A. Oh, yes, Mr. Messersmith; but that was before all this. I think that
really took place in 1933, ’34 or perhaps in ’35. He visited me three
times. When he was the Consul General of the United States, he had some
difficulties with some American subsidiary companies in Germany. One was
Standard Oil, as far as I recall. I asked him why he wanted to see me
since that was not my business. Then he said that he had full confidence
that I would look after his interests. He had been told by other
diplomatic representatives that I was able to help him.
Q. All right. Now, Witness, we come to the steps you took after your
report to Hitler, the steps you took later on. I ask you to tell about
that briefly.
A. Perhaps I’ll do that. It was after my visit to England.
Q. Very well, go ahead.
A. On 11 October 1937, the Italian Ambassador came to see me. That was
Professor Attolico. He told me that the Italians had got very excited at
my Paris visit. It was believed that I had gone to make arrangements
there which were in contradiction to German-Italian agreements. I calmed
him down at once without giving him too many details; but he asked me to
pay a brief visit to Italy before going to England. We had been asked to
go to England on the 17th of October. An air force exhibition in Milan
was the occasion; and I was asked to open that exhibition on the 12th of
May. That, of course, was headlined by the Italian papers. Attolico came
and saw me after this and expressed his gratitude. He said that Delbos
had put a trap in front of me.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: The witness gives the date as the 12th of May. Is
that what he meant for the exhibition in Milan?
A. 12 October.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: What year?
A. In October 1937. I went to Italy and then to England. The visit had
been arranged by the Royal Air Force as a reply to the visit paid to us
by the Royal Air Force in January 1937. At that time figures were
exchanged between us on planned armaments, that is to say the figures
concerning bombers, fighters, and so forth, by agreement with Goering
and Hitler. Here again the intention existed to know exactly what the
other was doing. The other point was the intention to come to terms on
all these questions.
The visit to England lasted until 25 October. England had quite a lot to
show. The air force was very well organized and had first-rate
personnel. The visits were very cordial. Political conversations of an
official nature were not held; but unofficially we spent an evening in a
club, in a very small circle of ten people, perhaps less than ten. Lord
Swinton, who was then Minister of Aviation, took part, as well as the
leader of the opposition, Mr. Churchill, and Lord [Rt. Hon.] Amery,
Secretary of State for India, and from the British Air Force, Lord
Trenchard.
We had brought General Stumpff and of course General Udet. This was more
in the nature of a personal contact and political questions were not
touched upon. The other hosts had told me before, “Today you meet your
first and second best enemy. Don’t be confused by this; but if there is
an attack, hit back.” That is what happened; but it was a very jolly
evening.
Before we took off again, that is to say on 24 October, Mr. Eden, the
Foreign Secretary, rang me up. He said that he had been busy all the
time before, but could I see him now. I said that I should be delighted
but that a program had been arranged for us by the RAF to visit an
airfield tomorrow. I asked that if the program could be changed, would
he please contact the RAF. He told me that perhaps that would be a bit
too complicated and asked if perhaps I could see him later on. I could
be with him in two hours and thirty minutes since that was how long my
aircraft took from Berlin to London at that time. Unfortunately I never
saw Mr. Eden.
I reported about that trip to England on 2 November. The report took
over two hours. Hitler was much more accessible than when I talked to
him about France. I reported particularly my talk with Mr. Churchill and
drew his attention to the seriousness which was expressed. Hitler
immediately interrupted me. He said, “Please do not worry at all; never
in my life will I do anything against Britain. The basis of my whole
policy is collaboration with Britain.” These words calmed me
considerably. I immediately explained to him once more that the way to
come to terms with England would be by Brussels and Paris, and I
explained why.
I saw von Neurath on 11 October on the trip to France; and on 28 October
I reported to him on my trip to England in great detail. All I could
tell him at the time was what Hitler had said or had failed to say about
France. Neurath again was very impressed with me for having worked for
him in this sense. I was in agreement with him that without any further
invitations by him or Hitler I must not take any further steps.
Then on 1 November 1937 I went and saw Field Marshal von Blomberg who at
that time was Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, that is to say,
Goering’s military superior. I reported to him. Blomberg in all things
entirely agreed with me, as had Neurath. Goering at that time did not
have enough time to see me. I asked on several occasions to be allowed
to report to him on these very important matters; but this did not
happen because he simply declined.
Q. Witness, I think we can leave this field now. Will you only explain
briefly to the Tribunal whether you received foreign delegations, and of
which nations, and what happened at those occasions?
A. I said before that the British had visited us in January 1937. After
that I had perhaps five or six visits from Englishmen. The French paid a
return visit in 1938. On that occasion again we returned the very
cordial welcome which the French had given to us. We showed the French
our troops and factories. Yesterday, reference was made by the witness
Vorwald[140] to this, who said that we only showed what the troops had
at their disposal at the time and what expressly had been permitted to
be shown by Goering, after a request had been made by the competent
department of the General Staff. I know that somebody has alleged that
Hitler at the end of the war said I had shown secret methods to foreign
visitors and damaged Germany thereby. That is a slanderous statement. It
was alleged that I had shown radar instruments, and at that time we
didn’t have any radar at all.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, were you ever Goering’s deputy in this capacity, and how
long?
A. Until 1937 I was his deputy, and all offices in the Luftwaffe which
were subordinate to him were also subordinate to me. This applied to the
execution of orders. From 1937 onwards I was his deputy only in my own
sector, and this automatically as Chief of the General Staff in his
field, which applies also to the Generalluftzeugmeister. In any case it
was within my capacity to deputize for Goering in all matters as I was
the second senior officer of the Luftwaffe, and this was done only by
way of rank. But Goering reserved the right to appoint a deputy in
general, that is, especially always only for the Luftwaffe. This
authority he did not confer upon me. Even when he was on leave he kept
this right, he retained his command. I agreed with this arrangement
personally.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, what was the position at the beginning when you took over
the duties of GL? What measures did you take, and what was your aim?
A. I can be brief in this connection, at least in regard to the first
point. General Vorwald yesterday spoke at length about it. No useful
developments for the immediate future were available. No bomber aircraft
of a new type was in existence, and as to mass production we stood very
poorly, as I previously described to you. Painstakingly we had
reorganized on 1 September, and it was only because of the extreme
devotion of industry and because of the faithful service rendered by our
German workers and those who helped them that it was possible to, shall
we say, bring about a miracle.
The production figure in bombers was reached once more in the shortest
of time, in the spring of 1942. There was not a single individual
instance where our program as we had set it for ourselves was not
reached. This was something extraordinary. In the case of fighters,
there was a good type of fighter aircraft, or even two; namely, the
Focke-Wulf and the Messerschmitt, but there were no engines for those
fighters. We had to use incomplete engines to equip these aircraft, and
on the strength of my experience collected in my capacity as director of
the Lufthansa, I had to have tests carried out. My testing department in
Rechlin was excellently staffed, the commander being an excellent pilot
and technician, and it was due to their devotion that in a few months we
managed to get even these new engines ready although, according to human
estimate, we could not expect it. It was more through luck than
intelligence that we got that.
Now that was the situation as I found it. The new organization, of
course, had not been started up, and I had to collect a few new,
extremely good experts. The men who were working there independently
were rather downhearted for a long time. As experts they had lost any
doubt in the outcome of the war, and they did not believe that it would
be possible once again to start up our armament program.
The total number of aircraft in production was something in the
neighborhood of 800. That included trainer aircraft, transports, liaison
aircraft, such as the Storch; it even included towing aircraft which
were to be used for parachutists. As far as fighters were concerned,
production of those, when it was removed from under my care, had
increased by only about ten percent, although ’37, ’38, ’39, ’40,
’41—four years—five years—had elapsed. The saddest fact was that
among those 800 there were only 200 fighter aircraft, although both on
the British front and in the East, fighter planes were necessary. The
Russians had at their disposal a very large number of bombers, and even
if they were an elderly type, after all, we did have to have fighters to
keep them in check, and since the transport extended from the North to
the South over 2,000 kilometers, a large number of fighter units had to
be used in that campaign. This arm could not be supported with 200
fighters. We needed more.
The demand which I found from the General Staff, which of course made
all demands and had them confirmed by Goering, amounted to a total of
360 fighters which were to be obtained in 1942. It was said yesterday
that immediately I ordered a considerable increase. Several figures have
been mentioned by various witnesses. Actually, these increases were not
decided upon in one day. To begin with, it was to be doubled and a few
days later I said, “Let’s make it 1,000; that’s a round number,” and
later, in fact, there were 3,000 and later even we planned 5,000. We
knew at about that time just what we had to expect from our enemies. We
knew the types they had.
America, in the initial period, still published their production figures
correctly subdivided according to types, and we also had an excellent
intelligence, and from analyzing aircraft that had been shot down and
from the numbers which were coded, and which could be deciphered by an
expert right away, we could discover right to the very last number what
they had produced. That was production that had been actually carried
out, and the figures found in the United States were not fictitious.
Industry, although with a certain amount of reticence and difficulty,
but certainly afterwards quite clearly fulfilled these figures. I still
know exactly that the plan ran to about 8,000 aircraft, and was
achieved, and that figure included four-engine bombers. Production under
Britain’s rearmament, too, was learned in detail, and I remember at the
time Great Britain was either already producing 800 four-engine bombers
a month or was just about to produce that number.
You could calculate from that the number, the quantity of bombs which
could be brought to Germany, and regarding the function and size of the
bombs, of course we knew about that too. This was, of course, the reason
that previously as Inspector General I demanded that the entire force
should be built to defend our home country, this being the fundamental
principle of warfare, since without armaments and life at home, battles
at the front were unthinkable. I shall later have to come to this
question in more detail because I am probably the man who remembers this
most accurately, and as long as I am still about I would like to state
this clearly once again, because this is one of the most important
questions which probably existed in every war. This was the biggest
struggle that went on, and as I look back on it today I am surprised
that I did not despair over that struggle myself.
Q. Witness, those measures which you planned, were they dictated by the
thought that with the campaign against Russia the situation of Germany
would become desperate?
A. As I said earlier, the war on two fronts was the stab in the back of
this war as far as I was concerned, that I thought excluded victory once
and for all, and the only remaining question now was just how badly
fleeced we might escape from this whole affair. It was no longer
possible in my opinion to end this war by force of arms. It was only
possible by means of arms to attain a somewhat satisfactory final
position on the strength of which political and diplomatic steps would
have to take place. In order to achieve such a final position it was
necessary in the first place that Germany should be protected against
destruction, because once the war potential was destroyed it was
immaterial whether the fronts collapsed a little earlier or a little
later. They could not be held any longer. This thought, unfortunately,
was not understood by our leaders, or rather they did not agree with it
and turned it down and just did not come to it. The end did not come
until there was hardly one stone left intact.
Q. Witness, in this connection I should like to ask you to show the
correctness of your present report and to prove that from the very start
you had these thoughts, and to submit to the Tribunal the remark you had
made in your diary when the Russian campaign started.
A. I wrote in it, “The attack against Russia: the first day 1,800
aircraft destroyed, mostly on the ground. The Russians left them there.
They didn’t expect that we would attack. They overestimated our
intelligence.”
Q. What did you want to say by these words, “They overestimated our
intelligence?”
A. Well, the Russians might have thought that no opponent would be so
foolish and so stupid to attack them now and create a war on two fronts.
* * * * *
[March 13]
Q. Witness, do you know at what point the Central Planning Board was
ordered and how did the creation of this institute come about?
