THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has seen this affidavit recently so there is

no need to read it. Now, if you will, give us the exhibit number.

DR. THOMA: Rosenberg-35. This deals with machinery which had a value of

180 millions and was delivered to the Ukraine—agricultural machinery.

Witness, were you a member of the SA or the SS?

ROSENBERG: No, I belonged neither to the SA nor the SS.

DR. THOMA: So you have never worn an SS uniform?

ROSENBERG: No.

DR. THOMA: Do you know anything about concentration camps?

ROSENBERG: Yes. This question, of course, has been put to everybody and

the fact that concentration camps existed became known to me in 1933.

But although this may appear a repetition, I must nevertheless state

that I knew by name only two concentration camps, Oranienburg and

Dachau. When these institutions were explained to me I was informed,

among other things, that in one concentration camp there were 800

communist functionaries whose previous sentences averaged 4 year prison

terms or partly also penitentiary terms. In view of the fact that this

involved a complete revolution and even though it had legal basis it was

still something revolutionary, I considered it comprehensible that

protective custody should be for some time decreed by this new State for

these hostile persons. But at the same time I saw and heard how our

toughest opponents, against whom otherwise no charges of a criminal

nature were made, were treated so generously that, for example, our

strongest opponent, the Prussian Minister Severing was retired with full

ministerial pension, and I considered this very attitude as National

Socialistic. Thus I had to assume that these arrangements were

politically and nationally necessary, and I was thoroughly convinced of

this.

DR. THOMA: Did you participate in the evacuation of the Jews from

Germany?

ROSENBERG: I should perhaps add one thing: I visited no real

concentration camp, neither Dachau nor any other one. Once—it was in

1938—I questioned Himmler on how things really were in the

concentration camps and told him that one heard from the foreign press

all sorts of derogatory atrocity reports. Himmler said to me, “Why don’t

you come to Dachau and take a look at things for yourself? We have a

swimming pool there, we have sanitary installations—irreproachable; no

objections can be raised.”

I did not visit this camp because if something actually improper had

been going on, then Himmler, upon being questioned about it, would

probably not have shown it to me. On the other hand I desisted from

going for reasons of good taste; I simply did not want to look at people

who had been deprived of their liberty. But I thought that such a talk

with Himmler made him aware that such rumors were spreading.

A second time, later on—I cannot say, however, whether it was before or

after the outbreak of the war—Himmler himself spoke to me about the

matter of the so-called Jehovah’s Witnesses, that is, about a matter

which has also been submitted by the Prosecution as a religious

persecution. Himmler told me only that it was certainly impossible to

put up with conscientious objections, considering the situation the

Reich was in, that it would have incalculable consequences; and he went

on to say that he had often talked personally to these internees in

order to understand them and eventually convince them. That, he said,

has been impossible, however, because they replied to all questions with

quotations—quotations from the Bible which they had learned by heart,

so that nothing was to be done with them. From that statement by Himmler

I gathered that since he was telling me such a story he could not

possibly want to plan or carry out executions of these Jehovah’s

Witnesses.

An American chaplain has very kindly given me in my cell a church paper

from Columbus. I gather from that that the United States, too, arrested

Jehovah’s Witnesses during the war and that until December 1945, 11,000

of them were still detained in camps. I presume that under such

conditions, every state would answer in some way such a refusal of war

service; and that was my attitude too. I could not consider Himmler

wrong on this point.

DR. THOMA: Could you intervene in the case of Pastor Niemöller?

ROSENBERG: Yes. When the case of Pastor Niemöller was being tried in

Germany I sent one of my staff to the trial because I was interested in

it both from an official and humane point of view. This official—his

name was Dr. Ziegler—made a report to me from which I concluded that

this arraignment was based partly on misunderstandings on the part of

the authorities, and furthermore that he was not as seriously

incriminated as I had assumed. I then submitted that report to the

Deputy of the Führer, Rudolf Hess, and I asked him whether he could not

give this case consideration also, and after some time, when I was with

the Führer once, I brought the conversation around to this subject, and

stated that I thought this whole trial and the subsequent handling most

unfortunate. The Führer told me:

“I have asked only one binding statement from Niemöller—that

he, as a clergyman, will not challenge the State. He has refused

to give that and hence I cannot set him free. Apart from that, I

ordered that he receive the most decent treatment possible, that

he, being a heavy smoker, receive the best cigars, and that he

have the means for carrying on all learned studies, if he wants

to do this.”

I do not know on what reports the Führer based this statement, but as

far as I was concerned it was clear that I was not in a position to

intervene any further in this matter.

DR. THOMA: We come now to the last question but one: Is it true that

after the seizure of power, you made a certain examination of your

attitude towards the Jews, and that the whole treatment of Jews

immediately after the seizure of power underwent a certain modification?

Further, that originally it had been intended to settle the Jewish

question in quite another way?

ROSENBERG: I will not deny that during that time of struggle up to 1933,

I too had used strong polemic arguments in my writings, and that many

hard words and suggestions appeared in that connection. After seizure of

power I thought—and I had good reason to think that the Führer thought

so too—that now one could renounce this method, and that a certain

parity and a chivalrous treatment of this question should be observed.

Under “parity” I understood the following—and I stated it in a public

address on 28 July 1933 and also at the Party rally in September 1933

publicly over all the broadcasting systems—that it was not possible,

for example, that the communal hospitals in Berlin should have 80

percent Jewish doctors when 30 percent was their ratio. I stated further

at the Party rally that we had heard of conditions that the Reich

government, in connection with all these parity measures and beyond

that, were making exceptions for all those members of the Jewish people

who had lost a relative, father or son, during the war; and I used the

expression that we would now have to make efforts to solve this problem

in a chivalrous way. That it turned out otherwise is a tragic destiny,

and I must state that the activities following in connection with the

emigration and the support of this emigration in many countries abroad

had as a result the aggravation of the situation; then things occurred

which were regrettable and I must say robbed me of the inner strength to

continue petitioning the Führer for the method I favored. As I said,

what was stated here recently in the veiled phraseology of the police

and made known here, and what has been testified to here the other day,

I considered simply impossible and I would not have believed it even if

Heinrich Himmler himself had related it to me. There are things which,

even to me, appear beyond the humanly possible, and this is one of them.

DR. THOMA: I have one last question. In connection with this question I

should like to submit Exhibit Rosenberg-15, Document 3761-PS. This is

contained in the document book but it has not yet been submitted to the

Tribunal as an Exhibit. It contains a letter from Rosenberg to Hitler,

written in 1924, containing the request that he should not be nominated

as a candidate for the Reichstag.

Witness, you have taken part in all phases of the development of

National Socialism from its beginning to its dreadful end. You have

participated in its meteoric rise and its dreadful descent, and you know

well that everything centered in this one person. Will you inform the

Tribunal what you did yourself, and how much you were able to accomplish

to avert having all the power centered in this one single person, and

what you did to have the effect in every way alleviated? I am showing

you first this document given to you, and then Document 047-PS, which

has also already been submitted to the Tribunal under the Exhibit Number

USA-725.

[_The documents were submitted to the defendant._]

ROSENBERG: I did actually serve this National Socialist movement from

its very first days on and I was completely loyal to a man whom I

admired during these long years of struggle because I saw with what

personal devotion and passion this former German soldier worked for his

people. As far as I personally am concerned, this letter refers to an

epoch...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, exactly what is your question to the witness?

We don’t want him to make a speech. We only want to know what question

you are putting to him.

DR. THOMA: What suggestions did you make, and did you publicly advocate

suggestions to restrict the authority of the Führer?

ROSENBERG: I must say that at that time I advocated—and this in full

agreement with Adolf Hitler—and I advocated in my book, _Myth of the

20th Century_, the view that the Leadership Principle did not consist of

one head but that both the Führer and his collaborators are to be bound

by common duties. Further, that this Leadership Principle concept should

be understood to mean the establishment of a senate or, as I described

it, Ordensrat, which would have a correcting and advisory function.

That point of view was emphasized by the Führer himself when he had a

senate hall with 61 seats built in the Brown House in Munich, because he

himself considered it necessary. Then I again advocated this policy in a

speech in 1934, but...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think this is in answer to the

question as to what he did to limit the Führer’s power. We want to know

what he did, if anything, to limit the Führer’s power.

DR. THOMA: In a public meeting he pointed out that—I draw your

attention to Document Book 1, Volume II, on Page 118...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, I didn’t want you to point it out to me, I

wanted the witness to point that out to the Tribunal.

DR. THOMA: In that case, will you concentrate on those two speeches

which you made at that time.

ROSENBERG: I can quote the speeches, but they are not a direct answer to

the question either. They signify that I stated that the National

Socialist State may not be a caste which reigns over the German nation

and that the Führer of a nation must not be a tyrant. However, I did not

see in Adolf Hitler a tyrant, but like many millions of National

Socialists I trusted him personally on the strength of the experience of

a 14-year-long struggle. I did not want to limit his own full power,

conscious though I was that this meant a personal exception for Adolf

Hitler, not in keeping with the National Socialist concept of the State.

Nor was this the Leadership Principle as we understood it or a new order

for the Reich.

I served Adolf Hitler loyally, and what the Party may have done during

those years, that was supported by me too. And the ill effects, due to

the wrong masters, were branded by me, in the middle of the war, in

speeches before political leaders, when I stated that this concentration

of power as it existed at that moment, during the war, could only be a

phenomenon of the war and could not be regarded as the National

Socialist conception of a State. It may be opportune for many, it may be

opportune for 200,000 people, but to adhere to it later on would mean

the death of the individuality of 70 million.

I said that in the presence of the Higher SS leaders and other

organization leaders or Gauleiter. I got in touch with the heads of the

Hitler Youth, together with my staff, fully conscious that after the war

a reform would have to be carried out here in the Party, so that the old

demands of our Movement, for which I too had fought, would find respect.

However, that has not been possible any more; fate has finished the

Movement and has taken a different course.

DR. THOMA: Witness, can you state a concrete fact from which it arises

that the Party, from the beginning, did not have the idea of coming to

power alone but also by collaborating with other parties?

ROSENBERG: That, of course, is a historical development of 14 years, and

if I can evaluate that letter here, then I would like to say that at the

end of 1923, after the collapse of the so-called “Hitler Putsch,” when

the then representatives of the Party either were arrested or had

emigrated to Austria, and when I remained in Munich with a few others, I

advocated that a new development must take place and that the Party

should prove itself in a parliamentary contest.

The Führer, who was then in prison at Landsberg, turned that suggestion

down. My collaborators and I continued to try to influence him, however,

whereupon the Führer wrote me a long, handwritten letter, which is also

in the files, in which he once more developed his reasons for not

wanting to comply with my suggestion. Later on, nevertheless, he agreed.

And here in this letter I asked him—he later agreed—not to nominate me

as Reichstag candidate, because I felt not entitled to the privileges of

a Reichstag deputy by favoring a Reichstag election, and secondly,

because I felt myself too new in Germany for exposing myself in such a

way after only a few years of activity.

DR. THOMA: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendant’s counsel want to ask any

questions?

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, in September and October 1942 you received

various reports regarding unbearable conditions in connection with the

recruiting of workers in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Did you

investigate to find out whether the statements contained in these

reports were true?

ROSENBERG: These allegations, which were received by the Ministry for

the Occupied Eastern Territories, have been constantly checked by Main

Department of Labor and Social Policy during all these years and I asked

the Tribunal to hear as a witness here the official who always had

charge of this question, Dr. Beil. This request has been granted by the

Tribunal, but I now hear that Dr. Beil is ill and that he can give a

report of his experiences only by a written statement. From my knowledge

I can say the following:

These matters were reported to me frequently by Dr. Beil and the

so-called Central Department for People of Eastern Nationalities. In a

letter which has already been mentioned I transmitted them to Sauckel.

