putting to good use his superiority in naval strength. Several islands
had either been occupied or were making preparations to join the
Persian general, and even in continental Greece the anti-Macedonian
influence was being felt. There was no question that Memnon’s arrival
on the shores of European Greece would be the signal for a general
abandonment of the Macedonian cause. Athens even sent an embassy to
Darius, although the city did not dare to join the Persians openly. In
the midst of these successes, Memnon was taken ill and died. Those who
succeeded him in the command showed none of his capacity. The fleet
was kept in inactivity, and though on land some small successes could
be put to the credit of the Persian arms in Asia Minor, the soldiers
operating there were soon directed to join the main army of Darius
in Syria, now being collected to meet the advancing Greeks. When the
news of Alexander’s victory at the Granicus reached the interior of
the Persian Empire, Darius began to draw together a large army, and
leaving Babylon in January, reached northern Syria in autumn. Alexander
was still in Cilicia, detained in Tarsus by a severe illness, and on
his recovery busied himself with the conquest of some of the coast
cities. But when he heard of the advance of Darius, he marched trough
the narrow pass near the coast which connects Cilicia and Syria, and
commenced the siege of Myriandros, the first Phœnician city on the
road. He evidently reckoned on Darius meeting him in the level places
of northern Persia, where the latter’s cavalry could be used to its
best advantage, but Darius showed a keener strategical instinct than is
usually associated with Persian generalship. While Alexander was taking
the coast road south, Darius’ army made a northerly movement, passing
over a difficult mountain region, and so appeared in the rear of the
Macedonian army on the level plain near Issus. The Persians had a
strong position; on their right was the sea, and on their left a chain
of mountains. On the front they were protected by the deeply worn bed
of the river Pinarus. They had also constructed a line of earthworks.
The preliminary operations of the Persians were conducted with
great intelligence. By them Alexander was cut off from his base and
his position was desperate, unless he could restore his line of
communications by a successful engagement. This was no easy matter, for
the mountain defile, the Assyrian Gate, had to be passed through, a
place where the mountains and the sea are so close that there is room
only for a road. Darius had an excellent position but failed to make
any use of it. Without attempting to interfere he allowed Alexander to
march through the narrow strip of land between the mountains and the
sea and to change from a column formation into regular battle array.
It took the Greek commander the whole night to make the journey from
Myriandros, a place south of the defile, to the level country on the
banks of the Pinarus. As Alexander’s army debouched on the plain, the
cavalry and the light-armed troops sent against them by Darius failed
to arrest their progress. The Persians were outmanœuvered from the
start, for on the plain, which had very narrow limits--a little more
than two miles wide--Darius could make no use of his superior numbers,
nor was there opportunity for bringing to bear to any purpose the
Persian advantage in cavalry. It was possible for Alexander to extend
his own line of battle just as far as the enemy could, and the nature
of the ground protected him against any enveloping manœuver. Thus the
disposable forces, on either side, were equalized, and on account of
the superior training and skill of the Macedonians, there was little
doubt from the first as to the issue of the fight.
On the Greek side the left wing was commanded by Alexander in person,
and it was made up of the Macedonian cavalry, the hypaspists, and
a part of the ordinary infantry. The vigor of their onslaught was
irresistible, and the Asiatics opposed to them gave way after a short
struggle and fled. The whole Persian center was disorganized, even
Darius avoiding capture with difficulty. His chariots, his royal robes,
and his arms fell into the hands of the victorious Greeks. In another
part of the field Parmenio, who was in command of the left wing of
the Greek army, had no easy time in withstanding the charges of the
Asiatic cavalry, and also when the Macedonian phalanx undertook to
storm the heights which were occupied by Greek mercenary troops on the
other side, they were repulsed with considerable loss. Fortunately,
Alexander, after defeating the division opposed to him, was able to use
his infantry to attack the mercenaries on their rear, and they were
forced to withdraw from the field. They retired in good order, but the
Persian cavalry proved inefficient, and were repulsed with great loss.