A. Its creation must have taken place during the last days of March
1942. It originated from a discussion which Speer had with Hitler in the
latter’s headquarters. At the time when Speer had taken over armament
there was no higher authority which was acting according to clear-cut
points of view when distributing raw material. Until then we had been
receiving raw material through a certain department of the OKW. This
department in turn had been getting it from the Four Year Plan. The OKW
was distributing to the army, navy and air force but this department had
no expert knowledge. Consequently the continuity of armament suffered
under this. Speer quickly recognized the state of affairs and without my
having previous knowledge of it he tackled this question when talking to
Hitler. As a result Hitler appointed Speer as the central planner for
this subject. Subsequently Speer made the request that I should take on
this task together with him, since Speer had been in the armament
business rather briefly and since he said I would be able to help
him—at least this was the way Speer discussed the matter with me
shortly afterwards; I, myself, hadn’t been at that conference. Following
this, on 2 April 1942, Speer and I together went to see Goering since
Speer considered that this task, which, after all, was connected with
the Four Year Plan, should be discussed with Goering. Goering expressed
agreement but he demanded that a representative of State Secretary
Koerner, who was in official contact with the Four Year Plan should
enter the Central Planning Board. I know that Speer said at this point:
“It seems to me three are rather too many for this job”, and I said
“Well, I am only too willing to drop out. I have enough work as it is,”
and Speer interfered and said that was out of the question. Goering
said: “No, it is my view that there can be three.” That is how the
composition of the Central Planning Board was realized. I can anticipate
at this point that very much later Minister Funk joined the Central
Planning Board as a force which was done at the instance when the
so-called “War Production”—and in this case we are not talking about
the armament business but civilian requirements and the like—was
transferred from Funk’s Ministry to Speer’s Ministry.
Q. Witness, did you, within the framework of the Central Planning Board
become the armed forces’ or air forces’ representative?
A. No, right at the very beginning that had been decided upon by Hitler
that, namely, that in no way was I to look after my own interest there,
that is to say, the interest of the air force, that I should be above
the Party. Later on there were demands from the navy, which had not
known about this arrangement. They, too, wanted to have a representative
in the Central Planning Board. * * *
Q. Witness, what were the actual tasks of this Central Planning Board?
A. The tasks had been communicated to me by Speer and had been confirmed
through Goering. There was only distribution of raw materials to all
holders of priority permits.
Q. Witness, what is what you call the “holder of a priority”?
A. Well, the armed forces are such priority holders, and within the
armed forces the navy, army, and air force are holders of these
priorities. The coal industry holds these priorities; the steel
industry; the textile industry; the German cities and municipalities,
for their municipal requirements; the power supplying industry.
Q. What about agriculture?
A. Most certainly agriculture, for agricultural machinery requires
steel, requires coal, requires all sorts of things. Altogether, the
forms according to which we used to distribute, and which contained the
word “armament” on the left, contained on the right all the civilian
purchasers, all the buyers. There were approximately 40 to 45 civilian
holders of these priorities.
Q. But then what did the Central Planning Board have to do with the Four
Year Plan, to which there seemed to be some sort of formal connection
through Speer?
A. The Central Planning Board as such had nothing to do with the Four
Year Plan; only Speer, in his capacity as Armament Minister.
Q. Did you ever report to Goering about the Central Planning Board?
A. No, with the exception of that first meeting on 2 April 1942, when
the matter was reported to him. Apart from that meeting, I have never
talked to him or with him about the Central Planning Board. * * *
* * * * *
Q. From whom did the Central Planning Board have instructions?
A. Directly from Hitler.
Q. Through which channels were they given?
A. Speer was with Hitler practically every week, for the reason of army
supplies, or other questions, sometimes staying with Hitler for several
days. On such occasions Hitler would mention his most important
problems. For instance, he would mention the sequence of priorities of
the various armament branches, which I explained to you yesterday. Quite
automatically, through this, the approximate priority ratings were laid
down. However, within the individual spheres, because of the events of
the war, there were current changes: At one moment one type of tank, and
then at another moment, another type of tank; or first one type of gun,
and then another type of gun, would be more important. That, of course,
necessitated considerable rapid changes in the allotment of raw
materials. That was the case, and to an even stronger degree, in the
case of munitions, so that currently, probably during every such
conference which took place in his office, Hitler used to express
special wishes, which of course meant orders for us.
I personally took part in such conferences on nine occasions.
Occasionally Speer would take me along to have me appear on the stage
there, as he would put it. However, that ceased almost completely during
the last years. Anyway, I know for certain, according to my documents,
that I was there nine times.
Let me add at this point that State Secretary Koerner[141] was never
there. Speer did not think that it was necessary for him to be taken
along, and Koerner would not impose his presence either.
Q. So that during such a meeting for the receiving of orders of the
Central Planning Board, Koerner was never there?
A. No, he was not there, and he did not know about it either. He didn’t
know, therefore, how strongly Hitler interfered in this sphere by giving
orders.
Q. But didn’t you always report to him, either you or Speer, in the case
of the meetings of Central Planning Board?
A. It might have come as an aside during the meetings; one of us might
have said, usually Speer, “Hitler has given this or that order,” but
that wasn’t anything very noticeable to Koerner.
Q. Was it only because of the Central Planning Board that Speer went to
see Hitler?
A. No, that was one very small portion of all the other discussions,
because Hitler was interested, to an extraordinary degree, in army
armament, and even right down to the most minute detail. He himself
decided, on his own initiative, the thickness of armor on armored
fighting vehicles; he decided upon the caliber and type of gun which
should be fitted to tanks; he decided the thickness and the caliber of
antitank defensive armor; he himself laid down, personally, the supply
rate of ammunition for every type of gun. I had an awful lot of
difficulty with him over antiaircraft ammunition in that connection,
since Hitler would never depart during that time, from anything which he
had once laid down. He had changed a great deal from his prewar days.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, it is your opinion that even this first record of the
Central Planning Board meeting is inexact and does not correspond with
the true discussions which took place?
A. May I state quite basically in connection with this that I hardly
ever had my deputy with me when I went to the meetings; he had a lot of
other assignments and their meetings went on for several hours.
Koerner’s deputy, the representative whom he brought along, always kept
the minutes in the sense of observing Koerner’s meaning. Sometimes I did
read through these brief minutes, and I might say that I pointed out to
Koerner and Speer that facts always seemed altered considerably, but all
three of us used to laugh about it, and with a flick of the wrist we
used to consider it quite unimportant to have these minutes altered
afterwards because all of these minutes appeared of no importance
whatsoever. What was important were decisions of the Central Planning
Board, and they were taken down most exactly, and they contained to my
knowledge only contingencies of raw materials such as we had
distributed. * * *
Q. Witness, on this occasion we might touch upon the value or lack of
value of the so-called verbatim minutes, now that we have come to this
subject, don’t you think? These verbatim minutes, which are very
comprehensive, very voluminous, even with reference to one meeting,
there was a whole volume it seems. Were they examined?
A. No. That wasn’t possible. I might have examined one or the other
minutes at the beginning, and I did on one occasion try to make
improvements, but I found that it contained so many mistakes that the
time of reading and improving them would have amounted to fifty percent
more time than the actual meeting. These meetings often went on for four
or more hours or so, and I really did not have the time to sit down for
something like six hours afterwards in order to put the minutes right. I
know that there wasn’t any one who read through them, and I didn’t
really know why these records, these verbatim records, were prepared. I
thought perhaps it was a question of supervision for us, and I had no
cause to state that I would not allow myself to be supervised. If you
went to the pains of having one stenographer who would do nothing but
write, but who was stumped by the fact that we sometimes spoke too
quickly or not too clearly; a stenographer who often sat far away from
the man who was speaking, or who didn’t know the name of the man who was
speaking, there was bound to be a lot of muddle in that respect. He
didn’t know whether the man who was sitting on the left was talking or
his neighbor on the right, and one mistake after another occurred. I
gave it up pretty quickly after looking through these minutes. I once
asked the others whether they read through the minutes and they just
laughed at me, and said that they had more and better jobs on hand, and
I said so had I.
Q. Witness, you have just said that these stenographers who sat on the
side could quite often not even distinguish between the speaker, whether
it was he or his neighbor. What was the custom; did you remain seated
while you were speaking, or did one always rise?
A. No, no, we all stayed seated; we all remained seated and the
stenographer couldn’t always see who was speaking because on certain
occasions a lot of people were there. If you invited one man to a
meeting in Germany, then possibly he always brought his entire staff
along so that he could answer all the questions; and if you invited one,
sometimes fifteen or twenty showed up. I sometimes asked whether these
men didn’t have anything else to do because we were not really concerned
with details, only with the basic, larger points, and they used to say,
well, everybody is invited.
Q. Witness, did it happen that specific orders were given to
stenographers to alter certain points or omit them? So that apart from
accidental mistakes, deliberate mistakes were being made?
A. I have recollections of many occasions that Speer, who used to sit
next to me, would shout to the stenographer across the room and say,
“Leave that out, what the Field Marshal just said.” Unfortunately,
notorious before this Tribunal are the expressions and words I used,
which were not always too carefully chosen. I have always said during my
entire life what came to my mind at the moment, and I, as a soldier, was
never taught to hide my opinion. But sometimes, in order to refreshen
sometimes boring meetings, I used rather forceful language to shake up
the others a bit so that they would at last come out with their true
opinions, because many of the people were only there as experts on
individual points. Quite often ministers were there; even in Germany a
minister and a field marshal have a fairly high-ranking position; and
the German is rather more inclined to speak too much than too little.
Now, if they found that I too would use strong expressions on one
occasion, or another, then they would loosen up a bit and they would
start talking, since they felt that I had let go too. I was keen to have
clarity, and that the cat wouldn’t always run around the hot porridge,
because, after all, we had to know the truth and the real background.
Since Speer was much more cautious and much more courteous, never having
been a soldier, I could allow myself the exhibition of freedom, and
unfortunately I did.
Q. Yes, unfortunately. So that statements of that kind of yours were
either stricken or they were altered?
A. That warning of Speer’s only came into force if I stated my criticism
of the higher leaders too severely. If, for instance, somewhere Hitler
had given assignments or orders which, to my view, were wrong, or even
as to orders coming from Goering or other people, the Minister of the
Interior or the Minister of the Police or some other person, then I even
here would state my frank criticism amongst these people. Usually I
didn’t have any other possibility to state my deviating opinion, and I
had the inner urge to say it out aloud. Speer, in my interest, would
have it struck out, and he told me a few times afterward, “For heaven’s
sake, do be careful. They will hang you one day.” But of course he meant
by the German side. Sometimes when I myself became aware of the fact
that in my criticism of these high-ranking gentlemen I had gone too far,
I would say to the stenographer, “Leave that out.” And on one or two or
three occasions I said, “Change it. Put someone else in there as having
been referred to,” because I myself discovered—mind you, I wasn’t
always aware that I criticized too severely, but since Speer told me so
a few times, I controlled myself a little more—that I had said too much
and that it was a mistake, and so I intervened myself.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, after our discussion concerning labor questions, in
connection with the decree concerning the Central Planning Board, I want
you to answer my question now, whether and what powers the Central
Planning Board had with reference to the Plenipotentiary General for
Labor, Sauckel?
A. The Central Planning Board had no power to issue orders to Sauckel.
Q. Who was it that gave Sauckel’s orders?
A. Sauckel’s office had been formed by Hitler’s Decree. However, after
that it was taken into the Four Year Plan, so that formally Sauckel was
under Goering immediately. However, he received his orders from Hitler
himself.
Q. As you said, the Central Planning Board had no powers toward Sauckel?
A. None whatsoever.
Q. However, don’t you know that Speer tried to win influence over
Sauckel? Did that occur in his capacity as a member of the Central
Planning Board, or did that occur in his capacity as Armament Minister?
A. It only occurred in his capacity as Armament Minister.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, on this occasion I would like to ask you, what then do you
know about these concentration camps during the war?