Then they were always sent to the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine or

some other administrative officials for investigation and comments. A

part of these proved to be correct, a part proved to toe untrue and

exaggerated; and as far as I know, the Plenipotentiary General for

Allocation of Labor, Sauckel, even made the complaints received from me

an occasion for his own intervention, as did the German Labor Front,

which was responsible for the welfare of all foreign workers in Germany.

There was constant negotiation with the head of this Labor Front, and

the Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories made requests here

continuously, until eventually, at the end of 1944, Dr. Ley, as the

chief of this welfare department, thought that he could inform me that

now after considerable difficulties, really lasting and good conditions

had been achieved. I replied to him even then that I could express my

pleasure about it, but that I still received reports that here and there

things were going wrong. In practice the members of my ministry,

together with inspectors of the German Labor Front, went to inspect a

number of labor camps in order to investigate the complaints and then

have them adjusted by the Labor Front.

DR. SERVATIUS: You are talking here mainly about conditions in Germany,

which did not come under your jurisdiction. What did you do regarding

Koch? Is the memorandum of 16 March 1943, which has already been

mentioned here, a reply to these complaints? In that memorandum you

write Koch that he must use legal means only and that he must call the

guilty to account. Was this an answer to these reports?

ROSENBERG: Yes, it was an answer because by December 1942 there had been

quite a number of complaints already.

DR. SERVATIUS: And what did Koch reply?

ROSENBERG: Koch replied to me that he, for his part, also wanted and

would employ legal means, but in the document read today, in his report

dated 16 March 1943, he complained several times that I did not always

believe these assurances, but that in every case the Ministry for the

Occupied Eastern Territories not only intervened, but even demanded of

him a report on the carrying out of these instructions.

DR. SERVATIUS: Thus he denied considerable abuses?

ROSENBERG: Yes, he denied considerable abuses. He referred in the

document to one particularly serious case, namely, that individual

houses had been burned down in Volhynia because those who had been

called upon to work had resisted the recruiting by means of force, as he

explained, and he said that he had no other way of doing it. He added

that this case in particular had caused new complaints on the part of

the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was he entitled to such measures, in your opinion?

ROSENBERG: Reich Commissioner Koch had jurisdiction over the execution

of all orders coming from the highest Reich authorities. He was

responsible for the execution of all measures within the bounds of the

instructions. He had, I now believe, often overstepped the bounds of

these instructions and acted on his own initiative in taking, as he

thought, exclusively war economic measures. Sometimes I heard of these

measures, and often I did not, as appears from the document.

THE PRESIDENT: The question you were asked was whether in your opinion

he was entitled to burn houses because people refused to work, and you

have given a long answer which seems to me to be no answer to the

question.

ROSENBERG: In my opinion he did not have the right to burn down houses

and therefore I intervened, and he tried to justify himself.

DR. SERVATIUS: In order to carry out the labor recruiting, there were to

be recruiting measures which, it is true, had to be applied with a

certain amount of administrative coercion. How far was coercion

permissible, is there legal and illegal coercion, and how do you judge

the measures that were carried out in practice?

ROSENBERG: I myself insisted up until 1943 on a voluntary recruitment.

But in the face of the urgent demands from the Führer I could not

maintain this stand any longer and I agreed therefore—in order to have

a legal form at least—that certain age groups should be called up. From

these age groups all those working who were needed in the Occupied

Eastern Territories were to be excluded. But the others were to be

brought from all sides with the help of their own administrations in the

regional commissariat, that is, the little burgomasters in the Occupied

Eastern Territories, and there is no doubt, of course, that to give

force to these demands the police stood at the disposal of the

administration in the execution of this program.

DR. SERVATIUS: If there were abuses, could Koch stop them? Did you have

no influence in the matter?

ROSENBERG: It was the duty of the Reich commissioner to whom the

regional government of the Ukraine was subordinated to investigate and

to take action, in accordance with the instructions which he had

received from me.

DR. SERVATIUS: But why did you go to Sauckel as well? Was it Sauckel’s

duty also to stop this?

ROSENBERG: Sauckel, as the deputy of the Delegate for the Four Year

Plan, had the right to give instructions to me, as Minister for the

Occupied Eastern Territories, and over and above that, he had the right

to bypass me and give instructions to the Reich commissioners, a right

which, he used a few times in giving lectures in the general districts

of the Ukraine and of the Eastern territories.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was he—was Sauckel responsible for the conditions in the

Ukraine?

ROSENBERG: Sauckel was not responsible for the execution of these

demands, but of course on the basis of the authority given him by the

Führer he made the demands so harsh and exact that the responsible

regional governments of the commissioner general felt themselves bound

by conviction and appearance to back up the recruiting of labor by force

as appears, for example, from the report, Document 265-PS, from the

Commissioner General in Zhitomir. I think this can also be seen from the

report of the District Commissioner in Kovno, of which I cannot give the

exact number.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have an organization of his own?

ROSENBERG: Yes, he had a staff, but I cannot make a statement on the

size of it. He took care only that the civil administration had labor

offices attached to it, and his requirements as to the civil

administration in the East for the direction of these labor offices were

forwarded to the administrative offices. To my knowledge he did not have

a large organization.

DR. SERVATIUS: Before Sauckel came into your ministry was there not

already a department of “Labor,” which had its corresponding subordinate

departments on the middle and lower levels?

ROSENBERG: I cannot give you a precise answer to that. At any rate, I

think a department “Labor and Social Policy” was set up almost at the

beginning of the ministry, but at the moment I am not able to tell you

the exact date. Perhaps Dr. Beil’s statement will contain some details.

DR. SERVATIUS: Thus, you are not informed regarding the organization of

this recruitment of workers?

ROSENBERG: No, I am informed as far as I have just told you, but I

cannot give you exact information about the date of the foundation of

this main department “Labor and Social Policy” in the Ministry for the

Occupied Eastern Territories.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did labor offices for the Occupied Eastern Territories

exist, which had their head in your ministry?

ROSENBERG: The work—yes, insofar as the Main Department of Labor and

Social Policy did of course co-operate with the civil administration;

that is, both Reich commissioners had continuous contact and had

correspondence with the appropriate department, namely the labor office

attached to the Reich commissioner. A correspondence with the lower

agents, with the general districts, was naturally not carried on, but

there was continuous consultation with the appropriate department

attached to the Reich commissioner.

DR. SERVATIUS: In your letter you speak of “Sauckel offices.” What

offices do you mean by this?

ROSENBERG: Well, I mean, first of all, his immediate deputy Peuckert,

who later, in order to guarantee smooth co-operation, formally took over

the direction of this main department of “Social Policy.” He was but

very rarely at the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories since

he was officially working especially for Sauckel; and apart from that,

Sauckel had a few other gentlemen with whom my main department

negotiated continuously regarding the reduction of the quotas...

THE PRESIDENT: Surely, the witness Sauckel will give all this

information. What is the good of wasting our time putting it to

Rosenberg?

DR. SERVATIUS: It is important in order to ascertain the responsibility.

Later I cannot call on Rosenberg as a witness again; a number of

questions will arise, to which I...

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that, of course, but these are all details

of Sauckel’s administration which Sauckel must know himself.

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, but I will have no opportunity later on to question

the witness Rosenberg regarding the individual authorities within the

organization, namely: Who was responsible, who had the right to

supervise, who had the duty to intervene? Why were letters addressed to

individuals? Why has he to answer them? One cannot understand that, if

one does not ask the witness—if he is not first asked about it before.

I would suggest that the witness Rosenberg should be called again in

connection with Sauckel’s case, after Sauckel has spoken; that would

save time.

THE PRESIDENT: There is no issue with the Prosecution about it. If there

is no issue with the Prosecution, then Sauckel’s evidence about it will

be quite sufficient.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the witness Rosenberg, in his letter—in a

letter addressed to Sauckel—mentioned the fact that his offices were

using these objectionable methods. Since in my opinion such offices did

not exist, and thus Rosenberg was addressing the wrong person, I must

establish what offices there really were. It is a complaint about

conditions that were oppressive to Rosenberg and he addressed himself to

Sauckel, instead of Koch.

THE PRESIDENT: Ask him some direct question, will you?

DR. SERVATIUS: What did Sauckel do upon receiving the letter you

addressed to him?

ROSENBERG: I did not receive a letter in reply to it; but I heard that

Sauckel, then at a meeting of his labor offices in Weimar, went into

these complaints in detail and that he tried to do his best to remove

the grounds for these complaints.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did not that meeting take place a fortnight later, that

is on 6 January 1943, and were you not present also?

ROSENBERG: Possibly. I spoke at a meeting at Weimar once; whether or not

it was this one, I am not able to say.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you hear Sauckel’s speech at this meeting?

ROSENBERG: No, I have no recollection of it.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you get the speech in writing later?

ROSENBERG: I cannot remember that either.

DR. SERVATIUS: Later on I want to submit the speech as a document in

connection with Sauckel’s case. I have a number of further questions.

Did other departments, too, in the occupied territories, concern

themselves with the recruitment of laborers?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I received indeed some reports that also, for its part,

the so-called Todt Organization engaged workers for the carrying out of

their technical tasks, and I think also the railway administration and

other offices in the East were making efforts to get new workers for

themselves.

DR. SERVATIUS: Is it not correct that the Armed Forces were demanding

workers, that workers were demanded for road construction, were needed

by the domestic industry, and that there was a general effort to keep

manpower at home and not let them go to Germany?

ROSENBERG: That is correct, and it is a foregone conclusion that the

Armed Forces, the Todt Organization, and other offices wanted to keep as

many laborers as possible in the country for the growing amount of work

there and they probably did not like to part with their workers. That

goes without saying.

DR. SERVATIUS: Sauckel repeatedly pointed out that workers must be

supplied under all circumstances and that all obstacles must be removed.

Did that refer to the resistance of the local offices which did not want

to give up these workers?

ROSENBERG: It certainly referred to this local manpower, and in a

conference which I had with Sauckel in 1943 and which is also in

evidence as a document here but which was not submitted today, reference

was made to it. Sauckel stated that by order of the Führer he would have

to raise a large number of new workers in the East and that in this

connection, I am thinking of the Armed Forces most of all who had been,

as he expressed it, hoarding workers who might instead have been active

in Germany.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have anything to do with the recruitment of

workers, which took place in connection with the germanizing of the

East?

ROSENBERG: I cannot quite understand this question. What do you mean in

this case by “germanizing”?

DR. SERVATIUS: The SS undertook the resettlement in the East. In

connection with this manpower was shifted. Was this manpower allotted to

Sauckel upon his request?

ROSENBERG: First of all I do not know exactly which resettlement you are

talking about.

DR. SERVATIUS: A report has been presented to me which concerns the Jews

who were sent into Polish territory. I assume that they reached your

territory, too.

Do you not know about that?

ROSENBERG: Based on my own knowledge, I can say only that this

concentration of the Jewish population from Eastern Germany, in certain

cities and camps in the East, was carried out under the jurisdiction of

the Chief of the German Police, who also had this assignment for the

Occupied Eastern Territories. In connection with the resettlement in

camps and with the concentrations in ghettos, there probably also

developed a shortage of labor or something like that. I merely do not

know what that has to do with Germanization.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Before we adjourn, I should like to know what the

position is about the Defendant Frank’s documents. Does anybody know

anything about that?

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I wish to say that insofar as we are concerned,

we have been in consultation with Dr. Seidl for the Defendant Frank as

well as the representatives of the Soviet prosecuting staff. We are

prepared to be heard at any time that the Tribunal would care to hear us

on the documents.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Then, Dr. Thoma, how many more witnesses have you

got and how long do you think you will be in the Defendant Rosenberg’s

case?

