Transcriber’s Notes:
Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_), and text
enclosed by equal signs is in bold (=bold=).
The whole number part of a mixed fraction is separated from the
fractional part with -, for example, 365-1/4.
Additional Transcriber’s Notes are at the end.
* * * * *
THE WORLD’S LEADERS
A NEW SERIES OF BIOGRAPHIES
Edited by W. P. TRENT
Each, with portraits. Large 12mo. $1.75 net.
H. W. BOYNTON’S THE WORLD’S LEADING POETS.--Homer, Virgil, Dante,
Shakespeare, Milton, Goethe.
G. B. ROSE’S THE WORLD’S LEADING PAINTERS.--Leonardo da Vinci, Raphael,
Titian, Rubens, Velasquez, Rembrandt.
W. L. BEVAN’S THE WORLD’S LEADING CONQUERORS.--Alexander, Cæsar,
Charles the Great, The Ottoman Conquerors of Europe, Cortes and
Pizarro, Napoleon.
_Other Volumes in Preparation._
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
34 West 33d Street NEW YORK
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[Illustration: CHARLEMAGNE]
* * * * *
The World’s Leaders
Edited by W. P. TRENT
THE WORLD’S LEADING CONQUERORS
ALEXANDER THE GREAT, CÆSAR, CHARLES
THE GREAT, THE OTTOMAN SULTANS,
THE SPANISH CONQUISTADORS, NAPOLEON
BY
W. L. BEVAN
Doctor of Political Science, Munich; Sometime Fellow of Columbia
University; Professor of History, University of the South
WITH PORTRAITS
[Illustration]
NEW YORK
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
1913
* * * * *
COPYRIGHT, 1913,
BY
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
_Published March, 1913_
THE QUINN & BODEN CO. PRESS
RAHWAY, N. J.
PREFACE
The purpose of this volume is to present, in harmony with the popular
character of the series of which it is a part, brief sketches of
some of the most familiarly named men and well-known incidents in
the history of Western Civilization. The plan upon which the work is
constructed assumes that the broad highway of historical narrative
must be followed, however attractive may be the deviations from it
that offer themselves at almost every page. The story told here has
been told often before and very frequently the telling of it has come
from master hands of literature. It is no easy task to reproduce, in
a condensed form, material so often handled under much more generous
limitations of space than are possible in this work. An attempt
has been made, however, to escape from the bald tabular method of
recording historical happenings that is almost certain to make a
continuous reading of text-book history an impossibility. This must
be the apology for many omissions; not only had the temptation to
generalize to be resisted in favor of what might be called a process
of arbitrary selection but many things are passed over in order to
give appropriate emphasis in treating the matters which do actually
appear in a narrative. If the volume had aimed at comprehensiveness,
many more conquests would necessarily have been described and the list
of characters and leaders in large numbers of military campaigns could
of course be almost indefinitely enlarged. One can say in any case
that though such additions will naturally suggest themselves, there
is less doubt as to the claim of the leaders and events selected to
appear with the prominence here assigned to them. If there has been a
guiding principle in the selection, it may be found in the deliberate
choice made of widely different periods of history. What may be called
the group conquest is best illustrated in the case of the Ottoman
Sultans and the Spanish Conquistadors, whereas the personal factor of
the conqueror comes intensively forward in the chapters describing
Alexander, Cæsar, and Napoleon. Although the military aspect of the
history of conquest has not been neglected, the other less visible
elements that ushered in great changes in history have not been
omitted. In the preparation of the volume some attempt has been made
to incorporate methods, points of view, and material that might not
be accessible to those not concerned with the range of literature
to which the ordinary student of history must appeal. It is only
fair, therefore, to express my obligations to the following works.
In the chapters dealing with ancient history, Beloch’s “Griechische
Geschichte,” Delbrück’s “Kriegs Geschichte,” Kaerst’s “Geschichte
des Hellenismus” and Heitland’s “History of the Roman Republic” have
been largely used. In the chapter on Charles the Great, apart from
Hodgkin’s well-known volumes “Italy and Her Invaders,” I have drawn
upon Hartmann’s “Geschichte Italiens,” Ranke’s “Welt Geschichte,”
Hauck’s “Kirchen Geschichte” and Lavisse’s “Histoire de France.” For
the Ottoman conquest Professor Jorga’s two recently published volumes,
“Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches,” have been found especially useful
because the author is thoroughly acquainted with the authorities both
Slavonic and Turkish not previously accessible to Occidental scholars.
In the chapter on the Spanish Conquest use has been made of Payne’s
“History of the New World,” MacNutt’s “Life of Las Casas,” and in the
narrative portion Garcia’s “Character de la Conquista Española” has
been found especially valuable. In the life of Napoleon, which offers
the most serious difficulties in applying any accepted method of
condensation, the well-known volumes of Fournier and portions of the
“Histoire Générale” of Lavisse and Rambaud have been followed. Much
help has been received from Professor W. P. Trent, the editor of the
series; in the arduous task of revision, I wish to express my special
obligations for time and work ungrudgingly given by my colleague, the
Rev. S. L. Tyson of the University of the South, and I cannot pass over
aid of the same kind received from Mr. Karl Schmidt of the New York
_Churchman_.