A. I only knew of two concentration camps, namely, Dachau and
Oranienburg. I visited Dachau personally in 1935; in other words, before
the war. That was the only time that I visited a concentration camp,
except for now as a prisoner of war. What there was inside the
concentration camps I do not know. In 1935 there were only Germans in
there; and I was very much surprised to learn after the collapse of
Germany that there were also foreigners in the concentration camps. I
did not know that. I am quite convinced that none of my collaborators
knew about these things in the concentration camps. We had been told at
the time that in these concentration camps criminals of various
categories were being detained. What I saw in 1935 were habitual
criminals. I thought it a very good idea that these people be not
allowed to walk around freely. When we were there these people had to
tell us their sentences; and there were several barriers full of people,
and there the average criminal record was twenty to thirty times rape of
small children. Therefore, I, being a father, believed that it was best
for these people to be locked up.
However, I know that there were political people there; and I saw them,
too. There my opinion differed. But I was told that those people were
there on a temporary basis and would only be kept in there for a longer
period of time if they actually committed active sabotage against the
state. At Dachau most of the political people who were being detained
there as prisoners in 1935 were members of the SA, on account of the
Roehm Putsch in 1934, and that was the basis and reason for their being
there.
I should like to add that I asked to be allowed to visit that
concentration camp at the time, together with other officers of my
branch, in other words, of the Luftwaffe, because during my meetings and
conversations with foreigners, I repeatedly heard the statement,
particularly from the British, “We understand your Hitler’s system very
well. There was no other way for you to go. However, we do not
understand your concentration camps.” That is why I decided to get some
sort of a picture for myself by seeing the camp. It took a little while,
but finally I got the permission to visit the concentration camp. That
at the time was my only contact with the question.
Q. What was your impression of the camp? Was it clean?
A. In 1935, well, yes, at that time it looked very well. There were good
barracks, absolutely waterproof, with two cots, one above the other. Our
barracks always had the same system anyway; and I was the only one to
get that principle in the Luftwaffe, so that there was quite a
revolution among the soldiers in the army. I witnessed one of their
meals. There was a good portion of food, meat, vegetables, potatoes,
quite a lot of soup. The people were thus well-fed. Of course, they had
to work. The work they did was not an easy task. Cleanness was
noticeable. The beds had sheets with a special design on them. The
entertainment of the people was taken care of. There was recreation.
They had a special room where they could hold speeches. They had
facilities for writing and reading. There was an excellent library there
which even according to its size and contents was very interesting. I
looked through the index one time. The man in charge of the library was
a Gruppenfuehrer of the SA and also a concentration camp inmate. I saw
the bakery, saw the butcher shop.
At that time I am sure that there were no cruelties and no inhumane
equipment of any kind. Of course, I could not speak to these same
individuals and ask them how they like it in there. We were allowed to
talk to these people; but each of them was allowed only to say what his
sentence was.
Q. Did you see what kind of work these inmates had to do?
A. That was very hard. They worked on their own equipment, I believe,
not only for the camp but for all sorts of purposes and for the SS. In
other words, they made furniture for themselves and for the Waffen SS
for instance, cupboards, chairs, stools, tables. They also had a
locksmith shop there. As far as I know they did work outside the camp as
well.
I believe there were special commands for cutting down trees; there were
special commands for splitting stones. However, I cannot go into detail
because I inserted this visit into one day—it was in the afternoon
after I had an inspection of the troops in Munich, which inspection I
finished about 9:30 in the morning, and at four o’clock in the afternoon
I had another inspection to carry out of the Luftwaffe, and in between I
saw the camp. I myself ate or tasted the food which the German inmates
had, and I thought it was very tasty, good, and sufficient.
Q. Witness, at a time following that, did you ever hear, even if only
rumors, that inhumane acts were being committed in the concentration
camps?
A. I cannot remember that anything had been mentioned in that
connection—anything that had anything to do with the truth or that
seemed like the truth. I can confirm the fact that there were quite a
few rumors during the war. However, all our efforts to find where these
rumors originated were not successful. We were not able to find out
anything at all. I had very few connections with the SS itself.
Q. I shall come back to the SS later on. Now, Witness, as witnesses have
said, you yourself saw to it that persons in concentration camps were
freed, or were not committed to the concentration camps. Can one not
draw the conclusion from that that you were of the opinion that it was
not very good in the concentration camps; that bad things were happening
there, because in general one who has committed a criminal offense is
not protected from imprisonment?
A. At the beginning I was quite convinced that these concentration camps
were just a temporary measure. I knew from the press that they had done
the same thing in Italy under the Mussolini regime, and that then, after
a few years, these institutions had been dissolved—at least that’s what
I heard at the time—and, since many things were being imitated here in
Germany which Mussolini’s Italy had done, I saw at that concentration
camp nothing but such an imitation. That certain abuses would occur
there, I could understand, because, after all, the National Socialist
movement itself, in its early beginnings, was a revolutionary group.
Even if it weren’t so, at least that’s what people said. I thought that
these things were only the childish diseases of the new regime. However,
if I ever heard anything, if anything was brought to my own personal
attention, then I thought it my human duty to help. That the parents of
anybody who is sent to a concentration camp or something are always
convinced of his innocence, can be understood and every one of us today
knows how unpleasant that is. However, certain other reasons prevailed
at the time, when a family wrote: that is probably the case with one of
the cases which was submitted here in an affidavit. The main reason was
not that the man was a Social Democrat leader. No. He was blamed for
other things, and they had to be cleared up. That is why my help took a
little bit longer here, and I believe that the man was vindicated. The
reproaches which they made to him, and which came from those greatest
pests whom we had at the time, the informers, had to be refuted by
bringing counter-evidence.
Q. That’s enough, Witness. Now such people were taken out of the camp by
you. Then I’m sure that they came to see you and thanked you for it?
A. No. They didn’t do that and I did not pay too much attention to that.
I told their parents and their relatives to restrain them from doing
that. Maybe they wrote a letter though, sometime, but I did not do it in
order to get their thanks and appreciation.
Q. Witness, didn’t you ever speak to anybody who had been released from
a concentration camp and who then would have given you more details
about the concentration camp?
A. I never spoke with anybody who had been released from a concentration
camp—at least, not that I know of. I never spoke with anybody about his
experience in a concentration camp. However, during my captivity, I
heard through other people that no one else ever heard about such things
either, because these people were not only prohibited from speaking, but
they were also so scared that they followed that order to the very
letter.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, you also visited factories, didn’t you, and you saw eastern
male or female workers there, didn’t you?
A. Yes.
Q. What was your opinion about these people. Didn’t they complain to you
or anything?
A. I regarded it as absolutely natural that whenever I visited a factory
it was natural for me to talk to these workers, even if, in my official
capacity, I had nothing to do with that question. However, as a soldier
I was accustomed to act in that way. On each occasion I asked them how
they were, how the food was; I looked at the people and I saw how they
were clad and what kind of an impression they gave, generally speaking,
whether they looked healthy, whether they looked satisfied or not. I saw
Russians, and also Russian prisoners of war. Then I saw Russian female
civilian workers, namely, Ukrainians. I saw Frenchmen, namely French
civilian workers. There could have been prisoners of war among them, but
they were wearing protective overalls over their clothes. There could
have been workers from Slovakia, who considered themselves our allies,
but they were very, very few. Then there were quite a few Italian
workers there, those who had come on a voluntary basis at the time;
those so-called “Imis” (Italians who revolted against Mussolini and were
sent as prisoners of war to work in Germany) I did not see.
Q. Did eastern workers, male or female, ever complain to you concerning
their work?
A. No, they did not. On the contrary, the general impression of these
female Ukrainians who worked on the Junker 52’s was a very pleasing one.
The girls were singing; they were well fed; they were well dressed; and
they answered my questions in a nice, cheerful way. I spent about 20
minutes with these girls. There were quite a few pretty ones among them,
and towards the end they flirted with me, and the girls were laughing
all the time.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, I will now enter into the question of what the Central
Planning Board has to do with labor questions at all?
A. The Central Planning Board had considerable difficulties connected
with the question of getting raw materials. The acquisition of raw
materials was originally the tasks of the Ministry of Economics and then
of Speer in the Armament Ministry. On such raw materials depended the
armament program.
The pacemaker among all these raw materials for the armament program was
steel, but the pacemaker in turn for steel was coal or coke production.
That was the biggest bottleneck, since, unfortunately, during the first
years of the war the youngest and strongest age groups of miners had
been called up for military service. Hitler had given us the order to
develop a steel production program amounting to 3.2 million tons per
month. This was to be done by Speer, and Speer had succeeded in reaching
the figure of 2.6 million tons, but that was the maximum. Hitler’s
armament program, however, had been based on the figure of 3.2 millions.
Hitler had demanded these armament programs and the experts had
calculated the amount of steel they needed for those programs.
We in the Central Planning Board discussed the possibilities of getting
up to 3.2 million tons of steel, and Speer being the man for that part
of the production, ordered the men from the steel manufacturers’ union
to come and see him in a conference in which all steel problems, through
the self-administration of the industry, were dealt with. Speer was in
agreement with me, this is an aside which I must add, to the effect it
was a mistake to direct industry through the state, but that industry
ought to govern itself through committees of their own, coming from
their own ranks, and in this sense of course, these main committees and
rings which we have talked about must be understood.
These gentlemen from the Reich Association Iron stated that the
possibilities existed that 3.2 million tons of steel could be
manufactured, subject to certain conditions. In that connection the main
prerequisite was a very much larger allocation of coke. Apart from that
they wanted certain additional matters for their own production, some
labor too. I remember the question of smelters which was submitted at
the time. I am not an expert, but at that time I did gather that we were
concerned with specialists with very considerable ability and knowledge,
since otherwise a few handful of men wouldn’t have been brought into our
conversation. At any rate, the main problem was coal.
Speer, anyhow, during one of our conferences, sent for the men
representing the coal industry. Such a Reich Association Coal had
existed for some considerable time. These people stated that there was
enough coal in the mines but that human manpower was lacking to bring it
up. Speer in his capacity as Armament Minister now asked them to tell
him in writing what was needed. Now, these men apparently reported the
figures regarding workers they had, and during those conferences with
the coal representatives, always, of course with reference to the
question of steel, it was stated that all efforts on the part of the
Armament Ministry would have to fall down because of the labor shortage.
Speer, as he told me, mentioned this to Hitler dozens of times. It was
here for the first time that various controversies arose between Speer
and Sauckel.
* * * * *
The first difficulties between Speer as Armament Minister and Sauckel
came to Hitler for decision. Speer said, “I’m short of workers”. Sauckel
said, “I have fulfilled all your demands”, and as proof he submitted his
figures. Between the figures which Speer had and those which Sauckel
had, no comparison was ever possible. They were based on different
suppositions. Speer was unable to obtain the basis for the figures which
were at Sauckel’s disposal. In their conflict Hitler took the side of
Sauckel. He wished thereby to exercise pressure on Speer to increase
armament. Speer was unable to do so because he did not have the workers
who had to produce coal.
This struggle went on through the years. At first Speer still hoped that
Sauckel would still bring the workers into his factories until in the
summer of 1943 he gave up this hope. In the Central Planning Board this,
of course, was discussed, and it was also discussed how much steel we
could obtain for the next three months and how we could distribute it.
Always there was this contrast between the figures—Hitler wishes to
have 3.2 million tons of steel; we can only distribute 2.6 millions
because Speer is quite unable to produce more. The consequence was again
that Hitler reproached Speer for not producing more steel although
Sauckel had supplied the workers. The Central Planning Board was not
responsible for the quantity of raw materials at his disposal. Speer
asked me to give him my support in this question. I did so quite
frequently in the meetings and also when I reported to Goering because
we wished to convince Goering that we did not have the workers so that
Goering would intervene with Hitler in that sense.
