coincidence that two of your top men were in communication in this tone
in 1942 without your knowledge.
Did you also tell the Tribunal yesterday that you understood that most
of the difficulty or a large part of the difficulty in the East for the
Jewish people came from the local population? Do you remember saying
that yesterday?
ROSENBERG: I did not receive this translation.
MR. DODD: I asked you if it was not a fact that yesterday you told the
Tribunal that much of the difficulty for the Jews in the East came from
the local population of those areas.
ROSENBERG: Yes. I was informed about that in the beginning by returning
personalities, that it was not due to local authorities but to parts of
the population. I knew the attitude in the East from before and could
well imagine that this was true.
Secondly, I have stated that I had been informed that along with
executions of various other nests of resistance and centers of sabotage
in various cities, a large number of Jews were shot by the police. And
then I have treated the case of Sluzk here.
MR. DODD: I think you will agree that in the Ukraine your man Koch was
doing all kinds of terrible things, and now I don’t understand that you
dispute that Lohse and Kube were helping to eliminate or liquidate the
Jews, and that Bräutigam, an important member of your staff, and that
Leibbrandt, another important member of your staff, were informed of the
program. So that five people at least under your administration were
engaged in this kind of conduct, and not small people at that.
ROSENBERG: I should like to point out that a decree by the Reich
Commissioner for the Ostland is at hand, which in agreement...
THE PRESIDENT: Will you answer the question first? Do you agree that
these five people were engaged in exterminating Jews?
ROSENBERG: Yes. They knew about a certain number of liquidations of
Jews. That I admit, and they have told me so, or if they did not, I have
heard it from other sources. I only want to state one thing: That
according to the general law of the Reich, the Reich Commissioner for
the Ostland issued a decree according to which Jewry, which of course
was hostile to us, should be concentrated in certain Jewish quarters of
the cities. And until the end, until 1943-1944, I have heard that in
these cities such work was still carried out in these Jewish ghettos to
a very large extent.
And may I supplement this with still another case which came to my
knowledge, namely that a district commissioner...
MR. DODD: I don’t want you to point out anything else. You have answered
the question, and you have explained your answer. I don’t ask you
further...
ROSENBERG: What I wanted to add explains another part of my answer in a
very concrete case, namely, a district commissioner in the Ukraine had
been accused before the court of having committed blackmail in a Jewish
community and having sent furs, clothes, _et cetera_ to Germany. He was
brought before court, he was sentenced to death, and was shot.
MR. DODD: Well, that is very interesting, but I don’t think it is a
necessary explanation of that answer at all. And I would ask that you
try to confine these answers. I would like to get through here in a few
minutes.
You are also, of course, the man who wrote the letter, as you told the
Tribunal yesterday, suggesting the out-of-hand execution of 100 Jews in
France, although you said you thought that was what? a little bad
judgment, or not quite just, or something of the kind? Is that right?
ROSENBERG: I made my statement about that yesterday.
MR. DODD: I know you have, and I would like to talk about it for a
minute today. Is that what you said about it, that it was not right, and
that it was not just? “Yes” or “no,” didn’t you say that to the Tribunal
yesterday?
ROSENBERG: You have to quote literally, word for word, if you want me to
answer “yes” or “no.”
MR. DODD: I will ask you again. Didn’t you say yesterday before this
Tribunal that your suggestion in that letter, in Document 001-PS, was
wrong and was not just? Now, that is pretty simple and you can answer
it.
ROSENBERG: I stated that it was humanly unjust.
MR. DODD: It was murder, isn’t that what it was, a plan for murder?
“Yes” or “no”?
ROSENBERG: No. But I considered the shooting of hostages, which was
publicly made known by the Armed Forces, as an obviously generally
accepted fact under the exceptional conditions of war. These shootings
of hostages were published in the press. Therefore, I had to assume that
according to international law and certain traditions of warfare this
was an accepted act of reprisal. Therefore, I cannot admit...
MR. DODD: Well, were you talking then as the benign philosopher or as a
soldier? When you wrote this letter, 001-PS, in what capacity were you
writing it, as a benign, philosophical minister on ideology and culture,
or were you a member of the Armed Forces?
ROSENBERG: As can be seen from the document, I have spoken about the
fact that certain sabotage and murder of German soldiers was being
committed here, so that good future relations, which I also aimed for,
between Germany and France would be poisoned forever. For that reason
this letter was written, although I regret it from the human point of
view.
MR. DODD: It comes a little late, don’t you think?
The witness Hoess—you were in the courtroom when he testified, Hoess,
H-o-e-s-s?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I heard him.
MR. DODD: You heard that terrible story of 2½ to 3 million murders which
he told from the witness stand, very largely of Jewish people?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
MR. DODD: Although it was not brought out here, you can take it from me
as being so. If you care to dispute it, you may, and we will establish
it later. You know that he was a reader of your book and of your
speeches, this man Hoess?
ROSENBERG: I do not know whether he read my books. Anti-Jewish books
have existed for the last 2,000 years.
MR. DODD: Now, you offered to resign in October 1944 from your position
as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories?
ROSENBERG: October 1944.
MR. DODD: You did not have very much to resign from on that date, did
you? The Germans were practically out of Russia, isn’t that a fact? On
October 12, 1944, the German Army was practically out of Russia. It was
on the retreat, isn’t that so?
ROSENBERG: Yes. It was the question of my further tasks for the
political end psychological treatment of several millions of Eastern
workers in Germany; it was furthermore a question of refugees who came
from the Eastern territories and from the Ukraine to Germany, and of the
settlement of economic problems, and above all I still had the hope even
at that hour that a military change also might still occur in the East.
MR. DODD: And everybody, pretty nearly everybody who was informed at all
in Germany knew that the war was lost in October of 1944, isn’t that so?
You knew that the war was lost in October of 1944.
ROSENBERG: No, I did not know that.
MR. DODD: You did not know that?
ROSENBERG: No, I did not know that.
MR. DODD: I will accept that answer. That is all. I have no further
questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, do you wish to re-examine?
[_There was no response._]
General Rudenko, have you got some additional questions you want to ask?
GEN. RUDENKO: I have some questions to ask in connection with the
defendant’s activities in the Eastern territories.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, General.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, at what time did you begin,
personally and directly, to participate in preparations for an attack on
the Soviet Union?
ROSENBERG: Not at all.
GEN. RUDENKO: Was your appointment of 20 April 1941 to the post of the
Führer’s Commissioner in central control for all questions relating to
the Eastern European territories not directly connected with Germany’s
attack on the Soviet Union?
ROSENBERG: That was no longer a planning in which I took part, but it
was the consequence of a decision which had already been made and about
which my advice had not been asked. I was notified that a decision had
been made and military orders had been given. Therefore I have
nothing... Well, if I have to answer the question as much as possible
with “yes” or “no,” I have just answered this, on the basis of the
wording, with “no.”
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny the fact that this appointment took place
in April 1941?
ROSENBERG: That is evident, that I received a task.
GEN. RUDENKO: With this nomination Hitler gave you very wide powers. You
collaborated with the highest authorities of the Reich, received
information from them and summoned the Reich authorities to meetings. In
particular you collaborated with Göring, with the Minister for Economy,
and with Keitel. Do you confirm this? Please reply briefly.
ROSENBERG: There are, again, three questions. As to the first question,
whether I received wide powers, plenipotentiary powers, I had not
received plenipotentiary powers at all. The answer would be “no.”
To the second question, whether I had conferences, the answer is “yes.”
As a matter of course, I conferred with the supreme Reich authorities
who were concerned with the East, as was my duty in connection with my
task.
GEN. RUDENKO: Please reply briefly to the following question:
Immediately after your appointment of 20 April 1941, did you hold a
conference with the Chief of the OKW?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I visited Field Marshal Keitel.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did you have a conversation with Brauchitsch and Raeder in
connection with your appointment, regarding the solution of the Eastern
problems?
ROSENBERG: According to my recollection I did not speak to Brauchitsch
and I also have no recollection of having had any conversation at that
time with Raeder.
GEN. RUDENKO: Did you have a conference with the Defendant Funk, who
appointed Dr. Schlotterer as his permanent representative?
ROSENBERG: The then Reich Minister Funk, of course, was shortly informed
of this task given me and he named Dr. Schlotterer for purposes of
liaison.
GEN. RUDENKO: You had several conversations with General Thomas, State
Secretary Körner, State Secretary Backe, and Ministerial Director
Riecke, regarding the economic exploitation of the Eastern territories?
ROSENBERG: I do not believe that I spoke to Thomas, and I met the other
gentlemen gradually, one by one. Later I took over Riecke as liaison man
to the Economic Staff East in the Ministry. I must have met Backe also
later on, as is natural in the course of time. I do not know at all
whether I ever met General Thomas personally, maybe I met him in
passing.
GEN. RUDENKO: Then I shall have to produce documents where you yourself
speak about it.
You were negotiating with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and, as a
result, the Defendant Ribbentrop appointed Grosskopf to act as permanent
liaison officer with your organization, and placed on the other hand Dr.
Bräutigam in charge of the political section. Is that correct?
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct, because the Foreign Minister was, of
course, informed briefly and appointed the then Consul General Grosskopf
as ambassador...
GEN. RUDENKO: You received competent representatives of the Ministry of
Propaganda such as: Fritzsche, Schmidt, Glasmeier, and others?
ROSENBERG: Yes, that may have been so. I met most of these gentlemen for
the first time then, and it goes without saying that I had to inform
myself about the task.
GEN. RUDENKO: You negotiated with the Chief of Staff of the SA and
requested him to place at your disposal the most experienced of the SA
leaders.
ROSENBERG: Of course I also spoke to the Chief of Staff of the SA about
possible capable assistants in the event of an occupation of the Eastern
territories.
GEN. RUDENKO: In this connection, therefore, you will not deny that a
co-ordinating center did actually exist for preparing measures of attack
against the Soviet Union.
ROSENBERG: Not in that form, because all the tasks connected with the
conflict with the Soviet Union were divided up from a military point of
view. They were assigned to Göring in the field of economic planning;
they were, as became evident later on, clearly defined with the Police.
I had been given a political liaison office in order to discuss the
political problems of the East, and to give the different offices ideas
about the eventual political administration and the direction of this
policy. In the main I did that in the sense which you find in my speech
of 20 June.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. One and a half months before the treacherous
attack by Germany on the Soviet Union, you drafted a directive for all
Reich commissioners in the Occupied Eastern Territories. You do not deny
that?
ROSENBERG: I already mentioned that yesterday. In the line of duty, some
provisional drafts were worked out by myself and my assistants. These
drafts which we have here, or which have been shown to me up to now,
were not sent out in this form.
