin Decree remained in force against her. The

Decree was universal in application, not limited to the United States

commerce, towards which Champagny's letter undertook to relax it; and

British commerce would remain excluded from neutral continental ports

unless Great Britain not only withdrew the Orders in Council, but

relinquished prescriptive rights upon which, in war, depended her

position in the world.

In declining to repeal, Great Britain referred to her past record in

proof of consistency. In the first communication of the Orders in

Council, February 23, 1808,[326] Erskine had written, "I am commanded

by his Majesty especially to represent to the Government of the United

States the earnest desire of his Majesty to see the commerce _of the

world_ restored once more to that freedom which is necessary for its

prosperity, and his readiness to abandon the system which has been

forced upon him, _whenever the enemy shall retract the principles_

which have rendered it necessary." The British envoy in these

sentences reproduced _verbatim_ the instructions he had received,[327]

and the words italicized bar expressly the subsequent contention of

the United States, that revocation by one party as to one nation,

irrespective of the rest _of the world_, and that in practice only,

not in principle, entitled the nation so favored to revocation by the

other party. They exclude therefore, by all the formality of written

words at a momentous instant, the singular assertion of the American

Government, in 1811, that Great Britain had pledged herself to proceed

"_pari passu_"[328] with France in the revocation of their respective

acts. As far as can be ascertained, the origin of this confident

assumption is to be found in letters of February 18 and 19, 1808,[329]

from Madison, then Secretary of State, to Armstrong and Pinkney. In

these he says that Erskine, in communicating the Orders,[330]

expressed his Majesty's regrets, and "assurances that his Majesty

would readily follow the example, in case the Berlin Decree should be

rescinded, or would proceed _pari passu_ with France in relaxing the

rigor of their measures." By whichever of the colloquists the

expression was used, the contrast between this report of an interview

and the official letter quoted sufficiently shows the snare latent in

conversations, and the superior necessity of relying upon written

communications, to which informal talk only smooths the way. On the

very day of Madison's writing to Armstrong, February 18, the Advocate

General, who may be presumed to have understood the purposes of the

Government, was repudiating such a construction in the House of

Commons. "Even let it be granted that there had been a public

assurance to America that she alone was to be excepted from the

influence of the Berlin Decree, would that have been a sufficient

ground for us not to look further to our own interest? What! Because

France chooses to exempt America from her injurious decrees, are we to

consent to their continuance?"[331] Where such a contradiction

exists, to assert a pledge from a Government, and that two years after

Erskine's singular performance of 1809, which led to his recall, is a

curious example of the capacity of the American Administration, under

Madison's guidance, for putting words into an opponent's mouth. In the

present juncture, Wellesley replied[332] to Pinkney's claim for the

revocation of the Orders in Council by quoting, and repeating, the

assurance of Erskine's letter of February 23, 1808, given above.

Yet, unless the Orders in Council were repealed, Napoleon's

concessions would not go far to relieve the United States. The vessels

he would admit would be but the gleanings, after British cruisers had

reaped the ocean field. Pinkney, therefore, had to be importunate in

presenting the demands of his Government. Wellesley persisted in his

method of procrastination. At last, on December 4, he wrote briefly to

say that after careful inquiry he could find no authentic intelligence

of the repeal, nor of the restoration of the commerce of neutral

nations to its previous conditions. He invited, however, a fresh

statement from Pinkney, who then, in a letter dated December 10,[333]

argued the case at length, under the three heads of the manner, or

form, the terms, and the practical effect of the alleged repeal.

Having completed the argument, he took incidental occasion to present

the views of the United States concerning the whole system of the

Orders in Council; animadverting severely, and emphasizing with

liberal italics. The Orders went far beyond any intelligible standard

of _retaliation_; but it soon appeared that neutrals might be

permitted to traffic, if they would submit with a dependence _truly

colonial_ to carry on their trade through British ports, to pay such

duties as the British Government might impose, and such charges as

British agents might make. The modification of April 26, 1809, was one

of appearance only. True, neutrals were no longer compelled to enter

British ports; their prohibition from interdicted ports was nominally

absolute; but it was known that by coming to Great Britain they could

obtain a license to enter them, so that the effect was the same; and

by forged papers this license system was so extended "that the

commerce of _England_ could advantageously find its way to those

ports."[334]