W. L. B.
SEWANEE, TENN., _January, 1913_.
CONTENTS
ALEXANDER THE GREAT PAGE
I INTRODUCTORY 3
II THE CONQUEST OF GREECE 4
III THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA 17
IV THE INVASION OF INDIA 34
V ALEXANDER’S EMPIRE 48
CÆSAR
I CÆSAR’S BEGINNINGS 65
II ALLIANCE WITH POMPEIUS AND CRASSUS 75
III THE CONQUEST OF GAUL 84
IV THE BREAK WITH POMPEIUS AND THE SENATE 102
V CÆSAR SUPREME 119
CHARLES THE GREAT
I INTRODUCTORY 134
II CONSOLIDATION OF RULE 140
III THE CONQUEST OF THE SAXONS 144
IV OTHER MILITARY ACHIEVEMENTS 150
V THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE 158
VI CLOSING YEARS 166
VII THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE 172
VIII CAROLINGIAN CULTURE 180
IX ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 189
X THE CHURCH 198
XI THE EMPIRE WITHOUT AND WITHIN 203
THE OTTOMANS
I OSMAN 213
II MURAD I 219
III BAJESID 235
IV MURAD II 244
V MOHAMMED II 253
VI SELIM AND SOULIMAN 272
VII THE DECLINE OF THE OTTOMANS 280
SPANISH CONQUERORS
I THE SPANIARD AND THE NEW WORLD 293
II THE CAREER OF CORTEZ 322
III THE INCAS 350
IV PIZARRO 357
NAPOLEON
I EARLY YEARS 371
II ITALY AND EGYPT 379
III THE FALL OF THE DIRECTORY 388
IV THE FIRST CONSUL 393
V THE INAUGURATION OF THE EMPIRE 407
VI AT THE ZENITH OF POWER 418
VII THE BEGINNING OF THE END 426
VIII DEFEAT AND EXILE 433
IX THE NAPOLEONIC RÉGIME 448
INDEX 465
PORTRAITS
CHARLES THE GREAT _Frontispiece_
ALEXANDER THE GREAT 3
CÆSAR 65
MOHAMMED II 253
SULEYMAN 276
CORTEZ 322
PIZARRO 357
NAPOLEON 371
* * * * *
THE WORLD’S LEADING CONQUERORS
* * * * *
ALEXANDER THE GREAT
I INTRODUCTORY
Even in the critical time of the Persian invasion, the Greek peoples
did not act together. The experiences of political individualism were
too strong to be overcome, and the rooted tradition of local autonomy
successfully resisted all attempts at larger plans of unity. It is not
surprising that at a time when Greek thinkers regarded the development
of the city-state as the highest field for human endeavor, Greek
statesmen should have seen in the expansion of their native communities
only a loose federation of subject cities to be exploited financially
or for the purpose of adding increased military and naval strength, and
not to be subjected to any formal centralized control.
[Illustration: ALEXANDER]
As time went on the old solidarity of the Greek city-state was sapped
in the fight of social classes and political parties. Not only were
Athens, Sparta, and Thebes frequently at war with one another but in
each one of these states there were at work factions dominated by
revolutionary aims. Nothing was regarded as fixed except that the
community must be self-sufficing, it mattered little in what way. It
seemed as if the troubled relations of Greek political life might go on
indefinitely after the Persian invasion had been repelled.
No Greek statesman for a hundred and fifty years, say roughly from 500
B.C. to 350 B.C., the most brilliant period of Greek history, regarded
the kingdom of Macedon as anything but a negligible quantity. Macedon
itself was a land that lay on the boundaries of the Hellenic world.
Its people were held to be half Hellenic and half barbarian. Even
to-day scholars are not at one on the question whether the Macedonian
dialect can be reckoned as properly belonging to Greek speech. But
it was this alien power that ended in bringing Greece to a kind of
unity, a unity based on the force of arms. The most remarkable feature
of this achievement lies in the fact that it was accomplished by one
man, Philip of Macedon, who began his victorious career in 359 B.C. by
repressing internal disturbances at home and by dealing effectively
with his warlike neighbors, the Illyrians and the Thracians. The
divisions in Greece gave him the opportunity of intervention there.
He posed as the friend of the oligarchic party in various Greek
communities, and made it his aim to oppose by diplomacy and by war the
most important center of Greek democracy, Athens. The final struggle
between the free states and the Macedonian monarchy took place at the
battle of Chæronea, August, 338 B.C. Philip won a decisive victory,
because he had spent years in training a professional army that proved
irresistible when it faced the best citizen soldiers of Athens,
Thebes, and other smaller towns which, persuaded by the eloquence of
Demosthenes, stood side by side in the defense of liberty. Philip
survived his victory only a short time, dying in 336 B.C. as the master
of Greece and leaving to his son Alexander the heritage of his unique
achievements.