GEN. RUDENKO: I shall return to this question later.
In your report which you submitted to Hitler on 28 June 1941, regarding
the preliminary work on questions connected with the Eastern
territories, you stated that you had had a talk with Admiral Canaris,
during which you asked Canaris, in the interests of counterintelligence
work, to choose certain persons who, while working on
counterintelligence, would also be able to do political work. Do you
confirm this statement?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct. But I heard that Admiral Canaris had
organized a certain group of Ukrainians, I believe, and other nationals
for some sabotage or other work. He visited me once and I asked him not
to meddle with the political work, that is with the political
preparatory work, and he assured me he would not.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny your meeting Canaris?
ROSENBERG: The meeting—no.
GEN. RUDENKO: And the conversation in which you asked him, in the
interests of Intelligence, to select certain people to help you. Do you
deny that?
ROSENBERG: No—yes, I deny that. However, I do not deny the fact that,
of course, if Canaris had an interesting political report it would be
proper for him to inform me about it on occasion. I had no
counterintelligence organization or espionage organization. During these
years I never...
GEN. RUDENKO: We are going to submit this document to you.
[_Turning to the President._] Mr. President, perhaps we can declare a
recess now, because I still have a series of questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn the hearing of this case at 4
o’clock in order to hear supplementary applications for witnesses and
documents. The Tribunal hope, therefore, that we may be able to conclude
the case of the Defendant Rosenberg before that. I mean, to conclude the
case of the Defendant Rosenberg, including his only other witness, or
any other witness.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, you replied to me that the
conversation with Admiral Canaris did not take place.
ROSENBERG: On the contrary, I said that such a conference with Admiral
Canaris did take place.
GEN. RUDENKO: Then maybe this was wrongly translated.
ROSENBERG: Probably.
GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you whether you requested Canaris in the course of
your conversation, in the interests of the counterintelligence service,
to choose men who, while working as counterintelligence agents, would be
able to do simultaneously political work. Do you remember my question?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Was that the main subject of your conversation?
ROSENBERG: That is not correct. Admiral Canaris had...
GEN. RUDENKO: That is not correct? Well, let us not go into that in
detail.
In order to speed up the interrogation, I will show you a document, and
I will read this passage into the record.
Show this document to the defendant. [_Turning to the Tribunal._] I
mean, gentlemen of the Tribunal, Document 1039-PS, on Page 2. The part
is underlined. I will read this passage.
[_Turning to the defendant._] This is your report on the preliminary
work concerning the organization of the territory of Eastern Europe. I
read:
“A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect
that, under the existing confidential circumstances, my office
could in no way negotiate with any representatives of the
peoples of Eastern Europe. I asked him to do this insofar as
counterespionage work required it and then to name persons to me
who, over and above counterespionage service, might be regarded
as political personalities, in order to determine their possible
utilization later. Admiral Canaris said that of course he would
take into consideration my request not to recognize any
political groups among the emigrants, and that he intended to
act in line with my statements.”
ROSENBERG: That is in accord with what I said.
THE PRESIDENT: General, I think you are going a little too fast.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I ask you, do you confirm this quotation?
ROSENBERG: Yes, in the German wording but not in the Russian
translation. I understand Russian also and can, therefore, determine
that the translation is not entirely correct; for it says here that I,
under the existing confidential circumstances, naturally could not
negotiate with other countries for eventual collaboration in a civilian
administration. That is the first point. And point two is that, since
Admiral Canaris had to do with various groups of Ukrainians, Russians,
and other people, I was asking him—apart from counterintelligence, that
is—not to do espionage work for me or ask me to do espionage work but
that he should point out to me people of other nationalities whom I
could use later—under given conditions—in civilian administration.
That was the meaning; and furthermore, at the end it is quite correct
that he agreed not to carry on any political work himself.
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, this absolutely follows the Russian
text. What you just told us now means exactly the same in Russian.
ROSENBERG: According to the German translated into Russian it must have
been that. I can recognize only the German text, not the Russian
translation, which is not in accord with this meaning. You interpret
this text as though I were trying to carry on espionage work. I asked
Admiral Canaris, since I could not carry on political negotiations with
representatives of the Eastern people, simply to tell me from his
personal knowledge, apart from his official capacity, what people of the
Eastern regions, under certain circumstances, might later work in the
civilian administration for me. That is the meaning. The translation is,
therefore, not entirely correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well; but you confirm the German text?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: It means you were connected with counterespionage?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct. I only received Admiral Canaris and
told him that, in his official capacity in which he had to function, he
should not deal with political negotiations and plans, because I was now
being given that task.
GEN. RUDENKO: You heard the admonition of the President of the Tribunal
about answering briefly, and I beg you to do so.
ROSENBERG: I would answer more briefly if the questions were put to me
factually.
GEN. RUDENKO: I will put to you several questions concerning the aims of
the war against the Soviet Union. Do you admit that Nazi Germany, having
prepared and pursued war against the Soviet Union, aimed at plundering
the economic riches of the Soviet Union, the extermination of her
people, the enslavement of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and the
dismemberment of the Soviet Union? Answer briefly. Do you admit this, or
not?
ROSENBERG: Five questions are being put to me again, and if...
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you please answer briefly: Do you admit the aims of
the aggression as I have put them to you? You will be able to give your
explanation later.
THE PRESIDENT: You can answer that question “yes” or “no.”
ROSENBERG: I must answer “no” to all four questions.
GEN. RUDENKO: You deny it. All right. Let us turn to a new document in
this connection. I mean the Document 2718-PS, which is in the minutes of
the morning session of 10 December 1945. That is your memorandum dated 2
May 1941. [_The document was handed to the defendant._] Will you please
follow? This document reads as follows:
“1) The war can be continued only if all the Armed Forces are
fed with stocks from Russia in the third year of the war.
“2) There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people
will die of starvation if we take out of this country everything
that we need.”
I ask you now, did you write that?
ROSENBERG: I neither wrote that nor did I participate in this session,
and I cannot determine whether any one of my collaborators knew anything
at all about this meeting. It says here, “Senior officers only, two
copies, one for the files (I-a) and the second General Limbert.”
Therefore, only two people in the Armed Forces knew about this.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do not go into that in detail, Defendant. You do not know
about this?
ROSENBERG: This document has been submitted twice already.
GEN. RUDENKO: Let us go on to the next one.
THE PRESIDENT: The question was whether you knew of this document.
ROSENBERG: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: We come to the next document, which determines the aims of
the war. This is your instruction to the Reich Commissioner for the
Baltic countries and for Bielorussia. You stated the following—I mean
now the Document 1029-PS; the part which I will read is marked in the
margin:
“The aim of a Reich Commissioner for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
and Bielorussia must be to strive for the creation of a German
protectorate, with a view to transforming these regions later
into a part of Greater Germany by the Germanization of racially
admissible elements, the colonization of Germanic peoples, and
the resettlement of undesirable elements.”
Do you remember these instructions? Please reply first.
ROSENBERG: Yes, I am familiar with this document. I already remarked
yesterday that at the beginning all sorts of drafts were made in my
office which were not approved by me. The corrections were made by me.
GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you very clearly, do you know these instructions
or not?
ROSENBERG: But I still heard the wrong translation. Nothing is mentioned
about “destruction,” but “incorporation,” and the Russian translation
again said “destruction.” If it is translated that way, then my question
appears in the Russian language as an approval of destruction; and that
is a wrong translation which is being made here, which I can follow only
because I speak Russian.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you can be heard perfectly well without
shouting.
ROSENBERG: I beg your pardon.
GEN. RUDENKO: You are only correcting an error in the translation. Now
as regards the rest—Germanization and colonization—is that right? Does
that sound right in German? Answer me. Is that right or not?
ROSENBERG: Even in that way it is not translated quite correctly. Here
it says “colonization of German peoples,” and now you are translating
“Germanization and colonization.” These are two substantives which again
give correspondingly different sense, and I would like to add that these
drafts made by a collaborator of mine were not actually issued, and that
they in no way constitute instructions.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask you, was it issued or not; but I ask you was
there such a draft? Will you deny that?
ROSENBERG: I am not disputing that such a draft was submitted to my
office.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. We pass on.
These instructions concern the aims of the war. They are instructions
for all Reich Commissioners of the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 8
May 1941. This is Document 1030-PS. I will read only a short excerpt,
which states—I quote from Page 4. This excerpt is marked in the margin.
In these instructions you state that this coming struggle would be a
struggle for the supplying of Germany and all of Europe with raw
materials and foodstuffs. Do you confirm this?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Then you confirm that.
ROSENBERG: Yes, of course. This document was presented in my office as a
draft. That is correct, and I am not disputing it.
GEN. RUDENKO: Do not go into details again. I will remind you once more,
please reply briefly. You confirmed this point, and that is enough.
ROSENBERG: This document, yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. This statement was made by you previous to the
attack on the Soviet Union. I will remind you, but I will not submit the
document to you since it has already been presented to the Tribunal
several times and is at the disposal of the Tribunal. I mean a
conference which took place in Hitler’s office on 16 July 1941.
[_Turning to the Tribunal._] This is Document L-221, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You were present at this conference, were
you?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Hitler said then that the Baltic States would have to
become an integral part of the Reich, and the same applied to the Crimea
with adjacent territories as well as to the Volga districts and also the
Baku area. Do you recall these statements of Hitler?
ROSENBERG: I have seen this document, purporting to be Bormann’s
observations, here for the first time. At that time the Führer made very
long, passionate statements. I did not take any exact notes at that
conference, but he did in fact speak about the Crimea, and he said that,
because of the tremendous power of the Soviet Union, no bearers of arms
should be allowed there later and...
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask why. I ask you: did he say that?
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you are going too fast. You must wait
until the man is finished.
GEN. RUDENKO: He is going into too many details, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, you admit the Crimea. You agreed
with Hitler’s idea concerning the seizure of these territories?
ROSENBERG: You can see from the document and you can see from my speech
how I pictured the self-determination of all the peoples in the East in
a new order of states; and I controverted the declarations of the
Führer. That can be seen here. That was how I argued.
GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask you about that. I am asking you whether you
agreed with these ideas of Hitler, or whether you objected to them.
ROSENBERG: Yes, it can be proved that I protested, and it is even shown
in the record.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal are not concerned with whether or not it can
be proved. The question is: did you agree or not. You can answer that, I
suppose. Did you agree, or did you not agree?
ROSENBERG: I agreed with many points and rejected other points; but this
is a compilation of at least 10 to 15 points.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is an answer.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. We will return to this question in a few
minutes.
