in the United States. Even an attack on St. Helena was discussed by
Napoleon’s followers, some of whom were on the American continent as
participants in the Brazilian war of independence against Portugal.
But Napoleon refused to consider any such methods of relief. “I could
not be in America six months,” he said, “without being attacked by
the murderers, whom the royalist committees, that returned to France
in the train of the Count d’Artois, have hired against me. In America
I see nothing but murder and oblivion, so I prefer to stay on at St.
Helena.” He saw truly that, in a life of freedom on the other side of
the Atlantic, there would be little chance of posing as the victim of
misfortune and maltreatment, and it was on the maintenance of this
pose that he built his hope of relief from captivity, perhaps even
of a return to his old place as ruler of France, for he counted on
the expulsion of the Bourbons and a reaction of popular feeling in
his behalf. A change of ministry in England also he looked forward to
as the opening of an avenue of escape to Europe. He refused to take
exercise because, in his walks, according to regulations, he had to
be accompanied by an English officer; therefore, he blamed his bad
health on the British government. Care was taken by publications in
London to detail at length the sufferings of the captive. Incessant
complaints were made of the trying climate of the island, the aim being
to represent the banishment to St. Helena as nothing but a plan to get
rid of Napoleon by the toxic effects of a tropical atmosphere. Indeed,
the bad climate of St. Helena has become an inseparable part of the
Napoleonic legend, yet we know that Napoleon said to members of his own
suite, that if he had to live an exile, St. Helena was, after all, the
best spot.
As the years passed, nothing was changed, for the Whigs in England were
not strong enough to get any measures though Parliament favorable to
Napoleon, and in 1818 the five Great Powers issued a signed statement
that they approved of the strict treatment of the prisoner by the
British government, and resolved that all correspondence with Napoleon,
such as sending money or other communications, which was not submitted
to the inspection of the governor, must be regarded as an attack on the
public safety and punished accordingly.
Under the régime of no exercise imposed upon himself by Napoleon, his
health became impaired; his manner of life accentuated the symptoms
of a disease, cancer of the stomach, which had appeared long before
the period of his exile. It was an inherited malady, for his father
had died of it, also his eldest sister. Some relief was secured by his
adopting a more active life in 1819; but with the beginning of the year
1821, the progress of the disease was rapid; exercise was no longer
possible, and even occasional dictation was found to be an exhausting
task. In April the condition of the prisoner was evidently hopeless,
and after he was assured on this point by a surgeon of the British
army, Napoleon dictated his testament to Montholon, one of his faithful
companions. After his death, which took place on May 5, 1821, the body
of the great captain was buried not far from Longwood, his residence.
Nearly a generation elapsed before it was carried to its present
resting place beneath the dome of the Invalides at Paris.
IX THE NAPOLEONIC REGIME
During the captivity at St. Helena much attention was given by Napoleon
to the dictation of his memoirs. These, however, cover only a short
portion of his career and are confessedly apologetic in character. They
are shrewdly constructed, often with a gross disregard of accuracy, in
order to influence public opinion in his favor. In his conversations
also he made good use of his interlocutors, to build up that legend of
Napoleonic infallibility and good faith that soon found a receptive
atmosphere in the prevalent romanticism of European society. He was
convinced to the end of his life that Bourbon rule in France could not
last, and he looked forward to a time when his son would be restored.
In summing up his own career, he claimed that his dictatorship was
a necessity. “Should I be accused of having loved war too much, the
historian will demonstrate that I was never the aggressor. Should I be
censured for desiring universal empire for myself, he will show that
that was the product of circumstances, and how my enemies drove me to
it, step by step.”
In many passages in the same strain Napoleon curiously manifests his
adhesion to the principles and phrases of the idealogues, on whom as
a ruler he heaped so much scorn. It may be doubted whether the base
metal of his rhetoric would have become current, if the Powers who
participated in the Congress of Vienna had not introduced as their
maxims of political morality the inflated and transparently insincere
professions of the Holy Alliance. Indeed, from the beginning to the end
of the Napoleonic period, the point of view that the coalitions against
him were fighting in behalf of nationalism and liberty is little short
of absurd. At almost any time France under Napoleon might have arranged
an alliance with England by offering her the bait of commercial
concessions; and even more unsubstantial than the Napoleonic legend
is its antithesis, that the Tory oligarchy of England were spending
hundreds of millions of pounds of their good money for the benefit of
the peoples and states on the Continent.
Napoleon’s inferiority cannot be discovered in his lack of morality as
a ruler, if morality be determined according to the standards of the
allied Powers; his chief opponents were trained and acted according to
the principles adopted in the partition of Poland. His lack of scruples
carried him farther, simply because of the immeasurable distance
between his own genius and the commonplace characteristics of any of
his antagonists. He built up his personal rule on his military skill
by consistent and well-directed effort. France was made the instrument
of his ambition; it was in his interest, not in the interest of the
country he ruled, that Germany, Italy, and Spain were made dependent
states. France would have been more solidly established, if, in spite
of all military success abroad, her ruler had been satisfied with her
natural frontiers.