DR. THOMA: I have only one witness, Your Honors, the witness Riecke. I

believe that as far as I am concerned, he can be examined in one hour at

the most; I do not think it will take as long as that. After that, it

depends on the cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, yes; then you may finish the Defendant

Rosenberg’s case tomorrow?

DR. THOMA: It depends upon the cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, of course. Then, Dr. Seidl, will you be able to go

on at once in Frank’s case? Supposing we finish Rosenberg

tomorrow—tomorrow is Wednesday, is it not? Will you be able to go on on

Thursday morning in Frank’s case?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I can start with Frank’s case as soon as

Rosenberg’s case is finished. As far as the documents are concerned,

there was difficulty regarding only one document and I have foregone the

presentation of this one document. But apart from that, these documents

have for the greater part already been presented by the other side.

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one document in question, we can hear

you upon it now. As I understand you, you have only one document about

which there is any difference of opinion.

DR. SEIDL: That has been settled already because I have given up

presentation of this document.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. There is no further difference of opinion?

DR. SEIDL: There is no further difference of opinion.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then you are perfectly ready to go on?

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Have the documents been translated yet?

DR. SEIDL: As far as I know, they already have been all translated.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, thank you.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 17 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND TENTH DAY

Wednesday, 17 April 1946

_Morning Session_

[_The Defendant Rosenberg resumed the stand._]

MR. DODD: Just before recess yesterday afternoon the Tribunal inquired

as to the status of the Frank Document Book, and when I informed the

Tribunal that we were prepared to be heard Dr. Seidl advised that we had

a pact to which we had agreed. I was not aware of that at the time. I

think we were both a little bit in error. The situation is that last

night about 6 o’clock we did reach an agreement so that there is no

difficulty at all about the Frank books.

DR. THOMA: I would like to make a brief correction. Yesterday I spoke

about the request for a document on the setting up of the Einsatzstab

Rosenberg. My client has repeatedly asked me to bring in this document.

However, there is a possibility that I confused this document with other

documents which I requested, but which were not granted. I just wanted

to make that correction.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You do not want to do anything more than just make

that verbal correction? Very well.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other defendant’s counsel who wishes to ask

any questions?

DR. HAENSEL: Witness, you were the Plenipotentiary of the Führer for the

ideological objectives of the NSDAP and its affiliated organizations.

Are you of the opinion that what you did as Plenipotentiary of the

Führer in carrying out your duties and everything you said and wrote for

these aims and for the systematic so-called ideological combating of

Jewry may be considered as an official outline of the activity of the

Party and its affiliated organizations?

ROSENBERG: If I may answer this long series of questions one by one I

would like to say the following: My office, as far as ideological

education was concerned, worked with the SS Main Office for Political

Training. We were, of course, in constant contact with them. The

so-called “guiding pamphlets” of the SS, which appeared as an

instruction periodical, were read in my office. I myself had it

repeatedly in my hands, and during these years I found that in this

Office for Political Training, in these periodicals, a great number of

very valuable articles with mostly very decent ideas was contained. This

is one of the reasons why, through all these years, I did not enter into

any conflict with the SS.

As far as the Jewish question is concerned, the objective as to this

problem was expressed in the program of the NSDAP. That is the only

official statement which guided the Party members. Anything which I said

about it, and what others wrote about it, were just reasons that were

set forth. Certainly much of that was accepted, but as far as the Führer

and the State were concerned these proposals were not binding rules.

DR. HAENSEL: Was the objective of your fight against Jewry limited? Did

you envisage that the Jews were to be eliminated from economic and State

administration, or did you from the first have a vague notion of

stronger measures, such as extermination, _et cetera_? What was your

objective?

ROSENBERG: In agreement with the Party program, I had the one objective

in mind—to change the leadership in the German State as it existed from

1918 to 1933! That was the vital aim. As to elimination, even from

economic life, we did not talk about it at that time; and yesterday I

already referred to two of my speeches—which are available in print—in

which I declared that after the end of this harsh political battle an

investigation or examination of the problem would have to take place.

There was even earlier talk about the demand for Jewish emigration from

Germany, quite rightly. Later, when matters became more critical, I

expressed this idea again in conformity with the proposals of very

prominent Jewish leaders that German unemployed be deported to Africa,

South America, and China.

DR. HAENSEL: Then, following your train of thought of yesterday and

today, one could differentiate three kinds of measures against the Jews:

First, until 1933—up to the seizure of power—were the propagandistic

measures; second, after 1933, those measures which found their

expression in the anti-Jewish laws; and then, finally, after the

outbreak of the war certain measures which without doubt can be

considered as Crimes against Humanity. Do you agree with this tripartite

arrangement?

ROSENBERG: Yes, it is approximately right.

DR. HAENSEL: Then I would like to call your attention to Group 2, that

is, to those measures which were instituted after the taking over of

power, and which were laid down in laws against the Jews. Did you

participate in the formulating of the laws?

THE PRESIDENT: You are counsel, are you not, for the SS?

DR. HAENSEL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: What have those questions got to do with the SS?

DR. HAENSEL: The questions concern the SS in the following way: If the

Party as a whole had the objective of a clearly formulated anti-Jewish

legislation, which was in the beginning quite orderly, then the SS was

bound to this objective and for the time being had none beyond that

point. I wanted to establish when the legislation and the measures

against Jews turned into criminal acts, and that up to that time the SS

in no manner took criminal measures against the Jews.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he said already that the Jewish problem was

contained in the Party program, and that is all that you want, is it

not?

DR. HAENSEL: I wanted only to show that the fact that the Jewish problem

was contained in the Party program does not prove that it was in the

Party program as a Crime against Humanity. In the Party program there

was simply a general sentence which I do not believe can be construed as

a Crime against Humanity. In addition to that, there must be...

THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of construction of the Party program. It

is not a matter for him to give evidence about. It is in a written

document—the Party program is contained in the written documents.

DR. HAENSEL: But, in addition to the Party program, a great number of

decrees and laws were issued later which expanded the Party program, and

the question...

THE PRESIDENT: They are also documents which this Tribunal has to

construe—not for this witness to construe.

DR. HAENSEL: The question is, insofar as the defendant can tell us, how

far the SS participated in the carrying out of these regulations.

THE PRESIDENT: He can tell us the facts. He cannot tell us the laws or

the interpretation of documents. If you are asking him about facts, well

and good; but if you are asking him to interpret the Party program or to

interpret the decrees, that is a matter for the Tribunal.

DR. HAENSEL: Very well.

[_Turning to the defendant._] In your books you advocated the objective

that all Germans should be unified in a Greater Germany, and that point

is also set down in the Party program?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

DR. HAENSEL: Did you believe that this was possible only through the

preparation for a war, or did you believe that it was just as possible

through peaceful means?

ROSENBERG: In the beginning of my testimony I referred to a speech of

mine made before an International Congress in 1932. Here this proposal

was expressly approved by the Führer to the effect that the four great

powers should investigate and examine the entire European problem. This

proposal said that we would give up all claims to German colonies, to

Alsace-Lorraine, to the Southern Tyrol as well as claims to the

separated German...

THE PRESIDENT: We have heard all this before from the Defendant Göring

and the Defendant Ribbentrop, and we said that we did not want to go

into it again. In any event, it has nothing to do with the SS—nothing

directly to do with the SS.

DR. HAENSEL: [_To the defendant._] Just one more question. Do you know

that the SS, as far as the Jews were concerned, followed secret aims and

objectives, others than those that were published officially?

ROSENBERG: That I learned here.

DR. HAENSEL: You do not know that from your own knowledge?

ROSENBERG: No.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I have one single question to put to you. Under

Document 091-PS the Prosecution submitted a letter which you, as the

Chief of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, sent to Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his

capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands. In that letter you

demanded that the library of the so-called Social Institute at Amsterdam

be handed over to you. I do not know whether you recall this library. It

was rather voluminous and of Socialist-Marxist content. The Prosecution

did not submit the answer given by my client. Therefore, I have to ask

you: Do you remember this matter and what answer did Seyss-Inquart give

you?

ROSENBERG: I remember this library very well, for I was told about it.

To my knowledge it represented the establishment of a spiritual center

of the Second International in Amsterdam, in which the history of social

movements in various countries was to be summarized in a library, so

that on the basis of this scientific material now a spiritual political

fight, a scientific fight...

DR. STEINBAUER: Very well. We want to be brief, and you know what I am

talking about. What answer did you receive? Did Seyss-Inquart permit

this library to be transferred to Germany, or did he demand that it

remain in Holland?

ROSENBERG: It was at first agreed that this library would remain in

Holland, and that the cataloging and classifying of this collection,

which was not yet classified, was to take place in Amsterdam. In the

course of the next few years this took place in Amsterdam. Only in the

year 1944, when either the invasion had already begun or was surely

imminent, when bombing attacks also increased in this area, part of this

library was taken to Silesia; the other part, to my knowledge, did not

get through, but remained in Emden; and the third part, I believe, was

not removed.

DR. STEINBAUER: Is it then correct that Seyss-Inquart prevented the

taking away of this library from the Dutch working class?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

MR. DODD: Before we begin our discussion of some matters that we would

like to go over, I wonder if you would be good enough to write your name

a few times on these pieces of paper, both in pen and in pencil.

[_Paper, pen, and pencil were handed to the defendant._]

Would you write “A. Rosenberg,” please, with pen, and “Alfred Rosenberg”

with the pen; and would you handwrite the first initial of your last

name with a capital?

Now, would you do the same thing with pencil on another piece of paper,

“A. Rosenberg” in pencil, “Alfred Rosenberg,” and the first initial of

your last name?

And then would you do one thing more, please. Would you print the first

initial of your last name?

[_The signatures were passed to Mr. Dodd._]

Now, yesterday afternoon, while you were on direct examination through

your own counsel, you stated before the Tribunal that you did have a

discussion with Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer SS, about

concentration camps, and if I remember correctly, you said that that was

some time in 1938; is that so?

ROSENBERG: Yes. I testified that I discussed the concentration camps

with him once, but I cannot say with certainty that it was in 1938, as I

did not make a note of it.

MR. DODD: Very good. He offered to have you go through one or the other

of these camps, Dachau or some other camp; is that so?

ROSENBERG: Yes, he then told me that I should take a look at the Dachau

Camp.

MR. DODD: And you declined the invitation?

ROSENBERG: Right.

MR. DODD: And I understood you—if I recollect correctly, you said

because you were quite sure that he would not show you the unfavorable

things that were in that camp?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I assumed more or less that in case there really were

unfavorable things, I certainly would not see them anyway.

MR. DODD: You mean that you simply assumed that there were unfavorable

things; that you did not know there were unfavorable things?

ROSENBERG: I heard this through the foreign press and it is about...

MR. DODD: When did you first hear that through the foreign press?

ROSENBERG: That was already in the first months of 1933.

MR. DODD: And did you continuously read the foreign press about the

concentration camps in Germany from 1933 to 1938?

ROSENBERG: I did not read the foreign press at all for unfortunately I

do not speak English. I received only some excerpts from it from time to

time, and in the German press there were occasional references to it

with the strict declaration that these allegations were not true. I can

still remember the statement by Minister Göring in which he said that it

was beyond his comprehension that something like that could be written.

MR. DODD: But you thought they were true to the extent that there were

unfavorable things in that place that Himmler might not show you.

ROSENBERG: Yes, I assumed that in such a revolutionary process surely a

number of excesses were taking place, that in some districts also on

occasion there might be conflicts, and that the fact that murders of

National Socialists in the months subsequent to the seizure of the power

continued most probably resulted in sharp countermeasures here and

there.

MR. DODD: Did you think that was still going on in 1938, these measures

against the National Socialists?

ROSENBERG: No. The chief reports upon the continuance of murders of

members of the Hitler Youth, of the Police, and of members of the Party

were made especially in 1943 and 1944, but I do not remember that many

reports still were published about this in subsequent years...