Wellesley delayed reply till December 29.[335] He regretted the

intrusion of these closing remarks, which might tend to interfere with

a conciliatory spirit, but without further comment on them addressed

himself to the main question. His Government did not find the

"notification" of the repeal of the French Decrees such as would

justify it in recalling the Orders in Council. The United States

having demanded the formal revocation of the blockade of May, 1806, as

well as of the Orders in Council, he "must conclude, combining your

requisition with that of the French Minister, that America demands the

revocation of that order of blockade, as a practical instance of our

renunciation of those principles of blockade which are condemned by

the French Government." This inference seems overstrained; but

certainly much greater substantial concession was required of Great

Britain than of France. Wellesley intimated that this concert of

action was partial--not neutral--between the two belligerents. "I

trust that the justice of the American Government will not consider

that France, by the repeal of her obnoxious decrees, _under such a

condition_,[336] has placed the question in that state which can

warrant America in enforcing the Non-Intercourse Act against Great

Britain, and not against France." He reminded Pinkney of the situation

in which the commerce of neutral nations had been placed by many

recent acts of the French Government; and said that its system of

violence and injustice required some precautions of defence on the

part of Great Britain. In conclusion, his Majesty stood ready to

repeal, when the French Decrees should be repealed without conditions

injurious to the maritime rights and honor of the United Kingdom.

Unhappily for Pinkney's argument on the actuality of Napoleon's

repeal, on the very day of his own writing, December 10, the American

_charge_[337] in Paris, Jonathan Russell, was sending Champagny a

remonstrance[338] upon the seizure of an American vessel at Bordeaux,

under the decrees of Berlin and Milan, on December 1,--a month after

their asserted repeal. That the Director of Customs at a principal

seaport should understand them to be in force, nearly four months

after the publication of Champagny's letter in the "Moniteur," would

certainly seem to imply some defect in customary form;[339] and the

ensuing measures of the Government would indicate also something

misleading in the terms. Russell told Champagny that, since November

1, the alleged day of repeal, this was the first case to which the

Berlin and Milan Decrees could apply; and lo! to it they were applied.

Yet, "to execute the Act of Congress against the English requires the

previous revocation of the decrees." It was, indeed, ingeniously

argued in Congress, by an able advocate of the Administration, that

all the law required was the revocation in terms of the Decrees; their

subsequent enforcement in act was immaterial.[340] Such a solution,

however, would scarcely content the American people. The French

Government now took a step which clearly showed that the Decrees were

still in force, technically, however honest its purpose to hold to the

revocation, if the United States complied with the conditions.

Instructions to the Council of Prizes,[341] from the proper minister,

directed that the vessel, and any others falling under the same

category of entry after November 1, should "remain suspended" until

after February 2, the period at which the United States should have

fulfilled its obligation. Then they should be restored.

The general trend of argument, pro and con, with the subsequent

events, probably shook the confidence of the Administration, and of

its supporters in Congress, in the certainty of the revocation, which

the President had authenticated by his proclamation. Were the fact

unimpeachable, the law was clear; non-intercourse with Great Britain

would go into effect February 2, without further action. But the

doubts started were so plausible that it was certain any condemnation

or enforcement under the law would be carried up to the highest court,

to test whether the fact of revocation, upon which the operativeness

of the statute turned, was legally established. Even should the court

decline to review the act of the Executive, and accept the

proclamation as sufficient evidence for its own decision, such feeble

indorsement would be mortifying. A supplementary Act was therefore

framed, doing away with the original, and then reviving it, as a new

measure, against Great Britain alone. In presenting this, the member

charged with its introduction said: "The Committee thought proper that

in this case the legislature should step forward and decide; that it

was not consistent with the responsibility they owed the community to

turn over to judicial tribunals the decision of the question, whether

the Non-Intercourse was in force or not."[342] The matter was thus

taken from the purview of the courts, and decided by a party vote.

After an exhausting discussion, this bill passed at 4 A.M., February

28, 1811. It was approved by the President, March 2.