II THE CONQUEST OF GREECE
Alexander’s succession to the throne of Macedon seemed secured by his
father Philip’s sincere personal affection for him. His confidence in
Alexander’s ability, even in his son’s early youth, was manifested
in the assignment to him of the most responsible positions under his
father’s directions. Philip saw to it that his son should be carefully
educated by placing him under the charge of Aristotle. Good reports
must have come of his precocity, because Philip, while he was occupied
in the siege of Byzantium, handed over to Alexander, then only sixteen
years old, the administration of Macedon. Two years later, at the
battle of Chæronea, already mentioned as marking the downfall of Greek
freedom, the youth was placed at the head of the division of the army
which took the offensive at a critical part of the engagement, and
it was through this important command that the questionable honor of
striking the decisive blow in the defeat of the allied forces of free
Greece was ungrudgingly conceded to him.
Philip, unattractive as his character was in so many ways, stained
as he was by savage passions and duplicity, at least performed
conscientiously and effectively a father’s part in preparing his son
for the high position he was to take in the future. But the domestic
situation of the Macedonian royal family was very far from being
modeled on that described in the Odyssey as befitting the heroes and
the leaders of men. Philip was lawless, and his numerous amours brought
him both difficulty and notoriety, for in his irregular relations he
did not scruple to disregard the customary conventions of Greek social
life. On his return from his campaign for the subjugation of Greece,
he became enamored of Cleopatra, a girl belonging to a distinguished
Macedonian family, whose uncle, Attalus, had a high place in the
government. Cleopatra’s position made it impossible for the King to
offer her the place of a royal mistress; accordingly he made her a
legitimate wife. Olympias and her son Alexander left Macedon, the queen
returning to her home in Epirus, and the crown prince withdrawing to
the traditional enemies of the Macedonians, the Illyrians.
Philip, alarmed at the possibility of political combinations dangerous
to his throne, came to an agreement with Alexander by which the latter
was to return to his father’s court at Pella, and Olympias’ brother,
the prince of Epirus, was induced to give up his hostility against
his brother-in-law by a promise that he should have in marriage
Philip’s daughter, another Cleopatra. This alliance took place with
great ceremony in the summer of 336, in the ancient royal town of
Ægæ. Immediately after Philip prepared to set out to war with Persia.
During the marriage festivities, however, he was assassinated by one
of the members of his bodyguard, Pausanias, who in the confusion that
followed almost succeeded in making his escape. Personal motives were
assigned as grounds for this murder. Pausanias, it appears, had been
deeply insulted by Attalus, the uncle of Philip’s young wife Cleopatra,
and failing to get redress from the King, had so revenged on him his
injured honor. It has been asked why, if this were the case, he did not
strike at Attalus rather than Philip. The probability is that Philip’s
murder was inspired by a woman’s indignation.
It was suspected immediately after the event that it was a case of
“cherchez la femme,” and all indications pointed to the outraged
Olympias as the author of the murder. Alexander himself was thought
to have been concerned in his father’s death, for his own rights of
succession were endangered by the influence of Cleopatra over Philip,
an influence no longer merely sentimental, since she had recently given
birth to a son. For this infant she would naturally strive to secure
the Macedonian crown, and Alexander would be left to play the uncertain
rôle of Pretender.
Whatever happened at Ægæ, the fruits of the crime fell into Alexander’s
hands. He had been officially proclaimed his father’s heir. Of Philip’s
sons he was the only one who had been tested on the battlefield, and
he was also the one who had already shown capacity for leading the
state in such crises as were bound to result from his father’s murder.
Philip’s old companions in arms did not hesitate for a moment as to
the proper choice of a ruler. Alexander was immediately recognized as
king, and in the selection special weight was attached to the fact that
his cause was urged by Antipater, one of Philip’s closest friends and
supporters.
In this way the young prince’s road to the succession was made easy;
there were no disturbances, and care was also taken that there should
be no competitors for the crown in the future, for the young son of
Cleopatra was killed. But these grim measures to establish domestic
peace did not stop here. There was another line of Macedonian princes,
descended from the dethroned family of Lynkestes; there were two
members of this house who might, by making awkward claims at unsuitable
times, give much trouble. These two, Heromenes and Arrhabæos, were
both executed, on the ground that they had acted as accomplices
with Pausanias in the conspiracy against Philip. They had a brother
Alexander, whose life was spared only because he was a son-in-law of
Antipater and had hailed Alexander as the new king immediately after
the murder.
By these deeds of violence, Alexander became the acknowledged master
of Macedon, but the prospects outside his own country were anything
but favorable. In Asia, Attalus was at the head of the Greek cities.
As the uncle of Cleopatra he would naturally be a most bitter enemy
of Alexander. The uncertain future in Macedon was not lost on those
Greeks whose liberties Philip had so recently destroyed, and whose
acquiescence in the rule of Macedon was due only to their fear of
the conqueror. Now they were ready to throw off the yoke, needing
no excuse, but only an opportunity of rising, which the advent to
the throne of an untried youth made most hopeful. A revolt broke
out in Ambrakia and the Macedonian governor was driven out. Thebes
was preparing for a similar outbreak, and there were plain signs of
restlessness in Ætolia and in the Peloponnesus.
Athens was the city to which all the opponents of Macedonian rule
looked for sympathy and support. The peace party there, who had gained
adherents among the Athenians because of the moderation shown by
Philip after his decisive victory at Chæronea, now lost ground because
patriotic hopes sprung anew to life at the unexpected death of the man
who had shattered the traditional system of Greek city autonomy.