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 1943 and 1944 or 1933 and 1934? Which is it?

ROSENBERG: 1933 and 1934, excuse me.

MR. DODD: But, in any event, in 1938 you had some knowledge in your own

mind which made you think that it would not be profitable for you to

inspect these camps because some things were going on there that would

not be shown to you. Now, that is so, isn’t it?

ROSENBERG: No; but I said very frankly that under some circumstances

excesses might be taking place, and I talked to Himmler about this

matter so that he in any case knew that we were informed about such

things from abroad and that he should watch his step. Only once did I

receive a complaint directly myself.

MR. DODD: Now, turning to another matter, we also understood you to say

yesterday that when you wrote your book, _The Myth of the 20th Century_,

you expressed your personal opinion and you did not intend it to have

any great effect upon state affairs. Is that a fair statement of your

testimony of yesterday with respect to your book?

ROSENBERG: I did not quite follow the last sentence. I must say, I wrote

_The Myth of the 20th Century_ during the years 1927 and 1928

approximately, after certain historical and other preliminary studies.

It was published in October 1930 with an introduction to the effect that

this was a purely personal opinion, and that the political organization

of which I was a member was not responsible for it.

MR. DODD: Very good. I will ask that you be shown Document 3553-PS. That

is also, if Your Honor pleases, Exhibit Number USA-352. It is already in

evidence.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, you wrote a preface or a little

introduction for that edition of that book. It is right there before

you. You said in it:

“To the 150,000th copy: The _Myth_ has today drawn deep,

ineffaceable furrows into the emotional life of the German

people. Every new edition is a clear indication that a decisive

spiritual and mental revolution is growing into a historical

event. Many things which in my book seemed to be a peculiar idea

have already become a reality of State policy. Many other things

will yet, I hope, materialize as a further result of this new

vigor.”

You wrote that?

ROSENBERG: That is certainly entirely correct. This book of 700 pages

does not concern only those points of which I am accused here. This book

deals with a large number of problems, the problem of the peasants, of

the world states, of the concept of socialism, of the relation between

leadership, industry, and labor, a presentation of the judgment...

MR. DODD: Now, just a minute. I don’t think it is necessary for you to

give us a list of the table of contents of the book. I simply asked you

if you wrote that introduction.

ROSENBERG: Yes, of course.

MR. DODD: Now, with respect to the well-known forced labor program. I

think it is perfectly clear to everyone who has been in attendance at

these sessions before this Tribunal, and of course to yourself, that

there was a forced labor program in effect, or a so-called slave labor

program, both in the East and in the Western occupied countries. Isn’t

that a fact?

ROSENBERG: Yes, the law of 21 March is concerned therewith with workers

from the occupied countries who were to be taken to Germany. In Germany

there was also a compulsory labor law.

MR. DODD: Now, there are only two possible offices under the then German

State which can, by any stretch of the imagination, be held responsible

either in part or altogether for that forced slave labor program. Isn’t

that so? Two principal offices, at least.

ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.

MR. DODD: And they were your own ministry and the office of the

Defendant Sauckel. That is pretty simple. Is that true or not?

ROSENBERG: It is correct that Gauleiter Sauckel had been given the

authority to pass orders to me and to all the supreme Reich authorities.

It was my duty to make known and carry through these orders in the

Occupied Eastern Territories according to my powers, my judgment, and my

instructions.

MR. DODD: Did you carry out the compulsory labor directives under your

ministry, force people to leave their homes and their communities to go

to Germany and to work for the German State?

ROSENBERG: I fought for about three-quarters of a year for this

recruitment of workers in the East to be put on a voluntary basis. From

my record of a discussion with Gauleiter Sauckel still in the year 1943,

it is very evident that at all times I made efforts to do this. I also

mentioned how many millions of leaflets, of posters, and pamphlets I

distributed in these countries so that this principle would be carried

through. However, when I heard that if the number of German workers who

had to go to the front could not be replaced, the German Army reserves

would be at an end, then I could not protest any longer against

recruitment of certain age-classes, or use of local authorities and

forces of the gendarmerie to assist in this work. Yesterday I already

...

MR. DODD: What you are telling us is you tried to get them voluntarily

and you found they would not go, so then you forced them to go. Isn’t

that so?

ROSENBERG: That coercion took place here is true and is not disputed.

Where an excess took place—and some terrible excesses took place—I did

my utmost to prevent it or alleviate it.

MR. DODD: All right. You, of course, had promulgated an order in your

own ministry concerning compulsory labor, had you not?

ROSENBERG: Yes. In the beginning, a general compulsory labor service law

was promulgated.

MR. DODD: That’s right, on the 19th of December 1941.

ROSENBERG: It may be that it was promulgated about that time.

MR. DODD: Well, you can accept that as being so, I think, that that is

the date of your decree concerning compulsory labor, the compulsory

labor, significantly—I want to make this very clear to you—in the

Occupied Eastern Territories.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: That order was promulgated by you as the Reich Minister for

the Occupied Eastern Territories.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: I ask that you be shown Document 1975-PS. It is Exhibit Number

USA-820, already in evidence—not in evidence, I’m sorry. I am now

offering it.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

I don’t care to stress this document too much except to have you verify

the fact that this is the order which you promulgated, and in the first

paragraph with the small Figure 1, you stated, “All inhabitants of the

Occupied Eastern Territories are subject to the general liability for

work according to their capacity.” And I wish to point out the paragraph

under that small Number 1, with the Number 3, where you say, “A special

ruling is drawn up for Jews.” That is the 19th day of December 1941.

ROSENBERG: The document which has been submitted to me is signed by the

Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine and is concerned with a skeleton law

of the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. I ask that I be

shown the skeleton law of the Minister for the Occupied Eastern

Territories in order that I may judge correctly the carrying-out

provisions issued by the Reich Commissioner.

MR. DODD: Well, we can make that available to you. This is taken from

the official gazette of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern

Territories. You are not disputing, are you, the fact that you

promulgated this order and that these two paragraphs I read to you were

in it?

ROSENBERG: That I am not disputing.

MR. DODD: All right. If you care to look at all at the other paragraphs

and at other parts, I will see that they are made available to you, but

for the present purposes I can assure you there is no trick in

connection with this.

I want to move on to another document.

ROSENBERG: I would like to refer to just one point. Under Paragraph 1 it

says expressly that people not completely able to work are to be used

according to their capability for work. This shows the state of health

had been considered.

MR. DODD: Yes, I read that to you.

Now, you had a permanent state secretary by the name of Alfred Meyer,

isn’t that so?

ROSENBERG: I do not find anything here regarding the laws about Jews.

There was a point mentioned about the directive for Jews, only it is not

here.

MR. DODD: You will find it just below the sentence to which you made

reference a minute ago, two paragraphs below it. There is a Figure 3 in

parentheses and then this statement: “A special ruling is drawn up for

Jews.”

Don’t you find that there?

ROSENBERG: I do not find it here—oh, on this page, yes. That refers to

another law, yes.

MR. DODD: That’s all right. I just asked you if it was there, and it is.

Let’s go on.

I asked you if you had a permanent staff secretary by the name of Meyer,

Alfred Meyer, M-e-y-e-r.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: I want to show you Document 580-PS, which will become Exhibit

Number USA-821. Now, this is an order from your Ministry for the

Occupied Eastern Territories, and it is signed by your permanent staff

secretary, Alfred Meyer, and it is addressed to the Reich Commissioner

for the Ostland, a man by the name of Lohse, L-o-h-s-e, and also to the

Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, a man by the name of Koch about whom

we have heard a good deal in this Trial.

I want to have you agree, if you will, that the order calls for 247,000

industrial workers and 380,000 agricultural workers.

Now, I want you to turn specifically to Page 2 of the English

translation and to Page 2, as well, of the German text, and Line 14 of

the English text and Line 22 of the German text. The paragraph has

before it the Figure 6, and it says:

“The workers are to be recruited. Forced enlistment should be

avoided; instead, for political reasons, the enlistment should

be kept on a voluntary basis. In case the enlistment should not

bring the required results and there should be a surplus of

workers still available, use may be made in case of emergency,

and in agreement with the Commissioner General, of the decree

dated 19 December 1941 concerning the introduction of compulsory

labor in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Promises...”

So that this order, signed by Meyer of your staff, directing the Reich

commissioners in the Eastern Occupied Territories, was founded on your

decree of 19 December 1941 for compulsory labor.

ROSENBERG: Mr. Prosecutor, you read the introduction, and from that we

can see also that my deputy clearly tried in every way to avoid forced

enlistment and, as he says, the enlistment was to “be kept on a

voluntary basis.” That is proof of what I already said yesterday, that

Meyer, my permanent deputy, most emphatically tried to work along these

lines, and lastly this does not refer to arbitrary measures but rather

to a general compulsory labor law in the Occupied Eastern Territories

which would prevent hundreds of thousands who could neither work nor

study from wandering about idly in the streets. I would however like to

read also the end of the paragraph, and that says:

“Promises which cannot be kept may not be given, neither in

writing nor verbally. Therefore, the announcements, posters, and

appeals in the press and over the radio may therefore not

contain any untrue information in order to avoid disappointment

among the workers employed in the Reich, and thus reactions

against future recruitment in the Occupied Eastern Territories.”

I think a more legal attitude in the midst of war is not at all

thinkable.

MR. DODD: Very good. All I am trying to indicate here, and to see if you

will not agree with it, is that you, nevertheless, despite these

remonstrances and these objections which we do not deny that you made,

did authorize your people in the Eastern Occupied Territories actually

to conscript and force people to come to work in Germany, and you did it

on the basis of your own decree. That is the point I am trying to make

with you.

ROSENBERG: A compulsory labor law was issued by me at the end of 1941

for the territory of the Reichskommissariat concerned, that is, for the

Ostland and for the Ukraine. The compulsory recruitment of this manpower

for the Reich was not taken until much later, and compulsory labor

service in the occupied countries was, in my opinion, legally necessary

so that on the one hand no wildcat recruitment would take place, and

also to prevent chaos resulting from the hundreds of thousands loitering

in the streets.

THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. You are giving a long

paraphrase for the one word “yes,” which is the answer you ought to have

made.

ROSENBERG: When compulsory labor service was also instituted for the

Reich, I said that I was in favor of voluntary enlistment. I could not

persist in this attitude for long and therefore, of course, I agreed

that then also compulsory labor laws would have to be instituted. I

already admitted that three times yesterday; I have not disputed it.

MR. DODD: Yes, I know you repeated it three times yesterday and again

this morning. In your own defense document—Rosenberg-11, I think it

is—which is the letter that you wrote to Koch on the 14th of December

1942—I don’t think it will be necessary to show it to you again; I

think you saw it yesterday—you specifically mentioned to Koch the

matter of picking up people from lines in front of theaters and off the

streets, those people who were attending movies and matters of that

sort. You knew that was going on under your decree of compulsory labor,

didn’t you? You were objecting to it, but you knew it was going on.

ROSENBERG: Excesses are connected with every law, and as soon as I

learned of excesses, I did take steps against them.

MR. DODD: Very good. Now, finally, with respect to this forced labor

matter, would you say as a matter of fairness and honesty that your

ministry was not very largely responsible for this terrible program of

forcing people from their homes into Germany, or do you say that you

must accept a very considerable responsibility for what happened to

these hundreds of thousands of people out of the Eastern occupied areas?

ROSENBERG: I, of course, will take the responsibility for these laws

which I issued, and for any framework of directives which were issued by

my ministry. The territorial governments were legally responsible for

their execution. Where they went beyond these measures—they were 1,500

kilometers away from me—I concerned myself with every case. Many

exaggerations were made and excesses also took place. I admit that

terrible things did occur. I tried to intervene, to apply punitive

measures and because of this quite a number of German officials were

taken to court and were sentenced.