I am now passing on to your own directives, which you issued as Minister
for the Occupied Eastern Territories. These documents were already
presented to the Tribunal as 1056-PS and EC-347. First of all, I would
like to ask you one question: What is this “Brown Folder”?
ROSENBERG: The Brown Folder was compiled by the administrative
department of the Eastern Ministry in response to certain requests of
industry, of my political department, of the personnel department, and
of the technical supply department for officials in the Baltic States
and in the Ukraine. Thus it was the first attempt at a general
regulation.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, then that is a sort of “Green Folder.” It is
quite clear.
Now, let us turn to your directives, Document EC-347. We will show you
this document right away. Will you note the passage which has been
underlined, on Page 39 of the document, if I am not mistaken. I will
read this paragraph:
“The first task of the civilian administration in the Occupied
Eastern Territories is to represent the interests of the Reich.”
I omit a few lines.
“The stipulations of the Hague Convention regarding land
warfare, which deal with the administration of territories
occupied by a foreign power, do not apply, since the U.S.S.R.
can be considered as nonexistent....”
Then further:
“Therefore, all measures which the German administration deems
necessary or suitable in order to carry out this extensive task
are admissible.”
Do you agree that this exposes your secret designs, although you somehow
too hastily proclaimed the Soviet Union as destroyed?
ROSENBERG: In the Russian translation I again heard the word
“plundering,” but the word “plundering” does not appear in this German
text. If the German text is translated in such a way that the word
“plundering” appears everywhere, although in the German...
GEN. RUDENKO: I interrupt you and say that the word “plundering” is not
in the Russian text, which I just read into the record; so I believe you
are simply inventing, or at least you did not hear rightly.
ROSENBERG: May I say a few words in this connection?
GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you, did you write this?
ROSENBERG: I did not, in fact, write it, but it was a circular letter
which was issued by the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories,
and, therefore, I am officially responsible for this Brown Folder. But I
would like to say a few words of explanation in regard to this—the
explanation about the status of international law in the East I received
from the Führer’s headquarters. It stated that, in accordance with the
attitude of the Soviet Union toward certain conventions, as far as the
Hague Convention was concerned, it did not apply to the Soviet Union in
this instance. Furthermore, as this document contains many pages, I was
not able to read it in its entirety at the time; but on the second page
I have already found a paragraph which shows very obviously what lines
the wording followed. It states as follows...
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, one minute, please.
ROSENBERG: But I must be allowed to read from the document.
THE PRESIDENT: We must try and conduct this cross-examination in an
orderly fashion. Now, what is the question?
[_Turning to General Rudenko._] What is your question?
GEN. RUDENKO: I put to him the question, whether he admitted that he
knew of the tasks put before the civilian administration in the occupied
territories as they are set forth in the quotation which I just read. He
said that he did know. I have exhausted my questions in this particular
sphere. The document is in possession of the Defense and the Defense
will be able to quote other parts of this document which have not yet
been read into the record. This is a very long document. If I had tried
to quote it to the Tribunal in its entirety it would have taken too much
time.
THE PRESIDENT: [_To the defendant._] You answered the question. I
understood what the question was, and that you were told that the Hague
Convention did not apply to Russia.
ROSENBERG: Yes. May I quote this one paragraph on Page 40, the next to
the last paragraph:
“The most important prerequisite for this”—that is, for the
development of the East—“is the treatment of the country and of
the people in a corresponding manner. The war against the Soviet
Union is—with all necessary regard to the securing of
foodstuffs—a political campaign with the establishment of
lasting order as its objective. The conquered territory as a
whole is, therefore, not to be considered an object of
exploitation, even if the German food and war economy must lay
claim to considerable areas on a large scale.”
And I believe I may say that the fact that the necessities of the
inhabitants are taken into consideration cannot be expressed more
clearly.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I will put to you a few more questions as to
how you treated the population, although we have heard quite a lot about
this treatment, as you have too. We pass on.
I asked you about the Crimea and you said, “Yes, Hitler proposed to
annex the Crimea to Germany.” Do you remember that you did not only
approve of these plans, but you also invented new names for towns—for
instance, Simferopol was to be called “Gotenburg” and Sevastopol was to
become “Theodorichshafen.” Do you remember that?
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct. The Führer told me that I should think
of a change of names for these cities. The renaming of very many other
cities was discussed, too.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, of course.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I am expected to conclude my entire
presentation of evidence with respect to Rosenberg by 4 o’clock. I do
not know how I can do that.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has not laid that down as a condition. I did
not make any order about it. I said only that the Tribunal hoped, and
the “hope” was addressed more to the Prosecution than it was to the
Defense.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, if I may be permitted to say so, the Soviet
Prosecutor has submitted documents again which I already submitted
yesterday, and on which the defendant has already given answers. I am
referring to Documents 1029-PS and 1030-PS. The defendant himself
already said...
THE PRESIDENT: You are wasting the time of the Court by making this
entire interposition.
GEN. RUDENKO: Thus you admit the change of the names of Simferopol and
Sevastopol.
Next question: You also worked on the reorganization of the Caucasus,
and you had organized a special staff. Will you answer “yes” or “no”?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Furthermore, you favored Prince Bagration-Mukhransky, an
adventurer from the emigré circle, as candidate for the throne of
Georgia. Is that true? Answer briefly.
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is true. We did mention that—we spoke about
him—but we turned down such a candidacy.
GEN. RUDENKO: He was turned down. Is that so? Very well.
As regards the reorganization of the Caucasus, on 27 July 1942 you
compiled a special report; is that true?
ROSENBERG; It may be that a report was made. Yes—yes, naturally, it is
quite a lengthy report. It has been submitted here.
GEN. RUDENKO: And I will show you this report in order to draw your
attention to one short quotation.
[_Turning to the President._] I have in mind, Mr. President, a document
which has already been submitted as Exhibit USSR-58.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant Rosenberg, please pay attention
to Page 7, a passage which is marked, which says first that the German
Reich must seize all the oil. Have you found this passage?
ROSENBERG: On Page 7 of the text I find the passage—yes, I have found
it.
GEN. RUDENKO: The text reads:
“From the economic point of view the German Reich must take
control of the total oil supply. The necessary participation in
the riches could be discussed in the future.”
Do you confirm that this statement was made by you?
ROSENBERG: This document is a memorandum of my office, and I confirm
that it is true.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well.
ROSENBERG: May I make a remark in addition? Here we are not talking
about the oppression of a people but of an assurance of autonomy and of
every possible mitigation for these people. Only I cannot locate that at
once from a document which has 14 pages if I only read one sentence.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have just questioned you concerning the tasks of the
German Reich with regard to this matter of oil. Now if you look at Page
14 of this same report you will find it at the very end—this is how you
define the tasks:
“The problem of the Eastern territories consists of a
transference of peoples from a Baltic to a German field of
culture and the preparation for the military frontiers of
Germany on a vast scale. The task of the Ukraine is to provide
Germany and Europe with foodstuffs and the continent with raw
materials. The task in the Caucasus is, above all, of a
political nature and represents the decisive extension of
continental Europe, under German direction, from the Caucasian
isthmus to the Near East.”
Did you read this passage?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny that these were the actual plans?
ROSENBERG: I affirm that this is set down correctly, and that it is in
accord with our hope that eastern continental Europe might, some time,
be incorporated into the total economic system and economic supply of
the rest of the continent, as had been the case before 1914; for at that
time the Ukraine was an important country of exports of raw materials
and foodstuffs.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, your plan concerning the Ukraine is well known. In
this connection I will put the last question concerning aggression.
After having seen these documents, which you do not deny, do you admit
the aggressive and plundering character of Germany’s war against the
Soviet Union and your personal responsibility for the planning and
carrying out of this aggression? Answer briefly. Do you admit this, or
do you not?
ROSENBERG: No.
GEN. RUDENKO: No? Very well.
ROSENBERG: No, because I did not consider this a war of aggression on
our part but just the opposite.
GEN. RUDENKO: Of course; but we will not go into details.
I have a few more questions to put to you concerning the German
administration and the German policy in the Occupied Eastern
Territories.
Who was the highest official in the civil administration in the Reich
Commission?
ROSENBERG: The Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories was
responsible for the administration and legislation in the Eastern
Territories, and the Reich Commissioner, for the territorial
governments.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, the Tribunal have already heard all
about the administration—the former administration—and personnel of
the administration.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I have only two or three more questions in
this particular sphere.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Did the Reich Commissioner have the
authority to issue orders for the arrest and execution of hostages?
ROSENBERG: At this moment I cannot recall whether he had such authority
by law, or whether that came under direct police jurisdiction. I cannot
answer this question with assurance, for at the moment I do not recall a
decree to that effect, but it is not entirely impossible; I do not know.
GEN. RUDENKO: It was possible? Very well.
I would like to remind you that you foresaw in your directive this
authority of the commissioners to shoot hostages. We will pass right on.
A lot has been said here about German policy in occupied territories. I
will, therefore, put only a few questions to you.
First of all, as regards the Ukraine, you have here described the
situation in such a light as to show that Koch was the sole person
responsible, whereas you have always assented that, on the contrary, you
were the benefactor of the Ukrainian people.
ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct; I never said that I was a
benefactor.
GEN. RUDENKO: In your document, which has been submitted by your defense
counsel and which I will therefore not submit to you, Document
Rosenberg-19, Riecke wrote, in a letter to all Reichsleiter of the press
in November 1942:
“Koch has declared ‘that the Ukraine is for us only an object of
exploitation, and that it must pay the expenses of the war, and
that in a certain way the population must, as a second-rate
people, be utilized for the tasks of the war, even if they have
to be caught with a lasso.’”
This was the policy of Koch in the Ukraine. This document was submitted
by your counsel. I will ask you now: Did you write to Koch on 14
December?
ROSENBERG: May I reply to that? I do not have the verbatim document in
front of me. I only know that it was a letter written by Riecke to me
with the big complaint which so many others had also had, and that he
requested me...
GEN. RUDENKO: Koch?
ROSENBERG: Yes—to complain, and that he used rather drastic language,
and that we both strove to reach orderly methods of work here.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have been all over this matter of Koch as to
the Ukraine today, and so it is not helping the Tribunal to go over it
again.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Yesterday you stated here repeatedly in
your explanations as regards the atrocities and extermination of the
Soviet population that you were not informed, and that these were police
measures. Did I understand you correctly?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not exactly true. I was informed of many combats
with partisans and of bands and, as I have stated, of some shootings;
and also I was told about the fact that German agricultural leaders,
German officials and policemen, and peaceful Soviet farmers were
attacked by these partisans and bands and were murdered by thousands.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. We know that the partisans who fought against
the enemies of their country were called bandits by you and treated
accordingly. I do not argue that. But I am speaking of the extermination
of the civilian population, of old men, women, and children. Did you
have knowledge of this?