Every Greek regarded Macedon as an alien and semibarbarous power, and
one can sympathize with their view. Demosthenes was the leader of the
patriotic party in Athens, and all attempts to undermine his popularity
only put the partisans of Macedonia in a worse light in the eyes of
the Athenians. Whenever he was judicially attacked he came out of
the trial in triumph. Besides, the personal ascendancy of Demosthenes
protected the minor politicians who joined him as opponents of the
friends of the Macedonian monarch. Hyperides, who was responsible for a
decree calling every Athenian freeman, slave, and ally under arms for
the defense of the city against Philip after the defeat of the Greeks,
was brought to trial for his action and, despite the eloquence of the
pro-Macedonian orator, Aristogeiton, was acquitted.
The current of popular emotion was even more plainly revealed when
the time came to deliver the oration, at the Attic feast of the
dead, to commemorate the citizens fallen at the battle of Chæronea.
The honor fell to Demosthenes, the one man whose implacable hatred
to the Macedonian dynasty and all its works was known to everyone.
Attempts were made in Athens to reform the terms of military service
by arranging that all citizens should be called out to defend
their country, and at the same time money was spent in putting the
fortifications of the city in a state to resist an army composed of
skilled troops and provided with the siege artillery of the time.
But care had been taken not to invite attack while Athens was yet
unprepared. At the marriage feast of Ægæ appeared an Athenian
deputation bringing a golden wreath to Philip and a copy of a decree,
passed formally by the city, by which it undertook to surrender anyone
in its jurisdiction who should dare to plot against the king. When
the news of the assassination reached Athens, Demosthenes appeared
in the council in festal garb, and solemnly thanked the gods for the
deliverance done at Ægæ. He considered that Athens had nothing to fear
from the silly youth who now was ruling over Macedon.
But Alexander showed that the great orator had not taken his
enemy’s measure. By the rapidity of his actions, he checked all
attempts to revolt. Suddenly appearing at the head of his army
in Thessaly, he received from the Thessalian allied cities the
position of commander-in-chief, as his father had done before him,
and moving rapidly south, he reached Thermopylæ, where he summoned
the Amphiktyons, and meeting no opposition, was declared by them
guardian of the temple at Delphi. Marching farther south to Thebes,
he prevented, by his presence with an overwhelming force, any
anti-Macedonian movement; and when the Athenians sent a delegation to
greet him, he was tactful enough not to ask for further guaranties of
good behavior on the part of the city they represented.
The Hellenic league, which included all the Greek states south of
Thermopylæ and all the islands which had once owned the supremacy
of Athens, met again at Corinth and renewed with Alexander the same
agreement that had previously been made with his father, a treaty of
offensive and defensive alliance, and the chief command by land and
sea was assigned to the new king, as his father’s successor. After
this triumphal and peaceful progress, Alexander returned home, where
his barbarian neighbors were giving trouble by revolts against his
authority.
In order to bring himself in contact with the Greek opposition to
Alexander, Attalus, one of the two commanders of the Macedonian army in
Asia, had entered into relations with Demosthenes, only a short time
after Alexander’s succession. As Cleopatra’s uncle he took a leading
part in engineering a conspiracy intended to supplant Alexander by
Amyntas, the young son of Perdikkas, the elder brother of Philip, who
by the traditional usage of the Macedonian monarchy was entitled to
succeed Philip. The success of Alexander in Greece convinced Attalus of
the futility of his schemes, and he therefore tried to make advances
to the young ruler. But Alexander was not to be placated, and, as a
deviser of conspiracies in his own interest, he showed that he had
nothing to learn from the practised hands of the Macedonian nobles.
It would have been extremely unwise for Alexander to have shown himself
openly an enemy of Attalus, who enjoyed much popularity in the army.
Accordingly he made a show of friendship by graciously accepting the
advances of Attalus, and at the same time he despatched an associate,
Hekatæus, on whom he could rely, with directions to assassinate
him. The treacherous deed was made the easier, because Parmenio,
joint-commander with Attalus in Asia Minor, facilitated the plans of
the assassination, despite the fact that Attalus was married to his
daughter. The tribal interests of a half-barbarous people had full sway
among the Macedonians, so Parmenio, who had throughout his life been
conscientiously loyal to the Macedonian monarchy, did not scruple to
sacrifice his daughter’s husband, when it appeared that his son-in-law
was plotting to supplant the regularly accepted monarch of his people.
Alexander’s difficulties were being quickly dissolved by crime and
bloodshed. The Macedonians had none of the political experiences common
to the free Greek communities, and assassination was regarded both as
an ordinary expedient for removing opponents, and as the logical method
of rounding off a policy that was complicated. With Attalus removed,
Alexander could proceed, without further hesitation, to strengthen his
position at home. Amyntas, the young pretender, was executed, and with
him all of the relatives of Attalus and Cleopatra. In this Borgia-like
program of eliminating possible claimants to the throne, only the
stepbrother of Alexander, a half-witted lad, Amidæus, was spared.
