of a friend what is wrong, nor do what is wrong at a friend's request.
The plea that it was for a friend's sake is a base apology,--one that
should never be admitted with regard to other forms of guilt, and
certainly not as to crimes against the State. We, indeed, Fannius and
Scaevola, are so situated that we ought to look far in advance for the
perils that our country may incur. Already has our public policy
deviated somewhat from the method and course of our ancestors. Tiberius
Gracchus attempted to exercise supreme power; nay, he really reigned for
a few months. What like this had the Roman people ever heard or seen
before? What, after his death, the friends and kindred who followed him
did in their revenge on Publius Scipio [Footnote: Publius Cornelius
Scipio Nasica, who took the lead of the Senate in the assassination of
Tiberius Gracchus, and incurred such popular odium that he could not
safely stay in Rome. He was sent on a fictitious mission to Asia to get
him out of the way of the people, and not daring to return, wandered
with no settled habitation till his death at Pergamum not long before
the assumed date of this dialogue.] I cannot say without tears. We put
up with Carbo [Footnote: Carbo succeeded Tiberius Gracchus on the
commission for carrying the agrarian law into execution, and was shortly
afterward chosen Tribune. He then proposed a law, permitting a tribune
to be re-elected for an indefinite number of years. This law was
vehemently opposed by Scipio Africanus the Younger, and if he was really
killed by Carbo, it was probably on account of his hostility to Carbo's
ambitious schemes.] as well as we could in consideration of the recent
punishment of Tiberius Gracchus; but I am in no mood to predict what is
to be expected from the tribuneship of Caius Gracchus. Meanwhile the
evil is creeping upon us, from its very beginning fraught with threats
of ruin. Before recent events, [Footnote: The reference undoubtedly here
is to the Papirian law which had just been passed before the assumed
date of this dialogue, having been proposed and carried through by
(Caius _Papirius_) Carbo. By this law the use of the ballot was
established in all matters of popular legislation.] you perceive how
much degeneracy was indicated in the legalization of the ballot, first
by Gabinian, [Footnote: By which magistrates were to be chosen by
ballot.] then two years later by the Cassian law. [Footnote: By which
the judges were to be chosen by ballot. With reference to the use of the
ballot the parties in Rome were prototypes of like parties in England.
The voice of the people was for the ballot, on the ground that it made
suffrage free, as it could not be when employers or patrons could
dictate to their dependents and make them suffer for failure to vote in
favor of their own candidates or measures. The aristocratic party
opposed the ballot as fatal to their controlling influence, which many
sincere patriots, like Cicero, regarded as essential to the public
safety, while patrician demagogues, intriguers, and office-seekers made
it subservient to their own selfish or partisan interests.] I seem
already to see the people utterly alienated from the Senate, and the
most important affairs determined by the will of the multitude; for more
persons will learn how these things are brought about than how they may
be resisted. To what purpose am I saying this? Because no one makes such
attempts without associates. It is therefore to be enjoined on good men
that they must not think themselves so bound that they cannot renounce
their friends when they are guilty of crimes against the State. But
punishment must be inflicted on all who are implicated in such guilt,--on
those who follow, no less than on those who lead. Who in Greece was
more renowned than Themistocles? Who had greater influence than he had?
When as commander in the Persian war he had freed Greece from bondage,
and for envy of his fame was driven into exile, he did not bear as he
ought the ill treatment of his ungrateful country. He did what
Coriolanus had done with us twenty years before. Neither of these men
found any helper against his country; [Footnote: No one of his own
fellow-countrymen.] they therefore both committed suicide. [Footnote: If
the story of Coriolanus be not a myth, as Niebuhr supposes it to be, his
suicide forms no part of the story as Livy tells it. The suicide of
Themistocles is related as a supposition, not as an established fact. If
he died of poison, as was said, it may have been administered by a rival
in the favor of Artaxerxes.] Association with depraved men for such an
end is not, then, to be shielded by the plea of friendship, but rather
to be avenged by punishment of the utmost severity, so that no one may
ever think himself authorized to follow a friend to the extent of making
war upon his country,--an extremity which, indeed, considering the
course that our public affairs have begun to take, may, for aught I
know, be reached at some future time. I speak thus because I feel no
less concern for the fortunes of the State after my death than as to its
present condition.