ROSENBERG: In these combats we tried especially to protect the farming
population and others too; and when we heard about what appeared to us
to be excessive measures by the Police, we put the most severe demands
to them that even in the full heat of battle these matters were to be
considered; and the Police told us that it was easy to make those
demands from behind a desk, but, if in White Ruthenia the partisans
murder and burn 500 White Ruthenian burgomasters with their families in
their houses and we are shot at from the rear, then terrible conflicts
must follow.
GEN. RUDENKO: I will remind you that, in your directive concerning
occupied territories and organization of administration and the primary
task for administration, you personally planned the police measures as
your first task. Do you deny this now? I ask you, do you deny this now?
ROSENBERG: If it is Document 1056-PS, I proposed seven urgent measures.
I cannot tell you at the moment which is the first one here. I ask that
you submit this document to me.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. I will ask that one paragraph of this document
be shown to you, “Police measures,” which is in the very first place.
THE PRESIDENT: Has this document been put to him?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the use of going into it again?
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, Defendant Rosenberg asked for it. I would
like to say simply that the defendant tried to make me believe that he
was not informed and that these were purely police measures. I am going
to prove that he put as his primary task the carrying out of these
police measures.
ROSENBERG: It goes without saying that in an occupied territory in the
middle of such a war the Police are responsible for police protection
measures. And the third point is “the supply of the population with
foodstuffs in order to avoid famine.” I repeat, “supply of the
population in order to avoid famine.”
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Very well. We heard about this in detail
yesterday. I have a few last questions to put to you. First of all, I
would like to ask you about the Zuman incident. The document has already
been submitted to the Tribunal, but I consider it my duty as a
representative of the Soviet Union to put to you this question
concerning the shooting of Soviet citizens for the sole purpose of
obtaining a stretch of land needed as a hunting ground. You remember
this document?
ROSENBERG: Yes, I gave an extensive explanation on it yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, this has been gone into before before
the Tribunal. Why should the Tribunal’s time be taken up by going over
and over again on the same grounds? We have said that we would not have
things done cumulatively.
GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, a few details of this question are of great
importance, and the defendant did not explain them; therefore, I would
like very much to ask this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn to consider the
matter.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: First of all, the Tribunal will rise tomorrow afternoon
at half past 4.
Now, as to this question, the Tribunal think that the matter has been
sufficiently gone into; but, if there is a particular point which has
not been dealt with before, a question may be asked in that connection.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, Mr. President.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant Rosenberg, on 2 April 1943, you
addressed a letter to Himmler regarding this incident regarding the
shooting of hundreds of Soviet citizens in the region of Zuman, because
this place was needed as a hunting ground. Did you not address such a
letter to Himmler? Until June 1943, furthermore, you were interested in
receiving a reply. What were the results of this letter?
ROSENBERG: First, I wrote to the Chief of the German Police; and I had
to wait for what he, as the official responsible for the measures of
security in the Ukraine, might cause to be done. When I did not receive
any further information, I brought this case as a personal complaint
before the Führer.
GEN. RUDENKO: When did you report it to Hitler?
ROSENBERG: This complaint to the Führer was dealt with in the middle of
May 1943 and, since it was a rather lengthy complaint, probably reached
him several weeks in advance, that is, 5 or 6 weeks elapsed between 2
April and the day it was dealt with, the middle or end of May. I believe
that is a very short time for dealing with a complaint because: First it
had to be investigated rather thoroughly by Lammers and Bormann; then it
had to be reported to the Führer; the Führer then had to make his
decision and give his directives; and then I was summoned.
GEN. RUDENKO: When was this complaint discussed for the last time?
ROSENBERG: In May—between the middle and the end of May 1943.
GEN. RUDENKO: Was it discussed in the presence of Koch?
ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.
GEN. RUDENKO: Yesterday you told the Tribunal that Koch presented a
report to Hitler—a memorandum from the Forestry Office. Is that true?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore, this memorandum confirmed that it was a fight
against the partisans?
ROSENBERG: Not quite exactly like that, but it said that this forest
district had to be utilized for the necessary supply of lumber for the
Armed Forces or the Administration and that these needed forests
harbored many restless partisans and guerrilla bands. Therefore there
was great danger for the workers in these districts and it had come to
shootings between them and partisans and guerrilla bands; and, since one
could not watch over all of them, a transfer of certain groups from
these forest districts into forest areas farther south took place. Koch
added that then many of these people who had been transferred expressed
their thanks for having received better land than they had had before.
That was the information that Koch had given.
GEN. RUDENKO: They were grateful that one December night they were
evicted from their houses and taken away hundreds of kilometers and
hundreds of them shot. They appreciated that very much. I should like to
ask you the following, however. In your letter to Himmler on 2 April
1943, you also attached a memorandum from the Forestry Office; and in
this memorandum it is stated—I am going to read this passage—you
should remember this incident—this terrible incident when men were shot
because hunting ground was needed. In the memorandum of the Forestry
Office it is stated, “There is no doubt that several villages located in
the forest region of Zuman were evacuated principally in order to create
a hunting area.” This is stated in the memorandum of the Forestry
Office.
ROSENBERG: I only want to point out that we are dealing here with an
assistant of the Forestry Office in Berlin, who had added that on the
basis of his reports. What Koch had produced was a report from the Chief
of the Forest Administration in the Ukraine, himself.
GEN. RUDENKO: All right. The last question in connection with this
incident: Did you believe Koch when he stated that?
ROSENBERG: If I am asked on my conscience, that is hard to answer; but
there was a...
GEN. RUDENKO: It is exactly on your conscience, if you like.
ROSENBERG: A description of actual conditions by the Forestry
Administration was included, and I could not protest against such a
presentation since it appeared well-founded, and I had to admit to
myself that I had made a mistake in protesting.
GEN. RUDENKO: You did not protest against that, I quite understand. I
shall finish by just reminding you of one quotation from your letter:
“Hundreds of people in and around Zuman were shot by using a
whole police company ‘because they were communistically
inclined.’ No Ukrainian believes that. The Germans are also
astonished by this argument; because, if this was done for the
safety of the country, then the communist-infected elements in
other regions should have been executed at the same time.”
I have here to put to you the last question. Here in the Tribunal
yesterday you declared several times that you wanted to resign from your
post. Moreover, you spoke about your letter to Hitler, dated 12 October
1944, where you asked for directives for the future. Regarding this my
colleague, Mr. Dodd, has already reminded you that at that date, 12
October 1944, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories no
longer had any territories, because the Germans were out of Russia by
that time. I would like to ask you the following question: How could you
ask to be relieved of your post, you, who for years had dreamed about
getting this position of Reich Minister and even becoming a member of
the Secret Cabinet? You asked Hitler to grant you this position of Reich
Minister. Do you remember that?
ROSENBERG: In the first place I was never a member of the so-called
Secret Cabinet. That is not correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: Well, I shall correct myself. You dreamed of becoming a
member of the Secret Reich Cabinet.
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.
GEN. RUDENKO: And also dreamed of becoming Reich Minister; is that also
true?
ROSENBERG: When the question as to my task became acute, there was a
long discussion one way and another about the form of that task. Dr.
Lammers, commissioned by the Führer, told me that the Führer intended
either to appoint a Reich inspector because he wanted both Reich
Commissioners to...
GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, please. So that we shall not linger
too long on that question, I am going to submit to the Tribunal a
document: This is your personal letter—the last document...
THE PRESIDENT: In the first place, I do not know what the question is,
and you are interrupting the witness before he has answered any
question.
GEN. RUDENKO: No, Mr. President. I have but one aim here, because I
should also like to shorten my interrogation in accordance with the
desire of the Tribunal. So I am going to submit the letter of Rosenberg
of 6 February 1938, addressed to Hitler, wherein he requests the post of
Reich Minister from Hitler. That is a short letter. I ask permission to
submit this document as Document USSR-117.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant Rosenberg, I am going to read
this document into the record. It is not very long:
“6 February 1938. My Führer, because I was unable...”
THE PRESIDENT: The document is translated into German, is it not?
GEN. RUDENKO: The original is in German.
THE PRESIDENT: It is in German to start with. It is not necessary to
read it all; you can put it in like other documents.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well.
[_Turning to the defendant._] In this letter you expressed your
resentment in connection with the appointment of the Defendant
Ribbentrop as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Is that correct?
ROSENBERG: Yes, yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You thought that the post of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs in the Hitler Cabinet could have been filled by yourself,
Defendant Rosenberg; is that correct?
ROSENBERG: Yes, and I do not find it so extraordinary that I should not
have expressed my wish to be used in the State service of the German
Reich after so many years of activity.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. You speak in this letter of the existence of a
secret cabinet; is that correct?
ROSENBERG: Well, may I read through this letter a little? Because I
cannot answer fragmentary questions.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, yes. [_Handing the document to the defendant._]
Please read it through.
ROSENBERG: Yes, I have read this.
GEN. RUDENKO: Everything that is contained in it is correct?
ROSENBERG: Certainly, yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: This is your own letter?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You asked to be appointed into this secret Reich Cabinet?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You asked for the position of Reich Minister?
ROSENBERG: I reported that I had spoken to Party Member Göring about the
question of this appointment; and since the Führer had charged me with
the ideological education of the Party and since the foreign political
office of the Party still existed and the impression might thereby arise
in the Party that I had somehow been refused by the Führer, I therefore
asked the Führer to receive me personally to discuss this matter. I
think it quite understandable that I should express the wish to speak
about a matter which was important to me personally.
GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore—here is my last question—you were the closest
collaborator of Hitler in carrying out all his plans and his ideas?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct; that is absolutely wrong.
GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, let us consider it as a reply to my question. I
have finished, Mr. President.
M. HENRI MONNERAY (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): I have
only a few questions to ask the defendant.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant Rosenberg, is it correct that
the deportation and the execution of the Jews in France put your
organization in a position to seize furniture and valuables which
belonged to these Jews?
ROSENBERG: It is quite true that I received a governmental order to
confiscate archives, works of art, and later, household goods of Jewish
citizens in France.
M. MONNERAY: The mass deportation of Jews could only increase the
profits of your confiscation and seizures; is that not so?
ROSENBERG: No. The deportation of Jews has nothing to do with that. The
suggestion for these measures was given only when I was informed that
the Jewish people in question no longer inhabited their institutions,
castles, and apartments—that they had left Paris and other places and
had not returned.
M. MONNERAY: Once the Jews were deported they were absent; is that not
true?
