this kind of men there is a great dearth. It is very difficult to judge
of character before we have tested it; but we can test it only after
firendship is begun. Thus friendship is prone to outrun judgment, and to
render a fair trial impossible. It is therefore the part of a wise man
to arrest the impulse of kindly feeling, as we check a carriage in its
course, that, as we use only horses that have been tried, so we may
avail ourselves of friendships in which the characters of our friends
have been somehow put to the test. Some readily show how fickle their
friendship is in paltry pecuniary matters; others, whom a slight
consideration of that kind cannot influence, betray themselves when a
large amount is involved. But if some can be found who think it mean to
prefer money to friendship, where shall we come upon those who do not
put honors, civic offices, military commands, places of power and trust,
before friendship, so that when these are offered on the one hand, and
the claims of friendship on the other, they will much rather make choice
of the objects of ambition? For nature is too feeble to despise a
commanding station, and even though it be obtained by the violation of
friendship men think that this fault will be thrown into obscurity,
because it was not without a weighty motive that they held friendship in
abeyance. Thus true friendships are rare among those who are in public
office, and concerned in the affairs of the State. For where will you
find him who prefers a friend's promotion to his own? What more shall I
say? Not to dwell longer on the influence of ambition upon friendship,
how burdensome how difficult does it seem to most men to share
misfortunes to which it is not easy to find those who are willing to
stoop. Although Ennius is right in saying
"In unsure fortune a sure friend is seen,"
yet one of these two things convicts most persons of fickleness and
weakness,--either their despising their friends when they themselves are
prosperous, or deserting their friends in adversity.
18 Him, then, who alike in either event shall have shown himself
unwavering, constant, firm in friendship we ought to regard as of an
exceedingly rare and almost divine order of men.
Still further good faith is essential to the maintenance of the
stability and constancy which we demand in friendship, for nothing that
is unfaithful is stable. It is, moreover, fitting to choose for a friend
one who is frank, affable, accommodating, interested in the same things
with ourselves,--all which qualities come under the head of fidelity,
for a changeful and wily disposition cannot be faithful, nor can he who
has not like interests and a kindred nature with his friend be either
faithful or stable. I ought to add that a friend should neither take
pleasure in finding fault with his friend, nor give credit to the
charges which others may bring against him,--all which is implied in the
constancy of which I have been speaking. Thus we come back to the truth
which I announced at the beginning of our conversation, that friendship
can exist only between the good. It is, indeed, the part of a good
or--what is the same thing--a wise man [Footnote: Wisdom and goodness
were identical with the Stoics.] to adhere to these two principles in
friendship,--first, that he tolerate no feigning or dissembling (for an
ingenuous man will rather show even open hatred than hide his feeling by
his face), and, secondly, that he not only repel charges made against
his friend by others, but that he be not himself suspicious, and always
thinking that his friend has done something unfriendly.
To these requisites there may well be added suavity of speech and
manners, which is of no little worth as giving a relish to the
intercourse of friendship. Rigidness and austerity of demeanor on every
occasion indeed carry weight with them, but friendship ought to be more
gentle and mild, and more inclined to all that is genial and affable.
19 There occurs here a question by no means difficult,[Footnote: Latin,
_subdifficilis_ which I should render _somewhat difficult_ had not
Cicero treat that question as one that presents no difficulty. In the
ancient tongues, as in our own or even more than in our own, a word is
often better defined by its use than in the dictionary.] whether at any
time new friends worthy of our love are to be preferred to the old, as
we are wont to prefer young horses to those that have passed their
prime. Shame that there should be hesitation as to the answer! There
ought to be no satiety of friendships, as there is rightly of many other
things. The older a friendship is, the more precious should it be as is
the case with wines that will bear keeping, [Footnote: Some of the best
Italian wines will not "bear keeping," and it was probably true of more
of them in Cicero's time than now that wines are so often vitiated by
strong alcoholic mixtures in order to preserve them. Cato, in his _De Re
Rustica_, prescribes a method of determining whether the wine of any
given vintage will "keep".] and there is truth in the proverb that many
pecks of salt must be eaten together to bring friendship to perfection.