But I was unable to obtain Goering’s support. Goering took Hitler’s
side, and he said, “The workers are there”. All that was left now was
for Speer in the first line and we ourselves who wished to help him in
the second line to attack Sauckel. Sauckel escaped all meetings for a
long time. Sometimes he sent a representative, and in some cases he
himself appeared, but he and his representative pursued the same policy
by giving us a lot of figures and alleging they had fulfilled
everything. Our doubts in these figures increased. Hitler became more
and more impatient and the reproaches for Speer towards the end of 1943
became insufferable. Whereas Hitler supported Speer until roughly the
middle of 1943 and regarded him as one of the first collaborators, the
relations became much more cool later on, and I explain that mainly
through this conflict. I myself had the same annoyance both with Goering
and with Hitler, who maintained in opposition to me that I had been
given all of the workers.
Our mood wasn’t very nice about this, obviously because although we had
no personal ambition we did not wish to be blamed for something that we
were not responsible for, bad armament, and to have stated that because
of bad armament the war had been lost. That reproach, of course, we
could foresee, and it was obvious that we fought against it with every
means within our disposal. We felt ourselves to be quite innocent in
this field, but in order to prove our innocence, we were missing one
link in the chain, and that was to show beyond doubt that Sauckel’s
figures were untrue. They were not wrong by accident; they were
deliberately forged, in our opinion, because Sauckel wished to impress
Hitler with his own efficiency in his ability to fulfill all the demands
of Hitler in the sphere of labor.
Sauckel pursued that policy up to 4 January 1944. Only when there was a
conference with Hitler on 4 January 1944, of which I was a participant,
did he there say for the first time to Hitler, “Up to now I always
fulfilled all your demands, my Fuehrer. Whether that will still be
possible with the new demands of four million workers, I can no longer
guarantee.”
Q. Witness, we will come later to this conference. Now, I ask you to go
back to answer one question. Did the Central Planning Board have
authority to request labor and to distribute it?
A. A clear “no” to both parts of the question. The question of labor was
discussed in the Central Planning Board only in the interest of Speer
because Speer needed help and knew I would always give him my support. *
* *
* * * I may claim, for example, that throughout my activities, anyway
shortly after the beginning of the war, that is to say, on 9 November,
there were about sixty production managers of factories—no, not
managers but so-called men of trust [Vertrauensmaenner], elected by
workers—these men came to me and I found out they wanted to ask me to
get their rations increased. At that time the whole nutrition was based
upon lower rations; these people in our high industries were not
entitled to the supplementary rations for heavy workers, and these
people explained to me that now that there was a war, and they were
forced to work in different factories from peacetime, their housing was
much further away from their places of work, and in the morning and at
night they had to travel longer; and, therefore, their food was
insufficient. That gave me the idea to apply for a new supplementary
ration and as we became very set in this question, it became possible to
achieve that supplementary ration which was now for the benefit of all
workers. And I have now gotten hold of documentary evidence that
supplementary rations were also given to foreign workers; that was a
supplementary ration for foreign workers working long hours. As this
documentary evidence shows it is an affidavit actually the food of
German and foreign workers was the same. But I also wanted to say that
it is quite possible that there are cases where this principle was not
observed, but that was against the will of the German Government if it
happened.
Q. Witness, that means that neither the labor office nor the Armament
Inspectorate were under your supervision, as the GL.
A. Yes that is quite correct.
Q. But Speer has testified that until the very end you did not renounce
the command of the air industry. What could you say to this effect?
A. If Speer should mean that my personnel official, in the way I
described before, talked with his, Speer’s armament office, once a
month, then it is quite correct; but my officials might have used these
occasions, and how far he worked with my name on these occasions I do
not know. I hope he did so in order to get his point through. I was
never present. I never heard how these negotiations went on. Should
Speer mean, however, that my work in that field was the same as his in
his field, then he makes a mistake, for I did not have that organization
nor did I have the task. My field was only a very specialized one
compared to Speer’s field. * * * I might add perhaps, that Speer did not
know my organization; of course we never discussed it. He knew, of
course, that I had a technical office; he knew that I had a planning
office, and he also knew that I had an economic department for the
contracts of industry. After all, he fought a battle to take the whole
economic department into his sphere, and when I said he couldn’t
possibly do it, he waited until the whole armament industry came under
his charge. We two always settled everything in a friendly manner after
that up to the last moment. Even if there were a certain amount of
conflicting interests, which sometimes were quite considerable,
particularly between our subordinate officers—there were quite severe
battles between those subordinate officers at times—but we always
poured oil on the troubled waters, Mr. Speer and I.
Q. Witness, but couldn’t it be, that in the sphere of the Central
Planning Board in presenting the labor demands of your industry, you
spoke for your own interests?
A. I cannot recall, and I have read some of the records, but in not one
of them, there is not one word said that I had any special demands for
the Luftwaffe. Apart from the fact that once or twice I remarked that I
was equally badly off, that I didn’t get anything, but that doesn’t mean
that I was looking after my interests in the GL. If I talked about
workers at the Central Planning Board, I did so at Speer’s request, to
give him in the armament industry all the support. Speer was
particularly pleased when I played the wild man and became a little
strong. He once told me, “you are much better at this than I am; I am
only a civilian; I can’t do it as well as you can”. And sometimes he
pepped me up and said “Speak a little more fiercely, please”, which I
was only too delighted to do for him. That was meant to achieve
something which you may wish to ask me about a little later on: How we
could get Sauckel to speak clearly. How we could get rid of the
suspicion that we through our inefficiency cannot bring German industry
up to the high level, to the right level.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, during these conferences of the Central Planning Board did
it happen that the bulk of the workers was discussed, or was it rather a
question of bringing new workers into Germany?
A. No, it was only the labor question as such, only inasmuch as it was
important for the increase of raw materials in accordance with Hitler’s
order, and indeed always as an attack on Sauckel in order to get him to
give us the people or to say he cannot do it. As we knew he could not
supply them, our main demand which we wished to achieve was an open
statement by Sauckel, “I haven’t got the workers whom you need”.
Q. Witness, but if your air force industry, for instance, either the
labor offices or the Armament Inspectorates had made requests to Speer,
and when your planning office had checked these demands in order to find
out what was really necessary and what was unnecessary, was it a matter
of proposing what kind of workers you wanted to have and what kind of
workers should be distributed into these different production programs?
Was it a question of deciding whether you needed German workers or
rather more foreigners?
A. We did that in one sense, that for certain factories we simply had to
have skilled workers, which we asked for, but never did we ask, “Give us
foreigners; give us prisoners of war”, and so forth. Our wishes were to
the effect to have Germans, but it was quite clear to us that there
weren’t enough German workers to fulfill the demands. Had they been
available, one needn’t have used prisoners of war or recruited foreign
workers or sent the prisoners of war to work unless they volunteered for
it.
* * * * *
[March 14]
JUDGE PHILLIPS: The Tribunal understands you to say that Polish
prisoners of war were changed into civilian workers and that you no
longer considered them to be prisoners of war. How were they changed
into civilian workers from prisoners of war?
A. Personally I cannot give you many details about this because that
happened as early as 1939, and at that time I was not connected with the
armament question. How it was worked I do not know. All I can imagine is
that there was no longer a Polish Government and that the Governor
General gave the order; whether any Polish office was asked, I don’t
know; it is only in the files here that I found something about some
Polish regional authority. I cannot give you any more clear details.
DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, perhaps I can clarify the
matter.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Let’s let the witness clarify it. Witness, you are
an old soldier. You have been a soldier for many years. How do you
transfer a prisoner of war into a civilian, by discharging him?
A. Yes, he must be released from being a prisoner of war, and then there
are various possibilities. One possibility would be—and this was
resorted to by Germany—to make him a free worker and tell him that “You
are being released, but you must do some work. That is the conditions
which we put to you. You are being paid properly, and otherwise you live
as a free man.”
There is also another possibility, which was the way chosen by the
Americans, by which a prisoner of war is released and then regarded as
an internee. I think that that procedure is not quite so favorable for
the man concerned.
Q. You just transposed them from prisoners of war to civilian prisoners,
then?
A. No, they were no longer prisoners. They were properly released, but
they signed a document which obliged them to do some work for Germany.
Q. You imprisoned them by a document instead of in a stockade?
A. They were no longer locked up, Sir. The Polish workers—I saw them in
the country, for instance—live quite freely.
Q. Could they go where they liked?
A. They could not change their places of work without permission. For
instance, if they were allocated to a farmer, they had to stay with that
farmer. Only if there were special reasons could they change their place
of work. Then they were transferred.
Q. That is what you call freeing them?
A. It was not complete freedom, but it was a better status than
previously when they were prisoners of war.
Q. What would happen to one of these free workers if he walked away from
his place of employment?
A. Sir, that is what I do not know myself. But may I say something else?
A German worker was not allowed to change his place of work either.
Freedom for a German was not any bigger than freedom for a Pole, as long
as the war lasted.
Q. The German went home to his family every night, did he not?
A. These Polish soldiers—I cannot speak comprehensively because I am
not particularly well informed here—but those I saw were young people,
and they lived with the farmer’s family.
Q. Witness, you don’t mean to tell this Tribunal seriously that the
Polish worker, the former prisoner of war, had the same freedom of
movement that the German civilian had?
A. I cannot speak on all fields of life because I do not know. All I do
know was that he was under the obligation to remain with his employer,
but, as I said before, the German worker had to remain with his
employer.
Q. Oh, well, we had that in the United States, for that matter. I still
don’t remember your answering my question: What would happen to a Polish
worker who chose to walk away from his place of employment?
A. I am unable to answer that. I know of no such cases, nor was I told
about one.
DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, the defendant cannot know,
because he was a soldier, what the Polish worker had to do. Like the
German worker, the Polish worker would have been punished and brought
before a tribunal because he broke his contract, and he would have
received a small punishment. Thousands of German workers have been
punished for the same reason, and I have defended many a German worker
for the same charge. That would have happened—nothing else.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Let me ask you, Dr. Bergold. Did you ever defend a
Polish worker for walking away from his employment?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, I did.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: I have no inclination to dispute you.
DR. BERGOLD: I defended quite a few foreign workers in wartime, not only
Poles, but Frenchmen, Belgians, and Dutchmen.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Oh, maybe Belgians, Dutchmen, but Poles—?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, definitely. I am prepared to make that statement on
oath, Sir.
DEFENDANT MILCH: May I supply an observation of my own on the Polish
question? Shortly before I was taken prisoner, I was in the country in
Schleswig-Holstein. In that region the only foreigners there were Poles.
Those Poles on the estate where I was, perhaps 30 or 40 of them, said
that they did not wish to return home, that they would ask to be allowed
to remain on the estate just as did their colleagues in the
neighborhood. These people were dressed very neatly on Sundays. They
looked very clean and healthy. They could not be told from any German in
the neighborhood there except for certain racial distinctions. All of
them had bicycles. On that bicycle they went on Sundays to the nearest
pub and met their girl friends and danced, and they told me themselves
that never before had they been so happy as they were in Germany. That
was at a time when the British were 50 kilometers away from their
village.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Perhaps that is why they were so happy.
A. No. They said that they did not want to leave there now. They wished
to remain.
Q. I think you misunderstood my point. Perhaps their happiness arose
from the fact that the British were only 50 kilometers away.
A. No. I understood what you were trying to say, Sir, but I also talked
to the German employers there. I was there in a totally private
capacity, and I knew these people quite well. They were friends of mine,
and they told me that they were quite satisfied with their Poles, and
they also said that the Poles had done very good work and that the Poles
had asked to be allowed to remain after the collapse, because in those
days they did not wish to return to Poland and they were quite well
looked after here.
