the rôle of a puppet in his hands, and he wondered because “great lord
as he was, that being a prisoner as he was, he was so much obeyed.”
On his own initiative, Montezuma addressed his chieftains, telling
them that the Spaniards were sent by Quetzalcohuatl, and begging them
to be obedient to Cortez in every respect, urging them to accept
their position of vassalage to Spain. This was the signal for another
great collecting expedition among the Aztec feudatories, the chief
contributor being Montezuma himself. The chronicler’s powers of
description are exhausted in enumerating the wealth that poured into
the hands of the eager adventurers. There was no scruple in taking what
was left after the regular tribute of vassalage had been paid.
The commander, however, was very unwilling to proceed to the
distribution, and when he could resist his soldiers’ demands no
longer, it was found that the greater part of the three and a half
million dollars’ worth of metal had been retained by the leader and
the captains. He met their complaints by telling them that they all
would be very prosperous and rich, because they would be the masters
of rich cities and mines. As a more practical argument, he went among
the soldiers giving them secretly gold ornaments, and making individual
promises of reward.
Meanwhile the rapacity of the adventurers and their open display of
their wealth did not bring so much odium upon them as their forcible
efforts to convert the natives. A Christian chapel was placed in the
chief temple, an action which seems to have contributed to destroy the
illusion among the people that there existed some relation between
the newcomers and their god Quetzalcohuatl. The undisguised enmity
soon came to a head in plans for a revolt that included a general
massacre of the Europeans. When information of the plot was conveyed
to Montezuma, who seemed worried at the fate of his strange guests and
advised their leaving the city, Cortez spoke of the destruction of his
ships and told the king that, when ships were prepared, the latter must
go with them to see their emperor. Workmen were sent to Villa Rica to
prepare the vessels, but it was probably with no serious intent beyond
the purpose of deceiving the prisoners.
This was the state of affairs after five months’ residence in Mexico,
when news came that Spanish ships were off the coast, 16 vessels,
large and small, 1400 soldiers, 80 horses, and 20 pieces of artillery.
When the envoys landed, they summoned the captain of Vera Cruz to
accept as superior officer Narvaez, who had been sent by Velasquez
to take possession of the country. The four Spanish envoys were
hurried off as prisoners under an escort of natives who, by forced
marches night and day, reached Mexico in four days. Cortez, with
characteristic diplomacy, excused the rude behavior of his lieutenant.
Indeed, adequate reparation was made, not only by smooth speeches,
of which Cortez was past-master, but by the more telling arguments
of gold strips and ornaments. They, in turn, told all they knew of
the expedition of Narvaez, and regained the coast, won over by the
munificence and the amicable manners of the commander.
No time was lost in heading off Narvaez’ expedition from entrance into
the interior. Cortez took most of his men and probably a large force of
the native allies sufficient to block Narvaez’ march to the capital.
Only 130 Spaniards were left in Mexico under the command of Alvarado.
While Narvaez was sojourning at Cempoala despoiling the neighborhood of
the few valuables that remained there after Cortez’ march, one of the
ecclesiastics from Cortez’ army was sent to visit the rival camp. He
showed much dexterity in winning over important men-at-arms, especially
those of the artillery, by a judicious distribution of gifts, though
outwardly he made loud profession of devotion to Narvaez. The work of
this skilled emissary was made the easier because Narvaez kept all the
spoil he collected for himself; the contrast was not left unnoticed by
the men whom the commander had won.
When the work of undermining Narvaez’ men had been completed, the
Friar Olmedo found it easy to break off negotiations and return to
his own camp. There was now little difficulty in settling the affairs
between the two captains without bloodshed; Narvaez’ men were ready
to abandon him. Cortez, as he explains in a letter to Charles V,
after drawing near to Cempoala with his army, entered Narvaez’ camp
with a few followers by night and, before he was observed, took his
rival prisoner. There was only a little fighting; two were killed by
artillery fire in preventing those who wished to rescue Narvaez from
entering a tower where he had his quarters. This strategy seemed to
Cortez the best way “to avoid a scandal,” but less satisfactory to his
men was the division of booty found in the camp. Cortez gave it all
to Narvaez’ men. “They were many and we were few,” Diaz del Castillo
regretfully explains; “Cortez feared that they might kill him and his
small band of men-at-arms.”