13. Let this, then, be enacted as the first law of friendship, that we
demand of friends only what is right, and that we do for the sake of
friends only what is right. [Footnote: This is a virtual repetition of
the law of friendship announced at the beginning of the previous
section, and Cicero probably so intended it. He states the rule, then
demonstrates its validity, then repeats it in an almost identical form,
implying what the mathematician expresses when he puts at the end of a
demonstration _Quod èrat demonstrandum._] This understood, let us not
wait to be asked. Let there be constant assiduity and no loitering in a
friend's service. Let us also dare to give advice freely; for in
friendship the authority of friends who give good counsel may be of the
greatest value. Let admonition be administered, too, not only in plain
terms, but even with severity, if need be, and let heed be given to such
admonition. On this subject some things that appear to me strange have,
as I am told, been maintained by certain Greeks who are accounted as
philosophers, and are so skilled in sophistry that there is nothing
which they cannot seem to prove. Some of them hold that very intimate
friendships are to be avoided; that there is no need that one feel
solicitude for others; that it is enough and more than enough to take
care of your own concerns, and annoying to be involved to any
considerable extent in affairs not belonging to you; that the best way
is to have the reins of friendship as loose as possible, so that you can
tighten them or let them go at pleasure; for, according to them, ease is
the chief essential to happy living, and this the mind cannot enjoy, if
it bears, as it were, the pains of travail in behalf of a larger or
smaller circle of friends. [Footnote: This passage seems to be a
paraphrase of a passage in the _Hippolytus_ of Euripides, in which the
Nurse says: "It behooves mortals to form moderate friendships with one
another, and not to the very marrow of the soul, and the affections of
the mind should be held loosely, so that we may slacken or tighten them.
That one soul should be in travail for two is a heavy burden." Euripides
was regarded, and rightly, as no less a philosopher than a tragedian,
and was not infrequently styled [Greek: sophos]. Cicero here veils his
thorough conversance with Greek literature and philosophy, and assumes
the part of Laelius, in whose time, though Greek was not omitted in the
education of cultivated men, the study was comparatively new, and was
not carried to any great extent.]
Others, [Footnote: The Epicureans.] I am told, with even much less of
true human feeling, teach what I touched upon briefly a little while
ago, that friendships are to be sought for defence and help, not on
account of good-will and affection. The less of self-confidence and the
less of strength one has, the more is he inclined to make friends. Thus
it is that women [Footnote: Latin, _mulierculae_, a diminutive, meaning,
however, not _little women_, but denoting the feebleness and dependence
of women in comparison with men. It must be confessed, too, that the
term is sometimes used, and perhaps here, semi-contemptuously; for the
Roman man felt an overweening pride in mere manhood.] seek the support
of friendship more than men do, the poor more than the rich, the
unfortunate more than those who seem happy. Oh, pre-eminent wisdom! It
is like taking the sun out of the world, to bereave human life of
friendship, than which the immortal gods have given man nothing better,
nothing more gladdening. What is the ease of which they speak? It is
indeed pleasing in aspect, but on many occasions it is to be renounced;
for it is not fitting, in order to avoid solicitude, either to refuse to
undertake any right cause or act, or to drop it after it is undertaken.