May I ask the Court to believe me that we in Germany were not all of us
hangmen and people who delighted in other people’s misery. I may say
here that I think that the majority of the German people are
good-hearted and that they treat other people well and that these people
did not know that in some isolated places there were isolated criminals
who polluted our good name for a long time to come. The people are
suffering from that now, and they will suffer in the future. That is
what depresses all of us the most. Otherwise, one has to take the point
of view that all Germans are criminals and then it might be justified to
hang the lot. Then, please start on me.
* * * * *
DR. BERGOLD: Witness, after this question was discussed, you received
information that this employment of foreign workers was admissible.
Could you tell me now what you knew before, prior to that moment,
concerning this question?
A. I know that after the First War, the question of deportation of
Belgium workers had been examined by a committee of the German
Reichstag. I know that this parliamentary committee examined people like
Hindenburg, Ludendorff, I think also Mackensen and others; and that many
questions were discussed, including that of Belgian civilian workers. As
far as I can recall, that committee was presided over by a man who had
been given the Nobel Prize, Professor Schuecking; I think that was his
name. However, I was very interested in it, and closely followed it
because Hindenburg whom I worshipped, was put before a court; and as far
as I can recall, no sentence was passed upon that score; and nobody was
reproached that international law had been violated. At that time the
Hague Convention existed and the first Geneva Conference had taken
place. I am not very well informed, but I think that was so.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, I shall now come to the 54th meeting, concerning two points
there. Witness, during that meeting[142] Sauckel mentioned that only a
very small percentage of those sent to Germany came on a voluntary
basis. This statement has been mentioned repeatedly in this trial and I
want you to say something about that.
A. I might say that I do not remember having heard these words from
Sauckel. It is possible that I was not there at the moment when he said
that. However, it is possible that I overheard that remark, because
during those long meetings, we had discussions among each other. We were
also interested in other questions. During those long meetings there was
at least one meeting, probably more, during which our concentration was
not quite what it should have been. Had I heard it, I would have
believed Sauckel just as little as I believed all the figures he gave
us, because Sauckel had stated the contrary not long before. I know
exactly it was not so long before that he had declared how well his
system functioned and how he brought all these laborers on a voluntary
basis.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, I shall now leave the meetings of the Central Planning Board
and come to single questions in that connection. What do you know about
the use of British and American prisoners of war?
A. According to my opinion and as far as I know, they went into the
respective camps and they were not used for labor. I never saw such a
prisoner of war any place.
Q. * * * What orders did you have toward the middle of January 1943?
What orders did you receive from Hitler?
A. On 15 January 1943, in the evening I was called up and summoned to go
to Hitler’s Headquarters the next day for a special mission. As far as I
know, I believe that it was General Bodenschatz who called me to the
Fuehrer’s Headquarters. The following morning I reported to Goering, who
happened to be in Berlin at that time. Goering knew that the question of
food for Stalingrad was involved. Stalingrad had been encircled for
months, and the whole Sixth German Army was in it. On the 16th, in the
morning, I flew to Hitler’s Headquarters in East Prussia; and then
Hitler either in the afternoon or in the evening gave me the information
that I should proceed to Czechoslovakia immediately by air in order to
supervise Stalingrad’s food supplies from there.
Q. Witness, make it a little more brief, please.
A. Yes. I tried to carry out this mission. When I received the mission,
the last airfield had been lost. The Russians had taken them. We looked
for smaller places which were rather difficult to find there in those
mountainous areas; and within the next few days we succeeded in carrying
out a considerable air lift of supplies. However, it was too late. The
resisting force of the defenders had broken down; the people were
starving; they had hardly any vehicles or horses. They could not get the
food from the landing places for the planes because they were too weak
to do so. They could not carry the containers so that the air lift of
supplies in the case of Stalingrad could not be kept up after the end of
January or the beginning of February.
Q. Did you have a serious accident then?
A. Yes. At that moment when I wanted to fly into Stalingrad, before I
hit the airfield, I was hit by a railroad engine, and I was seriously
injured.
Q. Then you went back to Hitler?
A. I carried out the mission first. Then when Stalingrad had fallen, I
withdrew and went to see Hitler and told him that I could not complete
my mission. He told me, however, that it was not I who had not carried
out the mission but that it was his fault. He said he gave me the orders
too late; he had wanted to give the orders to me much earlier but had
been talked out of it.
Q. Witness, during that occasion, did you tell Hitler your opinion about
the war and the general situation of the war?
A. It was on 4 February when I reported back to Hitler. Hitler on that
particular day was very crushed due to the loss of Stalingrad. It was
not possible to have a quiet talk with him. He did not receive me at
first, or my chief of staff, namely, General of the Tank Corps Model,
who had a corps within that fortress. We both were under the impression
that day that we would not be able to speak to him. However, he told me
in a few words, “Now, go right ahead to your GL task, manufacturing. Now
we will have transport planes in the first line, transport planes, and
more transport planes.” He was talking about Stalingrad. He thought that
had he had more transport planes he would have been able to keep
Stalingrad.
With respect to Stalingrad, I had a long discussion with him on 5 March.
That was the last time I saw him. That was about a month later. I was
ordered to see him because he wanted to give me the mission to build
high-altitude and fast bombers and put them in the first line of
production. Those now were more important than transport planes. I
availed myself of that opportunity on that day and had prepared myself
in order to tell him my opinion about the general situation. That
discussion took place in the evening. I had dinner with him alone. That
was shortly before 9:00 o’clock; and it lasted until 3:15 a.m. Then in
contrast to all other discussions I had with him, I was the one who was
speaking all the time.
* * * * *
I told him first of all the truth about Stalingrad; and I told him that
the question of leaving an army was a military mistake, when according
to military and strategical points of view it should have withdrawn,
something which had been suggested both by myself and by the army. It
was a mistake; and it did end with the loss of 350,000 men on the German
side. However, a withdrawal in time would have saved the greatest part
of these soldiers. I told him that, after all, the Russians were not as
anxious to attack as that; that in the winter they themselves were in a
difficult position for attacking a German army and they would not have
dared. I told him then that that point was the last turning point in the
fate of the war. I told him that I had tried to reach him before the
Russian campaign. However, I had been unable to do so because it had
been forbidden. I said that the time was now five minutes past twelve.
We use that expression in Germany when something is completed; when it
is finished. I told him that by that I meant that the war was lost. I
apologized for not considering his nervous condition. There was no time
for that any more. I thought it my duty to tell him my sincere opinion;
as a field marshal I thought myself entitled to do so.
I knew that he did not want to hear this. However, I wished that he
would hear me in spite of that. He could do with me whatever he wanted
to afterwards. I remembered, however, that he himself before the war had
used strong words against the bad advisers of Wilhelm II, who out of
cowardice, had not told him the truth. In no case did I wish to stand
before my own conscience with such a reproach on myself. He told me
then, “Yes, you can say today whatever you wish to say.”
I told him then that he was no more in a position to attack in the East.
That those attacks which had already been developed, he should stop.
That he could only defend himself, and I was of the direct opinion that
instead of building great fortification works in France and Norway, that
during the whole of the spring, summer, and autumn, he should
concentrate on fortifying the Dnieper position, which lay about 800
kilometers behind the Russian front, with all the means at his disposal,
with fortifications of concrete, etc., in a great width, between
two-hundred and three-hundred kilometers depth, and in that way there
would be strong fortifications and good shelter for soldiers, with good
equipment and food and ammunition, and that then he should take the
troops back to that position for the winter, and that he should give up
the whole territory in front of that fortification, out of which he
would not get anything at all, neither oil, coal, nor ore. By doing that
he would shorten the length of the Russian front, and in such a way that
the maintenance of those soldiers on the line would be much easier.
Apart from that he should take more care of the eastern forces, and I am
quite sure that on the whole eastern front of two-thousand kilometers,
of about ten million German soldiers, not one million of them were
fighting and he should take measures to change that. That was the only
point he carried out later on, and unfortunately only towards the end of
November of that year and the result was that the fighting infantry
units on the whole eastern front amounts to 265,000 men of the army. It
was impossible to hold that front with such a small number.
I furthermore suggested to him that a great personnel change should be
made, namely, he himself should give up command over the army, that he
should place a simple general in that position. As it was, he held
before the German people a responsibility, which he could not bear. He
was no soldier in that sense, since he was not trained for that. I
suggested to him to dissolve my own branch as an independent Wehrmacht
unit and to put the Luftwaffe entirely under the Wehrmacht, since there
was no strategic air force any longer.
Now what I had to say was special for the army, and this was certainly
of a personal nature, namely, to remove Reich Marshal Goering from the
Luftwaffe, and give him a different task. I said also that it was now
the opportune moment for the Reich Foreign Minister also to be removed
from his position.
Q. Would you give the name?
A. Von Ribbentrop. I suggested to him that the Field Marshal be put in
charge of the units at the front, and I gave as a reason that Keitel was
too lenient in reference to Hitler, and did not know how to get his
ideas across to Hitler; that he should have somebody who would force him
to observe correct military measures. I told him then that the most
important task in my opinion was the home defense of Germany; the air
home defense of Germany, and to consider as having the highest priority;
and also the fighter production should be placed in the first place, and
armaments. I showed him the figures of the English, the American and the
Russian armaments explicitly, and I showed him how these armaments would
have their effect over Germany, and also at what point, or at what time
this would happen. I reported to him that many false reports were made
to him, and I gave him an exact instance. I told him that he
overestimated himself, and his allies, and that he also underestimated
the Russians, and the attitude of Stalin personally, and that that had
led to the Stalingrad collapse, and he should be quite clear as to the
facts if the attack was continued in the East; that he could hold the
Dnieper position, and that if he held that position, the air defense
would be able to prepare a military preparation for peace if the enemy
would see that this crushing of Germany from the air was no longer
possible and if the Russians would see that they would not be able to
cross the Dnieper without being crushed; that I am sure with that
preparedness which should be started at once, we ought to be coming to a
peace. It might be possible to get away with bearable peace terms if
they would act immediately.
Then I also discussed the peace question, and I told him he might make a
real peace with France without taking territory, and I was sure that
France would still consider that. The same applied to Belgium, and also
Holland, as well as Norway. A peace with these countries would then
induce the greater powers of the Western countries to be able to
conclude peace with Germany which would be endurable.
Those were the main points of my opinion. I do not wish to recite
details. He listened to and interrupted me only once, and that was on
the question whether he could or could not attack in 1943, and I
remember exactly that I said to him more than twenty times, “You cannot
attack” and first he said in a quiet way, then got more excited and more
excited until he was very cross, and knocked on the table, “I must
attack.” I told him at the end, “I know I am very impolite, I don’t want
to discuss this question of attacking anymore. But be convinced I shall
not change my opinion.”
Then he waited for a short while, and I began to speak of something
else, and then suddenly he said, “What would you say, Milch, if I would
only make a short attack in order to be able to push through the Russian
preparations before they can start developing.” I answered, “Wait a
minute, it is a defensive measure, because a soldier carries out his
defense by attacking in turn,” and he said, “Then we agree on that
point.” I said, “No, I don’t think we do. If you are successful you will
continue. I would say all the troops should go back after forty-eight
hours that no matter what. Think of Verdun in 1916 when the same mistake
was made; when they did not succeed in getting through on a surprise
attempt, they went doggedly on.”
* * * * *
Q. Witness, what was the development after Stalingrad of your
relationship to Hitler and Goering?
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Before you go on, will you ask for the date of
this conference of Hitler’s again?