Under Napoleon the divorce of national from personal aims is seen
in the changed character of the French army; there was no longer a
general levy as in the time of the Revolution, for in 1800-1804,
service was regulated by lot and by permission to provide substitutes.
Middle-class families as a rule took advantage of this permission, and
there were plenty of opportunities, because old soldiers were anxious
to re-engage for the service. War had become a profession. The mass of
the troops were made up of children of the people, while the officers
were mostly scions of well-to-do families. As time went on, owing to
the exhausting character of the wars, one year’s conscription was not
enough. Sometimes there was an anticipated enrollment of the conscripts
of the two following years. Then came the turn of the National Guard,
made up of men from forty to sixty years, and of those from twenty to
twenty-six who had been relieved from regular army service, because of
their poor physique or because their families were dependent on their
work; these, too, were placed on the active list.
Altogether 3,153,000 French soldiers were called upon for military duty
from 1800 to 1815. The losses from wounds and disease, apart from the
fatalities on the battlefield, were enormous. In all, the victims of
these wars are reckoned at 1,750,000 men. Oftentimes, those who desired
to escape military duty had to buy themselves off as many as three
times, and yet, even after spending $4000, they were obliged to take
part in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. Finally, owing to the scarcity
of officers, requisition by force was resorted to. Lists were made of
special families in Paris and the departments, whose children between
the ages of sixteen and eighteen were constrained to prepare themselves
for service at the military school at St. Cyr.
In the complicated system of the Napoleonic army, a place had to be
made for the various national elements and groups, who served in it.
But the characteristic feature was the Imperial Guard. In itself it was
a replica on a small scale of the whole force, because the various arms
of the service all found a place within it. It grew out of the consular
guard, first numbering 7000 men, then increased to 50,000, until it
was finally brought to 92,000 in 1813. The Guard was always with the
Emperor in a campaign, it fought under his eye, and was ordinarily
kept in reserve for a critical point of the battle. The section of
the Guard which was closest to the Emperor, was the mounted scouts or
“guides,” who wore a green uniform, the imperial color, and were first
commanded by his son-in-law, Eugène, and then by another member of the
Beauharnais house, Lefebre-Desnouettes. Napoleon described them as a
body of brave men who had always seen the enemies’ cavalry flee before
them. A part of this division was a corp of Mamelouks, recruited in the
Eastern campaign, from the Coptic and Syrian volunteers, a picturesque
body of men that still continued to wear Oriental dress, though later
on many Frenchmen were added to their number.
In the infantry divisions of the army little change was made; there
were grenadier regiments composed of the tallest and best proportioned
soldiers, and companies of slight, undersized men intended for the
kind of work done in the present Italian army by the bersaglieri.
Experiments with dismounted dragoons proved a failure. Napoleon’s
special work was the reorganization of the cavalry, an arm of the
service which had almost altogether disappeared at the time of the
Revolution, because large numbers of the cavalry officers went into
exile on account of their monarchical sympathies. The most conspicuous
branch of the cavalry was the hussars, who gained a reputation for
dare-devil bravery, and whose charges with drawn sabers were the
dramatic feature of an engagement. They were led by generals of the
type of Murat, Marbot, and Ségur.
As to the French artillery and engineers, their already high reputation
among European armies was fully maintained. In many of Napoleon’s
hardest contested battles, such as Eylau, Friedland, and Wagram,
the cannonading of the French played a decisive part. In the later
campaigns troops of the allied states came to be a more important
element, and they gave the army a cosmopolitan character. There were
German, Swiss, Italian, Spanish, Polish auxiliaries; even Albanians,
Greeks, and Tartars were represented in the enormous masses of men
drawn about the Emperor, in his final efforts to subjugate the European
continent.
The weapons used by the army showed no technical advance on those
employed in the last half of the eighteenth century. The guns were
flint-locks of the model of 1777, and the cannon were of the type
employed in 1765, most of them pieces of 12 and 6 with mortars that had
a carrying power of between 800 and 1900 feet.
Owing to the years of incessant warfare, the administration of the army
was the chief care of the government. It was under the supervision of
the Emperor himself, who was untiring in attending even to the most
minute details. He made frequent inspections, kept in personal touch
with his soldiers, and looked out for their comfort. In preparing for
a campaign he knew with accuracy all matters relating to the equipment
of his troops, the actual resources of the arsenals, and the amount
of military stores. But the army in the field was expected to provide
its own rations. “I made eight campaigns under the empire,” De Brack
said, “and always at the front; I never saw during this whole time a
single army commissary. I never touched a single ration from the army
stores. The soldiers depended on requisitions from the inhabitants or
on pillage.”