With the advent of this new army of marauders in the country there
appeared a plague of smallpox, a disease hitherto unknown. It made
frightful ravages, and its effects were compared by the Indians to
those of leprosy. No mention is made of the epidemic by Cortez; he was
too alarmed at the news which came from Mexico to heed the sufferings
of the native population, who were dying like cattle. While he had
been so successful on the coast, his garrison in the capital had
been attacked; their quarters had been partly burned and undermined,
and Cortez was afraid that all the treasure would be lost, his men
massacred, and the city sacrificed. No word had come from Montezuma; it
seemed that the worst must have happened.
The difficult situation in which Alvarado was placed was due to his own
brutality. Before Cortez had left the city, he had given permission
that the festival of the god Toxcatl should be celebrated with the
accustomed ceremonies. Alvarado added as further conditions that they
should bear no arms nor offer human sacrifices. This festal occasion
lent itself readily to a repetition of the butchery of Cholula, and
some authorities go so far as to think that Cortez had given secret
commands for the massacre before he set off for the coast. While the
chiefs, warriors, and other leading men, more than 1000 in number,
were solemnly dancing in honor of their god in the court of the
temple, unarmed and covered with gold ornaments and jewels and singing
as they moved about, half the men of the Spanish garrison entered
and ranged themselves around the wall, after closing the entrances
to the courtyard. The Indians, thinking they had come in as curious
spectators, made no break in the ordinary ritual; suddenly the dancers
and the spectators were set upon, and the patio of the temple was soon
filled with dismembered heads, arms, and legs. The court was soon
nothing but a human shambles. Some tried to escape by climbing over the
side walls or by rushing up the temple steps; others feigned to be
dead; only a few saved themselves.
The massacre lasted an hour, and, carefully planned as it must have
been, no hitch occurred during its progress. The people outside finally
got news of what was happening and, picking up their weapons, they made
savage attacks on the Spaniards, forcing them back to their quarters.
Alvarado himself was wounded on the head. Finding refuge, the Spaniards
barricaded themselves as well as they could, and the Indians turned to
bury their dead, an operation which took many days on account of the
elaborate ceremonial required by the dignity of those who had perished.
After the funeral ceremonies, the Mexicans returned impetuously to the
attack on the Spanish quarters.
It would have gone hard with Cortez’ men if Montezuma had not
interfered in their behalf. Speaking from the roof of the building
where he was kept a prisoner, he gave orders to the Aztec warriors
to stop the fight. Cortez had heard of the massacre from both sides,
as Montezuma had sent to him envoys to complain of Alvarado’s wanton
slaughter in the temple. He promised to do justice when he arrived,
and also spoke, as a proof of his peaceful temper, of the small force
he was bringing back with him. As a matter of fact, when he re-entered
the city there were over 1000 Europeans and many allies with him; in
Tlaxcala alone he enlisted the services of 2000 men. No opposition was
made to this formidable force taking up their old quarters.
It was strange that Cortez, who was usually quick to punish any
contravention of his orders, took no account of the massacre. He omits
mentioning it in his letters to Charles V, and it is not surprising
that Friar Sahagun reports that Cortez approved of the crime and told
Alvarado he had done well. In the disturbed conditions in the city no
market was held, and the Spaniards were no longer provided with food.
Montezuma excused the omission because of his imprisonment. Threatening
words were spoken by Cortez, and from this time his prisoner ceased to
exert any influence to prevent the revolt against the invaders.
A messenger sent out to Vera Cruz returned to his comrades with the
news a half hour later that the whole city was up in arms. Even a group
of 200 Spaniards could make no headway through the streets. The Indians
faced the artillery in close array, and as fast as they were mowed
down, the gaps were filled up by others. They fought with a desperation
which caused wonderment even from men in Cortez’ army who had served
against the Turks. Constructions of wood were made to protect the
Spaniards from the showers of stones that poured down on them from
the housetops, while they tried to clear the streets covered with
barricades. But they could make no progress, and finally they withdrew
to their quarters, pursued by the Aztecs, who entered the palace in the
face of the desperate resistance of the Europeans. They threatened to
leave no Spaniard alive, yet they begged as suppliants for their lord
Montezuma to be given back to them.