A. It was on 5 March 1943.
* * * * *
On the question of how my relationship to Hitler and Goering developed
later on I have to say the following: It became worse and worse from
time to time. It was due to a struggle which I had about the German air
defense which contradicted Hitler’s idea of waging war, for this was the
specific field of the Luftwaffe and I as Inspector General of the
Luftwaffe was forced to make suggestions. I did not let this matter
drop, and I repeatedly brought it to the front, in contrast with
political proposals or proposals in the field of the army and navy,
which were outside of my field of tasks and which I could not bring to
anyone’s attention unless Hitler gave me his permission or if he wished
me to.
Q. With respect to this conference, did you inform him of the fact that
you wanted to have Goering gone?
A. Yes. I did. I told Goering about that. I did not want to stab him in
the back.
Q. Then, what happened to your relationship with Goering?
A. I do not believe that this single incident had any influence on our
relationship, which was bad anyway. Goering was not the kind of a man
who would hold it against me. He had a certain understanding of the
circumstances. There were other things that he did not like about me.
* * * * *
[March 17]
Q. Witness, the last time you were giving us a description of the
suggestions you made with Hitler with regard to achieving a change. What
was the impression you had afterwards as to whether he was going to
follow your suggestions or not?
A. At that time I first of all hoped that he would somehow react to my
suggestion, because in the case of the Stalingrad assignment which had
been given to me although too late, I saw indications that at that time
he still had confidence in me, and also in my military ability. During
the following weeks and months I waited for something to happen, but
nothing did. In the spring of 1943, after my conference, new attacks
were ordered by him on the eastern front. He was not making an attack
for the purposes of defense, he was going to try to reestablish the
front along the Volga River. He was also going to try again to advance
towards the Caucasus. It was only in November 1943 that he followed one
of my suggestions, namely, to ascertain how many men were fighting in
the East, as I said last Friday, and I need not repeat it. The attack
was catastrophic, but in spite of that, no basic changes were made after
that. All the other suggestions, political, military, and those
regarding the personnel, were not followed. Through that I lost my last
hope, namely, that a final basis favorable to Germany could be
established to bring an end to this war through political means, in
other words, peace negotiations, which might have had certain prospects
of success.
Q. Witness, now I shall have to put to you this question. Why, after you
recognized that fact did you continue your activity at all. What were
the reasons which made you place your service at their disposal at all?
A. The main reason was that I was responsible to my people, and even if
all the plans failed to materialize, I, nevertheless, still had one last
hope at least, that a proper air defense could be arranged for Germany
in order to protect our home country and the people from the worst, and
the destruction of their homes and places of culture. That was my main
reason.
Q. What then are the steps that you took in order to achieve your last
final aim for the German people?
A. After 1941 I had a constant struggle, I would like to say, with
Goering and with Hitler in order to achieve an air defense which I
considered necessary. My last effort then was the foundation of the
Jaegerstab.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, you have just testified that you had founded the Jaegerstab
in order gradually to leave your post. Did that further have any other
purpose, for instance, the removal of existing difficulties outside your
own department?
A. Yes. Air armament within the entire armament program had very small,
very negligible powers. As Hitler especially demanded army and naval
rearmament, Speer’s Ministry for years had encroached on a large scale
in all matters which were important for my industry. As a result experts
and other workers had been simply taken away from us. The armament
inspectors and district military administrative authorities, both of
whom were under Speer, were able to carry this through. It was merely by
accident that I learned of this in individual cases, when, for instance,
one of the industrialists happened to come to see me. We raised
objections but we could not alter the situation, I mentioned this the
other day. I wanted to use the Jaegerstab in order to transfer part of
this responsibility for air armament to Speer and his ministry so that
such encroachment, which was particularly noticeable where materials
were concerned, should no longer happen.
The man who had approximately the same task as my own in Speer’s
Ministry was Mr. Saur. Saur was a very clever man, very able, very
energetic, and since he was always sent to report to Hitler personally,
he knew Hitler and his intentions very well, and he knew therefore that
Hitler was not so keen on air armament, and from that he drew the
conclusion which led to these encroachments into our sphere. I was very
anxious to have him join the Jaegerstab so that there too he would share
in the responsibility. There was a struggle about this with Speer until
it finally came about that Saur joined the Jaegerstab. I did not want to
found the Jaegerstab without him, and it turned out that Saur now
tackled this new task very energetically and he did in fact succeed to
some extent in bringing Hitler at least to a standstill. But Hitler’s
views and Hitler’s orders he could not change. Apart from that it was
necessary, if I wanted to transfer armament work to Speer, for the final
armament would have to go through Saur’s hands eventually, so it was
essential that Saur should be included right from the start.
Q. Thank you. Did you give him responsibility to a small or a large
extent within the Jaegerstab?
A. Let me answer that like this: I gave him as much freedom of action as
possible, since he was going to take it over later, and it was his
nature that when any matter was placed in his hands he took it up very
energetically, and I was happy to see that he was going ahead so
vigorously.
Q. Witness, you have made notes about everything you did during the war.
Can you tell this high Tribunal whether you gradually withdrew from the
Jaegerstab and how many meetings you participated in each month?
A. In March, I participated in 15 meetings—they took place daily—and
two trips. In April, I participated in eight meetings, and one journey.
In May, I attended five meetings and took part in two journeys. In June
I attended two meetings only, and had also two journeys. In July, I
didn’t attend any meetings at all, neither did I participate in any
journey. I took more active interest in the journeys, totaling seven, in
order to go into the provinces and show that the handing over of my task
to Saur was taking place with my agreement. These are the figures: March
15, then eight, then five, then two.
Q. You mean the meetings?
A. Yes; that applies to meetings. In other words, I participated in a
total of 30 meetings.
Q. But there was one more on 1 August 1944, wasn’t there?
A. That was after my retirement. It was a meeting when Speer was in the
chair, in which the Jaegerstab was now finally discontinuing its work,
as the tasks of the Jaegerstab were now being incorporated with ordinary
armament under Speer in the armament staff. It was a purely formal
meeting of handing over, and I deliberately took part, so as not to
create the impression that I was leaving reluctantly or that I was angry
about anything, for, of course, the exact opposite was the case.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, did the Jaegerstab have anything to do with workers?
A. Do you mean building workers?
Q. I mean generally speaking, for the moment.
A. I see. Well, you have to draw a clear dividing line. There were two
completely different conceptions for us, armament workers and building
workers. Armament workers came through the existing channels; in other
words, requests were made to Sauckel by the industries, and Sauckel
fulfilled, or did not fulfill such requests. Information about this
first of all went to Speer’s Ministry through the Armament
Inspectorates, and secondly, there were statistical reports monthly from
industry to air force. Building workers, on the other hand, did not
concern any of us at all, not even statistically speaking; that is,
insofar as the GL was concerned and his representatives on the
Jaegerstab. This was entirely a problem for Todt’s Organization. We knew
absolutely nothing about this problem as far as we were concerned.
Q. Witness, did the Jaegerstab include a representative of the GBA, the
Plenipotentiary General for Labor, Sauckel, on its board?
A. I cannot at this moment recollect that accurately, but I believe not.
As far as I know, for these questions there was only a representative
from Speer’s Ministry. That was Mr. Schmelter, who has been a witness in
this trial, and who on his part used to hear our requests and take our
requests to his ministry to help as far as he could.
Q. In order to help in labor problems did Schmelter have to go to
Sauckel on his part?
A. Yes, quite decidedly. He, on his own initiative, could not distribute
workers because he did not have any workers reserves of any kind.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, the construction work which Hitler stated had to be
constructed either by Kammler or Dorsch, was that all for the purpose of
the Jaegerstab or also for other armament purposes?
A. I know that these constructions were meant for many other purposes
because if these questions were discussed in the Jaegerstab I repeatedly
heard Saur or some of his representatives saying, “We wish to change
this; we want to use this for making tanks; or here, for instance, we
will have V-2 rockets.” That is how it fluctuated. In any case, I know
that the subterranean constructions or tunnels were meant for other
armament purposes.
Q. Witness, did you ever hear about the fact that for the construction
of the surface concrete factories concentration camp inmates were to be
used?
A. I heard about that in the Jaegerstab, I believe; and that is how we
can explain Kammler’s task.
Q. Witness, in your capacities as GL, as member of the Central Planning
Board, or member of the Jaegerstab, what did you have to do with the
concentration camp inmates? Did you apply for those?
A. No, we had nothing whatsoever to do with it. But they were
requisitioned for industry through channels which I did not know at the
time. At that time I knew from a conference that in Oranienburg, at
Heinkel’s, people were being used from the concentration camps which
were near there. I heard one of my men say that the work that was being
done over there was good work, I myself did not see these inmates
working. However, at that time I was convinced of the fact, through my
visit to the concentration camp of Dachau in 1935, that these were, in
the main, only German criminals.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, did you hear in connection with labor for concrete
construction work, that Hitler gave orders for the use of one hundred
thousand Jews, or did the Jaegerstab request this?
A. I am sure that the Jaegerstab did not do that. I cannot say for sure
if before the collapse I knew anything at all about this matter. I know
from the record that Hitler is said to have had a conference on 4
January 1944 about this question. However, I know that that conference
lasted for quite a few days, I believe, from 1 to 4 January. I
participated for a very short time in that conference on 4 January. I do
not know, or I cannot recall, if during the time I was there they
discussed that point.
Q. Did you later on find out that Jewish concentration camp inmates were
used in this construction?
A. I never found out for sure.
Q. However, in the sessions of the Jaegerstab they had discussed that
point?
A. I cannot remember anything about it. Many things were discussed there
every day, so that it is not quite possible to remember every detail
that they discussed.
Q. During those conferences or meetings, the number of which you had
mentioned, did you always participate in these conferences?
A. No. I was called out very often. I left on my own initiative
sometimes in order to make certain arrangements in connection with my
other fields of work; otherwise, I should not have been able to do any
work whatsoever in my other spheres. At that time I had the whole set-up
of General Foerster under my orders, and also the entire training of the
Luftwaffe; on top of that were the questions of the Inspectorate General
and his problems.
Q. Witness, I shall come now to your speech of 25 March 1944, which has
been repeatedly mentioned here, Document NOKW-017, Prosecution Exhibit
54. It is your speech to the chief engineers of the Luftwaffe and the
chief quartermasters. It says here at one point that for construction a
few hundred thousand laborers were being used who had been withdrawn
from other places. By that don’t you mean those 100,000 Jews we just
mentioned?
A. No. Under no circumstances. At that time workers had been transferred
for these purposes from many other constructions which were already
under way.
Q. Witness—
A. May I add to that, this: I could not possibly imagine why Jews should
be used as construction workers. Therefore, I am sure that it would have
struck me if I had heard that, for Jews are not used as carpenters and
bricklayers. They are mostly people who work in offices, and one could
hardly expect construction work from them. I don’t believe that I
myself, as a man who has never done that kind of work, would be of any
use for it.
Q. Witness, explain to us now the purpose of this speech of yours, which
uses rather strong language.
A. During the severe air raids we had lost many stocks of material,
mainly of parts. The new output of these parts could not possibly keep
pace with the destruction. There was only one way left, namely, to take
these parts from troops’ stocks. The troops had large stocks over which
the GL himself had no power of disposal whatsoever. He just gave the
orders for the manufacture of them. The requests of the troops, in my
opinion, were always too high—4.2 billion marks’ worth of parts were
being ordered at that time, that is proof of it. If we wanted to have
these planes, which were half ready, in time, it was possible only if
the troops would give us some of their parts. Prior to this conference
many attempts to that effect had been made, but the Quartermaster
General, because of the veto of his chief quartermasters and chief
engineers, had refused my wishes. I was very annoyed about that. Saur
came to see me and stressed once more that the completion of the planes
was impossible. He thought that in the army that would have been taken
care of long ago, but in the Luftwaffe there did not seem to be any
definite power to give orders, and he would take this matter up with the
higher authorities. That, for the second time, made me very cross, and
when this conference took place immediately after these things, I spoke
in very strong terms in order that the Quartermaster General with his
staff should give me the parts that were needed. That was the purpose
and the aim of the whole thing, and contrary to what had happened
before, when they had refused me those parts, the harsh military speech
I made was crowned with success.