[Footnote: Aristotle quotes this as a proverbial saying, so that it must
be of very great antiquity.] If new friendships offer the hope of fruit,
like the young shoots in the grain-field that give promise of harvest,
they are not indeed to be spurned, yet the old are to be kept in their
place. There is very great power in long habit. To recur to the horse
there is no one who would not rather use the horse to which he has
become accustomed, if he is still sound, than one unbroken and new. Nor
has habit this power merely as to the movements of an animal, it
prevails no less as to inanimate objects. We are charmed with the places
though mountainous and woody, [Footnote: Therefore uninviting, for
mountain and forest had not in early time the charm which we find in
them. Indeed the love of nature uncultivated and unadorned is for the
most part, of modern growth.] where we have made a long sojourn. But
what is most remarkable in friendship is that it puts a man on an
equality with his inferior. For there often are in a circle of friends
those who excel the rest, as was the case with Scipio in our flock, if I
may use the word. He never assumed superiority over Philus, never over
Rupilius, never over Mummius, never over friends of an order lower than
his own. Indeed he always reverenced as a superior, because older than
himself, his brother Quintus Maximus [Footnote: Quintus Fabius Maximus
Aemilianus, the eldest son of Aemilius Paulus, and the adopted son of
Fabius Maximus.] a thoroughly worthy man, but by no means his equal, and
in fact he wanted to make all his friends of the more consequence by
whatever advantages he himself possessed. This example all ought to
imitate, that if they have attained any superiority of virtue, genius,
fortune, they may impart it to and share it with those with whom they
are the most closely connected; and that if they are of humble
parentage, and have kindred of slender ability or fortune, they may
increase their means of well-being, and reflect honor and worth upon
them,--as in fable those who were long in servile condition through
ignorance of their parentage and race, when they were recognized and
found to be sons either of gods or of kings, retained their love for the
shepherds whom for many years they supposed to be their fathers. Much
more ought the like to be done in the case of real and well-known
fathers; for the best fruit of genius, and virtue, and every kind of
excellence is reaped when it is thus bestowed on near kindred and
friends.
20. Moreover, as among persons bound by ties of friendship and intimacy
those who hold the higher place ought to bring themselves down to the
same plane with their inferiors, so ought these last not to feel
aggrieved because they are surpassed in ability, or fortune, or rank by
their friends. Most of them, however, are always finding some ground of
complaint, or even of reproach, especially if they can plead any service
that they have rendered faithfully, in a friendly way, and with a
certain amount of painstaking on their part. Such men, indeed, are
hateful when they reproach their friends on the score of services which
he on whom they were bestowed ought to bear in mind, but which it is
unbecoming for him who conferred them to recount.
Those who are superior ought, undoubtedly, not only to waive all
pretension in friendly intercourse, but to do what they can to raise
their humbler friends to their own level.(l) There are some who give
their friends trouble by imagining that they are held in low esteem,
which, however, is not apt to be the case except with those who think
meanly of themselves. Those who feel thus ought to be raised to a just
self-esteem, not only by kind words, but by substantial service. But
what you do for any one must be measured, first by your own ability, and
then by the capacity of him whom you would favor and help. For, however
great your influence may be, you cannot raise all your friends to the
highest positions. Thus Scipio could effect the election of Publius
Rupilius to the consulship; but he could not do the same for his brother
Lucius.(2) In general, friendships that are properly so called are
formed between persons of mature years and established character; nor if
young men have been fond of hunting or of ball-playing, is there any
need of permanent attachment to those whom they then liked as associates
in the same sport. On this principle our nurses and the slaves that led
us to school will demand by right of priority the highest grade
[1 Or, as it might be rendered by supplying a _se_ "so ought the humbler
to do what they can to raise themselves." Some of the commentators
prefer this sense; but if Cicero meant _se,_ I think that he would have
written it.]