MR. DODD: Leaving aside the terrible things that happened to people,

assuming that no great violence took place, the very fact of forcing

them against their wills to leave is something else that you will accept

responsibility for, I assume.

ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.

MR. DODD: And you also feel that a considerable part of this...

ROSENBERG: [_Interposing._] I accept the responsibility due to a State

law which empowered Gauleiter Sauckel to place these claims to me which

I applied in legal form to the Eastern territories.

MR. DODD: Briefly, I want to remind you, while we are on this subject,

that you acknowledged yesterday that you did consent to the taking of

children as young as 10, 12, and 14 years old and removing them to

Germany, and I think you told us that at first it did disturb you, but

when you found out there were happy recreational circumstances, your

mind was eased. Is that a fair statement of your position on forcing

those children from the East?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct. I do not know just what the

translation of the document was, but the opposite was true. I wanted to

prevent anything from happening in any action in the operational zone

which might, under certain circumstances, be of gravest importance for

many children. Then, upon the request of the Army Group Center—which

anyway would have done it on its own—I took over the care of these

children on condition that I take most scrupulous care of them and care

for their own mothers, that they have contact with their parents, and so

that they might be returned to their homeland again later on. That is

certainly the exact opposite of what the Prosecution has submitted from

this document here.

MR. DODD: Well, I don’t want to dwell much longer on it except to remind

you that that document which you have seen and which you discussed

yesterday states, among other things, that by removing these children

out of the East you will be doing more than one thing; you will be

destroying the biological potentiality of those people in the East. That

is what you approved among other things, isn’t it?

ROSENBERG: Yes. That is contained in the first point of the Prosecution

and it was already read. I have made it clear by reading the whole

document that my approval did not depend at all on that point, that in

the first report I definitely refused that as an argument, and that only

after hearing other information did I find a method, for which the women

thanked me despite the fact that not I but the Hitler Jugend in Dessau

and elsewhere deserve the credit for taking care of them in this way.

MR. DODD: Actually, I understand from all your testimony that, with the

possible exception of the little while of which we have been talking,

you have been very benign and humane towards these people under your

jurisdiction in the Occupied Eastern Territories. You wanted to be very

kind to them.

ROSENBERG: I do not want at all to claim for myself any such sentimental

phraseology. However, in the midst of this terrible war in the East,

which brought with it the continual murder of German employees and

German agricultural officials, I only tried to carry on an intelligent

policy and to induce the people to heart-felt voluntary co-operation.

MR. DODD: Yes. Now I ask that you be shown Document 1058-PS, which is

(Exhibit USA-147.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

You now have that before you. It is an extract from a speech which you

made with your closest collaborators, and it has been referred to

before. It is a speech that you made on the 20th of June 1941, the day

before the attack was launched against Soviet Russia. I want to refer to

the very first paragraph, and the only one on the paper. It says: “The

job of feeding the German people stands in these years without a

doubt....”

ROSENBERG: What page is that?

MR. DODD: It is the first page; there is only one page. Oh, you have the

whole document. You referred to it yesterday; I think you will be able

to find it. It is at Page 8, Line 54. You may recall it; you talked

about it yesterday. As a matter of fact, you said it was an impromptu

speech. Do you find it on Page 8?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I have found it.

MR. DODD: In that paragraph you say, among other things—and I want to

call it to your attention for a specific purpose—you say that the job

of feeding the German people is at the top of the list, and that the

southern regions and the northern Caucasus will have to serve as a

balance for the feeding of the German people. And you go on to say that

you see no reason why there is any obligation to feed the Russian people

with the surplus products of the territory. Then you say, “We know that

this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings.”

You then go on to say, “A very extensive evacuation will undoubtedly be

necessary and the future will hold very hard years in store for the

Russians.”

Now, you read us some parts of that speech yesterday that you seemed to

think were quite to your credit. Were all parts of the speech impromptu

or are you suggesting that only the parts that seem damaging to you now

were impromptu?

ROSENBERG: I just used a few key words and gave the speech that way.

This paragraph has been read by the Prosecution three or four times.

Yesterday when we discussed this speech I myself expressly referred to

this paragraph. Beyond that, I admitted that I was told by people

connected with the Four Year Plan that it was not certain whether the

industry of the Moscow industrial region could be fully maintained after

its conquest—here the “wagon factories” are mentioned. Restriction

might be necessary to some key industries, and through that a difficult

problem in the supply of this area would arise. My remarks pointed out

that, of necessity, these unemployed would probably have to be

evacuated. I expressly referred to this document, namely, the first

document of the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories on this

question where, under seven most important points for the civilian

administration, Point 3 concerns the feeding of the civilian population.

Later in the document it says that famines are to be avoided in any

event and that in such a case the population was to receive special

rations. I believe that in these hard times, in view of the laws and

directives, it was impossible for me to do more than that. My entire

political and spiritual position is to be concluded from what I said

yesterday about the demand for liberty and culture in the Ukraine, about

the sovereignty of the Caucasians, and also about the Russian State and

its big...

MR. DODD: All right. I don’t want you to go into all that. I understand

you thoroughly, and I think everyone else does. I merely wanted to point

out to you that on that early date you did say there would be harsh

necessities and that there would be very many hard years for the

Russians. That is all. And if you don’t want to acknowledge that you

were serious in saying that, as you were in saying the other things,

then I won’t press you on it.

I want to turn to document...

ROSENBERG: Mr. Prosecutor, I believe that not much more could have been

done for this problem than by planning beforehand how to master the

difficulties rather than afterwards. Other occupation forces have had

the same experience.

MR. DODD: All right.

I ask that you be shown Document 045-PS, Exhibit USA-822.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

ROSENBERG: Perhaps I might say something more about the translation of

this passage. It was translated to me that these measures were to be

carried through “without any feeling.” In the original it says “beyond

feeling,” or “above feeling.”

MR. DODD: All right, I accept your interpretation; we won’t have any

trouble about that. Now, will you please look at this document? This is

a memorandum found in your files, for your information.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: You set out there, in the second paragraph, what you call the

aim of German politics, notably in the Ukraine, as having been laid down

by the Führer. They are, you say, exploitation and mobilization of raw

materials, a German settlement in certain regions, no artificial

education of the population towards intellectualism, but the

preservation of their labor strength; apart from that, an extensive

unconcern with the interior affairs.

Then, moving down a little bit—because I don’t think it is necessary to

read all of it, much of it has been referred to in another document—we

come down to the 12th line from the bottom of that paragraph. Beginning

at the 14th line:

“After continuous observation of the state of affairs in the

Occupied Eastern Territories, I am convinced that German

politics may have their own, possibly contemptuous opinion of

the qualities of the conquered peoples, but that it is not the

mission of German political representatives to proclaim measures

and opinions which could eventually reduce the conquered peoples

to dull despair instead of promoting the desired utilization of

manpower to capacity.”

Then, in the next paragraph, you say:

“If at home we had to announce our aims to the whole nation most

openly and aggressively, in contrast to the others, the

political leaders in the East must remain silent where German

policy calls for necessary harshness. They must remain silent as

to any derogatory opinions which they may form about the

conquered peoples. Yes, a clever German policy may in certain

circumstances do more in the German interest through

alleviations which do not affect policy and certain humane

concessions, than through open, inconsiderate brutality.”

Were you honestly expressing your views when you wrote that memorandum

on the 16th of March 1942?

ROSENBERG: This document is correct. It was also submitted to me in the

preliminary interrogation. It shows that, although I knew that the

Führer had not accepted my more far-reaching proposals, I continued to

fight for these more far-reaching proposals. And it shows, further, that

I saw the Führer personally, so that a few crazy middle-class people in

the East would not make derogatory remarks about other nations whose

standard of living may to all appearances have been poor at the time.

From the many thousands who came in there, I could not expect either

sympathy or antipathy, but I could demand one thing of them if their

attitude was contemptuous, and that was to keep it to themselves and to

act decently.

In conclusion I would like to add something which is extraordinarily

decisive, namely, it says here in the last paragraph, “I ask that the

Führer rule on this record and the draft decree.” This instruction is

unfortunately not attached to the document; I believe that much would

have been proved from it.

MR. DODD: All right. Now let’s turn to Document R-36, Exhibit USA-699.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

You have seen this document before, haven’t you?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I have seen it.

MR. DODD: Now, this is a memorandum submitted to you by one of your

subordinates, Dr. Markull, and directly submitted to you by Leibbrandt,

also one of your subordinates, one of your top men, on the 19th of

August 1942. I want you to follow along with me while I read you certain

passages from it.

The first few lines are dated the 5th of September 1942, and it says,

“To the Reich Minister; on the premises.” It states that there is

enclosed a memorandum containing the opinion of Dr. Markull on the

matter of the Bormann letter of the 23rd July.

Before we go into this just for a minute—if you will just pay attention

to this—you told us yesterday that you were in disagreement with

Bormann about some matters. Is that so?

ROSENBERG: I said...

MR. DODD: Just answer the question. Did you tell us that yesterday?

ROSENBERG: On decisive points I did not agree with Bormann. I testified

that in the course of years I was assailed in such a way that, on

occasion, I had to give him an appeasing answer. My whole policy was

to...

MR. DODD: All right. Let’s look at this document, which is, as I say, a

memorandum about a Bormann letter to you, dated the 23rd of July, I

assume 1942:

“On 23 July 1942, Reichsleiter Bormann sent the Minister a

letter which enumerates in eight paragraphs the principles which

the Minister is to follow in administering the Occupied Eastern

Territories.”

It goes on to say that you, in a message to the Führer dated the 11th of

August 1942, explained in detail to what extent these principles are

already being put into practice or used as a basis of policy.

The next paragraph says:

“Any person reading this correspondence is struck, first of all,

by the complete agreement of concepts. The Minister”—that is

you—“apparently was particularly concerned about two points.

The first relates to the protection of German rule against the

pressure of the Slav race; the second to the absolute necessity

of simplifying the administration. These are indeed decisive

problems, of which more will have to be said.”

Then there is this statement:

“For the rest, the Minister”—referring to you—“not only raises

no objections against Bormann’s principles or even his

phraseology; on the contrary, he uses them as a basis for his

reply and endeavors to show that they are already being put into

practice. When, however, Bormann’s letter was read out by

Captain Zimmermann in a conference of the department chiefs,

grave concern was shown at once, both on account of the

phraseology of the letter and the future conduct of our Eastern

policy.”

Then it goes on to say:

“In order to find out whether this concern is justified, it is

best to start from a supposition which clearly shows the

prevailing situation.”

Then, under the Number 1, Markull writes:

“Let us suppose Bormann’s letter were issued to the Reich

commissioners as a ministerial decree. This supposition is by no

means unrealistic since the Minister”—and that again refers to

you—“appears to hold identical views. Since the Ostland

presents a special case, and moreover the Ukraine is, or will

become probably the most important region politically, the

following discussion will mainly be based on that region.”

Then, going on:

“The consequences of a decree of this kind will best be judged

by its effect on those men whose duty it is to put it into

practice.”

Moving down a little bit, he says:

“Imagine the formulas of Bormann’s letter translated into the

language of a member of the German civilian administration, and

you will get, roughly, the following views:

“The Slavs are to work for us. Insofar as we do not need them,

they may die. Therefore, compulsory vaccination and German

health service are superfluous. The fertility of the Slavs is

undesirable. They may use contraceptives or practice abortion,

the more the better. Education is dangerous. It is enough if

they can count up to 100. At best an education which produces

useful coolies for us is admissible. Every educated person is a

future enemy. Religion we leave to them as a means of diversion.

As for food, they will not get any more than is necessary. We

are the masters; we come first.”