Though there are conflicting details given of the Aztec attack on the
Spanish quarters, there is not much doubt but that Montezuma had been
killed on the morning of the 27th of August, the day the wooden engines
were first used. The monarch was no longer of any use now that he had
refused to keep the revolt in check. There are different accounts of
the murder, but there seems a fairly general agreement that Montezuma
was stabbed to death.
As there was no longer any hope of defending their quarters
successfully, Cortez tried to save himself and his men by a ruse. The
dead body of the Aztec ruler was taken up on the roof, covered with a
large shield so that the fact that it was a corpse could not be seen
clearly. Then one of the feudatories, the lord of Tlaclolco, addressed
the crowd and bade them, as if speaking in the presence of his master,
to give up the attack on the Spaniards, because, if they persisted, he
was afraid he would be killed. Little impression was made; injurious
words were spoken against the vacillating and effeminate ruler,
supposedly still alive before them. There was a volley of arrows, and
some say the body was struck by a stone. This is the basis of a story
circulated purposely by Cortez and others that the monarch had died
from the wounds received on the roof, where he had gone voluntarily to
speak to his people. It was a dangerous thing for Cortez to confess to
the murder, for Montezuma, be it remembered, had accepted the position
of a vassal of the Spanish crown. When the Aztecs showed no sign of
taking a peaceful attitude, Cortez himself tried the plan of addressing
them from the roof, but his diplomacy was of no avail. The only
conditions offered were withdrawal from Aztec territory; as long as he
stayed in the city, the Aztecs said, they would keep up the fight.
Further essays at street combats showed this to be no idle threat;
forty-six Spaniards were killed and persistent attempts were made to
pull down the walls of their quarters, while missiles of all kinds were
directed on the defenders day and night. In order to bring some relief
to this perilous position, Cortez sent one of the prisoners to announce
the death of Montezuma, and offered to give up the body, knowing that
the burial ceremonies would keep his enemies occupied for several
days. But the animosity of the people was not to be diverted from
their prey. Cortez was afraid that the one causeway, that to Tlacopan,
would be destroyed and the sole means of escape cut off. His men were
discouraged; indeed, those who had belonged to Narvaez’ expedition were
in a state of mutiny.
One of the Aztec priests and other leading men previously held as
prisoners were sent to ask permission for the Spaniards to leave on
condition that all the gold should be given up. Timbers were prepared
to place across the ditches near the causeway, and a plan of escape
was mapped out for the Europeans and their allies. The treasure was
carefully guarded by the allies, but before the night appointed for the
retreat all the Aztec prisoners were put to death. The soldiers also
found a large quantity of gold which they divided among themselves.
The exit from the city began just before midnight; there was a severe
thunderstorm which kept the Europeans from being observed until they
got past the first ditch; here they were seen by a native woman who was
drawing water there. She gave the alarm, and before the second ditch
was reached the Mexican warriors had gathered to annihilate their
enemies. There was immediately a panic, and those who were carrying the
gold were forced into the ditch. Diaz remarks laconically, “The gold
killed them and they died rich.”
The only Europeans saved were those who carried small amounts of gold.
On the mass of Indian allies drowning in the ditch the Spaniards threw
their loads; using this living embankment a few of them made their
way to safety. Everyone looked out for himself, and when Cortez was
reproached for deserting his men, he replied that it was a miracle
that anyone had crossed the causeway alive. It was some time before
Alvarado, with the miserable surviving rear-guard of seven soldiers,
all in a sad plight, reached the main body of the army at Tlacopan.
(August, 1520.)