[2 The brother of Publius Rupilius, not his own brother.]
of affectionate regard,--persons, indeed, who are not to be neglected,
but who are on a somewhat different footing from that of friends.
Friendships formed solely from early associations cannot last; for
differences of character grow out of a diversity of pursuits, and
unlikeness of character dissolves friendships. Nor is there any reason
why good men cannot be the friends of bad men, or bad men of good,
except that the dissiliency of pursuits and of character between them is
as great as it can be.
It is also a counsel worthy of heed, that excessive fondness be not
suffered to interfere, as it does too often, with important services
that a friend can render. To resort again to fable, Neoptolemus could
not have taken Troy [Footnote: Or rather, could not have borne the
indispensable part which it was predicted that he should bear in the
taking of Troy.] if he had chosen to comply with the wishes of Lycomedes,
who brought him up, and who with many tears attempted to dissuade him
from his expedition. Equally in actual life there are not infrequently
important occasions on which the society of friends must be for a time
abandoned; and he who would prevent this because he cannot easily bear
the separation, is of a weak and unmanly nature, and for that very
reason unfit to fill the place of a friend. In fine, in all matters you
should take into consideration both what you may reasonably demand of
your friend, and what you can fitly suffer him to obtain from you.
21. The misfortune involved in the dissolution of friendships is
sometimes unavoidable; for I am now coming down from the intimacies of
wise men to common friendships. Faults of friends often betray
themselves openly--whether to the injury of their friends themselves, or
of strangers--in such a way that the disgrace falls back upon their
friends. Such friendships are to be effaced by the suspension of
intercourse, and, as I have heard Cato say, to be unstitched rather than
cut asunder, unless some quite intolerable offence flames out to full
view, so that it can be neither right nor honorable not to effect an
immediate separation and dissevering. But if there shall have been some
change either in character or in the habits of life, or if there have
sprung up some difference of opinion as to public affairs,--I am
speaking, as I have just said, of common friendships, not of those
between wise men,--care should be taken lest there be the appearance,
not only of friendship dropped, but of enmity taken up; for nothing is
more unbecoming than to wage war with a man with whom you have lived on
terms of intimacy. Scipio, as you know, had withdrawn from the
friendship of Quintus Pompeius [Footnote: Laelius intending to present
himself as a candidate for the consulship, Scipio asked Pompeius whether
he was going to be a candidate, and when he replied in the negative,
asked him to use his influence in behalf of Laelius. This Pompeius
promised, and then, instead of being true to his word, offered himself
for the consulship, and was elected.] on my account, he became alienated
from Metellus [Footnote: Scipio and Metellus, though their intimacy was
suspended for political reasons, held each other in the highest regard,
and no person in Rome expressed profounder sorrow than Metellus for
Scipio's death or was more warm in his praise as a man of unparalleled
ability, worth, and patriotism.] because of their different views as to
the administration of the State. In both cases he conducted himself with
gravity and dignity, and without any feeling of bitterness. The endeavor
then, must first be, to prevent discord from taking place among friends,
and if anything of the kind occurs, to see that the friendship may seem
to be extinguished rather than crushed out. Care must thus be taken lest
friendships lapse into violent enmities, whence are generated quarrels,
slanders, insults, which yet, if not utterly intolerable, are to be
endured and this honor tendered to old friendship that the blame may
rest with him who does not with him who suffers the wrong.
The one surety and preventive against these mistakes and misfortunes is,
not to form attachments too soon, nor for those unworthy of such regard.