ROSENBERG: When the German troops marched in, Paris was almost entirely
depopulated. The rest of the Parisians and inhabitants of cities in the
north of France returned in the course of time; but, as I have been
informed, the Jewish population did not return to these
cities—particularly not to Paris. Therefore they had not been deported,
but they had fled. I believe the number of those who had fled was given
as 5, 6, or 7 millions or more.
M. MONNERAY: Do you mean to say by that, Defendant Rosenberg, that in
the time that followed, when new deportation measures were carried out
in the course of the German occupation of France, the apartments and
homes of people deported were not seized by your organization?
ROSENBERG: No, I cannot express it that way. It may very well be that
the apartments of Jewish persons who had been arrested had also been
confiscated under certain circumstances, but I cannot give any exact
information about that.
M. MONNERAY: One can, therefore, say that the deportation measures gave
to your organization a greater chance of success in seizures and
confiscations; is that not true?
ROSENBERG: No, that does not agree with the facts; but, as may be seen
from the report which the French Prosecution made here, what actually
happened was that confiscated apartments generally were sealed by the
Police. Two months were allowed to elapse to see whether or not the
owners of these apartments would return, and only after the fact had
been established that this was not the case were the household goods
transferred to Germany for those whose homes had been damaged by bombs.
That can be seen from the report which the French Prosecution has
submitted here.
M. MONNERAY: I suppose that there are very few cases—and I am sure you
would agree with me on this—of people who had been deported returning
after two months?
ROSENBERG: On the contrary! I was informed about such cases. Even in
Document 001-PS, regrettable as it is from the humane point of view, it
is clearly stated that we had heard that a large number of Jewish
personalities, who had been formerly arrested, had been released again.
M. MONNERAY: You remember, certainly, the memorandum which you sent to
Hitler on 3 October 1942, which has already been presented to the
Tribunal as Document Number RF-1327. In that document you remind Hitler
of your jurisdiction and your powers; and you say that it is a matter
for you, as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, to
seize the homes of Jews who had taken flight, who were absent, or who
were called upon to leave. I can submit this document to you in order to
refresh your memory if necessary.
[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]
The first lines of that document are the ones I am referring to. I
emphasize the words “the Jews who were called upon to leave later.” It
is a document of 3 October 1942, which has already been submitted.
ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct—that is according to the facts. And as
I have already said before, it is possible that a number of apartments
of arrested people—other people who were absent—were included in that;
but as I said before, in the other report there was more detailed
information. But this document as such corresponds to the facts; it is a
letter from me.
M. MONNERAY: The consequence of this act was that you were entrusted not
only with the seizure of apartments which you found vacant at the time
of the arrival of the Germans in Paris but also of apartments of people
who were, as you say, “called upon to leave” in the following period.
You surely know, Defendant Rosenberg, under what conditions, in
territories occupied by the Germans in the West as well as in the East,
Jews were called upon to leave—namely, in special trains which
generally led directly to concentration camps?
ROSENBERG: No, I did not know about those trains. We definitely dealt
with deserted apartments, and I was probably informed that eventually
also the apartments of people who had been arrested, people who were
still living, or had long since fled would be taken into consideration.
Nothing more is stated here, and I could not give you any further
information. As to the reports which have been submitted here at the
Trial, I have seen them here for the first time. I can only tell you
that in the end I was informed that, before the conquest of Paris by
Allied troops, all available furniture and household equipment was
turned over to the French Red Cross.
M. MONNERAY: Do you agree with me on the following point: That your
organization had the right to seize valuables and apartments which had
become vacant after the arrival of the German troops in Paris? Do you
agree with me on that point?
ROSENBERG: Yes.
M. MONNERAY: Defendant, you have just said that you had no knowledge
whatsoever of the deportations in special trains to special
destinations. Do you know—and I suppose you do know it since the
document to which I am referring has already been produced before the
Tribunal—that in Paris every Tuesday since 1941 and until the end of
the German occupation conferences called “Tuesday meetings” brought
together the representatives of the various German organizations in
Paris—that is to say, the experts in Jewish affairs in the different
German administrative organs—to be exact, a representative of the
German Military Command, a representative of the Civilian
Administration, a representative of the Police Department, and a
representative of the Economics Department? At these meetings there was
also present a representative of the German Embassy in Paris and also a
representative of your Special Staff.
I am referring to Document Number RF-1210, which is a report of
Dannecker of 22 February 1942. He was the responsible chief and the main
expert on anti-Jewish terrorist action in Paris during the occupation.
If you wish, I will submit that document to you.
ROSENBERG: I remember these declarations made during the Trial very
well, but I have never received a report about these Tuesday conferences
which took place regularly. The fact that my deputy for the furniture
action had to maintain closest liaison with the Police was a matter of
course, since the confiscations of such articles could not be carried
out by my office, that being an exclusive right of the Police.
Therefore, one had to speak to the Police about these matters. It was
not reported to me that there were regular Tuesday conferences. I
believe that if such a report had been consistently turned in it would
have been submitted to me.
M. MONNERAY: You agree, however, that these Tuesday meetings were
extremely useful to the interests of your organization. As a matter of
fact, the various collective actions which were taken against the
Jews—that is to say, arrests, police raids, and deportations—were
discussed in those meetings. Did it not, therefore, seem completely
logical and natural for your organization to be regularly informed of
these actions in order that it might take the resulting economic
steps—namely, seizures of property?
ROSENBERG: In my opinion that is not logical at all, because if that
certain Chief of Police sent secret transports of that kind into these
camps, as has been revealed here, then it does not follow that he would
report about that every Tuesday to the other gentlemen. Neither do I
believe that this Chief of Police informed the representative of the
Foreign Office about these things in detail.
M. MONNERAY: You are perhaps badly informed on this point, but I would
like to read again the concluding passage of the report which says, “The
conference had as a result an alignment of Jewish policy as complete as
could be realized in the occupied territory...”
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has said, has he not, that he does not know
anything about these Tuesday meetings—he received no reports of them?
M. MONNERAY: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Then why are you asking about them?
M. MONNERAY: The agencies in Paris collaborated actively in the
terrorist policy of the Police and benefited by it through the economic
step which followed—namely, the seizure of valuables.
THE PRESIDENT: You have not been able to connect him with these
reports—with the document. He has not signed the document. Nothing
shows on the document that he received it—at least, I suppose not—or
you would have put it to him. He says he did not know the document.
M. MONNERAY: Allow me, Mr. President, in that case to ask, whether he
contests the reality of the evidence concerning the representation of
his Paris organization at this meeting.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you deny its presence at this meeting?
ROSENBERG: I cannot give any information about that, because I have not
received any report.
M. MONNERAY: I would like to conclude this cross-examination by
reminding you of a document which has already been produced, quoted, and
discussed—that is Document 001-PS. In that document the defendant
proposes, in the first paragraph, the transport of all seized household
goods to the East, and in Paragraph 2 he suggests to Hitler that French
Jews instead of other Frenchmen should be shot as hostages.
Considering, as a result of the questions and answers, that the
organization of the defendant could benefit by these measures of
execution and deportation, it seems that the real motive of this
document is very clear. It is necessary—is not that your opinion,
Defendant—first to get rid of the people in order to be able afterwards
to seize their property?
ROSENBERG: No, that is not true.
M. MONNERAY: I have no more questions to ask, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to ask anything of the witness, Dr. Thoma?
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I quite briefly ask the defendant whether
he wants me to ask him another question? I believe I shall have finished
immediately.
ROSENBERG: No.
DR. THOMA: Thank you. The defendant does not want any more questions.
Then, with the permission of the Court, I should like to call the
witness Riecke.
THE PRESIDENT: Will he be long or not?
DR. THOMA: Half an hour at most.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. Well then, the defendant may retire.
[_The witness Riecke took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
HANS JOACHIM RIECKE (Witness): Hans Joachim Riecke.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
Dr. Thoma, will you spell the name, please?
DR. THOMA: R-i-e-c-k-e.
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, what position did you have in the
Economic Staff East and in the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern
Territories?
RIECKE: I held both positions upon orders from Göring. I was in charge
of the food and agriculture department.
DR. THOMA: What was the task of these offices?
RIECKE: The first main task of this office was the reconstruction of
Russian agriculture; the second task was the utilization of the surplus
areas in the south for the Armed Forces and for nutrition purposes.
DR. THOMA: What offices were established for administration in the
Occupied Eastern Territories?
RIECKE: In addition to the Foreign Ministry there existed a number of
special assignments: Göring for agriculture, Himmler for police, and
Sauckel for the recruitment of manpower.
DR. THOMA: Who was in charge of agriculture?
RIECKE: Agriculture—and also the entire economy—was under Göring. He
gave his instructions directly or through State Secretaries Körner and
Backe.
DR. THOMA: Were the figures for delivery—the quota in
agriculture—higher than those imposed under the Soviet administration?
RIECKE: The figures imposed for delivery were adjusted to the former
Russian figures. During the first year the actual quantities delivered
were lower than during the Russian era. In the next year, as far as
crops were concerned, they were lower; as far as livestock was
concerned, higher.
DR. THOMA: Were the actual deliveries according to Göring’s directives?
RIECKE: No, Göring had expected considerably higher figures.
DR. THOMA: Did Germany ship agricultural machinery—scythes and so
on—into the Occupied Eastern Territories and in what quantities?
RIECKE: A large-scale program for agricultural machinery under the name
of the Eastern Agricultural Program was set up in Germany whereby, with
regard to war conditions, large amounts of agricultural machinery and
equipment were shipped into the occupied Russian territories. The reason
for that was the removal and large-scale destruction of agricultural
machinery and equipment by the Russians during their retreat.
DR. THOMA: On 5 February 1942 an agricultural decree was issued. What
were the reasons for that?
RIECKE: The main purpose of that agricultural decree was to get the
population to co-operate voluntarily. In the beginning it was intended
to maintain the collective economy. That proved to be impossible,
because—as has been mentioned—part of the heavy machinery, especially
tractors, was no longer available. On the other hand, it was not
possible to resort to individual farming, as some of the population
wished, because smaller equipment was also lacking. Therefore a
compromise solution was reached by so-called agricultural co-operatives
whereby the Russian peasants got a share of the land to work, but a part
of the work was still carried on collectively.
DR. THOMA: What was the result?
RIECKE: The result of the agricultural decree was generally favorable.
The extent and quantity of the tillage increased. A particularly good
example of the results was the conditions in the so-called Kharkov
Basin, where in the spring of 1942 the farms which had been converted to
agricultural co-operatives had already achieved more than 70 percent of
the spring tillage, whereas the unconverted collective farms had
achieved only about 30 percent.
DR. THOMA: On 3 June 1943 the so-called private property declaration was
issued. What were the principles involved?