In their flight they demoralized the reserves which had been placed
by the Persians immediately behind the line of battle. The Persian
army ceased to exist as a military entity and the fugitives were saved
from further pursuit only by the early nightfall of the autumn season.
Darius was able to bring together on the other side of the Syrian
mountains 4000 men, most of whom were Greek mercenaries, and with a
small force he recrossed the Euphrates. The main body of the Greeks,
attached to the army of Darius, made their way to Tripolis in Phœnicia
and from there sailed to Cyprus. (October, 333 B.C.)
After the battle the Persian camp was occupied by the Greeks, and
among the captives were the mother of Darius and his wife, Stateira,
and her children. These members of the royal household were treated
considerately. Their presence with the Greek army was a most
valuable asset, and a few days after his defeat Darius began to open
negotiations for the purpose of having the captives restored to him.
Alexander showed no unfriendly spirit, and received an embassy with
formal proposals of peace from Darius. The conditions were, that all of
the country west of the Euphrates should be ceded and the large sum of
10,000 talents given for the return of the royal captives. In addition
to this, as a pledge of good faith, it was proposed that Alexander
should receive one of the king’s daughters in marriage. The offer was a
proof that Darius realized how deep was his humiliation and how small
the chance of successful resistance to the conqueror.
Liberal as the terms were, it must have been plain to Alexander that
to make peace now was to leave his work half finished, especially as
the first half was the more difficult. In it he had defeated the best
soldiers under the command of Darius, and there was nothing more to
fear from the Persian fleet, its most important units being withdrawn
to protect Syria, nor was a rising in Greece likely to be attempted.
The news of the battle of Issus had made the anti-Macedonian faction
in the Greek cities see the purposelessness of counting on the
co-operation of Persia. At the Isthmian games the representatives of
the Hellenic confederation voted Alexander a golden crown as a defender
of the liberties of Greece.
Alexander answered the proposition of the Persian king in a stern
mood, fully conscious of his strength. His letter to Darius, which
has been preserved, is a document that speaks in no uncertain tone.
“Your ancestors invaded Macedonia and the rest of Greece, and without
provocation inflicted wrongs upon us. I was appointed leader of the
Greeks and crossed over into Asia for the purpose of avenging those
wrongs; for ye were the first aggressors. In the next place ye assisted
the people of Perinthus, who were offenders against my father, and
Ochus sent a force into Thrace, which was part of our empire. Further,
the conspirators who slew my father were suborned by you, as ye
yourselves boasted in your letters. Thou with the help of Bagoas didst
murder Arses (son of Ochus) and seize the throne unjustly and contrary
to the law of the Persians, and then thou didst write improper letters
regarding me to the Greeks, to incite them to war against me, and
didst send to the Lacedæmonians and other of the Greeks, for the same
purpose, sums of money (whereof none of the other cities partook but
only the Lacedæmonians); and these emissaries corrupted my friends
and tried to dissolve the peace which I had brought about in Greece.
Wherefore I marched forth against thee who wert the aggressor in
general. I have overcome in battle first thy generals and satraps, and
now thyself and thine host, and possess thy land through the grace of
the gods. Those who fought on thy side and were not slain but took
refuge with me, are under my protection and are glad to be with me and
will fight with me henceforward. I am lord of all Asia, and therefore
do thou come to me. If thou art afraid of being evilly entreated, send
some of thy friends to receive sufficient guaranties. Thou hast only to
come to me to ask and receive thy mother and children, and whatsoever
else thou mayest desire. And for the future whenever thou sendest, send
to me as to the Great King of Asia, and do not write as to an equal,
but tell me whatever thy need be, as to one who is lord of all that is
thine. Otherwise I shall deal with thee as an offender. But if thou
disputest the kingdom, then wait and fight for it again and do not
flee; for I will march against thee, wherever thou mayest be.”