But it is those in whose very selves there is reason why they should be
loved, that are worthy of friendship. A rare class of men! Indeed,
superlatively excellent objects of every sort are rare, nor is anything
more difficult than to discover that which is in all respects perfect in
its kind. But most persons have acquired the habit of recognizing
nothing as good in human relations and affairs that does not produce
some revenue, and they most love those friends, as they do those cattle,
that will yield them the greatest gain. Thus they lack that most
beautiful and most natural friendship, which is to be sought in itself
and for its own sake, nor can they know from experience what and how
great is the power of such friendship. One loves himself, not in order
to exact from himself any wages for such love, but because he is in
himself dear to himself. Now, unless this same property be transferred
to friendship, a true friend will never be found, for such a friend is,
as it were, another self. But if it is seen in beasts, birds, fishes,
animals tame and wild, that they first love themselves (for self-love is
born with everything that lives) and that they then require and seek
those of their kind to whom they may attach themselves, and do so with
desire and with a certain semblance of human love, how much more is this
natural in man, who both loves himself, and craves another whose soul he
may so blend with his own as almost to make one out of two.
22 But men in general are so perverse, not to say shameless, as to wish
a friend to be in character what they themselves could not be and they
expect of friends what they do not give them in return. The proper
course however, is for one first to be himself a good man, and then to
seek another like himself. In such persons the stability of friendship,
of which I have been speaking, can be made sure, since, united in mutual
love, they will, in the first place, hold in subjection the desires to
which others are enslaved; then they will find delight in whatever is
equitable and just, and each will take upon himself any labor or burden
in the other's stead, while neither will ever ask of the other aught
that is not honorable and right. Nor will they merely cherish and love,
they will even reverence each other. But he who bereaves friendship of
mutual respect (1) takes from it its greatest ornament. Therefore those
are in fatal error who think that in friendship there is free license
for all lusts and evil practices. Friendship is given by nature, not as
a companion of the vices, but as a helper of the virtues, that, as
solitary virtue might not be able to attain the summit of excellence,
united and associated with another it might reach that eminence. As to
those between whom there is, or has been, or shall be such an alliance,
the fellowship is to be regarded as the best and happiest possible,
inasmuch as it leads to the highest good that nature can bestow. This is
the alliance, I say, in which are included all things that men think
worthy their endeavor,--honor, fame, peace of mind, and pleasure, so
that if these be present life is happy, and cannot be happy without
them. Such a life being the best
[1 Latin, _verecundio,_ an indefinite word; for it may have almost any
good meaning. I have rendered it _respect_, because I have no doubt that
it derives its meaning here from _verebuntur_, which I have rendered
_reverence_, in the preceding sentence.]
and greatest boon, if we wish to make it ours, we must devote ourselves
to the cultivation of virtue, without which we can attain neither
friendship nor anything else desirable. But if virtue be left out of the
account, those who think that they have friends perceive that they are
mistaken when some important crisis compels them to put their friends to
the test. Therefore--for it is worth reiterating--you ought to love
after having exercised your judgment on your friends, instead of forming
your judgment of them after you have begun to love them. But while in
many things we are chargeable with carelessness, we are most so in
choosing and keeping our friends. We reverse the old proverb, [Footnote:
What this proverb may have been we cannot determine with precision from
its opposite; but the caution based upon it might remind one of our
proverb about shutting the barn door after the horse is stolen. The
words, _acta agimus,_ so terse that they can be translated only by a
paraphrase, are probably the converse of the proverb, which may have
been something like _non agenda sunt acta_.] take counsel after acting,
and attempt to do over again what we have done; for after having become
closely connected by long habit and even by mutual services, some
occasion of offence springs up, and we suddenly break in sunder a
friendship in full career.