As long as they were in Aztec territory, there was little chance of
escaping annihilation, for the disconsolate army after their night
journey were set upon by the warriors of the neighboring pueblos. Their
Tlaxcalan allies guided them along devious trails until they reached
Totoltepec, where the fugitives found some temporary security in a
temple, which they were glad to use as a fortress. Fortunately they
were not actually pursued by the main body of the Aztec fighting men,
who remained behind to collect the gold and jewels cast aside by the
Spaniards, and to spoil the dead. Besides, a number of Spaniards had
either by choice or by necessity remained in the city. According to one
authority not all of Cortez’ soldiers were acquainted with the plan
for the night journey; others preferred not to desert their treasures.
It is computed that 270 Europeans kept up the fight in the city and
then surrendered. During the rest of the retreat there were some sharp
skirmishes, and because of their fatigue and discouragement the army’s
power of resistance was soon exhausted. Thanks to their native allies,
however, they were brought finally to a place of safety in the friendly
pueblo of Tlaxcala. The losses had been terrible, nearly 1000 men had
perished, besides 4000 of the Tlaxcalans and other natives. At Tlaxcala
there was much mourning for the great calamity which had robbed the
place of its best warriors, but there was no hesitation in offering
Cortez their continued support in resuming the war against the Aztecs.
Cortez was careful to give instructions to his men to treat the
inhabitants with consideration and not to rob them of their property.
These orders did not cause so much dissatisfaction to the survivors as
Cortez’ high-handed procedure in appropriating for himself whatever he
could find of the gold that had been saved in the panic of the retreat.
Many of the Spaniards spoke of returning to the coast to sail back to
Cuba. Cortez’ iron will now stood him in good stead; he quieted his own
men, and arranged to start immediately a campaign against Mexico by the
help of the Tlaxcalans, promising as the price of their aid a part of
all the conquests he made and various privileges and exemptions from
tribute.
This offer proved an attractive one not only to the Tlaxcalans but
to other natives who saw a further chance of securing their freedom
from their Mexican overlords. Over 100,000 men were collected, either
by promises or by methods of terrorism; any pueblo that resisted
was sacked and the inhabitants massacred. Tepeacac, the center of
resistance, was taken; its men were put to death, and the women and
children set apart as slaves. As time went on, various individual
adventurers appeared off the coast, and by degrees the losses in
Europeans, in artillery, and in horses were made up. This good fortune
caused so much satisfaction to the veterans of Cortez’ army and their
commander that he resolved to undertake the seemingly hopeless task of
besieging Mexico itself. Additional re-enforcements and the necessary
war supplies were brought from Hispaniola, and in order to attack the
Aztec capital in its most vulnerable point brigantines were prepared on
the lake, since it was realized that it was impossible to force now an
entrance over the causeways.
By the end of December all was ready. The Europeans numbered not quite
700 men, while the native contingent is placed by some at 150,000. From
Tlaxcala, 10,000 were asked for, but many more volunteered. As the army
proceeded, they found no great difficulty in occupying the places on
their route. Some, like Texcoco, had been partially deserted by the
inhabitants, who had the forethought to remove their goods. In disgust
the Spaniards burnt the town and its palace where all the ancient
records in picture scrolls of the Aztec kingdom were preserved. The
ravages of the smallpox weakened the Aztec resistance, and among those
who died was the implacable enemy of the Spaniards, Cuitlahuac, the
brother of Montezuma, who had been chosen as his successor. His death
at the end of November was a loss hard to repair. Even Diaz speaks of
him as “a valiant man and very prudent.”
As their next chieftain they selected Cuauhtemoc, a cousin of
Montezuma, a young man who, during the period of the Spanish occupation
of Mexico, had distinguished himself by his active opposition to it.
He had taken a leading rôle in the revolt that had brought about the
evacuation of the capital, and he now set forward upon the work of
defense with great intelligence. Orders were sent to the dependent
pueblos to unite in repelling the European invasion, and the tribute
was remitted. Care was taken to collect treasures and arms, and
Mexico itself was placed in a state of defense by the construction of
intrenchments and ditches. Cuauhtemoc’s plan of campaign consisted in
concentrating all the available forces in the capital, yet offensive
tactics were skilfully applied. His hand was seen when the Spaniards
occupied Iztapalapa; here the inhabitants deserted the pueblo, and
while their enemies were peacefully enjoying the spoil and resting in
their quarters, the sluices were opened, and had not the natives of
Texcoco warned Cortez in time all would have been drowned.