Darius now set about collecting another army and made no more peace
proposals. He gathered the fragments of the force that had been beaten
at Issus, and to this were added contingents drawn from all the
furthermost parts of his empire still in his hands. The army so formed
was almost exclusively Asiatic, for of Greek mercenaries there were
only the soldiers, a few thousand all told, who had followed him in his
flight. No others could now be secured. Darius’ new plan was to await
the approach of Alexander on the plains of Assyria, where the Persian
cavalry could be used with most effect.
On Alexander’s part there was no haste in turning to the interior.
Instead of following Darius, he remained on the sea coast, while
Parmenio was sent to Damascus with half the Greek army, to seize the
treasure left there by Darius before the battle of Issus. Alexander
with the rest of the army turned south to the conquest of the great
island city of Phœnicia, which unlike its smaller neighbors had refused
to surrender and had declared its neutrality to Alexander. Tyre was the
center of Persian sea power, and so long as it remained independent its
fleet could be used against the Greek king, either on the sea itself or
as an instrument for creating disturbances in continental Greece.
The siege of Tyre involved special difficulties; not only were its
walls high and strong, but it was situated on an island separated
from the mainland by a shallow body of water. As Alexander had no
fleet adequate to conduct aggressive operations from the open sea
against the city, he planned to bring up his siege engines against
the walls from the land side, by building a causeway over the shallow
body of water. The defenders of the town tried repeatedly and with
great bravery to prevent such an approach from being made. Tyre’s own
commercial competitors, Cyprus and the less important Phœnician cities,
including Sidon, placed their navies at Alexander’s disposition, and
with their ships he began to operate from the sea. The situation of the
town was desperate, but its people made a defense as desperate and as
resourceful as their daughter city Carthage in later days against the
Romans.
When the causeway was finally constructed, the walls on this side,
being 150 feet high and enormously thick, were not damaged by the
siege engines. Accordingly Alexander changed his plans quickly; the
engines were mounted in vessels and a breach was effected in one of the
battlements extending along the harbor. While the Macedonians were now
able to penetrate the city, they met with heavy resistance from the
besieged townsmen, and the occupation of Tyre was only effected by the
protection of Alexander’s naval allies, who forced an entrance into the
two harbors, and so drew off a portion of the defenders from the side
where the Greeks were making their attack. The stubborn defense cost
the Tyrians 8000 men, and of the prisoners 3000 were sold as slaves.
On the Macedonian side the loss was small, only amounting to 400 men,
but no mention is made of the losses of the allied fleets. The siege of
Tyre lasted seven months, the city falling in July, 332. The long delay
was worth while, for the successful issue showed how invincible was the
generalship of the Greek leader. By the possession of the city he held
the key to the control of the eastern Mediterranean.
On the way south he met with no resistance except from the strong
citadel at Gaza, which withstood him for two months and was finally
taken by storm. The march to Egypt could now be safely undertaken,
as the whole sea coast from the Hellespont south was in the hands
of the Greeks. Egypt itself had no love for its Persian masters. It
had not long before been autonomous for fifty years, and it had been
brought back under the régime of the Great King under circumstances of
repression that made its inhabitants greet Alexander as a liberator.
The Persian governor, seeing the folly of resistance, gave up the
strong places, and Alexander passed the winter in the country. During
his stay he founded the only good harbor on the coast, the city which
still bears his name. This undertaking was not the boastful action of a
conqueror, solicitous of the praise of posterity; it was a keen-sighted
scheme to divert from the Phœnician towns of Syria the control of the
Mediterranean trade. Within half a century Alexandria had become a
great commercial emporium, the center of Greek science and learning,
and for three hundred years it continued to be the richest and largest
city in the world.
As the members of the old Egyptian monarchy had proclaimed themselves
sons of Ammon, Alexander, in order to regularize his position in the
newly conquered province, made a visit to the temple of Zeus Ammon,
traveling across the desert with a small company of troops. He was
greeted by the priests of the temple as the divinely accredited ruler
of Egypt, but the exact words of the response of the oracle were not
communicated. They were kept as a mystery, but the divine honors
claimed afterwards by Alexander were always connected with this
mysterious attestation of his claim that his father was no earthly
parent, but Zeus himself.