Q. Witness, in this speech there are certain passages which in
themselves have nothing to do with those aims you just mentioned. I
would like to show you these passages. At one spot you come to the
question concerning labor, and you say that the portion assigned to the
Luftwaffe in the allocation of labor had been constantly diminished,
that the foreigners were running away and not keeping their contracts,
and that if a foreman reprimanded or beat one of these young laborers
who was engaged in sabotage, he, the foreman, got into trouble; and that
the international law could not be applied here and that you would see
to it yourself that the prisoners, with the exception of the Americans
and British, were removed from the power of the military
organization—then, if a man committed sabotage, he should be hanged in
his own factory or workshop. What does that have to do with this speech
and these aims that you mentioned?
A. As far as prisoners of war were working with the Luftwaffe itself,
the Quartermaster General and the Chief Quartermaster had something to
do with it. This was to be a threat to that department, namely, that
certain rights would be withdrawn from them. Of course, I could not do
that. I don’t believe that Goering would have followed such a suggestion
of mine either.
I have no excuse whatsoever for these words which I used. I have now had
the time to read this passage in peace, and I cannot understand it
myself. I can only repeat that I myself was in an impossible position. I
could see what was coming, and I could no longer help my people. At that
time—I do not wish to say this as an excuse, but just in order to
explain—I was still suffering very badly from my accident, and I could
not quite get over the concussion, because at that time I could not
possibly be absent for one minute. I knew that because my doctor was
worried about me and he tried to help me with all sorts of drugs and
medicines.
Q. Witness, a number of witnesses who were here have stated that very
often you had outbursts of rage. At the time when you made that
statement did you have the sincere wish to carry through these measures?
A. No. I can say that with a good conscience. Never, never in my life
did I do such a thing, and I believe that he who really knows me knows
exactly that, on the contrary, I was different. However, at that time I
simply had to give vent to my feelings, and I could not use strong words
to the people I really wanted to use them on. That was not consistent
with the discipline you have in an army. I also have to say that
immediately after such a discussion I myself no longer knew what I had
said during one of those outbursts of rage. Even today I could not say
for sure that I said that. However, I cannot deny it.
Q. Witness, did you at that time use such wild expressions with
reference to these Luftwaffe gentlemen, and did you threaten them as
well?
A. Yes. I did. I read now that I did so. I am very sorry even today that
I used such strong words against my comrades.
Q. Later on in another place you said that people who acted as if they
were sick ought to be whipped to work and that the whip should be used
as a medicine. That is a similar statement?
A. That was just silly talk, so to speak, and I also used strong words
about myself and called myself an idiot once in a while.
Q. Did you ever issue orders to drive people to work with the whip?
A. Never, and I am sure that I myself would have intervened in such a
case.
Q. Did you ever have anybody hanged because of sabotage at any time.
A. No. First, I did not do it. Second, I could not do it. I never had
anybody punished for sabotage in any way because that was not within my
competency, not even in the few instances where sabotage had actually
taken place.
Q. Witness, weren’t you afraid, however, that if you spoke like that
before this circle of men, that those people would actually act
according to your words?
A. In this circle there was nobody who could possibly have the power to
carry out such things, and second, I believe that everybody knew me,
because my friends even at that time had told me that I had lost my
control over myself. It was a very good thing that nobody took me
seriously at such a time. I also always promised myself that I would not
burst into rage again. However, at that time I did not have full control
over myself because the situation was becoming more serious every day.
Moreover, I knew that all this could have been avoided, that it had
never been necessary to go to war, but if so, that the war could have
been terminated long ago, and apart from all this, if nothing else, the
destruction of Germany could have been avoided. That thought did not
leave me alone day or night, and that actually contributed to these
explosions. When everything was over, from that day I became more quiet.
Q. Witness, those people you spoke to were soldiers, were they not?
A. Yes.
Q. Could those soldiers, according to your knowledge, have possibly been
led to carry out these orders which were against international law?
A. No, never. They quite rightly thought, as people often told me, that
I was crazy during such outbursts. I myself was in no position to judge
that, however.
Q. Witness, however, a certain number of measures in contradiction to
international law were carried out in Germany. Did you know anything
about that, could you have thought then that maybe you were also causing
such measures against international law?
A. No. I did not know about that, with the very few exceptions that were
discussed here. However, I never connected them with myself. There never
was any connection at any time.
* * * * *
[March 18]
Q. Witness, after you received the Knight’s Cross in 1940, did you
receive any distinctions from Hitler, any decorations?
A. Yes, I did, in 1940 I received the promotion to a field marshal, and
that was also in 1940. After 1940 I did not receive anything which I
considered a distinction as a soldier, because the bonus I received in
1942—yes, I will refer to that later—I couldn’t see any distinction in
that as a soldier.
Q. Will you now talk of this bonus which you received? Give us some
details about it.
A. Hitler sent his adjutant on my 50th birthday, with a picture of
Hitler, that is, a photograph, with a dedication, and a letter in which
he congratulated me, and there was a check inside to the amount of
250,000 marks. Hitler wrote in his letter that he knew I was leading a
very modest life and he would like to give me in this way the
possibility of making it a little pleasanter.
I thanked Hitler, and I told him that I gladly accepted the money,
because after all I could not refuse it, as a compensation for the fact
that I had earned a little less by this amount than I would have earned
if I had remained with the Lufthansa, because my salary in the Lufthansa
was twice as high, and even later on, three times as high as the money I
received from the State. Consequently, I did not consider that as a gift
exceeding my merits.
Q. Witness, did the Air Ministry not offer you a bonus, also?
A. That was not a bonus but the President of the Air Ministry told me
that the industry wanted to give me a present to the value of 50,000
marks. I told him that I rejected this present; it looked to me like
bribery. He immediately withdrew the offer, especially as he knew that
never in my life had I accepted a present from industry while I was in
government service.
* * * * *
Q. Was it possible for you to remove directors of industry, or to
appoint them?
A. No. Either there were limited companies [G.m.b.H.], or shareholder
companies, and they had their own organizations, their own
administrations. The shareholders appointed the board of directors and
the board of directors decided who was to be the general manager, and we
never interfered with that.
* * * * *
Q. Witness, will you explain to the Tribunal how overburdened you were
with work during all these years?
A. May I refer to my field of tasks which is shown in one exhibit?
DR. BERGOLD: May I ask this Tribunal now to see the charts which are in
the document book—the first document?
* * * * *
A. Until the end of 1941 my main task was that of Inspector General of
the Luftwaffe. From that point onward, the work as GL took the first
place, while in my capacity as Inspector General I was continuously
travelling by plane. But as Inspector General I was tied more closely to
the Berlin ministry. Oh, I beg your pardon, I mean to say as GL. There
we had meetings every day; and in my capacity as GL I took over a
technical staff in the Ministry of over four thousand. I reduced this
staff to about half; but in spite of that the number of conferences and
meetings could not be reduced. Therefore, I had to go through the
incredible amount of papers which were to be read and also the papers
which had to be signed; and I had to take them home in the evening. I
think that always amounted to two large suitcases and sometimes even
three of them. On the average I would work at home until 2:00 o’clock,
a.m. The reading was the main task because in all technical matters I
had to be up to the mark myself; and that was not very easy for me
because, after all, I had not studied technique but rather was a
self-taught man as a soldier who had been a pilot. In the morning I
would start my duties at 9:00 o’clock or at 9:15. Generally I would eat
my lunch at my desk, and often I even ate my dinner at my desk, so that
I had the impression that I was overburdened with work. Even apart from
these two functions, as GL and Inspector General of the Luftwaffe, the
direction of the different other offices in the Ministry made quite a
lot of work for me, though in my last position the excellent General
Foerster took most of the work off me.
Q. Witness, are the offices correct as they are shown on this chart
which I have submitted to the Tribunal, and can you confirm them as
such?
[Illustration: _CHART OF MILCH’S POSITION SUBMITTED BY DEFENSE_]
A. Yes.
DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, this concludes my
interrogation; and I make room now for the prosecution.
_CROSS-EXAMINATION_
MR. DENNEY: You testified as a witness before the International Military
Tribunal on behalf of the defendant Goering, did you not?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And in the course of your testimony before the Tribunal you stated
that you were the second highest officer in the air force?
A. Yes, that was my rank.
Q. So that the only one who ranked higher than you was Goering?
A. Yes.
Q. And that continued up until the time when you told us this morning
that you completely withdrew, which, I believe was some time in January
of 1945?
A. Yes. May I remark here that from 1937 several officers were in the
second place. That is to say, the chief of the general staff, the chief
of the personnel office, and also the GL. We were all of the same rank,
as it were, but I was the most senior officer among them.
Q. And under Goering there were really four echelons; that is, the chief
of staff, the inspector general, the GL, and the director of the
personnel office?
A. Yes. They were all equal to each other.
Q. Goering was on top, and then came these four in a parallel line below
him; is that right?
A. Yes, under Goering.
Q. And you, from 1941, November, following Udet’s death until sometime
in the middle of 1944, held both the office of GL and inspector general?
A. That is correct.
* * * * *
MR. DENNEY: If your Honor pleases, I ask that this be marked Prosecution
Exhibit 133 for identification. This is a letter, dated 1 April 1943.
The writer of the letter is Sauckel, and the letter is addressed to the
defendant.
“Most honored Field Marshal,
“I take the liberty of enclosing in confidence three copies of
the speech I gave in Poznan on 5 and 6 February 1943, on the
occasion of the Reich and Gauleiters meeting and beg you kindly
to peruse it. The figures contained in this speech refer to the
end of the year 1942. Of course, the figures given concerning
utilization of labor have again increased in the meantime. I
would ask for your continued sympathetic understanding of the
interests of manpower utilization, and your understanding and
assistance in my task as far as possible. On my side, I can
assure you that I always have asked the offices of the labor
allocation administration subordinate to me for close and
successful cooperation with all departments, and that I will do
so for the future too.
“Heil Hitler,
“Yours respectfully,
[Signed] “Sauckel”
And, on the 7th, the last page, the defendant acknowledges receipt of
this letter:
“Most esteemed Gauleiter,
“I thank you most cordially for kindly transmitting to me the
speech you made in Poznan on 5 and 6 February 1943 on the
occasion of the Reich and Gauleiters meeting.
“Heil Hitler! Yours.”
* * * * *
Q. Do you recall receiving it from Sauckel on 1 April 1943?
A. No. At the beginning of April I wasn’t there the first few days. I
see a remark, by somebody else, on this document. It probably says—I
can’t read it very well—“for the files of the Central Planning Board”.
Perhaps this letter may have been submitted to me later on—I do not
know whether I replied myself. I certainly did not read the report
because otherwise I would be able to recall the figures.
Q. But you did initial the letter, didn’t you?
A. I do not know. I do not recall it at all.
* * * * *
MR. DENNEY: On the copy that your Honors have, I believe it’s apparent
in the upper left-hand corner of the first page, the defendant’s
initials appear there, as well as on the original letter.
* * * * *
Q. Now, do you ever recall saying that you would put the German workers
into concentration camps, the ones who did not work well?
A. When I talked about slackers, I referred to education by Himmler, but
not to sending them into concentration camps. Himmler had other training
places for workers where such people who were disinclined to work were
being trained by making their supplementary rations dependent on their
production.