Later Alexander’s mother, Olympias, forced her rival, the queen-widow
Cleopatra, to commit suicide.
With this orgy of crime, the reign of Alexander was ushered in, and one
reads with astonishment to-day the thin and specious apologies which
would excuse the young ruler, the real instigator of these atrocities.
As a matter of fact he early acquired the habit of assassination;
unfortunately he never unlearned it. Whatever may be argued in behalf
of his people, who were uncivilized, nothing can extenuate this early
exercise in crime of the pupil of Aristotle. When we survey his record
of one year we perceive that hatred of his deeds must have been the
test of patriotism and good citizenship among the Greek communities,
who might well see in him the typical tyrant of their political
theories.
Alexander’s violent preparations for a peaceful reign were successful.
During his lifetime the tranquillity of Macedonia was not disturbed.
Greece had been brought by the display of military supremacy to a
position of servitude; all that needed to be done before he took up his
father’s program for the invasion of Asia, was to bring the western
tribes on his northern frontier to reason, and to force home upon them
the realization of the power of Macedon.
In the spring of 335, Alexander left Amphipolis, and by a rapid march
of ten days reached Mount Hæmus in the thick of a population which
had never recognized the supremacy of Macedon. They tried to defend
themselves in their mountain passes, but Alexander soon forced his way
through, and on the top of the highest mountain, celebrated his victory
by setting up a thank offering to Dionysus. He then gave his attention
to various mountain tribes with whom his father had had trouble, who
had never before been subjugated, but who now met a decisive defeat
at his hands. An island on the Danube, where the tribesmen had placed
for security their wives and children and property, proved, however,
impregnable. The young king showed himself from the first a master of
strategy, for although he could not capture the island, he executed
rapid movements along the river, beating the Getæ who were defending
the passages, and when the Triballi had come to terms, he marched up
the Danube, and then, crossing the eastern passes of the Hæmus range,
returned to Pæonia.
Alexander’s absence in the north in this untiring campaign against
barbarian tribes, whose homes and habits were hardly known to the
civilized states of Greece, was taken advantage of by his enemies.
While he was fighting on the Danube, the King of Illyria, Kleitos,
whose people had given trouble to Philip and whose father had fallen
in battle with the Macedonians, rose in revolt. Several tribes
farther north on the Adriatic coast joined with the Illyrians in this
anti-Macedonian movement. Without a moment’s hesitation, Alexander
turned to deal with his new enemies, and in order to do effective work,
penetrated far into the mountainous region of Illyria. The Macedonian
army soon found itself in a hazardous position, surrounded on all
sides by hostile tribes. By skilful strategy, Alexander withdrew his
troops from the danger that threatened them, while they were besieging
Pelion in the face of superior numbers, and when he found that the
Illyrians were following him, he quickly turned on them, administered a
decisive blow, and forced Kleitos to seek a refuge in the territory of
the Taulantines, one of the tribes which had been co-operating with the
Illyrians in their resistance to his army.
In the meantime, the presence of a Macedonian force in Asia Minor had
awakened the Persians to the danger confronting them of an invasion
from Greece. Its full meaning was hardly appreciated, and the new
situation was interpreted as only another example of the type of attack
so frequently made by the Greek communities ever since the time when
the Persian invasion of Greece had been successfully blocked. It had
always been found possible to avoid a serious attack from Greece on
the Persian Empire by playing off one Greek state against another.
This well-tried expedient was now used again. Letters were sent from
the King of Persia to the states of Greece urging them to rise against
Macedon, and offering large sums of money to subsidize the revolt.
Sparta alone responded to the invitation; Athens and the other states,
which had just renewed a formal alliance with Macedon, seemed to
realize the hopelessness of an anti-Macedonian movement, and refused to
accept the offer of Persian money. All that the representatives of the
great king could accomplish in this direction was to leave in the hands
of Demosthenes the sum of three hundred talents, with the understanding
that he could use his own discretion in employing it to the best
advantage in the interests of Persia.
The action of the great Athenian orator in accepting the Persian gold
has been severely criticised and warmly defended. It must be remembered
that to him Alexander appeared only as the destroyer of Greek liberty
and not as the protagonist of Greek culture, a position which can be
understood only as the result of his conquests in the East. There was
no reason why an Athenian patriot should have been willing to destroy
the Persian Empire at the cost of the enslavement of his own city.
The perils and difficulties of the Illyrian campaign were magnified by
the rumors which reached the Greek cities. It was even reported that
Alexander had been slain and his army destroyed. This report was soon
followed by an uprising in Thebes against the Macedonians. The leaders
of the Macedonian faction were murdered and the Macedonian garrison
in the citadel closely besieged. The democratic constitution was
then restored and Theban officials were elected according to the old
constitutional forms. At this juncture, Demosthenes used some of the
Persian treasure to purchase arms, which he sent to Thebes to aid its
citizens in their contest for the restoration of their independence.
While the Thebans were most active, the rest of Greece was not slow in
showing its antipathy to Macedonian control. Athens prepared itself to
do battle for Greek autonomy; the isthmus of Corinth was occupied by
an army raised from among the Arcadian cities, with Mantineia at their
head. And the people of Elis and Ætolia showed that they would be ready
to aid the Thebans.