Darius, meanwhile, was in no position to interrupt this series of
successes in Syria and in Egypt. He had no army there prepared to
take the field, but he did try to interfere with the Greek lines
of communication in regions more remote from the present scene of
operations. Antigonus, left in Phrygia as its governor, was attacked
by a force composed of some of the soldiers who had fought on the
Persian side at Issus, as well as of contingents from Cappadocia
and Paphlagonia. But the attempt was unsuccessful. Antigonus showed
remarkable military ability, for with his small force he defeated the
Persians and added to the region under him the country of Lycaonia,
which had never submitted to Persian rule. In the spring of 331
Alexander left Egypt for his march to the interior of the Persian
Empire, and by the middle of the summer he crossed the Euphrates
near Thapsacus, and from there, taking a northerly direction through
Mesopotamia, he passed the Tigris on the 20th of September.
The advance of the Greek army was continuous, little resistance being
offered to its progress. It seemed to be the aim of Darius to do
nothing to prevent Alexander from penetrating into the interior. If
the Greeks were defeated there, they would be cut off from retreat,
and in case the Persians again failed, there would be a chance for
the vanquished to withdraw in security to the mountainous country to
the north. Alexander has been criticised for delaying so long in his
occupation of Syria and Egypt; indeed Parmenio had urged him to accept
the terms offered by Darius after the battle of Issus, a suggestion
which called forth from Alexander the reply “that he would do it if
he were Parmenio.” But the small number of soldiers under his command
showed the strategy he followed to be as cautious as his conduct of the
expedition was daring. If he had gone straight on after the battle of
Issus, he would have been obliged to detach enough men from his main
army to act as a corps of observation in Syria and Egypt, and this
would have left him hardly more than 20,000 men.
In the meantime he had received accessions of numbers, so that when he
came to confront Darius for the second time he had under his command
about 47,000 men. The engagement took place at Gaugamela (October, 331
B.C.), not far from the ruins of Nineveh. Darius had made some attempt
to give an improved armament to his foot soldiers, supplying them
with longer spears and swords so that they might fight the Macedonian
phalanx on more equal terms. Besides this, he had provided chariots
armed with scythes and a small number of elephants, which could be
effectively used only in a level country. But his chief hope lay in his
cavalry, of which he probably had 12,000, while Alexander had but 7000.
The Greeks had had four days’ rest in a fortified camp before they
were drawn up in battle array, and besides this the ground between
them and the Persians had been carefully reconnoitered, in order to
discern if the enemy had constructed concealed pits to confuse the
cavalry charge. There was no way of protecting the flanks of the army,
so Alexander placed a reserve force behind with orders to move towards
the right or the left, according as the expected turning movement from
the Persians might develop. The Greeks moved forward on the 30th of
September, with Alexander leading the Macedonian heavy cavalry and the
bulk of the phalanx. He directed his attack against the enemy’s left
wing, but as he did so he was charged on the flank by the Scythian and
Bactrian horse. He sent against them the reserves previously mentioned,
and himself engaged the Persian infantry, who had lost heart when
they were attacked by the Macedonian cavalry. The manœuvers with the
scythe-bearing chariots did no damage, for the Greeks made way for them
to pass through their ranks, and re-formed again as soon as they had
rattled past. The onslaught of the phalanx proved irresistible; the
Asiatic foot could not withstand its superior armament and discipline.
The Persian center was broken and again Darius had the ignominious
experience of a headlong flight. The Persian cavalry, left to battle
alone, was soon demoralized and could not hold its ground.
Parmenio’s experience with the left wing of the Greeks was different,
for he had difficulty in keeping his position against the Persian
horse. He could not follow Alexander’s advance, and hence there came
to be a great gap between the two positions of the army. In this open
space the Persians precipitated themselves; the Greek lines in battle
array were forced farther apart and their camp occupied. It was a
most dangerous position, but the barbarians, instead of using their
advantage, busied themselves in plundering the Greek camp. Alexander
turned from pursuing the Persian center to help the hard-pressed left
wing, and on his way met the enemy’s cavalry, now on their way back
with the booty of the Macedonian camp. He tried to cut them off from
their main body, but they fought with desperation and succeeded in
breaking through. In the hand-to-hand fights one of Alexander’s closest
friends, Hephæstion, was wounded.