RIECKE: The basic purpose of the private property declaration was to
turn over to the Russian peasants as personal property the shares of
land which had been allotted to them by the agricultural decree.
DR. THOMA: How was the vegetable supply of large cities handled—for
example, in the Ukraine?
RIECKE: Around the large cities considerable lands for garden plots were
allotted to the working population.
DR. THOMA: Now some questions about Latvia. Did the German
Administration in Latvia confiscate the land of the Latvian peasants?
RIECKE: No; on the contrary. The nationalization measures taken by the
Russians during the occupation were discontinued. The land which had
been separated from the farms for purposes of settlement was returned to
the former owners. To say it in one sentence: The conditions existing
before the Russian occupation were re-established.
COL. POKROVSKY: I beg to be excused, but I cannot understand—with the
best of wishes—what all these questions, even in the remotest way, have
to do with the case of the Defendant Rosenberg. It seems to me that
further questions of the defense counsel, if they are along these same
lines, should not be allowed.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, you ought to show that what the witness is
testifying about is connected in some way with the Defendant Rosenberg.
DR. THOMA: With this question I want, first, to refute the Soviet
assertion that after the occupation the Barons had their land returned
to them—I refer to the Soviet Prosecution’s document, Document Number
USSR-395, which I submitted to the Tribunal yesterday. Secondly, I want
to prove with it that that area was supposed to be administered in an
orderly way and in such a manner that the population co-operated
voluntarily. Thirdly, I want to prove that during the entire German
occupation not one Ukrainian nor one citizen of the Soviet Union
starved, because the agricultural work was conducted accordingly. But I
can demonstrate this proof only through statements of an expert. I
believe that I have only a few more questions, and then I shall have
finished with this subject of evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Thoma.
DR. THOMA: Did the German Administration in Latvia confiscate the land
of the Latvian peasants?
RIECKE: I have answered that question already. On the contrary,
socialization was revoked, and the land separated for settlement
purposes was returned to the Latvian peasants. In a word, conditions as
existing before the Russian occupation were re-established.
DR. THOMA: Were former large German estates reinstated?
RIECKE: No. On the contrary, Latvian peasants’ property—which after
1919 had been created at the expense of large German estates—was left
in their hands. It remained their property.
DR. THOMA: What were the ideas behind the so-called reprivatization?
RIECKE: Reprivatization was intended to give the Latvian peasants the
feeling of security derived from working their own property.
DR. THOMA: Did this law also apply to Estonia and Lithuania?
RIECKE: The law applied in a similar manner also to Estonia and
Lithuania.
DR. THOMA: Do you know about a statement of Darré’s to the effect that
the local small farmers should be removed from their property and be
proletarianized?
RIECKE: I do not remember any such statement.
DR. THOMA: Do you know about the Society for the Administration of the
Eastern Territory?
RIECKE: There were two societies by that name. I assume that the one you
are referring to was the one founded in order to take care of the
state-owned property and the plants which were shown to have been formed
during the Russian occupation in the Baltic provinces, and which were
still left after the return to private ownership. In the former Russian
territories of the so-called Reich Commission, the MTS organization also
took care of these areas.
DR. THOMA: What was the attitude of Rosenberg toward the various
measures, such as labor recruitment, delivery of foodstuffs, _et
cetera_?
RIECKE: Rosenberg could not escape the orders given by the Führer. Yet
he always advocated that these measures be carried out without coercion
against the population, and that they be co-ordinated with each other.
DR. THOMA: Who took care of the Eastern Workers in the Reich?
RIECKE: To my knowledge the Labor Administration, through its labor
offices.
DR. THOMA: How were the Eastern Workers quartered in the country in the
Reich? Do you know anything about it?
RIECKE: The provisioning and quartering of the Eastern Workers in the
country in the Reich were quite satisfactory on the whole. I received
reports directly by way of the offices of the Reich Food Estate.
DR. THOMA: Can you tell us something about Rosenberg’s general attitude
toward the Eastern people?
RIECKE: As I have said before, Rosenberg personally wanted to get the
Eastern people to co-operate. This was true especially in the matter of
cultivating and maintaining their cultural life. For instance,
Rosenberg, as far as I know, always intervened for the re-opening of the
colleges and special schools.
DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg have any restrictions in this sphere? Did he
have to oppose other points of view to attain this goal?
RIECKE: Strong forces were at work counteracting Rosenberg’s efforts;
and especially in the Führer’s headquarters there were Bormann and
Himmler, whose opinions were strongly supported by Reich Commissioner
Koch, and who in turn was supported by Bormann and Himmler in his work.
That led to the fact that a large proportion of the measures which
Rosenberg had planned, especially in the Ukraine, were sabotaged by
Koch.
DR. THOMA: Now one last question: What do you know about the
concentration camps and about the treatment of the inmates in protective
custody?
RIECKE: I, of course, knew of the existence of concentration camps but
not their number and what happened in them. During the years of 1933 and
1934 various representations were made about individual cases of
maltreatment. Later, persons who visited concentration camps turned in
definite, positive reports. In the last days of April of last year, near
Berlin, I met inmates of concentration camps being marched to the rear.
Conditions were so terrible that I immediately saw Himmler and asked him
not to let these people go on marching but to turn them over to the
enemy. That discussion took place in the presence of Field Marshal
Keitel. Himmler unfortunately gave only an evasive answer.
DR. THOMA: There is one more question that just came to my mind. In
addition to providing food for the Armed Forces, were measures taken in
the Occupied Eastern Territories to get foodstuffs for the German
people?
RIECKE: About two-thirds of the supplies of foodstuffs from the Occupied
Eastern Territories went directly to the Armed Forces. The remaining
third was shipped to Germany, and we always considered it as
compensatory for the feeding of the foreign workers, whose number was
increasing continuously.
DR. THOMA: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any
questions?
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were State Secretary in the Reich Ministry for
Food and Agriculture; is that correct?
RIECKE: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Chief of the Main Department for Food
and Agriculture in the Government General was frequently in Berlin in
order to try to fix quotas there which would be bearable to the
population?
RIECKE: As I recall, he several times expressed that opinion during the
regular negotiations which took place with the Government General.
DR. SEIDL: According to your own observations, what was the food
situation of the population of the Government General?
RIECKE: According to my own observations and the reports which I
received, the rations which had been fixed were far lower than in the
Reich, but considerable compensation was achieved through both the black
market and the open market.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that every effort was made by the
administration of the Government General to increase agricultural
production?
RIECKE: Considerable efforts were made by the Government General to
promote agriculture; and one can even say that the entire remaining
industry, insofar as it was not used for armament, worked exclusively
for the production of food. Furthermore, fertilizer was shipped from the
Reich, although only in limited quantities, as well as machinery and
equipment, in accordance with the program for the Eastern territory.
DR. SEIDL: What percentage of the total German food supply did the
occupied countries deliver?
RIECKE: According to the calculations which were made independently by
our Ministry, the deliveries from occupied territories in 1942 and 1943
amounted to about 15 percent of the total food supply of Germany, during
the other years around 10 percent, usually less.
DR. SEIDL: Now one last question: The Soviet Prosecution have submitted
a document, Document USSR-170. It deals with a meeting of the chiefs of
the German offices in the occupied territories which took place on 6
August 1942 under the chairmanship of the Reich Marshal. I will have
this document handed to you, and I want you to tell me whether the
description given in that document correctly characterizes the relations
between Germany and the occupied territories. You were present at that
meeting yourself.
[_The document was submitted to the witness._]
RIECKE: The document represents the minutes of the meeting in which I
took part. First, I have to say that the document—that is to say, the
minutes—principally contains the speech of the Reich Marshal, and does
not indicate the actual relations between Germany and the occupied
territories with regard to the food situation. The demands which Göring
made in this meeting were so high that they could not even be taken
seriously. It was also clear to us, engaged in the food sector, that in
the long run we could never achieve anything by force. The additional
demands which Göring made in that meeting were actually never fulfilled.
I do not think that Göring himself believed that these quotas could be
fulfilled. As far as I know, Göring’s additional demands were never
submitted at all to France; Belgium in spite of a prohibition received
grain; and Czechoslovakia got fats in spite of another prohibition.
On the day before that meeting, there had been a conference of the
Gauleiter which—as well as I can remember—was dominated by the
increasing air attacks in the West and the augmenting difficulties,
especially for the population, resulting therefrom. The western
Gauleiter were of the opinion that the food supply for Germany was
becoming insufficient in view of the increasing burdens for the
population, but that, on the other hand, a large part of the occupied
territories was still enjoying a surplus. The Reich Ministry for Food
and Agriculture and the representatives of the occupied territories
themselves were in a certain sense accused of not demanding and
delivering enough from the occupied territories. Göring followed up
these demands; and, due to his disposition and his temperament, this led
to the strong exaggerations contained in the minutes and in this
document.
DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, how were foreign workers fed in Germany?
RIECKE: All groups of foreign workers, with the exception of the Eastern
Workers, received the same rations as the German population.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what about the supplies for the Eastern Workers?
RIECKE: For certain items the Eastern Workers received less than the
others; and in the case of bread and potatoes, higher rations.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the food supply such that the state of health of the
workers was endangered?
RIECKE: That question cannot be answered in a clear-cut fashion. It must
be considered in connection with the performance demanded of the
workers. For normal work these rations should have been entirely
sufficient.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel intervene especially for better nutrition of
these workers?
RIECKE: As far as I know, Sauckel appealed several times to my minister
on behalf of a better supply of food, whereupon Backe always answered
with the counter demand that no additional workers should be brought to
Germany. Backe repeatedly suggested that the number of workers be
limited and that they be supplied with better food instead.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions.
DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, in your capacity as State Secretary for
Agriculture, did you not also go to Holland at the end of 1944 or the
beginning of 1945?
RIECKE: Yes; at that time I was in the Netherlands.
DR. STEINBAUER: On that occasion, was it not the case there that the
Wehrmacht offices and the Police raised serious complaints about
sabotage of Dutch agriculture, particularly about the responsible
government agencies in Holland?
RIECKE: I do not remember a conversation of that kind.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that the Defendant Seyss-Inquart intervened
for the reduction of food exports from Holland to Germany?
RIECKE: Yes, on various occasions, and also in that meeting which this
document describes.
DR. STEINBAUER: And also, in spite of complaints, that he left the Dutch
officials in the Food Department?
RIECKE: Yes, that is the case.
DR. STEINBAUER: That is all.
DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER: (Counsel for Defendant Speer): Mr. President, may I
put several questions to the witness?
[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, could you give me information about
the following questions? Did the inmates of concentration camps who
worked in the armament industry get the same supplementary rations for
heavy and very heavy labor as the other workers?