Q. Don’t you recall that you asked that certain camps be set up
especially to take care of these German workers who weren’t doing well?
A. I did not say that we should make a special camp, but that they
should go to the training camps which already existed and we could get
them back from there. I do wish to emphasize here these were people,
Germans, who did not do their duty towards their Fatherland. I thought
it justified that such people should be trained.
* * * * *
MR. DENNEY: Witness, I believe you said you kept a diary?
A. A diary? You could not call it exactly a diary, I only took some
short notes concerning my stay, and I jotted down a few key words which
conveyed generally the most important matters.
Q. That was lost, was it, or destroyed, when you were captured?
A. It has not been lost. I still have it here.
Q. That is what you are referring to?
A. If I look up where I was at a particular day or what personalities I
met, I refer only to the most important questions, not to everything, I
can see whom I was with. Sometimes there is a table of contents, too,
which is more detailed, according to the interest I had in those
questions. For instance, for 28 October, which you referred to a while
ago, I only have the following: My dispute with Goering he had reported
to Hitler; he had not obtained anything, and now he started to vent his
bad humor on me. Then comes a short note again that there was a
conference afterwards with Goering. That was in Karinhall. It went on
for the whole day. It was one hour from Berlin by car. I noted down that
Speer was there, that Sauckel was there, Grawitz, von der Heyde, and
some others. There is no mention what subjects were discussed, but the
attendance of Sauckel clarifies the matter for me. That is an example of
how I would enter these notes in this book.
Q. Insofar as you recall, you were at that meeting on 28 October?
A. Yes, indeed. I have found it here in my book.
* * * * *
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Mr. Denney, let’s get an unequivocal answer to
this. Did you put the initials on the letter from Sauckel?
MILCH: The “Mi”, yes, indeed.
Q. You wrote that?
A. Yes, I did. I wrote it. Somebody else wrote “to the files—”
Q. Never mind what somebody else wrote. Now, on the first page of the
pamphlet, the printed speech, there are some initials. Did you write
those?
A. On the cover, yes; I did, “Mi, 6/4”, that is what I wrote.
Q. All right.
MR. DENNEY: Do you recall saying that Americans were never assigned to
work in any of the airplane factories?
MILCH: Yes, I said that.
Q. This is Document NOKW-364, which is a partial translation of the
minutes of the Jaegerstab, held on 19 June 1944. The cover page, which
is photostated here in the German, which will be given to the Secretary
General, bears the initials of the defendant.
PRESIDING JUDGE TOMS: Is this a new exhibit?
MR. DENNEY: Yes, your Honor. This will bear Prosecution Exhibit Number
135 for identification, if your Honor pleases. Document NOKW-364, a
partial translation of the minutes of the Jaegerstab of a meeting held
19 June 1944. On the covering page there appear the initials of the
defendant. Perhaps the Secretary General would be good enough to let Mr.
Blakeslee have the original so the cover page can be shown to the
defendant. Just show it to him, Mr. Blakeslee.
(The document was handed to the defendant.)
* * * * *
MR. DENNEY: Do your records show that you attended a conference of the
GL on 4 August 1942?
A. Yes, indeed. These discussions were twice a week. (_NOKW-409, Pros.
Ex. 140._)
* * * * *
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Curiosity consumes me as to what would happen if an
officer inferior in rank to yourself took you at your word and actually
executed a number of these workers or prisoners of war. Would that
officer then be punished?
A. No one was there who would have been in a position to do that. Apart
from that, all those who were under my orders knew me and my way of
handling things. They knew that I didn’t mean it, and apart from that
they always laughed about my remarks when I let myself go, as they said.
Q. In other words the comment of the Field Marshal in a matter of this
seriousness was really of no value?
A. Because the people knew that I got excited very easily about certain
things, and these incidents here have been selected and produced. From
every one of these meetings which took place twice a month, there was a
long report and owing to one or other of these reports, maybe once or
twice, there would be a certain outburst or explosion, and then, as we
soldiers were accustomed to do, we would just get mad, that is all.
However, I didn’t intend to do anything about it and I spoke to those
under my orders when the opportunity offered. They pointed the matter
out to me. They knew exactly from my words that this was not meant
seriously. They knew exactly that no such order had been given and that
I myself would never cause anybody to be punished, not even then when it
might have been justified, for the very simple reason that I did not
have the power to administer punishments.
JUDGE PHILLIPS: Mr. Denney read this paragraph to you, Document
NOKW-409, Prosecution Exhibit 140. I understood you to say this, that
the paragraph did not contain your attitude there, that you never gave
such an order, that when you were worried you sometimes used strong
language as a soldier would. Didn’t you say that?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, now whether you meant it or not, you would say these things,
and by so doing you counseled and advised others under you at a meeting
over which you presided to do such things. Whether you meant it or not
you did that, didn’t you?
A. No, I never gave an order by using these words, because my people
spoke with me, and they knew afterwards from my words that I never meant
it earnestly.
Q. Didn’t you say, “I would band the workers together and have fifty
percent of them shot. I would then publish this fact and compel the
other fifty percent to work by beating if necessary.” Did you say that
or not?
A. I do not remember having said that. However, three days ago I believe
I said that, when I had such a rush of blood to my head, due to that
injury I had, and I couldn’t remember what I had said at that particular
moment. I just burst out with rage.
Q. Well, if you did say that, you were advising and counseling others to
do that, were you not?
A. No, that was not a counsel or an advice to anybody else. On the
contrary, it was known that if someone had done such a thing I would
have intervened myself.
* * * * *
[March 20]
JUDGE MUSMANNO: Since we are on the subject of Jews, I would like to
refer to something which occurred at the first trial. Now you are not
compelled to discuss this matter if for any reason you prefer not to,
but you will recall that you were cross-examined by Justice Jackson on
the subject of your being Aryanized. Do you recall that?
A. Yes, I recall it.
Q. Now you gave an explanation at the trial which, however, was not
definite, it seems to have left something in mid-air, and since you have
given us quite a long autobiographical sketch of yourself, if you would
care to enlighten us on this point, you are free to do so.
A. My point of view is as I stated at the time.
Q. Yes.
A. That point of view I still adhere to.
Q. Let us see. You were asked certain questions and gave certain answers
as follows:
“Question: At that time” (Goering had referred to 1933) “Goering
had you—we will have no misunderstanding about this—Goering
made you what you call a full Aryan; was that right?
“Answer: I do not think he made me one; I was one.
“Question: Well, he had it established, let us say.
“Answer: He had helped me in clearing up this question, which
was not clear.
“Question: That is, your mother’s husband was a Jew; is that
correct?
“Answer: It was not said so.
“Question: You had to demonstrate that none of your ancestry was
Jewish; is that correct?
“Answer: Yes, everybody had to do that.
“Question: And in your case that involved your father, your
alleged father, is that correct?
“Answer: Yes.” [There the inquiry rested.]
A. Yes.
Q. Just what had to be done to demonstrate that you were a full Aryan,
and why did the question arise?
A. The first time that question arose was in 1933, and the occasion was
the following: The president of the German Aero Club was reported as
being adverse to the Hitler regime, and I protected that man. Following
that, a man who was a member of the SA sent a letter to Goering, and I
may add that this was a man who was trying to become a state secretary
in the Air Ministry, and he had been deeply hurt when he, an old Party
member, had to take second place to me. In this letter he said that
State Secretary Milch was not a full Aryan. This happened in the summer
of 1933. Goering forwarded this letter to me, and I went to Goering.
Following that I was asked to submit my family tree. That is how this
matter arose.
Q. In other words, you had to establish that no Jewish blood flowed in
your veins, is that correct?
A. Yes, that is what I was supposed to do.
Q. And you established that to their satisfaction?
A. That was established.
* * * * *
Q. * * * Now, I understand you to say that the first time you learned of
the proposed war against Poland was on 21 August, and even then it was
not very clearly indicated that a war could actually be unleashed, and
that further it was not until the very end of the day, that is to say,
at five o’clock in the afternoon of 31 August that you were directed to
put the Luftwaffe, or all your forces, in readiness for the attack. Is
that correct? Is that what you said?
A. On 31 August, not to get ready, but I received the order: “The attack
starts tomorrow,” that was the order for an attack, whereas, over-all
preparations had been made previously at the meeting which took place
with Hitler on 22 August, only then there was still the possibility of
negotiations which were still going on. These negotiations came to an
end on 31 August at 1700 hours.
Q. Did you not tell this Tribunal that after the meeting of 23 May 1939
you were convinced that war was not intended?
A. 23d of May?
Q. Yes, 23 May 1939?
A. Yes.
Q. That you had no intimation that Hitler intended an aggressive war on
Poland?
A. Yes, because at that time, according to my recollection, Hitler
stated again and again that he was certainly going to settle the Polish
problem, but that he would not allow war to break out.
Q. And that you had called to his attention the necessity of
manufacturing bombs, because you believed that hostilities might break
out?
A. That was before that date, before the 23d, and also after the 23d,
because I myself did not share Hitler’s optimism. Although he may not
have intended to wage war, his policy might nevertheless have led to
war, for he alone was not the deciding factor, the others would have
something to say as well.
Q. And that assumption lulled you into the conviction that there would
be no war, since he refused you authority to manufacture bombs?
A. Today I must assume that, at that time I was not aware of it.
* * * * *
Q. When did you first learn that an attack on Russia was intended?
A. At the beginning of January 1941—I beg your pardon—yes, that is
right, 1941, on 13 January actually. It was then that Goering, during a
conference with a large circle of commanding officers, informed us that
one’s attention should be turned to the East, as Hitler was fearing an
attack by the Russians.
Q. Yes, and you finally came to the conclusion that the declaration of
war, or rather, the undeclared war against Russia was a crime against
Germany.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you think it was a crime against Russia?
A. Yes, against Russia also.
Q. Also?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you endeavored to see Hitler to persuade him not to enter this
war.
A. Yes.
Q. And your immediate circle, your military friends, realized that it
was foolhardy to provoke a war with Russia and thereby establish two
fronts?
A. Exactly the way I saw it, yes. My immediate circle were of the same
opinion as I was.
Q. And all the generals were of the same impression—that it was
hopeless for Germany, and that further it was tragic and suicidal to
Germany to allow Hitler to take over the control of the armed forces?
You were practically unanimous in that belief, were you not?
A. This was never discussed in any larger circles.
Q. But you have testified—it is in the record—that you were all of
that belief.
A. It transpired at a later stage, when it was discussed, that they were
all of the same opinion.
Q. When was that?
A. Later on in the course of the war.
Q. When did you realize that it was a mistake to have Hitler as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces?
A. I, personally?
Q. When was it thoroughly recognized, even though not expressed at a
public meeting among the generals, that it was suicidal, a great
mistake, to have Hitler as Commander in Chief?
A. That was the general point of view after Stalingrad. That is when it
became general.
Q. And when was that?
A. That was the end of January 1943.
Q. Yes. You still had two and a half years of war ahead of you?
A. Yes.
Q. Why didn’t you do something about having Hitler removed?
A. It was my duty toward my people to keep allegiance to him. I had
sworn an oath of allegiance to Hitler. I am only a human being who can
see this world subjectively and I cannot presume to be an impartial
judge on such questions. Moreover, I believe that in the whole of
Germany’s history there is not one instance of soldiers rising against
their military commander. I certainly do not know of one.
Q. Even though you realized that Hitler was leading Germany into stark
annihilation and unspeakable hardship, and even though all the generals
were of that same belief, yet you upheld this fetish of an allegiance
which was destined, and very clearly so, to bring unparalleled misery to
the people that you professed to be faithful to?
A. Your Honor, I personally did not presume to say that my judgment was
right, and that Hitler’s judgment, and the judgment of all those around
him, was wrong.