It was the Emperor’s maxim that war must support war. When in Spain he
wrote to Dijeon, the administrative director of war in Paris: “Send
back the reserves of cattle; I don’t want any foodstuffs, I have an
abundance of everything. What I need are caissons, military transports,
hats, and shoes; I have never seen a cavalry in which the troops had
as much to eat.” The requisitions that had been found so profitable in
the Italian campaign were continued without any regard for their effect
on the conquered country. Enormous stores of money were accumulated
in this way. After the treaty of Tilsit the treasury of the army was
credited with about $70,000,000, and Napoleon reckoned that he could
continue to make war for five years without increasing French taxation
or asking for a fresh loan.
As companions in arms Napoleon had under him a large number of able
generals, formed just as he had been, in the wars of the Revolution.
When the empire was constituted many became marshals. These were
selected from all classes of society: Davout, MacDonald, Marmont,
Grouchy, Clarke, from the old nobility; Monery, Bernadotte, Soult,
Mortier, Gouvion, Suchet, Brun-Junot, from the middle classes; Jourdan,
Masséna, Augereau, Murat, Bessières, Ney, Lannes, Victor, Oudinot,
Lecourbe, Sebastian, Driant were all children of the people. It was
the policy of the Emperor to have young men in command of his troops;
by 1813 there were forty-one cavalry generals alone, who, though
less than fifty years old, were on the retired list. The life of an
officer was so strenuous that there was little chance of resisting
for long the tremendous demands made on the constitution by the long
marches and frequent battles. Advancement was speedy and the rewards
were munificent; many of the marshals received princely titles with
pay suitable to their rank. For example, Berthier’s annual income was
over $250,000. Masséna, Davout, and Ney were almost as well provided
for. After the battle of Eylau each guest at the Emperor’s table found
under his plate a 1000-franc bill. But these personal rewards were not
at all confined to those in high command. The Emperor was careful to
retain the devoted loyalty of his men by words and acts of personal
note, which by their spontaneity kept the army from being turned into
a mere mechanical organism. He went among the men, rewarding those
who had distinguished themselves on the field of battle, and showing
consideration to the wounded and the weary. The weak spot in the
army was the practice of pillage. The soldiers were forced to it and
regarded it as their right. Their exactions, too, were imitated on
a large scale by the commanders and marshals. Masséna made millions
by selling trade permits during the blockade against England. Soult
despoiled Spain of works of art and exacted large contributions from
rich monasteries.
In his economic policy, Napoleon followed the principles of the Bourbon
princes; he was a thorough-going disciple of the mercantilist school.
It was his purpose to ruin England; hence the severest enactments were
promulgated against colonial products and cotton, both prime articles
of English trade. Vessels touching English ports were excluded; not
only were high duties imposed on coffee, sugar, and cocoa, but cotton
fabrics were entirely prohibited. In 1806, when the English government
declared all the French ports from Brest to the mouth of the Elbe
closed, and subjected neutral vessels to search, Napoleon issued
the decree of Berlin by which the British Isles were declared to be
blockaded. All commerce with England was prohibited and no ship which
touched the English shores was admitted to a French port. Then came
from London the so-called Orders in Council by which neutral ships were
required to go to London, Malta, and other places subject to England,
to have their cargoes examined and to get permits to trade which had
to be paid for at high rates. The next stage in this economic war was
Napoleon’s decree of Milan, 1807 (December 7), which declared that
every ship which had been visited by English officials or had touched
at an English port should lose its nationality and be regarded as a
lawful prize.
These drastic measures were never rigidly applied, for there grew up
a system of exemption by special permits excepting certain articles.
Smuggling, practised on a large scale, acted also as an ameliorating
factor; indeed, after 1810 colonial products were admitted into France,
though at a high rate of duty, but the war against cotton continued.
Everywhere it was found, it was seized, and confiscated or burnt.
The result of this system for France was worse than for England, for
by her mastery of the sea the latter power was able to maintain both
her industries and her credit, while France had to pay more for raw
products and, the export of her goods being hampered, the price in
the home market was artificially lowered. In 1802, foreign commerce
reached a sum total of 790,000,000 francs, of which exports accounted
for 325,000,000; ten years later the figures were 640,000,000 and
383,000,000, respectively.
In finance the Napoleonic régime showed no disposition to make
innovations; only in details was the fiscal system altered. There
was no regular budget in the modern sense of the term; the accounts
for each year were kept open, and in order to make the yearly
balance, the resources of other years were drawn upon. Apart from
these financial irregularities, which, in the absence of any real
legislative representative system, were not criticised or counted, the
administration of the finances of the empire was carefully directed.