23. The more blameworthy are they who are so very careless in a matter
of so essential importance. Indeed, among things appertaining to human
life, it is friendship alone that has the unanimous voice of all men as
to its capacity of service. By many even virtue is scorned, and is said
to be a mere matter of display and ostentation. Many despise wealth, and
contented with little take pleasure in slender diet and inexpensive
living. Though some are inflamed with desire for office, many there are
who hold it in so low esteem that they can imagine nothing more inane or
worthless. Other things too, which seem to some admirable, very many
regard as of no value. But all have the same feeling as to
friendship,--alike those who devote themselves to the public service,
those who take delight in learning and philosophy, those who manage their
own affairs in a quiet way, and, lastly, those who are wholly given up to
sensual pleasure. They all agree that without friendship life cannot be,
if one only means to live in some form or measure respectably. [Footnote:
Latin _liberaliter_ that is, worthily of a free man.] For friendship
somehow twines through all lives and leaves no mode of being without its
presence. Even if one be of so rude and savage a nature as to shun and
hate the society of men, as we have learned was the case with that Timon
of Athens, [Footnote: Plutarch says that Timon had an associate,
virtually a friend, not unlike himself, Apemantus, on whom he freely
vented his spite and scorn for all the world beside and that he also
took a special liking to Alcibiades in his youth, perhaps as to one
fitted and destined to do an untold amount of mischief.] if there ever
was such a man [Footnote: Latin, _nescio, quem_, I know not whom, or of
whom I am ignorant, that is, there may or may not have been such a man.]
he yet cannot help seeking some one in whose presence he may vomit the
venom of his bitterness. The need of friendship would be best shown,
were such a thing possible, if some god should take us away from this
human crowd, and place us anywhere in solitude, giving us there an
abundant supply of all things that nature craves but depriving us
utterly of the sight of a human countenance. Who could be found of so
iron make that he could endure [Footnote: Latin, tam ... _ferreus,_ qiu
... _ferre_ posset,--an assonance which cannot be represented by
corresponding English words.] such a life, and whom solitude would not
render incapable of enjoying any kind of pleasure? That is true then
which, if I remember aright, our elders used to say that they had heard
from their seniors in age as having come from Archytas of Tarentum--"If
one had ascended to heaven and had obtained a full view of the nature of
the universe and the beauty of the stars, yet his admiration would be
without delight, if there were no one to whom he could tell what he had
seen." Thus Nature has no love for solitude, and always leans as it were,
on some support, and the sweetest support is found in the most intimate
friendship.
24 But while Nature declares by so many tokens what she desires, craves,
needs, we--I know not how--grow deaf, and fail to hear her counsel.
Intercourse among friends assumes many different forms and modes, and
there frequently arise causes of suspicion and offence, which it is the
part of a wise man sometimes to avoid, sometimes to remove, sometimes to
bear. One ground of offence, namely, freedom in telling the truth, must
be put entirely away, in order that friendship may retain its
serviceableness and its good faith, for friends often need to be
admonished and reproved, and such offices, when kindly performed, ought
to be received in a friendly way. Yet somehow we witness in actual life,
what my friend [Footnote: Terence with whom Laelius was so intimate that
he was reported probably on no sufficient ground to have aided in the
composition of some of the plays that bear Terence's name. This verse is
from the _Andria._] says in his play of _Andria_--
"Complacency *[Footnote: _Obsequium_] wins friends, but truth gives
birth to hatred."
Truth is offensive, if hatred, the bane of friendship is indeed born of
it, but much more offensive is complacency, when in its indulgence for
wrong doing it suffers a friend to go headlong to ruin. The greatest
blame, however, rests on him who both spurns the truth when it is told
him and is driven by the complacency of friends to self-deception. In
this matter therefore there should be the utmost discretion and care,
first, that admonition be without bitterness, then, that reproof be
without invective. But in complacency--for I am ready to use the word
which Terence furnishes--let pleasing truth be told, let flattery, the
handmaid of the vices be put far away, as unworthy, not only of a
friend, but of any man above the condition of a slave, for there is one
way of living with a tyrant, another with a friend. We may well despair
of saving him whose ears are so closed to the truth that he cannot hear
what is true from a friend. Among the many pithy sayings of Cato was
this 'There are some who owe more to their bitter enemies than to the
friends that seem sweet, for those often tell the truth, these never'.
It is indeed ridiculous for those who are admonished not to be annoyed
by what ought to trouble them, and to be annoyed by what ought to give
them no offence. Their faults give them no pain, they take it hard that
they are reproved,--while they ought, on the contrary, to be grieved for
their wrong-doing, to rejoice in their correction.