If we flee from care, we must flee from virtue, which of necessity with
no little care spurns and abhors its opposites, as goodness spurns and
abhors wickedness; temperance, excess; courage, cowardice. Thus you may
see that honest men are excessively grieved by the dishonest, the brave
by the pusillanimous, those who lead sober lives by the dissolute. It is
indeed characteristic of a well-ordered mind to rejoice in what is good
and to be grieved by the opposite. If then, pain of mind fall to the lot
of a wise man as it must of necessity unless we imagine his mind
divested of its humanity, why should we take friendship wholly out of
life, lest we experience some little trouble on account of it? Yet more,
if emotion be eliminated, what difference is there, I say not between a
man and a brute, but between a man and a rock, or the trunk of a tree,
or any inanimate object? Nor are those to be listened to, who regard
virtue as something hard and iron-like. [Footnote: Here, undoubtedly,
Cicero refers to the sterner type of Stoicism, which in his time was
already obsolescent, and was yielding place to the milder, while no less
rigid, ethics of which the _De Officiis_ may be regarded as the manual.]
As in many other matters, so in friendship, it is tender and flexible so
that it expands, as it were, with a friend's well being, and shrinks
when his peace is disturbed. Therefore the pain which must often be
incurred on a friend's account is not of sufficient moment to banish
friendship from human life, any more than the occasional care and
trouble which the virtues bring should be a reason for renouncing them.
14. Since virtue attracts friendship, as I have said, if there shines
forth any manifestation of virtue with which a mind similarly disposed
can come into contact and union from such intercourse love must of
necessity spring. For what is so absurd as to be charmed with many
things that have no substantial worth, as with office, fame,
architecture, dress, and genteel appearance, but not to be in any wise
charmed by a mind endowed with virtue, and capable of either loving
or--if I may use the word--re-loving? [Footnote: Latin, _redamare_, a word
coined by Cicero, and used with the apology, _ut ita dicam_] Nothing
indeed yields a richer revenue than kind affections, nothing gives more
delight than the interchange of friendly cares and offices. Then if we
add, as we rightly may, that there is nothing which so allures and
attracts aught else to itself as the likeness of character does to
friendship it will certainly be admitted that good men love good men and
adopt them into fellowship as if united with them by kindred and by
nature. By nature I say, for nothing is more craving or greedy of its
like than nature. This, then as I think, is evident, Fannius and
Scaevola that among the good toward the good there cannot but be mutual
kind feeling and in this we have a fountain of friendship established by
nature.
But the same kind feeling extends to the community at large. For virtue
is not unsympathetic, nor unserviceable, [Footnote: Latin, _immunis_,
literally--without office.] nor proud. It is wont even to watch over the
well-being of whole nations, and to give them the wisest counsel, which
it would not do if it had no love for the people.
Now those who maintain that friendships are formed from motives of
utility annul, as it seems to me, the most endearing bond of friendship;
for it is not so much benefit obtained through a friend as it is the
very love of the friend that gives delight. What comes from a friend
confers pleasure, only in case it bears tokens of his interest in us,
and so far is it from the truth that friendships are cultivated from a
sense of need, that those fully endowed with wealth and resources,
especially with virtue, which is the surest safeguard, and thus in no
need of friends, are the very persons who are the most generous and
munificent. Indeed, I hardly know whether it may not be desirable that
our friends should never have need of our services. Yet in the case of
Scipio and myself, what room would there have been for the active
exercise of my zeal in his behalf, had he never needed my counsel or
help at home or in the field? In this instance, however, the service
came after the friendship, not the friendship after the service.
15. If these things are so, men who are given up to pleasure are not to
be listened to when they express their opinions about friendship, of
which they can have no knowledge either by experience or by reflection.
For, by the faith of gods and men, who is there that would be willing to
have a superabundance of all objects of desire and to live in the utmost
fulness of wealth and what wealth can bring, on condition of neither
loving any one nor being loved by any one? This, indeed, is the life of
tyrants, in which there is no good faith, no affection, no fixed
confidence in kindly feeling, perpetual suspicion and anxiety, and no
room for friendship; for who can love either him whom he fears, or him
by whom he thinks that he is feared? Yet they receive the show of
homage, but only while the occasion for it lasts. [Footnote: Latin, _dum
taxat ad tempus_, that is, while the homage rendered is in close contact
with the occasion,--with the immunity or profit to be purchased by it.]