RIECKE: During the time when I was charged with these problems, it was
decided to give all prisoners, including concentration camp inmates, the
same rations as the rest of the population, if they were working.
Therefore, they should have received the same rations.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Was the Defendant Speer, or the Ministry under his
direction, competent for the orderly maintenance of the rations in the
plants insofar as the latter—the plants—were in charge of the food
supply?
RIECKE: No, Speer’s Ministry was not competent in these matters. As far
as delivery upon demand was concerned, the food offices were competent.
The distribution of delivered foodstuffs in the plants, however, was the
affair of the camp or plant administrations.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: And one further question: What measures had Speer taken
in order to prevent a general food catastrophe which would have affected
the millions of foreign workers in Germany in an equal manner?
RIECKE: Beginning in December 1944, Speer purposely subordinated
armament tasks to the problem of nutrition with the idea in mind of a
change-over to a new regime, a new administration, an occupying power.
From this time on, Speer gave food transport priority over armament
transport. He saw to it that seed for the spring tillage was distributed
with the transportation means at his disposal. Speer emphatically
advocated reconstructing food processing plants damaged by air attack
even before armament plants. And above all, during that last phase,
Speer helped us prevent the senseless destruction of food processing
plants, against the instructions issued by Hitler. He did this with
complete self-abnegation and without consideration for any possible
consequences.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, did you participate in the Western campaign?
RIECKE: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: In what capacity?
RIECKE: As commander of a battalion in the field.
DR. LATERNSER: During the Western campaign, did you receive any dubious
orders—I mean to say, orders which were in violation of international
law?
RIECKE: I received no such orders.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you have any reason to believe, or did you establish,
that looting was tolerated by higher military authorities?
RIECKE: No. On the contrary, looting was most severely punished.
DR. LATERNSER: Later you were also in the East, but—as I have heard not
as a soldier. Could you look into the operational areas there, as well
as the regions governed by the commissions?
RIECKE: Both were open to my observations.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the treatment of the local population by the
German soldiers?
RIECKE: Taken as a whole it can be said that, especially in the Ukraine,
the treatment of the civilian population in the army’s sector—in the
operational area—was better than elsewhere; consideration was shown for
the necessities of the civilian administrative sector.
DR. LATERNSER: And what do you think is the reason for that difference?
RIECKE: I attribute it to a different basic attitude of the soldier who
was free of political tendencies and also to the fact that the troops,
of course, wanted to have peace and quiet in the rear areas.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution want to cross-examine?
MR. DODD: I can be through in 2 minutes, if Your Honor please.
[_Turning to the witness._] Were you a member of the Nazi Party?
RIECKE: Yes.
MR. DODD: When did you join?
RIECKE: In 1925.
MR. DODD: 1925?
RIECKE: Yes.
MR. DODD: You were also a member of the SA?
RIECKE: Yes.
MR. DODD: What rank did you hold in the SA?
RIECKE: My last rank was Gruppenführer of the SA.
MR. DODD: Previously, you were an SA Sturmführer, were you not?
RIECKE: In 1930, yes.
MR. DODD: When did you become an SS Gruppenführer?
RIECKE: In October 1944.
MR. DODD: That is all. I have no other questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any questions to ask in re-examination?
DR. THOMA: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that concludes your case in behalf of the Defendant
Rosenberg, does it not?
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I should like to state that the Document
Rosenberg-19, which General Rudenko referred to, was not submitted to
the Tribunal as an exhibit by me. Furthermore, I should like to inform
the Tribunal that a number of affidavits, which have been approved, have
not as yet been received.
THE PRESIDENT: You can mention them later, of course.
DR. THOMA: I should further like to make the request that my document
book Number 1 be not accepted in evidence but considered the same as
before, that is, as having general probative value according to the
decision of 8 March 1946; therefore, not as evidence, not as a matter of
proof, but just as argument. I assume that it had been approved in this
sense previously, and that it was only rejected as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: I anticipate that we shall not interfere in your
argument.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I should like to give an
explanation—that is, about the fact that Document Rosenberg-19
represents a letter from Riecke addressed to Rosenberg, dated 12 March
1943. This document was submitted by the defendant’s counsel, Dr. Thoma.
It is found in the Rosenberg Document Book Number 2, Page 42, and has
been translated into all four languages. It is in the possession of all
the prosecutors and is also in the document book which has been
submitted to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal has ruled to accept this
document from the Defense.
THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, the position is this: That a document
does not go into evidence unless it is offered in evidence. Dr. Thoma
has not offered this document in evidence, and I understand that the
Soviet Prosecution has not offered it in evidence. If you want to offer
it in evidence, and the document is an authentic document—which I
suppose it is—you can offer it in evidence.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We did not offer it as evidence, only because
we thought that it was already contained in the document book presented
by the Defense; and, therefore, we had no need to present it again. If
the defendant’s counsel, Thoma, refuses to present it, then we shall do
so.
THE PRESIDENT: You are wrong in assuming this. You see, documents do not
go into evidence unless they are offered in evidence. The fact that they
are in the books does not mean that they are in evidence; therefore, if
you want to offer it in evidence, you must do so.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In that case, Mr. President, we are going to
offer it in evidence now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you will give it a USSR number.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, we are going to give it a USSR exhibit
number and, with your permission, will offer it in evidence tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, we will proceed to deal with the supplementary
applications. The witness can retire.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, the first application
is that of Dr. Seidl’s with regard to two witnesses. First of all
witness Hilger, who was previously granted as a witness for the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop but withdrawn by counsel on the 2nd of April. I
believe that the witness is in the United States and that there is a
report that he is too ill to travel. But apart from this, My Lord, the
purpose of the witness is to give evidence as to the discussions and
treaty negotiations which took place in the Kremlin at Moscow before the
German-Soviet agreement of the 23rd of August 1939; and the allegation
states the conclusion of the alleged secret agreement dealt with in the
affidavit of the witness Gaus.
My Lord, the other application is for a witness Von Weizsäcker, who is
going to deal with the same point.
The Prosecution, of course, loyally accept the decision of the Tribunal
on the admissibility of the Gaus affidavit, but they respectfully submit
that that does not affect this point. What is desired is to call
witnesses as to the course of the negotiations before these
treaties—before an agreement was arrived at in respect to these
treaties—and that is a point which we have had several times; and, of
course, while all circumstances have a slight difference, the Tribunal
have—as far as I know—ruled universally up to now that they will not
go into antecedent negotiations which have resulted in agreements.
There is also the position that, of course, Dr. Seidl has put in the
Gaus affidavit, and he has had his opportunity to examine the Defendant
Von Ribbentrop; and the Prosecution respectfully submit that to call two
secondary witnesses—without any disrespect to their position in the
German Foreign Office, they are witnesses of a secondary importance
compared with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop—to discuss these
negotiations seems to the Prosecution to be going into irrelevant matter
and entirely unnecessary for the purposes of this case.
I confess I do not myself appreciate any special relevance that these
witnesses could have to the case of Hess, but I do not put it so
strongly on that ground; I put it on the ground which I have just
outlined to the Tribunal.
With regard to the third application of Dr. Seidl, I am not quite sure
whether he means that he wants the Prosecution to provide him with an
original or certified copy of the secret agreement, or whether he
desires to tender a copy himself. But with regard to that, again the
Prosecution take the line that that point—which, after all, is only one
tiny corner of one aspect of the case—is sufficiently covered by the
evidence which has already been brought out before the Tribunal from the
affidavit of Ambassador Gaus and the evidence of the Defendant
Ribbentrop.
That is the position of the Prosecution with regard to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the affidavit of the Ambassador Dr. Gaus,
which has been accepted by the Tribunal as Exhibit Hess-16, describes
only a part of the negotiations. Ambassador Dr. Gaus was not present at
the negotiations which preceded the conclusion of the pacts. I have,
therefore, made the additional application to call Embassy Counsellor
Hilger as a witness after his having already been approved as a witness
for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop.
I have, furthermore, requested that the Tribunal procure the text of
that secret supplementary appendix. I have to admit, however, that this
request no longer has the importance it had at the time it was made. In
the meantime we have received a copy of that secret supplementary
appendix.
Furthermore, I have a copy of the secret appendix to the German-Soviet
border pact of 28 September 1939; and I have an affidavit by Ambassador
Dr. Gaus of 1 April of this year certifying that these copies are
identical with the text of the secret agreements drafted on 23 August
and 28 September 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you any objection to that document being
produced for the consideration of the Tribunal?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not at all, My Lord. As I say, the Tribunal have
considered our objection on relevance, and we have lost on it; and,
therefore, it is not really open to me to argue any question of the
relevance of the document in view of the decision of the Tribunal.
The only point that I make is that if Dr. Seidl produces an alleged copy
of the treaty, supported by an affidavit of Ambassador Gaus, then it
immensely strengthens my argument, I submit, against him being allowed
to call the witness.
COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution, on the question which is now
being discussed by the Tribunal, have submitted today a document to the
General Secretariat of the International Military Tribunal. If this
document is already in your possession, then I need not talk about our
position here; but, if you find it necessary, Your Honors, I am going to
set it forth here. We object on the ground of considerations, which are
set forth in this document signed by General Rudenko.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you presenting an argument or a document of some
sort?
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am not going to argue about it nor return to this
question if you have this document.
THE PRESIDENT: You misunderstood me. You mentioned a document which you
asserted was in the possession of the Tribunal. I am not aware that we
have any document from the Soviet Prosecution. It may be that it has
been received; and, if so, we will consider it of course.
What I wanted to know is whether it was an argument or an original
document of some sort.
COL. POKROVSKY: The document deals with the official answer of the
Soviet Prosecution on the question as to whether we consider it
necessary to grant the request of Dr. Seidl regarding a group of
questions connected with the German-Soviet Pact of 1939.
THE PRESIDENT: We will consider the document.
COL. POKROVSKY: You think it would be possible to be content with just
the document which is in your possession now?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, certainly—unless you wish to say anything. We will
consider the document.
COL. POKROVSKY: There is going to be no further information regarding
it. Our position has been defined in detail in this document signed by
General Rudenko; and, if you have this document before you now, I have
nothing more to add regarding it.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, on 13 April I made a written motion to be
permitted to submit a documentary supplement as Exhibit Hess-17. I
submitted six copies of this document with the request to have it
translated. The following documents are included:
1) The German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, which was
already submitted by the Prosecution under Exhibit GB-145; 2) the
related supplementary protocol of the same date; 3) the German-Soviet
Friendship and Border Pact of 28 September 1939; 4) the secret
supplementary protocol of the same date which is related to it; and 5)
the second affidavit by Ambassador Dr. Gaus, mentioned before.