The officials were required to do their work well; there was no red
tape, and full value was received for every franc expended. Napoleon
was vigilant in defending the interests of the treasury, and he treated
it as his own patrimony.
In no phase do his gifts as a ruler shine more conspicuously than in
his refusal to increase the public debt to any considerable extent. At
the fall of the Directory there were 46,000,000 francs of Rentes in
French government bonds; his government added only 17,000,000 to this
amount. He did not trust to credit to carry on his wars, the bankruptcy
of the Revolution being too fresh in the minds of French bondholders.
We have noticed before how he expected the extraordinary expenses of
warfare to be supplied. His forethought in raising contributions,
hard as it was for the conquered countries, was a blessing to French
investors.
This care for a sound financial position sustained confidence in
the Napoleonic régime, even when its master was engaged in the most
hazardous military adventures. In the autumn of 1799 government five
per cents. were quoted at seven francs. In 1800 the lowest quotation
was 17.37, the highest 44. Each year the rise continued until it
attained its extreme limit in May, 1808, when it marked 88.15 francs.
Then there was a gradual fall. In March, 1814, the quotation was 45
francs, a year later it had risen to 81.65. Napoleon gave as much and
as watchful attention to the maintenance of public credit as he did to
the details of army administration. At the beginning of the Consulate
he proceeded to restore public confidence by abolishing forced loans
and by introducing specie payments. His only questionable financial
operation was the employment of the money allotted to the sinking fund,
to sustain artificially, at critical periods, the price of government
securities, in order to deceive public opinion as to the importance of
French defeats.
One of the first steps taken by Napoleon on his attainment of the
supreme executive power was to make peace with the Church. Under the
anti-religious legislation of the Revolution, in which most of the
clergy and bishops had been declared outlaws, the social order had
added to its other ills religious chaos. After the battle of Marengo
in 1800, Napoleon, in an address to the clergy of Milan, laid down
the following principles for his church policy: “No society can exist
without morality, and there can be no good morality without religion.
Religion alone gives the state a firm and stable support. A society
without religion is like a vessel without a compass; France, taught by
her misfortunes, has finally opened her eyes; she has recognized that
the Catholic religion is, as it were, an anchor, that alone can keep
her steady, in her time of stress.”
He had no purpose, however, to allow the Church to secure for itself an
organization, that might appeal to the people, apart from or contrary
to the government. His ideal was an ecclesiastical machine which could
be controlled exactly as if it were a government department. Under
such assumptions a concordat was arranged with the Papacy, whose power
Napoleon respected. He ordered his agent at Rome, who conducted the
negotiations, to treat the Pope as if he had 200,000 men. For some time
the discussion dragged, because Pius VII refused to accept certain
reforms which seemed to threaten the independence of the hierarchy.
Finally, the terms were arranged under which the First Consul gained
his two chief points: the introduction of an entirely new episcopate
with a reduction of dioceses and the recognition of the alienation of
church property during the Revolution.
Among the most important features of this instrument was the
declaration that the Catholic religion should be freely exercised in
France, but that it was to conform itself to such police regulations
as the government should judge necessary for public tranquillity.
The new bishops were to be presented by the state and instituted by
the Pope. Parish priests were to be appointed by the bishops, but
the appointment could be vetoed by the state, and the payment of the
bishops and priests was undertaken by the government. A number of the
former constitutional bishops, who had been in schism with Rome, were
appointed in the new hierarchy which now numbered sixty members. The
introduction of the clause mentioned above relating to the police
powers of the state was used as a ground for a whole series of “organic
articles” by which the French Church was bound hand and foot to the
Napoleonic system; they were but a revival of the Gallican principles
adopted by Louis XIV to help him to become the supreme administrator
of the Church in France. Rome naturally protested, for these articles
interfered with the autocratic system of the Curia. Acts of the Holy
See and decrees of councils were not legalized in France unless they
were verified by the government. Bishops could not consult together
without a license from the government, or retire from their dioceses
temporarily, without a permit. In many other details episcopal
jurisdiction and church autonomy were interfered with. But all protests
were in vain, and Pius VII conformed reluctantly to the will of the
master of Western Europe, hoping that the slow-going diplomacy of his
Secretary of State, Consalvi, would secure future concessions.
The first friction between the Emperor and the Pope occurred over the
introduction of religious orders. None were authorized except certain
orders for women, engaged in charitable or relief work. On December
2, 1804, after much hesitation, the Pope agreed to come to Paris to
participate in the imperial coronation. He was treated with respect,
but during the ceremony, when he was about to place the crown on
Napoleon’s head, the Emperor with a show of displeasure took it out of
his hands and crowned himself. On one ground or another Pius was kept
in France for several months, as Napoleon was glad to have the head of
the Church placed in a subordinate position before the world as a kind
of Grand Almoner to the Emperor of the French.