If they chance to fall, as they commonly have fallen, they then
ascertain how destitute of friends they have been, as Tarquin is
reported to have said that he learned what faithful and what unfaithful
friends he had, when he could no longer render back favors to those of
either class,--although I wonder whether pride and insolence like his
could have had any friends. Moreover, as his character could not have
won real friends, so is the good fortune of many who occupy foremost
places of influence so held as to preclude faithful friendships. Not
only is Fortune blind, but she generally makes those blind whom she
embraces. Thus they are almost always beside themselves under the
influence of haughtiness and waywardness; nor can there be created
anything more utterly insupportable than a fortune-favored fool. There
are to be seen those who previously behaved with propriety who are
changed by station, power, or prosperity, and who spurn their old
friendships and lavish indulgence on the new. But what is more foolish
than when men have resources, means, wealth at their fullest command,
and can obtain horses, servants, splendid raiment, costly vases,
whatever money can buy, for them not to procure friends, who are, if I
may so speak, the best and the most beautiful furniture of human life?
Other things which a man may procure know not him who procures them, nor
do they labor for his sake,--indeed, they belong to him who can make
them his by the right of superior strength. But every one has his own
firm and sure possession of his friendships, while even if those things
which seem the gifts of fortune remain, still life unadorned and
deserted by friends cannot be happy. But enough has been said on this
branch of our subject.
16. We must now determine the limits or bounds of friendship. On this
subject I find three opinions proposed, neither of which has my
approval,--the first, that we should do for our friends just what we
would do for ourselves, the second, that our good offices to our friends
should correspond in quantity and quality to those which they perform
for us, the third, that one's friends should value him according to his
own self-estimate. I cannot give unqualified assent to either of these
opinions. The first--that one should be ready to do for his friends
precisely what he would do for himself--is inadmissible. How many things
there are that we do for our friends which we should never do on our own
account!--such as making a request even an entreaty, of a man unworthy
of respect or inveighing against some person with a degree of
bitterness, nay, in terms of vehement reproach. In fine, we are
perfectly right in doing in behalf of a friend things that in our own
case would be decidedly unbecoming. There are also many ways in which
good men detract largely from their own comfort or suffer it to be
impaired, that a friend may have the enjoyment which they sacrifice. The
second opinion is that which limits kind offices and good will by the
rule of equality. This is simply making friendship a matter of
calculation with the view of keeping a debtor and creditor account
evenly balanced. To me friendship seems more affluent and generous and
not disposed to keep strict watch lest it may give more than it receives
and to fear that a part of its due may be spilled over or suffered to
leak out or that it may heap up its own measure over full in return.
[Footnote: We have here, first, a figure drawn from pecuniary accounts,
then one from liquid measure, then one from dry measure--all designed to
affix the brand of the most petty meanness on the (so called) friendship
which makes it a point neither to leave nor to brook a preponderance of
obligation on either side.] But worst of all is the third limit which
prescribes that friends shall take a man's opinion of himself as a
measure for their estimate and treatment of him. There are some persons
who are liable to fits of depression, or who have little hope of better
fortune than the present. In such a case, it is the part of a friend,
not to hold the position toward his friend which he holds toward
himself, but to make the efficient endeavor to rouse him from his
despondency, and to lead him to better hope and a more cheerful train of
thought. It remains for me then, to establish another limit of
friendship. But first let me tell you what Scipio was wont to speak of
with the severest censure. He maintained that no utterance could have
been invented more inimical to friendship [Footnote: Latin, _inimciorem_
(that is, _in amiciorem_) _amicitiae_.] than that of him who said that
one ought to love as if he were going at some future time to hate, nor
could he be brought to believe that this maxim came, as was reported
from Bias, who was one of the seven wise men, but he regarded it as
having proceeded from some sordid person, who was either inordinately
ambitious or desirous of bringing everything under his own control. For
how can one be a friend to him to whom he thinks that he may possibly
become an enemy? In this case one would of necessity desire and choose
that his friend should commit offences very frequently, so as to give
him, so to speak, the more numerous handles for fault-finding, and on
the other hand one would be vexed, pained, aggrieved by all the right
and fitting things that friends do. This precept then from whomsoever it
came, amounts to the annulling of friendship. The proper rule should be,
that we exercise so much caution in forming friendships, that we should
never begin to love a friend whom it is possible that we should ever
hate; but even in case we should have been unfortunate in our choice,
Scipio thought that it would be wiser to bear the disappointment when it
comes than to keep the contingency of future alienation in view.