Furthermore, on 15 April I made the motion to call the witness Dr.
Gaus—who is in Nuremberg—here before this Court if the Tribunal do not
consider the affidavit sufficient. I ask the Tribunal to make its
decision about these motions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the matter.
Now, with reference to Von Neurath.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, this is an application for a witness
Dieckhoff, in regard to whom interrogatories have already been granted.
As I understand, the reason is that the witness Tschirschky has been
found to have retired from the German Foreign Office some 18 months
earlier than was thought. Baron Von Lüdinghausen has suggested that, to
balance the calling of Dieckhoff as a witness, he will give up the
calling of the witness Zimmermann and have an affidavit or interrogatory
instead. My Lord, that seems to the Prosecution a very reasonable
suggestion, and we have no objection.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean, no objection to Dieckhoff as a witness and
Zimmermann for an affidavit or interrogatories?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is all with regard to the
Defendant Von Neurath.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, with regard to the Defendant Schacht, it
is only the petition of the witness Huelse; and the Prosecution do not
really mind whether Dr. Dix calls him or puts in an affidavit. I think
that it is only a question of whether the witness will be available to
come here from Hamburg; and, if he is available, we have no objection to
him being called as a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, My Lord, the next one on the list is an
application on behalf of the Defendant Sauckel: Withdrawal of
interrogatories for Mende granted on 23 March, as the prospective
witness is not located; and interrogatories for Marenbach in place of
Mende, who can give the same testimony. Dr. Servatius believes that
Marenbach is located at the Garmisch internment camp. The Prosecution
have no objection to that.
My Lord, I think there was a formal one from Dr. Thoma with regard to
the use of the sworn statement by Professor Denker, but there is no
objection to that.
THE PRESIDENT: We have already allowed that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have already allowed that; this is only the
formal application.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. Then we will consider those matters.
There are a number of documents for the production of which the
Defendant Sauckel’s counsel is applying.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It has been suggested to us that counsel for the
Defendant Sauckel and Counsel for the Prosecution could help us over
that matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, my friend, Mr. Roberts, has been
dealing with Dr. Servatius upon this point; so, perhaps he could help
the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, will it take a long time for that or not?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not think so. The Tribunal, I understand...
COL. POKROVSKY: I should like to inform the Tribunal that the Soviet
Prosecution did not receive any documents which the British Prosecutor
has just mentioned, and we ask that these documents not be discussed
until the moment when we shall have the opportunity to get acquainted
with them.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand that these documents have not been
translated yet. The question really is the preliminary one of which
documents should be translated, and we were only going through the
documents in order to see which documents were sufficiently relevant to
be translated; so that it would not be...
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the Tribunal—I understand—have made a
preliminary order of just striking out the documents which Dr. Servatius
and I agree should not be presented. My Lord, that leaves a very large
number of documents, of which I think the Tribunal has a list. My Lord,
the first 68 documents—or rather from documents 6 to 68—are
regulations dealing with the conditions of the employment of labor in
Germany. My Lord, I have seen Dr. Servatius’ proposed document book, and
he has marked certain passages which he would desire to read, and which
would have to be translated, My Lord; and that does cut down the bulk of
the documents very considerably.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, of course, we have not read all these documents
yet, and they are not translated. Can you indicate to us whether you
have any objection to them being translated?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not think I could object to those first
documents from 6 to 68—the passages marked “being translated,” because
from their description they appear to be relevant.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, 6 to 68.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the passages which are actually marked?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Then will you go on?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: 69 to 79 he has already struck out.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. My Lord, 80 and 81 I object to. They are
documents making allegations of breach of the Hague Regulations by the
Soviet nation. My Lord, I submit that that is not relevant.
THE PRESIDENT: The allegations of illegal acts by the Soviet Government
with reference to individuals?
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. My Lord, I submit that that could not be
relevant at all.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and 82 to 89; you do not object to these?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not object to these—the passages as marked.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: Dr. Servatius promised, as far as he could, to cut down the
passages which were going to be marked.
My Lord, 90 and 91 I object to. Dr. Servatius wants to put in, under the
description of documents, a large number of affidavits, the number of
which I think is not yet ascertained—affidavits by various persons as
to the conditions of labor and the conditions under which foreign
workers were employed. My Lord, the Defendant Sauckel has been allowed a
certain number of witnesses and also affidavits or interrogatories from
other people. My Lord, I submit that this application under 90 and
91—two files of affidavit—is not really an application for documents
at all, and it should be disallowed.
My Lord, Number 92...
THE PRESIDENT: Number 92 he has struck out.
MR. ROBERTS: 92 has been struck out.
My Lord, Number 93 is, in fact, a book which was referred to by the
French prosecutor; and, therefore, of course, Dr. Servatius would be
entitled to refer to it in his case.
THE PRESIDENT: Are the passages marked in that or not?
MR. ROBERTS: Well, he has not marked any yet. There are some pictures,
My Lord, of...
THE PRESIDENT: He only wants the pictures?
MR. ROBERTS: I think so, My Lord, showing the cherubic happiness of the
foreign workers in Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, 94 is an affidavit of Sauckel’s son. It is only
required, I understand, if one of three other witnesses who have been
allowed is not available. My Lord, it is to deal with the allegation
that Sauckel ordered the evacuation of Buchenwald; and, My Lord, I
cannot object to this very short affidavit, if Dr. Servatius cannot
produce one of the three witnesses who have been allowed to him.
My Lord, 95 is Sauckel’s speeches, and Dr. Servatius again has promised
to cut down the passages which he has marked. It is difficult to object
to that in view of the allegation of conspiracy.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, 96 and 97 are books in which there are very short
extracts which have been marked, and, again, as it deals with a relevant
period of the alleged conspiracy, My Lord, I do not see how I can object
to that.
THE PRESIDENT: In the same category, yes. Does that meet with your
views, Dr. Servatius?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I discussed the matter with a representative of the
Prosecution and that represents in principle the result. I would like to
add, however, something with reference to a few documents—namely,
Documents 80 and 81. One is the photostat copy of a deportation order in
the city of Oels, the other an affidavit concerning forced labor in
Saaz. I need the first document in order to prove that the Hague
Regulations for Land Warfare was obsolete—that is to say, that before
the armistice, while fighting was still going on, the population of the
Eastern German provinces was sent to Russia for forced labor. I
supplemented the motion orally at that time, because I considered the
proof for the deportation of a large part of the population for forced
labor, obtained by questioning the mayors of cities from Upper Silesia
to East Prussia, as insufficient. I believe that this is of great
importance for the defense of my client, as it proves that the Hague
Regulations for Land Warfare was considered nonexistent in the East.
Document 81 deals with the state of affairs after the armistice—but
which appears as only a continuation of what previously occurred in the
Eastern territories—and confirms the fact that, under the occupation of
the Soviet Army, such conditions generally continued to exist—namely,
the recruitment of the population for work not in the sense of the Hague
Convention for the repair of local roads, for instance, but rather for
the purpose of working in industry and for activities outside the
framework of the Hague Convention and for work outside the country. I do
not believe that I should be refused this evidence.
Now as to Documents Number 90 and 91, their contents have already been
presented. They are two folders with a collection of affidavits. The
attempt is made to bring evidence in refutation of a government
investigation such as we have met up with here. We have received reports
from the Soviet and French Prosecution; we have received reports from
Czechs; all of which constitute a huge quantity of material of
mosaic-like patterns that can only be dealt with in this manner.
I once before explained that I do not have a government at my disposal
which could prepare such a report, and so I suggest bringing a
collection of affidavits. Now I do not intend to read every one of these
affidavits here. My motion is that the Court appoint a deputy who would
study that folder and prepare a brief report about it for presentation
to the Tribunal. A similar problem will arise later when questions
concerning the political organizations are dealt with—namely, the
problem as to how these immense quantities of material can be presented
to the Tribunal.
If I bring one witness, one witness only, it will be said, “Well, one
witness cannot, of course, cover the entire ground.” On the other hand,
I cannot have a hundred or more witnesses. So this would be a middle
way: That a person appointed by the Tribunal study these affidavits and
then give a report. That is the content of these two folders.
THE PRESIDENT: How many affidavits have you in mind or have you
obtained?
DR. SERVATIUS: So far I have received very little. It proves that those
who could give information are very reticent, because they are afraid
that they might be prosecuted on that account. I hope, however, to be
able to make a selection of reasonable statements, which I believe will
amount to about 20 or 30 affidavits. I would limit it to that, because I
do not care to take up the Court’s time with unnecessary work dealing
with these affidavits. Judging from the present state of my collection,
I may even have to consider withdrawing my motion altogether, because I
have to admit myself that the amount of material reaching me is very
small; but I ask to be given another chance, and at the appropriate
moment I shall present the case to the Court again.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Is that all you want to say?
DR. SERVATIUS: There is still Document Number 93, the illustrated
booklet, _Europe Works in Germany_. I should like...
THE PRESIDENT: Did the Prosecution object?
DR. SERVATIUS: No, the Prosecution does not object. I should like to
project some pictures on the screen for the purpose of showing
particularly under what conditions these people from the East arrived
and what their condition was later, insofar as it can be shown from a
propaganda pamphlet.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.
MR. ROBERTS: There was one other point which I ought to mention. Perhaps
Dr. Servatius would be good enough to listen.
My Lord, Dr. Servatius has applied in writing to the Tribunal, by letter
dated 5 March 1946, for all medical reports of Dr. Jäger, who was a
chief camp doctor at Krupp-Essen; secondly, all monthly reports of a man
called Groene, who was a colleague of Dr. Jäger; thirdly, all minutes of
monthly conferences which the chief camp leader held with his
subordinate camp leaders at Krupps.
My Lord the position is this: That the French put in—oh, I think our
American colleagues put in—an affidavit of Dr. Jäger, and Dr. Jäger
himself has been granted as a witness for Sauckel, and so he will be
seen in the witness box.
My Lord, the Prosecution have no objection to Dr. Jäger being asked, I
suppose, to bring his reports with him if they are available. We do not
have them, and I do not think we know where they are.
THE PRESIDENT: But the witness is being called.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have received a portion of these documents already, and
I assume that the rest may also reach me. I believe the material which I
have now is sufficient for my purposes so that the Prosecution need not
take further pains.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean we need make no order?
DR. SERVATIUS: It is not necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 18 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for
periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document;
however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus
“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes
French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals:
hence Führer, Göring, Kraków, and Ljoteč etc. throughout.
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb
tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the
tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations
between the German, English, French, and, most specifically with this
volume, Russian documents presented in the trial.
An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as
possible to the original document presentation and layout.
[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal Vol. 11_, by Various.]