Then it goes on to say:

“These sentences are by no means overstatements. On the contrary

they are covered, word by word, by the spirit and the text of

Bormann’s letter. Already at this point the question arises

whether such a result is desirable in the interests of the

Reich. It can hardly be doubted that these views would become

known to the Ukrainian people. Similar opinions prevail already

today.”

Moving on, the next paragraph, with the Number 2, says:

“But there is no real need to assume a fictitious decree as was

done in Paragraph 1. The above-mentioned concept of our role in

the East already exists in practice. The Reich Commissioner for

the Ukraine has expounded his views of the Ukrainian people

governed by him in three successive speeches at the

inauguration....”—_et cetera._

And he goes on to quote those speeches, which have been referred to

before this Tribunal.

Then, in the next paragraph, he says that every visitor and every member

of the local civil administration can confirm this from his own

observations, and they show particularly clearly how well the soil is

prepared for the Bormann letter. Then he goes on to quote statements

that have been made by saying, “To be exact, we are here among negroes;

the population is just dirty and lazy,” and so on.

And then, passing on, he says:

“I may add that Kreisleiter Knuth, whom the Gauleiter still

retains in spite of the gravest accusations against his

professional integrity, declared, in conversations on the Kiev

question, that Kiev ought to be depopulated through epidemics.

Altogether it would be best if the superfluous part of the

population starved to death.”

Moving on further we come to the third paragraph down. It says:

“Finally among the district commissioners 80 percent oppose the

views described above. In many conferences with the general

commissioners they emphasized that the population ought to be

treated decently and with understanding.”

And, that statements opposing such policies as referred to above will

result in a catastrophe. That is what the next paragraph says.

And then Markull goes on to say:

“For the rest the only effect of the false concepts of the

‘master race’ is to relax the discipline of our officials.”

I will not take the time to read all of it. I am sure you are reading

it. Then we move on and we come to this very significant paragraph, with

a Number 5:

“However, it must be examined whether there is not in fact an

agreement between the policy hitherto pursued and the Bormann

letter in the sense that the decrees quoted above and the other

instructions of the ministry are to be understood merely as

tactical moves, whereas in fact there is no divergence of

opinion. The Minister’s reply”—I remind you each time the

Minister refers to you—“of 11 August might be considered to

point in this direction.”

Then he goes on to say:

“In answer to this it should be pointed out that the Minister

knows very well that it is not possible to reorganize a

continent of the size of Russia by means of political tactics

and by wearing the mask of a liberator, but only by applying a

statesmanlike conception appropriate to the political

conditions.”—And so on.

And finally he says:

“Another reason why...”

I want to be fair about this document with you. He indicates that

perhaps it should not be interpreted merely as a tactical maneuver,

because of the inconsistency which this would imply. For in that case

the word “liberation” ought never to have been mentioned and no theater

should be allowed to stay open, no trade school, no Ukrainian university

should be allowed to function.

And finally I would like to read you—not finally—but I would like to

read you this significant paragraph. It states—and I think you will

allow me to summarize it—that this letter of Bormann’s, which

originated from the field headquarters, simply cannot be issued as a

ministerial decree, since it would disavow the entire policy hitherto

announced by the Minister—yourself.

And in this connection, a few sentences down, says Markull:

“It is necessary to point once more to the obvious similarity

between the opinions professed by Koch and the instructions

given in the Bormann letter.”

Then, about halfway down the paragraph, it says only you can decide upon

this question and he suggests certain considerations which might be

useful, recounting some difficulties.

And finally you come, under Number II to the second paragraph:

“Without wishing to criticize in any way the statements of

Reichsleiter Bormann it is yet necessary to point out that the

wording of his letter does not always bring out clearly the

importance of the issue at stake. A phrase like ‘brisk trade in

contraceptives’ had better not be brought into connection with

the name of the Führer. In the same way abrupt phrases like

‘vaccination of the non-German population is completely out of

the question,’”—and so on—“would hardly seem to be entirely in

keeping with the importance of the historical problems involved

here.”

Finally, to go on, I want to read you this, under Number III, Markull

states:

“The statements set out above may appear very sharp. They are,

however, dictated by concern and duty.”

And finally—well, I don’t think there is any necessity to read the last

paragraph. It merely talks about the political philosophy which is being

raised in a grandiose manner by the Japanese ally in his new districts.

Now, you remember this memorandum that you received through your

assistant, Leibbrandt, from your subordinate, Markull? You can answer

that “yes” or “no,” by the way; that is all I want to know right

now—whether or not you remember it. Will you wait just a minute?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I received this report from Dr. Leibbrandt, and I would

like to make the following explanation.

MR. DODD: Just before you do that—you will have an opportunity; I won’t

shut you up on any explanations or even attempt to—I have one or two

things I would like to ask you about it, and then if you feel the need

to explain them or anything else I feel sure the Tribunal will permit

you to do so.

You had written a letter in answer to the Bormann letter, hadn’t you?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.

MR. DODD: And you had agreed with these—if I may use the term—shocking

suggestions of Bormann? In your letter you had agreed with these

shocking suggestions of Bormann? “Yes” or “no”?

ROSENBERG: I wrote an appeasing letter so that I could bring about a

pause in the constant pressure under which I was kept, and I would like

to anticipate and say that my activity, and the decrees which I issued

after this letter, did not change in any way; but, on the contrary,

decrees were issued setting up a school system and for the further

continuation of health control. I will discuss it further in my reply.

MR. DODD: You wrote this letter to the Führer; you did not write it to

Bormann, did you? Your answer went to Hitler?

ROSENBERG: I wrote my reply to the Führer, yes.

MR. DODD: And you were appeasing the Führer as well, were you, when you

mouthed back the phrases such as are repeated in this letter about the

use of contraceptives and abortion?

ROSENBERG: No; besides...

MR. DODD: Wait until I finish. I was saying, in your letter to the

Führer you wrote back those horrid suggestions of Bormann, didn’t

you—those nasty, horrid suggestions of Bormann, I might say? You wrote

them to Hitler?

ROSENBERG: I wrote a letter to the Führer, but did not use the wording

of Bormann’s letter. I wrote appeasingly to the Führer that I was not

doing any more than could and had to be done. I wanted to ward off an

attack from headquarters for I knew it would come because I did more for

the Eastern peoples than for the German people—that I was demanding

more doctors than the German people had for their sick, that I was doing

more in my capacity as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories for

the health problem and thereby for the Eastern people than German

doctors could do for the German people. The attack had reached such

proportions that Koch finally accused me of promoting a policy of

immigration. That was the reason why the conflict arose shortly

thereafter and was brought to the Führer.

MR. DODD: Just so there will be no doubt about this—I don’t want there

to be any misunderstanding and nobody else does—are you telling us that

you did not write back almost word for word what Bormann wrote to you?

ROSENBERG: I do not have the letter here verbatim.

MR. DODD: But you have the Markull memorandum here, which says that the

Minister not only raises no objections against Bormann’s principles or

even his phraseology. Now surely one of your subordinates would not be

impertinent enough to write you a memorandum like that unless it was

perfectly true that you had done so?

ROSENBERG: I welcomed very much that my collaborators always had the

courage to contradict me and give me their opinion, even concerning

something I myself requested. Dr. Leibbrandt came and said to me, “Herr

Reich Minister, that certainly is not in accord with what we are all

doing here.” I said, “Dr. Leibbrandt, please calm yourself. I have

written an appeasing explanation. Nothing will be changed. Later I will

also speak to the Führer personally about these matters.”

MR. DODD: Your subordinate was not afraid to tell you that you had

written such a letter in which you agreed word for word with Bormann. I

have no trouble with you on that score. That is all I am trying to get

you to tell this Tribunal, because it is true that you did write back

expressing these word-for-word sentences.

ROSENBERG: That is not correct. The author—I rather say Dr.

Leibbrandt—when he gave me this memorandum, read it through in a hurry

saying, “There seems to be a gentleman who believes that I cannot do

anything else but what I consider right.” But in this case I am facing a

serious conflict, and I will maintain my position as I consider it

right. That may be seen in the documents covering a period of 3 years

which I read yesterday. May I give my opinion now on this document?

MR. DODD: Answer this question: Who were you appeasing, Hitler or

Bormann? Or both of them?

ROSENBERG: First, I concurred with my collaborator, Dr. Leibbrandt, in

the idea that ministerial decrees in that sense would never be released

by me. Second, I regulated by a decree the school system in the Ukraine

including a 4-year elementary school, trade school, and professional

colleges.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. That is not an answer to the question. You

said that you wrote an appeasing answer. The question is whom were you

trying to appease. Was it Hitler or was it Bormann or was it both?

ROSENBERG: Yes, both of them; yes.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, would this be a convenient time to break off?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have stated yesterday that the document

books for Frank have already been translated. However, it appears—I

have just found this out—that the document books are not yet bound

because the office authorized to do that has not yet received permission

from another competent office. Perhaps the Tribunal could order the

binding of the document books, or else the whole translation is useless.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: I did not know there was any delay, but I will see to it right

away that they get it as far as we are able to do it.

ROSENBERG: May I say something about this document? This memorandum, as

I stated in the beginning, is based on the supposition of a possible

ministerial decree. It obviously uses phrases which Bormann had used in

his letter, but my letter which I sent to the Führer cannot possibly

contain these phrases. It may have contained appeasing statements to the

effect that I did nothing in the Occupied Eastern Territories for which

I was reproached; that is to say, that I did nothing for the German

population but that I established large health departments, school

departments, education departments, _et cetera_; and that now I was

absolutely compelled to simplify these administrative departments. But

that Bormann made these statements, that he used these phrases! It is

regrettable that he expressed himself in this way; and during the last

few years we were compelled to observe an unnecessarily large number of

similar instances.

I may add briefly that he himself stated that the Minister apparently

intervened to clarify these things there, but I want to indicate one

decisive point, and that is that the opinions advanced by Bormann were

also familiar to Koch’s circle. During these tragic years my entire

efforts were directed against Koch’s personal circle, especially in the

training of administrative leaders; and that can be seen from Paragraph

3, where it says, “Moreover, at least 80 percent of the district

commissioners are opposed to the views described.”

MR. DODD: I think we all know what is in it. If you have any

explanation, I think you ought to make it.

ROSENBERG: Yes. On Page 4, it says the great majority of the

administrative leadership corps set their hopes in the Minister—that

is, myself—and I endeavored and tried to fulfill these hopes of the

administrative leadership corps, which I attempted to educate by means

of my decrees because these thousands of people could not know the vast

Eastern territories, these thousands who, even in the fight against

Bolshevism, sometimes had no very clear conception of the state of

things in the East; and I must emphasize the fact that the author here

says that the decree issued by the Minister on 17 March 1942

re-emphasizes his former decrees in a more rigorous form. The decree of

13 May 1942 attacks the view that the Ukrainians were not a race at all

and attacks the false conception of superiority. Thus, these are two

decrees which I have not received and which are here; and furthermore,

Mr. Prosecutor, I say that he points out quite correctly that of course

the Minister—that is, myself—knows very well that such a continent has

to be treated differently than in accordance with these suggestions

which we have heard. As a consequence of these proceedings, however, I

have positively established that after that correspondence between Koch

and Bormann I introduced the orderly set-up of a school administration

in the Ukraine by issuing a detailed decree. Secondly, I requested the

extension of the...

MR. DODD: I am not interested in that. Just a minute.

ROSENBERG: Well, I have to answer these accusations.

MR. DODD: That is no answer to this, if Your Honor pleases, and no

explanation of this document. He is launching off on one of these long

speeches again about what he did after the document was received or

after he wrote the letter, and I ask that he be instructed to answer

that question and not to go on into statements about what he did in the

administration in the Ukraine. I don’t think it is pertinent.

ROSENBERG: I spoke to the Führer personally about this and told

him—that decree of May 1943 is in my file—I told him that it was

impossible to work in the East with this kind of talk from Koch and his

following.