17. I would then define the terms of friendship by saying that where
friends are of blameless character, there may fittingly be between them
a community of all interests, plans, and purposes without any exception
even so far that, if perchance there be occasion for furthering the not
entirely right wishes of friends when life or reputation is at stake,
one may in their behalf deviate somewhat from a perfectly straight
course (1) yet not so far as to
[1 This at first sight appears like a license to yield up moral
considerations to friendship, though the qualification, in the sequel,
"not so far as to incur absolute dishonor," and "virtue is by no means
to be sacrificed," seem saving clauses. But Cicero certainly has a
right to be his own interpreter since in the _De Officiis_ as I think,
he explains in full and in accordance with the highest moral principle,
what he means here, and we have a double right to insist on this
interpretation first, because the _De Officiis_ was written so very
little while after the _De Amicitia_, and both at so ripe an age, that a
change of opinion on important matters was improbable and secondly,
because in the later treatise he expressly refers to the former as
giving in full his views on friendship, and thus virtually sanctions
that treatise. Now in the _De Officiis_ he says A good man will do
nothing against the State, or in violation of his oath of good faith,
for the sake of his friend, not even if he were a judge in his friend's
case. . . . He will yield so far to friendship as to wish his friend's
case to be worthy of succeeding, and to accommodate him as to the time
of trial, within legal limits. But inasmuch as he must give sentence
upon his oath, he will bear it in mind that he has "God for a witness."
In another passage of the _De Officiis,_ Cicero asserts, somewhat
hesitatingly, yet on the authority of Panaetius as the strictest of
Stoics, the moral rightfulness of "defending on some occasions a guilty
man, if he be not utterly depraved and false to all human relations." As
in the passage on which I am commenting special reference is made to the
peril of life or reputation, what Cicero contends for, as it seems to
me, is the right of defending a guilty friend as advocate, or of
favoring him as to time and mode of trial as a judge. Aulius Gellius, in
connection with this passage in _De Amicitia,_ tells the following story
of Chilo, who was on some of the lists of the seven wise men. Chilo, on
the last day of his life, said that the only thing that gave him uneasy
thought, and was burdensome to his conscience, was that once when he and
two other men were judges in a case in which a friend of his was tried
for a capital crime, he, in accordance with his own conviction, voted
his friendy guilty, but so influenced the minds of his two associates
that they gave their voice for his acquittal.]
incur absolute dishonor. There is a point up to which a concession made
to friendship is venial. But we are not bound to be careless of our own
reputation, nor ought we to regard the esteem of our fellow-citizens as
an instrument of such affairs as devolve upon us,--an esteem which it is
base to conciliate [Footnote: Latin, _colligere,_ to collect, or gather
up, one by one, the good-will of each individual citizen.] by flattery
and fawning. Virtue, which has the sincere regard of the people as its
consequence, is by no means to be sacrificed to friendship.
But, to return to Scipio, who was all the time talking about friendship,
he often complained that men exercised greater care about all other
matters; that one could always tell how many goats and sheep he had, but
could not tell how many friends he had; and that men were careful in
selecting their beasts, but were negligent in the choice of friends, and
had nothing like marks and tokens [Footnote: Latin, _signa et notas,_
the marks and tokens by which the quality and worth of goats and sheep
were estimated.] by which to determine the fitness of friends.