But before any common plan of resistance could be prepared, Alexander
and his army had passed the frontiers of Bœotia after a remarkably
rapid forced march, undertaken as soon as the news of the defection of
the Thebans had reached him in Illyria. It took him but fourteen days
in all to cover the distance from the scene of operations in Illyria to
the gates of Thebes. He was willing to come to terms with the Thebans,
offering them easy conditions provided they would admit his troops into
the city; but the mass of the inhabitants preferred to cast in their
lot with those who were in favor of resistance.
The exiled citizens of Thebes knew they would receive short shrift
at the hands of the son of the man who had driven them from their
native city. The chances of successful resistance were overestimated,
but Thebes had formerly led a forlorn hope in its contest with the
Spartans; and, as the unexpected had happened before, the Thebans,
who were preparing to withstand the Macedonians can hardly be blamed
for recalling the glorious memories of the battle of Leuktra. But they
were now dealing with a new, vigorous army, not with a Spartan force
spoiled by routine. As no help could be looked for from the outside,
the situation was altogether different. The result proved that the
Thebans of Alexander’s day had inherited indeed the valor, but not the
intelligence, of the generation of Epaminondas and Pelopidas.
The Macedonian garrison still held out in the Kadmeia, the citadel
which lay in the southern part of the city, near the gate of Elektra,
through which passed the road to Athens. Its walls were an integral
part of the fortifications of the city. The object of the Thebans
was therefore to cut off all communication from the Kadmeia by
building about it inclosing lines. This operation Alexander aimed to
prevent, and with Perdikkas at the head of a contingent of Macedonian
mountaineers, he succeeded in breaking through the Theban line of
defense, and finally forced his adversaries back to the walls of the
city. They were closely pursued in this retreat, and, as they entered
the gate in disorder, the Macedonians were able to force their way
into the city at the same time. Another division of the Macedonians
found little difficulty in entering the Kadmeia, and from this point
of vantage they quickly descended into the city. The Thebans made an
attempt to rally in the market place, but the rout was soon general.
After the city was overrun by the Macedonians and their allies, it
was noted that the people of the smaller Bœotian towns signalized
themselves by their acts of cruelty done on the now defenseless
Thebans, from whose tyranny they had suffered in the past. Six thousand
men, it is said, perished in the taking of Thebes, while the Macedonian
loss did not exceed 500. (September, 335 B.C.)
Alexander called together his allies to settle the fate of the
conquered. The decision was a horrible example of rancorous hatred, for
he allowed the smaller cities of Bœotia, smarting, as we have seen,
under the sense of long grievances, to work their will on their once
powerful neighbor. The town was to be razed to the ground, only the
house of Pindar being spared. The sole part of the fortifications of
the town to be retained was the Kadmeia, which remained as a military
post with its Macedonian garrison. The Theban territory was to be
divided among the allies, and all the captive Thebans, men, women, and
children, with but a few exceptions, were to be sold as slaves. Those
Thebans who escaped from the city were to be outlawed, and no Greek
city would be permitted to receive them. The only positive items in
this ruthless decree were the provisions for restoring Orchemenos and
Platæa, places which Thebes had once treated with the severity now
meted out to her.
Such a catastrophe, as the result of a defeat or a siege, had never
before been witnessed in Greece, and the impression produced was
one of unmitigated terror. It was not simply the misfortunes of the
existing Theban community, or the material loss from the annihilation
of property. Thebes had the closest associations with the heroic age of
Greece, its name was interwoven with the stories of gods and heroes.
Kadmus had founded it; within its limits Dionysus and Herakles had
been born. The city which had shattered the power of Sparta was left
desolate, and the plow passed over the ground where it had once stood.
It seemed according to a contemporary as if Zeus had torn the moon from
the heavens.
The impression made throughout Greece by this barbarous deed was
universal; no one dared to think of resistance to Alexander. There was
a general desire among the various cities to place themselves in a
favorable position with the conqueror. The Arcadians condemned to death
those who had advised that aid should be given to the Thebans; in other
places the partisans of Macedonia were received back from exile, and
haste was made to acquaint Alexander of the general desire to meet his
wishes.
The Athenians were celebrating their most solemn religious festival,
the Eleusinian Mysteries, when the taking of Thebes was announced.
There was widespread consternation, because it was assumed that the
next move of Alexander would be made against Athens in order to punish
its citizens for their anti-Macedonian sentiments. The celebration of
the festival was abandoned; the inhabitants of the open country took
refuge within the city walls, in anticipation of the ravaging of their
lands, and the fortifications surrounding the city were fully prepared
for defense. In spite of the plain dangers involved in showing sympathy
for the defeated Thebans, fugitives from that city were received with
an open-handed hospitality, and their needs cared for without stint.
But at the same time an opening for maintaining amicable relations with
the victor was preserved, by sending a formal embassy to Alexander to
congratulate him on his return from Illyria and for his quick victory
over the rebels in Thebes.
The true situation of affairs in Athens was an open secret. Alexander
knew the part played by the Athenians in preparing for the Theban
revolt; he knew, too, that they had been on the point of actively
and openly co-operating with the Thebans, and that the plan had been
frustrated only by the rapidity with which he had moved on the city.