Desultory warfare continued for a time on the shores of the lake,
Cortez’ policy being to exact vengeance for the hostility of the lake
pueblos during the retreat. Many were razed to the ground and burnt.
But strenuous operations did not begin until the brigantines were
finished. For their construction Cortez was indebted to the skill and
industry of the people of Tlaxcala, who at their own expense cut the
wood, and transported it over mountainous defiles by bad roads to their
own pueblo, where it was cut into shape for the vessels. Thence the
pieces were carried eighteen leagues overland to Texcoco on the lake,
where, fastened together, they were transformed into ships ready for
navigation.
Futile attempts were made by the Aztecs to set fire to this navy, for
they recognized the danger of an attack from the water, but there was
no thought of surrender. Untiringly, night and day, they prepared for
the siege, making new weapons to meet the attacks of cavalry, and
constructing barricades in the streets. The Spaniards also had to do
much preliminary work to enable the fleet to get into deep water; 8000
Indians were constantly employed in digging a channel from the shore
sufficient to accommodate the draught of the brigantines.
All was ready on the 28th of April, 1521. The brigantines were manned
with European troops and artillerymen; but as usual the mass of the
army was made of native auxiliaries, probably underestimated by Cortez
at 80,000 men. Altogether the Spanish nucleus numbered about 1100, half
of them lately come to join the veterans. Efforts were made to arrange
terms of peace, but the Aztecs refused to listen to Cortez’ complaints
of bad treatment and disloyal conduct on the part of his late hosts.
At every point of the advance to the city, Cortez encountered stubborn
enmity. There was fighting both on the lake and on the shore, that
showed the temper of the people. The brigantines were surrounded by
a flotilla of canoes as they proceeded on their way; but it was an
unequal combat because the frail canoes of the Aztecs were exposed to
the gunfire of the ships. Under the protection of the brigantines a
landing was effected on the causeway. Step by step, the defenders were
forced back towards the town; as long as they fought on the causeway
they were exposed to the raking volleys of the guns on the brigantines.
It was a long, tedious process to take the many barricades of the city,
and even when the principal street was reached the determined onslaught
of the Aztecs forced the Spaniards back to the causeway bridges. No
real ground was gained in these first skirmishes, although there was a
concerted plan between Cortez and his lieutenants that they should make
for the center of the city at the same time. While the siege was being
resisted with such desperation, the straits of the Aztecs induced the
neighboring pueblos to send out large contingents of men to break the
power that had so long kept them in bondage. Cortez notices especially
the support given him from Texcoco both in men and in provisions; they
kept on the lake 1000 canoes going and coming with supplies, and 32,000
warriors.
In order to starve the city out, the water supply had been cut off
before the siege began, and it was hoped that by guarding the causeways
no food could be brought in. Much skill was shown by the Aztecs in
overcoming these difficulties; they sent out many canoes by night, a
flotilla of specially large canoes filled with warriors who did not
hesitate to grapple with the brigantines. One they captured, and they
inflicted heavy losses on the equipment of others. The resourcefulness
of the defenders was worthy of the skilled campaigners of Europe; but
the problem of the food supply could not be solved by deeds of heroism,
and famine was more destructive than the weapons of their enemies. They
faced not only the actual distress from scarcity of supplies but also
the desertion of the city itself by large numbers of warriors who could
not be fed within the walls.
The methods of warfare on both sides were worthy of the combatants.
Whenever the Spaniards or their allies were taken prisoners, they were
treated as victims for sacrifice and offered up in the various temples
of the gods with ordinary ceremonial rites. The Spaniards, whenever
they entered the streets, burnt and destroyed everything within reach,
temples and houses. The rage of the Aztecs at the destruction of all
they held dear showed itself in their furious attacks on their enemies
as they drew back at nightfall to their camp outside.