The danger to the left wing was now over, for the Persian commander
Mazæus, on hearing of his king’s flight, had ceased the attack on
Parmenio, who now occupied the Persian camp, while Alexander resumed
the pursuit of the main body, anxious to get Darius into his hands.
He marched with great rapidity, reaching on the day after the battle
Arbela, at which place the supplies and treasures of the flying
Persians were discovered. But the Great King had made good his escape
to Media, where, owing to the mountainous character of the country,
it was useless to pursue him farther. The results of the battle were
impressive materially and emotionally. The Persians had no heart to
continue the war. Their army was destroyed, 10,000 prisoners were in
the hands of their enemy, and the road to their capitals, Babylon and
Susa, lay open. All this had been won by Alexander at a small cost,
only 100 Macedonians having fallen, and the whole loss of the Greek
army did not exceed 500 men.
Alexander marched to Babylon, which was surrendered without resistance
by its inhabitants, who welcomed him as a liberator. Religious
differences had made the citizens regard the Persians as oppressors,
and Alexander won over the Babylonians by acting as the protector of
their national religion. He rebuilt the Babylonian temples and also
showed a placable temper by keeping the Persian Mazæus as satrap of
the province of Babylonia. Without delaying at Babylon longer than was
necessary to conciliate the inhabitants, Alexander passed to Susa. Its
citadel offered no resistance, and with its surrender the town and
its treasury, amounting to 50,000 talents ($60,000,000), became the
property of the conqueror. (December, 331 B.C.)
The next stage of the conquest of the interior of Asia was the
occupation of the country called Persis, the homeland of the Persians.
To reach it a difficult country held by Uxian hillmen had to be passed.
These were proud of their independence, for they had never paid tribute
to the Persians, and they now occupied their mountain defile, prepared
to dispute the passage of the Greeks. They were easily circumvented by
Alexander’s strategy, and brought to reason. Farther on, the access to
Persepolis was strongly defended by the Persians, but Alexander forced
his way through devious mountain roads and took the capital without
trouble. The national treasure, equivalent to 120,000 talents, fell
into his hands.
Up to this point the march of Alexander had been through territories
which the Persians had themselves acquired by conquest, and which had
been long exploited by their satraps. The populations were, therefore,
not inimical to the new conquerors. Indeed, as we have seen in many
cases, the latter were greeted as deliverers from the heavy yoke of the
Persians. On its side, the Macedonian army had been kept under strict
discipline, and the lives and property of the people through whom it
had passed were carefully respected. But Persepolis was really in the
enemy’s country, the cradle of Persian rule, and there was no chance
of reconciling its inhabitants by kind treatment. They were now to
feel the brunt of real warfare. The city was given up to plunder, and
the royal citadel of the Achæmenian kings was burnt down in a drunken
revel. This ruthless act has been condemned, and it does appear to have
been the result of a moment of excess, not planned as part of a policy
of repression, for Alexander ordered the flames quenched, though he
himself had cast the first firebrand that had set the costly cedar work
of the palace in flames.
These various military operations lasted far into the autumn. When
winter came the sorely tried and traveled Greeks took four months’
rest, and from this point begins another stage in the expedition, for
Persis was regarded as sufficiently pacified to allow the bulk of the
army to march into Media. Here Darius was preparing to make a last
stand, but his efforts to collect a new army had the somewhat pitiful
result of bringing to his standard a force of not more than 3000
horsemen and 6000 foot soldiers. As the Greeks approached, he fled
before them, recognizing the hopelessness of resistance. He seemed
minded to take refuge in the extreme limits of what had been his
empire, the province of Bactria. Without striking a blow, Alexander
occupied Ecbatana, the last of the great Persian capitals.