Yet the young ruler showed himself unexpectedly placable in his
treatment of Athens. There is no reason to attribute his attitude
to mere generosity of sentiment in favor of the city because of its
glorious past. There were more practical reasons; the siege of Athens
could hardly be successful except through command of the sea, and any
attempt of this kind would most likely have been frustrated or at least
rendered doubtful by the intervention of the Persian fleet.
Instead of advancing into Attica, Alexander stopped to parley, and
agreed to abstain from hostilities on condition that the Athenians
should promptly expel the Theban fugitives, and also should surrender
to him the men who had been lately responsible for the anti-Macedonian
direction of the government. It is to the credit of the Athenians that
the first condition was without a negative rejected; and as to the
second there were many of the anti-democratic faction who would have
been glad to get rid of their opponents by agreeing to this indirect
demand of the Macedonian king that the government of the city should
be handed over to his partisans. Phokion, one of the distinguished
and revered members of the oligarchic group, was willing to accept
the condition unreservedly; but Demosthenes and Demades, another
popular leader, successfully urged the assembly of the people to vote
against it, and even Phokion agreed to head an embassy to acquaint
Alexander with the decision of the Athenian citizens. The king showed
himself ready to compromise, for the success of his schemes against
Asia depended largely on the good will of Athens and its fleet. It
was finally arranged that the Athenian anti-Macedonian military
leader Charidemos should be banished, a proposal to which it was all
the easier for the Athenians to accede, because he was not a native
Athenian. This officer and several others withdrew to Asia and took
service under Darius.
III THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA
Now that the pacification of Greece was effected by the restoration of
Athens as a member of the Macedonian confederacy, Alexander, without
visiting that city, marched to the isthmus of Corinth to arrange for
the various Greek contingents for his expedition to Asia, and after
receiving from the oracle at Delphi a reply encouraging him to carry
out his grandiose scheme of conquest, he retired to Macedonia to spend
the winter before setting out on his march against the Persian Empire.
Of the details of his proposed invasion nothing is known beyond the
fact that his original scheme must have been considerably modified
as he penetrated farther into Asia. His geographical knowledge of
the interior of the empire could hardly have been sufficient for an
orderly mapping out beforehand of the course he actually took. That was
entirely governed by the extraordinary series of events which marked
the various stages of his expedition. His design was to dethrone
the Persian king and secure possession of the country. To do this
effectively the first step was to conquer Asia Minor, to get under his
control the remoter provinces of Syria and Egypt, and then to advance
on Babylon and Susa. That there was immediate necessity for setting his
army on the march was plain to him, because of the dangerous position
of the Macedonian forces already in Asia Minor. The Persian general,
Memnon, had checkmated Parmenio, who was recalled, and the prospects of
Macedonian success were blighted by the defeat of another Macedonian
general Kallás in the Troad. Before Alexander left his own kingdom,
the authority of the Persian government had been generally restored
throughout the whole of Asia Minor.
In the spring of 334, Alexander marched to the Hellespont with an
army numbering altogether 30,000 infantry and 4500 cavalry. Of these,
12,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry were from Macedon; contingents from
the allies made up the rest. There were besides 160 warships, of
which Athens furnished twenty. Alexander’s chief military adviser
was Parmenio, whom Philip, his father, had declared to be the only
Macedonian general he had discovered in many years. Of the subordinate
officers the most noteworthy were Philotas, who was in command of the
Macedonian cavalry, and Nikanor, who led the álite of the Macedonian
infantry (the so-called Hypaspistæ, or the Bodyguards). During the
absence of the king, the administration of Macedon and of the subject
states was left in the hands of Antipater.
The incompetence of the Persians in aggressive resistance was manifest
from the first. They were far superior to the Greeks at sea, and if
they had made intelligent use of their fleet they could have prevented
Alexander’s army from crossing the Hellespont. Indeed, orders had been
issued the year before to the coast cities that their ships should be
kept in readiness in anticipation of an invasion. But so slipshod was
the administration in the loosely governed provinces of Persia that
their great fleet was unable to put to sea when Alexander reached
the narrow arm of water which divides Europe from Asia. He had no
difficulty in passing; indeed Parmenio was left to superintend this
operation, while the young king visited the cities of the Troad rich
in legendary lore, and made a pilgrimage to the tomb of his reputed
ancestor, Achilles.
The Greeks soon began their march down the coast. The satraps of the
neighboring provinces had in the meantime gathered together all the
troops available in the Propontis and had joined the army of Memnon.
From the statements made in contemporary sources, it is not possible to
gather the numerical strength of the army which now opposed Alexander’s
advance; it is certain, however, that in infantry the Persians were
weaker than the Greeks, while it is probable that they were also
outnumbered in cavalry.
They were certainly aware of their weakness, because Memnon advised
against a stand-up battle, suggesting instead that they should retire
into the interior, wasting the country as they went, and so hinder the
rapidity of the enemy’s march until their own fleet appeared; then the
war could be carried into Greece and Alexander forced to retreat. But
this prudent strategy was not acceptable to the Persian satraps, who
preferred active measures that seemed to offer a chance of preventing
Alexander from getting a firm foothold in Persian territory.