For the settlement of American litigation this course was adequate;

not so for the vindication of international procedure. The United

States at this time had abundant justification for war with both

France and Great Britain, and it was within the righteous decision of

her own policy whether she should declare against either or both; but

it is a serious impeachment of a Government's capacity and manfulness

when, with such questions as Impressment, the Orders in Council,

Napoleon's Decrees, and his arbitrary sequestrations, war comes not

from a bold grappling with difficulties, but from a series of

huckstering attempts to buy off one antagonist or the other, with the

result of being fairly overreached. The outcome, summarily stated, had

been that a finesse of the French Government had attached the United

States to Napoleon's Continental System. She was henceforth, in

effect, allied with the leading feature of French policy hostile to

Great Britain. It was perfectly competent and proper for her so to

attach herself, if she saw fit. The Orders in Council were a national

wrong to her, justifying retaliation and war; still more so was

Impressment. But it is humiliating to see one's country finally

committed to such a step through being outwitted in a paltry bargain,

and the justification of her course rested, not upon a firm assertion

of right, but upon the refusal of another nation to accept a

manifestly unequal proposition. The course of Great Britain was

high-handed, unjust, and not always straightforward; but it was candor

itself alongside of Napoleon's.

There remained but one step to complete the formal breach; and that,

if the writer's analysis has been correct, resulted as directly as did

the final Non-Intercourse Act from action erroneously taken by Mr.

Madison's Administration. Jackson's place, vacated in November, 1809,

by the refusal to communicate further with him, remained still

unfilled. This delay was thought deliberate by the United States

Government, which on May 22 wrote to Pinkney that it seemed to

manifest indifference to the character of the diplomatic intercourse

between the two countries, arising from dissatisfaction at the step

necessarily taken with regard to Mr. Jackson. Should this inference

from Wellesley's inaction prove correct, Pinkney was directed to

return to the United States, leaving the office with a _charge

d'affaires_, for whom a blank appointment was sent. He was, however,

to exercise his own judgment as to the time and manner. In consequence

of his interview with Wellesley, and in reply to a formal note of

inquiry, he received a private letter, July 22, 1810, saying it was

difficult to enter upon the subject in an official form, but that it

was the Secretary's intention immediately to recommend a successor to

Jackson. Still the matter dragged, and at the end of the year no

appointment had been made.

In other ways, too, there was unexplained delay. In April Pinkney had

received powers to resume the frustrated negotiations committed first

to him and Monroe. Wellesley had welcomed the advance, and had

accepted an order of discussion which gave priority to satisfaction

for the "Chesapeake" affair. After that an arrangement for the

revocation of the Orders in Council should be attempted. On June 13

Pinkney wrote home that a verbal agreement conformable to his

instructions had been reached concerning the "Chesapeake," and that he

was daily expecting a written overture embodying the terms. August 14

this had not been received,--to his great surprise, for Wellesley's

manner had shown every disposition to accommodate. Upon this situation

supervened Cadore's declaration of the revocation of the French

Decrees, Pinkney's acceptance of the fact as indisputable, and his

urgency to obtain from the British Government a corresponding measure

in the repeal of the Orders. Through all ran the same procrastination,

issuing in entire inaction.

Pinkney's correspondence shows a man diplomatically self-controlled

and patient, though keenly sensible to the indignity of unwarrantable

delays. The rough speaking of his mind concerning the Orders in

Council, in his letter of December 10, suggests no loss of temper, but

a deliberate letting himself go. There appeared to him now no

necessity for further endurance. To Wellesley's rejoinder of December

29 he sent an answer on January 14, 1811, "written," he said, "under

the pressure of indisposition, and the influence of more indignation

than could well be suppressed."[343] The questions at issue were again

trenchantly discussed, but therewith he brought to an end his

functions as minister of the United States. Under the same date, but

by separate letter, he wrote that as no steps had been taken to

replace Jackson by an envoy of equal rank, his instructions imposed on

him the duty of informing his lordship that the Government of the

United States could not continue to be represented in England by a

minister plenipotentiary. Owing to the insanity of the King, and the

delays incident to the institution of a regency, his audience of leave

was delayed to February 28; and it is a noticeable coincidence that

the day of this formal diplomatic act was also that upon which the

Non-Intercourse Bill against Great Britain passed the House of

Representatives. In the course of the spring Pinkney embarked in the

frigate "Essex" for the United States. He had no successor until after

the War of 1812, and the Non-Intercourse Act remained in vigor to the

day of hostilities.