THE PRESIDENT: If there is a letter in your file or if there is not a

letter in your file, your counsel can re-examine you upon

cross-examination, but you cannot in cross-examination go into long

explanations. You must answer the question “yes” or “no” and explain, if

you must explain, shortly. You have been explaining this document for a

long time.

MR. DODD: When did you first meet Erich Koch?

ROSENBERG: Erich Koch?

MR. DODD: Yes.

ROSENBERG: In the twenties. It may have been 1927 or 1928...

MR. DODD: Apparently you have known him, then, a great many years?

ROSENBERG: I have not seen him often, but as Gauleiter I talked to him

personally now and again.

MR. DODD: When did he become a Gauleiter?

ROSENBERG: I believe in the year 1928 he became Gauleiter in East

Prussia, but I cannot give the exact date when he became Gauleiter.

MR. DODD: That is all right. I want an approximate date. Did you have

much to do with him from the time that he was appointed Gauleiter, let

us say, until 1940?

ROSENBERG: During the fighting years, I had practically nothing at all

to do with him. Then later, after 1933, I talked to him several times.

MR. DODD: You had a pretty good knowledge, I assume, in any event, of

his general reputation among his friends and acquaintances?

ROSENBERG: I knew Koch had a very excitable temperament, going from one

extreme to the other and hard to keep steady, and therefore not reliable

in carrying out a steady policy.

MR. DODD: I take it from your answer, that you were not aware, however,

before he became the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, of his

temperament in this way, that you did not know that he did these

terrible things, which he did do while Reich Commissioner in the

Ukraine, did you?

ROSENBERG: No, and...

MR. DODD: That is an answer and there is no need to explain that.

ROSENBERG: I even knew that Koch had expressed the opposite opinion

previously, and that he had said that the youth of the East embraces

also the German youth. He previously wrote that.

MR. DODD: So I take it you were surprised when this man turned out to be

the kind of man that he did turn out to be. Is that a fair statement?

ROSENBERG: That only came to light gradually later on. Another person

could not foresee that this temperament would involve such results and

it would not have gone so far had he not been supported by somebody

else.

MR. DODD: You don’t think he was quite so good a man as appears from the

record, but was rather encouraged by some others; is that what you are

trying to tell us?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that, of course, contributed.

MR. DODD: I am going to ask that you be shown Document 1019-PS; it

becomes Exhibit USA-823. By the way, before we look at that document,

Koch is the man whom you blame to a very great extent for many of these

terrible things that happened under your ministry in the Ukraine, isn’t

he? There isn’t any doubt about that. You told us about that all day

yesterday.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, could you go just a little bit slower?

MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor, I will.

[_Turning to the defendant._] If you look at this document, you will see

that it is a memorandum about your recommendations as to the personnel

for the Reich commissions in the East and for the central political

office in Berlin; and it was written on the 7th day of April 1941, and I

take it that that was only a few days after Hitler talked to you about

your new assignment in the East, 4 or 5 days at the most; isn’t that so?

Will you answer that question?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: Now, in this memorandum you set out that you recommended

Gauleiter Lohse and we know from the documents and the testimony that he

was appointed; isn’t that a fact?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: All right. Now, turn to the next page of the English text; it

is the paragraph beginning as follows:

“In addition it will eventually become necessary to occupy with

troops not only Leningrad, but also Moscow. This occupation will

probably differ considerably from that in the Baltic provinces,

the Ukraine, and the Caucasus. It will be aimed at the

suppression of any Russian and Bolshevik resistance and will

necessitate an absolutely ruthless person both as regards the

military representation and also the eventual political

direction. The problems arising from this need not be detailed

here. If it is not intended to maintain a permanent military

administration, the undersigned would recommend the Gauleiter of

East Prussia, Erich Koch, as Reich Commissioner in Moscow.”

Did you recommend Koch for that job as a particularly ruthless man in

April of 1941? “Yes” or “no”?

ROSENBERG: Yes...

MR. DODD: Just a minute. You have done a lot of talking here for the

last day and today if you will just give me a chance once in a while.

He is the same man you told us a minute ago you did not know to be

particularly ruthless until after he did these terrible things in the

Ukraine. Now, it is very clear you did know it in April of 1941, isn’t

it? What is your answer to that?

ROSENBERG: That is not correct; that is not laid down here. I have

stated that I know from Koch’s writings from 1933 and 1934 that he had a

special liking for the Russian people. I knew Koch as a man of

initiative in East Prussia. I had to expect that at the center of Moscow

and around Moscow a very difficult job would have to be done. For here

was the center of gravity of Bolshevism and here under certain

circumstances the greatest resistance would arise. Then I did not want

to have Koch in the Eastern territories and not in the Ukraine because I

did not believe I had to fear such resistance there. There was, on one

side, Koch’s devotion to the Russians, on the other side he was a man

with economic initiative; finally I knew he was supported in such a

manner that he was intended for some job in the East by the Führer as

well as by the Reich Marshal.

MR. DODD: When you were looking for a ruthless man you suggested Koch as

early as April of 1941.

ROSENBERG: This expression refers here rather to initiative and, of

course, to the view that he would fight any Bolshevik resistance

ruthlessly; but not in the sense that he would suppress a foreign race

or try to exterminate foreign cultures.

MR. DODD: The truth of the matter is that you had some peculiar and odd

interest in the Ukraine and you had somebody else in mind for that job

but you knew Koch was a bad actor and you wanted him in another part of

Russia, is it not?

ROSENBERG: No, for the Ukraine I wanted State Secretary Backe or my

Chief of Staff Schickedanz, as can be seen from this document. I wanted

State Secretary Backe because he is a German from the Caucasus and

speaks Russian, knows the entire southern territory and probably could

have worked very well there. I did not get him and I was forced to

accept Koch, I would like to say, against my personal protest in the

meeting of 16 July 1941.

MR. DODD: Well, if that is your answer I do not care to go any further

with it.

With respect to your attitude towards the Jewish people, in your

Frankfurt speech in 1938 you suggested that they all had to leave Europe

and Germany, did you not?

ROSENBERG: This phrasing was used.

MR. DODD: All you need to say is “yes” or “no.” Did you do that or not

in your speech in Frankfurt in 1938?

ROSENBERG: Yes, but I certainly cannot answer “yes” or “no” on an

incorrect quotation!

MR. DODD: I do not think you need to explain anything at all. I merely

asked you whether you said that in Frankfurt in your Party Day speech.

ROSENBERG: Yes, in substance that is correct.

MR. DODD: Now, in your Party Day speech to which you made reference

yesterday, you said you used harsh language about the Jews. In those

days you were objecting to the fact that they were in certain

professions, I suppose, and things of that character. Is that a fair

statement?

ROSENBERG: I said yesterday that in two speeches I demanded a chivalrous

solution and equal treatment, and I said the foreign nations might not

accuse us of discriminating against the Jewish people, so long as these

foreign nations discriminate against our nation...

MR. DODD: Yes, very well. Did you ever talk about the extermination of

the Jews?

ROSENBERG: I have not in general spoken about the extermination of the

Jews in the sense of this term. One has to consider the words here. The

term “extermination” has been used by the British Prime Minister...

MR. DODD: You will get around to the words. You just tell me now whether

you ever said it or not? You said that, did you not?

ROSENBERG: Not in a single speech in that sense...

MR. DODD: I understand the sense. Did you ever talk about it with

anybody as a matter of State policy or Party policy, about the

extermination of the Jews?

ROSENBERG: In a conference with the Führer there was once an open

discussion on this question about an intended speech which was not

delivered. The sense of it was that now a war was going on and that this

threat which had been made should not be mentioned again. That whole

speech was also not delivered.

MR. DODD: When was it you were going to deliver that speech?

Approximately what was the date?

ROSENBERG: In December 1941.

MR. DODD: Then you have written into your speech remarks about the

extermination of Jews, haven’t you? Answer that “yes” or “no.”

ROSENBERG: I have said already that that word does not have the sense

which you attribute to it.

MR. DODD: I will get around to the word and the meaning of it. I am

asking you, did you not use the word or the term “extermination of the

Jews” in the speech which you were prepared to make in the Sportpalast

in December of 1941? Now, you can answer that pretty simply.

ROSENBERG: That may be, but I do not remember. I myself did not read the

phrasing of the draft any further. In which form it was expressed I can

no longer say.

MR. DODD: Well then, perhaps we can help you on that. I will ask you be

shown Document 1517-PS. It becomes Exhibit USA-824.

[_Document 1517-PS was submitted to the defendant._]

Now, this is also a memorandum of yours written by you about a

discussion you had with Hitler on the 14th of December 1941, and it is

quite clear from the first paragraph that you and Hitler were discussing

a speech which you were to deliver in the Sportpalast in Berlin, and if

you will look at the second paragraph, you will find these words:

“I remarked on the Jewish question that the comments about the

New York Jews must perhaps be changed somewhat after the

conclusion (of matters in the East). I took the standpoint not

to speak of the extermination (Ausrottung) of Jewry. The Führer

affirmed this view and said that they had laid the burden of war

on us and that they had brought the destruction; it is no wonder

if the results would strike them first.”

Now, you have indicated that you have some difficulty with the meaning

of that word, and I am going to ask you about the word “Ausrottung.” I

am going to ask that you be shown—you are familiar with the standard

German-English dictionary, _Cassell’s_, I suppose, are you? Do you know

this word, ever heard of it?

ROSENBERG: No.

MR. DODD: This is something you will be interested in. Will you look up

and read out to the Tribunal what the definition of “Ausrottung” is?

ROSENBERG: I do not need a foreign dictionary in order to explain the

various meanings “Ausrottung” may have in the German language. One can

exterminate an idea, an economic system, a social order, and as a final

consequence, also a group of human beings, certainly. Those are the many

possibilities which are contained in that word. For that I do not need

an English-German dictionary. Translations from German into English are

so often wrong—and just as in that last document you have submitted to

me, I heard again the translation of “Herrenrasse.” In the document

itself “Herrenrasse” is not even mentioned; however, there is the term

“ein falsches Herrenmenschentum” (a false master mankind). Apparently

everything is translated here in another sense.

MR. DODD: All right, I am not interested in that. Let us stay on this

term of “Ausrottung.” I take it then that you agree it does mean to

“wipe out” or to “kill off,” as it is understood, and that you did use

the term in speaking to Hitler.

ROSENBERG: Here I heard again a different translation, which again used

new German words, so I cannot determine what you wanted to express in

English.

MR. DODD: Are you very serious in pressing this apparent inability of

yours to agree with me about this word or are you trying to kill time?

Don’t you know that there are plenty of people in this courtroom who

speak German and who agree that that word does mean to “wipe out,” to

“extirpate?”

ROSENBERG: It means “to overcome” on one side and then it is to be used

not with respect to individuals but rather to juridical entities, to

certain historical traditions. On the other side this word has been used

with respect to the German people and we have also not believed that in

consequence thereof 60 millions of Germans would be shot.

MR. DODD: I want to remind you that this speech of yours in which you

use the term “Ausrottung” was made about 6 months after Himmler told

Hoess, whom you heard on this witness stand, to start exterminating the

Jews. That is a fact, is it not?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct, for Adolf Hitler said in his

declaration before the Reichstag: Should a new world war be started by

these attacks of the emigrants and their backers, then as a consequence

there would be an extermination and an extirpation. That has been

understood as a result and as a political threat. Apparently, a similar

political threat was also used by me before the war against America

broke out. And, when the war had already broken out, I have apparently

said that, since it has come to this, there is no use to speak of it at

all.

MR. DODD: Well, actually, the Jews were being exterminated in the

Eastern Occupied Territories at that time and thereafter, weren’t they?