They prepared to offer battle by taking up a position on the river
Granicus, a stream flowing down from the northern slope of Mt. Ida
to the Propontis. It seems as if the Persians, conscious of their
weakness, selected a battlefield where their enemies, with a river in
front of them, would find it a matter of some difficulty to attack.
They may have supposed that Alexander would hesitate to advance under
such unfavorable conditions. The Macedonian army was so disposed
that the heavy-armed infantry held the center while the wings were
formed by the cavalry and the bowmen. Alexander himself was with the
picked Macedonian cavalry on the right wing; next him were arranged
the hypaspists, extending towards the middle. This wing, comprising
cavalry, bowmen, and heavy-armed troops, appears to have crossed the
river first and to have put to flight the Persian cavalry. That the
Persians used horsemen here and not bowmen seems strange. Cavalry were
of little use in preventing an advance up the steep slope from the
stream.
First the Persian horse were put to flight by the right Macedonian
wing, commanded by Alexander, who took an active part in the
hand-to-hand conflict; then the phalanx of Greek mercenaries on the
Persian side, who had stood by hitherto without taking any part in the
engagement, were attacked in front by the Macedonian phalanx and on the
flanks by the cavalry and bowmen and, being thus prevented from making
any real resistance, were hewn down or taken prisoners. The Macedonian
loss was so small, eighty-five horsemen and thirty foot soldiers, that
it would seem that probably the Greek mercenaries, instead of resisting
their own kinsmen, allowed themselves to be taken prisoners. The brunt
of the battle was borne by the Persian horsemen, who fought valorously,
and in the obstinate scrimmage with them Alexander was in considerable
personal danger. Two of the satraps lost their lives on the field.
The Greek prisoners were sent in chains to Macedon, and of the booty
taken, 300 suits of armor were sent to the Parthenon at Athens as
a thank-offering, a visible reminder to the Greeks of the victor’s
progress. (May-June, 334 B.C.)
The fruits of the victory were immediate: several of the principal
cities surrendered, among them Sardis, with its impregnable citadel,
and Ephesus. In both places Alexander was greeted as a deliverer from
Persian tyranny; democratic government was restored, and a beginning
was made for organizing a massacre of the oligarchic faction. This
Alexander prevented, making it clear by his intervention that he did
not wish to alienate the sympathies of the propertied classes in Asia.
Of the other Greek cities in Ionia and Æolis, only one gave serious
trouble, Miletus, which looked to the Persian fleet for aid. It was
occupied besides by a strong garrison of Greek mercenaries. Alexander’s
fleet, however, appeared at Miletus before the Persian fleet, which was
on its way from Cyprus and Phœnicia, reached the scene of action. When
this fleet came up, it tried in vain to entice the Macedonian ships
into an action, and remained idly by while Alexander besieged Miletus
and finally took it by storm.
The sole stronghold still left to Persia in the region was
Halicarnassus to the south. Hither the Persian fleet repaired, and
here, as the place was strongly fortified and well manned with troops,
Memnon planned to establish a base for further operations by sea
against Greece itself. But Alexander declined to take the risk of
meeting the Persian fleet in a naval engagement. Winter was at hand,
and most of the Macedonian ships had been sent home; there was only
a small squadron left, and the king marched south with his army to
besiege Halicarnassus by land.
The problem before him was anything but easy, for Halicarnassus,
besides being strongly fortified, had through the presence of the
Persian fleet free communication with the outside. It could be supplied
with food, although the opportunity of obtaining mercenary troops from
Greece was made difficult through the fear of Macedon. The city walls
were surrounded with wide ditches and these Alexander filled up, in
order to give access to his siege engines. Several breaches were made,
but the first attempt to storm the place failed, and the defenders of
the city erected new fortifications in place of those that had been cut
down. They also made a sortie, trying to destroy the siege engines,
but were repulsed with loss. Memnon saw that the town could no longer
be held, and by night embarked his troops, carrying them to Cos; but
before he left he set fire to the abandoned town. Alexander immediately
entered, showed himself merciful to its citizens, and proceeded
on his march, leaving a division of 3050 men to watch the citadel
of Halicarnassus, which evidently he did not think of sufficient
importance to besiege now that the Persians had only a small number of
troops in the neighborhood, in Salmakis and on the island Arconnesus.
The whole of the province of Caria now ceased to resist, with the
exception of a few places on the coast. A part of the Greek army, under
the orders of Parmenio, were sent into winter quarters in Lydia, while
Alexander advanced through Lycia and Pamphylia, without meeting any
real resistance, and marched by the way of the mountainous country of
Pisidia, among a population never conquered by the Persians, and in
the spring of 333 joined Parmenio at Gordion, the ancient capital of
Phrygia. From here the route of the army was through Cappadocia by
the narrow pass called the Cilician Gate, by which the road from the
interior plateau crosses the Taurus on its way to Tarsus. The garrison
which occupied the pass fled on the approach of the Greek army, Tarsus
itself was abandoned, and the whole province of Cilicia was occupied
without resistance.