ROSENBERG: Then, may I perhaps say something about the use of the words

here? We are speaking here of extermination of Jewry; there is also

still a difference between “Jewry” and “the Jews.”

MR. DODD: I asked you if it was not a fact that at that time and later

on Jews were being exterminated in the Occupied Eastern Territories

which were under your ministry? Will you answer that “yes” or “no”?

ROSENBERG: Yes. I quoted a document on that yesterday.

MR. DODD: Yes, and after that you told the Tribunal or, as I understood

you at least, you wanted the Tribunal to believe that that was being

done by the Police and without any of your people being involved in it;

is that so?

ROSENBERG: I have heard from a witness that a district commissioner is

said to have participated in these things in Vilna, and I have heard

from another witness that in other cities the report came through that

the Police would carry it out. From Document 1184 I gathered that a

district commissioner opposed in every possible way and protested

against this so-called “Schweinerei” (scandalous doings).

MR. DODD: Dr. Leibbrandt was your subordinate; he was in charge of

Division II in your Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories,

wasn’t he?

ROSENBERG: Yes, for a time.

MR. DODD: Now, for the second time, I’ll ask that you be shown Document

3663-PS, Exhibit USA-825.

[_Document 3663-PS was submitted to the defendant._]

Now, this document consists of three parts as you will notice. The first

page is a letter written by Dr. Leibbrandt on the stationery of the

Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and it is dated 31

October 1941; that’s not too many days before you had your conversation

with the Führer about your speech, and it is addressed to the Reich

Commissioner for the Ostland in Riga. That was Lohse, the man whom you

recommended. The letter says:

“The Reich Security Main Office has complained that the Reich

Commissioner for the Ostland has forbidden execution of Jews in

Libau. I request a report in regard to this matter by return

mail. By order”—signed—“Dr. Leibbrandt.”

Now, if you will turn to the next page, you will see the answer. Turn

that document over if you have the original—do you? You will see the

answer, dated Riga, the 15th of November 1941, to the Reich Minister for

the Occupied Eastern Territories, Berlin. “Subject: Execution of Jews,

re: Decree.” It refers to the letter of Leibbrandt, apparently, of the

31st of October 1941, and it says:

“I have forbidden the wild execution of Jews in Libau because

they were not justifiable in the manner in which they were

carried out. I should like to be informed whether your inquiry

of 31 October is to be regarded as a directive to liquidate all

Jews in the Ostland. Shall this take place without regard to age

and sex and economic interests of the Wehrmacht, for instance in

specialists in the armament industry?”

And there is a note in different handwriting:

“Of course, the cleansing of the Ostland of Jews is a main task.

Its solution, however, must be harmonized with the necessities

of war production.”

It continues:

“So far, I have not been able to find such a directive, either

in the regulations regarding the Jewish question in the ‘Brown

Portfolio’ or in other decrees.”

Now, that has the initial “L” for “Lohse,” doesn’t it, at the bottom of

it? And then, if you’ll look at the third page—no, it is another

document. There are only two parts to that document.

Now, I wish that you would look at Document 3666-PS, which becomes

Exhibit USA-826.

THE PRESIDENT: That has on it the initial “L,” has it?

MR. DODD: The original has, Your Honor; yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And the defendant agrees that that is the initial of

Lohse; is that right?

ROSENBERG: That could hardly be Lohse. I do not know Lohse’s initial. I

do not know.

MR. DODD: Well, it’s very...

ROSENBERG: It could also be Leibbrandt; I do not know.

MR. DODD: You’re not willing to say that that second letter was from

Lohse and that that is his initial on the bottom of it?

ROSENBERG: That I cannot say.

MR. DODD: All right.

ROSENBERG: That I cannot say because usually typewritten letters are

sent anywhere.

MR. DODD: Well, we’re...

ROSENBERG: This note in the back is not quite clear to me. Essentially,

however, it means that this was a protest against police measures which

had become known and that an instruction...

MR. DODD: We will go into what it means in a minute. We’re just talking

about the initial “L.” While we’re talking about the initial, will you

look at it and see if there are any “R’s,” capital “R”?

ROSENBERG: Yes, here is an “L.”

MR. DODD: Yes, “R”?

ROSENBERG: Yes, here are two “R’s.”

MR. DODD: Did you put those on there?

ROSENBERG: No.

MR. DODD: You initialled them, did you?

ROSENBERG: I cannot decipher that as my “R.”

MR. DODD: You say that it is not your “R”? We will have to be clear

about this. You’d have to know your own initial when you saw it

anywhere.

ROSENBERG: I never made such a pointed “R” on the top. You can compare

it with my handwriting.

MR. DODD: We’ll do that; don’t worry. I just want to ask you now if that

is your initial or not?

ROSENBERG: I cannot identify that as my initial.

MR. DODD: Do you say that it is not your initial?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: All right. Now, I wish you’d look at Document 3666-PS, which

is also related to these other documents, and that is also a letter

written on the stationery of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern

Territories, and it is dated December 18, 1941. Subject: Jewish

Question. Re: Correspondence of 15 November 1941. This is an answer then

to the letter marked “L,” inquiring whether or not execution of the Jews

is to be understood as a fixed policy.

“Clarification of the Jewish question has most likely been

achieved by now through verbal discussions. Economic

considerations should on principle remain unconsidered in the

settlement of the problem. Moreover, it is requested that

questions arising be settled directly with the Higher SS and

Police Leader. By order (signed) Bräutigam.”

Have you seen that letter before?

ROSENBERG: No, I have not seen it; in my opinion no. Here I see again

such an “R,” pointed on the top, and I cannot identify that as my “R”

either.

MR. DODD: So that you do not identify that as having your initial,

either?

ROSENBERG: Well, I could simply not identify that as my “R” because this

was a letter, signed by Bräutigam sent from the Ministry of the Eastern

Occupied Territories to the Ostland, and the notes on the top are from

an office that has received that letter.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to an explicit error

here? This “R” is in connection with a “K.” That apparently means

“Reichskommissar.”

MR. DODD: I am not discussing the “R” on the top of the letter; I am

discussing the one of the handwritten letter.

ROSENBERG: Well, it can be seen from this “R” now quite unequivocally

that this concerns the man who received the letter. “Received on 22

December—R.” And it is addressed from the Ministry to the “Ostland.”

That note, therefore, was written by a person living in Riga, and that

is the same “R” which can be found also on the other document.

MR. DODD: Who is your Reich Commissioner in the East for Riga?

ROSENBERG: Lohse.

MR. DODD: His name didn’t begin with “R,” did it?

ROSENBERG: Yes, but it is clear that this letter obviously was

initialled in his department.

DR. THOMA: May I also help the Tribunal in this matter? In the

handwritten thing with the German “L” you will find on the left margin

“WV 1/12/41,” which means to be presented again (Wiedervorlage). And

then you find “presented (vorgelegt) 1/12/41 R.” That appears to have

taken place in the office of the Reich Commissioner and it is a first

draft and therefore it was marked only with the first letter of his

name.

MR. DODD: We do not accept that as being any statement with which we can

prove this at this Trial. I think the matter as to whose initial it is

will be presented later for determination.

THE PRESIDENT: What do the words at the top mean, “The Reich Minister

for the Occupied Eastern Territories”?

MR. DODD: That is the stationery upon which it is written. It is

handwritten on this particular paper because this whole letter was

handwritten on the back of the first letter. These were both found in

this defendant’s office in Berlin.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, now, I’d like to call your attention

to another document, Number 36.

ROSENBERG: I maintain emphatically that that initial “R” was put down by

the person who received the letter, to whom the letter was addressed.

MR. DODD: Well, we’ll get around that. Document Number 36—I ask that

you be shown Document Number 3428, which becomes Exhibit USA-827.

THE PRESIDENT: Give me the number again, will you?

MR. DODD: I am sorry. 3428-PS becomes 827, USA-827.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, this is a letter written from Minsk

in the occupied area on July 31, 1942, and it is written by Kube,

K-u-b-e. He was another one of your subordinates, wasn’t he? Will you

answer that please?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: And it is written to Lohse, the Reich Commissioner for the

Eastern territory, isn’t it?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that’s right.

MR. DODD: Now, then, let’s look at it: “Combating of Partisans and

Action against Jews in the District General of White Ruthenia.” It says:

“In all the clashes with partisans in White Ruthenia it has been

proved that Jewry, in the former Polish part”—and so on—“is

the main exponent of the partisan movement. In consequence, the

treatment of Jewry in White Ruthenia is mainly a matter of

political concern....”

Then, moving down a sentence or two:

“In exhaustive discussions with the SS Brigadeführer Zenner and

the exceedingly capable leader of the SD, SS Obersturmbannführer

Dr. jur. Strauch, it was ascertained that we have liquidated in

the last 10 weeks about 55,000 Jews in White Ruthenia. In the

area of Minsk, Jewry has been completely eliminated, without

endangering the manpower commitment. In the predominantly Polish

district of Lida, 16,000 Jews; in Slonim, 8,000 Jews”—and so

forth—“have been liquidated. Owing to an encroachment by the

Army supply and communications zone already reported to you, the

preparations made by us for liquidation of the Jews in the

Glebokie area, have been disturbed. The Army supply and

communications zone, without contacting me, has liquidated

10,000 Jews, whose systematical elimination had been provided

for by us in any event. In the city of Minsk approximately

10,000 Jews were liquidated on 28 and 29 July, 6,500 of them

Russian Jews, predominantly aged persons, women and children;

the remainder consisting of Jews unfit for commitment to labor,

the greater majority of whom were deported to Minsk in November

of last year from Vienna, Brünn, Bremen, and Berlin, by order of

the Führer.

“The area of Sluzk, too, had been relieved of several thousand

Jews. The same applies to Novogrodek and Vileika. Radical

measures are imminent for Baranowicze and Hanzewitschi. In

Baranowicze alone, approximately 10,000 Jews are still living in

the city itself; of these, 9,000 Jews will be liquidated next

month.”

And it goes on to say:

“In the city of Minsk 2,600 Jews from Germany are left over. In

addition, all 6,000 Russian Jews and Jewesses who during the

action stayed with the units to which they were assigned for

work are still alive. Even in the future Minsk will still retain

its character as the strongest center of the Jewish labor

commitment, necessitated for the present by the concentration of

the armament industries and by the rail problems. In all other

areas, the number of Jews to be drafted for labor commitment

will be limited by the SD and by me to 800 at the most, but if

possible to 500...”

And so on. It tells of other situations with respect to Jews, all of

which I do not think it is necessary to read. But I do want to call your

attention to the last paragraph, the last sentence:

“I fully agree with the Commander of the SD in White Ruthenia,

that we shall liquidate every shipment of Jews which is not

ordered or announced by our superior offices, to prevent further

disturbances in White Ruthenia.”

And up above I did omit one sentence or two that I wanted to read:

“Naturally, after the termination of the economic demands of the

Wehrmacht, the SD and I would like it best definitely to

eliminate Jewry in the District General of White Ruthenia. For

the time being, the necessary demands of the Wehrmacht, which

are the main employers of Jews, are considered.”

I ought to tell you as well that this document was also found in your

office in Berlin. Now, that is a letter...

ROSENBERG: That seems very improbable to me, that it has been found in

my office in Berlin. If so, it can be at most only that the Reich

Commissioner for the Ostland had sent all his files to Berlin, packed in

boxes. It was not in my office at that time, and this letter was also

never presented to me. There is stamped here, “The Reich Commissioner

for the Ostland,” not the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern

Territories. I stated yesterday, however, that a number of such

happenings were reported to me as individual actions in the fighting,

and that I received this one report from Sluzk personally, and Gauleiter

Meyer was immediately charged to protest to Heydrich and to order an

investigation. That presupposes that he, the Gauleiter Meyer, did not

know of and did not think of such a general action on order of a central

command.